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Trade liberalization has become most relevant for the development of Latin American and 
Caribbean economies. Global trade policy and intraregional trade agreements raise issues that contain 
many common features. The 1991 Enterprise for the Americas Initiative not only called for a detailed 
analysis—especially from the Latin American and Caribbean perspective—but it also acted as a catalyst 
for revisiting the topic of preferential trade agreements.
It was natural for die Inter-American Development Bank and the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean to combine their resources to promote analysis and debate of the multiple 
implications of hemispheric trade liberalization. The two organizations have collaborated frequently to 
deal with major development issues. Each brought to this new association its unique assets to generate 
a set of issues papers and to provide venues where the issues could be aired and ideas discussed.
Both institutions are committed to the concept of trade liberalization, but they recognize that 
there is ample scope for debate regarding the content, sequence, and extent of liberalization. In selecting 
the consultants for the project, care was taken to offer many points of view from distinct perspectives. 
The purpose of the project was not to defend a particular point of view but to establish the parameters 
of the debate and help clarify the issues.
Several hundred officials and other leaders of Western Hemisphere nations were involved in the 
discussions. We are convinced that the debate is not over, but is only now beginning.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
ECLAC
This volume is the product of a joint project of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in “Support 
of the Process of Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere.”
When the IDB-ECLAC project was launched in 1991, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative 
(EAI) of the Bush Administration was one year old. The initiative envisioned a process of trade 
liberalization that would lead to a free trade area in the Western Hemisphere, built around the principle 
of reciprocal, rather than unilateral, trade concessions. The EAI proposed what amounted to a new form 
of integration between developed and developing countries through a partnership built around equivalent 
concessions.
The proposal aroused great enthusiasm, but it also raised many questions about its content, 
scope, and implementation. The IDB-ECLAC project was designed to promote a dialog on the process 
of trade liberalization in the Western Hemisphere, with the hope of shedding light on the options opened 
by such a process.
The project produced seventy papers, most by trade experts. The papers were discussed in 
seven colloquia and two conferences between January 1992 and December 1993 at the University of 
Toronto, Canada, the Federation of Industries of the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil, and at the IDB and 
ECLAC headquarters in Washington, D.C., and Santiago, Chile. More than 400 participants from the 
public and private sectors, research and academic institutions, international organizations, and 
nongovernmental organizations from throughout the Americas, Europe, and Japan came together to 
exchange views on the prospects for trade liberalization in the Western Hemisphere.
Over the course of the project, the participants addressed numerous conceptual, methodological, 
and practical topics related to hemispheric trade liberalization. Of great interest was its compatibility with 
the ongoing Uruguay Round negotiations and how liberalization would affect the global trading system; 
or the conditions for its success, particularly the methods and sequencing of alternative negotiations; the 
negotiating agenda and sequence for the participation of individual countries or groups of countries.
Most discussions, however, centered on three basic issues: What might a country hope to 
achieve from participating in the process of hemispheric trade liberalization? What conditions are 
essential in order to maximize potential gains? And, How best to go about liberalizing trade in the 
Hemisphere?
Potential Gains
In theory, unilateral trade liberalization can make it possible for a country to attain the maximum 
income. However, without universal liberalization, unilateralism is not as powerful, even though it is 
beneficial in aggregate terms. In a world of trade restrictions, a free trade agreement can open markets, 
a gain that is not necessarily available via unilateral trade liberalization. When trading groups are 
strengthening themselves and nontariff restrictions are rising, reciprocal opening, or the commitment to 
keep markets open, can be an advantage of a circumscribed free trade agreement.
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A commitment to establish a free trade area can also bolster the credibility of sustaining 
economic policies and solidifying past reforms. This is the so-called locking-in effect, and it offers more 
than the conventional efficiency gains associated with unilateral liberalization. It is also plausible that 
these gains may not be substantial. This is particularly true for some Latin American and Caribbean 
countries that have already undertaken unilateral trade liberalization as part of a deliberate—and often 
painful—strategy of relying on the market, privatizing state enterprises, and improving macroeconomic 
performance.
Inclusion in a continental free trade agreement is a far better option than exclusion. The costs 
of exclusion are likely to encompass the diversion of trade and investments as well as lost opportunities 
for growth through economic cooperation in a broad range of issues. This is more obvious for smaller 
economies that have relatively lower potential to benefit from economies of scale. At a time when 
regionalism is growing and free trade faces new challenges, it makes sense to undertake simultaneously 
the creation of a free-trade area and unilateral trade liberalization.
W h a t  Kind of Trade Liberalization?
The formation of trading blocs can help or hinder global trade liberalization. Some fear that a 
free trade agreement could create a form of prisoners’ dilemma, whereby rational actions at the regional 
level produce a negative global outcome. Preferential schemes, it is argued, violate the spirit of 
multilateralism, breed defensiveness, and can become insular trading blocs.
A move toward liberalization is said to be GATT-compatible if it does not violate provisions of 
the GATT, especially Article XXIV, and GATT-plus if it moves further toward liberalization than 
required by the GATT.
There is, however, a growing consensus that the multilateral system does not represent a unique 
track toward freer trade. Circumscribed, as opposed to global, trade liberalization can be trade-creating, 
GATT-compatible or, better still, GATT-plus. Regional trade liberalization should not be a threat to 
multilateralism. Rather, regional agreements may break down barriers on a limited regional scale, and 
this can create precedents and generate competitive forces that help propel broader liberalization efforts.
ECLAC advocates an “open regionalism” that results from the interdependence of special, 
preferential agreements and market signals produced by trade liberalization. What open regionalism seeks 
to accomplish is to make explicit integration policies compatible with, and complementary to, 
multilateralism.1
Whether regional arrangements in general are positive or negative for the global trading system 
will likely remain a matter of dispute. Widespread certainty exists, however, that complete free trade 
in the world is the best outcome and, consequently, trade agreements that complement multilateralism are 
better than those that do not. The question that must be answered is, What kinds of circumscribed trade 
agreements are GATT-plus and therefore more likely to generate increased gains?
1. ECLAC, 1994, Open Regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean: Economic Integration As a 
Contribution to Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity. [LC/L.808(CEG.19/3)] Santiago, Chile.
Introduction
First, it is essential that the regional trade agreement be based on a partnership and built on the 
principle of reciprocal concessions. As such, it will demand commitments and obligations over a broad 
range of issues. For instance, if the recently approved North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
is taken as a guide, countries interested in undertaking regional trade negotiations should be prepared to 
address both traditional obstacles such as tariffs and quotas and new issues such as investment, intellectual 
property rights, government procurement, and rules to deal with unfair trade practices. The environment 
and labor, as well as governability or the rule of law, can also be part of the expanded agenda.
An innovative regional agreement has the potential of providing precedents in areas not yet 
covered by global trading rules. More important, the inclusion of issues that are part of the political 
agenda of modern open economies can be viewed as an opportunity to continue along the path of 
economic modernization. To the extent that changes in domestic policies are beneficial, modernizing 
countries will be able to sustain their commitments in these areas by forming strategic alliances with 
analogous groups from their trading partners.
Other essential characteristics of a GATT-plus trade agreement are equal treatment to new 
members, clear terms o f accession, and precise rules. A regional trading agreement that does not offer 
new membership on terms equal to those of existing members can generate instability in foreign 
investment flows and perhaps cause trade and investment diversion.
When countries of different sizes and degrees of development are called to operate on reciprocal, 
rather than unilateral, terms and concessions, the principle of equality among members and of open access 
to new members means that there is equality of opportunity for all countries to reap the potential benefits 
of economic integration. Smaller or relatively less-developed newcomers may require lengthier phase-in 
terms instead of die special, nonreciprocal treatment they once demanded. Present circumstances indicate 
that demands for such special, nonreciprocal treatment may hinder the possibilities of concluding regional 
integration agreements.
Members that are less able to take advantage of the broadened market could explore the 
possibility of moving gradually, but progressively, in their commitment to the process of reduction of 
obstacles and easing, to some extent, the costs of adjustment. Lengthier terms and conditions may 
facilitate the emergence of genuine partnerships between members of different sizes and levels of 
development.
It is essential that terms of accession be clearly spelled out for the benefit of potential members. 
Stable and transparent terms of accession will help those interested in engaging negotiations. Beyond 
accession, it is also desirable that a regional free trade agreement be governed by rules that are 
transparent, precise, and clearly spelled out. This is especially important in areas such as dispute 
settlement mechanisms, safeguards, and rules of origin. For example, different types of dispute 
settlement procedures and their implementation in various regional trading arrangements should be 
observed carefully. Experience reveals that a carefully constructed and effective dispute settlement 
mechanism can help equalize differences in relative economic weight. This is true even for agreements 
that do not attain the most advanced supranational legal regimes that govern trade and other economic 
relations among the member countries of the European Union (EU).
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A free trade agreement aimed at reducing friction among its members should have an effective 
dispute settlement procedure at its core. Disputes could arise from use of unilateral remedies, which are 
often part of national legislation and therefore are not affected directly by an international agreement.
Clear rules on safeguards are also necessary. Safeguards provide both the means to minimize 
adjustment costs and political flexibility for decision makers. Without an agreement on safeguards, 
negotiators of a free trade agreement will be limited in what they can accomplish.
Finally, poorly negotiated and obscure rules of origin can limit the gains to members of a free 
trade agreement, especially for smaller countries. It is essential to avoid rules of origin that are 
restrictive and rigid. One of the best ways to overcome some of the problems generated by overly 
restrictive rules of origin is to reduce their importance by reducing barriers to trade from sources outside 
the free trade area.
How to Proceed
Over the course of the Project the questions of how to move toward a future hemispheric free 
trade area and what to do at the present received much attention. The current stage of transition, 
although still somewhat ambiguous, offers countries the opportunity to prepare for mutually beneficial 
negotiations in the future.
Central to the discussion about how to proceed is whether “widening” or “deepening” existing 
subregional integration schemes should come first. Whatever path is taken, hemispheric negotiations will 
test the cohesion of the subregional integration schemes. Tensions and strains are already present, since 
the mere possibility of undertaking negotiations has exacerbated some of the differences, particularly 
because of uneven speeds of unilateral trade liberalization.
Some believe that priority should be given to strengthening subregional arrangements to make 
them the building blocks of hemispheric free trade. However, even if the deepening of subregional 
integration arrangements becomes a primary vehicle for hemispheric trade liberalization, laggards could 
slow the process. An alternative, more viable strategy could be simultaneously to deepen subregional 
groupings and proceed to liberalize trade in the hemisphere. The two processes could become mutually 
supportive.
Furthermore, different countries or subregions find themselves at different levels of readiness 
to move forward. This readiness level, based on the consolidation of macroeconomic stability and the 
market orientation of policies, could influence a country’s ability to reap the benefits of hemispheric trade 
liberalization.
There appears to be a degree of consensus in Chile, for example, that the country is ready to 
reap a net welfare gain by increasing and diversifying its exports. No similar consensus yet exists, 
however, in the case of Brazil. Doubt remains as to whether hemispheric trade liberalization would best 
serve the country’s interests.
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Even if Brazil were, after Mexico, the country that stands to benefit the most from liberalization, 
skeptics point out that it would face significant trade diversion, given Brazil’s high level of import and 
export diversification. The potential for retaliation by the European Community, Brazil’s largest trading 
partner, as well as an unstable macroeconomic situation, have been obstacles to closer hemispheric trade 
relations.
In contrast, others argue that the major advantage for Brazil (and for the rest of Latin America) 
of joining a hemispheric free trade agreement is to end the marginalization and isolation they have 
experienced. The major danger is described as being excluded from emerging blocs, and hemispheric 
liberalization is perceived as offering the best, if not the only, opportunity available to eliminate that 
danger.
Some tasks could be carried out during the present stage of transition despite individual variations 
in level of readiness: for example, consolidation of domestic reforms and adding to mutual knowledge.
Trade liberalization by itself would not become the “driver” of the development process and, 
while it is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient. However, if free trade is combined with other 
appropriate domestic policy measures, synergism is possible and the benefits can be significant. 
Consolidation of domestic economic reforms is seen as the principal task; a country’s own policies are 
at least as important as a trade agreement for the improvement of its efficiency and insertion into the 
international economy.2
A second major task consists of increasing the mutual knowledge that is required by beneficial 
negotiations. Countries require access to information germane to commercial integration to proceed with 
any kind of hemispheric liberalization. Mutual knowledge implies increased awareness of the negotiating 
processes, some of which are fully open and subject to intense debate and pressures from a wide array 
of interests.
Besides increased mutual awareness and identification of possible sources of opposition, it is 
necessary for negotiators to understand fully the sources of the skepticism that still exist about 
hemispheric trade liberalization. Some of these arguments were on full display during the debate that 
took place before the approval of NAFTA. From these debates it was clear that hemispheric trade 
liberalization is far from being a free lunch, and it is far from being a panacea.
Finally, hemispheric trade liberalization demands caution. It is a journey into unknown territory, 
and costs and benefits cannot be accurately assessed in advance. However, it demands serious attention 
as well since it clearly supports the broad objectives of development.
2. ECLAC, 1994. Latin America and the Caribbean: Policies to Improve Linkages with the Global Economy. 
[LC/G. 1800 (SES.25/3)] Santiago, Chile.
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Overview of the Book
This volume contains some of the papers commissioned by the IDB-ECLAC Project. The papers 
are grouped into four sections, and they offer a wide range of perspectives on conceptual as well as 
practical aspects of hemispheric trade liberalization.
Part one includes three papers that focus on the overall impact of hemispheric trade 
liberalization. Max Corden’s paper provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the potential effects 
of a free trade area from the perspective of Latin American countries. Of these effects—liberalization, 
trade diversion, and reciprocity—Corden believes reciprocal opening, or commitment to continued market 
access will be the most important. This opening also includes changes in domestic policies such as 
subsidies, labor, and environmental regulation.
Rudiger Dornbusch sets out the case for regionalism as a way to open markets and pursue freer 
trade. He argues that regional developments are not a threat to multilateralism, but provide a way to 
break down barriers on a limited regional scale and create precedents, blueprints, and competitive forces 
that will help drive a broader liberalization effort.
Robert Pastor views NAFTA, too, as a catalyst for expanding trade and improving the rules and 
institutions of the world trading system. It has the potential to make the Americas the center of the global 
economy and the model for North-South relations in the twenty-first century. NAFTA does not represent 
an exclusive trading bloc, holds Pastor. It is rather the deepening of the last major trading area in the 
world; North America and eventually the Western Hemisphere.
In the second section, the papers by Anne Krueger, Hans Singer, Robert Blecker, William 
Spriggs, and Graciela Chichilnisky focus on what land of free trade agreements are desirable. In this 
sense, Krueger’s paper offers a framework for assessing alternative free trade agreements. She also 
highlights the kinds of policies that Latin American countries could adopt to provide the maximum scope 
for gains under a Western Hemisphere free trade agreement.
One desirable characteristic of a free trade area, according to Chichilnisky, is that trade should 
be structured around economies of scale rather than around traditional comparative advantages. If trade 
is based on economies of scale, it is more likely that the free trade agreement will complement rather than 
substitute for global trade negotiations.
Singer’s paper focuses on the likelihood of a beneficial free trade agreement among countries 
of different levels of economic development. For a “genuine partnership” to emerge, he proposes 
conditions to enable countries to take advantage of the opportunities opening to them and to ease the costs 
of adjustment. Blecker and Spriggs also focus on the need for strengthening policies such as adjustment 
assistance and labor retraining to ease the adjustment costs and to work toward the eventual international 
harmonization of labor standards and enforcement.
Part three consists of seven papers that address key negotiating issues. David Palmeter discusses 
the need to avoid restrictive and rigid rules of origin. The less important are rules of origin in an 
agreement, he points out, the better the chances of avoiding problems. This conclusion is also shared 




James Cassing’s paper points out that a good safeguards agreement is also crucial. A clear 
agreement on safeguards enhances the negotiating capacity of countries and as a consequence also 
increases the gain to countries joining a free trade area.
Several authors stress the importance of negotiating a precise dispute settlement mechanism. 
Blair Hankey reviews different types of dispute settlement mechanisms and their implementation in 
various regional trading arrangements. He concludes that it is the most promising institution to deal with 
countries of different bargaining power.
In his analysis of Section 301, Steven Husted also favors a strong dispute settlement mechanism 
to reduce possible frictions from closer commercial links and the likelihood of U.S. firms seeking 
unilateral remedies. Also, Gilbert Winham and Heather Grant stress that an effective and binding dispute 
settlement mechanism serves to restrain the use of antidumping and countervailing laws.
Charles Pearson addresses the new issue in the agenda; how to harmonize trade and 
environmental policies within the context of regional economic integration arrangements. He notes that 
conflicts can be easily exaggerated, but there are points at which trade and environmental regimes need 
to be reconciled.
Finally, part four contains papers that deal with how to proceed toward a hemispheric free trade 
agreement and individual country perspectives. Sidney Weintraub takes on the issue of “widening” or 
“deepening” of subregional integration schemes. He proposes that priority be given to strengthening 
subregional arrangements so that they can become the building blocks of hemispheric free trade.
The next five papers deal with individual country perspectives. Andrea Butelmann and Patricio 
Meller analyze the case of Chile, a country where it is widely believed that moving towards the formation 
of a free trade area would bring about welfare gains. The authors estimate that such a move would cause 
a net increase of Chilean exports of approximately 4.4 percent.
The papers by Marcelo de Paiva Abreu and Luiz Bresser Pereira and Vera Thorstensen, illustrate 
different assessments of Brazil’s trading options. While Paiva Abreu emphasizes the potential trade 
diversion and retaliation Brazil could face if it pursued integration with the United States, Bresser Pereira 
and Thorstensen highlight the danger of being excluded from a hemispheric trade agreement.
In turn, the paper by Winston Dookeran presents key policy issues faced by small economies 
such as those of Caribbean countries, and, in particular, how they respond to the fast-changing 
international trading regime. Last, Jeffrey Hayes and Seymour Lipset focus on the United States. Their 
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A WESTERN HEMISPHERE FREE TRADE AREA: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA
W. Max Corden
The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) launched in 1990 included a proposal to establish 
a Western Hemisphere free trade area. The idea was to start with bilateral free-trade negotiations, those 
between the United States and Mexico being the pilot case, using the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement 
as a model. The EAI was concerned not only with trade policy but also explicitly with investment, debt, 
and the environment. Although experience in Europe suggests that many considerations other than purely 
economic ones motivate progress toward regional free trade, this paper will be limited to considering 
trade policy and, apart from reference to the political economy of trade liberalization, will leave aside 
broader political issues.
The aim of this paper is to provide a framework for analyzing the potential gains and losses of 
forming a free trade area (FTA) from the point of view of individual Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. The paper is basically theoretical and draws attention to the numerous and complex issues 
involved. Latin America and the Caribbean, or LAC, will be used to refer to all countries in the Western 
Hemisphere other than the United States and Canada. The paper will ignore Canada, though the analysis 
could be applied to the formation of a free trade area with Canada as much as with the United States.
The main analysis, Part I of the paper, distinguishes between and analyzes in detail the effects 
of (a) liberalization, (b) trade diversion, and (c) reciprocity. Clarifying the distinctions among these three 
effects of an FTA will be helpful in sorting out the issues. The analysis in Part I makes three 
assumptions, all of which will be reconsidered in Part II.
First, it is assumed that the concern is only with the national welfare of the LAC country. The 
special interest of the United States, or any interest group within it, will be briefly discussed in Part II. 
Thus, this paper is primarily a guide for analysts and policy makers in LAC. The interest of the world 
community as a whole will not be considered.
Second, it is assumed that the free trade area is a bilateral one between the United States and any 
one LAC country. Of course FTAs can also be, and have been, formed between two or more LAC 
countries, but these have somewhat different implications that will be discussed briefly in Part II. The 
immediate issue is certainly the formation of an FTA between a very large and powerful developed 
economy—the United States—and various smaller, less-developed ones. This is the so-called hub-and- 
spoke model. The United States may negotiate bilaterally with individual LAC countries unless groups 
of the latter have already formed FTAs among themselves, so the case considered here will be a two- 
country bilateral negotiation.
Third, it will be assumed that macroeconomic adjustments—including exchange rate adjustment 
and appropriate fiscal and monetary policies—will ensure an appropriate balance-of-payments outcome 
and level of aggregate demand for domestic goods and services. This is the standard assumption in 
“real” trade theory and is designed to simplify the analysis. The implication of an FTA for exchange 
rate policy will be discussed in Part II.
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I. T h e  Three Effects: Liberalization, Trade Diversion, Reciprocity
Liberalization by L A C  Countries
The first of the components of an FTA is trade liberalization by the FTA itself. Tariffs are 
reduced or removed completely, and quantitative import restrictions are ended or the range of imports 
to which they apply is reduced. The result is that imports increase, consumers of the imports or domestic 
producers that use them as inputs benefit, and import-competing producers may be adversely affected. 
Exporters gain directly through reduced costs of imported and import-competing inputs, and indirectly 
through macroeconomic adjustment, notably the exchange rate depreciation likely to be associated with 
liberalization. Such gains may also accrue to import-competing producers. Inevitably there will be 
gainers and losers, and unemployment may increase in the transition. There are also benefits attributable 
to the reductions in rent-seeking and administrative costs normally associated with quantitative import 
restrictions. If tariffs have been high or import restrictions tight and widespread, the effects of trade 
liberalization on the pattern of domestic output and distribution of income between different industries 
and their workers may eventually be substantial.
Trade liberalization can take three forms: unilateral, multilateral, and regional. It is worth 
comparing the effects of the three. Table 1 shows that they have some similar effects.
First of all, liberalization can be unilateral and nondiscriminatory, a policy pursued because it is 
believed to benefit the country as a whole, and that in the long run most citizens will gain even though 
there are likely to be some short-run losers. Hence, liberalization does not need to be associated with 
any international agreement, and it does not explicitly discriminate between different foreign suppliers. 
Unilateral liberalization was pursued by Chile in the 1970s, more recently by Mexico and Argentina and, 
to a lesser extent, several other LAC countries.
Second, liberalization can be multilateral. In the postwar years multilateral liberalization in 
manufactured trade took place among developed countries under the GATT. Essentially it means that 
a country’s own liberalization is supplemented by liberalization by others and opens export markets for 
the country and improves its terms of trade relative to the unilateral alternative. This is the reciprocity 
effect, to be discussed below. Clearly, a country benefits when its own liberalization is associated with 
reciprocal liberalization by its trading partners.
Finally, there is regional liberalization, of which a bilateral FTA is a special case. A country’s 
own liberalization does not necessarily apply to imports from all countries, only to those from the region. 
In the case of a bilateral FTA between one LAC country and the United States, the LAC country may 
open its market only to U.S. goods. There will be the same general effects of liberalization: imports 
will increase, and there will be gainers and losers. But in this case liberalization is partial, and thus 
discriminatory. The discrimination may create trade diversion effects, which will be discussed below. 
In this discriminatory aspect, it differs both from unilateral and multilateral liberalization. In addition, 
regional liberalization, like multilateral liberalization, has a reciprocity effect: the other member of the 
region opens up its markets to the first country’s exports.
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In considering the effects of liberalization in an FTA, it is important to distinguish two groups 
of LAC countries. The first is a group where unilateral trade liberalization has already taken place to 
the point that quantitative import restrictions have been completely ended (with occasional few exceptions) 
and tariffs are very low. This group consists of Chile and Mexico, and if one extends the group to 
countries where the unilateral liberalization process is well under way or strong commitments to it exist, 
the group also includes Argentina and Colombia. The second group consists of countries that still have 
extensive trade barriers and no firm commitment to a movement towards near or complete free trade.
For the first group of countries, one might ask what difference an FTA with the United States 
would make to the liberalization process and ultimate situation. Obviously, if there were complete, 
unqualified, permanent free trade affecting imports of all kinds from all sources, forming an FTA with 
the United States would have an impact only through the reciprocity effect. But in practice this condition 
does not exist and is not likely to. Hence, forming a bilateral FTA would have two effects on the degree 
and effectiveness of the LAC country’s own liberalization.
First, a bilateral FTA would lock in institutionally a part of the liberalization. The present 
degree of liberalization could otherwise be reversed by a future government. But an agreement to 
establish an FTA would not be easily reversible, if at all. This was clearly an important consideration 
for Mexico, a high proportion of whose imports come from the United States. It would be relatively less 
significant for many of the other countries of LAC, but would certainly still be important. This “locking- 
in” effect has a dimension of political economy: a liberalizing government can ensure that future
administrations will not be able easily to revert to protectionism.
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The immediate benefit of locking in liberalization is that it is likely to stimulate investment. 
Indeed, even the expectation of an FTA may provide such a stimulus. Any arrangement that ensures that 
a particular structure of domestic prices and incentives will stay for a long time and not be changed 
unpredictably is likely to encourage both foreign and domestic investment, possibly financed by the return 
of flight capital as can be observed in Mexico. Furthermore, investors in export industries, especially 
those that export to the United States, will be encouraged by the prospect not only of ensured open 
markets in the United States but also of the ability to obtain imported components and inputs without 
restrictions or tariffs.
Second, it is likely that an FTA would involve a greater degree of liberalization and opening the 
economy than is likely to result from any degree of unilateral liberalization, even if the latter apparently 
leads to free trade. Trade is likely to be fostered by various measures of harmonization and elimination 
of barriers to trade other than tariffs and quantitative import restrictions. Here the example of the 
European Community can be cited. The first stage was to establish an area of conventional free trade 
(plus a common external tariff, which made it a customs union). The second stage was the “ 1992” 
program—the “completion” of the European market, which had disposed of numerous barriers apart from 
tariffs. This second stage is likely to be substantially trade-creating. It is hard to say how important this 
“completion effect” would be in an FTA formed between any one LAC country and the United States, 
but it could be significant.
The other group of countries—where protection is still quite high and it is unlikely that unilateral 
liberalization would approach free trade—either the political will to liberalize substantially does not exist, 
or the political ability to bring it about is lacking. The most important country of this kind is Brazil: 
liberalization, both actual and prospective, on the basis of commitments, has been substantial, but Brazil 
is still far from achieving free trade. The formation of an FTA would raise very substantive issues for 
the LAC country, the very same issues that arise when considering unilateral liberalization.
Are there arguments for protection from a national point of view—for example, the (sectional) 
employment or the infant industry arguments? Are there significant rent-seeking and administrative costs 
of protection to set against these arguments if the latter are thought to have some validity? Has the actual 
practice of import-substituting industrialization been shown to have had adverse consequences and, by 
contrast, have outward-looking policies as pursued in Latin America by Chile and in Asia by the Republic 
of Korea and others been shown to be a success? Even if an ultimate situation of trade liberalization were 
desirable, is the process of getting there too costly? Would powerful interests resist liberalization and 
make it politically impossible, or at least highly painful? Should losers be provided with compensation, 
or can increased growth from liberalization be relied upon eventually to compensate the initial losers?
It is impossible to discuss these complex issues fully here. Many arguments for protection have 
come to be discredited, at least at the level of theory, and, perhaps more important, empirical evidence 
is very convincing that outward-looking policies have led to, or have been associated with, higher growth 
rates. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that in LAC countries, as in all others including the United States, 
protectionist ideas and thinking are thoroughly alive—even when past experience has been very bad—and 
therefore have to be carefully considered. Furthermore, even if there were general agreement that the 
broad, long-term national interest would be best served by extensive trade liberalization (possibly to the 
point of completely free trade), this will still run counter to the interests of particular groups. When 
governments are not strong, interest groups have blocking capacity.
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Trade Diversion
Trade diversion is the principal negative aspect of an FT A. It results from the FTA’s 
discriminatory effect. If Mexico maintains tariffs on imports from Japan, and possibly even increases 
them, while removing tariffs on imports from the United States, there will be some tendency to divert 
purchases away from Japan and toward the U.S. The pattern of imports will change, and total imports 
are likely to increase because of the trade-creation effect. But the trade-diversion effect is adverse. 
Mexico will be buying goods from the U.S. that could have been obtained more cheaply from Japan.
Vinerian Trade Diversion
Suppose the LAC country has a tariff of 30 percent on all imports of a particular product. It then 
joins the FTA, and imports from the United States carry no tariff. However, imports from Japan must 
still pay a 30 percent tariff. The result is that there will be a diversion of the source of imports from 
Japan to the U.S. Excluding the tariff, the diverted imports will have cost less when bought from Japan 
than when bought from the U.S., so the LAC country is then buying a product from a higher-cost source 
and thus incurring an extra cost. This trade diversion concept, introduced by Jacob Viner, assumes that 
the tariff on imports from outside (Japan) remains unchanged when the country joins the FTA.
Vinerian trade diversion could well be significant when tariffs on imports from outside the FTA 
remain high. But the more the LAC country has followed a path of unilateral trade liberalization before 
joining the FTA, and hence the lower the external tariff, the lower the cost of such trade diversion will 
be. Nevertheless, some degree of trade diversion is likely even when a country has liberalized completely 
because of the locking-in and completion effects. These will foster trade within the FTA relative to trade 
with the outside world, at least marginally.
Vinerian trade diversion arises when trade with the outside world is restricted by tariffs. It does 
not arise when it is restricted by import quotas, provided these continue to be effective in restricting 
imports even after the FTA has been established. If the upper limit to the value of imports from Japan 
is fixed by a quota, and provided the trade diversion effect does not reduce the LAC country’s demand 
for imports from Japan to a level below this limit, there will be no trade diversion effect. But this 
qualification is probably not important, first, because quotas have largely been replaced by tariffs, and 
second, because there is no reason to expect the sizes of quotas to stay unchanged as a result of the 
establishment of the FTA. This, then, leads into the second concept, “trade contraction.”
Trade Contraction: Increase of Protection Against Imports
Trade contraction exists if the level of the external tariff is actually raised as a result of the 
establishment of the FTA. In the example above, imports from Japan will decline even more than when 
there is only Vinerian trade diversion. In an FTA, unlike a customs union, the external tariff for a 
particular product does not have to be the same around the whole area—i.e., the LAC country does not 
have to adopt the United States tariff on imports from Japan, or to agree on a common external tariff. 
In principle it is still free to choose its external tariff structure.
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There are two reasons why the external tariff might increase. First, it may be brought about as 
a result of pressure from the United States if its own external protection is relatively high, so as to avoid 
“trade deflection” (discussed below). Second, it may be a natural response to domestic pressure groups 
seeking more protection from imports when they find themselves harmed by U.S. imports. When a 
particular protected industry loses sales because of increased imports from the U.S. produced by the 
establishment of the FTA, it may seek, and successfully obtain, higher protection against imports from 
Japan.
Similarly, if there is a general loss of competitiveness by the country, possibly because the 
exchange rate has become overvalued owing to a burst of domestic inflation, the natural reaction will 
be—as it had often been in the past—to increase protection, which, once the FTA has been established, 
can be brought about only by increasing protection against imports from outside the FTA. In the past, 
this has taken the form of tightening or expanding the scope of quantitative import restrictions rather than 
raising tariffs. Other nontariff devices such as antidumping measures, countervailing duties, and 
voluntary export restraints accepted by exporters under threat of other measures can produce the same 
result.
Trade Deflection: Free Trade Area versus Customs Union
Suppose that the United States imposes voluntary export restraints or other restrictions on imports 
of a particular product from Japan, while imports of the same products from Japan can come in freely 
or at a low tariff from the LAC country. There will then be some tendency for goods to be imported 
from Japan into the U.S. via the LAC country: this is trade deflection. It leads to unnecessary transport 
costs and, more important, it defeats the purpose of the U.S. protectionist measures. The lower the 
transport costs, and the bigger the gap between the low tariff of the LAC country and the high tariff of 
the U.S. (or the tariff equivalent of the nontariff device), the greater the effect will be.
The problem is well known in an indirect form and has presented problems in the Canada-United 
States Free Trade Agreement. A country may import duty-free components of a car from Japan, then 
assemble them, and export the assembled car to its free trade partner—a partner which itself imposes 
restrictions on imports of components from Japan. Thus, the U.S. may wish to restrict imports from a 
LAC country on the grounds that these embody components or inputs that are just “trade-deflected.”
The standard solution to this characteristic problem of a free trade area is to make “rules of 
origin” for trade within the FTA. This raises various technical problems—e.g., the choice of the ratio 
of domestic component that is acceptable if intra-FTA trade is to be free—and these cannot be discussed 
in detail here. For a particular product, tariffs will be applied to the portion of the value of imports from 
(say) the LAC country to the United States that represents the part that is assumed to be of outside (e.g., 
Japanese) origin. The U.S. negotiating position with Mexico, as with Canada, has been to favor strict 
rules of origin, especially in the automotive sector. Such rules of origin mean that one of the main 
potential advantages of an FTA—the removal of formal barriers to trade within the area—cannot be 
achieved. If nothing is done, and trade deflection does take place, the net result will be that countries 
with high tariffs or other restrictions against imports from outside the area will find these tariffs evaded, 
and so will have an incentive to reduce them. In other words, the low-tariff (or low-protection) countries 
will tend to set the tone for the whole area.
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If one favors trade liberalization, such trade deflection would be desirable, but, naturally, it is 
not acceptable to the more protectionist country. Another possibility—one which cannot be ruled out but 
would certainly be less desirable—is that the United States might pressure its LAC partner to increase 
its restrictions on imports from Japan to the U.S. level to reduce the incentive for trade deflection. It 
must also be added that this analysis is, at least in theory, symmetrical: U.S. protection may be low and 
the LAC country’s protection high. In that case, trade deflection would consist of imports from outside 
entering the LAC country indirectly via the U .S., and the LAC country may then wish to apply strict 
rules of origin.
One obvious solution is to convert the FTA into a customs union. An FTA and a customs union 
are both areas of free trade. But, in addition, a customs union is (like a single country) an area with 
common barriers against imports from outside. This means that there would be a common external tariff 
and possibly other common restrictions such as antidumping duties. In a customs union there would have 
to be an agreement about common nontariff barriers, notably voluntary export restraints. But it is hardly 
conceivable that this could be brought about between any LAC country and the United States, and it is 
not under consideration.
In practice a customs union would mean that the external trade barriers of the LAC country would 
be determined in Washington, D .C ., since it is inconceivable that the United States Congress would allow 
relatively small economic partners—all countries in the Western Hemisphere are small relative to the 
U .S .—to play a significant part in determining its barriers against imports from, say, Japan. It is also 
possible that the United States will pass through its current protectionist phase and wish to liberalize 
imports from outside, possibly on the basis of multilateral or bilateral negotiations. But it is improbable 
that it would allow small LAC partners to play a part in, or even veto, its negotiations.
Reciprocity
The most important gain that a LAC country is likely to realize from an FTA is the reciprocal 
opening—or commitment to continued opening—of the United States market to the LAC country’s exports 
of goods and services. In this respect the FTA is far preferable to unilateral liberalization. Essentially 
there are two trade-creation effects from the establishment of an FTA: first, trade creation results from 
the LAC country’s own liberalization (which could be even greater under unilateral liberalization), and 
second, trade creation results from U.S. liberalization. If the general, comparative advantage gains from 
trade propositions are accepted, it follows that both countries gain from both forms of trade creation, 
though there are also offsetting terms-of-trade effects to be considered.
Extent o f  Gain from  Reciprocity
The extent of the gain to the LAC country depends not just on the level of existing barriers to 
its exports in the United States but also on what these barriers might have been in the future if no FTA 
were established. There is a possibility that the U.S. will become more protectionist. LAC countries 
could well suffer from a spillover effect and from the general rise in U.S. protection. The attraction of 
an FTA would then be to lock in the present relatively open trade policies of the U.S. with respect to the 
LAC country: the “safe-haven” effect.
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For given initial and potential barriers, the extent of the gain from their removal depends, in 
addition, on the extent to which the types of goods and services that the LAC country exports are 
substitutable with competing products in the United States. In many cases this substitutability is likely 
to be high, so that considerable gains might ensue.
The central questions, of course, are how big the barriers are now, what they might be if no FT A 
were established, and to what extent they will be genuinely reduced in an FTA. For each LAC country 
where the possibility of an FTA arises, a separate detailed analysis is required. Measurement of existing 
barriers is usually difficult because the main barriers are nontariff ones, notably the threat of antidumping 
duties and various “safeguard” provisions. Estimates of what the barriers might be if no FTA were 
formed involves imaginative judgments. But it is also important to note that an FTA might allow many 
loopholes and special arrangements so that, in effect, assured free entry of LAC goods into the U.S. will 
not be provided. The U.S. market may not be so “safe” a haven. In the cases of the U.S.-Canada 
agreement and the likely agreement with Mexico, there are provisions for a lengthy transition period 
during which trade will certainly not be completely free. It is clearly in the interests of the LAC 
countries to negotiate an agreement that will minimize the special cases and loopholes. But, of course, 
the LAC countries would also have to give up some of their own loopholes.
The value of an FTA to the LAC country depends on how the “safeguard problem” is handled. 
It is inevitable that some producers in the United States will be adversely affected by the FTA, or at least 
that they will expect to be adversely affected. Usually they have plenty of warning of what might 
happen, but sometimes the adverse impact can indeed be quite sudden. It is thus natural that they should 
seek temporary relief or safeguards against market disruption. Such measures are extremely common 
and have been allowed under GATT and also the U.S.-Canada agreement. But they represent the re-entry 
of protection by the back door. Measures are not usually temporary and, above all, they introduce 
uncertainty.
A LAC exporter who has, often with difficulty, penetrated a market in the United States must 
always cope with not only the normal threat of new competitors (which must be faced by all market 
participants) but also the threat of government intervention caused by successful lobbying. O f course, 
the same problem would arise for U.S. exporters in the LAC market if the same “protection-by-the-back- 
door” policies were followed there. A genuine FTA would avoid such safeguard interventions for the 
same reason that such interventions are not usually available within a single country. The hope is that, 
after a lengthy transition period, a genuine FTA would emerge.
If governments are concerned with localized unemployment resulting from increased competition 
from exporters in the FTA partner country, it is better that they devote resources to supporting labor 
retraining, labor mobility, and improving the local infrastructure to attract new investments. 
Nevertheless, the political acceptability of an FTA may depend on the incorporation of some safeguard 
provisions in the agreement. In that case, it is crucial to make all safeguard provisions temporary, with 
built-in sunset clauses to ensure automatic ending of a protectionist measure within a limited time.
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Trade Diversion and the “Bandwagon ”
One component of the reciprocity effect for the LAC country is trade diversion by the United 
States, to the benefit of the LAC country, although it harms both the U.S. and the other country or 
countries whose trade is diverted in favor of the LAC country. It is to be distinguished from trade 
diversion by the LAC country itself, discussed earlier, the effects of which are clearly adverse to it. The 
effect of U.S. trade diversion will be greater the higher the substitutability of the LAC country’s exports 
with those of competing countries. Considerable losses could be inflicted on the latter, for example, 
when Mexican labor-intensive exports replace those from Asia. It is part of the reciprocity effect because 
it results from the removal or reduction by the U.S. of its barriers on imports from LAC country while 
maintaining some barriers, actual or potential, against imports from others. Of course, if the U.S. forms 
an FTA with more than one LAC country, say, Mexico and Chile, there is no trade diversion between 
imports from these two countries; the adverse effect is borne by other countries, including other LAC 
countries.
This potential trade diversion effect provides a particular incentive for individual LACs to join 
the FTA “bandwagon.” When LAC country no. 1 forms an FTA with the United States, there could be 
an adverse effect on LAC country no. 2 because of U.S. trade diversion, so country no. 2 has a stronger 
reason than before to follow the leader. Insofar as there is a good deal of competitiveness between 
various LACs, once this process gets going there could be a very rapid bandwagon effect. There is, of 
course, no reason why it should stop at the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, the more countries join, 
the less the gains for the early joiners. To put it simply and crudely, it is in the interests of Mexico that 
the United States allows Mexican goods complete and assured free entry into the U.S. market while 
imposing tight protection on all other imports that compete with Mexican goods, and while Mexico itself 
has free trade with everyone. The problem, of course, is that this course of action is not in the interests 
of the U.S.
Political Economy Arguments fo r  an FTA
Finally, it is worth noting that a country’s own liberalization may be politically easier when it 
is part of a move to an FTA than when the liberalization is unilateral. Liberalization may be desirable 
from a national point of view but may be blocked either by interest groups or by lack of popular 
understanding of the gains from free (or freer) trade. Strong arguments based in political economy also 
favor an FTA.
First, countervailing export interest groups will emerge that expect to benefit from the reciprocity 
aspect of the FTA—e.g., the opening of the United States market. Such interest groups have also 
emerged in the case of unilateral liberalization when this was associated with devaluation; in Chile and 
Mexico, also, exports have increased. Thus this consideration is only a matter of degree. But benefits 
to potential exporters from unilateral liberalization of imports associated with devaluation are more 
indirect and sometimes hard to imagine in advance, compared to the benefits from direct opening of a 
foreign market. Second, the sentiment in favor of liberalization will certainly be strengthened by 
reciprocal liberalization in the U.S. Whatever economists may say—that unilateral liberalization is usually
19
Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere




How Would an FTA Affect the Real Exchange Rate?
Unilateral liberalization on a large scale inevitably requires a real depreciation to precede it or 
to be associated with it. There is a close connection between trade policy and exchange-rate policy, as 
may be found in many episodes of liberalization.
Liberalization of imports, on its own, is likely to increase the volume of imports and worsen the 
current account of the balance of payments. It may have some offsetting effect through reducing the costs 
of exports that use imported components or inputs, and hence increasing exports. But it is a reasonable 
presumption that the net effects on the balance of payments would be adverse. A real devaluation, by 
contrast, makes import-competing industries more competitive and hence to some extent offsets the 
adverse effects of trade liberalization on previously protected industries. More important, it improves 
the competitiveness of export industries. It may be desirable for the real devaluation to precede trade 
liberalization to ensure that the boost to exports happens in good time, and that extra jobs are available 
in export industries to compensate for those lost as a result of trade liberalization. But it must also be 
remembered that industries that use imported inputs will gain from trade liberalization, and employment 
there is likely to increase.
The real devaluation can be brought about by a once-for-all devaluation, or possibly by a 
devaluation in several steps, followed by a fixing of the exchange rate. A more common approach in 
Latin America is to use some kind of “crawling peg” or frequently adjustable exchange rate with frequent 
nominal depreciations, possibly on a regular basis, to compensate for the country’s higher inflation rate 
relative to its trading partners, notably the United States. The aim of such a “flexible peg” exchange rate 
regime is to keep the real exchange rate constant, or at least to avoid higher inflation leading to real 
appreciation. In that case, a real depreciation is brought about by ensuring that for some limited time 
the nominal exchange rate is depreciated faster than the inflation rate differential.
While unilateral liberalization by the LAC country requires associated real depreciation, this is 
not necessarily so when an FTA is formed. The reason is that the reciprocity effect—that is, the boost 
to exports resulting from the opening of the United States market—will improve the current account and 
may compensate for the adverse effect of the country’s own liberalization. It would be a pure 
coincidence if the compensation were precise; on balance some real exchange rate adjustment may still 
be required, but one can no longer be sure that the need would be for real depreciation, rather than 
appreciation. If there is no significant inflation differential between the LAC country and its trading 
partners, it may then be possible to sustain a fixed exchange rate commitment, if such has been made.
The formation of an FTA—indeed merely the expectation that one will be formed—could boost 
capital flow into the LAC country, at least temporarily. If that is so, and if the extra domestic investment 
which the capital inflow finances is not offset by a reduction in the fiscal deficit, the current account will,
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and should, go into deficit to allow the transfer of resources (that is, the use of foreign savings) which 
capital inflow is meant to bring about. In that case a real appreciation would be required. To obtain the 
net real exchange rate effect, this real appreciation effect of capital inflow has to be combined with the 
effect on the real exchange rate of the LAC country’s own trade liberalization combined with U.S. 
liberalization as part of the FTA. On balance, either real depreciation or appreciation are possible.
A real appreciation could come about through nominal appreciation caused by the additional 
supplies of foreign exchange increasing the value of the domestic currency in the market or—if exchange 
market intervention prevents such a rise—by a temporary increase in domestic inflation brought about by 
monetary expansion resulting from the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. Thus, real 
appreciation is compatible with a fixed nominal exchange rate, provided there is a willingness to accept 
some extra (possibly temporary) domestic inflation.
Does an FTA Require a Fixed Exchange Rate?
A central issue is whether a fixed exchange rate regime is needed to make an FTA work. Must 
the LAC country fix its currency to the dollar in order to form an FTA with the United States? The brief 
answer is: definitely not. It is certainly possible to have an FTA with exchange rates within the area 
varying, either frequently or occasionally, or even floating relative to each other. Trade has been free 
within the European Community, and yet under the European Monetary System there have been many 
exchange rate realignments. Over a long period a substantial part (though not all) of trade between the 
U.S. and Canada has been effectively free from restrictions, and yet the Canadian dollar has floated 
relative to the U.S. dollar. It follows therefore that a further step, namely, monetary integration—which 
requires a single central bank—is not necessary to have trade integration.
This simple answer covers what is possible and necessary. The answer to the question of what 
is desirable is more complex. There is no doubt that a fixed exchange rate fosters both trade and capital 
movements. It is certainly an advantage for trade if exchange rate uncertainty and the inconveniences 
associated with having different currencies are removed. If trade integration is to be complete, as it is 
within a single country, then the exchange rates should be firmly locked together. This would require 
a firm institutional commitment. Possibly the LAC country might establish a currency board system 
where domestic currency can be created only when backed by dollars, as has been instituted in Argentina.
The opportunity might also be taken to link the establishment of the FTA with a commitment to 
low inflation through an exchange rate commitment. The option to discipline domestic fiscal and 
monetary policies through making the exchange the “nominal anchor” exists in any case, and does not 
require an FTA. But it is possible that a move to a fixed exchange rate regime would be politically more 
acceptable—and more credible in the labor and foreign exchange markets—if associated with the 
establishment of an FTA. However, it has to be emphasized that such a link is in no way necessary to 
bring about an FTA or to ensure that the FTA brings about net gains.
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Dangers of a Fixed Exchange Rate
The dangers of attempting a fixed exchange rate commitment must also be stressed, and it is by 
no means clear that the “exchange-rate-as-nominal-anchor” approach is preferable to a more direct 
attempt to rein in inflation by a disciplined fiscal policy.
The dangers are three. First, the exchange rate commitment may be unsuccessful in disciplining 
fiscal policy, and fiscal deficits may continue to be monetized. In that case, the attempt to maintain a 
fixed exchange rate will lead to a foreign exchange crisis and eventually compel devaluation. There have 
been numerous episodes of this kind in Latin American history in the 1970s and early 1980s; it is clearly 
preferable for exchange rate adjustments to be frequent and small rather than infrequent, large, and crisis 
driven.
Second, for some time it may be difficult to establish the credibility of the fixed exchange rate 
regime in the labor market and the foreign exchange market, hence leading to continued domestic wage 
and price rises, and thus to real appreciation and eventually to a foreign exchange crisis.
Third, experience shows that countries that are unable or reluctant to devalue when they have 
balance-of-payments problems—caused perhaps by a deterioration in the terms of trade or a cessation of 
capital inflow (as in the early 1980s)—impose or expand the range of quantitative import restrictions. 
This is the most important danger of a fixed-exchange-rate commitment.
It is true that increases in trade restrictions, whether in tariffs or quantitative restrictions, are 
substitutes for devaluation as “switching devices”—that is, policies that switch domestic demand from 
imports to domestic goods, and that switch domestic output in the opposite direction. But import 
restrictions fail to foster exports and also distort the pattern of imports and domestic production, and are 
therefore much less desirable. If trade restrictions are likely to increase as a result of a nominal exchange 
rate being fixed and no longer adjustable, one should think twice about making the exchange rate 
commitment. In an FT A the trade restrictions that would be increased in case of a balance-of-payments 
problem would be imposed only on imports from outside the area. In other words, they would not be 
imposed on imports from the United States. Not only would the LAC country’s own producers be 
protected, but U.S. producers that export to the LAC country would also be protected. Trade diversion 
by the LAC country would increase, and the costs of the FT A would rise.
Fair Trade vs. Free Trade
A popular argument against free trade is that the advantages foreign countries have in exporting 
particular products are not “fair.” They do not stem from superior efficiency of a company or from a 
particular natural resource endowment, but from other factors. These may be “fundamentals,” such as 
a higher ratio of, say, unskilled to skilled labor and to capital, so that the real wages of the unskilled are 
lower, or from various government policies.
A Mexican company struggling with a relatively poorly educated work force may regard the 
greater expenditures on education in the United States as giving its U.S. competitors an “unfair” 
advantage. In other fields, the high level of military expenditures in the U.S. may have given some 
defense industries an advantage. It is not hard to think of advantages that U.S. industries have relative
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to those of a LAC country, some of which may be attributable to particular U.S. government policies. 
But in general the U.S. does not follow an “industrial policy,” so that there are few if any cases where 
one can say that particular industries (other than defense industries) have been subsidized either directly 
or indirectly. It is unlikely that the U.S. would change any of its domestic policies to respond to such 
complaints from a potential FTA partner. Surely, it would not wish to adjust its educational system so 
as to reach that of poorer neighbors!
The issue is much more likely to arise in the other direction. The United States may complain 
about “unfair” competition from the LAC country. U.S. critics of the proposed FTA agreement with 
Mexico make such complaints, especially with regard to labor and environmental regulations, as well as 
low wages in general. If a LAC country is to form an FTA with the U.S., it may be required to change 
certain domestic policies to avoid complaints of “unfair” competition. This could be an important 
implication of an FTA. The pressure from U.S. interests is both inevitable and fully understandable. 
The question is whether altering its various domestic policies would be in the interests of the LAC 
country. If not, we have here a cost of an FTA, to be added to the trade diversion cost. For example, 
the LAC country may have regulations protecting workers and their conditions that are much less strict 
than those prevalent in the U.S. If the same regulations were introduced as exist in the U.S., labor costs 
would rise for firms, and the effect would be much the same as if real wages had been increased. The 
LAC country would lose some of its comparative advantage stemming from cheap labor. In general, to 
seek to equalize wage cost—a farfetched idea—would be to negate comparative advantage.
How is one to analyze this issue in a general way? Any country has a pattern of government 
interventions in its economy, including subsidies (direct and indirect) to particular industries, regions, or 
sections of the community. There are regulations of various kinds covering, for example, transport, 
working conditions, or the environment. There are various special taxes, some of which may benefit 
foreign competitors of the country’s exporters; others harm them. Some are the results of pressures from 
interest groups, of historical and now irrelevant factors, or of unsound theories. Others can be described 
as “optimal” from a national point of view using standard economic criteria, or at least can be regarded 
as having moved the economy closer to an optimum. If joining an FTA leads a country to give up 
“nonoptimal” interventions—perhaps interventions which a well-meaning government (or its economic 
advisers) may have wished to remove but was unable to do so because of strong interest groups—then 
there is a benefit in this respect from the FTA. Similarly, joining an FTA may lead to new interventions 
(e.g., to protect the environment) which are optimal, in which case there is again a benefit. On the other 
hand, the LAC country may be required to give up interventions that are optimal, in which case there 
is a net loss.
The obvious question is: Who decides what is optimal, and if an intervention is nonoptimal, why 
has it not been removed? Presumably, one must simply look at each intervention under discussion. If 
one takes the view that the existing pattern of interventions—whether subsidies to particular industries, 
or lack of environmental controls, for example—must be optimal just because it is what the government 
of the LAC country has chosen, one would regard the pressures applied by the United States negotiators 
in the interest of “fairness” as perceived by the U.S. pressure groups as necessarily harmful. But I would 
take the view that the pressures could sometimes have a beneficial effect, for example, if they lead to the 
abandonment of subsidies that were not justifiable on purely (national interest) economic grounds, or if 
they lead to environmental measures that take external diseconomies appropriately into account.
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Gains from an FTA for the United States
The United States is a very large area of free trade (actually, a customs union) already, and it is 
unlikely that the gains relative to GNP of forming an FTA with any LAC country, or even all LAC 
countries, would be very large, whatever policy the LAC follows. In general, when a large and a small 
economy form an FTA, the small economy is likely to gain much more relative to its GNP. The 
principal gains to the U.S. could well be political, or they could stem from reduced pressure for 
immigration, especially from Mexico, resulting from the gains to the LAC being large. Particular U.S. 
companies that perceive profitable investment opportunities as a result of the FTA would also gain.
Suppose the LAC country liberalizes unilaterally and then forms an FTA with the United States. 
If one regards most or all relevant arguments for protection as unsound or not applicable to the LAC, 
that would be the best policy for the LAC. It would eventually obtain guaranteed free entry into the U.S. 
market, and yet it would not lose from any trade diversion away from (say) Japanese exports towards 
U.S. exporters. But would there be any gain for the U.S.? Leaving aside nontrade considerations, one 
might ask why the U.S. should commit itself to an FTA if the LAC were going to liberalize unilaterally 
in any case?
The answer is that there would still be a gain for the United States even when the LAC country 
liberalizes relative to all other countries as well. This is the “locking-in” gain. Liberalization by the 
LAC country of imports from the U.S. will be locked in by the FTA, while the liberalization on imports 
from outside the area could always be reversed. U.S. exporters gain certainty. This gain to U.S. 
exporters will, of course, be greater if the LAC country maintains protection against imports from 
outside.
In principle, the analysis of the economic gains and losses to the United States of joining an FTA 
is the same as that applicable to the LAC country. The U.S. will gain from trade creation and from trade 
diversion by the LAC, while losing from its own trade diversion. It can avoid its own trade diversion by 
itself following a policy of unilateral free trade relative to outsiders. But when particular U.S. industries 
are under competitive pressure, either from the LAC country or from outside, an increase in protection 
is likely. On the basis of past experience, this normally takes the form of voluntary export restraints or 
antidumping duties. If protection on imports from the LAC country cannot be increased owing to the 
FTA (and there are no loopholes), the extra protection on imports from outside will be all the greater. 
The need to focus all the extra protection on imports from outside produces a trade diversion cost for the 
U.S. relative to the alternative of increasing protection in a less discriminatory way.
An FTA for LAC Countries
The whole of the preceding analysis is relevant for studying the implications of the formation of 
an FTA between any group of LAC countries. If one stays with generalities, one would simply be 
repeating what has been said: there are trade creation, trade diversion, and reciprocity effects; trade 
diversion will be greater the less liberalized is trade with the outside world.
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Likelihood of Net Gain
If, in the absence of an FTA, trade with the outside world were the major part of an LAC 
country’s trade, then the trade creation gains are unlikely to be large and—if high levels of protection 
relative to the outside world remain—the losses from trade diversion might well be greater. Following 
exactly the same argument that was given above, if one regards protection as not in the national interest, 
the best policy for any one LAC is to liberalize unilaterally imports from all sources and then form an 
FTA with other LACs to obtain free entry there, and hence obtain the reciprocity gain. It will then get 
both a trade creation gain and a reciprocity gain, but suffer no trade diversion loss.
As also noted earlier, the possibility of an FTA bringing about some trade diversion does still 
exist if a country’s liberalization relative to the outside world is not complete or does not involve a firm 
commitment. But leaving that qualification aside, the conclusion is that an FTA would be a good 
supplement to unilateral liberalization. Some net gain might remain even if unilateral liberalization were 
not complete. But, in view of the relative importance for all LAC countries of trade with countries 
outside Latin America, unilateral liberalization is the more important step.
Should the FTA be Turned into a Customs Union?
The question also arises whether an FTA between two or more LAC countries might become a 
customs union. From the point of view of the members of the union, this would have one important 
benefit. By creating a common tariff and import control structure, it would provide a large bargaining 
group. If the proposed FTA with the United States were not immediately a complete FTA, but rather 
initially some kind of preferential area with provision for safeguard interventions and other loopholes, 
as well as a gradual process of tariff reduction, there would be particular bargains to be struck. Hence, 
the larger the LAC bargaining unit the better from the LAC point of view. Of course, if the FTA with 
the U.S. is to be complete, there is nothing to bargain about with regard to tariffs and other restrictions 
relative to the U.S., and this factor disappears. But the bargaining argument is still relevant when the 
group bargains with other (non-Western Hemisphere) countries, or multilaterally.
It has to be borne in mind that it is not necessary to have a common external tariff or trade policy 
to form a bargaining group in multilateral discussions. Various groups of developing countries have 
operated in the Uruguay Round negotiations, groupings varying with the issues, and the most influential 
group outside the Big Three economic powers (the United States, the European Community, and Japan) 
has been the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters.
The step from FTA to customs union can have various effects, depending on whether it leads to 
increased or decreased protection on imports from outside. The customs union may be desirable to avoid 
trade deflection, but it is certainly just as important that the external tariffs be low. Also, of course, it 
introduces a major burden on negotiations: in principle, it is much easier to decide to establish an area 
of complete free trade than to agree on a common external tariff structure, especially when existing tariffs 
and other trade restrictions are high and important to particular industries.
It is also important to avoid a situation where the establishment of the customs union provides 
a new platform for protectionism, giving new life to protectionist ideas. It is certainly true that the costs 
of protection (as a share of GNP) tend to be greater the smaller the economic size of a country, since
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small economies have the most to gain from free or freer trade. Hence, the formation of an FTA or 
customs union between several LACs will reduce the costs of protection resulting from given rates of 
tariff, and there will be gains from economies of scale. But there will still be costs of protection, and 
they will still be large (unless rates of protection are low) because even the largest economy—Brazil—is 
only of modest size by world standards and has much to gain from trade. Any likely grouping of LACs 
will not add up to an economy so large that considerable costs of protection can be avoided.
Of course, this is a generalization. Measurement is difficult, and judgments have to be made case 
by case. But the maximum benefits from economies of scale can be derived not by creating a larger 
domestic market in the form of a free trade or customs union but by aiming exports at the world market.
Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the Western Hemisphere Free Trade Proposal
One may regard multilateral free trade—or at least substantial worldwide liberalization supported 
by strong rules—as preferable to regional arrangements. This writer holds that view and will discuss it 
further, below. But the prior issue is whether a movement towards regionalism—of which the Western 
Hemisphere Free Trade Agreement proposal is a major example—is likely to foster or to discourage the 
success of multilateral negotiations and the rules and processes of the GATT system. In other words, 
we need not only to compare them as alternatives from the point of view of a LAC country but also to 
consider how an FTA would affect the achievement of improved multilateralism.
How Regionalism Might Affect Multilateralism
In summary, regionalism can be seen as a supplement to multilateralism, as an alternative, or as 
a path toward it. The official United States position is certainly that it is a supplement and that any FTA 
decisions must work within the framework of GATT and the Uruguay outcome. In this view, regionalism 
is no obstacle to progress in the multilateral liberalization. The matter is complex, but broadly, in the 
U.S. the supporters of a favorable Uruguay Round agreement and of an FTA with Mexico tend to be the 
same, while protectionist sentiment is directed both against possible implications of Uruguay Round 
agreements and against the proposed FTA with Mexico. One can certainly conceive of various FTAs 
around the world being supplemental to a new multilateral system that strongly regulates trade restrictions 
and brings about a good deal of liberalization. The main point is that, within its limited area, the FTA 
is likely to go further in liberalization, being then a true supplement.
But regionalism can also be an alternative to multilateralism. There is certainly evidence that the 
members of the European Community have been less committed to ensuring the success of the Uruguay 
Round because of their preoccupation with the completion of the internal market (the “1992” program) 
and, more generally, because, given the large and expanding area of genuinely free trade they are 
creating, they see less need for making politically painful concessions in agriculture in order to achieve 
a Uruguay Round success. In the United States, also, there are now advocates of regionalism in 
preference to multilateralism based not necessarily on a view that the former is preferable, but that, 
because of European and possibly Japanese attitudes, the latter is a lost cause.
Finally, one can see regionalism as a path to multilateralism. This view is mentioned here only 
briefly since it is not very plausible. With a great act of imagination one might conceive of a small
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number of regional groupings—FTAs—being formed (e.g., a European, a Western Hemisphere, and an 
Asian FTA), and then the three would in one grand bargain open up to each other and create worldwide 
free trade, or something close to it. But alas, this is surely a fantasy.
A more reasonable proposal is the “open club” idea. A free trade area, with the United States 
at its core, could be established between a limited number of countries—for example, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA—but any other country, whether in the Western Hemisphere or 
outside—would be invited to apply to join. There might be a standard agreement (with the usual 
safeguards and transition arrangements) to provide the basis for negotiations with a new candidate. 
Countries would find it advantageous to join, if only to avoid trade diversion against them, and if they 
were allowed entry, the FTA would grow until it eventually embraced the whole world. Actually, the 
European Community has done something like this, though the invitations have been rather limited and 
the applications not always accepted. It is also hard to believe that this process could eventually achieve 
world free trade, or at least a degree of liberalization and acceptance of international rules equal to what 
a successful Uruguay Round would achieve. It is more likely to end in a small number of complicated 
regional arrangements.
Multilateralism and Regionalism Compared
Let us now consider the interests of a particular LAC country and compare the effects of 
multilateral liberalization with regional liberalization, that is, an FTA. This comparison is relevant 
insofar as they are alternatives, and insofar as a LAC country can have influence the extent to which 
multilateral liberalization takes place.
The first and principal point is this: the FTA would open, or lock in the opening of, the United 
States market for the LAC country’s exports. By contrast, multilateral liberalization would open and lock 
in the world market. Clearly, from this point of view, the latter is preferable. But a qualification is that 
the strength of the locking-in effect might be greater in the case of the FTA, in which case the balance 
could be said to favor the FTA.
Second, any agreement, whether an FTA or a multilateral agreement under GATT, involves the 
continuous enforcement and interpretation of agreed rules, and inevitably negotiations. The bargaining 
strength of the LAC country relative to its trading partners, and the strength of the rules set up, are then 
relevant. Here a LAC country may be in a weaker situation in an FTA, where the United States would 
be clearly dominant, than in a multilateral environment where none of the three big economic powers (the 
U.S., the European Community, and Japan) have the same relative strength and where more will have 
to depend on the enforcement of universal rules. Hence, from this point of view multilateral 
arrangements are also preferable.
Third, the FTA gives the LAC country the benefit of some trade diversion in its favor in the 
United States market—as LAC exports replace exports from Asia, for example. This effect is not in the 
U.S. or the general world interest, but it is a benefit to the LAC country itself, and thus is an argument 
favoring the FTA relative to multilateralism. This benefit depends, of course, on the U.S. continuing 
to impose tariffs, quotas, or voluntary export restraints on imports from outside.
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Finally, we may consider a LAC country government that wishes to liberalize itself but has a 
problem overcoming domestic pressure groups. It may be able to go a limited way in unilateral 
liberalization, but beyond that it requires the promise of reciprocal benefits, as provided either by 
multilateral agreements or by an FTA. The question is, which of these would be politically more 
persuasive. If the Uruguay Round is successful, LAC countries should find it in their interests to ratify 
it, and so they will inevitably undertake certain commitments. But these are likely to be less than in the 
case of an FTA. On balance, it is probable that an FTA would be more successful in promoting domestic 
liberalization.
Discussion of multilateralism versus regionalism is really rather academic. In limited respects, 
Brazil has played a significant role, as has the Cairns Group, which includes some LAC countries, but 
most LAC countries have little influence on the outcome of the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
Conceivably, as a group, LAC countries can block agreement, but they cannot change the negotiating 
positions of the United States or the European Community.
Countries that are small in the world economy—like all countries in the Western Hemisphere 
other than the United States—have a great deal to gain from a new rules-based international trading 
system. If the choice were between regionalism and multilateralism, the first argument above, that the 
world market for their exports is better than the U.S. market, and the second argument, that they will 
be better protected by a rules-based system where there are several large actors rather than a smaller 
group with one dominant member, must weigh strongly. Multilateralism is best. But that is not a choice 
to be made. The Uruguay Round may succeed, and a sound rules-based system may be established, in 
which case an FTA might be considered as a supplement, taking into account the many matters discussed 
in this paper. Or the Uruguay Round may fail, in which case an FTA should still be considered, and 
there could be a stronger argument in its favor.
III. Conclusion
This paper’s principal aim has been to analyze the implications for a country in the LAC region 
of forming a free trade area with the United States. The emphasis has been on the interests of the LAC 
country—and not the United States or the world as a whole—and it has been concerned primarily with 
the hub-and-spoke case where the hub, the United States, makes bilateral agreements with the various 
spokes, the LAC countries. The analysis has distinguished the liberalization, trade diversion and 
reciprocity effects, and these have provided a convenient framework for considering the complex issues 
involved.
What, then, are valid conclusions?
1. The reciprocity effect is likely to yield the principal gain and has the potential of being very 
beneficial. It is surely the main reason why the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative has been 
greatly welcomed in the region. For any LAC country, the key benefit is to obtain an ensured 
open market in the United States. Of course, this depends on how open a particular country is 
already and what threats exist of the market’s becoming more closed. It has to be noted that in 
general the U.S. market is already very open. The central focus of negotiations must be toensure 
that it is opened further, that the transition period is not too long, and that there are not too many 
exemptions, loopholes, and safeguards. Numerous detailed considerations that have only been
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touched upon in this paper may play a major role in the current negotiations between Mexico and 
the United States.
The reciprocity effect is essentially about opening up and keeping open the United States market 
for LAC country exports. But this paper has noted another aspect, namely, the changes in 
domestic policies—including subsidies, labor, and environmental regulations—that LAC countries 
may be required to undertake as part of an FTA agreement. It has to be considered to what 
extent they are beneficial. If they are not, the costs have to be subtracted from the main potential 
reciprocity benefits. On this point also there are many detailed considerations that have not been 
discussed here.
2. The liberalization effects of an FTA any country that wants to liberalize is free to do so, and 
several have already begun the process. If one accepts the desirability of liberalization—as the 
writer of this paper does—the question then is simply whether more liberalization can be achieved 
with an FTA than with unilateral liberalization. Put another way, given that a country carries 
out unilateral liberalization, possibly to the extent of removing quantitative restrictions on all 
imports from all sources, and either abolishing all tariffs or leaving them at very low, nearly 
uniform levels (like Chile), can an FTA add anything in this respect?
The answer has to be: possibly not very much. But two points have been made. First, there 
is the “locking-in” effect. An FTA agreement is likely to lock in institutionally a part of the 
liberalization (that which applies to imports from the United States), and so prevent reversal by 
a future government. Second, there are other aspects of creating a single market which go 
beyond removing standard quantitative restrictions and tariffs, and these may be pursued in an 
FTA as they have been in the European Community. From the standpoint of political economy, 
liberalization may be politically easier to accomplish in some countries in the framework of an 
FTA than if pursued unilaterally.
It must also be added that for a government that does not really believe in the benefits of 
liberalization, or that, even if it believes in them, finds the domestic political cost very high, the 
liberalization that would be required by an FTA is pure cost—possibly a very high cost—to be 
set against the reciprocity gains.
3. Finally, we come to the trade diversion possibility. It has to be noted again that this refers to 
trade diversion by the LAC country, not trade diversion by the United States, the latter being 
beneficial for the LAC country and part of the reciprocity effect. This trade diversion effect is 
adverse but is likely to be important only if protection relative to outside imports remains high 
or may become high, possibly in response to shocks of various kinds, balance-of-payments 
problems, or interest-group pressures. Of course it may not be possible to resist pressures for 
higher protection from outside, but if a government has such a “resistance capacity,” then it can 
avoid trade diversion if it wishes.
A judgment is thus needed about the likely future levels of protection relative to imports from 
outside. If they are likely to be low—as in the case of countries that have recently liberalized 
unilaterally—the trade diversion effect would not be large, and thus not sufficient to offset the 
gains from reciprocity.
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On the basis of an essentially theoretical analysis, one cannot arrive at clear conclusions 
applicable to any or all LAC countries. For each, detailed judgments have to be made, and much 
depends on the outcome of negotiations. As noted at the end of this paper, insofar as a trend towards 
regionalism diverts interest from or discourages progress in multilateral liberalization, the trend is 
undesirable for economies that are small and relatively less powerful in the world economy. But one can 
conceive of FTAs as supplements, rather than alternatives, for multilateral liberalization, and in any case 
the LAC countries cannot have a very significant effect on international negotiations. The world 
environment is a given.
To summarize, because of the reciprocity effect, LAC countries are highly likely to benefit from 
forming FT As with the United States. They can avoid trade diversion if they wish, and they should 
welcome the additional domestic liberalization and assurance of its continuance that an FTA can provide. 
Various qualifications to these conclusions have been noted—including the need to change domestic 
policies to suit U.S. domestic pressure groups, and the possibility that at various times some protection 
directed against imports from outside may be unavailable (if there are severe adverse shocks on particular 
industries), and this would then lead to costly trade diversion.
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NORTH-SOUTH TRADE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAS: 
THE CASE FOR FREE TRADE
Rudiger Dornbusch
Free trade in the Western Hemisphere is in the common interest of all participants. With 
benefits for all, the extension of NAFTA to the entire Americas is a priority trade initiative. Regional 
integration represents a parallel track strategy to the GATT process. GATT has served well in the 
postwar period, especially in the North Atlantic. It can yield additional benefits in the ambitious 
liberalization targets set in the Uruguay Round for agriculture, trade in services, dispute settlement, and 
intellectual property rights.
GATT explicitly recognizes regional free trade agreements as an exception to the MFN rules. 
Europe has taken advantage of that exception throughout the postwar period and has derived peace and 
prosperity from that strategy. And because the trade integration strategy has been so obviously 
successful, it is now being applied to the transition economies in the East. The United States can only 
gain from emulating the European precedent and example.
Today the United States has an unusual opportunity to implement an outward-looking trade policy 
with Latin America. Looking for modernization as the way out of a difficult economic situation, Latin 
America today is open to far-reaching trade reform. If we miss this opportunity, we are bound to fail 
building an important Western Hemisphere trade and investment bloc in the 1990s. Failure to act on 
trade opening means inviting a slowdown—if not failure—of the reform movement and a resurgence of 
protectionism throughout Latin America and beyond.
Democracy, workers’ rights, safety, and environmental standards are obvious issues on the 
political agenda of modern, open economies. A free trade agreement supports modernization in the 
region and thus nurtures these objectives. It will also help raise wages back to their 1980 levels and 
beyond. By contrast, trade restrictions in the North will mean even more poverty in the South; and more 
poverty means fewer rights and a greater risk of political radicalism, neither of which is in the interest 
of the United States.
Regional Trade Arrangements and the GATT
Concerns about pursuing regional trade liberalization stem from fears about the dynamics of the 
multilateral trading system (MTS).1 If the United States were to pursue a bilateral route and set up a 
preferential trade block, would there be a risk of the formation of other, competing block? And if that 
were to happen, could one be certain that there would not be a 1930s-style decline in world trade? 
Fieleke (1992) has rightly emphasized that four fifths of world trade is conducted within trading blocs: 
intraregional trade in the EC, EFTA, and the U.S.-Canada free trade agreement already account for 61
1. For d iscussion  o f  the issue o f  regionalism  and its developm ent, see L loyd  (1992 ), de la  Torre and K elly  
(1 9 9 2 ), F ieleke (1 9 9 2 ), and Finger (1992). See also Park and Y oo  and de M elo , Panagariya and R odrik (1992).
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percent of world trade, and various other groups make up the balance. Indeed, the expansion of world 
trade in the postwar period depended on the ability of regional arrangements to facilitate acceptance of 
otherwise difficult trade liberalization.
Opposition to regional approaches is to a great extent a negative reaction to the untried. But it 
also seems that the general principle of bilateralism appears far more offensive, and is more readily 
challenged, than any particular implementation, and more so when the United States sees itself as the 
custodian of a policy tradition of multilateralism it helped to create in the 1930s. The multilateral system 
has served well—and still does—but it certainly does not represent a unique and exclusive path to freer 
trade.
Until recently the policy debate in the United States has been hostile to regional trade 
arrangements or bilateralism. The status quo position of those who favor an open trading system is the 
GATT-based multilateral approach. Few among the protagonists of the status quo ask of the GATT 
process where the gains will be and when they come, if at all—negotiations take a decade or more. The 
beneficial effects of the status quo are taken for granted, and the only counterfactual is a world without 
trade.
Regionalism (and even more so, bilateralism) has an unnecessarily bad name. The gains from 
the multilateral approach in the past have been significant and are not in question; but the pace at which 
the process delivers extra gains is slowing down. Moreover, trade policy initiatives in Europe and Asia 
are working quite possibly to the detriment of production located in the United States. In such an 
environment a search for a more effective U.S. trade policy assumes special importance. To reap the 
real income gains that freer trade can offer, the U.S. must not limit negotiations to the multilateral 
process.
Moreover, if the system is open in the sense of allowing conditional MFN access, a bilateral 
initiative can become a vehicle for freer regional trade. Regional initiatives move the world economy 
toward freer trade, complementing the MTS where it heads in that direction or filling a vacuum in the 
quest for freer trade in those areas where GATT has tacitly accepted the status quo or even a slide into 
protectionism.
In the past thirty years and the GATT notwithstanding, Europe has used regional approaches 
repeatedly, from the European Payments Union to the Common Market, EFTA, and the Europe 92 
initiative. Few questions have been raised about the wisdom of that strategy, whether it amounted to 
deepening the extent of integration or widening the scope to include Greece, Portugal, North Africa, and 
Turkey. Developments in Eastern Europe offer the prospect that this region will soon enjoy preferred 
trade status with the Common Market, just as all of EFTA already does.
Europe’s major regional effort negates any conceivable argument that a United States free trade 
bloc policy would undermine an otherwise intact MTS. The Europe 92 project so clearly foreshadows 
trade discrimination that the EFTA partners are scrambling to join it for fear of being left out in the cold. 
A U.S. policy of building a trade block is certainly not the first or even a decisive trespass on a system 
of more open trade. As Figure 1 shows, Europe’s trade is 70 percent intra-European. No one would 
argue that the rapid growth of intra-European trade is the product of a destructive, inward-looking 
strategy. On the contrary, it is giving energetic support to the idea of trade liberalization.
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Figure 1. 
Intra-EC/EFTA Trade 
(percent of total EC/EFTA Trade)
A Snapshot of the Americas











United States 253 5,678 22,443 15.45
Canada 27 574 21,259 17.31
Western
Hemisphere3 450 1,000 2,222
Brazil 153 418 2,732 2.55
Mexico 88 248 2,818 2.17
a. Estimate.
Sources: The World Bank, United States Department of Labor, and national sources.
2 . T he year 1991 w as the m ost recent w ith  com plete G D P  data for every country in  the region  at the tim e o f
w riting.
35
Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere
The very first impression is the disproportionate weight of the United States. Even using the 
World Bank’s ICP measures of per capita income, the discrepancy between North and South is still a 
factor of 4.3 Canada, although rich in per capita terms, is not an economic giant compared to Latin 
American economies. In fact, Brazil is a close second. Third, the per-capita and wage discrepancies are 
of a factor of 10. The exact number does not make much difference: the fact is that the gap will last for 
many decades. Barro and Sala-y-Martin (1991) have studied the pace of convergence among regions. 
They conclude that the per-capita GDP gap between regions shrinks at the rate of 0.02 percent per year. 
Even if that estimate is pessimistic in view of the increasing possibilities of integration—this is no longer 
the U.S. North and South, without communications—there is no prospect of a near-equalization in 50 
years. This point is important since it establishes that the regions are starkly unequal in their incomes.
The other point to consider is the state of trade integration. Table 2 shows some data on 
merchandise trade. Two facts stand out: first, Canada has virtually no trade with Latin America. Surely 
only the special dynamics of a free trade agreement will change that. Second, intra-Western Hemisphere 
trade is very small, and this fact raises the question whether North-South integration will substantially 
improve intra-Western Hemisphere trade integration. If regional schemes have failed, can a North-South 
deal do more? Third (not shown in the table) is the fact that more than half of the United States-Western 
Hemisphere link reflects the special relationship between the U.S. and Mexico. This fact immediately 
invites the question whether direct “neighborhood” effects have a very special role that cannot be equaled 
by simple free trade.
Table 2 






U.S. — 95.6 57.6
Canada 85.1 — 4.0
Western
Hemisphere 63.5 2.4 21.0
World 421.8 121.2 140.4
Pet. of GDP 7.0 24.2 13.6
a. 1989
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics
3 . A ccord ing to the W orld B ank’s ICP measure o f  per capita real G D P , the U nited States in 1990 stands at 
$ 2 1 ,3 6 0 , Canada at $ 1 9 ,6 5 0 , Brazil at $ 4 ,7 5 0 , and M exico  at $ 5 ,9 8 0 .
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Another point that emerges from the table is the relative closedness of the South as measured by 
the share of trade in GDP. This reflects substantially the closedness of the Brazilian economy. In part 
that is a characteristic of a large, diversified economy. But in part it is also a reflection of a very 
determined commercial policy in the past designed to keep out imports of manufactured goods.
Free Trade in the Americas: The Perspective of the United States
Several important trends in the world make pursuit of free trade agreements among the countries 
of North and South America an important, productive trade strategy. The arguments are first considered 
from the perspective of the United States.
■ Latin America has the potential to be an important trading partner; yet its economies (for 
the most part) are still relatively closed. Except in Chile, the process of unilateral 
opening is just now getting under way, and the starting point is one of severe restrictions: 
huge tariffs, pervasive quotas, and impermeable permit systems. Consider, for example, 
tariffs in Argentina.
Table 3
Argentina: Average Tariff Rates 
(Percent)
1976 1980 1989 1991
55.9 27.8 23.8 9.4
Source: GATT (1992)
Another measure of this closedness is imports per capita. In part, of course, they reflect the low 
level of income. But in part it is also as reflection of restrictive commercial policies. It is useful to 
bypass oil imports in countries such as Brazil. For that purpose we can look directly at trade with the 
United States. The contrast between Chile and Mexico, which have opened up, and Brazil and Argentina 
is striking.
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Table 4 












The counterpart of this closedness is that there are important markets which, if opened, would 
bring very substantial gains in productivity, and hence in living standards, in the course of trade reform. 
A clear demonstration is given by the (unilateral) Mexican trade liberalization in 1988. Within a single 
year, Mexican imports from the United States increased by $6 billion. That represents a larger increase 
than the entire prospective gain from the U.S.-Canadian free trade agreement.
■ All of Latin America is reforming and modernizing in a way we have not seen since early 
in this century. The momentum, direction, and success of these reforms must be 
strengthened by a partnership that makes it difficult for Latin America to move back and 
delivers tangible benefits to offset the immediately visible costs of opening up. Having 
encouraged the modernization, it would be unwise for the United States to walk away 
from participation and partnership in the process.
■ Regionalism has been a successful strategy in Europe throughout the postwar period, and 
it is now being driven at a far more ambitious pace. The merging of EFTA and the EC 
and the creation of a “European space” are already moving toward realization. An Asian 
co-prosperity sphere around Japan is also in the making.
Economic modernization demands a wider scope for economic activity, and the regional level 
offers the most concrete setting in which to visualize the benefits and hence find the willingness to make 
the concessions. These regional developments are not a threat to multilateralism; rather, they are a means 
to break down barriers on a limited regional scale and in so doing create precedents, blueprints, and 
competitive forces that will help drive a broader liberalization effort.
■ Latin America represents a national security interest. If freer access to the U.S. market 
and less restriction on trade (at least from the United States) can help reduce the
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economic problems of Latin America, then a useful purpose is immediately served. It 
is appalling to imagine the risks of Latin America’s falling into poverty and destitution 
like that in Haiti to recognize that there would be serious consequences, certainly in 
terms of migration, for the rich North.
With the spreading of democracy in Latin America, the United States has focused on deepening 
democracy and broadening trade policy to economic and special objectives including (in particular) labor 
standards and the environment. The opening and modernization of Latin America through trade and 
investment is a certain way to encourage the process and help shape the agenda. Limiting trade 
opportunities would not only set back modernization, but it would also certainly mean lower standards 
for workers and for the environment.
■ Latin American also is the United States’ fastest-growing market. Free trade with Latin 
America cannot solve the U.S.’s economic problems, but Latin America is still an 
important market, and the U.S. trade posture has important implications for Latin 
America’s prosperity and hence U.S. security.
One must also bear in mind a longer-run perspective of Latin American markets. Latin 
America’s population is almost twice that of the United States, and its economic growth will be 
substantial. If Latin America recovers economically (and the United States can certainly invest in that 
prospect), it will ultimately become a very significant market for U.S. exports.
To understand the prospects of an opening of markets in the South, Mexico’s trade liberalization 
highlights two features. First, LDCs’ markets are extraordinarily closed, and trade liberalization has 
potential for substantial increases in U.S. exports. The second point is that the first round of Mexican 
liberalization, even though it benefited overwhelmingly the United States, also allowed other countries 
to participate. A free trade agreement with Latin America would yield for the United States a privileged 
status.
It might be argued that Mexico’s gains are already in place and there is little left for others. Of 
course, Brazil is far larger and offers a significant opportunity for increased trade over the next 20 years. 
It has a strong interest in unimpeded access to the U.S. market and offers an important market for U.S. 
exports. The current level of trade with Brazil is far below the country’s market potential, as Table 5 
shows.
Trade and Employment Effects
The controversy surrounding the FTA with Mexico, and surely an FTA with all of Latin 
America, is misplaced. Free trade with Mexico will not bring about “an economic and social disaster 
for U.S. workers and their communities,” a view advanced by Thomas R. Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer 
of the AFL-CIO:
The enactment of a free trade agreement with Mexico, as proposed by President Bush,
would be an economic and social disaster for U.S. workers and their communities and
[would] do little to help the vast majority of Mexican workers.
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Table 5 











Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics
Specifically, according to opponents, trade opening with Mexico and beyond would cause an 
immediate loss of jobs in the United States, further job displacement once investment in Mexico has 
established alternatives to U.S.-located production, and cause a decline in real wages in the U.S.4 Any 
job losses are bad news at a time when real wages are depressed and employment is (at best) stagnant. 
But these issues must not become an argument for stopping a good move in trade policy that creates good 
jobs at home. The Clinton administration committed itself to the implementation of NAFTA, but 
organized labor and other groups opposing trade liberalization are far from accepting the situation.
Even if trade liberalization causes some dislocation, that must not freeze the United States into 
maintaining the status quo for the sake of poor jobs. It is bad trade policy to keep workers and their 
children in poor jobs and to pervert protection to the point where the U.S. attracts immigrants to perform 
this work. We should not let go of competition. But, equally important, displaced workers require 
adjustment programs, skill-building, and education to help them qualify for good jobs. The scope for 
worker training and adjustment assistance should be enhanced and broadened to include both trade- and 
productivity-related job losses.
Concerns about the effect of free trade on jobs in the United States focus on Mexico’s low labor 
cost, far less than U.S. labor. But that would be true with or without free trade. Short of closing our 
economy, the U.S. will be unable to escape from the increasing ability of developing countries to produce 
manufactured goods at highly competitive prices. But the U.S. can turn the situation to its advantage by
4 . F or various perspectives see K oechlin  and Larudee (1992), B lecker (1 9 9 3 ), Faux and L ee (1992 ), Brown  
(1992 ), Learner (1992 ), O ffice  o f  T echnology  A ssessm ent (1992 ), and L ustig , B osw orth, and Law rence (1992 ).
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gaining access to new markets. Table 6 illustrates the dramatic effect of the opening of Mexico for U.S. 
exports.
Table 6
















Net U.S. Job Creation, 1986-90
30 Jobs per $1 million 25 Jobs per $1 million
144,531 120,450
Note: 30 jobs per $1 million exports is the number 
used by the Economic Policy Institute.
Several factors support the assertion that an FTA with Mexico cannot bring major harm and is 
very likely to be beneficial. First, Mexico is very small relative to the United States. Any significant 
increase in Mexican exports (measured on the U.S. scale) would increase labor requirements and wages 
in Mexico dramatically and thereby squash competitiveness.
Second, although Mexico’s labor costs are low relative to those in the United States, these labor 
costs also reflect (in many cases) low productivity, and in areas such as textiles the very low quality of 
output. The quality factor especially is a major obstacle to a dramatic development of Mexico’s exports.
Third, the United States has a very open economy. Competition from abroad is a reality. 
Protection continues only in a few sectors. Moreover, Mexico already enjoyed a privileged position both 
as a result of the GSP and—more important—as a consequence of the tnaquila program, which imposed 
U.S. duties only on the value added in Mexico. The combination of factors reduces the extra impact of 
U.S. trade liberalization to a few sectors and to a negligible total on aggregate employment and output. 
And the same is true for countries in Latin America.
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In the 1980s, a vastly overvalued dollar caused abnormal import competition, job losses, and a 
reduction in real wages in the U.S. No doubt some of the competition came from Latin America and 
helps explain the 0.5-1.0 percent decline in real wages attributable to import competition.5
The remedy is not to close down trade and reverse liberalization, but rather to seek markets and 
create extra opportunities in manufacturing, which have a demonstrable positive effect on earnings. That 
has now already happened with Mexico, and more is to come as Mexico prospers in the 1990s; still more 
is to be gained from access to Brazil and other protected markets of Latin America. Aggressive pursuit 
of market access is the sensible strategy for a country like the United States, which is already open and 
does not wish to close.
Who is Ready?
Consider the argument that a free-trade agreement among unequals is a bad idea. A common 
objection to the free trade agreement with Mexico was, and will be even more so with other countries 
in the Americas, that they are not ready, their economies are too unstable, their politics insufficiently 
settled, or their standard of living too low. The argument has also been made from the South: Chile has 
argued that it is ready but other countries in the region are not.
The argument is appealing, but it lacks substance. The United States is interested in export 
markets and regional stability. Trade is already taking place with these countries, and nobody can 
possibly argue that existing trade restrictions, here or there, help make their economies or their societies 
function better. It can be argued, however, that substantial trade and investment links will promote freer, 
more stable, and more prosperous societies. Hence, particularly for economies where much is to be 
accomplished—notably Brazil—the possibility of an FTA raise the stakes and will enhance and accelerate 
reform. Nobody is thinking of political union or EC-style deep integration, for which a very high level 
of community is essential. What is at stake is the removal of impediments to trade and investment.
It is clear that institutionalization of reform and the spreading of a modern business culture 
(which is incompatible with closed, politically opaque societies) are fundamental objectives of the U.S. 
Indeed, they are a U.S. contribution to the region. Who needs it most? Clearly countries like Brazil 
stand to benefit more than Chile, which has already made significant progress. That is not an argument 
against free trade with Chile, it is an argument against singling out the most established and achieved 
economies for early treatment.
When Europe brought Portugal, Greece, and Spain into its fold, the purpose was to spread 
irreversibly democratic institutions and progress. That the venture was successful is beyond question. 
The same argument applies to Latin America, whether Venezuela, Peru, or Brazil be the case in point.
5 . See also Brown (1992) and Faux and Less (1992) for the v iew  that trade liberalization destroys job s. For 
em pirical evidence on w age effects, see Brauer (1991 ), Kosters (1991 ), and R evenga (1992).
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How will the South Benefit?
The Americas need to take very seriously the need to review their medium-term economic 
strategies. In the United States the emphasis on education, skills, and investment moves in that direction. 
In the South some countries have made remarkable strides in moving to modern, stable economies. But 
that cannot be said of all: Brazil, for example, indulges reckless institutional and economic instability, 
as if these were the natural side effects of growing up. That is expensive: Asia is not waiting, as Table 7 
makes clear.
Table 7 
Economic Growth in Asia
1971-80 1981-90 1991 1992 1993a
Asian NICs 9.0 8.8 7.2 6.4 7.1
S.E. Asia 7.7 5.5 6.4 6.7 7.0
China 7.9 10.1 7.7 10.8 9.2
Source: Asian Development Bank
In Latin America, by contrast, economic performance has a very poor record. There are growth 
spurts to be seen in Chile, Argentina, and Venezuela, but in fact only Chile has accomplished deep and 
lasting reform.
What role can trade integration play in improving reform and growth? Estimates of the South’s 
benefits cover the gamut from enormous to nil. For Chilean policy makers, for example, an early free- 
trade agreement is seen as an essential step in a growth strategy. For Mexico’s policy makers, the 
passing of NAFTA by the United States Congress was an urgent prerequisite for progress in stabilization 
and modernization. For other countries, the urgency seems much less. In Colombia, the view is 
common that trade integration should proceed first with Venezuela, and after that “training round,” one 
might be ready for more. In Brazil trade issues have not gone beyond a general approval of unilateral 
trade liberalization with little trade strategy other than adherence to a GATT process.
Quantitative estimates of the trade benefits to Latin America are scarce. A study by Erzan and 
Yeats (1992) finds that the benefits would be minor. These authors conclude that where trade is not 
restricted by quotas, duties are low and trade is substantially unrestricted, at least for primary producing 
countries. By implication, these countries would stand to gain little from a free trade agreement. For 
manufacturing countries the presence of quotas and other nontariff barriers would be more of an issue. 
But even these hindrances might be passing in the context of the success of the Uruguay Round.
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Table 8
Economic Growth in Latin America
1981-91 1990 1991 1992a
Latin America 1.5 0.3 3.5 2.4
Argentina -0.7 0.4 7.3 6.0
Brazil 1.7 -4.4 0.9 -1.4
Chile 3.4 2.0 5.8 9.5
Mexico 2.0 4.4 3.6 2.5
Venezuela 1.5 6.8 10.2 7.5
a. Forecast 
Source: ECLAC
These minimalist estimates are worth noting, but there is no reason to believe that they 
give a realistic picture of the effects of an FTA. In part, of course, the trade effects derive from the 
immediate removal of barriers. In fact, however, the trade effects are much more sweeping when they 
come from an entire reorientation of the region to become a modern, outward-oriented, integrated part 
of the regional and world economy. In that broader sense, the move to an FTA represents nothing short 
of an upheaval.
A broader and more ambitious list of advantages includes removal of trade impediments, 
guaranteed market access, more assured modernization, and improved access to foreign direct investment.
■ Removal of trade impediments. The point has already been made that there are relatively 
few impediments to trade and relatively low tariff barriers except in hard-core protection 
areas. There is, of course, the need to make a distinction between nominal and effective 
rates of protection. The escalation of duty rates by stage of processing means that value 
added in manufacturing where material content is substantial exceeds substantially the 
nominal rate. Even so, these are not formidable tariff barriers. Exemption from these 
duties will still yield an advantage, even for countries that already enjoy GSP treatment.
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Raw materials 0.2 0.5
Semimanufactures 3.0 8.3
Finished materials 5.7 8.3
Source: Economic Report of the 
President, 1989
Trade restraints by quotas and voluntary export limitations are the more obvious area where large 
benefits might be accomplished—textiles, steel,and leather footwear are ordinarily high on the list, as are 
cheap glassware and certain agricultural products. There would be transition periods but ultimately 
markets would open, and with that opportunities would expand.
Of course, as these industries are opened to intra-FTA competition, the arguments for protection 
become weaker, and there is bound to be a parallel impetus for worldwide market opening. That 
diminishes the narrow benefits to the South but from a world point of view it reduces the discriminatory 
effects, which is all for the good and more so if it lies a decade or two in the future.
■ Guaranteed market access is an extraordinarily important assurance. The status quo 
today is free trade, and that is likely to continue. But there is no assurance that this will 
in fact be the case. With the United States middle class squeeze and falling real wages, 
there is substantial pressure to close off trade wherever it hurts.6 Thus, if there is a risk 
of the U.S. sliding into protectionism, an FT A creates a regional umbrella that protects 
against extreme damage.
The presence of such an umbrella has important consequences for business strategy. Without the 
assurance of market access, firms would have to be conservative in their growth strategy and could not 
in fact bank on the U.S. market. Being more prudent, they would limit their exposure and, as a result, 
their profitability. They would underinvest in trade expansion and hence the growth effects of 
modernization could be curtailed. By contrast, with assured trade access countries can take a regional 
view of their operation, merge across borders, and pursue a far grander strategy. This is where 
productivity gains become startlingly large and where the fixed costs of modernization are more easily 
amortized and hence more decisively incurred.
6 . See Brown (1992) for an unfortunately influential v iew  in this direction.
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■ Modernization is not a process that inevitably gathers momentum. Venezuela and Brazil 
have demonstrated how very precarious the process can be. It is therefore critical to 
muster all positive forces that strengthen the move toward modern, open societies and 
economies. One of these is clearly intercourse with the rest of the world. A free-trade 
agreement creates a very powerful momentum and, it may be argued, a quite irreversible 
one. The provision of open access in goods, services, and investment opens up a 
country’s business institutions to international competition, and inevitably imposes 
international standards. People soon adapt and practice those standards themselves, and 
require them of others. Traditional, inefficient, and opaque ways of doing business come 
into conflict with modern ones.
In Mexico one can see quite clearly how this works. In less than a generation, the way of doing 
business has changed. More striking even is the example of Chile now colonizing Argentineans: Chileans 
have learned how to do business and the Argentines have not yet—Chileans are all over Argentina making 
deals, merging, buying, and brokering. Ten years ago no one would have thought that Chile could one- 
up sophisticated Argentina. But in fact they have, and one can only applaud.
Modernization has an important impact onbusiness-government relations. Cumbersome and costly 
regulation encumbers competition and will be thrown off. Arbitrary government intervention makes firms 
uncompetitive: it will be done away with. Soon governments will perform by international standards. 
In a very real sense, a free trade agreement internationalizes an economy and in the process wipes out 
the hold of governments, monopolies, and restrictions on individual freedom and prosperity. The effect 
is often dramatic.
■ Foreign direct investment serves several basic functions: First, they add to national saving 
in financing investment. Second, they give access to markets and technology, 
piggybacking on the scale or scope of the foreign investor. Third, they serve as a broad 
mechanism of business modernization.
It is clear that some foreign direct investment will go anywhere. But it is equally clear that steady 
and substantial flows require an institutionally stable situation. A free trade agreement provides exactly 
that. First, the specific provisions regarding financial services create an essential legal environment to 
assure foreign investors. Second, the assurance of institutional stability that comes with economic 
integration offers an important impetus for foreign investors to concentrate their attention on a specific 
country.
Two dimensions are particularly critical. One is market access. The decision to locate in a 
particular region comes with two questions: what are production costs in the region? And what is the 
market access from that region. On both counts, a free trade agreement is favorable. On the cost side, 
import liberalization is likely to reduce production costs. On the market access side, it offers assurance 
that there will not be random or systematic reversal of opportunities to sell into a partner country market, 
specifically the United States.
What evidence is there to show that foreign direct investment is attracted by trade integration? 
Spain serves as a case in point. Figure 2 shows direct foreign investment in Spain over the past 20 years. 
These flows were small in the 1970s. Only with the prospect, and then the realization, of joining the 
Common Market in the mid-1980s did FDI take off. By 1990, Spain received $11 billion in direct
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foreign investment, more than 2 percent of its GNP. The evidence is not totally rigorous: in the absence 
of a Common Market link, there would still have been some increase simply because of Spain’s 
modernization. But even that modernization is at least in part the result of joining the Common Market.
Figure 2.
Foreign Direct Investment in Spain 
(percent of GDP)
In sum, the South has far more to gain than the elimination of a few tariffs. In the process of 
historical change as substantial as the shift to inward-looking economies 60 years ago, free trade with the 
North is a powerful help.
Which Model for Integration?
Latin America has been trying to achieve trade integration within the region for a long time. It 
would be difficult to call the previous efforts successful. Perhaps because the benefits seemed too small, 
or because the protectionist philosophy of import substitution was still too prevalent, the efforts never 
took off. The Andean Pact or the Central American Common Market have had their ups and downs, and 
the new MERCOSUR is certainly not in the express lane, even though it is meant to lead to complete free 
trade by 1994.
The great difficulty in negotiating regional arrangements is finding a place to start. One position 
is defensive: try and string out protection, pile up exception lists, and let that dominate the process. The 
other mechanism starts from the end and views the transition regime as the price. This second approach 
establishes that after 10 or 15 years there will in fact be free trade, and the only issue is, how to get 
there. Superficially the mechanisms might seem to be the same; in fact they are radically different. One 
arrives after a decade at free trade, the other a decade later is dissatisfied with the concept of regional 
integration.
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In larger groups the exception process is deadly. Trying to find the largest common denominator 
in a situation where many countries seek protection for the same industries means that the status quo will 
simply continue. An effective way to break the logjam is the adherence process to a mechanism that 
imposes as the rigorous sine qua non the terminal data for unrestricted free trade. The accession clause 
to NAFTA provides an effective mechanism to accomplish just that. This is not to say that NAFTA, 
viewed close-up, is pretty. In fact, the transition period is highly protectionist: for example, for 12 years 
there are severe restrictions on used-car imports into Mexico, for obvious reasons. But in the end, 10-15 
years is a very short time, and free trade waits at the end.
A useful approach to Latin America would be to target the MERCOSUR group (Brazil, Argentina, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay) for a free-trade area, including (if possible) Mexico and Canada. Once the 
principle is accepted and the outline of an agreement is in place, other Latin American countries could 
join.
The dynamics of concluding an FTA are important because of the trade diversion aspect. It would 
be a mistake to have a long, drawn-out process with much uncertainty about who can or cannot join in 
the end. Trade diversion in the interim and a halt to investment pending clarification could create 
unnecessary problems for countries that ultimately may be members but are not in the early rounds at the 
negotiating table. This argument enhances the case for using NAFTA as a blueprint and for an early and 
short time window for other countries to join. Anything more than two years would be unnecessar­
ily—and unproductively—long.
The fast-track approach is clearly the right way to proceed. Negotiations in any other setting are 
an invitation to cannibalize the agreements with exemptions and loopholes so that what is left in the end 
may not be worth having. The CBI—with its exception of sugar, textiles, and more—is a case in point. 
In a setting other than fast track, it is a foregone conclusion that politicians will have to seek “relief” and 
special advantages for their customers; they will be rewarded not by the end result but by the deviation 
from the norm that they can secure. The result, unfailingly, is a worthless agreement.
Even with the NAFTA in place, it must be made clear that Latin America should practice opening 
and clearing the trade field of the myriad obstacles still in place. Countries like Brazil have a lot of work 
to do in removing extensive tariffs and other controls on trade. Other countries—Chile and 
Argentina—are already far ahead.
The best approach is to focus on large blocks (the Mercosur is clearly the most interesting) and 
bring them in first, and quickly. For isolated countries—Chile or Costa Rica—a streamlined adhesion 
process without special provisions should be the rule.
Objectives
There ought to be a clear target on which no compromise should be allowed: anyone who 
wants to join must be ready to practice unrestricted free trade in goods, services, and investment with 
the partner countries by 2005. A successful FTA must make significant progress over and above what 
GATT has already delivered:
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■ Elimination of quotas and other nontariff barriers.7
■ Full inclusion of all services in the liberalization process.
■ Investment must be an integral part of the liberalization effort.
The review of the United States Advisory Committee (ACTN) of the U.S.-Mexico agreement 
offers a solid blueprint of just how ambitious the targets should be.8 An important payoff is required 
to undertake changes in trade policy in addition to GATT. The only worthwhile payoff is a far more 
ambitious agenda than what is now being undertaken at the multilateral level.
Three Concurrent Processes
It is important to conclude by emphasizing the complementarity of three approaches: participation 
in the MTS, unilateral trade liberalization, and a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Agreement. The first 
is a worldwide strategy because a regional strategy alone will not suffice. Each country in the region has 
important extraregional interests and must take care that the world economy sustains open markets and 
broadens the opening of markets.
The WHFTA is critical because it carries trade liberalization much further than can be done at the 
world level: the coverage of liberalization—goods, services, and investment—is more substantial and the 
liberalization is more complete. For countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, becoming a part of 
it is essential in order to avoid concentrated trade diversion effects.
Unilateral liberalization is important in order to avoid the costs of trade diversion when one is an 
importer. If Brazil, for example, has 40 percent tariffs and grants the United States or Mexico zero-duty 
access, the scope for very costly trade diversion is substantial. The only remedy is to go quite far in the 
direction of unilateral liberalization. Since the FTA has a timetable of a decade, there is no need to rush 
unilateral liberalization. But it is essential to let the FTA and the unilateral moves go hand in hand to 
minimize unnecessary and undesirable trade diversion effects.
The three-pronged strategy described here is favorable for the world economy. Its results will 
be more trade, less protection, and hence greater scope for multilateral opening over time.
7 . C ongressional Budget O ffice (1991) provides an update on  just how  costly  rem aining U .S . hard-core protection  
is for the U .S . econom y.
8. See A d v iso iy  C om m ittee (1992).
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THE NORTH AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: 
HEMISPHERIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
Robert A. Pastor1
When Mexico’s President Carlos Salinas de Gortari proposed to United States President George 
Bush a free trade agreement between the United States and Mexico, he shattered a national tradition. 
Since its revolution in the first decade of the twentieth century, Mexico has sought to maximize its 
autonomy by minimizing its relationship with the United States. Salinas’s proposal represented a 
profound break with Mexico’s past policies of economic defensiveness.
A regional trade agreement also represented a departure for the United States from its traditional 
global trade policy. That change first occurred when the United States responded positively to a proposal 
by Canada for a free-trade agreement. Salinas proposed to get Mexico into a new North American 
market. On December 17, 1992, the leaders of the three countries signed the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).
A steady process of integration between the three North American countries had led first Canada 
and then Mexico to recognize, albeit reluctantly, that their welfare depended on more, not less, economic 
interaction with their stronger neighbor, and on fair and predictable rules of trade and investment. Thus, 
NAFTA was not a decision to integrate but rather a decision to manage and enhance integration in a 
systematic fashion. As such, the agreement should be viewed not as the end of a negotiation but as the 
beginning of a long journey by the countries of North America to harmonize their policies.2
NAFTA was reshaped by the 1992 presidential campaign, and that reshaping had important long­
term implications for the substance of trade policy. President George Bush viewed NAFTA as an issue 
because he understood that it placed his competitor in an awkward position. If Bill Clinton supported 
NAFTA, he would alienate the labor unions and the environmentalists, who supported him. If he rejected 
NAFTA, he could be called a protectionist, a liability in a presidential candidate almost as serious as 
being called weak on defense. Clinton postponed a decision, but on October 4, in a comprehensive 
speech, he announced support for ratification in the context of a changed policy. He proposed negotiating 
three supplementary agreements with Mexico and Canada on labor and environmental issues and on 
unforeseen trade problems. In addition, he insisted that five sets of policies should be included in the 
implementing legislation to ensure that the benefits of trade would be shared. The premise of the Clinton 
alternative was that NAFTA was good for all three countries but was not good for all groups in the 
countries, and special policies were needed to help those who would pay the price of freer trade. The 
election of President Clinton in November 1992 thus had the effect of changing the direction of U.S. 
trade policy.
1. The author is grateful to M ichael D iscenza for assistance in collectin g  data and preparing the tables and 
figures.
2. For an extensive d iscussion  o f  N A F T A  and the new  relationships that it w ill create, see Robert A . Pastor, 
In te g ra tio n  w ith  M e x ic o : O ptions f o r  U .S . P o licy  (N ew  York: Twentieth Century Fund 1993).
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While NAFTA will affect its three members the most, its impact will extend far beyond North 
America. Mexico’s proposal sent shock waves so strong that ripples were felt in Chile as well as in Asia 
and Europe. Latin Americans had grown accustomed to Mexico’s vetoing United States initiatives and 
asserting its separateness and independence. When Mexico’s president opened the door of the U.S. 
market, he discarded the veto, and other Latin American governments hastily tried to get through the 
door and secure a place in the U.S. market as well. President Bush responded with the Enterprise for 
the Americas Initiative on June 27, 1990. The initiative promised to expand NAFTA if the other 
governments in the hemisphere opened their economies and liberalized their trade and investment as 
Mexico had done. The Clinton amendments will mean that environmental and social issues will be 
incorporated into the agenda of trade negotiations. The decision by the world’s largest trading nation to 
pursue a regional agreement affected the entire world, but Europe was mainly preoccupied with the 
aftermath of the Cold War and the deepening and widening of the European Community. Japan was 
more dependent on the U.S. market than Europe was and than the U.S. was on Japan’s, and it was 
acutely sensitive to the potential ramifications of NAFTA. Japanese manufacturers feared that North 
America could become an exclusive bloc and impede Japan’s trade.
Some countries feared that NAFTA would lead, either directly or indirectly, to a collapse of the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations. The questions asked most frequently by economists and 
policy makers were whether NAFTA would be a stumbling block to global trade negotiations or a 
building block, and whether it would lead to a break-up of the global trading system or stimulate GATT 
to surmount the many obstacles in its path.
This paper will explore the hemispheric and global causes and consequences of NAFTA. The 
thesis is that NAFTA represents a crucial development for North America, the Western Hemisphere, and 
the world. NAFTA does not represent an exclusive trading bloc but rather the deepening of the last 
major trading area in the world: North America and eventually the Western Hemisphere. It is needed 
by the United States and the hemisphere because it comes at a moment when the GATT is languishing, 
unable to resolve the many tenacious issues on its agenda. Europe is turning inward, and Japan is 
increasingly oriented toward Asia. NAFTA will generate needed growth in Mexico, improve the 
efficiency of North American corporations, and lay the foundation for a new economic edifice that will 
benefit the three countries.
NAFTA’s extension to the rest of the countries of the Americas could modernize political and 
economic relations within the Western Hemisphere, and it has the potential of making the Americas the 
center of the global economy and the model for North-South relations in the twenty-first century. 
Finally, at the global level, NAFTA could be a catalyst for expanding trade and improving the rules and 
institutions of the world trading system.
This is not to suggest that there won’t be significant costs to NAFTA: there will be, as there 
always is with revolutionary change. Rapid growth entails dislocations and changes in the distribution 
of wealth. The issue for the three governments is to anticipate and respond effectively to those changes 
and ensure that the benefits of trade are shared with those who will initially suffer from NAFTA’s 
progress. The issue is whether the United States, Canada, and Mexico are prepared to build the kinds 
of institutions that will reduce the risks, minimize the costs, and improve the prospects for sustainable 
growth and trade. That question remains to be answered.
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To appreciate the significance of NAFTA, it is necessary to place it in historical and global 
context. In Part I, this paper discusses the theory of geopolitics and panregions and the relationship 
between geopolitical power and trade. It then describes the evolution of the post-World War II 
international economy and examines whether multilateralism is exhausted and whether regionalism is a 
threat or a stimulus to global trade. With this information as background, Part II describes the NAFTA 
agreement and the North American trading area. The hemispheric implications and choices that NAFTA 
poses are the subject of Part III, and Part IV offers recommendations on how NAFTA can (1) be 
sustained, deepened, and extended in North America; (2) stimulate freer trade and forge a democratic 
community in the Americas; and (3) solidify a more open and effective global trading system.
Geopolitics and Panregions: Theory and Reality
In the nineteenth century, German scholars developed the concept of “Geopolitik,” a world 
divided by geography and politics into “panregions.” The unification of Germany in 1871 and the new 
confidence that accompanied it gave rise to this idea. The premise of this world view was that powerful 
states needed Lebensraum (living space).3 The new German state sought room to expand and ideas to 
justify its expansion. The debate on the proper physical and ideological path to expansion continued 
through the 1930s.
One model was that of the United States: a large, unpopulated territory and informal control in 
the Western Hemisphere and parts of the Pacific. Building on this idea in the 1930s, G. Haushofer, a 
German scholar, suggested that Japan and Germany should try to emulate this model, and he drew up 
maps that reflected three panregions: Europe and Africa with Germany at its center, East Asia with Japan 
as the dominant power, and the Western Hemisphere with the United States at its core. A fourth 
panregion composed of Russia extending west to Poland, east to the Pacific, and south to Afghanistan 
was noted in several studies of the period, but few German “Geopolitikers” considered the Russian 
panregion as powerful as the other three.
The twentieth century can be viewed as a multisided clash between the new powers of Germany, 
Japan, and the United States and the old empires of England, France, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman, and 
China. The major wars in this century—from the Russo-Japanese War through the two world wars and 
the many engagements of the Cold War—were a struggle to rearrange the world’s geography by one or 
more of the three core nations. The explanatory power of the geopolitical theory is not only evident in 
the devastating wars but also in the fact that the three nations that arrived to challenge the world powers 
at the dawn of the twentieth century stand unrivaled at the century’s close.4
The relationship between geopolitical power and world trade has never been disputed, although 
its precise nature has been subject to varying interpretations. It is obvious that world trade has never 
been organized at random: nations do not trade equally with others. Geography has been an important
3 . For a survey o f  the literature on this subject, see John O ’Loughlin  and Herman van der W üsten, "Political 
Geography o f  Panregions," G eog rap h ica l R eview , V o l. 80 , N o . 1 (January 1990): 1-20.
4 . For an articulate and inform ed exam ination o f  this three-sided struggle, see Jeffrey E. Garten, A  C o ld  Peace: 
A m erica , Japan , G erm any, an d  the  S truggle f o r  Suprem acy  ( N .Y .: T im es B ooks, a Twentieth Century Fund B ook, 
1992).
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factor explaining trade patterns, but until the post-World War II era of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), it has been less important than politics. Trade followed the flag.
Empires were created and maintained to supply the resources and provide the markets for the 
imperial nation. In the cases of England and France, the empires were widely dispersed geographically, 
with colonies on many continents. The logic of politics prevailed over that of geography, as can be seen 
in the dominant role of France in trade in Indochina and England in Australia.
In contrast, the United States historically relied less on trade than other industrialized countries 
(Table 1), and it did not seek to carve Latin America into an exclusive trading zone. Until the First 
World War, U.S. trade with Latin America was often less than Europe’s trade in the region. But the war 
separated Europe from the Western Hemisphere, and afterwards its devastating effect on Europe’s 
economies compelled Britain, France, and Germany to retrieve overseas capital to pay debts and rebuild.
Table 1
Share of Exports in GDP, 1900-1990 
(Percent)
1900 1915 1930 1945 1960 1975 1990
U nited  States 5 .6 2 5 .7 6 6 .0 4 3 .4 7 5 .8 0 6 .8 4 7 .2 3
Canada 13.41 16 .36 2 2 .51 30 .41 17 .62 2 2 .9 0 2 6 .4 7
M exico 17.51 2 2 .9 2 12 .40 14 .09 1 0 .34 5 .7 7 17.63
Latin Am erica 2 0 .0 0 18 .00 19 .00 9 .5 0 7 .0 0 5 .2 0 7 .5 0
O ECD 1 2 .00 13 .50 11 .00 8 .0 0 1 2 .00 16 .50 18 .50
Europe
U nited K ingdom 2 4 .1 7 2 2 .11 18 .87 8 .1 4 2 0 .0 0 2 5 .2 6 2 6 .1 5
France n .a . n .a . 10.76 16 .06 14 .50 19.06 2 0 .8 0
Germ any n.a . n .a . n .a . 11 .32 18 .99 2 4 .8 0 2 5 .41
Japan n.a. n .a . 19.43 1 .02 10.71 12 .80 11.18
W orld 9 .0 0 12 .00 7 .0 0 6 .5 0 9 .0 0 13 .00 14 .50
N ote: D ata for the com posite groups are estim ated from  the W orld D evelopm ent R eport, 1992.
At the same time, both the war and its aftermath caused the United States to concentrate its trade 
in the Western Hemisphere. Due to these two shifts—Europe inward and the United States 
southward—the United States emerged from the First World War with an exaggerated degree of economic 
dominance in the Americas. The U.S. share of the Latin American market grew from 18 percent in 1912 
to 42 percent in 1920, and the United States went from being a debtor before the First World War to the 
world’s largest creditor afterwards. Prior to the war, U.S. foreign investment in Latin America ranked
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considerably below Great Britain’s. But by 1930, the United States had $5 billion of investments in Latin 
America—one third of its total overseas investments and more than the investments of European nations.5
The United States’ self-image, however, did nqt readily adjust to world leadership. Indeed, the 
passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 was yet another example of U.S. insularity. It raised U.S. 
tariffs on more than 20,000 products to an average of more than 50 percent, and President Herbert 
Hoover defended tariffs as “solely a domestic question in protection of our own people.”6 The law 
exacerbated the U.S. economic depression and further weakened world trade. Cordell Hull, the Secretary 
of State in Franklin Roosevelt’s administration, was a devoted free-trader, and he marshalled support in 
Congress for the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, which delegated to the president authority 
to reduce tariffs by reciprocal trade agreements with other governments. The new trade policy became 
a key element of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy. Sixteen of 22 trade agreements negotiated by the 
Roosevelt administration were with Latin American governments.
The effect of the Second World War on the magnitude and patterns of trade and investment in 
the Western Hemisphere was similar to that of the First World War. The United States and Latin 
America were drawn closer together as European markets closed, and after the war Europe was immersed 
in reconstruction. In 1945, 58 percent of Latin America’s imports came from the United States, and 
49 percent of its exports went to the United States. Latin America also become more important to 
Washington. In 1945, 42 percent of U.S. imports came from Latin America, and 14 percent of its 
exports went there.7
During World War II, U.S. policy makers began to contemplate involving Europe in global free- 
trade agreements that would require breaking up prewar trade blocs by our allies as well as by our 
enemies. The price that the United States extracted from Great Britain in exchange for lend-lease 
agreements in World War II was an end to imperial preferences and acceptance of a nondiscriminatory, 
reciprocal trading system based on most-favored-nation status.8
The principle of nondiscrimination became the centerpiece of the General Agreements on Tariffs 
and Trade, signed by 23 countries in Geneva on October 30, 1947, under the leadership of the United
5. Joseph S. T ulchin, The A fterm ath  o f  W a r: W o rld  W a r I  and  U .S . P o licy  T o w ard  L a tin  A m erica  (N ew  York: 
N ew  Y ork U niversity  Press, 1971), pp. 38-79; A lbert F ish low , The M a tu re  N e ig h b o r P o licy : A  N e w  U n ited  States 
E conom ic  P o licy  f o r  L a tin  A m erica  (Berkeley: U niversity o f  C alifornia Institute o f  International Studies, 1977), pp. 
3, 7 , 12.
6 . W illiam  Starr M yers and W alter H . N ew ton, The H o o v e r A d m in is tra tio n : A  D ocum ented  N a rra tiv e  (N .Y .:  
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936), pp. 493 -495 . For a review  o f  Sm oot-H aw ley and the evolution  o f  U .S . trade 
p olicy , see Robert A . Pastor, Congress and  the P o litics  o f  U .S . F ore ig n  E conom ic  P o licy  (Berkeley: U niversity  o f  
California Press, 1980), Part II, pp. 67-200 .
7 . Joseph S. T ulchin, The A fterm ath  o f  W a r: W o rld  W a r  I  an d  U .S . P o licy  T o w ard  L a tin  A m erica  (N ew  York: 
N ew  Y ork U niversity Press, 1971), pp. 38-79; A lbert F ish low , The M a tu re  N e ig h b o r P o licy: A  N e w  U n ited  States 
E conom ic  P o licy  f o r  L a tin  A m erica  (Berkeley: U niversity o f  C alifornia Institute o f  International Studies, 1977), pp. 
3 , 7 , 12.
8. Richard N . Gardner, S te r lin g -D o lla r  D ip lo m a c y : A ng lo -A m erican  C o llab o ra tio n  in  the Reconstruction o f  
M u lt i la te ra l  T rad e  (O xford, England: Clarendon Press, 1956).
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States. World trade has expanded more rapidly than world production virtually every year since 1947, 
thus enhancing global interdependence.
Together with decolonization, the GATT rearranged global trading patterns around panregions, 
reflecting the importance of geography.9 Between 1960 and 1980, Japan became the leading trading 
partner in most of non-Communist Asia; the Federal Republic of Germany became the trading center of 
Europe; and the United States was dominant in the Western Hemisphere. Two scholars of geography 
summarized the overall effect of these changes: “While the technical impediments to trade over long 
distances have largely been overcome, intense (macro-) regional trade relations, mainly shaped by a 
limited number of dominating centers, are becoming an increasingly salient feature of the global trade 
map.”10
Evolution of the Global Trade System
In theory, GATT was multilateral and nondiscriminatory; in practice, the United States made 
mostly unilateral concessions in Geneva and in subsequent trade negotiations in order to allow Europe 
and Japan time to recover economically. That was the price of leadership, and some have argued that 
without paying such a price, the world economy would not have recovered and the global economic 
institutions—the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the GATT—would not have been 
established.11 But by 1962, Europe had recovered and the dollar was under pressure. The United States 
demanded reciprocity.
President John F. Kennedy obtained authority from Congress to pursue a new round of trade 
negotiations to achieve that purpose. The Kennedy Round concluded on June 30, 1967, with 46 nations 
agreeing to reduce the average tariff for industrialized countries to a point—about 9 percent—where it 
ceased being an impediment to trade. From 1946 to 1967, U.S. exports tripled, from about $10 billion 
to about $31 billion, and world trade nearly quintupled, from about $55 billion to about $235 billion.
Tariffs continued to decline to less than 5 percent by 1990. By then, the agenda of trade 
negotiations had changed. The principal issue became nontariff barriers, which Robert Baldwin defines 
as “any measure (public or private) that causes internationally traded goods and services, or resources 
devoted to the production of these goods and services, to be allocated in such a way as to reduce potential 
real world income.”12 What this entails is virtually every domestic or regulatory policy—anything that
9 . T . N ierop and S. de V o s, "Of Shrinking Empires and Changing R oles: W orld Trade Patterns in  the Postwar 
Period," T ijd sch rift voor Econ. en Soc. G eogra fie  (Am sterdam , N etherlands), 7 9 , N r. 5 (1988): 343 -3 6 4 .
10. Ib id ., p . 362.
11. This is the theory o f  hegem onic stability - that global pow ers pay a price o f  leadership to build and maintain  
the international system . See Charles P. K indleberger, The W o rld  in  Depression, 1 9 2 9 -1 9 3 9  (Berkeley: U niversity  
o f  C alifornia Press, 1973); and Robert O . K eohane, A fte r H egem ony: C ooperation  and  D is c o rd  in  the  W o rld  
P o lit ic a l Econom y  (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1984).
12. Robert E . B aldw in, N o n -T a r if f  D is to rtio ns  o f  In te rn a tio n a l T rade  (W ashington, D .C .: B rookings Institution, 
1970), pp. 2 -5 .
58
The North America Free Trade Agreement: Hemispheric and Geopolitical Implications
would confer an advantage on an import or a disadvantage to an export. Safety, health, labor, or 
environmental standards; services; intellectual property rights; agricultural subsidies; investment 
restrictions; tax incentives or liabilities; discriminatory procurement procedures—these and others become 
subject to negotiations.
It is not surprising that these issues have proven to be far more difficult to negotiate, particularly 
in forums with more than 100 countries. The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations began in 1986 to deal 
with the new agenda of services, agriculture, textiles, intellectual property rights, trade-related investment 
measures, and dispute-settlement mechanisms, all issues that had been too difficult to address, let alone 
resolve, in the past. Although the Uruguay Round was supposed to end by December 1990, it was still 
far from finished by January 1993. Part of the problem was the complex agenda. Many of the nontariff 
issues were hard to grasp technically and quite sensitive politically.
Another reason for the stagnation of the GATT was the relative decline of the economic power 
of the United States. Germany overtook the United States as the world’s premier exporter in 1990, and 
while the United States regained the lead in 1991, the point is that no nation—neither the United States, 
Germany, nor Japan—had sufficient power to lead the GATT to closure.
The slide in U.S. leadership was evident in its change from creditor to debtor status. During the 
1980s, trade deficits increased to over $100 billion: this shift put severe strains on U.S. manufacturers 
and evoked new calls for protection. The dollar sank in value relative to both the deutsch mark and the 
yen, but the U.S. trade deficit remained chasmic. Fiscal deficits were two to four times larger than the 
U.S. trade deficit and constrained Washington’s interest in acting as the global leader.
Universalism versus Regionalism
The relative weakening of the economy of the United States coincided with other changes in the 
hemisphere and led to the first policy dent in the global armor of U.S. foreign economic policy. In 1982, 
partly because of scarce resources for aid but mostly because of security concerns about leftist influence 
in the Caribbean Basin, President Ronald Reagan turned to trade policy as an instrument for combatting 
leftist subversion. He proposed granting one-way free trade on a wide range of products from countries 
in the region. The countries were so small and the motive was so patently strategic that no major nation 
protested, but the significance of the act was not lost on those who viewed a global trading system as 
sacrosanct. The next exception occurred in the free-trade treaty with Israel in 1985, but for the same 
reasons, no concerns were raised.
In 1986, the European Community (EC) decided to attempt creation of a single common market 
with no internal barriers to trade, investment, travel, and immigration, all within six years. The United 
States had been one of the principal sources of encouragement to the Europeans to unite. The real genius 
of the Marshall Plan was not the $17 billion in aid but the condition that Europe could obtain the aid only 
if it developed a common plan that promoted regional cooperation. Through a series of steps, France 
and Germany and later five other European nations forged new institutions and bonds that paved the way 
for the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) with the signing of the Treaty of Rome 
in 1957.
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The United States accepted a provision in GATT—Article XXIV—that allowed for exceptions in 
cases of customs unions or free-trade areas, provided the preferential trade reductions for the group were 
eventually to eliminate all barriers to trade within the subset of countries. Two difficult questions were 
posed by the EEC. First, it was by no means certain that a l l  barriers to trade would ever be eliminated 
and, indeed, 36 years later barriers still remain. Second, the EEC insisted on discriminatory preferences 
for 18 ex-colonies in Africa; this also violated the GATT. Nonetheless, the United States promoted the 
EEC’s application under Article XXIV because of the larger goal of promoting European cooperation and 
security, and it never deviated from its support of European integration despite the fact that the region 
had become a formidable competitor in world trade.
But the deepening and widening of the EC in the late 1980s coincided with serious economic 
troubles in the United States. The result was that the nations of North America began to look to each 
other to build a regional trading area. First, Canada proposed a free-trade agreement with the United 
States, and that came into effect in January 1989. Given the magnitude of the trade between the two 
countries—the highest between any two in the world—this exception was taken seriously. Within 18 
months, Mexico decided to join this broader trading community.
The end of the Cold War played a role in the movement toward regionalism. Indeed, it had an 
effect on United States-Latin American trade similar to that of the end of the two world wars. The 
degree of U.S. dominance in Latin American trade declined sharply between 1950 and 1980. But from 
1986 to 1991, as the Cold War wound down, the United States increased its market share of OECD 
exports to Latin America from roughly 50 percent to 58 percent. 13 As in the previous cases, the change 
had less to do with the war, hot or cold, or U.S. policy than it did with European self-preoccupation. 
That was the point of departure for NAFTA. The idea of a free trade area for North America was 
hardly new: it has often been proposed by American academics or politicians, but just as often rejected 
by Mexico. What made NAFTA possible was that a Mexican president proposed it. Although his main 
motive was to enhance Mexico’s development, an important factor was the way the world was organizing 
itself.
Salinas went to Europe in early 1990 to encourage investment in Mexico, but Europe was focused 
on deepening the European Community by 1992, considering a widening of the EC to include 
Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, and sorting through the implications of the end of the Cold War. When 
he turned next to Japan to offset U.S. investment, he found the Japanese hesitant for two reasons. First, 
they were devoting much of their external energies in Asia—investing in China and Southeast Asia, trying 
to expand their markets there, and developing the yen as an alternative currency. Second, Japan’s most 
important alliance and market was the United States, and Japan knew the relationship between the United 
States and Mexico was awkward. Japan apparently decided not to get too close to Mexico for fear it 
would create problems with its more important ally. It was only when Salinas realized that the European 
and the Asian options were closed that he turned to the United States.
When the Cold War ceased, world power shifted as much as it had after the two world wars. 
Russia declined to the economic level of the third world, and the United States found itself competing 
on a new economic chessboard against Japan and a unified Germany anchored in a wider and more 
integrated European Community.
13. U .S . A gency for International D evelopm ent, L a tin  A m erica  and  the C arib b ean : Selected E conom ic  an d  Social 
D a ta  (W ashington, D .C ., April 1992), p. 171.
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The apparent trend toward regionalism has raised questions both about which country is most 
responsible and whether the trend is beneficial or protectionist. In the judgment of Jagdish Bhagwati, 
“the main driving force for regionalism today is the conversion of the United States.... As the key 
defender of multilateralism through the postwar years, its decision now to travel the regional route (in 
the geographical and the preferential senses simultaneously) tilts the balance of forces away at the margin 
from multilateralism to regionalism.”14 Bhagwati also finds the trend worrisome and unfortunate.
The Economist blames the EC as the principal culprit in the trend toward regionalism and 
protectionism and argues that “America has resisted [the protectionist logic] better than most.... In 
miserable contrast, the European Community has written the book on new methods of protection.”15 
Lawrence Krause agrees that the EC represents “a huge exception to a nondiscriminatory [international 
trade] regime.”16 Brunelle and Deblock agree that “if the fortress metaphor applies, it should be used 
to describe the EEC since over 58 percent of its total trade was done among the 12 member countries in 
1 9 8 7  ” 17 t 0 advance towards its 1992 deadline for achieving a completely open market, the EC has 
had to make internal political compromises at the expense of the region’s international obligations. The 
EC’s inability to adapt its Common Agricultural Policy has had the effect of closing the European market 
to many of Latin America’s crops and scuttling the GATT negotiations.
The consequences for world trade of the trend toward regionalism depend on whether the EC’s 
example—unity at the price of protectionism—proves the rule or the exception. In his classic study of 
customs unions, Jacob Viner argued that regional trading units are beneficial if they create more trade 
than they divert over the long term. Part of the problem is in determining how long is “long-term” and 
how to estimate the amount of trade created or diverted. But regionalism can also be beneficial to world 
trade if the new units develop formulas for dealing with the new trade agenda that could be tested and, 
if successful, used eventually by GATT. Some have suggested that the formulas devised by the United 
States and Canada for dealing with services and dispute settlement could be extrapolated to GATT.
The answer to the question whether the regionalist trend is good or bad for world trade thus 
depends, in large part, on the evolution of these units and whether they become exclusive trading blocs 
or platforms for more internal and external trade.
14. Jagdish Bhagwati, "Regionalism  and M ultilateralism: A n O verview ," D iscussion  Paper Series N o . 603  (N ew  
York: C olum bia U niversity Department o f  E cbnom ics, April 1992), p . 12.
15. The Econom ist, June 27th 1992, p . 13.
16. Lawrence B. Krause, "Regionalism  in W orld Trade: The Lim its o f  E conom ic Interdependence," H a rv a rd  
In te rn a tio n a l R eview , Summer 1991, p . 4 .
17. D orval Brunelle and Christian D eblock, "Economic B locs and the N A F T A  C hallenge," summary o f  w ork  
carried out by the Research Group on  the C ontinentalization o f  the Canadian and M exican E conom ies, U niversity  
o f  Q uebec in  M ontreal, M ay 2 , 1991, p . 6 .
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North America: The Agreement and the Entity
The NAFTA agreement signed by Presidents Bush and Salinas and Prime Minister Mulroney on 
December 17, 1992, is a massive document that aims to reduce trade barriers at varying speeds in 
different sectors. The agreement will go into effect in January 1994, but it will be phased in over 15 
years to give additional time for “sensitive” industries and farms to adjust to increasing competition. 
NAFTA was innovative in a number of areas, including promoting the harmonization of environmental 
pollution standards, eliminating quotas on textiles and apparel, creating free trade in services (including 
the very large telecommunications sector and the insurance market), and guaranteeing total market access 
in agriculture after the 15-year transition period.18
The Agreement
NAFTA provides for the progressive elimination of all tariffs, although most will be eliminated 
in 1994 or within five years. Tight rules of origin will prevent Mexico from being used as an export 
platform. In agriculture, the three governments agreed to eliminate all the quotas and quantitative 
restrictions and 50 percent of the tariffs in 1994. In some cases, tariffs will be replaced by tariff-rate 
quotas. The agreement relaxes most restrictions on investment except in the energy sector in Mexico and 
the cultural sector in Canada, and it establishes an advanced regime to protect intellectual property rights. 
The North American Trade Commission deals with disputes.
Because the debate in PRI-dominated Mexico and parliamentary Canada was a foregone 
conclusion, the debate in the United States Congress became the principal forum for addressing NAFTA 
and particularly for the social, political, environmental, and economic agenda that remained outside the 
agreement. From the spring of 1991, when the Bush administration requested fast-track negotiating 
authority through the ratification of the agreement, it sometimes appeared that the United States drove 
the wider agenda, but what was actually occurring was that groups from all three countries were using 
the Congressional forum to pursue a shared agenda. President Clinton later incorporated that agenda into 
his own.
This wider social, environmental, and political agenda reflects a change in public attitudes in all 
three countries in North America. Ronald Inglehart of the United States, Neil Nevitte of Canada, and 
Miguel Basanez of Mexico conducted surveys in all three countries at the beginning and at the end of the 
1980s, and they found that attitudes are not only similar, but they have also been converging in a way 
that makes further integration more feasible.19 In all three countries, public attitudes increasingly 
support political liberalization, free market (but not laissez-faire) economic policy, and a higher priority 
for autonomy and self-expression in all spheres of life. The authors believe that the main cause of the 
convergence in value systems is that young people in all three countries are better educated and more
18. For a detailed analysis o f  the agreement and its estimated impact, see Robert A . Pastor, In te g ra tio n  w ith  
M exico , Chapter 3.
19. R onald Inglehart, N eil N evitte, and M iguel Basanez, "Convergence in North America: C loser E conom ic, 
P olitical, and Cultural T ies B etw een the U nited States, Canada, and M exico."  M anuscript, 1992.
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influenced by global communications: “A narrow nationalism that had been dominant since the
nineteenth century is gradually giving way to a more cosmopolitan sense of identity.”20
Even as a North American orientation emerges, people in all three countries retain a certain 
parochialism. The key to dealing with the current and future agenda is recognizing that both inward and 
outward impulses are in a delicate balance, and the words and actions of one country can reinforce their 
mirror image in another. When a politician in the United States gives vent to the fears of people in 
California coping with massive waves of immigrants, such harangues are heard in Mexico City, and 
politicians there are likely to play on the insecurities of their countrymen about being treated unfairly by 
the United States. Some Mexicans might complain about U.S. corporations taking over their industries 
and insist that their government prevent a loss of Mexico’s identity. Such xenophobia is hardly unique 
to Mexico; the reaction by Americans to Japanese takeovers is cut from the same cloth. The point is that 
fears in one country reinforce fears in the other. Unless leaders or institutions step between the cycle 
of fear and describe the grounds for hope, the possibility always exists for a retreat from integration.
Theories developed using the Western European experience suggest that increased economic 
interaction does not lead to integration and political community unless there is an increase in trust and 
of shared experiences that reinforce positive feelings toward each other.21 Polls in North America 
indicate that there is a high level of trust between the United States and Canada, a slightly lower level 
by these two with Mexico, but Mexicans are more likely to distrust Americans than trust them. 
Nonetheless, the experience of Europe shows that distrust can erode, as it did between the French and 
the Germans from the 1950s to the 1970s, as a result of working together in the European Community.
In the case of North America, national historical experiences caused both Canada and Mexico to 
prefer distant relations, but the Inglehart study discovered that those feelings have undergone a 
fundamental change. By 1990, both Canada and Mexico were more inclined to support freer trade and 
closer ties with the United States than to oppose it. “To an astonishing extent, these traditional forms 
of nationalism seem to have vanished.”22 What replaced it is a cooperative realism; over 80 percent 
of the public in all three countries favor freer trade provided it is fair and reciprocal; only 15 percent 
oppose it.23
The North American Entity
North America constitutes a formidable region. Its population has grown dramatically since 1950 
to a combined total in 1990 of 362 million. Immigration has been an important cause of the rise in 
population in the United States and Canada, and improved health care has been the primary cause in 
Mexico. Although the rate of population growth in Mexico has declined precipitously since it introduced
20 . Inglehart, N ev itte , Basanez, Convergence, Chapter 1, p . 1.
21 . See particularly, Karl W . D eutsch , et. a l., P o lit ic a l C om m unity a n d  the N o rth  A tla n tic  A re a  (Garden C ity,
N ew  York: D oubleday, 1968).
22 . Inglehart, N ev itte , and Basanez, Convergence in  N o rth  A m erica , Chapter 2 , p . 15.
2 3 . Ibid, Chapter 2 , p . 12, F igure 2 -3 .
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family planning in 1974, its population growth is still about twice that of its two northern neighbors. The 
result is a much younger population in Mexico, but complementary profiles with the U.S. and Canada. 
In 1990, over 36 percent of Mexico’s population was less than 15 years old, compared to less than 
20 percent in its two northern neighbors (Table 2).
The gross product of the three countries grew by a factor of more than ten, from roughly 
$560 billion in 1960 to $6.2 trillion in 1990 (in current dollars). The region’s exports grew even faster, 
from $60 billion in 1970 to $587 billion in 1991, and intraregional trade as a percentage of the global 
exports of the three increased from 37 percent to 42 percent during the same period. The United States 
captures the lion’s share of the trade and the market, even though its dependence on its neighbors is a 
small fraction of their dependence on it. Both Canada and Mexico conduct between two thirds and three 
quarters of their global trade with the U.S., whereas the U.S. conducts a total of about one quarter of 
its global trade with its two neighbors. Their combined intraregional trade represents about 40 percent 
of their total, compared to about 60 percent for the European Community. In 1990, the per capita GNPs 
of the United States and Canada were comparable, $21,790 and $20,470, respectively, but Mexico’s was 
roughly one tenth that amount (Table 3).
Hemispheric Implications
Latin America’s motive in wanting to join a wider trade area with the United States is similar to 
Mexico’s: fear of exclusion. Fear has always been a more powerful motive than hope, particularly one 
as vague as joining a larger trading community. The trends in Latin America worsened demonstrably 
during the “lost decade” of the debt crisis. In 1955, nearly 20 percent of all U.S. imports came from 
South America; by 1990 that total declined to about 5 percent, and imports from the Caribbean fell from
6.6 percent to 1.6 percent.24 North American trade became more concentrated, and the rest of Latin 
America was slipping away and sinking. In 1989 and 1990, half of U.S. trade with Latin America was 
with Mexico. Failure to secure the U.S. market could mean marginalization.
The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) promised free trade agreements to hemispheric 
governments that implemented market reforms. The United States government gave priority to NAFTA, 
but it advised interested Latin American governments to prepare for future talks by accelerating 
subregional integration schemes and negotiating framework agreements similar to the U.S.-Mexican 
agreement of 1987.
Salinas pursued a similar approach to his neighbors. He offered the Central American 
governments a free trade agreement, sought and received associate membership in the Caribbean 
Community, and on July 20, 1991, joined with the presidents of Venezuela and Colombia to propose a 
three-way free trade zone to take effect in January 1992, a deadline that proved overambitious. By late 
August 1992, the three governments had failed to agree to a timetable, and questions arose as to how it 
would be affected by NAFTA. In the meantime, however, in January 1992 Colombia and Venezuela 
adopted zero tariffs for their bilateral trade and were pressing their Andean partners to accelerate the
24 . T his and the fo llow in g  data is from  the U .S . Departm ent o f  C om m erce, Bureau o f  the C ensus, S ta tis tica l 
A bstrac t o f  the U n ited  States, various years.
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Table 2
(M illions)
P o p u la t io n 1 9 5 0 1 9 7 0 1 9 9 0 2 0 0 0
N orth  A m erica 1 9 2 .2 9 2 7 7 .5 5 3 6 2 .7 0 4 0 0 .2 7
U .S . 1 5 2 .2 7 2 0 5 .0 5 2 5 0 .0 0 2 6 8 .2 7
M exico 2 6 .2 8 5 1 .1 8 8 6 .2 0 1 0 3 .0 0
Canada 1 3 .7 4 2 1 .3 2 2 6 .5 0 2 9 .0 0
%  D is tr ib u tio n
U n d e r  1 5  (% )  
1 9 5 0  1 9 7 0 1 9 9 0 2 0 0 0
1 6 - 6 0  (% )  
1 9 5 0 1 9 7 0 1 9 9 0 2 0 0 0
6 1 - o v e r  (% }  
1 9 5 0  1 9 7 0 1 9 9 0 2 0 0 0
U .S . 2 6 .8 7 2 8 .2 6 2 1 .5 7 1 9 .7 0 5 8 .2 5 5 7 .7 1 6 1 .2 0 6 2 .5 0 1 4 .8 8 1 4 .0 4 1 7 .2 2 1 8 .2 0
M exico 4 5 .6 0 4 6 .5 0 3 6 .5 0 2 5 .0 0 4 9 .3 0 5 0 .0 0 6 0 .5 0 6 6 .0 0 5 .1 0 3 .5 0 3 .0 0 9 .0 0
Canada 3 3 .5 0 3 0 .2 0 2 1 .4 0 1 9 .3 0 5 8 .2 0 6 1 .9 0 6 8 .6 0 6 3 .5 0 8 .3 0 7 .9 0 1 0 .0 0 1 7 .2 0
N orth  A m erica 3 5 .3 2 3 4 .9 9 2 6 .4 9 2 1 .3 3 5 5 .2 5 5 6 .5 4 6 3 .4 3 6 4 .0 0 9 .4 3 8 .4 8 1 0 .0 7 1 4 .8 0
(a v e r a g e )
Note: U.S. data for the year 2000 are projections from the U.S. Bureau of the Census; projections for Canada and Mexico
are based on World Bank estimates.
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Statistical Abstract of the U.S.," 1991; and The World Bank, "World Tables," 
1984 and 1991; and "World Tables-SocialData," 1984; and "WorldDevelopment Report," 1992.
Table 3
North America: Economic Indicators
GNP
($Bil - Current)
GNP per Capita 
($ - Current)
Exports
Customs Basis, fob 
($Mil - Current)
Imports
Customs Basis, cif 
($Mil - Current)
1960 1980 1990 1960 1980 1990 1960 1980 1990 1960 1980 1990






































560.06 3,178.91 6,204.60 1,775.88 8,466.89 14,916.74 28,418 295,333 523,236 23,618 332,635 659,580
Notes: * refers to the percentage (%) of trade within North America; and North American GNP per Capita is an average of the three countries.
Sources: The World Bank, "World Tables," 1984-, 1991; and "World Development Report," 1992; and OECD, "Monthly Statistics on Foreign Trade," July 1992; 
and International Monetary Fund, "Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook," 1992.
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integration of their pact.25 Salinas signed a free-trade agreement with Chile’s President Aylwin (it was 
implemented in January 1992), and he agreed to begin negotiations with the governments of Central 
American countries aimed at a free trade agreement by 1996. In the meantime, the Central Americans 
began discussions with CARICOM on a free trade pact.
Latin America embraced the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and Salinas’s example. 
Subregional trading groups, including old ones like the Andean Pact and new ones like MERCOSUR, 
experienced more serious consideration and made more progress since 1990 than they had for decades. 
In 1991 alone, trade within MERCOSUR grew by more than 40 percent, and within the Andean Group 
by 35 percent. 26 By 1992, the United States signed 16 trade and investment framework agreements 
with 31 countries in Latin American and the Caribbean.
The most surprising and exuberant response came from Latin America’s other nationalistic 
guardian, Peronist Argentina. Argentine President Carlos Menem lavished praise on the new approach 
to tighten United States-Latin American economic relations: “We consider this [the Enterprise Initiative] 
not as a proposal of a philanthropic nature, based on a false paternalism. Nor does it grow out of 
strategic military considerations. On the contrary, it is an ambitious business proposition. Latin America 
is considered this time as a new entity, as a valid interlocutor able to talk in terms of mutual interests.”27
An economic logic lurks beneath the movement toward hemispheric integration, and in some ways 
the 1990s resemble the 1930s when the United States and Latin America turned to each other for bilateral 
trade in the face of a world broken into trading blocs. The United States has found it hard to penetrate 
Japan, and Latin America has found similar problems exporting to a self-absorbed Europe. As in the 
1930s, the United States and Latin America have discovered a commonality of economic interests, but 
unlike that period, neither has an interest in withdrawing from the world today. What the hemisphere 
lacks is a strategy of helping each other while prying open the GATT.
Just five years ago, the idea of a hemispheric option would have been inconceivable. Burdened 
by debt, brutalized by military dictators, defiant of or disgusted with the policies of the United States, 
much of Latin America was no partner for the United States. Gradually, the old presuppositions are 
falling. A new image of modern, democratic technocrats is taking hold. Free, contested elections have 
been held in every country in South America, Central America, and all but Cuba in the Caribbean. There 
have been setbacks in Haiti, Peru, and Venezuela, and other countries like El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Bolivia continue to struggle with despotic demons of their past. But democracy is wider (if not deeper) 
than ever before, and the new democracies are groping on the frontier of an old order of sovereign states 
to devise collective mechanisms to defend each other from authoritarian reversals. In this, the region is 
unique.
Economically, most governments have laboriously constructed new and firm macroeconomic 
bases. Hyperinflation has been brought under control; debt service as a percent of GNP declined from 
64.3 in 1987 to 37.4 in 1991; capital is returning in large amounts, and the region’s economies have
25 . "Slower Pace for Subregional Groups," L a tin  A m erican  W eekly R eport, 10 Septem ber 1992, pp. 6 -7 .
26 . "Free Trade and Com m on M arkets," L a tin  A m erican  S pec ia l R eports, June 1992 , p. 1.
27 . Ibid.
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begun to grow, 2.8 percent in 1991, the first positive change since 1987. From 1986 to 1991, the United 
States doubled its exports to $63 billion and its foreign direct investment to $72 billion.28 With serious 
political problems and weak and vacillating macroeconomic policies, Brazil has been an exception to this 
trend, but when its engine restarts, it will pull all of South America forward at an accelerating clip.
At the very end of the long NAFTA text—Chapter 22, Article 2205—sits a very brief and vague 
“accession clause”:
Any country or group of countries may accede to this Agreement subject to such terms 
and conditions as may be agreed between such country or countries and the Commission 
and following approval in accordance with the applicable procedures of each country.
This accession clause merely begs the question as to how to proceed with the expansion of NAFTA. 
Prior to his election as president of the United States, Bill Clinton endorsed the idea of extending the 
agreement: “If we can make this agreement work with Canada and Mexico, then we can reach down into 
the other market-oriented economies of Central and South America to expand even further.”
Several questions remain to be answered: How and when should NAFTA be expanded? Which 
countries would negotiate first? What if some of the governments agree to the conditions and then fail 
to implement them, as has occurred in virtually all the subregional trade agreements? An even more 
interesting question is whether Mexico might have been trying to make itself into a “hub” rather than a 
“spoke” by reaching agreements with other Latin American governments.29 Will Venezuela, Chile, 
or Central America, for example, be able to use Mexico as a springboard to export goods duty-free to 
the United States? Will Mexico in effect define the rules for the entry of these other countries?
These questions have generated answers across the political and policy spectra, but the answers 
that count will have to be defined by all three governments under the auspices of the North America 
Trade Commission. Rather than try to speculate which of these various scenarios is the more likely, this 
paper will assess alternative answers to each question.
When Should NAFTA be Expanded?
Given the complexity of the agreement and the prospect that there will be many new problems, 
some anticipated and others not, it would be wise to allow an interim of at least two years before 
beginning serious negotiations to expand it to the rest of the hemisphere. In the meantime, countries 
should be encouraged to implement unilaterally the conditions and obligations of NAFTA; that would 
expedite the negotiations once they start.
28. U .S . A gency  for International D evelopm ent, L a tin  A m erica  and  the C arib bean : Selected E conom ic  an d  Socia l 
D a ta  (W ashington, D .C ., April 1992), pp. 3-5.
29 . R onald W onnacott first developed the "hub" and "spoke" ideas w ith  the U nited States as the object. See his 
"U .S. H ub-and-Spoke Bilaterals and the M ultilateral Trading S ystem ,'' Commentary (O ctober 1990), Toronto: C .D . 
H ow e Institute.
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One of the reasons that Mexico’s privatization campaign was so successful was the meticulous 
preparation before each sale. Making NAFTA work will not be as simple as signing the treaty; it will 
require experimenting with new institutions and new procedures, and (probably) numerous mistakes. 
Unless problems are identified and resolved satisfactorily in the first years, the wider experiment could 
be endangered.
Who Comes First?
President Bush promised Chile’s President Patricio Aylwin that the United States would negotiate 
with Chile as soon as NAFTA was ratified. Chile’s economy is the most open, its trade with the United 
States relatively small, and its technocrats among the most able. If the United States decides to let other 
governments set its agenda, or if it chooses the agreements that would be easiest to negotiate, then Chile 
should come first, particularly because Chile already has a free-trade agreement with Mexico. But there 
are alternative approaches.
Beyond Canada and Mexico, the countries with the closest economic relationships with the United 
States are those of the Caribbean and Central America—the Caribbean Basin countries. The dependency 
of these countries on the U.S. market is roughly comparable to that of Mexico and Canada; about 
60 percent-75 percent of their trade and investment are with the United States. When President Reagan 
proposed the Caribbean Basin Initiative—one-way free trade on certain products from the region—in 
February 1982, he advertised it as a way to promote the region’s development.
The motive of the United States motive was strategic—to counter leftist influence in the 
region—but the program was implemented at a time when the economies of the region were suffering 
severe dislocations. One of the principal reasons was the sharp contraction of U.S. sugar import quotas. 
Between 1975 and 1981, the region exported an average of 1.7 million tons of sugar per year to the U.S. 
That was reduced to 442,200 tons by 1989, with further reductions in the next two years. From 1982 
to 1989 alone, the region lost about $1.8 billion in potential revenue and 400,000 jobs as a result of sugar 
quotas. In comparison, CBI created about 136,000 jobs in manufacturing between 1983 and 1989.30
Since many countries in the region were dependent on the sugar industry, and since all of them 
had small, open economies, the adjustment was severe. CBI helped to cushion the shock, but NAFTA 
will virtually eliminate the CBI incentive to invest. The region faces a very difficult choice: whether 
to lower their own barriers to trade and investment and negotiate entry into NAFTA, or hope that the 
marginal difference in market access between CBI and NAFTA will be small enough not to divert current 
and future investments from the region t6 Mexico.31 The Caribbean might be lulled into avoiding this
3 0 . Joseph Pelzm an and Gregory K . Schoepfle, cited in "U.S. Sugar Quotas and the Caribbean Basin," by Stuart 
Tucker and M aiko Chambers, Overseas D evelopm ent C ouncil, P olicy Focus N o . 6 , D ecem ber 1989, p . 4; "Yet 
Another Cut in the U .S . Sugar Quota," L a tin  A m erica  W eekly R eport, 10 September 1992, p . 8.
3 1 . For tw o papers describing the full range o f  choices that the region faces, see C am ille N ico la  Isaacs, "The 
N orth A m erican Free Trade Agreement: A  Jamaican Perspective," paper presented at a sem inar at the M ona  
Institute o f  Business o f  the U niversity o f  the W est Indies, 11 D ecem ber 1991; and Robert Pastor and Richard 
Fletcher, "The Caribbean in the Tw enty-First Century," F o re ig n  A ffa irs  70  (Summer 1991).
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hard choice because it has the added advantage of access to the European Community via the Lomé 
Convention.
The Central American Common Market (CACM) was established in 1960. The thirteen-nation 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was founded in 1973. Both are struggling to find an answer to the 
question of whether or not to join NAFTA. Both trading areas had been among the most successful in 
the developing world in the 1960s and 1970s,32 but the CACM fell victim to the civil wars in Central 
America, and CARICOM repeatedly failed to implement its goals, most notably a common external tariff 
(CET).
The issue for the United States—and Mexico and Canada—is whether to find a transitional 
mechanism or delayed procedure that would permit the Caribbean Basin countries to dock on to NAFTA. 
From a strategic and political perspective, it would be desirable for the Caribbean Basin countries as a 
group to be the first to join an expanded NAFTA, but the North American countries would not want to 
allow such a broad exception to NAFTA for fear that it would function as a disincentive for Mexico to 
implement the agreement or for the rest of Latin America to try to fulfill its obligations.
Jamaica’s Ambassador Richard Bernal offered a thoughtful proposal in suggesting that the 
Caribbean Basin countries be granted parity with Mexico as a way to preserve their CBI benefits and that 
they would then phase in their reciprocal obligations over a long transition period.33 Because of its 
small population, the region is not really competitive to Mexico, but the first decision on whether the 
proposal makes sense should be made by Mexico.
Beyond the Caribbean Basin, NAFTA should negotiate with whichever subregional group—either 
the Andean Pact or MERCOSUR—is ready to take advantage of the agreement and has progressed 
sufficiently in terms of economic reforms to ensure a smooth negotiation. In general, however, the 
United States, Mexico, and Canada ought to encourage nations to join a western hemisphere economic 
area as part of a group rather than as individual governments.
How to Deal with Violations of the Agreement?
GATT’s failure to answer this question effectively threatens the institution’s existence. The 
standard procedure for handling violations in the GATT is for individual governments to petition the 
GATT to investigate an alleged violation, and if one is established, to allow governments to seek 
compensation or to respond proportionately in another area. NAFTA has a similar dispute-settlement 
mechanism, but there are reasons to question whether it will work any better. The United States has 
more economic leverage to gain compensation for an alleged trade violation from Mexico and Canada 
than these two countries have on the United States, but such leverage does not always produce changes
32 . See U .S . Department o f  State, Bureau o f  Intelligence and Research, E va lu atin g  R eg io n a l Schemes f o r  the  
P rom otion  o f ln te r -L D C  T rad e : A  Review  o f  Selected Attem pts to  C reate  F re e -T ra d e  A reas an d  Com m on M arkets , 
Report N o . 1362, A pril 14, 1980.
33 . Dr. Richard Bernal, "Impact o f  N A F T A  on the E conom ic D evelopm ent o f  the Caribbean and U .S .-C aribbean  
T rade,” statement made at the Hearing before the H ouse Com m ittee on Small B usiness, D ecem ber 16, 1992.
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in policy. A much tighter mechanism with clearer rules of procedure is necessary, and the nonparties 
to the agreement have to support the aggrieved complainant to make the system work.
Will Mexico be a Hub or a Spoke?
No one would have posed this question at the beginning of the NAFTA negotiations. The only 
question then was whether the United States would be the hub or accept a different kind of relationship 
with the other members. NAFTA is a genuinely trilateral agreement despite the asymmetry in trade. 
What was not anticipated was the extent to which Mexico has preempted NAFTA by reaching out to its 
Latin American and Caribbean neighbors. One of Salinas’s reasons has been political; he is eager to 
show Mexican critics that he has not aligned himself solely with the United States and abandoned his 
Latin American neighbors. Another reason for Mexico’s new trade initiatives in the hemisphere is that 
Mexico’s trade in the area is so small, but the multiplicity of agreements does raise the question whether 
Mexico could become a hub for Latin America or even a platform for their exports.
NAFTA’s rules-of-origin provisions were negotiated to prevent Mexico from being any other 
country’s platform, even though the greatest fear was that Japan, not Latin America, would use it for that 
purpose. If violations are detected, then a common NAFTA institution—perhaps the Trade 
Commission—would need to impose heavy fines. But it is possible that a freer trade relationship between 
Mexico and Latin America could facilitate the latter’s entry into an expanded NAFTA.
Potential Consequences of NAFTA
The most positive potential impact of NAFTA in the Western Hemisphere lies in its triple 
incentives for Latin American governments to (1) consolidate needed economic reforms, (2) stimulate 
subregional integration, and (3) forge a democratic community of nations. Each of these goals is vital 
to the economic and political development of the region, but before NAFTA, the conditions did not exist 
and the incentives were too weak to transform those goals into reality. A salutary effect of the debt crisis 
is that it forced Latin America to reassess its economic strategy. A new generation of Latin American 
leaders realized that while Latin America had declined, the Asian economies—particularly the “Four 
Tigers”—had leaped ahead of them by using export-oriented economic policies. The lesson they learned 
was that they should replace their protectionist strategies with international ones. The IMF, of course, 
“encouraged” a shift in this direction.
By 1992, there were signs that the new economic policies were bearing fruit. The debt crisis 
apparently peaked several years before, and governments were able to channel their scarce resources 
toward investment. As a percentage of GDP, debt declined from 64.3 percent in 1987 to 37.4 percent 
in 1991. Hyperinflation was brought under control. The average rise in prices for the region, weighted 
by GNP, fell from 1,711 percent in 1990 to 223 percent in 1991. In 1991, the region grew by 3 percent, 
the first real growth in many years. Exports expanded at an annual rate of 12 percent from 1987 to 
1991, and the percentage of manufactures rose to one third, up from 10 percent two decades ago.34
34. U.S. Agency for International Development, L a tin  A m erica  an d  the C arib b e a n : Selected E conom ic  a n d  S o c ia l 
D a ta  (Washington, D.C., April 1992), pp. 3-4; United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, P re lim in a ry  O verview  o f  the Econom y o f  L a tin  A m erica  an d  the C arib b ean , 1 991  (Santiago, December
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Latin America seemed to turn a corner economically, but social problems were worse than a 
decade before. Real minimum wages in 1991 were almost a third lower than in 1980. This meant that 
the average labor cost in Latin America had declined to less than half of what it was in Singapore and 
Hong Kong,35 but there were questions as to whether the economic policies could be sustained in a 
climate of social unrest, such as occurred in Venezuela in early 1992. A Western Hemisphere Free 
Trade Area could reinforce efforts by each country to maintain the best macroeconomic policies and, as 
such, it could play a valuable role in helping to modernize the economies.
NAFTA also makes more attainable the goal of subregional integration. For too long, the nations 
of the Andean Pact, CARICOM, and CACM were unwilling to make the kinds of decisions that would 
have fulfilled their pledges to lower trade barriers among members of their group. In the case of 
CARICOM, the failure of any of the 13 members to implement the common external tariff paralyzed the 
entire organization. NAFTA—and more precisely the prospect of a guaranteed market in North 
America—provides a substantial incentive for the governments to take action or risk being left out of the 
growing regional market.
While the United States has encouraged Latin American governments to apply for free-trade 
agreements as members of subregional integration schemes, there are no incentives to do so, and because 
of the difficulty of gaining the approval of others, the real incentives favor individual applications. 
Theoretically, a Western Hemisphere economic area would make subregional integration schemes 
obsolete, but for the next ten years (at least) the schemes will exist, and it would be desirable for 
members of each to help the others satisfy the preconditions for entry. Therefore, the NAFTA countries 
should indicate that individual governments will be permitted to join NAFTA but that subregional groups 
will take precedence.
Finally, research by Inglehart and others indicates that increasing economic integration within a 
framework that builds trust between partners can lead to political cooperation and subsequently political 
integration. The process of negotiating an expansion of NAFTA could stimulate more cooperation on 
political issues. For example, the leaders in most of the new democracies in Latin America are aware 
of the fragility of their regimes and are interested in developing mechanisms to defend democracy in all 
of their countries. The Organization of American States has been wrestling with this issue since it was 
asked to observe the elections in Nicaragua, but especially since the General Assembly passed a resolution 
on democracy at Santiago in June 1991. Much remains to be done, and increased cooperation among 
like-minded leaders on economic matters could translate into new political arrangements to defend 
democracy. Moreover, the United States and Latin America can work together in GATT to stimulate 
needed reforms in the international trading system.
With an infrastructure and a potential market roughly equivalent to Europe at the beginning of 
the Marshall Plan, Latin America today could be the basis for a new and powerful economic community 
of democratic nations. Together with the United States, the Americas could develop a global competitive 
economic edge.
35. The statistics are from  a report by the International Labour O ffice, cited in "More W ork, But M uch L ess Real 
Pay," L a tin  A m erican  W eekly R eport, 4  June 1992, p . 8.
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When Salinas said that “we want Mexico to be part of the First World, not the Third,”36 not 
only was he encouraging the people of Mexico to raise their hopes and standards, but he was also 
affirming that Mexico could exert greater influence on the international economic order if it were aligned 
with the United States than if it joined the developing world. This represents a momentous departure for 
Mexico and all of Latin America. After having resisted integration with the United States for decades, 
the region has apparently concluded that their economic goals are more likely to be attained in 
cooperation with the north.
Comparative Advantage and the Three Panregions
Consider the three panregions: the European Community, Japan and East Asia, and the North 
American Free Trade Area as the center of a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area (Table 4). The most 
integrated of the three areas is the 12-nation European Community, with a population of 345 million and 
a gross product of $5.9 trillion in 1990. By December 31, 1992, the EC theoretically eliminated all of 
its internal barriers. With the Treaty of Maastricht, signed in December 1991, the twelve governments 
committed themselves to moving toward a federal government that included a unified currency by the end 
of the century and a coordinated and unified foreign and defense policy. This leap forward was rejected 
by the Danes and sharply questioned by the British. In all likelihood, the steps toward further unity will 
not be in a straight line.
While the EC has been trying to deepen and unify its internal market, it has had to cope with 
numerous other issues and problems. It has had to rework its relationship with its former colonies, the 
ACP (African, Caribbean, and Pacific) countries. Germany has concentrated its resources on integrating 
the former East Germany. Austria, Sweden, and Finland have requested membership into the EC; the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) has agreed to join with the EC to form a single unified free 
trade area on January 1, 1993; and virtually every old and new nation in Eastern Europe has requested 
some form of association with the EC. The global implications of these developments is that the EC has 
been inward-looking.
Japan has become the economic center of an increasingly dynamic Asia, but aside from ASEAN, 
a trade group of five southeast Asian nations, there is as yet no formal trade regime that could compare 
to that of the European Community, and the region is much less integrated than either Europe or North 
America. In 1990 and 1991, for example, intraregional trade as a percentage of its total world trade was 
roughly 62 percent for Europe, 42 percent for North America, and 30 percent for Asia (Table 5).
Most Asian nations are increasingly dependent on Japanese investment and the U.S. market. 
Lawrence Krause proposes a “Pacific Basin” community that would include Japan, the United States, and 
13 other countries. The region’s real trade growth in the 1980s was 8.7 percent—higher than the EC’s 
6 percent—and it was more integrated, with intraregional trade of 65.7 percent compared to 58.6 percent 
for the EC.37
36 . Carlos Salinas de Gortari, "State o f  the N ation A ddress, N ovem ber 1, 1990." FBIS, 14 N ovem ber 1990, 
p. 13.
37 . Krause, "Regionalism  in W orld Trade," H a rv a rd  In te rn a tio n a l Review , Summer 1991, p . 5.
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Table 4
The World's Three Main Trading Areas: Basic Indicators
Exports Imports
Population GNP GNP per Capita * Customs Basis, fob Customs Basis, cif
(Millions) ($Bil - Current) (US$ - Current) ($Mil - Current) ($Mil - Current)
Region/Country 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990
W estern  H em isphere 4 9 9 .2 7 7 0 5 .4 8 1 ,3 4 3 .7 8 6 ,9 0 7 .1 0 8 2 1 .4 4 3 ,2 8 5 .0 0 7 4 ,8 7 6 6 1 9 ,9 3 6 7 0 ,3 5 6 7 3 0 ,9 8 8
North America 278.59 362 .70 1 ,225 .96 6 ,2 0 4 .6 0 3 ,3 3 9 .2 7 14 ,916 .67 60 ,610 523 ,236 56 ,6 6 4 6 5 9 ,580
United States 205 .00 250 .00 1,105 .50 5 ,4 4 7 .5 0 5 ,392 .68 21 ,7 9 0 .0 0 4 3 ,2 2 0 371 ,466 3 9 ,9 5 0 515 ,635
Canada 21.32 26.50 83 .58 542 .46 3 ,9 1 9 .5 7 2 0 ,4 7 0 .0 0 16,185 125,056 14 ,253 115,882
Mexico 52.27 86.20 36 .88 2 1 4 .6 4 705 .57 2 ,4 9 0 .0 0 1,205 26 ,714 2,461 28 ,063
Caribbean Basin 30.55 48.28 11.80 53 .63 573 .38 2 ,3 6 6 .1 9 2 ,873 10 ,970 4 ,0 8 8 17,559
Central America 16.89 28.78 6 .48 30.21 424 .29 1 ,264 .29 1,231 4 ,929 1,623 8 ,350
Caribbean 13.66 19.50 5.32 23 .42 647 .93 2 ,9 1 7 .1 4 1,642 6,041 2 ,465 9,209
South America 190.13 294 .50 106.02 648 .87 587 .00 1 ,725 .00 11,393 85 ,730 9 ,6 0 4 53 ,849
Andean Pact 55.53 91.20 30 .02 130.93 524 .00 1 ,318 .00 5 ,349 30 ,900 3 ,766 17,762
Mercosur 125.10 190.10 68 .02 4 9 2 .3 3 602 .50 2 ,1 8 0 .0 0 4 ,8 1 0 46,251 4 ,858 29 ,064
Chile 9.50 13.20 7.98 25.61 84 0 .0 0 1 ,940 .00 1,234 8 ,579 980 7,023
European C om m unity
EC (1970) 1 8 8 .3 2 4 9 5 .9 8 3 ,2 3 1 .5 3 8 8 ,5 4 5 8 8 ,4 2 5
EC (1990) 3 4 4 .3 9 5 ,8 7 8 .7 8 1 5 ,3 8 0 .8 8 1 ,3 4 9 ,9 7 1 1 ,4 0 5 ,2 7 3
A sia 3 4 6 .1 6 5 1 2 .3 2 2 4 2 .1 2 3 ,7 7 2 .5 6 4 4 4 .9 0 7 ,7 4 2 .2 2 3 1 ,8 1 2 6 4 1 ,9 6 9 3 5 ,8 1 9 6 7 4 ,4 7 7
Japan 104.00 123.50 2 0 3 .3 0 3,140.61 1,954.81 2 5 ,4 3 0 .0 0 19 ,320 286 ,768 18 ,880 231 ,223
ASEAN 204.21 316.77 29 .88 300.71 353 .83 3 ,2 4 0 .0 0 6,161 140,537 7 ,696 160 ,369
Four Tigers 37.95 72.05 8 .94 33 1 .2 4 280 .10 9 ,3 5 0 .0 0 6,331 214 ,664 9 ,243 282 ,885
Key: Andean Pact: Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia
EC (1970): Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
ASEAN: Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Phlllipines, Thailand 
Four Tigers: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan
Mercosur: Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay
EC (1990): Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom
Notes: German 1990 population data after unification; German trade & GNP data are prior to unification; 
trade data for Belgium includes Luxembourg; and (*) Regional GNP per Capita are averages.
Sources: The World Bank, "World Tables," 1984, 1991; and "World Development Report," 1992; and U.S. Agency for International 
Development, "Latin American and Caribbean: Selected Economic and Social Data," April 1992; and OECD 
"Monthly Statistics on Foreign Trade," July 1992.
Table 5
Intraregional Trade as a Percentage of Total Trade
1970
Exports
C u sto m s b as is , fob  
1976  1980  1990 1991 1970
Imports
C u sto m s basis , c if  
1976 1980 1990
North America 3 7 .3 4  3 7 .8 2  3 6 .0 9  42.91 4 1 .9 8  40.61 3 4 .1 5  32 .52  3 5 .5 4
European Community n.a. 5 2 .2 5  5 3 .5 3  6 0 .5 8  6 1 .8 9  n.a. 4 9 .3 7  48.31 5 7 .92
Asia n.a. 3 6 .2 4  1 7 .9 2  30.61 3 0 .0 3  n.a. 3 9 .0 7  18 .93  3 6 .67
Note: 1991 intraregional trade data for Asia are based on IMF and World Bank estimates.
Sources: OECD "Monthly Statistics on Foreign Trade," July 1992; "Historical Statistics on Foreign Trade, 196 5 -1 9 8 0 ,"  1982; 
and International Monetary Fund, "Direction of Trade Statistics," 1984, 1991, 1992 .
1991
3 6 .4 7
57.61
3 6 .4 4
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Some have argued that the United States would be making a mistake to create a trade bloc in the 
Western Hemisphere among slow-growth economies. The Asian economies, according to this view, offer 
the best vehicle for invigorating the U.S. economy. “There’s much more to gain by fighting for access 
to China, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and the European Community than by signing free-trade 
agreements across Latin America,” wrote Marc Levinson in Newsweek,38 The idea of looking east 
rather than south merits consideration, but the Pacific Basin is not a realistic trade entity in the short term 
because of the tremendous differences between the United States and Japan on trade policies and the 
continued difficulty that the United States and Latin America face in penetrating the Japanese and Asian 
markets.
The North America trading area is competitive. For Canada and Mexico, which have more than 
two thirds of their trade with the United States, it is central. But even for the world’s greatest trading 
power, the United States, which has often focused on Europe or Japan, its two neighbors have been its 
largest markets in the postwar period. In 1955, two years before the signing of the Treaty of Rome, U.S. 
exports to Europe were $2.6 billion, compared to $4 billion of exports to Canada and Mexico (Table 6). 
Thirty-five years later, U.S. exports to Asia had increased from 10 percent to 15 percent of U.S. exports, 
and to Europe, from 16.8 percent to 25 percent. But North America remained preeminent: U.S. exports 
grew to $112 billion or 28.4 percent.
Table 6
U .S . Exports to North America, Europe and Asia (1 9 4 5 -1 9 9 1 )  
($Mil)
North Japan &
ar America EC SE Asia World
1 9 4 5 1 ,485 3 ,1 1 4 1,381 1 0 ,5 2 7
1 9 5 5 3 ,9 6 9 2 ,6 1 4 2 ,1 4 4 1 5 ,5 1 8
1 9 6 5 6 ,7 6 3 5 ,2 5 2 5 ,1 8 0 28 ,461
1 9 7 5 2 6 ,8 8 5 2 2 ,8 6 5 1 9 ,6 5 8 1 0 9 ,3 1 7
1 9 8 0 5 5 ,4 7 6 5 8 ,8 5 5 4 4 ,5 1 2 2 2 5 ,7 2 2
1 9 8 5 6 6 ,9 2 2 4 5 ,7 7 6 5 1 ,0 3 6 2 1 3 ,1 4 6
1 9 8 6 6 7 ,9 0 4 5 3 ,2 2 2 52 ,981 2 2 7 ,1 5 9
1 9 8 7 7 4 ,3 9 6 6 0 ,6 2 9 5 8 ,2 4 4 2 5 4 ,1 2 2
1 9 8 8 9 2 ,2 5 0 7 5 ,8 6 4 88 ,841 3 2 2 ,4 2 6
1 9 8 9 103 ,791 8 6 ,4 2 4 1 0 1 ,5 0 9 3 6 3 ,8 1 2
1 9 9 0 1 1 1 ,9 5 3 9 8 ,1 2 9 1 0 9 ,0 5 4 3 9 3 ,5 9 2
1991 1 1 8 ,3 7 9 1 0 3 ,2 0 9 1 0 9 ,6 7 4 4 2 1 ,6 1 4
Sources: USDOC, International Trade Administration, "U.S. Foreign Trade Highlights," 1 9 9 2 , 1 9 8 8 , 1985 ; and 
USDOC, Office of Business Economics, "U.S. Exports & Imports 1 9 2 3 -1 9 6 8 ,: November 1970 ; and 
USDOC, Bureau of Economic Analysis, "U .S. Merchandise Trade: Exports & Imports 1 9 6 5 -7 6 ,"  19 7 7 ; and 
USDOC, Bureau of the Census, "Statistical Abstract of the United States," various issues, 1 9 5 0 -1 9 9 1 .
3 8 . Both Bhagwati and Krause make this argument. For a more popular and acerbic statement o f  this thesis, 
see M arc L evinson , "Let’s H ave N o  M ore Free-Trade D eals, Please: W hy N A F T A  is not a M odel for Latin 
A m erica," Newsweek, A ugust 17, 1992, p. 40 .
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An analysis of U.S. exports to North America, Europe, and Asia in the post-war period 
underscores the degree to which the United States remains the center—both in geography and in terms 
of the value of trade—of the world trading system. It also shows the extent to which world trade is 
dominated by three regions. The least integrated region—Japan and Southeast Asia—has shown the fastest 
growth, particularly in the last two decades. U.S. exports to Japan, ASEAN, and the four “Asian tigers” 
increased from less than $20 billion in 1975 to $110 billion in 1991. Of those markets, Japan’s has 
accounted for about half, although in the last decade the markets of the rest of Asia increased in relative 
importance. Nevertheless, North America has consistently remained a larger market for U.S. goods than 
the European Community or Asia.
The trends are similar for U.S. imports, with North America accounting for one quarter of U.S. 
imports and Europe for 19 percent. The difference, of course, is the extraordinary growth of Japanese 
and Asian exports to the U.S., from $1 billion in 1955 to nearly $100 billion in 1990, nearly 20 percent 
of total U.S. imports.
Canada has always been the principal U.S. trading partner, and the growth of this trade has 
remained relatively consistent. The highest rate of growth of U.S. exports has occurred with Mexico. 
With NAFTA secure, that is likely to expand even further.
Although the South American market has declined in importance for the United States in recent 
years, if added to North America, the new hemispheric market assumes much greater weight for the 
United States (Table 7). U.S. exports to the entire hemisphere are about one third greater than to Europe 
or Asia. Moreover, an expansion of NAFTA to include the Caribbean Basin and South America would 
effectively double the population (Figure 1) with a gross product that greatly exceeds Europe’s or Asia’s 
and additional advantages the others do not enjoy.
Table 7




ir America EC SE Asia World
1945 2 ,438 3 ,114 1,381 10,527
1955 6,327 2 ,614 2,144 15,518
1965 10 ,196 5 ,252 5,180 28,461
1975 3 9 ,265 22 ,865 19,658 109,317
1980 79 ,076 58,855 44 ,512 225 ,722
1985 8 4 ,143 45 ,776 51,036 213 ,146
1986 86 ,449 53 ,222 52,981 227,159
1987 94 ,617 60 ,629 58 ,244 254,122
1988 115,334 7 5 ,864 88,841 322 ,426
1989 127,454 86 ,424 101,509 363 ,812
1990 137,082 98 ,129 109,054 393 ,592
1991 144,967 103,209 109,674 421 ,614
Sources: USDOC, International Trade Administration, "U.S. Foreign Trade Highlights,’ 1992, 1988, 1985; end 
USDOC, Office of Business Economics, "U.S. Exports & imports 1923-1968," November 1970; and 
USDOC, Bureau of Economic Analysis, "U.S. Merchandise Trade: Exports & imports -1965-1976," 1977; and 
USDOC, Bureau of the Census, “Statistical Abstract of the United States, ’ various issues, 1950-1991.
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The effort by Western Europe to incorporate the east has confronted more serious problems than 
Latin America’s economic integration presents to the United States and Canada. While Latin America 
is privatizing its relatively few state corporations, Eastern Europe is trying to decide how to introduce 
the market into state-controlled economies. After almost a decade of depression, Latin America is in 
many ways at the stage where Western Europe was after World War II. It has considerable unused 
industrial capacity, a highly trained labor force, and a proven capacity to grow. All it needs is capital 
(or reduced debt service) and a secure market. The sharp reduction of trade barriers in the Western 
Hemisphere could provide the stimulus toward an economic take-off comparable to what occurred in the 
1960s and early 1970s.
In analyzing the implications of NAFTA for the other two regional trading areas, it is useful to 
recall that all three areas have significant interests in world trade and in maintaining the GATT. This 
does not mean that they have an equal interest. The United States is the largest exporter and importer 
of goods in the world, but Germany and Japan are much more dependent on world trade than the United 
States. More important, Japan and, to a lesser degree, Germany, are more dependent on the U.S. market 
than the United States is on them (Table 8). Japan’s exports to the United States represent roughly one 
third of its total exports and about 3 percent of its GDP. In contrast, U.S. exports to Japan amount to 
about 11 percent of its exports and less than 1 percent of GDP. Obviously, Japan has much greater 
reason to be concerned that NAFTA could lead to a closing of the North American market than the 
United States has to be worried about Japan’s market. Even though Germany is more dependent on the 
United States than the United States is on Germany, the gap is much narrower, and that is yet another 
reason why the European Community is less worried about NAFTA than it is about making the EC work, 
and why Europe is less worried than Japan.
The global configuration means that NAFTA is likely to attract the attention of Japan and to a 
lesser degree Europe. How they react is another matter. Their initial reaction may be negative and 
fearful, but as they realize the importance of their stake in the U.S. market, they will concentrate more 
and more on making the GATT work. That will mean, among other things, adopting some of NAFTA’s 
innovations—for example, on dispute settlement, services, and perhaps agriculture—and trying to 
incorporate them into an invigorated GATT.
It is obvious why Latin America would want greater and more secure access to the U.S. market. 
A question has been raised as to the reason why the United States would want to consider extending 
NAFTA to the rest of Latin America. There are several reasons. First, the United States would gain 
access to a market that is much more protected than the U.S. market. Second, if trade could help 
stabilize and develop Latin America’s economies and reinforce its budding democracies, such a wider 
market would serve broader U.S. strategic and political interests. Third, South America has enormous 
resources and potential. If these were developed, then the hemisphere would become a bloc with 
considerable weight and leverage in the international community.
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Table 8: Trade Dependency of the Three World Powers
Total E xports to E xports to
GDP E xports E xports to  %  Total J a p a n  a s  % E xports to %  Total G erm any  a s  %
@  m kt prices (fob) Ja p a n  U .S . E xports of US GDP G erm any U .S . Exports of US GDP
United States ($MII) ($Mil) ($Mil) (%) (%) ($MII) <%) (%)
1 9 6 0 5 0 9 ,0 0 0 2 0 ,6 0 0 1 ,341  6 .5 1 % 0 .2 6 % 1 ,0 6 8 5 .1 8 % 0 .2 1 %
1 97 0 1 ,0 0 8 ,2 0 0 4 3 ,7 6 2 4 ,6 5 2  1 0 .6 3 % 0 .4 6 % 2 ,741 6 .2 6 % 0 .2 7 %
1 98 0 2 ,6 8 4 ,4 0 0 2 2 5 ,7 2 2 2 0 ,7 9 0  9 .2 1 % 0 .7 7 % 1 0 ,9 6 0 4 .8 6 % 0 .41  %
1 99 0 5 ,3 9 2 ,2 0 0 3 9 3 ,5 9 2 4 8 ,5 8 0  1 2 .3 4 % 0 .9 0 % 1 8 ,7 6 0 4 .7 7 % 0 .3 5 %
1991 5 ,6 7 2 ,6 0 0 4 2 1 ,6 0 0 4 8 ,1 4 7  1 1 .4 2 % 0 .8 5 % 2 1 ,3 1 7 5 .0 6 % 0 .3 8 %
Total E xports to E xports to
GDP Exports E xports to % Total US a s  % E xports to %  Total G erm any a s  %
@  m kt prices (fob) US J a p  E xports of J a p  GDP G erm any J a p  E xports of J a p  GDP
Japan ($Mil) ($Mil) ($Mil) (%) (%) ($Mil) <%) (%)
1 9 6 0 5 0 ,0 9 5 4 ,7 0 9 1 ,1 4 9 2 4 .4 0 % 2 .2 9 % 3 7 2 7 .9 0 % 0 .7 4 %
1 9 7 0 143,511 19 ,4 0 5 5 ,8 7 5 3 0 .2 8 % 4 .0 9 % 1 ,5 2 8 7 .8 8 % 1 .0 7 %
1 9 8 0 1 ,8 4 0 ,3 3 5 130,441 3 0 ,8 6 7 2 3 .6 6 % 1 .6 8 % 5 ,7 8 6 4 .4 4 % 0 .3 1 %
1 9 9 0 2 ,9 4 2 ,8 9 0 287 ,581 8 9 ,6 8 4 3 1 .1 9 % 3 .0 5 % 1 7 ,8 9 4 6 .2 2 % 0 .6 1 %
1991 3 ,6 4 2 ,9 7 5 3 3 8 ,3 2 9 9 1 ,5 8 3 2 7 .0 7 % 2 .5 1 % 20 ,6 3 1 6 .1 0 % 0 .5 7 %
Total E xports to E xports to
GDP Exports E xports to %  Total US a s  % E xports to %  Total Ja p a n  a s  %
@  m kt prices (fob) US Ger E xports of G er GDP Ja p an Ger E xports of Ger GDP
Germany ($Mil) ($MII) ($MII) (%) (%) ($Mil) (%) (%)
1 9 6 0 84 ,481 1 5 ,3 9 4 8 9 7 5 .8 3 % 1 .0 6 % 88 0 .5 7 % 0 .1 0 %
1 9 7 0 1 3 6 ,3 5 2 3 5 ,3 2 9 3 ,1 2 7 8 .8 5 % 2 .2 9 % 146 0 .4 1 % 0 .1 1 %
1 98 0 7 7 5 ,6 6 7 192 ,861 1 1 ,9 2 4 6 .1 8 % 1 .5 4 % 2 ,1 8 6 1 .1 3 % 0 .2 8 %
1 99 0 1 ,4 8 8 ,2 1 0 4 1 0 ,1 0 4 2 8 ,1 6 2 6 .8 7 % 1 .8 9 % 1 0 ,8 1 6 2 .6 4 % 0 .7 3 %
1991 1 ,7 2 8 ,1 5 2 4 3 9 ,1 3 5 2 6 ,2 2 9 5 .9 7 % 1 .5 2 % 1 0 ,7 4 5 2 .4 5 % 0 .6 2 %
Sources: World Bank, "World Development Report," 1992; and International Monetary Fund, "Direction of Trade Statistics," 1976-1982, 1991, 1992 and 
World Bank, "World Bank Tables," 1976, 1988, 1991; and U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, "U.S. Foreign 
Trade Highlights," 1992; and "Statistical Abstract of the United States," U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, various issues, 
1950-1991; OECD, "Main Economic Indicators," July 1992.
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Some Proposals
The NAFTA debate within the United States will be difficult and awkward. The United States 
is perched on the fence between risking openness and opting for an elusive defensiveness, the same kind 
of choice that Mexico faced. It is ironic that the United States and Mexico have reversed roles. If U.S. 
legislators are arrogant and insensitive during the debate, the process of integration will be set back, but 
that process—whether private or managed—will continue as long as each country perceives that the gains 
from trade exceed the cost.
Cost-benefit calculations have objective and a subjective dimensions: whether the gains exceed 
the costs, and whether the public perceives that the gains exceed the costs. The U.S.-Canadian agreement 
offers an example of a case where economists concluded that Canada gained, but only 6 percent of the 
Canadian public agreed. The opposition to the FTA—66 percent—blame the agreement for the recession 
and for generating numerous trade disputes, most of which seem to be resolved in favor of the United 
States.39 As a result, both NAFTA and the Mulroney administration are unpopular.
There are important lessons in the U.S.-Canadian experience, but NAFTA shows no signs that 
they have been learned. Like other trade agreements, NAFTA will generate more trade problems, not 
fewer, because businesses and workers will become more dependent on the success or failure of trade 
flows, and they are more likely to complain if they fail than to credit the agreement if they succeed. 
Moreover, the agenda of legitimate issues will expand because of the nature of the nontariff issue and the 
logic of economic integration: all policies that could help a country’s exports or hurt a country’s imports 
are on the table.
The following tasks need to be accomplished to sustain, deepen, and extend NAFTA:
(1) collect data and information on trade and investment policies;
(2) establish a credible and effective body to judge disputes and to enforce judgments;
(3) establish a separate inter-American body to consult, negotiate, and plan for future
problems;
(4) establish an inter-American body made up of democratically elected representatives,
comparable to the European Parliament, to address and debate issues and concerns; and
(5) establish an office to disseminate information on the activities, accomplishments, and
mistakes of the inter-American bodies.
Information Collection
The Special Committee for Consultation and Negotiation (CECON) of the Organization of 
American States was established in 1970 to collect information on trade and trade policies in the 
hemisphere and publish some of the information in a newsletter. In May 1992, CECON was renamed 
the OAS Special Committee for Trade and given some new missions, among them to be a vehicle for 
consultation on trade issues among the member governments and to promote trade liberalization and
3 9 . See the fo llow in g  tw o articles by C lyde H . Farnsworth in  N e w  York Times, "U.S.-Canada R ifts G row  Over 
Trade: A ccusations on Beer, Cars, and Lumber," February 18, 1992, pp. 1, C6; and "U .S. Trade Pact a Spur to 
Canada," July 22 , 1992, pp. C l ,  C 6.
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expansion. Member governments were concerned that CECON was too confrontational, even though a 
more telling and accurate criticism is that it has been too anodyne.
To make a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area workable, a new institution is needed to collect 
information on trade and investment policies and provide credible, impartial, and effective judgments on 
what qualifies as “protectionist.” A single standard needs to be developed and applied. An annual report 
on protectionism—defined either as violations of existing trade agreements or government-directed 
reductions in trade and investment—would be a valuable document on which everyone could depend. 
But the information has to stand the test of public criticism, and it has to be disseminated widely.
It is important not to underestimate the importance of having a base of information that all view 
as fair. Public opinion polls show that the American public supports freer trade, provided our trading 
partners play by the same rules. As there is a growing feeling in the United States that our trading 
partners are playing by different rules that are not fair, the consensus for freer trade has begun to 
fragment. One way to reconstruct that consensus is to have credible, fair information available to all 
parties. This will not eliminate political problems or trade disputes, but it will lessen them.
An important question is where to locate the data-collection system. CECON could do the task 
of data collection, but it might not be prepared to make the controversial judgments necessary to identify 
the source of emerging trade problems. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean has the capability and experience, and the Inter-American Development Bank could 
manage such a group as well. To the extent that the group’s judgments would be controversial, it will 
be better for the institution to have a clearly defined autonomy and be composed of senior statecrafters 
and judges from throughout the Americas.
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
The trade dispute settlement mechanisms in NAFTA are quite complicated and emphasize 
consensus. The central institution created by NAFTA is the Trade Commission composed of cabinet-level 
officers of each country. The daily work is to be done by a Secretariat. If normal consultations fail to 
resolve a problem within 45 days, any country can call a meeting of the Trade Commission, which should 
settle the dispute promptly. If it fails, then a country can call for an Abritral Panel, either under NAFTA 
or GATT, which will issue a report within three months with recommendations for resolving the problem. 
If the parties do not accept the recommendation, then the complaining country can suspend the application 
of equivalent benefits until the issue is resolved. Any country that considers the retaliation excessive may 
seek another panel’s recommendation.
The central flaw of the mechanism is the absence of collective enforcement, and that is because 
all three governments apparently prefer weak or nonexistent institutions to ones that they could not 
control, or that could intrude on “sovereignty.” But a weak institution would undermine NAFTA. 
Problems in interpretation and enforcement are inevitable, and all three governments would benefit from 
the enforcement of trade violations, just as all would be harmed by the lack of enforcement. The United 
States is strong enough to accommodate virtually any decision, and Canada and Mexico need the 
institution to ensure that their interests would not be ignored or overridden unfairly. To a substantial 
degree, the GATT’s weakness stems from its inability to enforce its decisions. A similar flaw in NAFTA 
could doom the institution even before it was firmly established.
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Consultation, Negotiation, and Planning
N A F T A ’s  T r a d e  C o m m i s s io n  is  i n t e n d e d  to  s e r v e  a s  a  b o d y  f o r  c o n s u l t a t i o n ,  b u t  i t  i s  u n c l e a r  
w h e t h e r  i t  w i l l  s e r v e  a  s i m i l a r  n e g o t i a t i n g  f u n c t i o n ,  a n d  n o  b o d y  i s  c h a r g e d  w i t h  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  s t e p s  
r e q u i r e d  t o  m o v e  f r o m  N A F T A  to  a  W e s t e r n  H e m i s p h e r e  T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t .  M o r e o v e r ,  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  
t h e  m a n d a t e  o f  t h e  T r a d e  C o m m i s s io n — a s  i l l u s t r a t e d  b y  i t s  v e r y  t i t l e — is  t o o  n a r r o w  t o  t a k e  i n to  a c c o u n t  
t h e  f u l l  r a n g e  o f  p r o b l e m s  o f  i n t e g r a t i o n  a n d  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e .  P e r h a p s  t h e  T r a d e  C o m m i s s i o n  c o u ld  
a p p o in t  a  P l a n n i n g  G r o u p  c o m p o s e d  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  t h r e e  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  o f  o t h e r s  i n  L a t i n  
A m e r i c a  t o  b e g i n  t o  o u t l i n e  t h e  s t e p s  n e e d e d  a n d  t h e i r  t im i n g  to  m a k e  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  to  a  w i d e r  t r a d i n g  
a r e a .
Parliament of the Americas
W h i l e  i t  i s  t o o  s o o n  to  e s t a b l i s h  a  p a r l i a m e n t  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  s t a t e s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a s ,  i t  
i s  n o t  t o o  s o o n  to  b e g i n  t o  t h i n k  a b o u t  t h e  i d e a .  I f  t h e  p r e m i s e  is  a c c u r a t e — t h a t  a  W e s t e r n  H e m i s p h e r e  
e c o n o m i c  a r e a  w i l l  m e a n  t h a t  d o m e s t i c  a g e n d a s  w i l l  b e c o m e  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  n e g o t i a t i o n — t h e n  
a  f o r u m  w i l l  b e  n e e d e d  to  d e b a t e  n o r m s  a n d  p o l i c i e s  o n  s u c h  i s s u e s .  T h e  p r o s p e c t  f o r  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  
U n i t e d  N a t io n s  E n v i r o n m e n ta l  C o n f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  s u m m e r  o f  1 9 9 2  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  f a r  h i g h e r  i f  t h e  
n a t i o n s  o f  t h e  h e m i s p h e r e  h a d  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  f o r g e  a  c o n s e n s u s  a h e a d  o f  t im e .
W h a t  is  n e e d e d  o n  t h e s e  d o m e s t i c - g lo b a l  i s s u e s  i s  a  d i s c u s s i o n  a m o n g  p e o p le  w h o  c a n  i n t e g r a t e  
d o m e s t i c  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  a n d  th e  b e s t  f o r u m  f o r  a c c o m p l i s h i n g  th a t  w o u l d  b e  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p a r l i a m e n t  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  f r o m  e a c h  o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s .  M o d e l e d  o n  t h e  E u r o p e a n  P a r l i a m e n t ,  s e a ts  
s h o u l d  b e  a l l o c a t e d  t o  s t a te s  a c c o r d in g  to  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e i r  p o p u l a t i o n .  T h e  p l a n n i n g  g r o u p  s h o u l d  a s s i g n  
l o n g - t e r m  i s s u e s  t o  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t  f o r  d e b a t e  a n d  e v e n t u a l l y  f o r  r e s o l u t i o n .
An Office of Dissemination
T o o  o f t e n ,  g o v e r n m e n t s  h a v e  i n f o r m a t io n  o f f i c e s  t h a t  f a i l  t o  d i s s e m in a t e  r e p o r t s  t o  p e o p l e  a n d  
g r o u p s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  l e a r n in g  a b o u t  th e m .  T o o  o f t e n ,  t h e  r e p o r t s  a r e  s e l f - s e r v i n g .  T o  b u i l d  a  l o n g - t e r m  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  a m o n g  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a s  b a s e d  o n  f r e e r  t r a d e  w i l l  r e q u i r e  a  w i d e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
o f  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w o r k i n g  o n  t h e  i s s u e s .  F o r  r e p o r t s  t o  b e  e f f e c t i v e ,  t h e y  n e e d  
to  d e s c r i b e  n o t  o n l y  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n ’s  a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s ,  b u t  a l s o  i ts  m i s t a k e s  a n d  p r o b l e m s ,  a n d  th e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  d i s s e m in a t e d  w i d e ly .
T o  a c c o m p l i s h  t h e s e  f i v e  t a s k s  w i l l  r e q u i r e  n e w  i d e a s ,  a t t i t u d e s ,  p r o c e d u r e s ,  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  
N o n e  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  c o n te m p la t e d ,  b u t  a l l  a r e  n e e d e d  i f  t h e  n a t i o n s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a s  a r e  s e r i o u s  a b o u t  
w a n t in g  t o  e x t e n d  N A F T A  to  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  h e m i s p h e r e .  C o n s u l t i n g  a n d  n e g o t i a t i n g  t h e  f u l l  r a n g e  o f  
i s s u e s  w i l l  e q u ip  t h e  r e g i o n ’s  l e a d e r s  t o  b e g in  t h in k i n g  a b o u t  n e w  m o d e s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  c o o p e r a t i o n ,  b o t h  
t o  d e f e n d  d e m o c r a c y  i n  t h e  h e m i s p h e r e  a n d  t o  s h a p e  g l o b a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  t a k e  i n to  a c c o u n t  t h e  n e e d s  o f  
t h e  A m e r i c a s .
T h e  w o r l d  h a s  b e e n  lo n g  d i v id e d  i n to  t r a d i n g  b l o c s  a n d ,  s i n c e  t h e  S e c o n d  W o r l d  W a r ,  t r a d i n g  
a r e a s .  T h e  m o s t  h i g h l y  i n t e g r a t e d  is  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t y ,  b u t  J a p a n ’s  e f f o r t s  t o  i n t e g r a t e  S o u t h e a s t  
A s i a  a l s o  s u g g e s t  a n  e m e r g in g  a r e a  i n  t h e  e a s t .  T h e  W e s t e r n  H e m is p h e r e  h a s  h a r b o r e d  d r e a m s  o f  a  f r e e -
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t r a d e  a r e a  f o r  o v e r  a  c e n t u r y ,  b u t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  n e g o t i a te  N A F T A  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  f i r s t  s i g n i f i c a n t  s t e p  
i n  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n .  I t  i s  a  s t e p  t h a t  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  t r a d e  i n  N o r t h  A m e r i c a  a n d  c o u ld  b e  e x t e n d e d  t o  t h e  e n t i r e  
h e m i s p h e r e .  B e y o n d  t h a t ,  a n  e x p a n d e d  N A F T A  c o u ld  s e r v e  a s  a  m o d e l  f o r  a  n e w  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d i n g  
s y s te m .  A s  l o n g  a s  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  c o n t i n u e  t o  r e c o g n i z e  t h e i r  s t a k e  i n  t h e  g l o b a l  
t r a d i n g  s y s t e m ,  t h e y  w i l l  b e  a b le  t o  u t i l i z e  t h e i r  n e w - f o u n d  l e v e r a g e  to  s t i m u l a te  G A T T  t o  o v e r c o m e  i ts  
p r o b l e m s  a n d  to  g e n e r a t e  n e w  t r a d e  a n d  g r o w t h  in  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m y .  T o g e t h e r ,  t h e s e  s t e p s  m a y  
a d d  u p  t o  a  g r e a t  l e a p .
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I I .  W h a t  K in d  o f  A g re e m e n ts  a re  D e s ira b le ?

A n n e  O .  K r u e g e r
C O N D IT IO N S  F O R  M A X IM IZ IN G  T H E  G A IN S F R O M  A  W H F T A
U n t i l  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  m o s t  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  f o l l o w e d  p o l i c i e s  o f  i m p o r t - s u b s t i t u t i n g  
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  u n d e r  w h i c h  th e y  p r o v i d e d  h i g h  l e v e l s  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  t o  d o m e s t i c  i m p o r t - c o m p e t i n g  
i n d u s t r i e s .  I n  s u c h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  m o s t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s  o v e r  t r a d i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  a n d  
e s p e c i a l l y  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ,  t o o k  p l a c e  a m o n g  t h e  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s .
T h r o u g h  a  n u m b e r  o f  r o u n d s  o f  m u l t i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  ( M T N s ) ,  t h e  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  
s u c c e s s i v e l y  r e d u c e d  t h e i r  t a r i f f s  t o  v e r y  l o w  l e v e l s .  A l s o ,  b y  t h e  l a t e  1 9 5 0 s ,  t h o s e  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  
t h a t  h a d  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  i m p o r t s  f o r  b a la n c e - o f - p a y m e n ts  p u r p o s e s  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  
W o r l d  W a r  s u c c e e d e d  i n  e l i m in a t in g  t h e m  f o r  n e a r l y  a l l  t r a d e .  T h e  r e s u l t  w a s  a  s u s t a i n e d  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  
o f  t r a d e  a m o n g  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  f r o m  t h e  l a t e  1 9 4 0 s  t o  t h e  1 9 8 0 s .1 T h a t  i n  t u r n  p r o d u c e d  a  
v e r y  r a p i d  r a t e  o f  g r o w t h  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e ,  a l t h o u g h  th e  f a i l u r e  o f  m a n y  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t o  e l i m in a t e  
t h e i r  s t r o n g  i n w a r d  o r i e n t a t i o n  m e a n t  t h a t  t h e  s h a r e  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e  a c c o u n te d  f o r  b y  t h e  t r a d e - l i b e r a l i z i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  w a s  i n c r e a s in g  a n d  t h e  s h a r e  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  f e l l .  E v e n  s o ,  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
b e n e f i t t e d  g r e a t l y  a s  b y s t a n d e r s  t o  t a r i f f  r e d u c t io n  a n d  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  a m o n g  t h e  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s .
T h e  G e n e r a l  A g r e e m e n t  o n  T a r i f f s  a n d  T r a d e  ( G A T T )  w a s  f o u n d e d  u p o n  t h e  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
m u l t i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  w i t h  n o  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  a m o n g  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s .  H o w e v e r ,  i n  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  t o  t h i s  
p r i n c i p l e ,  t h e  i n w a r d - l o o k i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i n s i s t e d  u p o n ,  a n d  r e c e iv e d ,  s p e c ia l  a n d  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
( S & D )  t r e a t m e n t  u n d e r  G A T T .  T h e y  a s k e d  f o r  p r e f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  l o w e r  t a r i f f s  c o n t r a s t e d  w i t h  
t h o s e  o n  i m p o r t s  f r o m  o t h e r  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  o n  t h e i r  e x p o r t s  t o  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  a n d  w e r e  
a c c o r d e d  t h o s e  p r e f e r e n c e s  u n d e r  t h e  G e n e r a l i z e d  S y s te m  o f  P r e f e r e n c e s  ( G S P ) ,2 w h i l e  s i m u l t a n e o u s ly  
b e in g  e x e m p t  f r o m  t h e  G A T T  r e q u i r e m e n t  t o  r e c i p r o c a t e  i n  m u l t i l a t e r a l  t a r i f f  r e d u c t io n s .
1. To be sure, there w ere offsets. The most important o f  these from  the vantage point o f  develop ing countries’ 
access to markets w ere increasing protection o f  agriculture (as European and Japanese agricultural production  
recovered from  the war and pressures once again em erged on  sm all-scale farmers) and quantitative restrictions on  
textile  and cloth ing im ports from  developing countries. U ntil p o licy  changes in  the 1980s, there w ere few  develop ing  
countries that w ere even  able to fill their quotas under the M ultifiber Arrangement (M F A ), and exports from  
developing countries o f  textiles and clothing grew  rapidly [see C line (1990)]. H ence, these exceptions cannot be said 
to have changed the trend toward greater trade liberalization by developed countries, at least until the 1980s. By  
the late 1980s, how ever, there was concern that the M F A  was lik ely  to be increasingly protectionist i f  the Uruguay  
R ound negotiations failed to produce a signed agreement.
2 . It is arguable that, even  in the environm ent o f  the 1960s and 1970s w ith  the restrictionist trade p o lic ies o f  
develop ing countries, adherence to the open multilateral trading system , w ith  even  sm all additional reductions in  
developed countries’ tariffs, w ould  have provided greater benefit to developing countries. See, for exam ple, 
B aldw in and Murray (1977); later research has confirm ed the Baldwin-M urray findings.
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I n  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  h o w e v e r ,  m a n y  p o l i c y  m a k e r s  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  r e s t o r i n g  
s u s t a i n e d  a n d  s a t i s f a c to r y  g r o w t h  w o u l d  n o t  b e  f e a s i b l e  w i t h o u t  a  c h a n g e  in  t r a d e  s t r a t e g i e s . 3 I n  m a n y  
c o u n t r i e s ,  t r a d e  r e g im e s  w e r e  l ib e r a l i z e d ;  i n  a  f e w  c a s e s ,  t h e y  w e r e  e v e n  t r a n s f o r m e d  f r o m  h i g h l y  i n n e r -  
o r i e n t e d  to  f a i r l y  o p e n  e c o n o m i e s .  A s  t h o s e  p a in f u l  p o l i c y  c h a n g e s  w e r e  u n d e r t a k e n ,  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t  b e c a m e  e v e n  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  f u t u r e  g r o w t h  p r o s p e c t s .
J u s t  a s  t h a t  h a p p e n e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  m a n y  o b s e r v e r s  b e c a m e  s k e p t ic a l  o f  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  d e v e l o p e d  
c o u n t r i e s  t o  m a i n t a i n  o p e n  a c c e s s  t o  t h e i r  m a r k e t s .  P r o t e c t i o n i s t  p r e s s u r e s  e m e r g e d  a n d  g r e w  s t r o n g e r  
i n  t h e  d o m e s t i c  p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a s  o f  m a n y  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  a n d  t h e  U r u g u a y  R o u n d  o f  t r a d e  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  h a s  d r a g g e d  o n  w i t h o u t  a  f i n a l  a g r e e m e n t .
C o n c u r r e n t  w i t h  t h o s e  o m in o u s  d e v e l o p m e n t s ,  r e g io n a l  t r a d i n g  b l o c s  a p p e a r  t o  b e  e m e r g in g .  T h e  
E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t y ,  a l t h o u g h  s o m e w h a t  d i s t r a c t e d  b y  e v e n t s  i n  E a s t e r n  E u r o p e  a n d  t h e  C I S ,  is  
p r o c e e d i n g  w i t h  i t s  c o m m i tm e n t  t o  c o m p l e te  t h e  i n t e r n a l  m a r k e t  b y  t h e  e n d  o f  1 9 9 2 . S i m u l t a n e o u s ly ,  a f t e r  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  C a n a d a  s i g n e d  a  f r e e  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t  ( F T A ) ,  M e x i c o  a n n o u n c e d  i ts  i n t e n t i o n  to  
r e a c h  a n  a c c o r d  o n  a n  F T A  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  p r o p o s e d  t h e  E n t e r p r i s e  f o r  t h e  
A m e r i c a s  I n i t i a t i v e ,  w h i c h  e n v i s a g e s  a  h e m i s p h e r i c  F T A .
T h e  p r o s p e c t  o f  a  W e s t e r n  H e m is p h e r e  F r e e  T r a d e  A r e a  ( W H F T A )  p r e s e n t s  b o t h  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
a n d  d a n g e r s  f o r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s .  T h e r e  is  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  i m p r o v i n g  e c o n o m i c  p e r f o r m a n c e  
a n d  a c c e l e r a t i n g  g r o w t h  i f  ( a )  t h e  W H F T A  r e s u l t s  i n  f u r t h e r  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e  a n d  a c c e s s  t o  
m a r k e t s  f o r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s ,  a n d  (b )  a p p r o p r i a t e  d o m e s t i c  e c o n o m ic  p o l i c i e s  a r e  i n  p l a c e  to  
p e r m i t  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c e r s  a n d  c o n s u m e r s  t o  a v a i l  t h e m s e l v e s  o f  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  p r e s e n t e d  b y  s u c h  a n  
W H F T A .  T h e r e  a r e  d a n g e r s  i f  ( a )  t h e  n e t  r e s u l t  o f  r e g io n a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  a r r a n g e m e n t s  is  t h e  e m e r g e n c e  
o f  t r a d i n g  b l o c s  t h a t  d e g r a d e  t h e  w o r l d  t r a d i n g  s y s te m ,  o r  (b )  c o u n t r i e s  f a i l  t o  a d o p t  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c i e s  
c o m p a t ib l e  w i t h  l i b e r a l i z e d  t r a d e .
T h i s  p a p e r  a s s e s s e s  t h e  p o s s ib i l i t i e s  a n d  d a n g e r s  o f  a  W H F T A  a n d  c o n s i d e r s  t h e  k i n d s  o f  p o l i c i e s  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  c o u ld  a d o p t  to  p r o v i d e  t h e  m a x i m u m  s c o p e  f o r  g a in s  u n d e r  a  W H F T A .  T h e  
f i r s t  s e c t i o n  l a y s  o u t  t h e  f r a m e w o r k  o f  a n a l y s i s  a n d  in d ic a te s  w a y s  a  c o u n t r y ’s  t r a d e  r e g im e  a f f e c t s  i ts  
e c o n o m i c  p e r f o r m a n c e  a n d  p r o s p e c t s ,  t h e  r o l e  o f  d o m e s t i c  e c o n o m ic  p o l i c i e s  i n  a f f e c t i n g  t r a d e ,  a n d  th e  
s o r t s  o f  F T A s  t h a t  w o u l d  t e n d  to  i m p r o v e  e c o n o m ic  p e r f o r m a n c e .
T h e  s e c o n d  s e c t i o n  t h e n  c o n s i d e r s  t h o s e  a s p e c t s  o f  a n  F T A  t h a t  w i l l  b e  m o s t  c r u c i a l  f r o m  th e  
v i e w p o i n t  o f  t h e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  i n  s h a p in g  f u t u r e  t r a d i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t s .  T h e s e  r a n g e  f r o m  th e  
s y m m e t r y  o f  t r a d i n g  r e l a t i o n s  t o  s u c h  i m p o r t a n t  b u t  t e c h n i c a l  i s s u e s  a s  r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n  a n d  d i s p u t e -  
s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m s .
T h e  t h i r d  s e c t i o n  f o c u s e s  o n  d o m e s t i c  e c o n o m ic  p o l i c i e s  a n d  t h e  w a y s  a  c o u n t r y ’s  p o l i c i e s  a r e  
l i k e l y  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  a n  F T A ,  a n d  a  f i n a l  s e c t i o n  s u m m a r i z e s ,  n o t in g  t h e  s o r t s  o f  t r a d e - o f f s  t h a t  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  m a y  c o n s i d e r  i n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  o v e r  a n  F T A .
3 . The reasons for this conclusions are several, and vary som ewhat from  country to country. M ajor factors 
include (1) a harsher w orld econom ic environm ent that is no longer so perm issive o f  slack econom ic p olic ies; (2) 
related to that, the shrinkage in the availability o f  foreign capital; and (3) the b e lie f that im port substitution is either 
a "failed strategy" or one that has already delivered whatever it could toward econom ic grow th.
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A  F r a m e w o r k  f o r  A s s e s s i n g  A l t e r n a t i v e  B T A s
T o  a n a l y z e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  o f  F T A s  f r o m  a  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  t h e  f i r s t  q u e s t i o n  t o  a d d r e s s  
i s  t h e  r o l e  o f  t r a d e  i n  f a c i l i t a t i n g  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  e c o n o m i c  o b j e c t iv e s .  T h e n  a t t e n t i o n  t u r n s  t o  w a y s  a n  
F T A  m i g h t  f a c i l i t a t e  o r  i m p e d e  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  t r a d e  t o  a c h i e v i n g  t h o s e  o b j e c t iv e s .
F o r  p r e s e n t  p u r p o s e s ,  i t  i s  a s s u m e d  t h a t  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  e c o n o m i c  o b j e c t iv e s  a r e  t o  a c h i e v e  h i g h e r  
l i v i n g  s t a n d a r d s  a n d  r e a l  r a t e s  o f  g r o w t h  o f  t h e i r  e c o n o m i e s .  I t  i s  w e l l  k n o w n  t h a t  t h e s e  a r e  b u t  m e a n s  
t o  e n d s ,  a n d  t h a t  i n  f a c t  e c o n o m i c  o b j e c t iv e s  a r e  f a r  m o r e  c o m p l e x .  H o w e v e r ,  m o s t  o t h e r  o b j e c t iv e s  a r e  
f u n c t i o n s  o f  d o m e s t i c  e c o n o m i c  a n d  o t h e r  p o l i c i e s ,  a n d  l i t t l e  a f f e c te d  b y  t r a d i n g  o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  A s  s u c h ,  
i t  s e e m s  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  a n a l y z e  t h e  p r o b l e m s  a n d  p o t e n t i a l s  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  f o r m s  o f  F T  A s  a c c o r d in g  to  
t h e i r  i m p a c t  o n  e c o n o m i c  e f f i c ie n c y  a n d  g r o w t h .
The Role of Trade in Development
B y  t h e  l a t e  1 9 8 0 s ,  t h e r e  w a s  a  c o n s e n s u s  t h a t  a n  o u t e r - o r i e n t e d  t r a d e  s t r a t e g y  c a n  p r o d u c e  m u c h  
m o r e  r a p i d  a n d  s u s t a i n e d  g r o w t h  t h a n  c a n  i m p o r t  s u b s t i t u t i o n .  W h i l e  m a n y  q u e s t io n e d  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  
p o l i t i c i a n s  t o  c a r r y  o u t  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  i m p o r t  s u b s t i t u t i o n , 4 f e w  d o u b t e d  t h a t  t h e  p a y o f f  c o u ld  b e  
l a r g e  f o r  a  c o u n t r y  t h a t  s u c c e s s f u l l y  m a k e s  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n .  H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  f i r s t  K o r e a ,  T a i w a n ,  H o n g  K o n g ,  
a n d  S i n g a p o r e ,  a n d  l a t e r  T h a i l a n d ,  T u r k e y ,  a n d  M a l a y s i a ,  w e r e  s u s t a i n i n g  u n h e a r d - o f  r a t e s  o f  g r o w t h  
t h r o u g h  a n  o u t e r - o r i e n t e d  t r a d e  s t r a t e g y  a n d  d o m e s t i c  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c i e s  s u p p o r t i v e  o f  t h a t  s t r a t e g y .  
M e a n w h i l e ,  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  h a d  p e r s i s t e d  i n  i m p o r t - s u b s t i t u t i o n  e x p e r i e n c e d  m a j o r  s l o w d o w n s  i n  g r o w t h  
a n d  f a l l i n g  l i v i n g  s t a n d a r d s  o f t e n  a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  r a p i d  i n f l a t i o n  a n d  m a j o r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  s e r v i c i n g  d e b t .
T o  a n a l y z e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  o f  a n  F T A ,  i m p o r t a n t  d i m e n s i o n s  t o  c o n s i d e r  i n c l u d e  t h e  w a y s  a n  o u t e r -  
o r i e n t e d  t r a d e  s t r a t e g y  h a s  c o n t r i b u t e d  to  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  i n  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  c o u n t r i e s . 5 T h e  a n s w e r  h a s  
t o  d o  in  p a r t  w i t h  t h e  s h o r t c o m i n g s  o f  i m p o r t  s u b s t i t u t i o n :  t h e  s m a l l  s i z e  o f  t h e  d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t ,  t h e  
i n e v i t a b l e  t e n d e n c y  f o r  h e a v i l y  p r o t e c t e d  f i r m s  to  b e c o m e  h i g h - c o s t  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  s u f f i c i e n t  
c o m p e t i t i o n ,  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  t o  u s e  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e ,  a n d  t h e  c o n s e q u e n t  n e c e s s i t y  t o  m o v e  
i n c r e a s in g l y  i n to  c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e  i n d u s t r i e s  w i t h  t h e i r  a s s o c i a t e d  h i g h  c o s t s  a n d  l o w  i n c r e m e n t a l  o u t p u t ,  
a n d  t h e  e c o n o m i c  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  s h o r t a g e s .
B u t  f o r  p r e s e n t  p u r p o s e s ,  t h e  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  o f  t h e  a n s w e r  h a s  t o  d o  w i t h  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  
a n  o u t e r - o r i e n t e d  t r a d e  s t r a t e g y .  T h e s e  i n c l u d e  p h e n o m e n a  a s s o c i a t e d  b o t h  w i t h  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  s t i m u l u s  
t o  e x p o r t s  a n d  a c c e s s  o f  d o m e s t i c  f i r m s  to  i m p o r t s  f r o m  a b r o a d .  O n  t h e  e x p o r t  s i d e ,  i t  i s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  
t h e  p a y o f f  f r o m  a d o p t i n g  a n  o u t e r - o r i e n t e d  t r a d e  s t r a t e g y  w i l l  b e  g r e a t e r ,  t h e  m o r e  o p e n  t h e  w o r l d
4 . For an analysis o f  the political econom y o f  trade liberalization and other econom ic p o licy  reform s (m any o f  
w hich  are essential i f  trade liberalization is  to have the desired effects), see  Bates and Krueger (forthcom ing), 
N elson  (1990), and M ichaely , Papageorgiou, and C hoksi (1991). T he vested  interests that build  up under im port 
substitution are sure to object to reform s, and political opposition  has often  led to reversal o f  reform  programs 
before their benefits could be realized. That the p ay o ff for successfu l liberalization can b e enorm ous is  unquestioned. 
For a com parison o f  Korea (w hich liberalized in  1960 w hen its per-capita incom e w as less than on e third that o f  
Turkey) and Turkey (w here im port-substitution continued to 1980), see Krueger (1987).
5 .  T he reasons can on ly  be briefly sum marized here. For further analysis, see  Bhagwati (1988).
89
Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere
e c o n o m y  is  t o  a  c o u n t r y ’s  p r o d u c t s .  I n  t h a t  r e g a r d ,  i t  i s  a lw a y s  e a s i e r  t o  c a p t u r e  m a r k e t  s h a r e  i n  t h e  
c o n t e x t  o f  r a p i d  g r o w t h  t h a n  w h e n  n e w  e n t r a n t s  m u s t  c o m p e t e  w i t h  e x i s t i n g  s u p p l i e r s  f o r  b u s i n e s s .  M a n y  
c o n s i d e r  t h e  r a p i d  e x p a n s i o n  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m y  a  m a j o r  f a c t o r  a t  t h e  t i m e  K o r e a  a n d  T a i w a n  
w e r e  b e g i n n i n g  t h e i r  o u t e r - o r i e n t e d  t r a d e  s t r a t e g i e s .  O n c e  i n c e n t iv e s  w e r e  i n  p l a c e  f o r  e x p o r t i n g ,  
d o m e s t i c  f i r m s  h a d  l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l ty  f i n d i n g  o v e r s e a s  m a r k e t s .
T h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  i n c r e a s e d  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  r e s o u r c e  u s e  a n d  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  o f  a n  o u t e r - o r i e n t e d  
t r a d e  s t r a t e g y  a r e  a l s o  c l e a r l y  g r e a t e r  w h e n  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t  is  s m a l l  a n d  a  c o u n t r y ’s  
r e s o u r c e  e n d o w m e n t  d i v e r g e s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  f r o m  t h e  m e d i a n  o f  t h e  w o r l d  e c o n o m y .  S m a l l  d o m e s t i c  
m a r k e t s  g e n e r a t e  l a r g e  b e n e f i t s  f r o m  l i b e r a l i z i n g  t r a d e  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  im p e t u s  t o  e c o n o m ic  
e f f i c i e n c y  t h a t  a r i s e s  f r o m  c o m p e t i t i v e  f o r c e s  a f t e r  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ,  a n d  f i r m s  w i t h  s m a l l  d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t s  
a r e  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  h i g h  f i x e d  c o s t s . 6 I t  is  w i d e ly  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r e s s u r e  i s  a l s o  
i m p o r t a n t  i n  d r i v i n g  d o w n  c o s t s ,  a l t h o u g h  e m p i r i c a l  e v id e n c e  o n  t h i s  p o i n t  i s  s k e t c h y . 7
O n  t h e  i m p o r t  s i d e ,  o n c e  t r a d e  i s  l i b e r a l i z e d  a n d  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  f r e e l y  a v a i l a b l e ,  f i r m s  h a v e  
a c c e s s  t o  l o w - c o s t  s o u r c e s  o f  s u p p l y .  T h i s  c a n  b e  c o s t - r e d u c in g  b o t h  d i r e c t l y  a n d  i n d i r e c t l y ,  a n d  in  
a d d i t i o n  p r o v i d e s  a n  e c o n o m i c  w a y  o f  a d v a n c in g  t e c h n i c a l  k n o w l e d g e . 8 I t  a l s o  p e r m i t s  d o m e s t i c  
p r o d u c e r s  t o  c o m p e t e  w i t h  f i r m s  in  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  a c c e s s  t o  t h e s e  s a m e  l o w - c o s t  i n p u t s .  T h i s  is  
v i t a l  i f  t h e r e  i s  t o  b e  r a p i d  e x p o r t  g r o w t h ,  n o t  o n l y  b e c a u s e  i t  h e lp s  k e e p  d o w n  e x p o r t e r s ’ c o s t s  d i r e c t l y ,  
b u t  a l s o  b e c a u s e  i t  p e r m i t s  b e t t e r  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l ,  a  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  p r o d u c t s .
Role of the International Economy in Development
M u c h  o f  t h e  b e n e f i t  f r o m  s h i f t i n g  to  a n  o u t e r - o r i e n t e d  t r a d e  s t r a t e g y  ( a n d  t h e  o t h e r  e c o n o m i c  
p o l i c i e s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  e n s u r e  i t s  s u c c e s s )  c o m e s  f r o m  t h e  im p a c t  o n  t h e  d o m e s t i c  e c o n o m y :  i n c r e a s e d  
c o m p e t i t i o n  i n d u c e s  f i r m s  to  r e d u c e  t h e i r  c o s t s  a n d  i m p r o v e  q u a l i t y ;  d o m e s t i c  p r i c i n g  o f  i m p o r t s  t o  r e f l e c t  
t h e i r  f o r e i g n  p r i c e s  p e r m i t s  a  m o r e  r a t i o n a l  a l l o c a t io n  o f  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e ;  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n  f l o w s  a b o u t  
i n n o v a t i o n s  a n d  i m p r o v e d  t e c h n i q u e s  a b r o a d  a p p e a r  t o  t h r i v e  w h e n  t r a d e  p o l i c i e s  a r e  l i b e r a l i z e d .
H o w e v e r ,  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  i n c r e a s e  w i t h  g r e a t e r  a c c e s s  t o  m a r k e t s  i n  o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s  e n jo y e d  b y  d o m e s t i c  e x p o r t e r s  a n d  t h e  m o r e  r a p i d  t h e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m y .  
W h e n  t h e r e  a r e  f e w  b a r r i e r s  t o  n e w  e n t r a n t s ,  t h o s e  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c e r s  w h o  b e l i e v e  t h e y  c o u ld  p r o f i t a b l y  
e x p o r t  a r e  m u c h  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  t a k e  t h e  r i s k s  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  n e w  m a r k e t s  t h a n  w h e n  t h e r e  a r e  t r a d e  
b a r r i e r s  e i t h e r  i n  p l a c e  o r  l i k e l y  t o  b e  e r e c t e d  i f  e x p o r t e r s  a r e  s u c c e s s f u l .
6 . In recent years, international trade theory has m oved aw ay from  reliance on m odels in  w hich  there is  perfect 
com petition  to m odels in  w hich  markets are im perfectly com petitive in  the Chamberlain sense o f  the term. For 
producing differentiated products w here there are g iven  fixed  costs and constant marginal costs, it is  easily  show n  
that the gains from  econom ic integration include not on ly  a larger variety o f  products but a lso  a larger vo lu m e o f  
production over w hich  to spread fixed  cost. See Krugman (1979) for an exposition .
7 .  See L evinsohn (1991) and Krueger and Tuncer (1982) for tw o studies generating this result, how ever.
8 . See G rossm an and H elpm an (1991) for an analysis o f  the reasons w hy an open econom y may facilitate more 
rapid grow th through m echanism s that rely in  som e essential w ay on research and developm ent and innovation.
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L i k e w i s e ,  e v e n  w h e n  t h e r e  a r e  n o  b a r r i e r s  t o  n e w  e n t r a n t s ,  n e w c o m e r s  f i n d  e s t a b l i s h i n g  
t h e m s e l v e s  m u c h  l e s s  d i f f i c u l t  w h e n  t h e  o v e r a l l  s i z e  o f  t h e  m a r k e t  i s  g r o w i n g  a n d  t h e y  c a n  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  
s a l e s  a n d  m a r k e t  s h a r e  o u t  o f  m a r k e t  e x p a n s io n ,  t h a n  w h e n  t h e  o v e r a l l  s i z e  o f  t h e  m a r k e t  i s  s t a g n a n t  o r  
g r o w i n g  s l o w l y  a n d  t h e y  m u s t  w i n  c u s t o m e r s  a w a y  f r o m  e x i s t i n g  s u p p l i e r s . 9
M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  i t  i s  p r o f i t a b l e  t o  s h i f t  r e s o u r c e s  t o w a r d  e x p o r t i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  w i l l  
d e p e n d  o n  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  e x p o r t i n g ;  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  r e s o u r c e  s h i f t  t o w a r d  t h o s e  l i n e s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  n e w ly  
l i b e r a l i z i n g  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  w i l l  b e  t h e  g a in s  t h a t  a r i s e  f r o m  a l t e r i n g  
p o l i c i e s  a n d  s h i f t i n g  t o  a n  o u t e r - o r i e n t e d  t r a d e  s t r a t e g y .
T h e  id e a l  s i t u a t i o n  f o r  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  w o u l d  b e  a n  
o p e n ,  m u l t i l a t e r a l  w o r l d  t r a d i n g  s y s t e m  c o u p le d  w i th  h e a l t h y  g r o w t h  o f  t h e  w o r l d  e c o n o m y .  O p e n n e s s  
c o m b i n e d  w i t h  g r o w t h  w o u l d  p r o v i d e  t h e  a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  m a r k e t  a c c e s s  w o u l d  p e r s i s t  a n d  t h u s  i n d u c e  
d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c e r s  t o  r e s p o n d  to  i n c e n t iv e s  f o r  b e c o m i n g  c o m p e t i t i v e  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s .
H o w  t h e n  c a n  F T A s  a f f e c t  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ?  I n  a n  i d e a l  w o r l d ,  t h e y  w o u l d  n o t .  
A l l  c o u n t r i e s  w o u l d  p r a c t i c e  f r e e  t r a d e . 10 I n  t h e  c u r r e n t  c l i m a t e ,  h o w e v e r ,  F T A s  c a n  c o n t r i b u t e  i f  t h e y  
e n h a n c e  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  m a r k e t  a c c e s s  i n  i m p o r t a n t  m a r k e t s  and do not undermine the open multilateral 
trading system. P u t  a n o th e r  w a y ,  c o u n t r i e s  w h o s e  o w n  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c i e s  a r e  a l r e a d y  h i g h l y  l i b e r a l  c a n  
g a in  t h r o u g h  F T A  a r r a n g e m e n t s  i f  t h o s e  F T A s  a r e  “ G A T T - p l u s ”  a n d  p r o v i d e  g r e a t e r  a s s u r a n c e s  t h a t  
s u c c e s s f u l  e x p o r t e r s  w i l l  n o t  f i n d  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  e r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e m  in  i m p o r t a n t  m a r k e t s .
The Costs o f Regional Trading Blocs
S u p p o s e  t h a t  i n s t e a d  o f  f o r m i n g  a  t r a d i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t  t h a t  i s  G A T T - p l u s ,  E u r o p e a n ,  A s i a n ,  a n d  
W e s t e r n - H e m i s p h e r e  c o u n t r i e s  a l l  f o r m  r e g io n a l  t r a d i n g  b l o c s .  W h a t  w o u l d  b e  t h e  l i k e l y  c o n s e q u e n c e s  
f o r  t h e  w o r l d  t r a d i n g  s y s te m ?
A n s w e r i n g  t h e  q u e s t io n  p r e c i s e l y  i s  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  a  v a r i e t y  o f  r e a s o n s .  M u c h  o f  t h e  a s s e s s m e n t  
o f  p o t e n t i a l  d a m a g e  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  d e p e n d s  o n  h o w  o n e  v i e w s  t h e  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  e v o lu t i o n  o f  t h e  
w o r l d  s y s t e m  o n c e  t r a d i n g  b l o c s  h a v e  f o r m e d .  T h e  i n i t i a l  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t r a d i n g  b l o c s  w o u l d  p r e s u m a b l y  
b e  o n l y  t h e  s t a r t  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  t r a d e  f r i c t i o n — a n d  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s — b e tw e e n  r e g i o n s .  I f  t r a d e  f r i c t i o n s  
m o u n te d  o v e r  t i m e ,  o n e  c a n  i m a g i n e  t w o  o u t c o m e s :  e i t h e r  e a c h  r e g i o n  w o u l d  e r e c t  i n c r e a s i n g  b a r r i e r s  
a g a i n s t  i m p o r t s  f r o m  t h e  o t h e r ,  o r  t h e  c o s t s  o f  t h i s  o u t c o m e  w o u l d  b e  s e e n  to  b e  s o  g r e a t  t h a t  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  r e g i o n s  w o u l d  f i n d  w a y s  t o  r e i n s t i t u t e  a n d  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  
o p e n ,  m u l t i l a t e r a l  t r a d i n g  s y s te m .
9 .  In fact, although the rate o f  grow th o f  econom ic activity and the height o f  protection are log ica lly  separate, 
the p olitical econom y o f  protection tells us that trade barriers are related to stagnation. I f  ex isting suppliers are 
dom estic firm s and n ew  entrants m ust establish them selves at the expense o f  those suppliers, the response is  often  
to  seek increased trade barriers against im ports.
1 0 . T o  b e sure, there w ou ld  be dom estic interventions to correct dom estic d istortions, and there might b e infant 
industries subject to temporary production subsidies. T he on ly  case for a border intervention on  grounds o f  national 
w elfare is m onopoly  pow er in  trade: even  then, the likelih ood  o f  retaliation reduces the scope for gain  through that 
p o licy , and in  any event, it is  w orld-w elfare reducing.
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W h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  i n c r e a s in g  c o s t s  o f  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  p r o m p te d  r e n e w e d  i n t e r e s t  i n  s t r e n g th e n i n g  
t h e  G A T T ,  t h e  c o s t s  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t r a d i n g  b l o c s  t h a t  w e r e  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  v i s -  
a - v i s  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d  w o u l d  b e  o f  t w o  k i n d s .  T h e  f i r s t  w o u l d  b e  o f  t h e  t r a d e - d i v e r s i o n  ty p e  
d e s c r i b e d  b e l o w ,  t h e  c o s t s  o f  w h i c h  i n c r e a s e  a s  t h e  h e ig h t  o f  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  t o  c o u n t r i e s  n o t  i n  t h e  r e g io n a l  
g r o u p  r i s e s .  T h e  s e c o n d  w o u l d  b e  t h e  s l o w e r  g r o w t h  in  d e m a n d  f o r  e x p o r t s  o f  a n y  g i v e n  c o u n t r y  b e c a u s e  
t h e  g r o w t h  r a t e  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e  a n d  G N P  w o u l d  in e v i t a b l y  s lo w  d o w n  w i t h  i n c r e a s in g  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s .
D u r i n g  t h e  1 9 5 0 s  a n d  1 9 6 0 s ,  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  g r e w  a t  a n  a v e r a g e  a n n u a l  r a t e  i n  e x c e s s  
o f  4 . 5  p e r c e n t ,  a n d  w o r l d  t r a d e  g r e w  a t  a n  a v e r a g e  a n n u a l  r a t e  o f  9  p e r c e n t . 11 D u r i n g  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  r e a l  
g r o w t h  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  s l o w e d  to  a b o u t  2 . 7 5  p e r c e n t ,  w h i l e  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e  
s l o w e d  t o  a b o u t  5  p e r c e n t .  A l t h o u g h  i t  i s  a  v e r y  r o u g h  c a l c u l a t i o n ,  o n e  m ig h t  t a k e  t h a t  d i f f e r e n c e  a s  
i n d i c a t i v e  o f  t h e  o r d e r  o f  m a g n i t u d e  o f  d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  m a k e s  t o  w o r l d  e c o n o m i c  
g r o w t h .
I f ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  w o r l d  w e r e  to  e n t e r  a  p e r i o d  o f  i n c r e a s in g  p r o t e c t i o n i s m  b e tw e e n  r e g i o n s ,  o n e  
c o u ld  e x p e c t  a  r a t e  o f  g r o w t h  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e  o f  l e s s  t h a n  5  p e r c e n t ,  w h i l e  i f  i n s t e a d  t h e  o p e n  m u l t i l a t e r a l  
t r a d i n g  s y s t e m  a n d  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  p r e v a i l s ,  o n e  m ig h t  w i tn e s s  t h e  r e t u r n  t o  9  p e r c e n t - 1 0  p e r c e n t  
a n n u a l  g r o w t h  in  t h e  v o l u m e  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e .  F o r  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  s l o w  g r o w t h  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e  
w o u l d  i m p l y  n o  m o r e  r a p i d  g r o w t h  o f  e x p o r t s  t h a n  6  p e r c e n t - 7  p e r c e n t  a n n u a l l y , 12 w i t h  t h e  m o s t  
s u c c e s s f u l  c o u n t r i e s  e x p e r i e n c i n g  g r o w t h  r a t e s  b e tw e e n  1 0  p e r c e n t  a n d  1 5  p e r c e n t .  T h a t  c o n t r a s t s  w i t h  
K o r e a ’s a n d  T a i w a n ’s  4 0 - p e r c e n t  a n n u a l  g r o w t h  o f  e x p o r t s  i n  t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  a n d  T u r k e y ’s  2 5 - p e r c e n t  a n n u a l  
g r o w t h  o f  e x p o r t s  i n  t h e  1 9 8 0 s .  B y  c o n t r a s t ,  i f  w o r l d  t r a d e  a n d  o u t p u t ,  s p u r r e d  b y  c o n t i n u i n g  t r a d e  
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ,  c o u ld  r e s u m e  t h e  g r o w t h  r a te s  o f  e a r l i e r  d e c a d e s ,  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  a s  a  g r o u p  c o u ld  
e x p e r i e n c e  9  p e r c e n t - 1 0  p e r c e n t  a n n u a l  g r o w t h  o f  e x p o r t s  w i t h  l i t t l e  d i s r u p t i o n  o f  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s ’ 
m a r k e t s . 13 T h a t  w o u l d  p e r m i t  t h e  h i g h  f l y e r s  a m o n g  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t o  a c h i e v e  g r o w t h  r a te s  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  o f  K o r e a  a n d  T u r k e y  i n  e a r l i e r  d e c a d e s .
S i n c e  r a p i d  e x p o r t  g r o w t h  c a n  c o n t r i b u t e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  to  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ’ g r o w t h ,  o n e  h a s  
t o  c o n c l u d e  th a t  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw e e n  a n  a v e r a g e  6  p e r c e n t  t o  7  p e r c e n t  g r o w t h  a n d  a n  a v e r a g e  9 - 1 0  
p e r c e n t  g r o w t h  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e  c o u ld  m a k e  a  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  a t  l e a s t  2  p e r c e n ta g e  p o i n t s  o n  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
g r o w t h  r a t e s  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  u n d e r t a k in g  p o l i c y  r e f o r m  a n d  a d o p t i n g  o u t w a r d - o r i e n t e d  t r a d e  
s t r a t e g i e s .
11 . Intra-European trade grew  more rapidly than European trade w ith the rest o f  the w orld. H ow ever, European  
external trade barriers also fell sharply so that European trade w ith the rest o f  the w orld still grew  at an above- 
average rate.
1 2 . B ecause it is im possib le to estim ate how  protectionist each trade b loc  m ight becom e i f  trade frictions mount, 
it is not possib le  to quantify the extent to w hich developing countries’ export growth w ould  be restrained. The 
numbers g iven  here are illustrative o f  orders o f  m agnitude, and are certainly not "worst-case" scenarios. They 
nonetheless indicate the vital importance o f  maintaining an open multilateral w orld trading system .
13 . It is much easier to break into a rapidly grow ing market than it is to enter a stagnant one. I f  orders must 
be gained at the expense o f  existing producers, protectionist pressures rise sharply in developed countries. If, 
instead, new  markets can be found because incom es are grow ing, exports can increase substantially and market share 
increased w ithout causing a decline in production and sales for existing producers.
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B e n e f i c i a l  a n d  H a r m f u l  R e g i o n a l  A r r a n g e m e n t s
R e g io n a l  t r a d i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t s  c a n  b e  b e n e f i c i a l  o r  h a r m f u l  d e p e n d i n g  o n  th e  d e g r e e  t o  w h i c h  
p r o d u c e r s  a r e  i n d u c e d  t o  s h i f t  f r o m  l o w e r - c o s t  t o  h i g h e r - c o s t  s o u r c e s  ( t r a d e  d i v e r s i o n ) ,  t h e  e x t e n t  to  
w h i c h  r e d u c e d  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  p e r m i t  g r e a t e r  e c o n o m i c  e f f i c ie n c y  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  ( t r a d e  c r e a t i o n ) ,  t h e  e x te n t  
t o  w h i c h  t h e  F T A  i n v o lv e s  j o i n t  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ,  a n d  t h e  w a y s  i n  w h i c h  o t h e r  s i d e - e f f e c t s  o f  a  t r a d i n g  
a r r a n g e m e n t  ( i n c r e a s e d  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  w i l l  e n d u r e ,  w e a k e n i n g  o r  
s t r e n g t h e n i n g  o f  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  t r a d i n g  s y s te m )  a f f e c t  i n d iv i d u a l  s i g n a to r i e s  t o  t h e  F T A .
P e r h a p s  t h i s  is  b e s t  s e e n  b y  e x a m i n in g  t h e  w a y s  a n  F T A  c o u ld  n e g a t i v e l y  a f f e c t  a  c o u n t r y .  
T h e r e a f t e r ,  a n  o v e r v i e w  o f  t h e  m a i n  f e a t u r e s  o f  F T A s  is  p r o v i d e d ,  a n d  t h e  w a y s  i n  w h i c h  e a c h  o f  t h e m  
c a n  a f f e c t  t h e  b e n e f i t s  a n d  c o s t s  o f  a n  F T A  a g r e e m e n t  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d .
Detrimental Regional Arrangements
R e g io n a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s  w i l l  b e  m o r e  d e t r i m e n t a l ,  t h e  m o r e  a n y  in c r e a s e s  i n  t r a d e  o r i g i n a t e  in  
c o m m o d i t i e s  t h a t  w e r e  p r e v i o u s l y  im p o r t e d  f r o m  c o u n t r i e s  o u t s i d e  t h e  F T A  ( t r a d e  d i v e r s i o n )  a n d  th e  
h i g h e r  t h e  t a r i f f s  t o  w h i c h  t h o s e  c o m m o d i t i e s  w e r e  s u b je c t e d .
S u p p o s e ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h a t  p r i o r  t o  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a  U n i t e d  S t a t e s - M e x i c o  F T A ,  t h e  U . S .  i m p o r t s  
c lo t h i n g  f r o m  A s ia  s u b j e c t  t o  a  2 5 - p e r c e n t  d u t y ,  w h i l e  M e x i c o  i m p o r t s  c h e m i c a l s  f r o m  G e r m a n y  w i t h  a  
5 0 - p e r c e n t  d u t y .  A f t e r  t h e  F T A ,  t h e  U .S .  f i n d s  M e x i c a n  c lo t h i n g  ( w h i c h  c a n  e n t e r  t h e  U .S .  m a r k e t  n o t  
s u b j e c t  t o  d u t y )  5  p e r c e n t  c h e a p e r  t h a n  A s ia n  c lo t h i n g  ( o n  w h i c h  t h e r e  i s  a  2 5  p e r c e n t  d u t y ) ,  w h i l e  
M e x i c a n s  f i n d  A m e r i c a n  c h e m ic a l s  ( w h ic h  c a n  e n t e r  d u t y - f r e e )  1 0  p e r c e n t  c h e a p e r  t h a n  G e r m a n  
c h e m i c a l s .  T h e  c o s t  d i f f e r e n t i a l  w o u l d ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  b e  d u e  to  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  t h e  t a r i f f ,  a n d  i n  e a c h  c a s e  
t h e  i m p o r t s  w o u l d  b e  c o m i n g  f r o m  a  h i g h e r - c o s t  s o u r c e  a f t e r  t h e  F T A  t h a n  b e f o r e  i ts  f o r m a t i o n .  T h u s ,  
t h e  r e a l  c o s t s  o f  c lo t h i n g  i m p o r t s  t o  t h e  U . S .  w o u l d  i n c r e a s e  2 0  p e r c e n t  a n d  th e  r e a l  c o s t s  o f  c h e m i c a l  
i m p o r t s  t o  M e x i c o  w o u l d  i n c r e a s e  4 0  p e r c e n t .
T r a d e  d i v e r s i o n  c a n  o c c u r  o n l y  w h e n  a  c o u n t r y  is  o r i g in a l ly  i m p o r t i n g  f r o m  a  t h i r d  c o u n t r y :  i f  a l l  
p r o d u c t i o n  i s  d o m e s t i c  a n d  t h e n  i m p o r t e d  f r o m  t h e  p a r t n e r  c o u n t r y  a f t e r  t h e  F T A ,  t h e n  t r a d e  c r e a t i o n  is  
o c c u r r i n g .  N o t e  t h a t  t r a d e  d i v e r s i o n  n e c e s s a r i l y  h a r m s  th e  i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y ,  b u t  m ig h t  p r o v i d e  a  b e n e f i t  
t o  t h e  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y .  T h u s ,  a n  F T A  i n  w h i c h  t h e r e  w a s  t r a d e  d i v e r s i o n  o f  A m e r i c a n  i m p o r t s  f r o m  
E a s t  A s i a  t o  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ,  b u t  n o  s u c h  d i v e r s i o n  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  i m p o r t s ,  c o u ld  b e  h a r m f u l  t o  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  b e n e f i c i a l  t o  L a t i n  A m e r i c a . 14
M o s t  a n a l y s e s  o f  F T A s  f o c u s  o n  p o t e n t i a l  t r a d e  d i v e r s i o n  a s  t h e  m a j o r  c o s t  o f  s u c h  a n  
a r r a n g e m e n t .  H o w e v e r ,  o t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  a n  F T A  m ig h t  h a v e  m o r e  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t s  t h a n  
s u g g e s t e d  s i m p ly  b y  t h e  s o r t s  o f  d i r e c t  t r a d e  d i v e r s i o n  d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ,  
o n e  r i s k  is  t h a t  t r a d e  m i g h t  i n i t i a l l y  b e  d i v e r t e d  f r o m ,  s a y ,  K o r e a  t o  M e x i c o  w h e n  M e x i c o  j o i n s  t h e  F T A ,  
a n d  t h e n  d i v e r t e d  a g a i n  f r o m  M e x i c o  to  B r a z i l  w h e n  B r a z i l  j o i n s .  T o  a  d e g r e e ,  t h i s  is  a l r e a d y  h a p p e n i n g
14 . In effect, i f  the U .S . shifted to Latin A m erican from  A sian sources because imports from  Latin A m erica were 
duty-free, it w ould  be equivalent to an im provement in the terms o f  trade confronting Latin A m erica. It should be 
noted that trade d iversion  w ill occur on ly  w hen the differential betw een the low -cost exporter’s price and the FTA  
m em ber price is less than the tariff on  the good in  the im porting country.
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w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  b e c a m e  e l i g i b le  f o r  p r e f e r e n c e s  u n d e r  t h e  C a r i b b e a n  B a s i n  I n i t i a t i v e  
( C B I ) :  o n c e  i t  w a s  k n o w n  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  M e x i c o  w o u l d  e n t e r  a n  F T A ,  s o m e  o f  t h e  f i r m s  th a t  
h a d  b e e n  i n d u c e d  to  i n v e s t  i n  t h e  C a r i b b e a n  c o u n t r i e s  b e c a u s e  o f  C B I  p r e f e r e n c e s  s h i f t e d  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  
t o  M e x i c o . 15
T h e r e  i s  o n e  p a r t i c u l a r  v a r i a n t  o f  t r a d e  d i v e r s i o n  th a t  c o u ld  b e  c o s t l y  f o r  s o m e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  
c o u n t r i e s .  I t  is  p o s s i b l e  ( a n d  p e r h a p s  e v e n  l ik e ly )  t h a t  s o m e  i n d u s t r i e s  w i l l  s p r i n g  u p  in  r e s p o n s e  to  
p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  t h a t  c o u ld  n o t  s u r v i v e  a t  f r e e  t r a d e .  I f ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  C o l o m b i a  a n d  V e n e z u e la  w e r e  
t o  e n t e r  i n to  a  f r e e  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t ,  i t  m ig h t  p a y  p r o d u c e r s  i n  V e n e z u e la  t o  e s t a b l i s h  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  a  n e w  
i n d u s t r y  t o  c o m p e t e  i n  t h e  t w o  c o u n t r i e s  b e h in d  t h e i r  t a r i f f  w a l l s .  S h o u l d  C o l o m b i a  s u b s e q u e n t ly  
l i b e r a l i z e  t r a d e  m u l t i l a t e r a l l y ,  t h e  n e w l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  V e n e z u e la n  i n d u s t r y  c o u ld  f a l t e r .  T h i s  s o r t  o f  t r a d e  
d i v e r s i o n  w o u l d  b e  c o s t l y  i n a s m u c h  a s  n e w  in v e s t i b l e  r e s o u r c e s  w o u l d  f i r s t  b e  p u l l e d  i n to  t h e  i n d u s t r y  
a n d  t h e n  r e n d e r e d  u n e c o n o m i c .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  p r o t e c t i o n  in  t h e  p a r t n e r  c o u n t r y ’s m a r k e t  m a y  p r o v i d e  
s h e l t e r  f o r  d o m e s t i c  f i r m s  f r o m  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  a n d  th u s  b e  s u b j e c t  a t  l e a s t  t o  s o m e  e x t e n t  t o  
t h e  s a m e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a s  t h e  i m p o r t - s u b s t i t u t i o n  s t r a te g y .
A n o t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  c o s t  t o  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  r e la te s  t o  d o m e s t i c  c o n te n t  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  T h e s e  a r e  th e  
p e r c e n ta g e s  o f  v a l u e  a d d e d  t h a t  m u s t  o r i g in a t e  w i t h in  t h e  F T A  i n  o r d e r  to  b e  e l i g i b l e  f o r  d u t y - f r e e  
t r e a tm e n t  b y  t h e  p a r t n e r  c o u n t r y .  D o m e s t i c  c o n te n t  r e q u i r e m e n t s  c o u ld  i n d u c e  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c e r s  to  
s h i f t  t h e i r  p u r c h a s e s  o f  n e e d e d  i n p u ts  f r o m  l o w - c o s t ,  t h i r d - c o u n t r y  s o u r c e s  t o  h i g h e r - c o s t  s o u r c e s  a t  h o m e  
o r  i n  t h e  p a r t n e r  t r a d i n g  c o u n t r y ;  t h i s  c a n  a f f e c t  c o s t s  a n d  q u a l i t y ,  a n d  h e n c e  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  i n  e x p o r t  
m a r k e t s .
F i n a l l y ,  w h e n  F T A s  a r e  s e c to r a l  ( s e e  b e lo w ) ,  t h e y  m a y  s i m p ly  e n a b l e  t h e  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s  to  
p e r p e t u a t e  t h e i r  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  p o l i c i e s  a n d  s u b j e c t  t h e i r  d o m e s t i c  p o l i t i c i a n s  t o  f u r t h e r  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  
p r e s s u r e s .
Beneficial FTAs
N o  F T A  is  g o i n g  to  b e  e n t i r e l y  t r a d e - d iv e r t i n g .  T h e  m o r e  a  c o u n t r y ’s  i m p o r t s  a l r e a d y  o r i g in a t e  
w i t h  a n  F T A  p a r t n e r  a n d  t h e  l o w e r  i ts  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  p r i o r  t o  a n  F T A ,  t h e  l e s s  c o s t l y  t r a d e  d i v e r s i o n  is  
l i k e l y  t o  b e .  T h e r e  is  n o  q u e s t io n ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  p o t e n t i a l  p i t f a l l s  o f  r e g io n a l  F T A s ,  a l t h o u g h  
t h e y  c a n  b e  a v o id e d  b y  u n i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n .
W h e n  r e g io n a l  t r a d i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t s  a r e  a m o n g  “ n a t u r a l ” t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s ,  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  g a in s  
f r o m  F T A s  i n c r e a s e s .  B e c a u s e  e a c h  p a r t n e r  is  a l r e a d y  i m p o r t i n g  f r o m  t h e  o t h e r ,  i t  i s  a s s u r e d  t h a t  th e  
p a r t n e r  i s  a  l o w - c o s t  s o u r c e  o f  s u p p l y  f o r  t h e  i te m s  b e in g  im p o r t e d .  F o r  t h o s e  c o m m o d i t i e s ,  r e m o v a l  o f  
t a r i f f s  is  a lm o s t  g u a r a n t e e d  to  r e s u l t  i n  g a in s  f o r  m e m b e r  c o u n t r i e s . 16
T h e  p i t f a l l s  o f  r e g io n a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s  a r e  a ls o  s m a l l e r ,  a n d  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  g a in s  g r e a t e r ,  w h e n  th e  
p o t e n t i a l  e n t r a n t  t o  a n  F T A  a l r e a d y  h a s  v e r y  l o w  le v e l s  o f  p r o t e c t i o n .  I n d e e d ,  t h e  i d e a l  a r r a n g e m e n t
1 5 . Financial Times, A ugust 20 , 1992, p. 3. See the further d iscussion  o f  the CBI and trade d iversion  below .
16 . H am ilton and W halley (1985) found that tariff rem oval by a trading partner constituted the largest source o f  
gain for countries form ing regional trading arrangements.
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w o u l d  b e  f o r  a  p o t e n t i a l  e n t r a n t  t o  b e  p r a c t i c i n g  f r e e  t r a d e ,  a n d  t o  e n t e r  i n to  a n  F T A  w i t h  a n o th e r  c o u n t r y  
f o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  a c h i e v i n g  g r e a t e r  a s s u r a n c e  o f  m a r k e t  a c c e s s ,  a n d  g r e a t e r  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  m a r k e t s ,  t h a n  
c a n  b e  a c h i e v e d  s i m p ly  b y  r e m o v i n g  a l l  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s .
T h u s ,  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t y ’s  m o v e  t o w a r d  a  “ s i n g l e  m a r k e t ”  w a s  t a k e n  a f t e r  i n t e r n a l  t a r i f f s  
h a d  b e e n  r e d u c e d  t o  z e r o  a n d  e x t e r n a l  t a r i f f s ,  a n d  t a r i f f - e q u i v a l e n t s  o f  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  w e r e  v e r y  
l o w .  I s s u e s  a d d r e s s e d  w e r e  t h o s e  t h a t  c o u ld  f u r t h e r  i n t e g r a t e  t r a d e :  m e m b e r s  a g r e e d  t o  a c c e p t  e a c h  
o t h e r s ’ s t a n d a r d s  f o r  m o s t  i n d u s t r i a l  c o m m o d i t i e s ,  t h e r e b y  a v o id i n g  t h e  n e e d  f o r  d u p l i c a t e  i n s p e c t i o n s  a n d  
t h e  p a p e r w o r k  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e m ,  a s  w e l l  a s  d i f f e r e n t  m a k e s  a n d  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  E u r o p e a n  
m a r k e t s .
M o r e o v e r ,  i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  w h e r e  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  a r e  a l r e a d y  v e r y  l o w ,  a n  F T A  c a n  s e r v e  a s  a  
“ c o m m i tm e n t ”  t o  i n v e s to r s  t h a t  t r a d e  p o l i c i e s  w i l l  r e m a i n  l i b e r a l i z e d .  T h i s  c a n  b e  a n  i m p o r t a n t  s o u r c e  
o f  g a in  f o r  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  h a v e  r e c e n t l y  r e f o r m e d  t h e i r  t r a d e  a n d  p a y m e n t  r e g im e s ;  a  m a j o r  s o u r c e  o f  
d i f f i c u l ty  i n  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  to  a n  o u t e r - o r i e n t e d  e c o n o m y  c a n  a r i s e  i f  i n v e s to r s  a r e  h e s i t a n t  b e c a u s e  t h e y  
f e a r  t h a t  t h e  n e w l y  l i b e r a l i z e d  t r a d i n g  r e g im e  w i l l  n o t  p e r s i s t .  I n  t h o s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a n  F T A  m a y  
a c c e l e r a t e  a n d  i n c r e a s e  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  a n  o u t e r - o r i e n t e d  t r a d e  s t r a t e g y .
F T A s  c a n  a l s o  b e  b e n e f i c i a l ,  e v e n  f o r  e x i s t i n g  t r a d e  l e v e l s ,  w h e n  t h e y  r e s u l t  i n  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  
f o r  c o m m o d i t i e s  w h e r e  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  e x i s t s .  T h u s ,  i f  M e x i c o  i s  a l r e a d y  e x p o r t i n g  c lo t h i n g  to  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  t h a t  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  a  2 5 - p e r c e n t  i m p o r t  d u t y ,  a n d  i f  t h e  F T A  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  ( g r a d u a l )  
e l i m in a t io n  o f  t h a t  d u t y ,  M e x i c a n  p r o d u c e r s  s t a n d  to  g a i n  b y  t h a t  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n .
T h e r e  i s  o n e  a d d i t i o n a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e  in  w h i c h  a n  F T A  m a y  p r o v e  b e n e f i c i a l .  W h e n  a  “ n a t u r a l ”  
t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r  o f  a  s m a l l ,  o p e n  e c o n o m y  b e c o m e s  i n c r e a s in g l y  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  v i s - a - v i s  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  
w o r l d ,  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a  r e g io n a l  t r a d i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t  m a y  p r o v i d e  “ i n s u r a n c e ”  t h a t  a n y  i n c r e a s e  in  
p r o t e c t i o n  w i l l  n o t  a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t  t h e  s m a l l  o p e n  e c o n o m y .  T h a t  w a s  c e r t a i n l y  a  m o t i v e  f o r  C a n a d a  to  
f o r m  t h e  C a n a d a - U n i t e d  S t a te s  F T A . 17 E v e n  t h e n ,  t h e  p r e c i s e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  c a n  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n f lu e n c e  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  “ i n s u r a n c e ”  o b t a i n e d  t h r o u g h  F T A  f o r m a t i o n .
A s s u r i n g  a  B e n e f i c i a l  F T A
D i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  d o m e s t i c  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e n e f i t  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  
j o i n i n g  F T A s  i s  d e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n .  H e r e  t h e  f o c u s  i s  o n  a s p e c t s  o f  F T A  a r r a n g e m e n t s  t h a t  c a n  
r e d u c e  t h e  r i s k  o f  c o u n t r i e s  e n t e r i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t s  t h a t  r e s u l t  i n  e c o n o m i c  l o s s e s .
A  g o o d  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  i s  t o  n o t e  t h a t  “ n a tu r a l  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s ”  a r e  p o t e n t i a l l y  b e t t e r  m e m b e r s  o f  
a n  F T A  t h a n  a r e  t h o s e  i n  w h i c h  t h e r e  a r e  f e w  ( o r ,  a s  i n  t h e  e x t r e m e  e x a m p l e ,  n o )  c o m m o d i t i e s  o f  w h ic h  
e a c h  i s  t h e  l o w - c o s t  e x t e r n a l  p r o d u c e r  f o r  t h e  o t h e r .  A n  F T A  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  m a k e s  a  g r e a t  d e a l  
o f  s e n s e  f o r  M e x i c o , 18 f o r  e x a m p l e ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  U . S .  i s  t h e  l o w - c o s t  s o u r c e  f o r  a b o u t  7 0  p e r c e n t  o f
1 7 . See Rugm an and A nderson (1987).
18 . S ince this paper is  addressed to a Latin Am erican audience, the issue o f  w hether the U nited States w ould  
benefit is  not addressed here. N ote that, at least in  the case o f  M ex ico , trade diversion cou ld  represent a potential 
cost to  the U .S . ,  w hereas there are few er item s for w hich  M exicans are lik ely  to substitute h igh -cost U .S . sources
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M e x i c o ’s i m p o r t s .  M e x i c o  in  e f f e c t  r e d u c e s  i ts  t a r i f f s  a n d  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  i m p o r t s  f r o m  i ts  
l o w - c o s t  s o u r c e  a n d  in  a d d i t i o n  b e n e f i t s  f r o m  r e d u c e d  U . S .  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  to  i m p o r t s  f r o m  M e x i c o .  
M e x i c o ’s  t a r i f f  r a t e s  a r e  a l s o  v e r y  l o w ,  w h i c h  m e a n s  t h a t  t h e r e  c a n  b e  f e w  i te m s  f o r  w h i c h  t h e  r e g io n a l  
p r e f e r e n c e  s h i f t s  s o u r c e s  t o  t h e  U . S .  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  m a r g i n  o f  t h e  t a r i f f . 19
F o r  o t h e r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  s h a r e  o f  t r a d e  w i t h  C a n a d a  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  i s  l e s s  
t h a n  M e x i c o ’s .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  i t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  a n d  i f  t a r i f f s  a n d  o t h e r  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  a r e  a l r e a d y  v e r y  l o w  
o r  n o n e x i s t e n t ,  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  g a i n  t h r o u g h  j o i n i n g  a  W e s t e r n  H e m is p h e r e  F T  A  m a y  b e  s u b s t a n t i a l .  
A l s o ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  h a s  r e l a t i v e ly  l o w  t a r i f f s ,  a n d  t h e  c o s t s  o f  s h i f t i n g  to  a  h i g h e r - c o s t  s o u r c e  w i l l  b e  
s m a l l e r  t h a n  i f  t a r i f f s  w e r e  h i g h e r .  I f  t h e  F T  A  p r o v i d e s  r e a s o n a b l e  i n s u l a t i o n  a g a i n s t  A m e r i c a n  
a d m i n i s t e r e d  p r o t e c t i o n ,  a n d  i f  i t  m e e t s  t h e  d e s i d e r a t a  d i s c u s s e d  b e lo w ,  i t  c a n  i n c r e a s e  p r o d u c e r  
c o n f id e n c e  th a t  e x p o r t  m a r k e t s  w i l l  r e m a in  o p e n  a n d  h e n c e  e n c o u r a g e  d o m e s t i c  a n d  f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t .  
I t  c a n  t h e r e f o r e  a l s o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  a c c e l e r a t e d  e c o n o m ic  g r o w t h .
H o w e v e r ,  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  a n  F T A  c a n  a c c o m p l i s h  t h i s  d e p e n d s  b o t h  o n  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  
i t  i s  G A T T - p l u s  ( r a t h e r  t h a n  a  m o v e  a w a y  f r o m  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  t r a d i n g  s y s te m  t o w a r d  t r a d i n g  b l o c s )  a n d  
o n  s o m e  t e c h n i c a l  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  a g r e e m e n t .  I t  i s  t o  t h e s e  l a t t e r  t h a t  w e  n o w  t u r n .  S e v e r a l  i t e m s  n e e d  
to  b e  c o n s i d e r e d :  (1) t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  a l l  m e m b e r s  o f  a n  F T A  a r e  o n  a n  e q u a l  f o o t in g  a n d  p o t e n t i a l  
e n t r a n t s  m a y  j o i n ,  ( 2 )  t h e  d e g r e e  t o  w h i c h  t h e  a r r a n g e m e n t  is  a  u n i f o r m ,  a c r o s s - th e - b o a r d  a g r e e m e n t ,  a s  
c o n t r a s t e d  w i t h  s e c to r - s p e c i f i c  a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  ( 3 )  t h e  r e s t r i c t i v e n e s s  o f  r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n ,  a n d  ( 4 )  t h e  e x te n t  
t o  w h i c h  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  p r o v i d e s  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  “ a d m i n i s t e r e d  p r o t e c t i o n ” a n d  o t h e r  n o n t a r i f f  t r a d e  
b a r r i e r s .
1 . E q u a l i t y  o f  m e m b e r s  a n d  a c c e s s  t o  m e m b e r s h i p .  A n  id e a l  G A T T - p l u s  a r r a n g e m e n t  w o u l d  b e  
o n e  i n  w h i c h  m e m b e r s  s u b s c r i b e d  to  a l l  t h e  G A T T  c o d e s ,  s u b s c r i b e d  to  f u r t h e r  t r a d e - l i b e r a l i z i n g  
m e a s u r e s  a m o n g  t h e m s e l v e s ,  a n d  a g r e e d  to  p e r m i t  a s  n e w  e n t r a n t s  a n y  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  w i l l  
a d h e r e  t o  t h e  s a m e  a g r e e m e n t s  o n  t h e  s a m e  t e r m s .
W h i l e  i n  p r a c t i c e  t h e  i d e a l  c a n n o t  b e  f u l ly  a t t a in e d ,  a  r e g io n a l  t r a d i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t  t h a t  d o e s  n o t  
e n v i s a g e  n e w  m e m b e r s h i p  o n  e q u a l  t e r m s  w i t h  e x i s t i n g  m e m b e r s  ( p e r h a p s  a f t e r  a  p e r i o d  o f  t r a n s i t i o n )  
h a s  a  n u m b e r  o f  d r a w b a c k s .  F r o m  t h e  p e r s p e c t iv e  o f  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  t h e r e  w a s  
f o r  a  t im e  a  r i s k  o f  a  “ h u b - a n d - s p o k e ” s y s t e m .20 I t  a p p e a r e d  t h a t  t h e  U . S . ,  h a v in g  f o r m e d  a n  F T A  w i t h  
C a n a d a ,  m i g h t  f o r m  a  s e p a r a t e  b i l a t e r a l  F T A  w i t h  M e x ic o  a n d  o t h e r  s e p a r a t e  b i l a t e r a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s  w i t h  
o t h e r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s .
for low er-cost East A sian  or European ones.
19 . M exico  currently has quantitative restrictions on som e major agricultural com m odities w hich are quite h ighly  
protected. Those com m odities are primarily temperate grains, in w hich it w ould  appear that the U nited States is a 
low -cost producer. To the extent that M exico opens up grain im ports, its lon g-m n  gains w ill be greater since the 
U .S . is probably a low -cost supplier and, in addition, resources can be m ore productively used in M exico .
2 0 .  W onnacott coined  the phrase to describe a situation in w hich a central trading partner had duty-free access 
to im ports from  a large number o f  countries, but each other country had duty-free access on ly  to the central trading 
partner’s products. A s W onnacott pointed out, such a system  w ould  g ive  producers in the central country a cost 
advantage w henever low -cost com ponents and parts subject to duties were sourced in m ore than one country. See 
W onnacott (1990).
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A s  W o n n a c o t t  n o t e d ,  a  h u b - a n d - s p o k e  s y s te m  w o u l d  w o r k  to  t h e  d i s a d v a n t a g e  o f  p r o d u c e r s  i n  
a l l  c o u n t r i e s  e x c e p t  t h e  c e n t e r  ( u n l e s s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  p a r t n e r  c o u n t r i e s  m a d e  t h e i r  i m p o r t s  d u t y - f r e e ) .  
P r o d u c e r s  i n  t h e  h u b  c o u n t r y  w o u l d  h a v e  d u t y - f r e e  a c c e s s  t o  i n t e r m e d i a t e  g o o d s  f r o m  w h i c h e v e r  p a r t n e r  
w e r e  l o w e r - c o s t ,  w h e r e a s  e a c h  p a r t n e r  w o u l d  h a v e  d u t y - f r e e  a c c e s s  o n l y  i n  t h e  h u b - c o u n t r y  m a r k e t . 21 
T h a t  i n  i t s e l f  is  r e a s o n  e n o u g h  to  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  a  b e n e f i c i a l  F T A  w o u l d  b e  m u l t i l a t e r a l ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  
b i l a t e r a l .
T h e r e  i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  ( a s  a l r e a d y  m e n t i o n e d )  a  s e c o n d  p o t e n t i a l  s o u r c e  o f  d i f f i c u l ty  w h e n  a c c e s s  to  
a n  F T A  is  u n c e r t a i n .  I n v e s t o r s  m a y  b e g i n  p r o d u c t i o n  in  a  c o u n t r y  b e lo n g i n g  to  a n  F T A  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  
t a r i f f  m a r g i n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e .  I f  a n o th e r  c o u n t r y  s u b s e q u e n t ly  j o i n s  t h e  F T A  o n  th e  s a m e  o r  e v e n  m o r e  
f a v o r a b l e  t e r m s ,  i n v e s to r s  m a y  b e  t e m p t e d  t o  s h i f t  p r o d u c t i o n  to  t h e  s e c o n d  c o u n t r y .  O n e  c o u ld ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  b u i l d  i n  i n s t a b i l i t y  t o  f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t  i f  a c c e s s i o n  o f  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  w e r e  u n c e r t a i n .
T h i s  t r a d e  a n d  in v e s tm e n t  d i v e r s i o n  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  a  s o u r c e  o f  c o n c e r n  f o r  t h e  C a r i b b e a n  
c o u n t r i e s . 22 T h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  e x te n d e d  u n i l a t e r a l  d u t y - f r e e  p r e f e r e n c e s  t o  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  ( o v e r  a n d  
a b o v e  G S P  t r e a tm e n t )  i n  1 9 8 3 ,  a n d  f a c t o r i e s  w e r e  s u b s e q u e n t ly  b u i l t  t o  t a k e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h a t  s t a tu s .  
W h e n  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  a n  F T A  w i t h  M e x i c o  w e r e  a n n o u n c e d ,  t h e  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  o f  C a r i b b e a n  B a s i n  
I n i t i a t i v e  p r e f e r e n c e s  p r o t e s t e d ,  a n d  s e v e r a l  p o t e n t i a l  f o r e i g n  i n v e s to r s  s h i f t e d  t o  M e x i c o  in  a n t i c ip a t i o n  
o f  t h e  n e w  F T A .  I n  a  s i m i l a r  w a y ,  M e x i c o  w i l l  f a c e  t h e  r i s k  t h a t  s o m e  l o w e r - c o s t  s o u r c e  w i l l  
s u b s e q u e n t l y  f o r m  a n  F T A  a n d  d i v e r t  t r a d e  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n .  T h i s  w o u l d  n o t  o n l y  c o n s t i t u t e  a  w a s t e  o f  
r e s o u r c e s ,  b u t  w o u l d  a l s o  l e a d  t o  m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s  u n l e s s  i t  i s  r e c o g n i z e d  i n  a d v a n c e  t h a t  n e w  m e m b e r s  
w i l l  a c c e d e  t o  t h e  F T A  o n  s i m i l a r  t e r m s . 23
I f  i n v e s to r s  k n o w  t h a t  t h e r e  c a n  b e  o t h e r  e n t r a n t s  t o  a n  F T A ,  i n v e s tm e n t  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n  d e c i s i o n s  
w i l l  b e  m o r e  f i r m l y  b a s e d  o n  s o u n d  c o s t  e v a l u a t i o n s  t h a n  i f  t h e s e  i s s u e s  a r e  n o t  r e s o l v e d .  S i n c e  t h e  
u l t i m a t e  o b j e c t iv e  is  a n  o p e n ,  m u l t i l a t e r a l  t r a d i n g  s y s te m ,  a  m o r e  o p e n  F T A  a c c e s s i b l e  t o  a l l  w h o  
s u b s c r i b e  t o  i t s  c o n d i t i o n s  is  d e s i r a b l e  a n d  s h o u l d  b e  p a r t  o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  a g r e e m e n t .24
C o n s i d e r a t i o n s  s u g g e s t i n g  e q u a l i t y  o f  t r e a tm e n t  a n d  t e r m s  o f  a c c e s s i o n  a ls o  p o i n t  t o  a  p o t e n t i a l  
d a n g e r  o f  s o m e  F T A s :  t h e r e  i s  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  r i s k  t h a t  w h e n  t r a d e - d i v e r t i n g  i n v e s tm e n t s  a r e  m a d e  
b e c a u s e  o f  a n  F T A ,  t h e  i n v e s to r s  i n  t h o s e  i n d u s t r i e s  t h e n  b e c o m e  o p p o n e n t s  t o  a n y  f u r t h e r  t r a d e  
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n .
2 1 . To b e sure, this disadvantage w ould  disappear i f  a country reduced its tariffs to zero.
2 2 . See Krueger (1993 ), Chapter 7 , for a full description.
2 3 .  R eaching an understanding on  the potential for East A sian exporters to jo in  the F T A  w ill be especially  
im portant, in  light o f  their com petitive position  v is-a-v is Latin Am erican countries. On econom ic grounds, diversion  
o f  trade from  low er-cost to higher-cost sources is not efficient. M oreover, it is arguable that in the longer run it 
is not com patible w ith  healthy econom ic growth in the countries to w hich  production and trade are diverted.
2 4 . It can be argued that the Canadians lost out by assum ing that theirs w ould  be the on ly  F T A  form ed by the 
U .S . A s such, they negotiated for som e item s, the value o f  w hich  to them  may be significantly reduced as a 
consequence o f  other F T A  arrangements. See W onnacott (1991) for an analysis.
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T h i s  s h o u l d  b e  a  s o u r c e  o f  c o n c e r n  i n  r e g io n a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s  s u c h  a s  M E R C O S U R  t h a t  h a v e  b e e n  
e n t e r e d  i n to  p r e s u m a b l y  a s  a  s t e p  t o w a r d  f u l l e r  r e g io n a l  i n te g r a t i o n .  I n s o f a r  a s  M E R C O S U R  p r o v i d e s  
p r o d u c e r s  w i t h  a  l a r g e r  p r o t e c t e d  m a r k e t  b e h in d  h i g h  w a l l s  o f  p r o t e c t i o n ,  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  r e m o v a l  o f  
t h a t  p r o t e c t i o n  w i l l  b e  e v e n  g r e a t e r  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  n e w  i n d u s t r i e s  s p r i n g  u p  b e h i n d  p r o t e c t i o n  
l e v e l s  h i g h e r  t h a n  w o u l d  b e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  e n t r y  i n to  W H F T A .
2 .  A c r o s s - t h e - B o a r d  v s .  S e c t o r a l  A r r a n g e m e n t s .  A n  F T A  is  m o r e  l ik e l y  t o  b e  b e n e f i c i a l ,  t h e  
m o r e  i t  i s  c o m p a t ib l e  w i t h  u n i f o r m ,  a c r o s s - th e - b o a r d  in c e n t iv e s  a n d  t h e  l e s s  s c o p e  i t  l e a v e s  f o r  
g o v e r n m e n t  p o l i c i e s  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  a l t e r n a t iv e  a c t i v i t i e s .  T h e  m o r e  a c t i v i t i e s  
t h e r e  a r e  t h a t  a r e  s i n g l e d  o u t  f o r  s p e c ia l  r e g im e s  w i t h i n  a n  F T A — s u c h  a s  a u to s ,  c o a s ta l  s h i p p i n g ,  
“ c u l t u r a l  a c t i v i t i e s , ” a g r i c u l t u r e ,  a n d  o i l — th e  l e s s  w i l l  t h e  F T A  b e  t r a d e - l i b e r a l i z i n g  a n d  th e  
s m a l l e r  i t s  p o t e n t i a l  b e n e f i t s .
E v e n  i f  t h e r e  a r e  c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  s e c to r s  t o  a d ju s t ,  i t  is  p r o b a b l y  p r e f e r a b l e  
t o  h a v e  a  s l o w e r  b u t  u n i f o r m  s c h e d u le  o f  t r a n s i t i o n  to  d u t y - f r e e  e n t r y ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  to  s i n g l e  o u t  p a r t i c u l a r  
s e c to r s  f o r  s p e c ia l  t r e a tm e n t  f o r  a n  i n d e f i n i t e  p e r io d .
N o t  o n l y  i s  b a r g a i n i n g  f o r  s p e c ia l  p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  i n d iv i d u a l  s e c to r s  l i k e l y  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  d o m e s t i c  
s p e c ia l  i n t e r e s t s ,  b u t  i t  a l s o  o p e n s  t h e  d o o r  f o r  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  p r e s s u r e s  t o  o p e r a t e  i n  t h e  c o u n t e r p a r t  
c o u n t r y .  T h u s ,  w h i l e  t h e r e  m a y  b e  p a r t i c u l a r  c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  C a r i b b e a n  e th a n o l ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  i t  s h o u l d  
b e  r e m e m b e r e d  t h a t  t h e  q u i d  q u o  p r o  f o r  s p e c ia l  t r e a tm e n t  o f  t h a t  a c t i v i t y  is  l ik e l y  t o  b e  s p e c ia l  t r e a tm e n t  
o f  a n  a c t i v i t y  o r  s e c t o r  i n  t h e  p a r t n e r  c o u n t r y .  M o r e o v e r ,  o n c e  s u c h  t r e a tm e n t  is  a c c o r d e d  t o  a  s e c to r ,  
o t h e r  p r e s s u r e  g r o u p s  w i l l  d e m a n d  s i m i l a r  t r e a tm e n t .
O n e  o f  t h e  m a i n  b e n e f i t s  o f  a  W H F T A  s h o u l d  b e  t o  p r o v i d e  a s s u r a n c e s  a g a i n s t  f u r t h e r  
p r o t e c t i o n i s t  p r e s s u r e s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s .  T h i s  w o u l d  e n a b l e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  p r o d u c e r s  t o  u n d e r t a k e  
p r o m i s i n g  in v e s tm e n t s  w i t h  a s s u r a n c e s  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  n o t  e n c o u n t e r  n e w l y  e r e c t e d  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  i f  t h e y  
a r e  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  a c h i e v i n g  l o w - c o s t  p r o d u c t i o n .  O n e  o f  t h e  o b j e c t iv e s  o f  a  W H F T A  s h o u l d  t h e r e f o r e  b e  
t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  m in i m a l  p o s s i b l e  s c o p e  f o r  p r o t e c t i o n ;  t h a t ,  i n  t u r n ,  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e r e  s h o u l d  b e  a s  m u c h  
a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d ,  a n d  a s  l i t t l e  s e c t o r a l ,  a r r a n g e m e n t  a s  p o s s ib l e .
3 .  R u l e s  o f  O r i g i n .  F T  A s  a n d  c u s t o m s  u n i o n s  b o t h  h a v e  r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h a t  p r o d u c t s  
a r e  a n d  a r e  n o t  e l i g i b l e  f o r  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a tm e n t  u n d e r  t h e  t r a d i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t .  U n l i k e  c u s t o m s  
u n i o n s ,  h o w e v e r ,  F T  A s  p e r m i t  i n d iv i d u a l  m e m b e r s  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e i r  o w n  e x t e r n a l  t a r i f f s  a n d  th u s  
p e r m i t  d i f f e r e n t  t a r i f f  l e v e l s  b e tw e e n  c o u n t r i e s .
T h e  h i g h e r  t h e  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  c o n te n t  r e q u i r e d  b y  r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n ,  t h e  m o r e  d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s  t h e  
a r r a n g e m e n t .  T h i s  i s  m o r e  s o ,  t h e  l e s s  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  a n d  s m a l l e r  t h e  c o u n t r y  a n d  t h e  h i g h e r  t h e  t r a d i n g  
p a r t n e r ’s  t a r i f f s .  T o  s e e  t h i s ,  im a g i n e  a  l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e  a s s e m b ly  p r o c e s s  i n  a  s m a l l  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r y  
w h e r e  m o s t  i n p u t s  a r e  i m p o r t e d ,  p r o c e s s e d ,  a n d  a s s e m b le d  d o m e s t i c a l l y .  A s s u m e  f u r t h e r  t h a t  t h e s e  i n p u t s  
a r e  i m p o r t e d  p r e - F T A  a t  z e r o  d u t i e s ,  t h a t  d o m e s t i c  c o s t s  o f  a s s e m b ly  c o n s t i t u t e  3 5  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  e x p o r t  
p r i c e ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  a s s e m b le r  i s  a l r e a d y  a  l o w - c o s t  s u p p l i e r  e x p o r t i n g  to  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d .  I f  t h e  
c e n t e r  c o u n t r y  h a s  a  t a r i f f  o f  1 0  p e r c e n t ,  a n d  t h e  F T A  r e q u i r e s  5 0  p e r c e n t  l o c a l  c o n t e n t  t o  b e  e l i g i b l e  f o r  
i m p o r t a t i o n  d u t y - f r e e ,  t h e  a s s e m b le r  w o u l d  h a v e  s e v e r a l  c h o ic e s :  h e  c o u ld  e x p o r t  t o  t h e  p a r t n e r  c o u n t r y  
b u t  h a v e  h i s  p r o d u c t  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  d u t y ;  h e  c o u ld  s u b s t i t u t e  d o m e s t i c  ( p r e s u m a b l y  h i g h e r - c o s t )  
c o m p o n e n t s  f o r  p r e v i o u s l y  i m p o r t e d  o n e s ;  o r  h e  c o u ld  i m p o r t  ( a g a in ,  p r e s u m a b l y  h i g h e r - c o s t )  c o m p o n e n t s  
f r o m  t h e  p a r t n e r  c o u n t r y .  I f  l e n g t h  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  r u n  is  a  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  in  t h e  p r o d u c e r ’s  l o w - c o s t
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a d v a n t a g e  w o r l d w i d e ,  t h e  f i r m  w o u l d  h a v e  e i t h e r  t o  s h i f t  c o m p l e te ly  t o  l o c a l  s o u r c i n g ,  t h e r e b y  r a i s in g  
c o s t s ,  o r  h a v e  t w o  p r o d u c t i o n  r u n s ,  o n e  w i t h  t h e  F T A - s o u r c e d  c o m p o n e n t s  t o  m e e t  t h e  5 0 - p e r c e n t  
r e q u i r e m e n t ,  a n d  o n e  w i t h  f o r e i g n - s o u r c e d  c o m p o n e n t s  f o r  t h i r d - c o u n t r y  m a r k e t s .  T h i s  w o u l d  a l s o  r a i s e  
c o s t s .
I t  m a y  b e  n o t e d  a ls o  t h a t  t h e  h i g h e r  t h e  r u l e - o f - o r i g i n  d o m e s t i c  c o n te n t  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  t h e  m o r e  
c o s t l y  i t  c a n  b e  t o  l o c a l  p r o d u c e r s  r e ly i n g  o n  im p o r t e d  p a r t s  a n d  c o m p o n e n t s  f r o m  n o n - F T A  c o u n t r i e s .  
S i m i l a r ly ,  t h e  h i g h e r  t h e  i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y ’s  t a r i f f  t o  n o n - F T A  m e m b e r s ,  a n d  t h e  l a r g e r  t h e  s h a r e  o f  t h e  
i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y  i n  t h e  t o ta l  e x p o r t s  o f  t h e  a s s e m b le r ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  c o s t s  w i l l  b e .  W h i l e  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  
t h a t  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  c a n  d o  a b o u t  N o r t h  A m e r i c a n  t a r i f f  r a t e s ,  t h e y  c a n  n e g o t i a t e  f o r  m o r e  
l i b e r a l  r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n .  T h e s e  r u l e s  a r e  f a r  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  s m a l l  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t h a n  t h e y  a r e  
f o r  l a r g e ,  a d v a n c e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  a n d  a s  s u c h ,  h i g h e r  F T A  c o n te n t  r e q u i r e m e n t s  c o n s t i t u t e  p r o t e c t i o n  to  
p r o d u c e r s  w i t h i n  t h e  F T A ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  l a r g e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r y .
4 .  D i s p u t e  S e t t l e m e n t  a n d  M i n i m i z i n g  L i a b i l i t y  U n d e r  A d m i n i s t e r e d  P r o t e c t i o n .  I t  h a s  a l r e a d y  
b e e n  n o t e d  t h a t  p r o v i d i n g  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c e r s  w i t h  a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  l a r g e  i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  
n o t  e r e c t  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  a g a i n s t  t h e m  i s  o n e  o f  t h e  m a j o r  c o n t r i b u t io n s  a n  F T A  c a n  m a k e  t o  t h e  
g r o w t h  p r o s p e c t s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s .
F o r  a  W H F T A ,  b y  f a r  t h e  l a r g e s t  i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y  is  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  s o  a c h i e v i n g  a s  m u c h  
i n s u r a n c e  a s  p o s s i b l e  f r o m  U . S .  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  m e a s u r e s  s h o u l d  b e  a  m a j o r  o b j e c t iv e  o f  F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n s .
S in c e  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  U . S .  p r o t e c t i o n  h a s  i n c r e a s in g l y  b e e n  “ a d m i n i s t e r e d ” in  t h e  f o r m  o f  a n t i d u m p in g  
a n d  c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  d u t y  p r o v i s i o n s ,  a  m a j o r  o b j e c t iv e  o f  F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n s  s h o u l d  b e  t o  s e e k  a s  m u c h  
i n s u l a t i o n  a s  p o s s i b l e  f r o m  t h e s e  m e a s u r e s . 25
T h e  C a n a d a - U n i t e d  S t a te s  a g r e e m e n t  c o n ta i n e d  c la u s e s  t h a t  p r o v i d e d  s o m e  i n s u l a t i o n  f o r  C a n a d i a n  
p r o d u c e r s ,  a n d  a  j o i n t  t r i b u n a l  f o r  d e c i d i n g  c a s e s  i n  w h i c h  t h e r e  w e r e  d i s p u t e s .  I t  w i l l  b e  d e s i r a b l e  to  
e x t e n d  t h e s e  m e c h a n i s m s  m u l t i l a t e r a l l y  a c r o s s  m e m b e r s  o f  W H F T A  f o r  t h r e e  r e a s o n s .  F i r s t ,  t h o s e  
m e c h a n i s m s  a r e  a l r e a d y  in  p l a c e .  S e c o n d ,  t h e r e  is  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  c o n f u s i o n  i f  r u l i n g s  b y  
d i f f e r e n t  d i s p u t e  r e s o l u t i o n  p a n e l s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t .  T h i r d ,  a  m u l t i l a t e r a l  d i s p u t e - r e s o l u t i o n  m e c h a n i s m  w i l l  
p r o v i d e  a  c o u n t e r w e i g h t  t o  t h e  U . S . ,  w h i c h  h a s  c o n s i d e r a b ly  g r e a t e r  b a r g a i n i n g  p o w e r  v i s - à - v i s  a n y  
in d iv i d u a l  c o u n t r y  t h a n  i t  d o e s  v i s - à - v i s  a l l  o t h e r  m e m b e r s  o f  a  W H F T A .
U l t im a te l y ,  p r o t e c t i o n  a r i s i n g  f r o m  u n f a i r  t r a d e  l a w s  c a n  b e  m i t i g a t e d  i n  t w o  w a y s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a te s  c o u ld  u n i l a t e r a l l y  a b a n d o n  o r  r e d u c e  r e s o r t  t o  t h e s e  p r a c t i c e s .  A s  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  s i g n a to r i e s  
t o  t h e  F T A  c o u ld  n e g o t i a t e  c o m m o n  d o m e s t i c  f a i r - t r a d e  l e g i s l a t i o n  t h a t  w o u l d  o b v i a t e  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
p r e s s u r e s  f o r  t h e s e  m e a s u r e s  w i t h i n  t h e  U . S .  U n t i l  o n e  o r  b o t h  o f  t h e s e  p a th s  i s  t a k e n ,  a d m i n i s t e r e d  
p r o t e c t i o n  w i l l  r e m a i n  a  p r o b l e m  f o r  p a r t n e r s  i n  a  W H F T A .
D o m e s t i c  E c o n o m i c  P o l i c i e s  C o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  a n  F T A
A l l  o f  t h e  i s s u e s  d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  n e g o t i a t i o n  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  e n t r y  t o  a n  F T A ,  a n d  a s  
s u c h  a r e  n o t  e n t i r e l y  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  w i s h e s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  B a r g a i n i n g ,  b y  i ts  n a t u r e ,  m u s t
2 5 . For an analysis o f  administered protection and how  it operates, see Boltuck and Litan (1991).
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e n ta i l  s o m e  g i v in g  i n  o n  i s s u e s  o f  i m p o r t a n c e  b y  b o t h  p a r t i e s .  W h i l e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  s h o u l d  
w e i g h  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  a c r o s s - th e - b o a r d  a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  o p e n  a c c e s s i o n  p r o v i s i o n s ,  l i b e r a l  r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n ,  
a n d  a  f l e x i b l e  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m  f i g u r e  h e a v i l y  i n  d e c i d i n g  o n  t h e i r  n e g o t i a t i n g  s t a n c e ,  t h e y  
d o  n o t  t h e m s e l v e s  c o n t r o l  t h e  p r e c i s e  f o r m  o f  a  W H F T A .
B y  c o n t r a s t ,  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  c a n  a l t e r  t h e i r  d o m e s t i c  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c i e s  i n  w a y s  t h a t  a r e  
c o n d u c i v e  t o  g r e a t e r  g a in s  f r o m  t r a d e  a n d  p r o v i d e  a t  l e a s t  s o m e  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  p o s s i b l e  i n e f f i c i e n c i e s  
t h a t  m i g h t  a r i s e  f r o m  t r a d e  d i v e r s i o n  u n d e r  a n  F T A .  T w o  s e t s  o f  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c i e s  r e q u i r e  a t t e n t io n :
(1) t h e  c o n s i s t e n c y  o f  o v e r a l l  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  a n d  e x c h a n g e - r a te  p o l i c y ,  a n d  ( 2 )  t h e  o p e n n e s s  o f  th e  
p o t e n t i a l  F T A  m e m b e r ’s  o v e r a l l  t r a d e  r e g im e .
1. C o n s i s t e n c y  o f  M a c r o e c o n o m i c  a n d  E x c h a n g e - r a t e  P o l i c i e s .  W h e n  t w o  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  t r a d e  
l i t t l e  w i t h  e a c h  o t h e r  f o r m  a n  F T A  o r  c u s to m s  u n i o n ,  t h e r e  n e e d  b e  l i t t l e  c o n c e r n  a b o u t  
h a r m o n i z a t i o n  o f  a n y  d o m e s t i c  e c o n o m ic  p o l ic i e s :  t r a d e  w i t h  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d  d o m in a t e s  t h a t  
b e t w e e n  t h e  p a i r  o f  c o u n t r i e s .  W h e n ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e r e  is  s i g n i f i c a n t  t r a d e  w i t h i n  t h e  r e g io n a l  
a g r e e m e n t ,  t h e  v e r y  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  a r r a n g e m e n t  o b l ig e s  t h a t  e c o n o m ic  p o l i c y  b e  a p p r o p r i a t e .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  o p e n n e s s  o f  t h e  o v e r a l l  t r a d e  a n d  p a y m e n t s  r e g im e  g r e a t l y  i n f lu e n c e s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
f o r  g a i n  u n d e r  a n  F T A .
D e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  f o l l o w in g  p o l i c i e s  o f  i m p o r t  s u b s t i t u t i o n  h a v e  in  e f f e c t  i n s u l a t e d  t h e i r  
e c o n o m i e s  f r o m  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d  t h r o u g h  i m p o r t  p r o h i b i t i o n s  a n d  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  T h e y  h a v e  
t h e r e f o r e  o f t e n  h a d  e x c h a n g e - r a t e  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  w e r e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e i r  d o m e s t i c  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  
p o l i c i e s  f o r  s i g n i f i c a n t  p e r io d s  o f  t im e .  W h i l e  t h e  c o s t s  o f  t h o s e  i n c o n s i s te n c ie s  h a v e  b e e n  h i g h ,  t h e y  
h a v e  n o t  b e e n  n e a r l y  a s  g r e a t  a s  w o u l d  b e  t h e  c a s e  u n d e r  a n  F T A  o n c e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a r e  
r e m o v e d  a n d  i n t r a - F T A  t a r i f f s  e l im in a t e d .
T o  m a x i m iz e  t h e  g a in s  f r o m  a n  F T A ,  e a c h  c o u n t r y  w i l l  n e e d  to  i n s u r e  t h a t  i t s  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  is  
r e a l i s t i c .  U s u a l l y ,  w h e n  t h e r e  a r e  h i g h  w a l l s  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  s u r r o u n d i n g  i m p o r t s ,  r e m o v a l  o f  t h a t  
p r o t e c t i o n  im p l i e s  a  s u r g e  o f  im p o r t s .  T o  o f f s e t  p a r t  o f  t h i s  s u r g e  a n d  to  e n c o u r a g e  th e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  
e x p o r t s  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e  r e m a i n d e r ,  a  c h a n g e  in  t h e  r e a l  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  is  n o r m a l l y  e s s e n t i a l .  W i t h o u t  s u c h  
a  r e a l i g n m e n t ,  im p o r t - c o m p e t i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  f a c e  t o o  m u c h  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r e s s u r e ,  a n d  e x p o r t a b l e  i n d u s t r i e s  
h a v e  i n s u f f i c i e n t  i n c e n t iv e s  f o r  e x p a n s io n .
O n c e  a n  F T A  is  i n  p l a c e  w i t h  a  r e a l i s t i c  e x c h a n g e  r a t e ,  e i t h e r  e x c h a n g e - r a t e  ( a n d  i n t e r e s t - r a t e )  
p o l i c y  m u s t  c o m p e n s a t e  f o r  i n f l a t i o n  d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  o r  d o m e s t i c  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  p o l i c y  m u s t  a s s u r e  a  
d o m e s t i c  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  v e r y  c lo s e  t o  t h a t  o f  p a r t n e r  c o u n t r i e s . 26 B e c a u s e  i m p o r t s  m a y  e n t e r  f r o m  th e  
p a r t n e r  c o u n t r y  f r e e l y ,  a  s m a l l  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  i n f l a t i o n  r a te s  a t  a  f i x e d  n o m in a l  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  c a n  l e a d  to  
l a r g e  s h i f t s  i n  d e m a n d  b e tw e e n  d o m e s t i c  a n d  f o r e i g n  p r o d u c e r s .  T h e  w o r l d  w a s  g i v e n  a  d r a m a t i c  v i e w  
o f  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  e x c h a n g e - r a t e  p o l i c y  w h e n  G e r m a n y  a d o p te d  a n  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  f o r  u n i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  
l e f t  m o s t  f i r m s  i n  t h e  E a s t  u n a b le  t o  c o v e r  e v e n  m a r g i n a l  c o s t s  a t  W e s t  G e r m a n  p r i c e s  a n d  t h e  c h o s e n
2 6 . It is h igh ly  im probable that a m eaningful FTA  could be form ed w ithout full convertibility o f  currencies on  
current account am ong trading partners. Individuals w ould  have to be free to buy and sell in each others’ currencies 
for the F T A  to be m eaningful. In turn, that im plies that quantitative restrictions on imports cou ld  not be used to 
bring about the desired balance betw een foreign exchange expenditures and receipts. For som e Latin Am erican  
countries, this requirem ent w ould  necessitate a significant change in exchange rate p olicy .
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e x c h a n g e  r a t e . 27 T h e  s a m e  e f f e c t s  w i l l  o c c u r  b e tw e e n  a n y  n e w  e n t r a n t  t o  a  W H F T A  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a te s  a n d  C a n a d a  s h o u l d  e x c h a n g e  r a te s  i n i t i a l l y  b e  i n c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  t h e  c u r r e n t  p r i c e  a n d  c o s t  
s t r u c t u r e s  i n  t h e  p a r t n e r  c o u n t r i e s .  A n d  e v e n  w h e n  th e y  a r e  c o m p a t ib l e ,  i t  w i l l  b e  e s s e n t i a l  t o  k e e p  t h e m  
t h a t  w a y ,  a n d  t h i s  s t a b i l i t y  w i l l  r e q u i r e  e i t h e r  c o n v e r g e n c e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s  o r  v e r y  q u i c k  a d ju s tm e n t  o f  
t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  t o  i n f l a t i o n  d i f f e r e n t i a l s . 28
I t  i s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  d e s i r a b l e  f o r  F T A  m e m b e r s  t o  b r i n g  a b o u t  c a p i t a l - a c c o u n t  c o n v e r t i b i l i t y  f a i r l y  
r a p i d l y . 29 W h e t h e r  t h e y  d o  s o  o r  n o t ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t  w i l l  b e  e s s e n t ia l  t h a t  n o m in a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i n  m e m b e r  
c o u n t r i e s  r e f l e c t  i n f l a t i o n  d i f f e r e n t i a l s :  i f  t h e y  d o  n o t ,  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  s h i f t i n g  m o n ie s  t o  t h e  c o u n t r y  
w i t h  t h e  h i g h e r  e x p e c t e d  r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  a r e  s im p ly  t o o  g r e a t  o n c e  t r a d e  is  f u l l y  l i b e r a l i z e d .  E x p o r t e r s  
m a y  d e l a y  r e p a t r i a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  r e c e ip t s ,  a n d  i m p o r t e r s  m a y  a l t e r  t h e  t im i n g  o f  t h e i r  p a y m e n t s ;  c i t i z e n s  
c a n  c h o o s e  t h e  t im i n g  o f  t h e i r  t r a v e l ;  a n d  a  t h o u s a n d  o t h e r  w a y s  w i l l  b e  f o u n d  t o  t r a n s f e r  r e s o u r c e s  t o  
t h e  p l a c e  w h e r e  t h e  r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  a p p e a r s  h i g h e r .  T o  a t t e m p t  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e s e  t r a n s f e r s  b y  r e g u la t i n g  
e x p o r t s  a n d  i m p o r t s  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  a n  F T A  a n d  e s s e n t i a l l y  o b v i a t e s  a n y  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  a  s u c c e s s f u l  
o u t w a r d - o r i e n t e d  t r a d e  s t r a t e g y .  E f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l s  a r e  s i m p ly  to o  c o s t ly .
H e n c e ,  b o t h  e x c h a n g e - r a t e  a n d  i n t e r e s t - r a t e  p o l i c i e s  m u s t  b e  f i r m l y  b a s e d  o n  r e a l i s t i c  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
a b o u t  d o m e s t i c  m o n e t a r y  a n d  f i s c a l  p o l i c y .  S in c e  a l l  p o l i c y  m a k e r s  t e n d  to  e r r  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  
o p t im i s m ,  i t  is  p r o b a b l y  d e s i r a b l e  t h a t  c o u n t r i e s  j o i n i n g  a n  F T A  i n i t i a l l y  o p t  f o r  a  c r a w l i n g - p e g  e x c h a n g e  
r a t e  w h e r e  i t  is  e x p e c t e d  t h a t  a d ju s tm e n ts  w i l l  c o v e r  i n f l a t i o n  c o s t  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  a n d  m a y  a l s o  b e  u s e d  to  
b r i n g  t h e  r e a l  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  t o  a  r e a l i s t i c  l e v e l ,  a n d  f o r  a n  i n t e r e s t - r a t e  r e g im e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  a n t i c ip a t e d  
i n f l a t i o n  a n d  e x c h a n g e - r a t e  b e h a v i o r .  T h e n ,  w h e n  d o m e s t i c  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  p o l i c y  h a s  a c h i e v e d  
c o n v e r g e n c e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s ,  a  c r a w l i n g  p e g  c a n ,  f i r s t  d e  f a c to  a n d  t h e n  d e  j u r e ,  b e c o m e  a  f i x e d  
e x c h a n g e - r a t e  r e g im e .
2 .  O t h e r  D o m e s t i c  E c o n o m i c  P o l i c i e s .  I t  h a s  b e e n  r e p e a t e d l y  e m p h a s i z e d  t h a t  t h e  l o w e r  a  
c o u n t r y ’s  t a r i f f s  a n d  o t h e r  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  j o i n i n g  a n  F T A ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
f o r  g a in  a n d  t h e  s m a l l e r  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  h a r m .  S in c e  F T  A s  c o n s t i t u t e  p a r t  o f  t h e  t r a d e  r e g im e ,  
i t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t h e  n a tu r e  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  is  p e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  s i n g l e  e c o n o m i c  
p o l i c y  t h a t  c a n  a f f e c t  t h e  b e n e f i t s  a n d  c o s t s  o f  j o i n i n g  a n  F T A .
H o w e v e r ,  a l l  o f  t h e  o t h e r  p o l i c y  c h a n g e s  n o r m a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  “ p o l i c y  r e f o r m ” a n d  s t r u c t u r a l  
a d ju s tm e n t  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  c a n  i n c r e a s e  t h e  b e n e f i t s  a c c r u in g  f r o m  a n  F T A .  R e v iv i n g  a n d  
i n s u r i n g  a d e q u a te  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  i n  p o r t s ,  d o m e s t i c  t r a n s p o r t ,  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,  a n d  p o w e r  a r e  e s s e n t ia l  
b o t h  f o r  d o m e s t i c  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  a n d  f o r  p e r m i t t i n g  t h o s e  w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t l y  l o w  c o s t s  t o  b e  a b le  t o  
s u c c e e d  i n  e x p o r t  m a r k e t s .
2 7 . See A kerlof et a l., 1991.
2 8 .  There need not be full capital account convertibility for this proposition to hold . Indeed, a major concern  
is—and should be— that current levels o f  production may be needlessly  disrupted, even  in industries w ith  strong 
com parative advantage, if  the exchange rate is not realistic.
2 9 .  Capital account convertibility means the right o f  anyone (dom estic or foreign) to ask for, and receive, foreign  
currency in  exchange for local currency at the prevailing exchange rate. For technical defin itions, see Yearbook of 
Exchange and Trade Restrictions, 1992, The International M onetary Fund, W ashington, D .C . M ost developed  
countries’ currencies are convertible for both current and capital account transactions, usually w ithout restriction.
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A  f i r s t  p r e r e q u i s i t e  o f  a n  F T A  is  a  c o n s i s t e n t  s e t  o f  e x c h a n g e - r a t e ,  m a c r o e c o n o m ic ,  a n d  in t e r e s t -  
r a t e  p o l i c i e s .  T h a t  i n s u r e s  t h a t  g a in s  a r e  p o s s ib l e ,  a n d  th a t  a v o id a b l e  d a m a g e  to  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  
e m p l o y m e n t  w i l l  n o t  o c c u r .  T h e  s e c o n d  p r e r e q u i s i t e  is  r e m o v a l  o f  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  t o  i n s u r e  t h a t  t r a d e  
d i v e r s i o n  w i l l  b e  m in i m a l  a n d  t h a t  m e m b e r s h i p  i n  t h e  F T A  w i l l  b e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  a n  o v e r a l l  o u t w a r d -  
o r i e n t e d  t r a d e  p o l i c y .  T h a t  i n  i t s e l f  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  g r o w t h - p r o m o t i n g .  T h i s  l a s t  s e t  o f  p o l i c i e s  r e g a r d i n g  
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  is  n o t ,  s t r i c t l y  s p e a k in g ,  n e c e s s a r y  t o  F T A  m e m b e r s h i p ,  b u t  i t  c e r t a i n l y  a f f e c t s  t h e  s i z e  o f  
t h e  g a in s  t h a t  c a n  b e  r e a l i z e d  f r o m  a  m o r e  o u t w a r d  o r i e n t a t i o n  a n d  F T A  m e m b e r s h i p .  T h e r e  is  l i t t l e  
b e n e f i t  f r o m  e x p o r t e r s ’ r e a l i z i n g  l o w e r  c o s t s  i f  t h e i r  s h i p m e n t s  w i l l  b e  d e t a i n e d  f o r  u n p r e d i c t a b l e  a n d  
v a r i a b l e  p e r i o d s  b y  d e l a y s  i n  d o m e s t i c  t r a n s p o r t  o r  a t  p o r t .  R e l i a b i l i t y  a n d  s p e e d  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  
b e t w e e n  s u p p l i e r s  a n d  b u y e r s  a r e  e s s e n t ia l  f o r  s u c c e s s  i n  s e l l i n g  m o s t  m o d e r n  i n d u s t r i a l  g o o d s .  S i m i l a r ly ,  
a  1 0 - p e r c e n t  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  c o s t s  o f  d o m e s t i c  s h i p p i n g  c a n  b e  m o r e  v a lu a b l e  to  p o t e n t i a l  e x p o r t e r s  t h a n  
a  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  r e a l  e x c h a n g e  r a t e ,  a f f e c t i n g  a s  i t  w o u l d  b o t h  t h e i r  c o s t s  o f  i n p u t s  a n d  t h e i r  r e c e ip t s  f r o m  
e x p o r t s .
A p p r o p r i a t e  a t t e n t i o n  to  d o m e s t i c  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  is  e s s e n t ia l  f o r  a  r e s u m p t i o n  o f  g r o w t h .  T h e  
p a y o f f  f o r  i n v e s t i n g  i n  a p p r o p r i a t e  f a c i l i t i e s  c a n ,  h o w e v e r ,  g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  a n  a s s u r e d  
o p e n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t .
N e g o t i a t i n g  a n  F T A  F r o m  a  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  P e r s p e c t i v e
G i v e n  th e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  C a n a d a  a n d  th e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  i n  w o r l d  t r a d e ,  i t  i s  v e r y  l ik e l y  t h a t  L a t i n  
A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  e x p e r i e n c e  n e t  t r a d e  c r e a t i o n  a s  t h e y  j o i n  a n  F T A  a n d  s i m u l t a n e o u s ly  b e n e f i t  
f r o m  a s s u r a n c e s  t h a t  U . S .  a n d  C a n a d i a n  m a r k e t s  w i l l  r e m a in  o p e n  to  th e m .  T h e  c h a l l e n g e  i n  n e g o t i a t i n g  
a n  F T A  is  t o  a s s u r e  m a x i m u m  o p e n n e s s  o f  C a n a d i a n  a n d  U . S .  m a r k e t s  ( a s  w e l l  a s  o t h e r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  
m a r k e t s ) .  T h a t  i n  t u r n  i m p l i e s  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  a n  a c r o s s - th e - b o a r d  a r r a n g e m e n t  t o  p r e v e n t  s p e c ia l -  
i n t e r e s t  g r o u p s  i n  p a r t n e r  t r a d i n g  c o u n t r i e s  f r o m  p r e s s u r i n g  f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  a r r a n g e m e n t s  f o r  t h e i r  s e c to r s .
A s  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  s e c t i o n s  m a k e  c l e a r ,  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  h a v e  a l r e a d y  l i b e r a l i z e d  t h e i r  
t r a d e  r e g i m e s  a n d  s t a b i l i z e d  t h e i r  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  a n d  e x c h a n g e - r a t e  p o l i c i e s  s t a n d  to  g a i n  t h e  m o s t  f r o m  
j o i n i n g  a  W H F T A .  T r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  t a k e s  p r i o r i t y :  i f  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  i s  g r a d u a l ,  a  
c o n s i s t e n t  c r a w l i n g - p e g  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p o l i c y  c a n  e n a b le  a n  F T A  to  p r o v i d e  g a in s  e v e n  a s  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  p r o c e e d s ;  b y  c o n t r a s t ,  w i t h o u t  p r i o r  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  t h e  a d ju s tm e n t  c o s t s  o f  a n  F T A  w i l l  
b e  g r e a t e r ,  a s  w i l l  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  t r a d e  d i v e r s i o n ,  o n c e  a n  F T A  is  f o r m e d .  M o r e o v e r ,  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  
h a v e  l i b e r a l i z e d  t h e i r  t r a d e  r e g im e s  w i l l  t h e m s e l v e s  h a v e  f e w e r  p r e s s u r e  g r o u p s  s e e k in g  e x e m p t io n  f r o m  
t h e  F T A  i f  t h e y  h a v e  a l r e a d y  l i b e r a l i z e d  t h e i r  e c o n o m ie s .  T h a t ,  i n  t u r n ,  w i l l  p e r m i t  a  s t r o n g e r  
n e g o t i a t i n g  p o s i t i o n  v i s - à - v i s  p r e s s u r e s  f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n  s e c to r  b y  s e c to r  f r o m  o t h e r  F T A  m e m b e r s .  I n  
r e g a r d s  t o  a l l  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  m e a s u r e s ,  i t  is  i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  a l l  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c i e s  i m m e d ia t e l y  b e  b a s e d  
i n  p a r t  o n  a v o id i n g  m e a s u r e s  t h a t  w i l l  p r o m o te  s p e c ia l  i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  m ig h t  o p p o s e  a n  F T A .
T h i s  is  e s p e c i a l l y  a  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  f o r  s u b r e g i o n a l  F T A s ,  f o r  w h i c h  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  r e a l  d a n g e r  t h a t  
t h e  l o w - c o s t  r e g io n a l  p r o d u c e r s  w i l l  e x p a n d  t h e i r  c a p a c i ty  t o  s e l l  w i t h i n  t h e  r e g io n a l  F T A ,  a n d  r e c o g n i z e  
t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  l o s e  t h a t  m a r k e t  i f  a  h e m i s p h e r i c  F T A  is  n e g o t i a te d .  S u b r e g i o n a l  F T A s  c o u ld  b e  b e n e f i c i a l  
i f  t h e y  a c c e l e r a t e  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  p r i o r  t o  e n t e r in g  a  h e m i s p h e r i c  a g r e e m e n t ,  b u t  th e  
r i s k s  o f  b u i l d i n g  in  n e w  s o u r c e s  o f  o p p o s i t i o n  to  a n  F T A  ( a n d  s t r e n g th e n i n g  o p p o s i t i o n  o f  e x i s t i n g  
g r o u p s )  a r e  s u b s t a n t i a l .
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I t  is  i n  t h e  l o n g - t e r m  i n t e r e s t s  o f  a l l  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  t o  c r e a t e  a  W H F T A  t h a t  i s  o p e n  
a n d  a c c e s s i b l e  t o  n e w  e n t r a n t s  o n  r o u g h l y  t h e  s a m e  t e r m s  a s  t h o s e  o n  w h i c h  e x i s t i n g  m e m b e r s  e n t e r e d .  
I t  i s  i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t i o n  t h a t  r e g io n a l  u n i ty  m a y  w e l l  p e r m i t  a  b e t t e r  r e s u l t  f o r  a l l  t h a n  c o u ld  b e  e x p e c te d  
f r o m  i n d iv i d u a l  b a r g a i n i n g  f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  t e r m s  f o r  e a c h  c o u n t r y .
I t  i s  a l s o  i m p o r t a n t  t o  n e g o t i a te  a s  l o w  a  d o m e s t i c - c o n t e n t  r e q u i r e m e n t  a s  p o s s i b l e  w i t h i n  t h e  
F T  A ,  a n d  to  t a k e  d o m e s t i c  m e a s u r e s  o n  s u c h  i s s u e s  a s  h e a l t h  a n d  s a f e t y  s t a n d a r d s  t h a t  w i l l  p r e c l u d e  
r e s t r i c t i o n i s t  m e a s u r e s  e v o k e d  o n  t h e i r  a c c o u n t .
I f  a n  o p e n ,  a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d 'W H F T A  c a n  b e  n e g o t i a t e d  w i t h i n  t h e  W e s t e r n  H e m i s p h e r e ,  a n d  i f  
i t  s t r e n g t h e n s  t h e  G A T T  a n d  t h e  o p e n  m u l t i l a t e r a l  t r a d i n g  s y s te m ,  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  i m p r o v e d  
e c o n o m i c  p e r f o r m a n c e  w i l l  b e  g r e a t .  M o r e  r a p i d  e c o n o m ic  g r o w t h  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  h e m i s p h e r e  c o u ld  
r e s u l t  a n d  i n  t u r n  s p u r  i n c r e a s e d  t r a d e  w i t h i n  t h e  r e g i o n  a n d  w i t h  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d — m u c h  a s  i n  t h e  
E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t y  i n  t h e  1 9 5 0 s  a n d  1 9 6 0 s . T h e  b e n e f i t s  f r o m  s u c h  a  “ G A T T - p l u s ” a r r a n g e m e n t  c o u ld  
b e  s u b s t a n t i a l  t o  a l l  m e m b e r s  a n d  s i m u l t a n e o u s ly  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  g r o w t h  a n d  s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  o p e n ,  
m u l t i l a t e r a l  t r a d i n g  s y s te m .
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I S  A  G E N U I N E  P A R T N E R S H I P  P O S S I B L E  
I N  A  W E S T E R N  H E M I S P H E R E  F R E E  T R A D E  A R E A ?
H a n s  W . S i n g e r 1
F r e e  T r a d e  A r e a s  a n d  t h e  G A T T
Trade Creation and Trade Diversion: Net Costs and Benefits
T h e  c h i e f  d e b a t e  s u r r o u n d i n g  f r e e  t r a d e  a r e a s  a n d  r e g io n a l  t r a d e  b l o c s  is  t h a t  o f  t r a d e  c r e a t i o n  
v e r s u s  t r a d e  d i v e r s io n .  R e g io n a l  b l o c s  c a n  l e a d  t o  t r a d e  c r e a t io n ,  in  p a r t  b y  i n c r e a s in g  t r a d e  w i t h i n  t h e  b lo c  
a n d  in  p a r t  b y  in c r e a s in g  o v e r a l l  i n c o m e s  a n d  p r o d u c t i v i t y  w i t h in  t h e  b l o c  a n d  h e n c e  l e a d i n g  t o  a d d i t i o n a l  
d e m a n d  f o r  im p o r t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  im p o r t s  f r o m  w i t h in  a n d  o u t s i d e  t h e  b lo c .  T h e y  c a n  a l s o  l e a d  t o  t r a d e  
d i v e r s io n  b y  r e d u c i n g  i m p o r t s  b y  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  b l o c  f r o m  c o u n t r i e s  o u t s i d e  t h e  b l o c ,  a n d  b y  
d i v e r t i n g  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h in  t h e  b l o c  a w a y  f r o m  e x p o r t s  t o  c o u n t r i e s  o u t s id e .
T r a d e  c r e a t i o n  in c r e a s e s  w e l f a r e  b e c a u s e  i t  s h i f t s  p r o d u c t i o n  f r o m  l e s s - e f f i c i e n t  t o  t h e  m o s t  
e f f i c i e n t  p r o d u c e r s  w i t h i n  t h e  f r e e  t r a d e  a r e a  ( F T A ) .  B y  p r o v i d in g  l a r g e r  m a r k e t s  f o r  p r o d u c e r s ,  i t  m a y  
a l s o  b r i n g  in c r e a s in g  r e tu r n s  a n d  n e w  d y n a m i c  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e s  i n to  o p e r a t io n .  T h i s  
g r o w t h - o r i e n t e d  r a t h e r  t h a n  a l l o c a t io n - o r i e n t e d  a s p e c t  o f  a  W e s te r n  H e m is p h e r e  F r e e  T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t  
( W H F T A )  w o u l d  b e  o f  s p e c ia l  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  a n d  C a r ib b e a n  ( L A C )  c o u n t r i e s .  T r a d e -  
d i v e r s io n  i s  w e l f a r e - r e d u c in g  b e c a u s e  i t  s h i f t s  p r o d u c t i o n  f r o m  e f f i c ie n t  p r o d u c e r s  o u t s i d e  t h e  F T A  t o  l e s s  
e f f i c i e n t  p r o d u c e r s  w i t h i n  t h e  F T A .  G iv e n  t h i s  d u a l  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t ,  i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  t o  b e  c a t e g o r i c a l l y  
c o n f id e n t  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  F T A s  in c r e a s e  o r  d i m i n i s h  w e l f a r e .  E v e r y t h i n g  d e p e n d s  o n  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  
a r r a n g e m e n t s  w i t h i n  t h e  F T A  a n d  o n  i ts  p o l i c i e s  a n d  d e g r e e  o f  o p e n n e s s  t o w a r d  o u t s i d e r s .
FTAs and Multilateralism
T h e  d e b a t e  o f  w h e t h e r  t r a d e  c r e a t i o n  w i l l  b e  d o m in a n t  o v e r  t r a d e  d i v e r s io n ,  o r  v i c e - v e r s a ,  is  l in k e d  
( a l t h o u g h  n o t  a lw a y s  c le a r l y )  w i t h  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  r e g io n a l  b l o c s  a s  b e in g  e i t h e r  “ s t e p p in g  s t o n e s ”  t o  
g lo b a l  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  a n d  t r a d e  e x p a n s io n ,  o r  e l s e  b e c o m i n g  “ f o r t r e s s e s ”  a n d  t h u s  a c t i n g  a s  o b s t a c l e s  
t o  m u l t i l a t e r a l  l ib e r a l i z a t io n .  T h i s  w i l l  d e p e n d  o n  h o w  t h e  F T A  is  d e s i g n e d — in  p a r t i c u l a r  w h e t h e r  i t  
s t r i c t l y  c o m p l i e s  w i t h  t h e  G e n e r a l  A g r e e m e n t  o n  T a r i f f s  a n d  T r a d e  ( G A T T )  r u l e s  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  X X I V  t h a t  
t a r i f f s  a n d  o t h e r  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  a g a i n s t  o u t s i d e r s  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  i n c r e a s e d  a n d  t h a t  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  m u s t  a p p ly  
t o  “ s u b s t a n t i a l l y  a l l ”  i n t r a p a r t n e r  t r a d e .  I t  w i l l  a l s o  d e p e n d  o n  w h e t h e r  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  F T A  t a k e s  p l a c e  
in  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c l i m a t e  o f  p r o g r e s s  t o w a r d  m u l t i l a t e r a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  o r  i s  a d o p te d  in  r e s p o n s e  t o  
b r e a k d o w n s  a n d  f r i c t i o n s  t h a t  f r u s t r a t e  t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  m u l t i l a t e r a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s .
G i v e n  t h a t  t h e  W H F T A  p r o p o s a l  o r i g in a l ly  c a m e  a t  a  t im e  o f  g r e a t  u n c e r t a i n t y  a n d  l a c k  o f  
p r o g r e s s  in  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  l ib e r a l i z a t io n  s o u g h t  in  t h e  U r u g u a y  R o u n d ,  t h e  G A T T  w a s  c l e a r l y  w o r r i e d  
a b o u t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  t r a d e  d i v e r s io n  o r  o t h e r  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t s  o f  a  W H F T A ,  a s  i n d ic a te d  in  i t s  1 9 9 2  r e v ie w  
o f  U n i t e d  S t a te s  t r a d e  p o l ic y .  T h e  G A T T  c i t e s  i l l i b e r a l  a n d  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  f e a tu r e s  a n d  t e n d e n c i e s  in  U .S .
1. The author gratefully acknow ledges research assistance from N icholas Georgiadis.
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t r a d e  p o l i c y  ( e s p e c i a l l y  in  a n t i d u m p in g  a c t io n  a n d  c o u n te r v a i l i n g  d u t ie s ,  a n d  u n i l a t e r a l  a c t i o n s  u n d e r  
S e c t i o n  3 0 1 )  w h i c h  i t  f e a r s  a r e  i n d ic a to r s  t h a t  W H F T A  m ig h t  b e  a n  i n s t r u m e n t  o f  t r a d e  d i v e r s io n  a n d  
u n d e r m i n e  t h e  m o s t - f a v o r e d - n a t i o n  ( M F N )  p r in c ip l e .  O n  i ts  p a r t ,  t h e  U .S .  h a s  r e a f f i r m e d  i t s  c o m m i tm e n t  
t o  a  s t r e n g th e n e d  m u l t i l a t e r a l  t r a d i n g  s y s te m  ( M T S )  a n d  c le a r ly  w i s h e s  t h e  W H F T A  to  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a  
s t e p p in g - s to n e  t o w a r d  s u c h  a  s y s te m  a n d  a n  in s t r u m e n t  o f  t r a d e  c r e a t io n .  A r t i c l e  X X I V  o f  G A T T ,  w h i c h  
p e r m i t s  f u l l  f r e e  t r a d e  a r e a s  w i t h  1 0 0  p e r c e n t  f r e e  t r a d e  w i t h in  t h e  a r e a  ( a l t h o u g h  n o t  p a r t i a l  r e g io n a l  
p r e f e r e n c e s — t h e  l o g ic  o f  t h i s  i s  n o t  e n t i r e l y  c le a r ) ,  i s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  l a t t e r  a s s u m p t io n ,  i .e . ,  t h a t  t h e  f r e e  
t r a d e  a r e a  is  f o r m e d  in  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  m o v e m e n t  t o w a r d  g lo b a l  m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m  a s  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  G A T T .
T h e  t r a d e - d iv e r s i o n  e f f e c t  w i l l  b e  e s p e c i a l l y  i m p o r t a n t  w h e r e  t h e r e  a r e  s t r u c tu r a l  o r  n a tu r a l  
l im i t a t i o n s  o n  t h e  o v e r a l l  s u p p l y  o f  e x p o r t  g o o d s ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  in  t h e  c a s e  o f  e n e r g y  o r  o t h e r  n a tu r a l  
r e s o u r c e s .  T r a d e  d i v e r s io n ,  b y  r e d u c i n g  i n c o m e s  o f  c o u n t r i e s  o u t s id e ,  c a n  t h e n  l e a d  t o  t r a d e  r e d u c t io n  o r  
t r a d e  d e s t r u c t i o n .  T h i s  d a n g e r  is  s t r o n g l y  r e in f o r c e d  i f  W H F T A  p r o v i d e s  i n c e n t iv e s  ( o r  e x c u s e s )  f o r  A s i a n  
a n d  E u r o p e a n  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  t h e i r  r e g io n a l  g r o u p i n g s  t o  a d o p t  r e s t r i c t i v e  t r a d e  a n d  i n v e s tm e n t  p o l i c i e s .  T h is  
i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  k e e p i n g  W H F T A  G A T T - c o m p a t i b l e ,  a n d  m a k i n g  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  t r a n s p a r e n t  
f o r  t r a d i n g  c o u n t r i e s  o u t s i d e  t h e  W H F T A .
Pros and Cons for Latin America
F r o m  t h e  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  o f  L A C  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  b e tw e e n  W H F T A  a n d  t h e  M T S  is  
u n c e r t a i n .  M u l t i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  l ib e r a l i z a t io n  w i l l  d i l u t e  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  W H F T A  f o r  L A C  a n d  a l s o  f o r  N o r t h  
A m e r i c a n  e x p o r t e r s  t o  L a t i n  A m e r ic a .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  m u l t i l a t e r a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  w i l l  h e lp  L A C  
e x p o r t e r s  i n  t h i r d  m a r k e t s ,  a n d  t h e y  w i l l  a l s o  b e n e f i t  f r o m  a  g e n e r a l  t r a d e  e x p a n s io n  a n d  r i s i n g  in c o m e s .  
T h i s  i s  s i m p l y  a n o th e r  “ n e t t i n g  o u t ”  o f  p r o s  a n d  c o n s ,  a n d  t h e  r e s u l t s  m a y  b e  d i f f e r e n t  f o r  e a c h  c o u n t r y .  
T h e  f u t u r e  s u c c e s s  o r  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  M T S  is  m o r e  o r  l e s s  a  d a tu m  f o r  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  b e y o n d  t h e i r  r e a c h  
o f  i n f lu e n c e ,  a n d  a  s c e n a r io  o f  n o  M T S  a n d  n o  W H F T A  w o u l d  b e  w o r s e  f o r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  t h a n  e i t h e r  
M T S  a n d  n o  W H F T A  o r  W H F T A  a n d  n o  M T S .
F r o m  t h e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  t h e  c h i e f  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  W H F T A  a n d  t h e  M T S  is  t h a t  i t  
w o u l d  p r e v e n t  t h e  m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  w o u l d  r e s u l t  i f  t h e  t h r e e  b i g  r e g io n a l  b l o c s  i n  N o r t h  A m e r ic a ,  
E u r o p e  ( i n c l u d i n g  E a s t e r n  E u r o p e  a n d  c o n t i n u e d  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a tm e n t  o f  L o m é  c o u n t r i e s ) ,  J a p a n  ( w i th  
t h e  N I C s  a n d  c o m i n g  N I C s  in  E a s t  a n d  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia )  f r u s t r a t e  t h e  M T S .  T h is  w o u l d  b e  d a n g e r o u s  a n d  
u n f a v o r a b l e  f o r  L a t i n  A m e r ic a .  I f  s u c h  m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n  w e r e  c o m b i n e d  w i t h  c o n t i n u e d  s l o w  g r o w t h  o f  
t h e  w o r l d  e c o n o m y ,  g r o w i n g  p r o t e c t i o n i s m ,  c o n t i n u e d  d e b t  p r e s s u r e ,  a n d  u n f a v o r a b l e  t e r m s  o f  t r a d e ,  t h e  
o u t l o o k  w o u l d  b e  g l o o m y  in d e e d .  B y  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  W H F T A  a p p e a r s  t o  o f f e r  a n  e s c a p e ,  a lb e i t  a  
s e c o n d - b e s t  s o l u t io n .
D i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  P r e d i c t i n g  t h e  O u t c o m e
Dynamic Comparative Advantage
T h e  p r o b l e m  o f  n e t t i n g  o u t  t h e  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c ts  o f  t r a d e  c r e a t i o n  a n d  t h e  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t s  o f  t r a d e  
d i v e r s io n  is  o n e  o f  t h e  r e a s o n s  w h y  i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  u l t i m a t e  i m p a c t  o f  a  W H F T A .  A n o t h e r  
r e a s o n  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  t r a d e  c r e a t i o n  b a s e d  o n  e x i s t i n g  s t a t i c  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e s  is  o n ly  
o n e  p a r t  o f  t h e  b e n e f i t s  e x p e c te d  f r o m  a n  F T A .  T h e  a d v o c a te s  e x p e c t  e q u a l  o r  g r e a t e r  t r a d e  c r e a t i o n  f r o m
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t h e  i n c r e a s e  in  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  n e w  d y n a m i c  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e s  t h a t  
t r a d e  c r e a t i o n  is  e x p e c te d  to  b r i n g — l o n g e r  p r o d u c t i o n  r u n s ,  in c r e a s e d  s p e c ia l i z a t i o n ,  i n v e s tm e n t  in  
s p e c i a l i z e d  m a c h i n e r y ,  e tc .— a n d  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  b e n e f i t s  o f  t r a n s f e r  o f  t e c h n o l o g y  a n d  i n c r e a s e d  
in v e s tm e n t .
S u c h  d y n a m i c  a d v a n t a g e s  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p r e d i c t  a n d  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  q u a n t i f y .  T h e  s a m e  is  t r u e  o f  
t h e  d y n a m i c  d i s a d v a n t a g e s  a n d  v i c i o u s  c i r c le s  t h a t  m ig h t  f o l l o w  in  t h e  w a k e  o f  t h e  h a r m f u l  e f f e c t s  o f  t r a d e  
d i v e r s io n  o r  m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n .  E s t im a te s  o f  d y n a m i c  g a in s  h a v e  b e e n  m a d e  in  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  N A F T A ,  
b u t  t h e i r  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  t o  W H F T A  is  l im i te d  b y  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  d y n a m i c  g a in s  t o  M e x i c o  a r i s e  in  p a r t  
f r o m  t h e  d i s p l a c e m e n t  o f  o t h e r  L a t i n  A m e r ic a n  e x p o r t s  t h a t  w o u l d  n o t  a p p ly  u n d e r  W H F T A .  T h e s e  
d y n a m i c  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e s  a r e  t h e  m o s t  im p o r t a n t  f o r  s u s t a i n a b l e  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h e y  a r e  l a r g e ly  
c r e a t e d  r a th e r  t h a n  n a tu r a l .  T h u s  i t  is  c r u c i a l  t h a t  L A C  c o u n t r i e s ,  n o t  p a s s i v e ly  a c c e p t  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
a r i s in g  f r o m  lo c a t io n  o r  n a tu r a l  r e s o u r c e s .  T h e y  m u s t  u s e  t h e  r e s t r u c t u r in g  t h a t  w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  b e  r e q u i r e d  
f o r  a  W H F T A  t o  c r e a te  n e w  d y n a m i c  a d v a n ta g e s ,  a s  J a p a n  a n d  K o r e a  h a v e  d o n e .  T h i s  w i l l  r e q u i r e  
v i g o r o u s  t r a d e ,  i n d u s t r i a l ,  e d u c a t io n ,  t r a i n i n g ,  a n d  t e c h n o l o g y  p o l i c i e s  a n d  c a r e f u l  s e l e c t i o n  o f — a n d  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o n — p r i o r i t y  s e c to r s .  S u c h  p o l ic i e s  c a n  a n d  s h o u ld  b e  m a r k e t - f r i e n d ly ,  b u t  t h e y  r e q u i r e  m o r e  
t h a n  b l i n d  r e l i a n c e  o n  t h e  m a r k e t .
A Radical Change
T h e  s e c o n d  r e a s o n  w h y  t h e  u l t i m a t e  e f f e c t s  o f  W H F T A  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  f o r e s e e  is  t h a t  i t  w i l l  b e  
a  f a r  g r e a t e r  c h a n g e  in  e c o n o m i c  t r a d i n g  r e l a t i o n s  t h a n  t h e o r i e s  a n d  e c o n o m i c  m o d e l s  a r e  a b l e  t o  d e a l  
w i t h .  T h e s e  t o o l s  a r e  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  d e a l i n g  w i th  r e l a t i v e ly  s m a l l  c h a n g e s  in  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  n o t  
r e v o lu t i o n a r y  u p h e a v a l s  s u c h  a s  W H F T A ,  g i v e n  i ts  l a r g e  s c a le  a n d  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  p a r t  o f  a  t r a d e ,  
in v e s tm e n t ,  a n d  d e b t - r e d u c t i o n  p a c k a g e  l a u n c h e d  in  1 9 9 0  u n d e r  t h e  E n te r p r i s e  f o r  t h e  A m e r i c a s  I n i t i a t i v e  
( E A I ) .  W H F T A  is  n o t  r e a l l y  t r a d e  c r e a t io n ,  b u t  d e v e l o p m e n t  c r e a t io n .
Welfare Effects of WHFTA
T h e  w e l f a r e - in c r e a s i n g  a n d  w e l f a r e - r e d u c in g  e f f e c t s  o f  W H F T A  m u s t  b e  c a r e f u l l y  d e f in e d .  A  
W H F T A  c o u ld  b e  w e l f a r e  r e d u c i n g  f o r  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o u t s id e ,  b u t  w e l f a r e  i n c r e a s in g  f o r  t h e  W e s te r n  
H e m is p h e r e .  I t  c o u ld  e v e n  b e  w e l f a r e  i n c r e a s in g  f o r  s o m e  p a r t s  o f  t h e  h e m i s p h e r e  b u t  w e l f a r e  r e d u c i n g  
f o r  o t h e r  p a r t s ,  p l u s  w e l f a r e  i n c r e a s in g  f o r  s o m e  s e c to r s  b u t  w e l f a r e  r e d u c i n g  f o r  o t h e r s ;  s u c h  a s  w e l f a r e  
i n c r e a s in g  f o r  l a r g e - s c a l e  m o d e m  p r o d u c e r s  w i t h in  o n e  s e c to r  b u t  w e l f a r e  r e d u c i n g  f o r  s m a l l - s c a l e  
p r o d u c e r s  in  a n o th e r  s e c to r .  I n  t h e o r y  t h e  n e t  e f f e c t  o f  g a in s  a n d  l o s s e s  c a n  b e  b a la n c e d  b y  c o m p e n s a t i n g  
t h e  lo s e r s  (Pareto optimum). S u c h  c o m p e n s a t i o n  a r r a n g e m e n t s  a r e  p o l i t i c a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  n e g o t i a t e ,  a n d  
t h e  c o m p e n s a t i o n  p r o c e s s  i t s e l f  m a y  s e t  w e l f a r e - r e d u c in g  f o r c e s  i n to  m o t i o n .
I f  t h e  W H F T A  b e c o m e s  a  “ f o r t r e s s , ”  t h e  e f f e c ts  c o u ld  b e  w e l f a r e  r e d u c i n g  in  t h e  l o n g  r u n ,  e v e n  
in  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  r e t a l i a t i o n  f r o m  E u r o p e  o r  J a p a n .  T h e  d i f f i c u l ty  o f  p r e d i c t i n g  o v e r a l l  n e t  e f f e c t s  is  
h e ig h t e n e d  b y  m a k i n g  d i f f e r e n t  a s s u m p t io n s  a b o u t  a l t e r n a t iv e s  t o  W H F T A .  I s  t h e  a l t e r n a t iv e  t h e  p r e s e n t  
s t a tu s  q u o ?  I s  i t  a  c o n t i n u i n g  m u l t i l a t e r a l  l ib e r a l i z a t io n ?  I s  i t  s t r e n g th e n e d  o r  w e a k e n e d  r e g io n a l  
c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h in  L a t i n  A m e r ic a ?  T o  w h a t  e x t e n t  w i l l  J a p a n e s e  a n d  W e s te r n  E u r o p e a n  i n v e s tm e n t  f l o w s  
b e  d i v e r t e d  t o  E a s te r n  E u r o p e  a n d  t h e  C o m m o n w e a l th  o f  I n d e p e n d e n t  S t a te s ?  W i l l  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n
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a m o n g  m o r e  i m m e d ia t e  l o s e r s  in  b o t h  N o r t h  a n d  S o u th  A m e r i c a  b e  o v e r c o m e  in  w e l f a r e - e f f i c i e n t  w a y s ,  
o r  w i l l  i t  l e a d  t o  d i s t o r t i n g  e x e m p t io n s ,  i n ju r y  c la u s e s ,  a n d  e m b i t t e r in g  t r a d e  d i s p u t e s ?
W h i l e  d i f f e r e n t  a s s u m p t io n s  c a n  b e  b u i l t  i n to  m o d e l s  c o n s t r u c t e d  t o  f o r e c a s t  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  
W H F T A ,  n o  m o d e l  c a n  c o r r e c t l y  p r o d u c e  t h e  a c tu a l  f u t u r e  m i x  o f  e c o n o m i c  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
t h a t  w i l l  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  o u t c o m e .  E v e n  a t  a  f u t u r e  d a te  w e  c a n  n e v e r  b e  s u r e :  w h a t  w o u l d  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
o f  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  b e e n  in  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a  W H F T A ,  o r  w i t h  a  d i f f e r e n t l y  c o n s t r u c t e d  W H F T A ?  
C o u n t e r f a c t u a l  e v id e n c e  i s  n o t o r i o u s l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p i n  d o w n  a n d  o p e n  t o  s u b j e c t i v e  j u d g e m e n t s .  T h u s ,  
i f  W H F T A  is  d e s i g n e d  a s  a  c o u n te r  t o  p o s s ib l e  W e s t - E a s t  E u r o p e a n  o r  J a p a n - E a s t  A s i a n  i n t e g r a t i o n  p l a n s ,  
a n a l y s i s  w i l l  b e  b a s e d  o n  a  d o u b l e  c o u n te r f a c t u a l  s p e c u la t i o n ,  n a m e ly ,  ( 1 )  w h a t  w o u l d  b e  t h e  i m p a c t  o n  
t h e  W e s te r n  H e m is p h e r e  o f  a n y  s u c h  E u r o p e a n  o r  E a s t  A s i a n  in te g r a t i o n ;  a n d  ( 2 )  w h a t  w o u l d  b e  t h e  
i m p a c t  o f  W H F T A  in  a n  a s s u m e d  w o r l d  o f  E u r o p e a n  a n d /o r  E a s t  A s i a n  i n t e g r a t i o n ?  ( T h e  “ a n d / o r ”  in  t h e  
p r e c e d in g  s e n t e n c e  i n d ic a te s  t h e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  n o t  o n e ,  b u t  t h r e e  c o u n te r f a c t u a l  s i t u a t i o n s  w i t h  w h i c h  
W e s te r n  H e m is p h e r e  c o u n t r i e s  c o u ld  b e  f a c e d .)  C o u l d  W H F T A  p r o v o k e  t h e  v e r y  E u r o p e a n  a n d / o r  A s i a n  
b l o c  i n t e g r a t i o n  a g a i n s t  w h i c h  i t  m a y  b e  d e s i g n e d  a s  a  d e f e n s e ?  W i l l  t h e  e x i s t i n g  p r e f e r e n t i a l  a g r e e m e n t s  
w i t h  n o n h e m i s p h e r i c  c o u n t r i e s ,  u n d e r  t h e  G S P  o r  o th e r w is e ,  b e  m a i n t a i n e d  o r  m o d i f i e d  w h i l e  t h e  W H F T A  
is  e s t a b l i s h e d ?  W o u ld  t h e  a l t e r n a t iv e  b e  in c r e a s e d  U .S .  p r o t e c t i o n i s m ?  W i l l  t h e  F T A  b e  a c c o m p a n i e d  
b y  i n c r e a s e d  a id  o r  i n v e s tm e n t?  T h e  n u m b e r  o f  p o s s ib l e  s c e n a r io s  is  l a r g e ,  a n d  e a c h  c h a n g e  in  s c e n a r io  
w i l l  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a l t e r  t h e  i m p a c t  o n  L a t i n  A m e r ic a .
Who w ill Seize the Opportunities?
T h e  i s s u e  o f  t r a d e  e f f i c i e n c y  a d d s  t o  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  p r e d i c t i n g  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  W H F T A .  I t  is  
n o t  s i m p l y  a  q u e s t io n  o f  a n a l y z i n g  t h e  n e w  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t h a t  m a y  o p e n  to  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  in  t h e  N o r t h  
A m e r i c a n  m a r k e t  a n d  a s s e s s in g  t h e i r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  a m o n g  d i f f e r e n t  L A C  c o u n t r i e s .  T h e  a b i l i t y  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
c o u n t r i e s  t o  s e i z e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  is  a n o th e r  i m p o r t a n t  f a c to r ,  a n d  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  f a r  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p r e d ic t  
t h a n  t h e  f o r m e r .  I n  t h e  p a s t ,  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  m a n u f a c t u r e d  e x p o r t s  w e r e  p r o b a b ly  v e r y  s i m i l a r  f o r  t h e  
E a s t  A s i a n  t i g e r s  a s  f o r  L a t in  A m e r ic a ,  b u t  t h e  f o r m e r  p r o v e d  to  b e  b e t t e r  a t  s e i z i n g  t h e i r  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
( a n d  t o  s o m e  e x t e n t  p r e - e m p t i n g  th e m ) .
T h e  S p e c i a l  N a t u r e  o f  W H F T A
Theory and  Practice: Who Benefits fro m  FTAs?
T h e  “ g e n u in e  p a r tn e r s h i p ”  ( o r  “ b r o a d - b a s e d  p a r tn e r s h i p , ”  a s  i t  i s  d e s c r i b e d  in  t h e  l e t t e r  t o  C o n g r e s s  
i n t r o d u c i n g  t h e  E n te r p r i s e  f o r  t h e  A m e r ic a s  A c t )  p r o c la im e d  b y  f o r m e r  P r e s i d e n t  B u s h  c a n n o t  b e  a  
p a r tn e r s h i p  o f  e c o n o m i c  e q u a l s .  I t  is  a n  E n te r p r i s e  f o r  t h e  A m e r ic a s ,  n o t  f o r  A m e r ic a .
I n  t h e o r y ,  f r e e  t r a d e  a r e a s  m a y  b e n e f i t  w e a k e r  c o u n t r i e s  a s  m u c h  a s ,  o r  e v e n  m o r e  t h a n ,  t h e  la r g e r ,  
r i c h e r  p a r tn e r s  ( t h e  “ s m a l l - c o u n t r y  a s s u m p t i o n ” ). T h is  is  s u p p o r t e d  b y  a d v o c a te s  o f  F T A s  w h o  p u t  
e m p h a s i s  o n  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  e c o n o m i e s  o f  s c a le  t h a t  s p e e d  g r o w th ,  a  p a r t i c u l a r ly  i m p o r t a n t  p l u s  f o r  t h e  
r e l a t i v e ly  s m a l l e r  a n d  p o o r e r  c o u n t r i e s .  P o o r e r  c o u n t r i e s  w o u l d  t e n d  t o  b e n e f i t  a s  m u c h  a s  o r  e v e n  m o r e  
t h a n  t h e  l a r g e r ,  r i c h e r  p a r tn e r s  s in c e  p r o d u c t i o n  w o u l d  t e n d  t o  m o v e  f r o m  h i g h - c o s t  r e g io n s  t o  l o w - c o s t  
r e g io n s  a n d  i n c r e a s e  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  c a p i t a l  a n d  t h e  w a g e  le v e l  in  t h e  l o w - c o s t  r e g io n s .  T h e  r e s u l t  w o u l d
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b e  r e l a t i v e ly  h i g h e r  g r o w t h  o f  t h e  l e s s - d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  c o n v e r g e n c e  o f  i n c o m e  le v e l s  w i t h i n  t h e  
i n t e g r a t i o n  s c h e m e .
H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  a r g u m e n t  i s  f o u n d e d  o n  v a r io u s  s i m p l i f y i n g  a s s u m p t io n s :  p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  f u l l  
e m p l o y m e n t ,  c o n s t a n t  r e tu r n s  t o  s c a le ,  a n d  p e r f e c t  m o b i l i t y  o f  f a c to r s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  a c r o s s  s e c to r s .  T h e s e  
a s s u m p t i o n s  d o  n o t  c o r r e s p o n d  w i t h  r e a l i t y .  T o  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  n a tu r e  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m  r e q u i r e s  g o i n g  
b e y o n d  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s  t o  o b s e r v e  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t  a  n u m b e r  o f  f a c to r s  t h a t  a r e  l ik e l y  t o  c a u s e  r e l a t i v e ly  
l e s s - r a p i d  g r o w t h  ( o r  e v e n  d e c l i n e )  a m o n g  t h e  p o o r e r  m e m b e r s  o f  a n  i n te g r a t i o n  a r r a n g e m e n t .  C a p i t a l  
m a y  f l o w  f r o m  p o o r e r  t o  r i c h e r  a r e a s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  g r e a t e r  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  e c o n o m i c  i n f r a s t r u c tu r e ,  
a c c e s s  t o  s p e c i a l i z e d  s e r v i c e s ,  p r o x i m i t y  t o  l a r g e  m a r k e t s ,  g r e a t e r  r e la t i v e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s ,  
a n d  g r e a t e r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c a p a b i l i ty .
A l s o ,  w i d e n i n g  o f  m a r k e t s  d u e  t o  t r a d e  l ib e r a l i z a t i o n  in  a n  i n t e g r a t i o n  s c h e m e  w i l l  o f t e n  g i v e  
c o m p e t i t i v e  a d v a n t a g e s  t o  t h e  i n d u s t r i e s  in  t h e  m o r e  a d v a n c e d  r e g io n s .  U n d e r  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  i n i t i a l  
d i f f e r e n c e s  in  p r o d u c t i v i t y  a n d  e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  c a n  l e a d  t o  “ c i r c u l a r  a n d  c u m u l a t i v e  c a u s a t io n ”  a n d  
g r o w i n g  p o l a r i z a t i o n  b e tw e e n  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  a n  i n te g r a t i o n  s c h e m e :  t h e  c r e a t i o n  a n d  p e r p e t u a t i o n  o f  
i n e q u a l i t i e s  t h a t  H i r s c h m a n  c a l l s  “ p o l a r i z a t i o n ”  a n d  M y r d a l  t h e  “ b a c k w a s h . ”  M y r d a l  a n d  H i r s c h m a n  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  p l a y  o f  m a r k e t  f o r c e s  t e n d s  t o  i n c r e a s e ,  r a th e r  t h a n  d e c r e a s e ,  i n e q u a l i t i e s  b e tw e e n  r e g io n s  
i n  a n  i n t e g r a t i o n  a r r a n g e m e n t .  I f ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a  r e g io n  is  n o t  a t t r a c t i v e  f o r  i n v e s tm e n t ,  i t  w i l l  t e n d  to  
e n jo y  l e s s  t e c h n o l o g ic a l  p r o g r e s s  a n d  b e n e f i t  l e s s  f r o m  e c o n o m i e s  o f  s c a le  t h a n  o t h e r  r e g io n s ;  i t  w i l l  
b e c o m e  e v e n  l e s s  a t t r a c t i v e  f o r  f o r e i g n  in v e s tm e n t .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  in  o r d e r  t o  t a k e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h e  p o s i t i v e  
o r  “ t r i c k l e - d o w n ”  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  w i d e r  m a r k e t ,  a  p o o r  r e g io n  m u s t  h a v e  d e v e l o p e d  i t s  i n f r a s t r u c tu r e ,  h u m a n  
c a p i t a l ,  a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  a  l e v e l  t h a t  w i l l  a l l o w  t h e  r e g io n  t o  b e n e f i t  f r o m  
g r o w t h  s t i m u l i  f r o m  p r o s p e r o u s  r e g io n s .
P o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  a d d s  y e t  a n o th e r  d i m e n s i o n  t o  t h e  i s s u e .  R e g io n a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s  h a v e  
s u f f e r e d — a n d  s o m e t i m e s  f a l l e n  a p a r t— b e c a u s e  o f  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  w e a k e r  p a r tn e r s  w i t h  a  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  
( r e a l  o r  i m a g i n e d )  o f  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  t h e  i n te g r a t i o n  in  t h e  b e t t e r - o f f  c o u n t r i e s .  T h e  r e a l  e c o n o m i c  r e a s o n  
f o r  t h i s  i s  t h a t  t h e  s t r o n g e r  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  b e t t e r  in f r a s t r u c tu r e ,  t e c h n o l o g y ,  s k i l l s ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  a n d  
i n d u s t r i a l  b a s e  t o  t a k e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  n e w  t r a d i n g  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  a n d  l a r g e r  m a r k e t s  a s  w e l l  a s  t o  w i t h s t a n d  
i n t e n s i f i e d  c o m p e t i t i o n  f r o m  a b r o a d .  T h e y  w i l l  a l s o  b e  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e  in  n e g o t i a t i o n s  t o  s h a p e  t h e  F T A  
a g r e e m e n t  t o  t a k e  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e i r  n a t i o n a l  i n te r e s t s  a n d  in  s u b s e q u e n t  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t s .  I t  h a s  b e e n  
s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  s t r o n g e r  p a r tn e r  w i l l  u s e  s u p e r i o r  b a r g a i n in g  s t r e n g th  a n d  n e g o t i a t i n g  c a p a c i t y  t o  e x t r a c t  
“ s i d e  p a y m e n t s ”  o n  o t h e r  r e la te d  m a t t e r s . 2
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Labor productivity and per capita income. L a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  in  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  ( m e a s u r e d  b y  
v a l u e  a d d e d  p e r  w o r k e r  in  1 9 9 0 )  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  w a s  l e s s  t h a n  o n e  t h i r d  o f  t h a t  in  N o r t h  A m e r i c a .  T h i s  
d i f f e r e n c e  w a s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h a t  b e tw e e n  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  in  W e s te r n  E u r o p e  v e r s u s  t h a t  i n  E a s te r n  
E u r o p e  a n d  t h e  f o r m e r  U S S R ,  w h e r e  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  i s  a  l i t t l e  o v e r  2 : 1 ,  b u t  l e s s  t h a n  t h a t  b e tw e e n  J a p a n  
a n d  E a s t  a n d  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia ,  w h i c h  i s  c lo s e r  t o  4 :1 .  I t  s h o u l d  b e  o n e  o f  t h e  o b j e c t iv e s  o f  W H F T A  to
2. G. K. H elleiner, Toward a New Regional Development Strategy for Latin America in the 1990s. Prepared for 
a panel d iscussion  at the Inter-American D evelopm ent Bank Conference on Latin American Thought: Past, Present, 
and Future, W ashington, D .C ., N ovem ber 14-15, 1991.
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r e d u c e  t h i s  3 :1  d i f f e r e n t i a l .  T h e  d i s c r e p a n c y  in  p e r  c a p i t a  in c o m e  le v e l s  is  e v e n  g r e a t e r ,  o f  t h e  o r d e r  o f  
7 :1 .
T h e  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  d i f f e r e n t i a l  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  v e r s u s  t h e  N o r t h  A m e r i c a n  le v e l  
d i f f e r s  s h a r p l y  b e tw e e n  v a r io u s  s e c to r s  o f  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r y .  B a s e d  o n  1 9 9 0  d a t a  f r o m  th e  
U N I D O  d a ta b a s e ,  t h e  o v e r a l l  d i f f e r e n t i a l  is  3 .3 :1 .  T h e  s e c to r s  t h a t  h a v e  a  m a r k e d ly  m o r e  f a v o r a b l e  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  ( a n d  t h e r e f o r e  s h o u l d  b e  in  a  g o o d  p o s i t i o n  t o  b e n e f i t  f r o m  e x p a n d e d  t r a d e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  u n d e r  
t h e  W H F T A )  i n c l u d e  t e x t i l e s ,  l e a t h e r  a n d  f u r  p r o d u c t s ,  p e t r o l e u m  r e f in e r ie s ,  m i s c e l l a n e o u s  p e t r o l e u m  a n d  
c o a l  p r o d u c t s ,  r u b b e r  p r o d u c t s ,  i r o n  a n d  s te e l ,  a n d  n o n f e r r o u s  m e ta l  p r o d u c t s .  B y  c o n t r a s t ,  s e c to r s  in  
w h i c h  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  is  l e s s  t h a n  o n e  f i f th  t h a t  o f  N o r t h  A m e r i c a  i n c l u d e  f o o d  
p r o d u c t s ,  t o b a c c o  p r o d u c t s ,  w o o d  a n d  c o r k  p r o d u c t s ,  f u r n i tu r e  a n d  f i x tu r e s ,  v a r io u s  n o n m e t a l l i c  m in e r a l  
p r o d u c t s ,  a n d  n o n e le c t r i c a l  m a c h in e r y .  T h e s e  a r e  t h e  s e c to r s  w h i c h  prima facie o n e  w o u l d  e x p e c t  t o  b e  
a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c te d  b y  W H F T A .
W i t h o u t  c o m p e n s a to r y  m e a s u r e s  o r  a  f r e e  f l o w  o f  c a p i t a l  a n d  l a b o r ,  c o m p l e t e ly  f r e e  t r a d e  b e tw e e n  
t w o  a r e a s  w i t h  s u c h  p r o d u c t i v i t y  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  c o u ld  w i d e n  t h e  g a p  t o  t h e  d i s a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h e  w e a k e r  
p a r tn e r .  F r e e  f l o w  o f  c a p i t a l  w a s  in  f a c t  e m p h a s i z e d  b y  P r e s i d e n t  B u s h  w h e n  h e  n a m e d  i n v e s tm e n t  a s  t h e  
t h i r d  p i l l a r  o f  h i s  p r o p o s a l ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t r a d e  a n d  d e b t  r e d u c t io n .  ( T h e  v e x e d  a n d  e x p lo s iv e  “ h o t  p o t a t o ”  
o f  f r e e  m o v e m e n t  o f  l a b o r  w a s  n o t  t o u c h e d . )  I t  c a n  o f  c o u r s e  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
b e tw e e n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a n d  N o r t h  A m e r i c a  is  le s s  im p o r t a n t  t h a n  a c tu a l  p r o g r e s s  in  r a i s i n g  b o t h  
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  in  L a t i n  A m e r ic a .  B u t  e q u a l l y  i t  m a y  b e  t r u e  t h a t  
w i t h o u t  s o m e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  b e n e f i t s  f a v o r i n g  th e  p o o r e r  p a r tn e r ,  t h e  W H F T A  p r o p o s a l  m a y  n o t  b e  
p o l i t i c a l l y  a c c e p t a b l e  o r  s u s t a i n a b l e  in  L a t in  A m e r ic a .  G r i f f i th - J o n e s ,  S t e v e n s ,  a n d  G e o r g i a d i s  a r g u e  t h a t  
a n c i l l a r y  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c i e s  a r e  n e c e s s a r y  in  W H F T A  a n d  p r o p o s e  a  m o d e l  o f  r e d i s t r i b u t io n  m e c h a n i s m s  
b a s e d  o n  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t y .3
Comparison with other potential blocs. N o r t h  A m e r i c a  w o u l d  a l s o  b e  t h e  l a r g e r  p a r tn e r  in  t e r m s  
o f  t h e  v o l u m e  o f  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  e m p l o y m e n t  ( 2 0  m i l l i o n  v e r s u s  10  m i l l i o n ) .  T h i s  is  in  s h a r p  c o n t r a s t  b o th  
t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  in  E u r o p e ,  w h e r e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  e m p l o y m e n t  is  in  f a c t  l a r g e r  in  E a s te r n  E u r o p e  a n d  th e  
f o r m e r  U .S .S .R .  t h a n  in  W e s te r n  E u r o p e ,  a n d  a l s o  t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  in  E a s t  A s ia ,  w h e r e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
e m p l o y m e n t  in  J a p a n  is  s m a l l e r  t h a n  in  E a s t  a n d  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia .  A s  f a r  a s  s h e e r  w e i g h t  o f  n u m b e r s  is  
c o n c e r n e d ,  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  a d v a n c e d  “ c o r e ”  in  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  “ p e r ip h e r y ”  is  g r e a t e r  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
t h e  W H F T A  t h a n  in  t h e  t w o  o t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  b lo c s .  T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  im p a c t  o f  W H F T A  o n  N o r t h  
A m e r i c a n  e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  t h e  U .S .  e c o n o m y  in  p a r t i c u l a r  m a y  b e  s m a l l  a n d  s u b m e r g e d  b y  o t h e r  
e c o n o m i c  t r e n d s  a n d  e v e n t s ,  t h e  im p a c t  o n  t h e  L A C  e c o n o m i e s  w o u l d  b e  m a j o r  a n d  h a s  t o  b e  c a r e f u l l y  
a n a l y z e d  a n d  a n t i c ip a te d .
Export coverage. F o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  f r e e  t r a d e  a r e a  f r o m  C a n a d a  t o  t h e  
r e s t  o f  t h e  h e m i s p h e r e  is  a  r e l a t i v e ly  s m a l l  s t e p  in  t e r m s  o f  e x p o r t  c o v e r a g e ,  e v e n  i n c l u d i n g  M e x i c o ,  f r o m  
2 1 .0  p e r c e n t  b y  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  1 3 .5  p e r c e n t ;  w h e r e a s  f o r  t h e  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  f r o m  L a t i n  
A m e r i c a n  p r e f e r e n c e s  t o  W H F T A  is  a  v e r y  m a j o r  s te p :  o v e r w h e l m in g l y  s o  f o r  M e x i c o  ( f r o m  7 .6  p e r c e n t  
b y  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  6 6 .0  p e r c e n t )  a n d  V e n e z u e la  ( f r o m  9 .0  p e r c e n t  b y  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  5 6 .6  p e r c e n t ) ,  a n d  f o r  
B r a z i l  ( f r o m  1 2 .9  p e r c e n t  b y  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  2 8 .9  p e r c e n t ) .  F r o m  t h e  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  o f  t h e  U .S . ,  t h e  b i g  s t e p s
3. See S. Griffith-Jones, C. Stevens, and N . Georgiadis, Regional Trade Liberalization Schemes: The Experience 
o f the ECC. ID B-EC LA C  Project W orking Paper W P-TW H -47, June 1993.
1 1 2
Is a Genuine Partnership Possible in a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area?
i n  r e g io n a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  h a v e  a l r e a d y  b e e n  t a k e n .  F r o m  t h e  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  o f  L A C  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  b i g  s t e p s  
a r e  s t i l l  t o  c o m e .
Country diversity. O n e  m i g h t  e x p e c t  t h e  im p a c t  o f  W H F T A  o n  in d iv i d u a l  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  to  
d e p e n d  l a r g e ly  o n  t h e  s h a r e  o f  t h e i r  e x p o r t s  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  C a n a d a .  T h i s  i s  h i g h e s t  f o r  M e x i c o  
( 6 6  p e r c e n t ) ,  V e n e z u e l a  ( 5 7  p e r c e n t )  a n d  E c u a d o r  ( 4 6  p e r c e n t ) ;  c o n s i d e r a b l e  f o r  B r a z i l  ( 2 9  p e r c e n t ) ,  
C o l o m b i a  (4 1  p e r c e n t )  a n d  P e r u  ( 3 2  p e r c e n t ) ;  b u t  l o w  f o r  A r g e n t in a  ( 2 4  p e r c e n t ) ,  B o l i v i a  8 1 7  p e r c e n t ) ,  
C h i l e  ( 1 9  p e r c e n t ) ,  U r u g u a y  ( 1 2  p e r c e n t ) ;  a n d  v i r t u a l ly  n o n e x i s t e n t  f o r  P a r a g u a y  ( 4  p e r c e n t ) .  H o w e v e r ,  
i t  w o u l d  b e  a  v e r y  s t a t i c  a s s u m p t io n  t o  m a k e  t h a t  c o u n t r i e s  w o u l d  b e n e f i t  f r o m  W H F T A  in  t h e  s a m e  
o r d e r .  O n  a  d i f f e r e n t  r e a d i n g ,  a  l o w  s h a r e  c o u ld  b e  t a k e n  t o  i n d ic a te  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  l a r g e  u n u s e d  
p o t e n t i a l  t h a t  c o u ld  r e v e r s e  t h e  o r d e r  o f  b e n e f i t .  E x p o r t s  t o  n o n h e m i s p h e r i c  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  o v e r  h a l f  o f  t o t a l  
e x p o r t s  f o r  A r g e n t i n a  ( 6 5  p e r c e n t ) ,  B r a z i l  ( 5 8  p e r c e n t ) ,  C h i le  ( 6 7  p e r c e n t ) ,  P a r a g u a y  ( 5 4  p e r c e n t )  a n d  
U r u g u a y  (6 1  p e r c e n t ) ;  a n d  u n d e r  h a l f  f o r  B o l i v i a  (2 5  p e r c e n t ) ,  C o l o m b i a  (4 3  p e r c e n t ) ,  E c u a d o r  
(3 3  p e r c e n t ) ,  M e x i c o  ( 2 6  p e r c e n t ) ,  P e r u  ( 4 9  p e r c e n t )  a n d  V e n e z u e la  ( 3 4  p e r c e n t ) .  T h e s e  f i g u r e s  c o u ld  
i n d ic a te  t h e  v a r io u s  d e g r e e s  b y  w h i c h  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  w o u l d  b e  a f f e c te d  b y  a n y  “ f o r t r e s s ”  d e v e l o p m e n t s  
in  W H F T A  a n d  p o s s ib l e  r e t a l i a t i o n  b y  o u t s i d e  c o u n t r i e s .
I m p o r t s  f r o m  t h e  U .S .  a l s o  f o r m  t h e  h i g h e s t  s h a r e  o f  t o t a l  im p o r t s  in  M e x i c o  ( 6 6  p e r c e n t )  a n d  
V e n e z u e l a  ( 4 3  p e r c e n t ) ;  r a n g e  b e tw e e n  3 0  p e r c e n t  a n d  4 0  p e r c e n t  in  C o l o m b i a  a n d  E c u a d o r ;  b e tw e e n  
2 0  p e r c e n t  a n d  3 0  p e r c e n t  in  B o l iv i a ,  B r a z i l ,  C h i le ,  a n d  P e r u ;  a n d  b e lo w  2 0  p e r c e n t  i n  A r g e n t in a ,  
P a r a g u a y ,  a n d  U r u g u a y .  T h e s e  f i g u r e s  i n d ic a te  c o n s i d e r a b le  v a r i a t i o n s  in  r e l i a n c e  o n  i m p o r t s  f r o m  th e  
U .S .  D e p e n d e n c e  o n  i m p o r t s  f r o m  o u t s i d e  t h e  h e m i s p h e r e  is  h i g h e s t  in  B r a z i l  ( 6 4  p e r c e n t ) ;  b e tw e e n  
4 0  p e r c e n t  a n d  5 0  p e r c e n t  in  A r g e n t in a ,  C h i le ,  E c u a d o r ,  P a r a g u a y ,  U r u g u a y  a n d  V e n e z u e la ;  b e tw e e n  
3 0  p e r c e n t  a n d  4 0  p e r c e n t  in  B o l iv i a ,  C o l o m b i a ,  a n d  P e r u ;  a n d  l o w e s t  ( 2 8  p e r c e n t )  in  M e x i c o .  B y  
c o m p a r i s o n ,  U .S .  h e m i s p h e r i c  e x p o r t s  t o  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  w e r e  u n d e r  1 0  p e r c e n t  o f  t o t a l  e x p o r t s  ( a l t h o u g h  
t h i s  f i g u r e  j u m p s  t o  3 5  p e r c e n t ,  c o m p a r a b l e  t o  t h e  s h a r e  o f  h e m i s p h e r i c  e x p o r t s  b y  A r g e n t i n a  a n d  C h i le  
i f  C a n a d a  i s  i n c lu d e d ) .  S i m i l a r ly ,  t h e  s h a r e  o f  U .S .  im p o r t s  f r o m  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  is  o n l y  12  p e r c e n t ,  a n d  
t h e  h e m i s p h e r i c  s h a r e ,  e v e n  w i t h  C a n a d a  in c lu d e d ,  a t  2 9  p e r c e n t  i s  s t i l l  l o w e r  t h a n  t h a t  o f  a n y  L A C  
c o u n t r y .  N a t u r a l l y ,  t h e s e  a g g r e g a te  f i g u r e s  a c q u i r e  r e a l  m e a n i n g  f o r  a n  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  
W H F T A  o n l y  w h e n  b r o k e n  d o w n  b y  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  g o o d s .  T h i s  f u r t h e r  a n a l y s i s  is  b e y o n d  t h e  s c o p e  o f  
t h i s  p a p e r .4
I s  a  G e n u i n e  P a r t n e r s h i p  P o s s i b l e ?
Conditions to be Met
Strengthening trade creation. T h e  t r a d e - c r e a t i o n  e f f e c t  o f  a  W H F T A  w o u l d  b e  s t r e n g th e n e d  b y  
t h e  f r e e  f l o w  o f  i n v e s tm e n t  a n d  r e m o v a l  ( o r  r e d u c t io n )  o f  d i s t o r t i n g  e x te r n a l  p r e s s u r e s  l ik e  t h e  p e r v e r s e  
p a y m e n t s  a r i s in g  f r o m  d e b t  s e r v i c i n g  ( b o th  i n c l u d e d  in  t h e  E A I  p r o p o s a l )  a n d  a l s o  b y  i m p r o v e d  t r a n s p o r t  
a n d  i n f o r m a t io n  l in k s  w i t h in  t h e  a r e a ,  f r e e r  m o v e m e n t  o f  l a b o r  a n d  s t a b le ,  s a t i s f a c to r y  t e r m s  o f  t r a d e  a n d  
c o m m o d i t y  p r i c e s  ( n o n e  o f  w h i c h  w e r e  m e n t i o n e d  in  t h e  E A I  m e s s a g e ) .  E n t i r e ly  f r e e  m o v e m e n t  o f  l a b o r  
is  c l e a r l y  n o t  a  p o l i t i c a l l y  r e a l i s t i c  e x p e c ta t io n ;  w h a t  is  u n d e r  d e b a t e  is  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  c o n t r o l s  o n  th e  
m o v e m e n t  o f  l a b o r  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  “ b r a in  d r a in . ”  T h e  id e a l  o b j e c t iv e  w o u l d  b e  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  i n c e n t iv e  t o
4. See R efik  Erzan and Alexander Yeats, "Free Trade Agreem ents w ith the U nited States— W hat’s in it for Latin 
America?" The W orld Bank, P olicy  Research W orking Paper Series 827, January 1992.
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m ig r a t e  f r o m  S o u t h  t o  N o r t h  b y  p r o v i d in g  p r o d u c t i v e  e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  b e t t e r  i n c o m e s  in  t h e  S o u t h  w h i l e  
a l s o  l i b e r a l i z i n g  a s  m u c h  a s  p o s s ib l e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  e n t r y  i n to  t h e  N o r t h .
H o w e v e r ,  t h e r e  s e e m s  t o  b e  a  t e n d e n c y  to  a v o id  t h i s  s u b j e c t  b y  t a c i t l y  a s s u m i n g  t h a t  c r e a t i o n  o f  
e m p l o y m e n t  in  t h e  S o u t h  w o u l d  h a v e  n o  im p a c t  o n  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  t h e  N o r t h .  T h i s  is  n o t  t h e  c a s e .  T o  
s o m e  e x t e n t  i t  i s  u n a v o id a b l e  t h a t  t h e  in c r e a s e d  e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  i n c r e a s e d  e x p o r t s  f r o m  t h e  S o u t h  w i l l  
b e  a t  t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  u n s k i l l e d  l a b o r  in  c e r t a in  i n d u s t r i e s  a n d  r e g io n s  o f  t h e  N o r t h .  W h i l e  t h e  p r o s p e c t  is  
t h a t  t h e  n e t  e f f e c t  o n  e m p l o y m e n t  in  t h e  N o r t h  w i l l  b e  b e n e f i c i a l ,  b o t h  t h r o u g h  in c r e a s e d  e m p l o y m e n t  in  
t e c h n o l o g y - i n t e n s i v e  a n d  s k i l l - i n t e n s iv e  i n d u s t r i e s  a n d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  a  g e n e r a l  e x p a n s io n  o f  t r a d e  a n d  r i s e  
in  i n c o m e .  B u t  t h e r e  a r e  b o u n d  to  b e  lo s e r s  a m o n g  c e r t a in  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  w o r k e r s  a n d  in  p a r t i c u l a r  
i n d u s t r i e s .  T h e s e  l o s s e s  w i l l  c a l l  f o r  a d ju s tm e n t  a n d  g o o d  s o c i a l  a n d  c o m p e n s a to r y  p o l i c i e s  in  t h e  N o r t h  
t o  a v o id  p o p u l a r  a n d  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  h o s t i l i t y  t o  a  W H F T A  a g r e e m e n t  ( e v e n  t h o u g h  s u c h  a  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  
b a c k l a s h  w o u l d  b e  t h e  w o r s t  p o s s ib l e  r e s p o n s e ) .  T h e  U .S .  T r a d e  A d j u s t m e n t  A c t  w o u l d  h a v e  t o  b e  
s t r e n g th e n e d  a n d  e f f e c t i v e ly  im p l e m e n t e d .  S u c h  a d ju s tm e n t ,  o f t e n  f r o m  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n to  s e r v i c e  
i n d u s t r i e s ,  m a y  r e s u l t  in  l o w e r  w a g e s  f o r  s o m e  g r o u p s  o f  U .S .  w o r k e r s .
Terms of Trade
T h e  q u e s t io n  o f  t e r m s  o f  t r a d e  a n d  c o m m o d i ty  p r i c e s  is  p a r t i c u l a r ly  i m p o r t a n t  t o  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  
in  v i e w  o f  t h e i r  f r e q u e n t  a n d  r e c e n t  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  “ i m m i s e r i s in g  t r a d e  e x p a n s io n , ”  i .e . ,  e x p a n s io n  o f  e x p o r t  
v o l u m e  a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  f a l l i n g  o r  s t a g n a n t  e x p o r t  r e v e n u e  a n d /o r  r e a l  e a r n e d  i m p o r t  c a p a c i t y ,  a s  a  r e s u l t  
o f  f a l l i n g  p r i c e s  a n d  d e t e r io r a t i n g  t e r m s  o f  t r a d e .5 D u r i n g  1 9 8 5 - 9 0 ,  e x p o r t  v o l u m e  e x p a n d e d  a t  a n  a n n u a l  
r a t e  o f  4 .3  p e r c e n t ,  b u t  a l l  t h e s e  a d d i t i o n a l  r e v e n u e s  w e r e  w i p e d  o u t  b y  d e t e r io r a t i n g  t e r m s  o f  t r a d e .  T h e r e  
w a s  n o  in c r e a s e  in  e a r n e d  i m p o r t  c a p a c i t y  a t  a l l .  T h i s  e x p e r i e n c e  h a s  n o t  b e e n  l im i t e d  t o  e x p o r t s  o f  
p r i m a r y  c o m m o d i t i e s ,  b u t  h a s  a l s o  e x te n d e d  t o  t h e i r  t r a d e  in  m a n u f a c t u r e s .6 T r a d e  e x p a n s io n  m a y  b e  a  
r a t i o n a l  o b j e c t iv e  in  i t s e l f  f o r  t h e  w o r l d  a s  a  w h o l e  a n d  f o r  b o t h  p a r tn e r s  t a k e n  t o g e t h e r ,  b u t  f o r  a n  
i n d iv i d u a l  t r a d i n g  c o u n t r y  i t  i s  o n l y  a  r a t i o n a l  o b j e c t iv e  i f  i t  l e a d s  t o  a d d i t i o n a l  e a r n e d  i m p o r t  c a p a c i ty .  
( T h e r e  i s  a  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  t o  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t :  i n s o f a r  a s  e m p l o y m e n t  c r e a t i o n  is  a n  o b j e c t iv e  i n  i t s e l f ,  t h e  
e x p a n s io n  o f  t h e  v o l u m e  o f  t r a d e  is  a  g o o d  t h i n g  in  i t s e l f ,  b u t  t h e r e  s h o u l d  b e  b e t t e r  w a y s  o f  a c h i e v i n g  
t h i s  t h a n  t h r o u g h  i m m i s e r i s in g  t r a d e . )  I m m i s e r i s i n g  t r a d e  e x p a n s io n  w i l l  n o t  h e lp  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  c o p e  
w i t h  i t s  d e b t .
Improving trade efficiency. T h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  i m m i s e r i s in g  t r a d e  e x p a n s io n  in  t h e  1 9 8 0 s  p o i n t s  
t o  a  f a i l u r e  t o  c o m p e t e  a b r o a d  in  t e r m s  o f  n o n p r i c e  f a c to r s  s u c h  a s  p r o d u c t  q u a l i t y ,  m a r k e t i n g  
o r g a n iz a t i o n ,  s u p p o r t i n g  f i n a n c ia l  s e r v i c e s ,  p r o m p t  d e l iv e r y ,  e tc .  I f  t h e  W H F T A  c a n  h e lp  t o  i m p r o v e  th e  
n o n p r i c e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  t r a d i n g ,  t h i s  w o u l d  b e  n o t  i t s  l e a s t - i m p o r t a n t  b e n e f i t  t o  L A C  c o u n t r i e s ;  t e c h n i c a l  
a s s i s t a n c e  a n d  o t h e r  r e l e v a n t  s u p p o r t  in  t h i s  a r e a  w o u l d  d e s e r v e  h i g h  p r i o r i t y .  I m p r o v e d  t r a d e  e f f i c i e n c y
5. See H. W. Singer, The Relationship between Debt Pressures, Adjustment Policies and Deterioration o f  Terms 
o f  Trade fo r  Developing Countries (with special reference to Latin America). Institute o f  Social Studies W orking  
Paper N o . 59, July 1989, The Hague.
6. See P. Sarkar and H. W. Singer, "Manufactured exports o f  developing countries and their terms o f  trade since 
1965." World Development, Vol 19, N o.4 , pp. 333-340 , 1991.
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h a s  in  f a c t  b e e n  p u t  f o r w a r d  a s  a  m a j o r  a r g u m e n t  in  f a v o r  o f  a n  a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  a n d  in d u s t r i a l  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  a  p r e f e r e n t i a l  o r  f r e e - t r a d e  a re a :
A s  t h e  m a r k e t s  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  t h e  k e y  m a r k e t s  f o r  t h e  n o n t r a d i t i o n a l  
e x p o r t s  o f  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  a  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r a d e  a r r a n g e m e n t  w i t h  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  
r e m o v e s  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  o f  e x p o r t  p e s s i m i s m  t h a t  o f t e n  a c t s  a s  a  r e s t r a i n t  in  s t i m u l a t i n g  
e x p o r t  p r o d u c t i o n  in  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  e c o n o m ie s .  S e c o n d ly ,  t h e  m a r k e t s  o f  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  
m a y  a c t  a s  b e t t e r  “ i n c u b a t o r s ”  in  a s s i s t i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ’ p r o d u c e r s  t o  a c q u i r e  t h e  
m a r k e t i n g  e x p e r i e n c e  in  e x p o r t s  t h a t  t h e y  la c k .  T h e  m a r k e t s  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  p a r tn e r s  
a r e  l ik e l y  t o  b e  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  e n o u g h  t o  a c t  a s  u s e f u l  “ i n c u b a t o r  m a r k e t s ”  w h i l s t  t h e  
p r e f e r e n t i a l  a r r a n g e m e n t  o f f e r s  t h e m  a  b r e a t h in g  s p a c e  b y  r e d u c i n g  t h e  s t r e n g th  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h in  t h e  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r a d e  a r e a .  O n e  c a n  r e c a l l  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  
p r e f e r e n t i a l  a g r e e m e n t s  o f  t h e  E E C  w i t h  a  n u m b e r  o f  M e d i te r r a n e a n  c o u n t r i e s  in  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s  ( b o t h  p r o c e s s e d  a n d  u n p r o c e s s e d )  t o  s e e  t h e  r e l e v a n c e  o f  t h i s  p o i n t . 7
H ow  Should the Gap be Closed?
Trade-promoting, developmental government. A c t iv e  t r a d e  p r o m o t i o n  r e q u i r e s  a  p a r tn e r s h i p  o f  
g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  b u s i n e s s .  T h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  o f f i c i a l  e x p o r t  p r o m o t i o n  a g e n c ie s  i s  n e i t h e r  a  n e c e s s a r y  
n o r  a  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n ;  n e i t h e r  h a s  i t  b e e n  in v a r i a b l y  s u c c e s s f u l .8 T h e r e  a r e  m a n y  p o s s ib l e  f o r m s  th e  
r e q u i r e d  p a r tn e r s h i p  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  i n d u s t r y  c o u ld  t a k e .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  r o l e  o f  a n  a c t i v e  a n d  s e l e c t i v e  
g o v e r n m e n t  p o l i c y  i s  l a r g e  a n d  i r r e p l a c e a b le ,  w h e t h e r  in  f i s c a l ,  c r e d i t ,  a n d  e x c h a n g e - r a t e  p o l i c y ,  u s e  o f  
d i p lo m a t i c  m i s s i o n s  a b r o a d ,  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  f r a m e w o r k  a g r e e m e n t s ,  a n d  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
t r e a t i e s  a n d  c o n v e n t i o n s .  B u t  t h e  f e e d b a c k  t o  p r o d u c t i o n  to  a d a p t  i t  t o  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  
m a r k e t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  e q u a l l y  e s s e n t ia l  a n d  r e q u i r e s  n o n o f f i c i a l  t r a d e  p r o m o t i o n  f a c i l i t i e s  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n s .
J a p a n ,  K o r e a ,  a n d  T a i w a n  a r e  m o d e l  e x a m p l e s  f o r  a c t i v e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  p o l i c i e s  b y  a  
d e v e l o p m e n t a l  s t a t e  t o  p r o m o te  e x p o r t  e f f i c ie n c y .  I n  t h e  c a s e s  o f  J a p a n  a n d  K o r e a ,  t h i s  w a s  d o n e  o n  th e  
b a s i s  o f  p r o m o t i n g  d o m e s t i c  e n t e r p r i s e  c a p a c i t y  a n d  d i s c o u r a g i n g  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  i n v e s tm e n t ,  w h i l e  in  t h e  
c a s e  o f  T a i w a n ,  e n c o u r a g e m e n t  o f  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  i n v e s tm e n t  w a s  a n  i n te g r a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  p o l ic y .  I n  a l l  t h r e e  
c a s e s ,  t h i s  a c t i v e  g o v e r n m e n t  i n te r v e n t i o n  c a n  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  s u c c e s s f u l  o v e r a l l .  B u t  t h i s  o v e r a l l  s u c c e s s  
w a s  b a s e d  o n  s p e c ia l  c o n d i t i o n s  ( n o t  e a s i l y  r e p l i c a t e d  e l s e w h e r e )  r e l a t i n g  t o  g o o d  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  p o l i c i e s ,  
a n  e n t e r p r i s e - f r i e n d l y  g o v e r n m e n t  w i t h  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  f o r  a n d  g o o d  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c to r ,  
e f f e c t i v e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  a n d  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  s o u n d  i n f r a s t r u c tu r e  f o r  t r a d e  d e v e l o p m e n t .  I n  K o r e a ,  
p r e f e r e n t i a l  f i n a n c e  ( s u b s id i z e d  c r e d i t )  p l a y e d  a  m a j o r  r o l e ,  b u t  t h i s  is  a  t r i c k y  a n d  s o m e w h a t  d a n g e r o u s  
m e t h o d  o f  t r a d e  p r o m o t i o n ,  a n d  i t s  s u c c e s s  in  K o r e a  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  t a k e n  a s  a  s ig n a l  f o r  i n d i s c r i m in a t e  u s e  
o f  t h i s  s p e c i f i c  m e t h o d  o f  t r a d e  p r o m o t i o n  e ls e w h e r e .
M odification o f  Adjustm ent Policies. T h e  q u e s t io n  p r e v io u s ly  r a i s e d  c o n c e r n in g  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  
c o n n e c t i o n  b e tw e e n  m e m b e r s h i p  in  W H F T A  a n d  a d o p t i o n  o f  f r e e  m a r k e t  p o l i c i e s  c a n  b e  s h a r p e n e d  b y
7. Y annopoulos, G eorge N ., Trade Policy Options in the Design of Development Strategies. U niversity  o f  
R eading D iscussion  Paper in E conom ics, Series A , N o . 181, N ovem ber 1986.
8. See D onald  K eesin g  and A ndrew  Singer, "Why officia l export prom otion fa ils .” Finance and Development, 
M arch 1992. H ow ever, th is article underem phasizes the need for an active governm ent role in  trade prom otion.
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a s k i n g ,  “ W i l l  r e q u i r e d  a d ju s tm e n t  p o l i c i e s  b e  m o d i f i e d  t o  a l l o w  f o r  r e g io n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  a n d  th e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  W H F T A  a s  a  ’g e n u in e  p a r t n e r s h i p ’ o r  w i l l  t h e  W H F T A  b e  c o n s t r u c t e d  in  s u c h  a  w a y  
t h a t  i t  b e c o m e s  a n  i n s t r u m e n t  t o  a p p ly  p r e s s u r e  f o r  s p e c i f i c  r e f o r m  p o l i c i e s ? ”  N e g o t i a t i o n s  w i l l  p r o d u c e  
c o m p r o m i s e s  a n d  e s t a b l i s h  a  m id d l e  g r o u n d  b e tw e e n  t h e  e x t r e m e s .  T h e s e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i l l  n e c e s s a r i l y  
e x t e n d  o v e r  a  n u m b e r  o f  y e a r s  ( p e r h a p s ,  o n  h i s t o r ic a l  p r e c e d e n t ,  f i v e  y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  U .S .  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
e l e c t i o n s ) .  D u r i n g  t h i s  t im e  t h e  e x te r n a l  g lo b a l  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  in  t h e  U .S .  a n d  L a t i n  A m e r ic a ,  
a s  w e l l  a s  d e v e l o p m e n t  t h i n k i n g  a n d  t h e  v i e w s  o f  p o l i c y  m a k e r s  in  b o t h  t h e  N o r t h  a n d  S o u t h  ( a n d  i n  t h e  
B r e t t o n  W o o d s  i n s t i t u t i o n s )  m a y  c h a n g e .  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  l ik e l y  t o  w a n t  t o  p r e s e r v e  t h e  o p t i o n  o f  
p u r s u i n g  a c t i v e  p o l i c i e s  in  k e y  s t r a te g i c  a r e a s ,  f o l lo w in g  t h e  E a s t  A s i a n  d e v e l o p m e n t  m o d e l  ( b o t h  J a p a n  
d u r i n g  t h e  r e l e v a n t  p e r io d  a n d  S o u th  K o r e a ) ,  a n d  to  s o m e  e x t e n t  t h e  c o n t i n e n ta l  W e s te r n  E u r o p e a n  m o d e l .  
S u c h  s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y  i n te r v e n t i o n  m a y  b e  r e q u i r e d  in  o r d e r  t o  t a k e  f u l l  a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h e  n e w  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
i n  t h e  N o r t h  A m e r i c a n  m a r k e t s  o p e n in g  u p  u n d e r  W H F T A .
I t  s h o u l d  b e  a  t a s k  f o r  W H F T A  t o  c lo s e ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  r e d u c e ,  t h e  p r e s e n t  p r o d u c t i v i t y  g a p .  H i g h e r  
p r o d u c t i v i t y  a n d  e x p a n d i n g  e m p l o y m e n t  in  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  w o u l d  e n h a n c e  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  L a t i n  
A m e r i c a n  a n d  C a r ib b e a n  d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t s ,  a n d  w i th  m u c h  o f  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  d e m a n d  d i r e c t e d  to  
n o n t r a d e a b l e  o r  o t h e r  g o o d s  c a n  b e  e f f i c i e n t ly  h o m e - p r o d u c e d ,  t h e r e  w o u l d  b e  a  n a tu r a l  p r o c e s s  o f  
e f f i c i e n t  i m p o r t  s u b s t i t u t i o n  n o t  b a s e d  o n  t r a d e  o b s t a c l e s  o r  d i s t o r t e d  in c e n t iv e s .  W h e n  t h e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  i s  in  f a c t  d e c l i n in g  i t  w i l l  t h e n  b e c o m e  in c r e a s in g l y  s a f e r  a n d  m o r e  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  e n g a g e  in  
f u r t h e r  t r a d e  l ib e r a l i z a t io n .  T h i s  h a s  l e s s o n s  f o r  t h e  s e q u e n c i n g  o f  t h e  v a r io u s  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  W H F T A  
p r o p o s a l .  T r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  s h o u l d  c o m p l e m e n t ,  r a th e r  t h a n  p r e c e d e ,  a  s t r e n g th e n i n g  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i v e  
b a s e  o f  L A C  c o u n t r i e s .  T h i s  is  a l s o  in  l in e  w i t h  t h e  r e l e v a n t  d e v e l o p m e n t  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  c o u n t r i e s  l ik e  
J a p a n  a n d  S o u t h  K o r e a .
The need for infrastructure. O n e  m a y  g e n e r a l l y  p r e d i c t  t h a t  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  a  l a r g e r  d o m e s t i c  
m a r k e t ,  i n d ig e n o u s  t e c h n o l o g ic a l  c a p a c i t y ,  a n d  g o o d  i n f r a s t r u c tu r e  f o r  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  c o m m u n i c a t i o n , '  e tc . ,  
w i l l  b e  in  a  b e t t e r  p o s i t i o n  t o  d e r iv e  a d v a n t a g e  f r o m  a  W H F T A  t h a n  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h o u t  t h e s e  a s s e t s .  T h e  
m o r e  a d v a n c e d  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  m o r e  l ik e l y  t o  b e n e f i t  t h a n  th e  l e s s  a d v a n c e d  o n e s .  T h e  p o l i c y  c o n c l u s i o n  
t o  b e  d r a w n  is  t h a t  t h e  p o o r e r  c o u n t r i e s  d e s e r v e  s p e c ia l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  a n d  p e r h a p s  c o m p e n s a t i o n .  T h e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  p r e c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  s e i z i n g  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  in  t h e  p o o r e r  c o u n t r i e s  ( i n f r a s t r u c tu r e ,  t e c h n o l o g y ,  
i n f o r m a t io n ,  e t c . )  s h o u l d  b e  a s s i g n e d  h ig h  p r i o r i t y  in  i m p l e m e n t in g  t h e  W H F T A .
The need for aid and ancillary policies. F o r  t h e  w e a k e r  p a r tn e r  in  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s ,  t h e r e  a r e  t w o  
r e a s o n s  f o r  n o t  o p e n i n g  u p  t o  f r e e  t r a d e ,  i .e . ,  i n f a n t  i n d u s t r i e s  a n d  t h e  b a la n c e  o f  p a y m e n t s .  B o t h  t h e s e  
r e a s o n s  a r e  a c c e p t e d  a s  l e g i t im a te ,  n o t  o n l y  in  e c o n o m i c  t h e o r y  b u t  a l s o  in  G A T T : A r t i c l e  X V I I I ( b ) .  T h e  
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  n o n t r a d i t i o n a l  e x p o r t s  b y  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  u n d e r  a  W H F T A  r e g im e  w o u l d  i n e v i t a b l y  r e q u i r e  
i n d u s t r i e s  t h a t  w o u l d  i n i t i a l l y  b e  i n f a n t  i n d u s t r i e s  in  n e e d  o f  p r o t e c t i o n .  T h e  b a l a n c e - o f - p a y m e n t s  
a r g u m e n t ,  in  t h e  c a s e  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  W H F T A ,  w o u l d  t a k e  t h e  s p e c ia l  f o r m  o f  
r e q u i r i n g  n o t  j u s t  b a la n c e - o f - p a y m e n t s  e q u i l i b r iu m  b u t  b a la n c e - o f - p a y m e n ts  s u r p l u s e s  i f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  
d e b t s  a r e  t o  b e  s e r v i c e d ;  a n  a l t e r n a t iv e  w o u l d  b e  in c r e a s e d  i n f lo w  o f  a id  o r  n o n d e b t - c r e a t in g  f o r e i g n  
i n v e s tm e n t .  I f  t h e r e  w e r e  w i d e s p r e a d  d e b t  f o r g i v e n e s s ,  b a l a n c e - o f - p a y m e n t s  e q u i l i b r iu m  w o u l d  b e  
s u f f i c ie n t ,  b u t  t h i s  i s  p e r h a p s  n o t  a  r e a l i s t i c  s c e n a r io .  I n  o n e  w a y  o r  a n o th e r ,  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  n e w ,  i n f a n t  
i n d u s t r i e s  a n d  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m e n t s  w o u l d  h a v e  to  b e  b u i l t  i n to  t h e  W H F T A .
T h e  i m p a c t  o f  t h e  p r o p o s a l  f o r  a id  t o  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  is  s o m e w h a t  a m b i g u o u s .  P r e s i d e n t  B u s h ’s 
s t a t e m e n t  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  “ p r o s p e r i t y  in  o u r  h e m i s p h e r e  d e p e n d s  o n  t r a d e ,  n o t  a id . ”  H o w e v e r ,  i n  t h e  s a m e  
s p e e c h  h e  a l s o  a n n o u n c e d  a  n e w  f u n d  a d m i n i s t e r e d  b y  t h e  I n t e r - A m e r i c a n  D e v e l o p m e n t  B a n k  t o  c r e a te
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a  n e w  l e n d i n g  p r o g r a m  “ f o r  n a t i o n s  t h a t  t a k e  s i g n i f i c a n t  s t e p s  t o  r e m o v e  i m p e d i m e n t s  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
i n v e s t m e n t ”  t o  w h i c h  t h e  W o r ld  B a n k  w o u l d  a ls o  b e  e x p e c te d  to  c o n t r i b u t e ,  a s  w e l l  a s  a  U .S .  c o n t r i b u t io n  
t o  a  n e w  i n v e s tm e n t  f u n d  “ in  r e s p o n s e  t o  m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d  i n v e s tm e n t  r e f o r m s  a n d  p r o g r e s s  in  
p r i v a t i z a t i o n , ”  w i t h  m a t c h in g  c o n t r i b u t io n s  f r o m  E u r o p e  a n d  J a p a n .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  a n  i n d i r e c t  a s s u r a n c e  
w a s  g i v e n  t h a t  a id  t o  E a s te r n  E u r o p e  w o u l d  n o t  b e  a t  t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  L a t i n  A m e r ic a .  T h e  E n te r p r i s e  f o r  
t h e  A m e r i c a s  A c t  f o l l o w e d  u p  o n  t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  ( T i t l e  I )  b y  a s k i n g  f o r  a u th o r i t y  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  $ 5 0 0  
m i l l i o n  in  f i v e  e q u a l  a n n u a l  i n s t a l l m e n t s  t o  a n  E n te r p r i s e  f o r  t h e  A m e r i c a s  F u n d  ( th e  M u l t i l a t e r a l  
I n v e s t m e n t  F u n d ,  M I F )  w h i c h  is  b e in g  a d m i n i s t e r e d  b y  t h e  I D B .  I t  w a s  s p e c i f i e d  t h a t  t h e  f u n d  c o u ld  
p r o v i d e  p r o g r a m  a n d  p r o j e c t  g r a n t s  a s  w e l l  a s  t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e  w i t h  p r i v a t i z a t i o n .  T h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h i s  
f u n d  w e r e  p r o j e c t e d  t o  c o v e r  d o m e s t i c  a s  w e l l  a s  f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t  in  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a n d  t h e  C a r ib b e a n .
A l t h o u g h  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  f u n d  w e r e  v e r y  s m a l l  in  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  a m b i t i o u s  t a s k  t h e  M I F  w a s  
s e t  t o  p e r f o r m ,  t h e  p r o p o s a l  t o  c r e a te  s u c h  a  f u n d  t o  h e lp  t h e  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  m e e t  t h e  “ in d i c a to r s  o f  
r e a d i n e s s ”  w a s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n i t i a t i v e .  T h e  p r o p o s a l  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  a n  i n f lo w  o f  e x t e r n a l  r e s o u r c e s  i s  a  
n e c e s s a r y  c o m p l e m e n t  t o  in te r n a l  r e f o r m s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  M I F  i n i t i a t i v e  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  s w if t ,  s u c c e s s f u l  
a d j u s t m e n t  in  t h e  i n v e s tm e n t  s e c to r  in  L a t in  A m e r i c a  r e q u i r e s  c o s t ly ,  o n e - t i m e  g r a n t  f i n a n c in g  w h i c h  th e  
m u l t i l a t e r a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  b a n k s  a r e  n o t  e q u ip p e d  to  p r o v i d e ,  t o  b e  u s e d  f o r  c r u c ia l  t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  
t o  e n c o u r a g e  t h e  i n v e s tm e n t  r e f o r m  p r o c e s s ,  a n d  to  e a s e  t h e  b u r d e n s  o f  a d ju s tm e n t .  I n  t h e  d e b t  a r e n a ,  th e  
C o n g r e s s  h a s  e n a c t e d  s e p a r a t e  a u th o r i t y  w h i c h  a l l o w s  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  P L - 4 8 0  
p r o g r a m  a n d  U .S .  A g e n c y  f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  d e b t  o f  l e a s t - d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  a r e  m o v in g  
to w a r d  m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d  e c o n o m i e s .  I n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n ,  a n d  in  o r d e r  t o  d e a l  w i t h  d e b t  i s s u e s  in  L A C  
c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  I n i t i a t i v e  p r o p o s e d  a n  E n te r p r i s e  f o r  t h e  A m e r ic a s  F a c i l i t y  a d m i n i s t e r e d  b y  t h e  T r e a s u r y  
D e p a r t m e n t .  D e p t  r e d u c t io n ,  i n v e s tm e n t  r e f o r m ,  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  w e r e  i n c l u d e d  in  t h e  
p a c k a g e .  T h e  f a c i l i t y  w a s  d e s i g n e d  to  s u p p o r t  d e b t  r e d u c t io n  p r o g r a m s  f o r  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  m e e t  c e r t a in  
e l i g i b i l i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t s :
( 1 )  T h e  c o u n t r y  s h o u ld  h a v e  a n  I M F  s t a n d b y  a r r a n g e m e n t ,  a n  a r r a n g e m e n t  u n d e r  t h e  W o r ld  B a n k  
s t r u c tu r a l  a d ju s tm e n t  f a c i l i t y ,  o r  in  e x c e p t i o n a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  a n  I M F - m o n i t o r e d  p r o g r a m  o r  i t s  
e q u iv a l e n t .
( 2 )  T h e  c o u n t r y  s h o u ld  b e  r e c e iv i n g  s t r u c tu r a l  o r  s e c to r a l  l o a n s  f r o m  t h e  W o r ld  B a n k  o r  t h e  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  A s s o c ia t io n .
( 3 )  T h e  c o u n t r y  s h o u ld  h a v e  in  p l a c e  m a j o r  i n v e s tm e n t  r e f o r m s  in  c o n ju n c t io n  w i t h  a n  I D B  lo a n ,  o r  
i t  s h o u l d  b e  i m p l e m e n t in g  a n  o p e n  i n v e s tm e n t  r e g im e .
( 4 )  T h e  c o u n t r y  s h o u l d  h a v e  n e g o t i a t e d  a  s a t i s f a c to r y  f i n a n c in g  p r o g r a m  w i th  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s ,  
i n c l u d i n g  d e b t  a n d  d e b t - s e r v i c e  r e l i e f  ( i f  a p p r o p r i a te ) .
T h i s  l i s t  o f  r e q u i r e m e n t s  r a i s e s  a n  i m m e d ia t e  q u e s t io n :  is  m e m b e r s h i p  in  t h e  W H F T A  s u p p o s e d  
to  b e  c o n d i t i o n a l  o n  f r e e - m a r k e t  r e f o r m s  a n d  “ p o s i t i v e  c h a n g e s , ”  p o s s ib l y  v e r i f i e d  b y  a n  I M F - W o r l d  B a n k  
“ s e a l  o f  a p p r o v a l ? ”  O r  d o e s  t h i s  l i s t  m e r e ly  e x p r e s s  a  h o p e  t h a t  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  c o n s i d e r  t h e  p r o s p e c t  
o f  f r e e  a n d /o r  p r e f e r e n t i a l  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  N o r t h  A m e r ic a n  m a r k e t s  a s  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  i n c e n t iv e  t o  t a k e  t h e  r i s k  
o f  p l u n g i n g  in to  “ f r e e - m a r k e t  r e f o r m ? ”
T h e  f i r s t  a l t e r n a t iv e  w o u l d  c le a r l y  l im i t  t h e  f r e e d o m  o f  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  t o  f o r m u la t e  t h e i r  o w n  ( a n d  
p o s s i b l y  d i v e r g e n t )  d e v e l o p m e n t  s t r a te g i e s  c o n c e r n in g  t h e  s i z e  a n d  r o l e  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c to r ,  e x c h a n g e
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r a te s ,  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c e s ,  f i s c a l  p o l i c i e s ,  p r iv a t i z a t i o n ,  f o o d  s u b s id i e s ,  i n te l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s ,  e t c . ,  a n d  
p o w e r f u l l y  r e in f o r c e  p r e s s u r e s  t o  f o l l o w  p o l i c i e s  o f  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  a n d  a d ju s tm e n t  u l t i m a t e l y  g e a r e d  to  
e n a b l e  t h e m  t o  s e r v i c e  d e b t s  w i t h i n  a n  a g r e e d  p o l i c y  f r a m e w o r k .  H o w e v e r ,  a g a i n s t  t h i s  i t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  
t h a t  i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  p r o p o s a l  t h e r e  w a s  a  d i r e c t  l i n k  w i t h  t h e  d e b t - r e d u c t i o n  p r o g r a m  t h a t  w o u l d  r e d u c e  th e  
i n t e n s i t y  o f  t h e  a d ju s tm e n t  r e q u i r e d  a n d  t h u s  m a k e  i t  e a s i e r  f o r  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  t o  a c c e p t  a n d  i m p l e m e n t  
r e f o r m  p r o g r a m s .
W h e n  t h e  a b o v e  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  m e t ,  t h e  U .S .  w o u l d  p r o v i d e  n e w  p a y m e n t  t e r m s  f o r  o u t s t a n d i n g  
d e b t .  T h e  I n i t i a t i v e  a l s o  p r o v i d e s  f o r  t h e  r e d u c t io n  o f  a  p o r t i o n  o f  a s s e t s  h e ld  b y  t h e  C o m m o d i t y  C r e d i t  
C o r p o r a t i o n  ( C C C )  a n d  a  p o r t i o n  o f  E x p o r t - I m p o r t  B a n k  lo a n s ,  p r o v i d e d  t h e  e l i g i b l e  c o u n t r y  c o n f i r m s  t h a t  
d e b t  r e l i e f  a s s i s t a n c e  w i l l  b e  u s e d  t o  c a r r y  o u t  d e b t - f o r - e q u i t y  o r  d e b t - f o r - n a tu r e  s w a p s .
E a r l i e r  in  t h i s  p a p e r  i t  w a s  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  f r e e  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t s  b a s e d  o n  n e g a t i v e  i n t e g r a t i o n  
m e a s u r e s  c a n  s e l d o m  b e  e q u a l l y  b e n e f i c i a l  b e tw e e n  p a r tn e r s  w i t h  s h a r p l y  d i s p a r a t e  l e v e l s  o f  p e r  c a p i t a  
i n c o m e  a n d  s o c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s .  T h e  n e c e s s a r y  “ c a t c h i n g  u p ”  c a n n o t  h a p p e n  w i t h o u t  e x t e r n a l  r e s o u r c e s  a n d  
s u p p o r t ,  a n d  w i t h o u t  s o m e  d e g r e e  o f  “ c a t c h i n g  u p ”  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  n o t  b e  a b le  t o  t a k e  f u l l  a d v a n t a g e  
o f  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  W H F T A  a n d  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  a  “ g e n u in e  p a r tn e r s h i p ”  in  t h e  W e s te r n  H e m is p h e r e .
Focus on people. A p a r t  f r o m  t h e  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  p o o r e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e r e  is  t h e  o v e r a l l  e f f e c t  o n  
p o v e r ty  t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d .  T h is  is  a  q u e s t i o n  n o t  o n l y  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  b e n e f i t s  b e tw e e n  c o u n t r i e s  b u t  a l s o  
o f  i n c o m e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i t h in  c o u n t r i e s .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  W o r ld  B a n k  e s t im a te s ,  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  p e r s o n s  l iv in g  
b e lo w  t h e  p o v e r t y  l in e  in  L a t i n  A m e r ic a  a lm o s t  d o u b l e d  b e tw e e n  1 9 8 5  a n d  1 9 8 9  t o  o v e r  1 0 0  m i l l i o n ,  
a l m o s t  o n e  q u a r t e r  o f  t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n .  T h i s  i n c r e a s e  w a s  b o th  a b s o l u t e l y  a n d  r e l a t i v e ly  h i g h e r  t h a n  
in  a n y  o t h e r  p a r t  o f  t h e  w o r l d ,  e v e n  in c l u d i n g  s u b - S a h a r a n  A f r i c a  ( a l t h o u g h  t h e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  p o v e r t y  a t  
2 5  p e r c e n t  i s  l e s s  t h a n  in  A f r i c a  o r  S o u th  A s ia ,  w h e r e  i t  is  a r o u n d  5 0  p e r c e n t ) .  A b o u t  7 0  p e r c e n t  o f  L a t in  
A m e r i c a ’s  p o o r  a r e  l i s t e d  a s  e x t r e m e l y  p o o r  a n d  l iv e  b e lo w  a n  e v e n  l o w e r  p o v e r ty  l in e ;  t h i s  p r o p o r t i o n  
i s  a l s o  a s  h i g h  a s  in  s u b - S a h a r a n  A f r i c a  a n d  h i g h e r  t h a n  in  a l l  o t h e r  r e g io n s .  T h e  i m p a c t  o f  e x p a n d e d  
t r a d e  o n  b o t h  t h e  r u r a l  a n d  u r b a n  p o o r  in  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  d e s e r v e s  s p e c ia l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  in  a n y  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  
T h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  W H F T A  s h o u l d  n o t  c o n c e n t r a t e  s o l e ly  o n  t e c h n i c a l ,  f i n a n c ia l ,  a n d  e c o n o m i c  f e a s i b i l i t y  
a n d  c o n s e q u e n c e s ,  b u t  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  i ts  i m p a c t  o n  p e o p le .  T h e  U N D P ,  w i t h  i t s  h u m a n  r e s o u r c e  
d e v e l o p m e n t  e x p e r i e n c e ,  c o u ld  o f f e r  u s e f u l  a s s i s t a n c e .  O n e  w o u l d  a l s o  h o p e ,  in  t h i s  c o n te x t ,  t h a t  t h e  
m o v e m e n t  t o w a r d  a  W H F T A  w i l l  b e  a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  g r e a t e r  e m p h a s i s  o n  t h e  s o c ia l  i m p a c t  o f  s t r u c tu r a l  
a d j u s t m e n t  p r o g r a m s ;  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  g r e a t  i n f lu e n c e  o f  t h e  U .S .  o n  t h e  p o l i c i e s  o f  t h e  I M F  a n d  t h e  W o r ld  
B a n k ,  t h i s  c o u ld  l e g i t im a te ly  b e  i n c l u d e d  in  t h e  W H F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n s .
P r o b l e m s  o f  N e g o t i a t i o n
Indicators o f Readiness
T h e  E A I  w a s  b r o a d ly  d e s i g n e d  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  n e w  c o m m i tm e n t  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  a n d  C a r ib b e a n  
g o v e r n m e n t s  t o  d e m o c r a c y  a n d  m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d  r e f o r m s  t h r o u g h  a  p r o g r a m  t h a t  w o u l d  c u t  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s ,  
p r o m o te  i n v e s tm e n t ,  a n d  h e lp  r e d u c e  d e b t .
A s  a  f i r s t  s t e p ,  t h e  U .S .  n e g o t i a t e d  b i l a t e r a l  f r a m e w o r k  a g r e e m e n t s  o n  t r a d e  a n d  i n v e s tm e n t  w i t h  
i n te r e s t e d  c o u n t r i e s  in  t h e  r e g io n .  T h e  f r a m e w o r k  a g r e e m e n t s  g e n e r a l l y  c o n ta i n  a  s t a t e m e n t  o f  p r i n c i p l e s  
c o v e r i n g  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  o p e n  t r a d e  a n d  in v e s tm e n t ,  t h e  i n c r e a s in g  im p o r t a n c e  o f  s e r v i c e s  in  t h e  e c o n o m y ,
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t h e  n e e d  f o r  a d e q u a te  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  i n te l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s ,  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  o b s e r v i n g  a n d  p r o m o t i n g  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  r e c o g n i z e d  w o r k e r ’s  r i g h t s ,  a n d  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  e f f e c t i v e ly  r e s o l v in g  t r a d e  a n d  i n v e s tm e n t  
p r o b l e m s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  e a c h  f r a m e w o r k  p a c t  e s t a b l i s h e s  a  C o u n c i l  o n  T r a d e  a n d  I n v e s t m e n t  t h a t  s e r v e s  
a s  a  b i l a t e r a l  c o n s u l t a t i v e  m e c h a n i s m .
T h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  h a s  s i g n e d  b i l a t e r a l  f r a m e w o r k  a g r e e m e n t s  w i t h  a l l  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  e x c e p t  H a i t i ,  
S u r i n a m ,  a n d  C u b a .  T h e  f r a m e w o r k  a g r e e m e n t s  w e r e  s e e n  a s  a  m e c h a n i s m  t h a t  e n a b l e d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  
a n d  i t s  p r o s p e c t i v e  p a r tn e r s  “ t o  m o v e  f o r w a r d  o n  a  s t e p - b y - s t e p  b a s i s  t o  e l i m in a t e  c o u n te r p r o d u c t i v e  
b a r r i e r s  t o  t r a d e  a n d  i n v e s tm e n t ,  a n d  e s t a b l i s h  a  c h a n n e l  t o  a d v a n c e  t h e  E A I  v i s i o n . ” 9 P r o s p e c t s  f o r  F T A  
t a l k s  d e p e n d  o n  p r o g r e s s  t o w a r d  e c o n o m i c  r e f o r m  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i ty .
S o m e  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  w e l l  p o s i t i o n e d  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  t h e  W H F T A .  O t h e r s ,  h o w e v e r ,  a r e  n o t  
y e t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  a d v a n c e d  in  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  s t r u c tu r a l  r e f o r m  a n d  a r e  s t r u g g l in g  w i t h  s h o r t - t e r m  o b s t a c l e s ,  
m a n y  o f  a  p o l i t i c a l  n a tu r e ,  t h a t  l i m i t  t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  t h e  I n i t i a t i v e .
E A I  e n t r y  r u l e s  r e m a in  a n  o p e n  i s s u e ,  a n d  n o  d e c i s i o n  h a s  b e e n  m a d e  a b o u t  w h e t h e r  o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s  c o u ld  a c c e d e  t o  t h e  N A F T A  o r  w h e t h e r  s e p a r a t e  F T A s  w o u l d  b e  n e g o t i a t e d .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  
N A F T A  t r e a t y  is  s t i l l  a n  i m p o r t a n t  m o d e l  f o r  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a n d  t h e  C a r ib b e a n  r e g a r d i n g  
t h e  r i g h t s  a n d  o b l ig a t io n s  t h a t  t h e  U .S .  w i l l  e x p e c t  in  t r a d e  p a c t s  w i t h  L A C  c o u n t r i e s .
T h e  s e q u e n c i n g  o f  p r o s p e c t i v e  F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n s  i s  s t i l l  n o t  c le a r ,  b u t  a  s e r i o u s  p h a s e  o f  n e w  t a l k s  
w i l l  s o o n  b e g in .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e r e  a r e  f i v e  p o s s ib l e  s c e n a r io s  f o r  L A C  c o u n t r i e s :
( 1 )  a s  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  m e e t  t h e  p r e c o n d i t i o n s ,  t h e y  n e g o t i a t e  b i l a t e r a l  F T A  a g r e e m e n t s  w i t h  t h e  U .S . ;
( 2 )  F T A  a g r e e m e n t s  a r e  r e a c h e d  b e tw e e n  t h e  U .S .  a n d  g r o u p s  o f  s u b r e g i o n a l l y  i n t e g r a t e d  L A C
c o u n t r i e s ;
( 3 )  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  j o i n  N A F T A ;
( 4 )  N A F T A  is  e x t e n d e d  to  i n c l u d e  s u b r e g i o n a l l y  i n te g r a t e d  L A C  c o u n t r i e s ;  o r
( 5 )  a l l  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  j o i n  N A F T A  a t  t h e  s a m e  t im e .
A  c o m p l e t e  W H F T A  w i l l  m a t e r i a l i z e  o n l y  i f  a l l  W e s te r n  H e m is p h e r e  c o u n t r i e s  e n t e r  i n to  a  f r e e  t r a d e  
a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  C a n a d a .  T h a t  c a n  h a p p e n  e i t h e r  s i m u l t a n e o u s ly  f o r  a l l  L A C  
c o u n t r i e s  i f  s c e n a r io  5 is  f o l lo w e d ,  o r  s t e p  b y  s t e p  in  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  s c e n a r io s  1 -4 .
The Role o f  Regional Groupings
I t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  w h a t  t h e  r o l e  o f  e x i s t i n g  r e g io n a l  g r o u p i n g s  in  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a n d  t h e  C a r ib b e a n  
w i l l  b e  in  t h e  c o m i n g  W H F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  W i l l  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  b e  w i t h  s u c h  r e g io n a l  a s s o c i a t i o n s  a s  
a  s i n g l e  n e g o t i a t i n g  p a r tn e r ,  o r  w i l l  t h e y  b e  w i t h  t h e  i n d iv i d u a l  m e m b e r s  o f  s u c h  a s s o c i a t i o n s ?  T h e  
a c c e s s i o n  c l a u s e  t o  N A F T A  o f f e r s  a  r o u t e  t o  a  p i e c e m e a l ,  c o u n t r y - b y - c o u n t r y  m o v e m e n t  f r o m  N A F T A
9. U nited States Department o f  Commerce, "Enterprise for the Americas," January 17, 1992.
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t o  W H F T A  t h a t  h a s  b e e n  d e s c r i b e d  a s  “ m in i l a t e r a l . ”  F r o m  t h e  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  o f  L A C  c o u n t r i e s ,  p i e c e m e a l  
a c c e s s i o n  c a r r i e s  a  d a n g e r  o f  z e r o - s u m  g a m e s ,  i .e . ,  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a tm e n t  o f  o n e  L A C  c o u n t r y  m a y  
d i s p l a c e  t r a d e  o f  a n o th e r  L A C  c o u n t r y  t h a t  e x p o r t s  s i m i l a r  p r o d u c t s  t o  N o r t h  A m e r ic a .
T h e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  b e tw e e n  W H F T A  a n d  e x i s t i n g  o r  p r o s p e c t i v e  r e g io n a l  g r o u p i n g s  in  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  
s u c h  a s  A L A D I ,  t h e  A n d e a n  P a c t ,  t h e  C e n t r a l  A m e r ic a n  C o m m o n  M a r k e t ,  C A R I C O M ,  a n d  M E R C O S U R ,  
is  c l e a r l y  c o m p l e x .  I n  p r a c t i c e  i t  w i l l  b e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a v o id  w e a k e n i n g  t h e s e  r e g io n a l  g r o u p i n g s  a s  a  r e s u l t  
o f  W H F T A .  T h e  U .S .  is ,  in  p r i n c i p l e ,  s u p p o r t i n g  r e g io n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a .  T h i s  m e a n s  
t h a t  e v e r y b o d y  w a n t s  t o  a v o id  b y p a s s i n g  o r  d i s r u p t in g  e x i s t i n g  r e g io n a l  g r o u p i n g s  t h r o u g h  c o m p e t i t i o n  
a m o n g  i n d iv i d u a l  m e m b e r  c o u n t r i e s  t o  e n te r  i n to  d i r e c t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  o n  W H F T A  a n d  c o m p e t e  f o r  a c c e s s  
t o  t h e  U .S .  m a r k e t  a n d  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  i n v e s tm e n t  a n d  d e b t  p a c k a g e s .  T h e r e  is  a l s o  a  d a n g e r  t h a t  a n y  s u c h  
b y p a s s i n g  o f  e x i s t i n g  r e g io n a l  g r o u p i n g s  in  f a v o r  o f  d i r e c t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  m a y  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  
c o m m o n  t o  a l l  e x i s t i n g  g r o u p i n g s  t h a t  p r o h i b i t  s u c h  b i la t e r a l  t r e a t i e s  a n d  p r o v i d e  t h a t  a n y  t a r i f f  p r e f e r e n c e  
w i t h  a  n o n - L A C  c o u n t r y  ( w h ic h  w o u l d  i n c lu d e  t h e  U .S .  a n d  C a n a d a )  m u s t  a u to m a t i c a l l y  b e  f u l l y  e x t e n d e d  
t o  t h e  o t h e r  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  r e g io n a l  g r o u p in g .  T h e  m o s t  r e a l i s t i c  p r o p o s a l  in  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  s e e m s  
t o  b e  t h a t  a r r i v e d  a t  b y  S E L A .10 T h is  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  r e g io n a l  g r o u p i n g s  s h o u ld  f i r s t  d e f in e  a  c o m m o n  
p o s i t i o n  c o n c e r n in g  t h e  “ c r i t e r i a ,  r u le s  o f  t h e  g a m e ,  a n d  i s s u e s  t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d ”— p e r h a p s  l e a d i n g  t o  a  
c o m m o n  L A C  p o s i t i o n  b u t  l e a v in g  t h e  d e ta i l e d  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a n d  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  a c t u a l  a g r e e m e n t s  to  
i n d iv i d u a l  c o u n t r i e s  o r  s u b r e g i o n a l  g r o u p in g s .  T h i s  is  a  s u g g e s t i o n  t o  b e  c a r e f u l l y  c o n s i d e r e d ,  a l t h o u g h  
th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw e e n  “ r u l e s  o f  t h e  g a m e ”  a n d  a n  a g e n d a  f o r  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  o n  t h e  o n e  h a n d  a n d  th e  
a c tu a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s  o n  t h e  o t h e r  m a y  n o t  b e  e a s y  to  m a i n t a i n  in  t h e  a c tu a l  u n f o l d in g  o f  e v e n t s ,  a s  
e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  t h e  U r u g u a y  R o u n d  a n d  o t h e r  G A T T  n e g o t i a t i o n s  s e e m s  to  s u g g e s t .
T h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  a  W H F T A  w i l l  b e  c o m p l i c a te d  a n d  t im e - c o n s u m i n g  w h e t h e r  t h e  r e g io n a l  
g r o u p i n g s  a r e  i n v o lv e d  o r  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a r e  c a r r i e d  o u t  c o u n t r y  b y  c o u n t r y .  T h i s  a l s o  r a i s e s  t h e  p r o b l e m  
a n d  d a n g e r  o f  a n  u n e q u a l  p a r tn e r s h i p .  C l e a r l y  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a n d  n e g o t i a t i n g  r e s o u r c e s  o f  L A C  
c o u n t r i e s  a n d  r e g io n a l  g r o u p i n g s  a r e  m u c h  m o r e  l im i te d  t h a n  t h o s e  o f  t h e  U .S .  a n d  C a n a d a .  M o r e o v e r ,  
t h e r e  a r e  m a n y  o t h e r  c la i m s  o n  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c a p a c i t y  o f  L A C  c o u n t r i e s :  n e g o t i a t i o n s  h a v e  t o  t a k e  
p l a c e  w i t h  t h e  I M F  a n d  t h e  W o r ld  B a n k  o n  s t r u c tu r a l  a d ju s tm e n t ,  w i t h  o f f i c i a l  c r e d i to r s  a n d  c o m m e r c i a l  
b a n k s  o n  d e b t  p r o b l e m s ,  w i t h  a id  d o n o r s  a n d  s o u r c e s  o f  t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  e tc .  I f  c o m p l e x  n e w  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  o n  W H F T A  a r e  a d d e d  t o  o t h e r  h e a v y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  t h e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  s t r u c tu r a l  
a d ju s tm e n t ,  d e b t ,  a n d  a id  p r o b l e m s  m a y  b e  a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c te d .  A l l  t h i s  e s t a b l i s h e s  a  c a s e  f o r  e a s i n g  th e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  b u r d e n  o f  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a s  m u c h  a s  p o s s ib l e ,  e .g . ,  b y  a p p o in t i n g  l e a d  c o u n t r i e s  t o  n e g o t i a t e  
o n  b e h a l f  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  o n  s p e c i f i c  i s s u e s ,  u s i n g  e x i s t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  s u c h  a s  t h e  I n t e r - A m e r i c a n  
D e v e l o p m e n t  B a n k ,  C a r ib b e a n  D e v e l o p m e n t  B a n k ,  E C L A C ,  S E L A ,  e tc . ,  t o  t h e  g r e a t e s t  p o s s i b l e  e x te n t ,  
w i t h  t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  f r o m  U N  o r g a n iz a t i o n s  ( f o r  in s t a n c e ,  a s s i s t a n c e  f r o m  F A O  
o n  q u e s t io n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  im p a c t  o f  W H F T A  o n  a g r ic u l tu r e ,  f r o m  I L O  o n  t h e  e m p l o y m e n t  e f f e c t s ,  f r o m  
U N I D O  o n  t h e  e f f e c t s  o n  i n d u s t r y ,  e tc ) .
O n e  m a j o r  f a c t o r  f u r t h e r  c o m p l i c a t i n g  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  is  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  m a j o r  b a r r i e r s  t o  f r e e  
t r a d e  b e tw e e n  L a t i n  a n d  N o r t h  A m e r i c a  a r e  n o t  t a r i f f s  b u t  n o n t a r i f f  b a r r i e r s ,  w h i c h  a r e  m u c h  le s s  
t r a n s p a r e n t  a n d  m u c h  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  n e g o t i a te .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  U .S .  n o n t a r i f f  b a r r i e r s  a g a i n s t  im p o r t s  
f r o m  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  h a v e  b e e n  e s t im a te d ,  in  t e r m s  o f  t a r i f f  e q u iv a l e n t s ,  a s  4 0  p e r c e n t  f o r  s u g a r  a n d
10. SELA , The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative in the Context o f Latin America and Caribbean Relations 
with the United States. C onsultation m eeting on Latin Am erica and the Caribbean relations w ith  the U nited States 
o f  Am erica, Caracas, April 2 -24 , 1991, SP/R C -IA /D T  N o. 2.
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c lo t h i n g ,  3 0  p e r c e n t  f o r  r i c e ,  2 5  p e r c e n t  f o r  d a i r y  p r o d u c t s ,  2 0  p e r c e n t  f o r  t e x t i l e s ,  i r o n  a n d  s t e e l ,  a n d  
c o l o r  t e l e v i s i o n  s e t s  ( w i t h  m u c h  h i g h e r  p o s s ib l e ,  e .g . ,  8 0  p e r c e n t  f o r  s u g a r ,  5 0  p e r c e n t  f o r  t e x t i l e s  a n d  
c l o t h i n g ,  e t c ) . 11 T h e s e  N T B s  i n c l u d e  v o l u n ta r y  e x p o r t  r e s t r a i n t s ,  a n t i d u m p in g  a n d  c o u n te r v a i l i n g  d u t ie s ,  
q u o ta s ,  e x c i s e  d u t ie s ,  e tc . ,  a l l  o f  w h i c h  m a y  r e q u i r e  d i f f e r e n t  n e g o t i a t i n g  a p p r o a c h e s  a n d  a r e  a l s o  s u b j e c t s  
o f  v a r io u s  k i n d s  o f  m u l t i l a t e r a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  M u l t i l a t e r a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  w o u l d  o f  c o u r s e  r e d u c e  t h e  v a lu e  
o f  f r e e  t r a d e  a c c e s s  u n d e r  W H F T A .
T h e  i n h e r e n t  i n e q u a l i t y  in  e c o n o m i c  w e i g h t  b e tw e e n  N o r t h  A m e r i c a  a n d  L A C  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  f r o m  
t h e  L A C  c o u n t r i e s ’ p o i n t  o f  v i e w  i t  is  p r e f e r a b le  t o  h a v e  a s  m u c h  a s  p o s s ib l e  o f  t h e  a c tu a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
t a k e  p l a c e  a f t e r  t h e y  h a v e  d e f in e d  a  c o m m o n  r e g io n a l  p o s i t i o n ,  w h e r e a s  t h e  U .S .  m i g h t  p r e f e r  t o  n e g o t i a t e  
b i l a t e r a l l y  o r  i n d iv i d u a l l y  w i t h  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  s u b r e g io n a l  g r o u p s .  T h u s ,  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  p r o p e r  
f r a m e w o r k  f o r  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a c q u i r e s  g r e a t  s u b s ta n t iv e  im p o r t a n c e .  T h e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  b e tw e e n  W H F T A  
a n d  e x i s t i n g  r e g io n a l  g r o u p i n g s  in  L a t in  A m e r ic a  is  a  m i r r o r  i m a g e  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  b e tw e e n  W H F T A  
a n d  t h e  M T S .  I n  b o t h  c a s e s  t h e  l e s s e r  l e v e l  o f  c o o p e r a t i o n — r e g io n a l  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  g r o u p i n g s  in  
r e l a t i o n  t o  W H F T A  a n d  W H F T A  in  r e l a t i o n  t o  g lo b a l  t r a d e  l ib e r a l i z a t io n — c a n  b e  e i t h e r  a  s t e p p in g  s to n e  
o r  a  s t u m b l i n g  b lo c k .
P e r h a p s ,  a f t e r  a  s u c c e s s f u l  c o n c lu s io n  a n d  f u l l  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  a  s a t i s f a c to r y  W H F T A ,  e x i s t i n g  
s u b r e g i o n a l  g r o u p i n g s  in  L a t in  A m e r i c a  m a y  b e c o m e  le s s  i m p o r t a n t .  H o w e v e r ,  t h a t  d a y  l i e s  f a r  i n  t h e  
f u t u r e  a n d  t h e  W H F T A  p r o p o s a l  w o u l d  g iv e  r e g io n a l  g r o u p i n g s  a d d i t i o n a l  im p o r t a n c e ,  b o t h  a s  a  
m e c h a n i s m  o f  n e g o t i a t i o n  to  im p r o v e  w h a t  is  e s s e n t i a l l y  a n  i n f e r i o r  b a r g a i n in g  p o s i t i o n  a n d  a l s o  a s  a  
r e a s s u r a n c e  o r  f a l l b a c k  p o s i t i o n  a g a i n s t  f a i l u r e  o r  d e la y s  in  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  W H F T A .
L e s s o n s  f r o m  t h e  C U S F T A  a n d  N A F T A
E x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  t h e  C U S F T A  s h o w s  t h a t  e v e n  in  t h e  b e s t  o f  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a n d  w i t h  g o o d w i l l  o n  
b o t h  s id e s  a n  F T A  d o e s  n o t  r e s o l v e  a l l  t r a d e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  b e tw e e n  t h e  p a r tn e r s .  T h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  c u r r e n t  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  a n d  t e n s i o n s  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e i r  n a tu r e  a r e  i n s t r u c t i v e  f o r  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  w h e n  t h e y  c o n te m p la t e  
t h e  c o m i n g  W H F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  T h e  e x i s te n c e  o f  d i f f i c u l t i e s  y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  t h e  C U S F T A  
a n d  o v e r  a  t h i r d  o f  t h e  w a y  t o w a r d  th e  b e n c h m a r k  o f  1 9 9 8  f o r  t h e  e l i m in a t io n  o f  a l l  c u s t o m s  t a r i f f s  
d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h e  g r e a t  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  a n  e f f e c t i v e  a g r e e m e n t  o n  t r a d e - d i s p u te  s e t t l e m e n t .  T h i s  w i l l  n o t  
b e  e a s y  to  r e c o n c i l e  w i t h  t h e  i m p l i c i t  u n i l a t e r a l i s m  o f  s u c h  U .S .  t r a d e  l e g i s l a t i o n  a s  S e c t io n  3 0 1  a n d  c la im  
t o  d e t e r m i n e  in ju r y  t o  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c e r s  u n i l a t e r a l l y  r a th e r  t h a n  s u b m i t  t o  G A T T  p r o c e d u r e s  o r  d e a l  w i t h  
d i s p u t e s  b y  n e g o t i a t e d  t r e a ty .  ( T h e  p r o b le m  m a y  a l s o  a p p ly  in  r e v e r s e  i f  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  w i s h  t o  p r e v e n t  
i n ju r y  t o  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c e r s  f r o m  c h e a p  U .S .  im p o r t s . )  T o  a v o id  f u t u r e  d i s a p p o in t m e n t s  a n d  f r i c t i o n ,  t h i s  
m a t t e r  s h o u l d  b e  c l e a r l y  s e t t l e d  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  W H F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  T h e r e  a r e  a l r e a d y  p r e c e d e n t s  f o r  t h e  
t a r g e t i n g  o f  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  b y  3 0 1  a n d  S u p e r - 3 0 1  a c t i o n s  b y  t h e  U .S .  B e tw e e n  1 9 8 0  a n d  1 9 8 5 ,  o u t  o f  2 5 2  
c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  d u t i e s  i n i t i a t e d  b y  th e  U .S . ,  51  ( 2 0  p e r c e n t )  w e r e  a g a i n s t  B r a z i l  a n d  M e x i c o . 12 T h e  
C U S F T A  e x p e r i e n c e  a n d  t h e  N A F T A  p r o v i d e  a  h o p e f u l  m o d e l  o f  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  
b i n a t i o n a l  p r o c e d u r e s  t h a t  c o u ld  b e  r e a d i ly  e x te n d e d  to  W H F T A .
11. See Erzan and Yeats, op. cit., p. 29.
12. P aolo B ifani, "International trade from the 1980s to the 1990s: the Latin American perspective," IDS Bulletin, 
January 1990, p. 80.
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T h e  n a tu r e  o f  t h e  t e n s io n s  b e tw e e n  t h e  U .S .  a n d  C a n a d a  is  a l s o  i n s t r u c t i v e  i n  a n o th e r  s e n s e .  F o r  
e x a m p l e ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  d i s p u t e  o v e r  a  r u l i n g  t h a t  a u to m o b i l e s  a s s e m b le d  in  C a n a d a  f a i l e d  t o  m e e t  t h e  lo c a l -  
c o n te n t  r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  d u t y - f r e e  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  U .S .  u n d e r  t h e  F T A .  T h e  d e f in i t i o n  o f  l o c a l  c o n t e n t  a n d  
t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  r u l e s  o f  o r i g in  a r e  n o t o r io u s ly  t h o r n y  q u e s t io n s .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  W H F T A ,  t h e r e  w i l l  
b e  t h e  a d d e d  p r o b l e m  o f  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  o r i g in  w i l l  b e  d e te r m i n e d  o n  a  p u r e ly  n a t i o n a l  a n d  b i l a t e r a l  
b a s i s  ( s a y ,  g o o d s  f r o m  B r a z i l  a d m i t t e d  d u t y - f r e e  t o  t h e  U .S .  i f  t h e y  s a t i s f y  a  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  5 0  p e r c e n t  
B r a z i l i a n  o r i g in )  o r  o n  a  h e m i s p h e r i c  b a s i s ,  s a y ,  B r a z i l i a n  g o o d s  a d m i t t e d  d u ty - f r e e  a s  l o n g  a s  5 0  p e r c e n t  
o r  m o r e  o r i g i n a t e s  i n  t h e  W e s te r n  H e m is p h e r e .  O n e  w o u l d  im a g i n e  t h a t  i n  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  a  W H F T A  t h e  
l a t t e r  w o u l d  b e  t h e  r u l e .  T h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  r u l e s  o f  o r i g in  a n d  lo c a l  c o n te n t  w o u l d  b e  e s p e c i a l l y  
i m p o r t a n t  t o  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  in  a  W H F T A  s i n c e  o n e  o f  t h e  m a in  a d v a n t a g e s  o f  W H F T A  t o  t h e m  w o u l d  
b e  t h e  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t  f r o m  o u t s i d e  t h e  h e m i s p h e r e  t o  t a k e  a d v a n t a g e  b o t h  o f  l o w e r  w a g e s  
a n d  o f  f r e e  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  N o r t h  A m e r i c a n  m a r k e t .  S in c e  m a n y  o f  t h e s e  i n v e s tm e n t s  w o u l d  h a v e  a n  
a s s e m b l y  e l e m e n t  a n d  b e  b a s e d  o n  g lo b a l  c o m p o n e n t s ,  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  l o c a l  o r i g in  b e c o m e s  
e s p e c i a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  a n d  e s p e c i a l l y  i m p o r t a n t .
D i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  t h e  C U S F T A  c o n c e r n in g  C a n a d i a n  l u m b e r  e x p o r t s  a r e  a l s o  i n s t r u c t i v e  a s  a  s ig n a l  
o f  p r o b l e m s  t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d ,  a n d  i f  p o s s ib l e  a n t i c ip a te d .  T h e  U .S .  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  C o m m e r c e  i m p o s e d  
a  t a r i f f  o n  C a n a d i a n  l u m b e r  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  C a n a d i a n  s a w m i l l s  a r e  s u b s id i z e d  b y  c u r b s  o n  e x p o r t s  o f  
l o g s .  U n d e r  a  W H F T A ,  L A C  c o u n t r i e s  w o u l d  n a tu r a l l y  b e  k e e n  to  in c r e a s e  t h e  v a lu e  o f  t h e i r  e x p o r t s  b y  
u p g r a d in g  t h e i r  p r i m a r y  c o m m o d i t y  e x p o r t s  t h r o u g h  a d d i t i o n a l  p r o c e s s in g .  I n  t h e  i n te r e s t s  o f  t h i s  n a tu r a l  
d e v e l o p m e n t  s t r a t e g y  t h e y  m i g h t  w i s h  t o  c u r b  e x p o r t s  o f  p r i m a r y  c o m m o d i t i e s  in  c r u d e ,  u n p r o c e s s e d  f o r m .  
W o u ld  t h i s  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a n  u n f a i r  s u b s id y  t o  p r o c e s s o r s  t o  b e  m e t  b y  a  t a r i f f  o r  o t h e r  i m p o r t  c o n s t r a i n t s  
u n d e r  a  W H F T A ?
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B E Y O N D  N A F T A :
E M P L O Y M E N T ,  G R O W T H ,  A N D  I N C O M E - D I S T R I B U T I O N  E F F E C T S  
O F  A  W E S T E R N  H E M I S P H E R E  F R E E  T R A D E  A R E A
R o b e r t  A .  B l e c k e r  
W i l l i a m  E .  S p r i g g s
I n t r o d u c t i o n
N e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  a  N o r t h  A m e r i c a n  F r e e  T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t  ( N A F T A )  t o  l i n k  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  
M e x i c o ,  a n d  C a n a d a  h a d  n o t  e v e n  s t a r t e d  w h e n  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a  b r o a d e r  W e s t e r n  
H e m i s p h e r e  F r e e  T r a d e  A r e a  ( W H F T A )  b e g a n  t o  b e  h e a r d .  F o r m e r  U . S .  P r e s i d e n t  G e o r g e  B u s h  
q u i c k l y  e n d o r s e d  t h e  i d e a  w i t h  t h e  E n t e r p r i s e  f o r  t h e  A m e r i c a s  I n i t i a t i v e  ( E A I ) .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  h o w e v e r ,  
h e m i s p h e r e - w i d e  i n t e g r a t i o n  t o o k  a  b a c k  s e a t  w h i l e  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  o f  t h e  N A F T A  w a s  u n d e r  w a y .
I n  t h e  m e a n t im e ,  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  a  f a r - r e a c h i n g  d e b a t e  o v e r  t h e  l i k e l y  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  t h e  
N A F T A  f o r  t h e  t h r e e  m e m b e r  c o u n t r i e s .  I n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h i s  d e b a t e ,  i t  h a s  f r e q u e n t l y  b e e n  o b s e r v e d  
t h a t  t h e  N A F T A  w i l l  l a r g e l y  e x t e n d  a n d  d e e p e n  a  p r o c e s s  o f  U . S . - M e x i c a n  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  t h a t  
w a s  a l r e a d y  t a k i n g  p l a c e .  M e x i c o  h a s  m a d e  a  p h e n o m e n a l  o p e n in g  t o  f o r e i g n  t r a d e  a n d  i n v e s tm e n t  in  
t h e  p r e v i o u s  f i v e  y e a r s ,  a  r e v e r s a l  o f  7 0  y e a r s  o f  e f f o r t s  t o  d e v e l o p  a u to n o m o u s l y .  M e x i c o  h a s  
a l r e a d y  a c q u i r e d  a n  u n p r e c e d e n t e d  i m p o r t a n c e  i n  U . S .  f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t  a n d  in  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
e m p l o y m e n t  g e n e r a t e d  b y  U . S .  f i r m s .
F o r  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  e v e n  t h o u g h  p r e c i s e  p r e d i c t i o n s  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  m a k e  ( a n d  t o  b e l i e v e ) ,  i t  is  
p o s s i b l e  t o  i n f e r  h o w  t h e  N A F T A  i s  l i k e l y  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  M e x i c a n  e c o n o m i e s  b y  
e x t r a p o l a t i n g  f r o m  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  o n g o i n g  i n t e g r a t i o n  p r o c e s s  b e t w e e n  t h e m . 1 O f  c o u r s e ,  i t  w o u l d  
b e  n a i v e  s i m p ly  t o  p r o j e c t  e x i s t i n g  t r e n d s  i n to  t h e  f u t u r e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  w h e n  b o t h  e c o n o m i e s  a r e  
u n d e r g o i n g  p r o f o u n d  s t r u c t u r a l  c h a n g e s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  w e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  a n y  s e r i o u s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  
N A F T A  m u s t  b e g i n  w i t h  a n  a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  h o w  U . S . - M e x i c a n  i n t e g r a t i o n  h a d  a l r e a d y  a f f e c te d  b o t h  
n a t i o n s ’ e c o n o m i e s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  b y  m a k i n g  f o r e c a s t s  d e r iv e d  f r o m  t h e o r e t i c a l  m o d e l s  o f  t r a d e  
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . 2
F r o m  t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  t h e  b e s t  w a y  t o  l o o k  a t  t h e  N A F T A  ( a t  l e a s t  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  
M e x i c o )  i s  a s  an opportunity to regulate and manage a process that is already going on a n d  w h i c h  is  
p r o b a b l y  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  s to p  a l t o g e th e r .  T h e  i s s u e  w a s  n o t  whether t h e  U . S .  a n d  M e x i c o  w o u l d  
b e c o m e  m o r e  t i e d  t o g e t h e r  e c o n o m i c a l l y ,  b u t  how t h e y  w o u l d  b e  c o n n e c t e d ,  a n d  h o w  t h e  c o s t s  a n d  
b e n e f i t s  o f  i n t e g r a t i o n  w o u l d  b e  d i s t r i b u t e d  a m o n g  d i f f e r e n t  g r o u p s  i n  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  a n d ,  b y  
e x t e n s i o n ,  i n  C a n a d a  a s  w e l l .  U p  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t ,  t h e  m o b i l i t y  o f  c a p i t a l  h a s  a l r e a d y  f a r  o u t s t r i p p e d  
t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  l a b o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  l o c a l  c o m m u n i t i e s ,  o r  n a t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t s  t o  r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  
c h a l l e n g e s  t h a t  m o b i l i t y  p o s e s .  I t  i s  c l e a r  f r o m  t h e  t e x t  o f  t h e  N A F T A  t h a t  i t s  m a i n  i n t e n t i o n  is  t o
1. It is  som ew hat harder to draw inferences about the likely  effects o f  the N A F T A  on  Canada, since (as w ill 
be show n b elow ) C anadian-M exican trade is still m inuscule. S ince the present authors’ concern is  principally  
w ith  the U .S . and M ex ico , w e  w ill focus largely on  those tw o countries.
2 . See Stanford (1992 ) for a critique o f  theoretically based m odels o f  U .S .-M ex ica n  trade liberalization and 
the N A F T A .
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e x te n d  t h e  status quo b y  g i v i n g  g r e a t e r  p r o t e c t i o n s  a n d  i n c e n t iv e s  t o  f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t  i n  M e x i c o ,  
w i t h  l e s s  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  n o n e  f o r  l a b o r  r i g h t s  o r  s t a n d a r d s .
T h i s  p a p e r  d r a w s  l a r g e l y  o n  w h a t  t h e  a u th o r s  l e a r n e d  f r o m  t h e  d e b a t e  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  
a n d  t o  a  l e s s e r  e x t e n t  f r o m  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  i n  M e x ic o  a n d  C a n a d a ,  a b o u t  t h e  p r o b a b l e  e f f e c t s  o f  
N A F T A ,  in  o r d e r  t o  o f f e r  s o m e  h y p o t h e s e s  a b o u t  t h e  p r o b a b l e  e f f e c t s  o f  a  W e s t e r n  H e m i s p h e r e  F r e e  
T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t  ( W H F T A ) .  W h i l e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  N A F T A  c a n  p r o c e e d  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  o n g o i n g  
t r e n d s ,  a n a l y s i s  o f  a  W H F T A  is  i m p e d e d  b y  t h e  m u c h  l o w e r  d e g r e e  o f  e x i s t i n g  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  
b e t w e e n  t h e  U . S .  ( o r  N o r t h  A m e r i c a  a s  a  w h o l e )  a n d  m o s t  o f  S o u t h  A m e r i c a .  O n l y  i n  c e r t a i n  p a r t s  
o f  C e n t r a l  A m e r i c a  a n d  t h e  C a r i b b e a n  d o e s  t h e  e x i s t i n g  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  U . S .  r e s e m b l e  
t h a t  w i t h  M e x i c o ,  a n d  t h e s e  r e g i o n s  a r e  a l r e a d y  p a r t  o f  a  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r a d i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  
U . S .  u n d e r  t h e  C a r i b b e a n  B a s i n  I n i t i a t i v e  ( C B I ) .
M o s t  o f  t h e  n a t i o n s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a n d  t h e  C a r i b b e a n  ( L A C )  h a v e  i n c r e a s e d  t h e i r  
i n t e g r a t i o n  in to  t h e  w o r l d  t r a d i n g  s y s te m  in  t h e  p a s t  d e c a d e .  M o s t  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  n a t i o n s  h a v e  
r e d u c e d  t h e i r  t r a d e  a n d  i n v e s tm e n t  b a r r i e r s  s i n c e  t h e  d e b t  c r i s i s  o f  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 8 0 s .  T r a d e  a n d  
i n v e s tm e n t  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  m e a s u r e s  h a v e  b e e n  a d o p te d  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  “ s t r u c t u r a l  a d ju s tm e n t  p o l i c i e s ” 
p r o m o t e d  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  g o v e r n m e n t  a lo n g  w i t h  t h e  I M F ,  t h e  W o r l d  B a n k ,  a n d  o t h e r  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  p e r c e iv e d  f a i l u r e  o f  p a s t  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c i e s .  B u t  m o s t  
o f  t h e s e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  m e a s u r e s  h a v e  t r a d e  a n d  c a p i t a l  f l o w s  w i t h  a l l  n a t i o n s — n o t  j u s t  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s .  ( M e x i c o ’ s  t r a d e  a n d  i n v e s tm e n t  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  in  t h e  l a t e  1 9 8 0 s  w a s  a l s o  u n i l a t e r a l ,  b u t  
M e x i c o ’s  p r o x i m i t y  t o  t h e  U . S .  m a r k e t  l e d  t o  a  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  n e w  t r a d e  a n d  i n v e s tm e n t  f l o w s  
in  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n . )  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  m o v in g  t o w a r d  a  W H F T A  w o u l d  b e  l e s s  o f  a n  e x t e n s i o n  o f  
o n g o i n g  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  m e a s u r e s ,  a n d  m o r e  o f  a  s h i f t  f r o m  u n i l a t e r a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  t o  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r a d e  
a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  f o r  t h e  n a t i o n s  o f  S o u th  A m e r i c a ,  a s  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  M e x i c o  o r  t h e  C a r i b b e a n  a n d  
C e n t r a l  A m e r i c a n  n a t i o n s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  C B I .3 W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  S o u t h  A m e r i c a  e s p e c i a l l y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a d o p t  a  c o m p a r a t i v e  p e r s p e c t i v e  i n  o r d e r  t o  g a in  i n s i g h t s  i n to  t h e  d e g r e e  t o  w h i c h  i t  
w o u l d  o r  w o u l d  n o t  f o l l o w  t h e  M e x i c a n  m o d e l  a f t e r  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a  W H F T A .
T h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  p a p e r  w i l l  e x a m i n e  r e c e n t  t r e n d s  in  U n i t e d  S t a t e s - M e x i c a n  t r a d e ,  e m p l o y m e n t ,  
a n d  i n v e s tm e n t  r e l a t i o n s  a s  p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  a  c o m p a r a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  o f  h e m i s p h e r i c  i n t e g r a t i o n .  I t  w i l l  
m o v e  f r o m  g o o d s  m a r k e t s  t o  l a b o r  m a r k e t s  t o  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s .  T r e n d s  i n  e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  
t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  a m o n g  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  r e g io n s  o f  t h e  w e s t e r n  h e m i s p h e r e  a r e  t h e  t o p i c  o f  
s e c t i o n  t w o .  S e c t i o n  t h r e e  c o n ta i n s  a n  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  o p e n in g  u p  o f  t r a d e  o n  e m p l o y ­
m e n t ,  w a g e s ,  a n d  i n c o m e  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  S e c t i o n  f o u r  e x a m i n e s  c a p i t a l  f l o w s  a n d  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b o t h  i n  t h e  w e s t e r n  h e m i s p h e r e  a n d  b e tw e e n  i t  a n d  o t h e r  r e g i o n s .  I n  e a c h  c a s e ,  t h e  
d i s c u s s i o n  s t a r t s  f r o m  t h e  m o r e  f a m i l i a r  t e r r i t o r y  o f  U . S . - M e x i c a n  r e l a t i o n s  a n d  t h e n  a s s e s s e s  h o w  
w e l l  c o n c l u s i o n s  a b o u t  t h o s e  r e l a t i o n s  c a n  b e  g e n e r a l i z e d  a n d  a p p l i e d  t o  o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  t h e  h e m i s p h e r e .  
F i n a l l y ,  i n  s e c t i o n  f i v e  t h e  a u th o r s  d r a w  c o n c l u s i o n s  a b o u t  p o l i c i e s  f o r  m a n a g i n g  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  
h e m i s p h e r i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  b a s e d  o n  t h e  c o n c e r n s  e l a b o r a t e d  in  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  p a p e r .  T h e  i n t e n t io n  
t h r o u g h o u t  i s  n o t  t o  r e a c h  d e f i n i t i v e  c o n c l u s i o n s  b u t  t o  r a i s e  q u e s t io n s  t h a t  n e e d  t o  b e  d e a l t  w i t h  b y  a ll  
w h o  a r e  s e r i o u s l y  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  t h i s  p r o c e s s .
3 . T he authors are indebted to H . W . Singer for suggesting this point.
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2 .  G o o d s  M a r k e t s :  D e v e l o p m e n t a l  D i f f e r e n c e s  a n d  T r a d e  F l o w s
B a s i c  I n d i c a t o r s  o f  D e v e l o p m e n t
T h i s  s e c t i o n  b e g in s  b y  e x a m i n in g  s o m e  s t a n d a r d  “ d e v e l o p m e n t  i n d i c a t o r s ”  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s ,  C a n a d a ,  a n d  M e x i c o ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t o t a l s  f o r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  ( i n c l u d i n g  M e x i c o )  a n d  t h e  C a r i b b e ­
a n  ( L A C ) ,  s h o w n  in  T a b l e  1 . M o s t  s t r i k i n g  a r e  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  h o w  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  c o m p a r e  
i n  t e r m s  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  v e r s u s  i n c o m e .  M e x i c o  h a s  a b o u t  o n e  t h i r d  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  U . S .  ( b a s e d  
o n  1 9 9 0  f i g u r e s )  a n d  i s  p r o j e c t e d  t o  h a v e  n e a r l y  h a l f  t h e  U . S .  p o p u l a t i o n  b y  2 0 2 5 ;  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a s  a  
w h o l e  h a s  t h r e e  q u a r t e r s  m o r e  p e o p l e  t h a n  t h e  U . S .  t o d a y  a n d  is  e x p e c te d  to  h a v e  m o r e  t h a n  d o u b l e  
t h e  U . S .  p o p u l a t i o n  b y  2 0 2 5 .  Y e t  M e x i c o  h a s  b a r e l y  4 . 4 %  o f  t h e  G D P  o f  t h e  U . S . ,  a n d  a l l  o f  L a t i n  
A m e r i c a  c o m b i n e d  h a s  l e s s  t h a n  o n e  f i f th  o f  t h e  U . S .  G D P .  T h e  p e r - c a p i t a  i n c o m e  ( G N P )  o f  a l l  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a  is  j u s t  o n e  t e n t h  o f  t h e  U . S . ,  a n d  M e x i c o ’s  is  a b o u t  o n e  n i n t h  t h a t  o f  t h e  U . S .
T h e s e  f i g u r e s  s h o u l d  p r o m p t  s k e p t i c i s m  a b o u t  t h e  a l l e g e d  e n o r m o u s  m a r k e t  t h a t  t h e  N A F T A  
o r  t h e  W H F T A  w o u l d  c r e a t e  f o r  U . S .  b u s i n e s s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i t  is  o f t e n  c la i m e d  t h a t  t h e  N A F T A  
c r e a t e d  a  $ 6 - t r i l l i o n  e c o n o m y .  B u t  9 6 %  o f  t h a t  e c o n o m y  a l r e a d y  e x i s t s  i n  t h e  U . S . - C a n a d a  F T A ,  a n d  
8 7 %  o f  i t  i s  i n  t h e  U . S .  a lo n e ;  o n l y  4 %  is  g a in e d  b y  a d d in g  M e x i c o .  W i t h  M e x i c o  in c l u d e d ,  t h e  
t h r e e  N A F T A  c o u n t r i e s  h a d  a  t o t a l  G D P  o f  $ 6 . 2  t r i l l i o n  i n  1 9 9 0 ;  w i t h o u t  a d d i n g  o n  M e x i c o ,  t h e  U . S .  
a n d  C a n a d a  t o g e t h e r  a l r e a d y  h a d  a  c o m b i n e d  G D P  o f  $ 6 . 0  t r i l l i o n .  A n d  m o s t  o f  t h e  M e x i c a n  
c o n s u m e r s  w h o  w i l l  b e  a d d e d  o n  a r e  m u c h  p o o r e r  t h a n  t h o s e  o f  t h e  U . S .  a n d  C a n a d a .  W i t h  p e r -  
c a p i t a  i n c o m e  o n e  n i n t h  o f  t h e  U . S .  l e v e l ,  a n d  g r e a t e r  i n e q u a l i t y ,  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  a v e r a g e  M e x i c a n  
f a m i l y  t o  p u r c h a s e  e x p o r t e d  U . S .  c o n s u m e r  g o o d s  m u s t  b e  q u i t e  m in i m a l .  T h e  p i c t u r e  c h a n g e s  o n ly  
s l i g h t l y  i f  w e  s h i f t  t h e  f o c u s  t o  a  W H F T A .  T h e  U . S .  a lo n e  w o u l d  c o n s t i t u t e  7 7 %  o f  a  W H F T A ,  a n d  
t h e  U . S .  a n d  C a n a d a  t o g e t h e r  w o u l d  m a k e  u p  8 5 % .  T h e  o t h e r  15  p e r c e n t  w o u l d  b e  c o m p o s e d  o f  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a n s  w h o ,  w h i l e  m o r e  n u m e r o u s ,  a r e  a l s o  m u c h  p o o r e r  o n  a v e r a g e  t h a n  t h e i r  N o r t h  
A m e r i c a n  c o u s i n s  ( a n d  e v e n ,  o n  a v e r a g e ,  p o o r e r  t h a n  m o s t  M e x i c a n s ) .
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e e  a priori h o w  a d d in g  a  r e l a t i v e ly  s m a l l  a n d  i m p o v e r i s h e d  m a r k e t  c o u ld  g i v e  
t h e  U . S .  s i g n i f i c a n t  a g g r e g a t e  g a in s  f r o m  t r a d e ,  e i t h e r  s t a t i c  o r  d y n a m i c ,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  w h e t h e r  o n e  
a s s u m e s  a  m o d e l  b a s e d  o n  c o n s t a n t  o r  i n c r e a s in g  r e t u r n s  t o  s c a le .  O f  c o u r s e ,  t h e r e  c o u ld  b e  l a r g e  
g a in s  i n  s p e c i f i c  s e c t o r s  t h a t  h a v e  s i g n i f i c a n t  e x p o r t s  t o  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  ( w h ic h  c o u ld  b e  e x p e c te d  t o  b e  
m a i n l y  p r o d u c e r  g o o d s  s e c t o r s ) ,  a s  w e l l  a s  l a r g e  l o s s e s  i n  s p e c i f i c  s e c t o r s  t h a t  c o m p e t e  w i t h  i m p o r t s  
f r o m  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .
A t  f i r s t  g l a n c e ,  t h e r e  a p p e a r  t o  b e  e n o r m o u s  p o t e n t i a l  g a in s  f o r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  
f r o m  i m p r o v e d  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  v a s t  U n i t e d  S t a t e s - C a n a d a  c o n s u m e r  m a r k e t .  B u t  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h a t  
p o t e n t i a l  d e p e n d s  o n  m a n y  f a c t o r s .  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ’s  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  e x p o r t  g a in s  w i l l  d e p e n d  h e a v i l y  o n  
t h e  g r o w t h  o f  t h e  U . S .  m a r k e t  i n  t h e  n e x t  d e c a d e .  T h e  U . S .  m a r k e t ’s  g r o w t h ,  f a i r l y  r a p i d  i n  t h e  
1 9 8 0 s ,  w a s  l a r g e l y  f u e le d  b y  u n s u s t a i n a b l e  d e f i c i t  s p e n d i n g  a n d  r i s i n g  d e b t — m u c h  l i k e  t h a t  o f  L a t i n  
A m e r i c a  i n  t h e  1 9 7 0 s .  T h e  1 9 9 0 s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  a  d e c a d e  o f  s l o w e r  g r o w t h  in  t h e  U . S .  e c o n o m y ,  
g i v e n  t h e  s l u g g i s h  r e c o v e r y  f r o m  t h e  1 9 9 0 - 9 1  r e c e s s i o n  a n d  t h e  c o n t r a c t i o n a r y  e f f e c t s  o f  P r e s i d e n t  
C l i n t o n ’s  i n i t i a t i v e s  f o r  r e d u c i n g  t h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t ’s  b u d g e t  d e f i c i t .  T h e  q u e s t io n  o f  t h e  
p r o s p e c t s  f o r  U . S .  m a r k e t  g r o w t h  w i l l  b e  r e v i s i t e d  i n  s e c t i o n  4 ,  b e l o w .  I t  i s  w o r t h  m e n t i o n i n g  h e r e ,  
h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  i f  t h e  U . S .  m a r k e t  d o e s  n o t  g r o w  r a p i d l y ,  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  g a i n  o n l y  to  
t h e  e x t e n t  t h e y  c a n  t a k e  m a r k e t  s h a r e s  a w a y  f r o m  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t  E a s t  A s i a n  c o m p e t i t o r s .  W h i l e  t h e  
t r a d e  p r e f e r e n c e s  u n d e r  a  W H F T A  w o u l d  h e l p ,  t h i s  w o u l d  s t i l l  b e  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  m a n y  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n
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T a b l e  1
B a s i c  D e v e l o p m e n t  I n d i c a to r s  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  
C a n a d a ,  M e x i c o ,  a n d  L A C
U . S . C a n a d a M e x i c o L A C
P o p u l a t i o n  ( m i l l io n s )
1 9 9 0 2 5 0 2 7 8 6 4 3 3
2 0 2 5  ( p r o j e c t e d ) 3 0 7 3 2 1 4 2 6 9 9
P o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h ,  a v e r a g e  
a n n u a l  p e r c e n t a g e  r a t e
1 9 8 0 - 1 9 9 0 0 . 9 % 1 .0 % 2 .0 % 2 . 1 %
P r o j e c t e d ,  1 9 8 9 - 2 0 0 0 0 .8 % 0 .8 % 1 .8 % 1 .8 %
W o r k i n g - a g e  p o p u l a t i o n  
( 1 5 - 6 4  y e a r s ) ,  i n  m i l l i o n s
1 9 9 0 1 6 5 18 5 1 2 7 5
P r o j e c t e d ,  2 0 2 5 1 8 8 19 9 7 4 4 1
G r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t  
p e r  c a p i t a ,  1 9 9 0 ,  
i n  U . S .  d o l l a r s
2 1 , 7 9 0 2 0 , 4 7 0 2 , 4 9 0 2 , 1 8 0
G r o s s  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t  
( G D P ) ,  1 9 9 0 ,  i n  b i l l i o n s  
o f  U . S .  d o l l a r s
5 , 3 9 2 5 7 0 2 3 8 1 ,0 1 5
G r o w t h  o f  G D P ,  a v e r a g e  a n n u a l  
p e r c e n t a g e
1 9 6 5 - 1 9 8 0 2 .7 % 4 .8 % 6 .5 % 6 .0 %
1 9 8 0 - 1 9 9 0 3 .4 % 3 .4 % 1 .0 % 1 .6 %
N o te :  D a t a  f o r  L A C  i n c l u d e  M e x i c o .
S o u r c e :  W o r l d  B a n k ,  World Development Report 1992, W o r l d  D e v e l o p m e n t  I n d i c a t o r s  ( T a b l e s  1 , 2 ,  
3 ,  5 ,  a n d  2 6 ) ,  a n d  c a l c u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  a u th o r s .
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c o u n t r i e s  t o  a c h i e v e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h o s e  t h a t  h a v e  n o t  a l r e a d y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  th e m s e l v e s  a s  c o m p e t i t i v e  
e x p o r t e r s  o f  m a n u f a c t u r e d  p r o d u c t s .
W h i l e  t o t a l  p r o d u c t s  a n d  p e r  c a p i t a  i n c o m e s  a r e  t h e  m o s t  r e l e v a n t  i n d i c a t o r s  o f  l i k e l y  g a in s  
f r o m  t r a d e ,  p o p u l a t i o n  a n d  d e m o g r a p h i c  d a t a  a r e  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  i n d i c a to r s  o f  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  
f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  i n v e s tm e n t  ( F D I )  b y  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  ( M N C s ) .  N o t e  e s p e c i a l l y  t h a t  M e x i c o ’s 
w o r k i n g - a g e  p o p u l a t i o n  ( 1 5 - 6 4  y e a r s )  i s  p r o j e c t e d  n e a r l y  t o  d o u b l e  i n  t h e  n e x t  3 5  y e a r s  ( 1 9 9 0 - 2 0 2 5 ) ,  
w i t h  a n  i n c r e a s e  o f  4 6  m i l l i o n  w o r k e r s  o v e r  t h e  e x i s t i n g  5 1  m i l l i o n .  T h i s  i s  a n  i n c r e a s e  o f  m o r e  t h a n  
o n e  m i l l i o n  w o r k e r s  p e r  y e a r ,  a n d  i t  m e a n s  t h a t  t h e  M e x i c a n  w o r k  f o r c e  w i l l  l e a p  f r o m  l e s s  t h a n  o n e  
t h i r d  o f  t h e  U . S .  w o r k  f o r c e  t o d a y  t o  o v e r  h a l f  i n  j u s t  o n e  g e n e r a t i o n .
E v e n  t h e  h i g h e s t  e s t im a te s  o f  t h e  e m p l o y m e n t - c r e a t i o n  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  N A F T A  f o r  M e x i c o  
s h o w  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  n o t  s u f f i c e  t o  a b s o r b  m o r e  t h a n  a  s m a l l  f r a c t i o n  o f  t h i s  p r o j e c t e d  i n c r e a s e  in  
M e x i c o ’s  l a b o r  f o r c e . 4 F o r  t h e  f o r e s e e a b l e  f u t u r e ,  t h e n ,  t h e  a s s u m p t io n  o f  a n  i n f in i t e l y  e l a s t i c  s u p p ly  
o f  l a b o r  a t  a  r e l a t i v e l y  c o n s t a n t  r e a l  w a g e  is  a  r e a s o n a b l e  f i r s t  a p p r o x i m a t i o n  f o r  M e x i c o .  T h i s  v a s t  
a n d  e v e r - e x p a n d i n g  s o u r c e  o f  c h e a p  l a b o r ,  a n d  n o t  t h e  l im i t e d  M e x i c a n  c o n s u m e r  m a r k e t ,  i s  w h a t  
e x c i t e s  A m e r i c a n  c o r p o r a t e  c a p i t a l  a b o u t  t h e  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  a  N A F T A .  B a s i c  e c o n o m i c  r e a s o n i n g  
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  g i v i n g  A m e r i c a n  f i r m s  g r e a t e r  a c c e s s  t o  s u c h  a  l a r g e  a n d  g r o w i n g  s u p p l y  o f  l a b o r  c a n n o t  
h e lp  b u t  d e p r e s s  w a g e s  f o r  A m e r i c a n  w o r k e r s . 5 T h e  n u m b e r s  a l s o  s u g g e s t  t h a t ,  e v e n  i f  s o m e  
M e x i c a n  w o r k e r s  g e t  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  j o b s  a t  t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  U . S .  w o r k e r s ,  a v e r a g e  M e x i c a n  r e a l  w a g e s  
a r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  r i s e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  f o r  a  l o n g  t i m e  t o  c o m e — e s p e c i a l l y  i f  M e x i c a n  w o r k e r s  h a v e  to  
c o m p e t e  w i t h  e v e n  l o w e r - w a g e  w o r k e r s  f r o m  o t h e r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  i n  a  W H F T A .  A n d  
f i n a l l y ,  t h e s e  n u m b e r s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  N A F T A  w i l l  h a r d l y  m a k e  a  d e n t  i n  t h e  p r o s p e c t i v e  i n f lu x  o f  
M e x i c a n  ( o r  o t h e r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n )  m ig r a n t s  t o  t h e  U . S .  i n  t h e  n e x t  f e w  d e c a d e s .  T a k i n g  a c c o u n t  o f  
t h e s e  d e m o g r a p h i c  t r e n d s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  d i s r u p t i o n s  t o  p e a s a n t  a g r i c u l t u r e  c a u s e d  b y  t h e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  
o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  t r a d e , 6 t h e  m i g r a t i o n  p r o b l e m  m a y  w e l l  w o r s e n  r a t h e r  t h a n  i m p r o v e  f o l lo w in g  t h e  
a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  N A F T A  i f  i t  i s  n o t  a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  d o m e s t i c  p o l i c i e s  t o  d e a l  w i t h  r i s i n g  s t r u c tu r a l  
u n e m p l o y m e n t  i n  M e x i c o .
4 . T h is conclusion  is  based on a survey o f  m odels w hich  generally show  favorable effects o f  the N A F T A  on  
M exican  em ploym ent in  the U .S . International Trade C om m ission  (U SIT C ), Economy-Wide Modeling of the 
Economic Implications of a FTA with Mexico and a NAFTA with Canada and Mexico, R eport on Investigation  
N o . 3 3 2 -3 1 7 , U SIT C  Publication 2 5 1 6 , W ashington, D C , M ay 1992. In this survey, the highest estim ate o f  the 
increase in  M exican em ploym ent is  a once-and-for-all gain  o f  6 .6% , based on  the Bachrach-M izrahi (P olicy  
E conom ics Group o f  KPM G  Peat M arw ick) m odel w ith  additional capital invested  in  M exico  (none o f  w hich  is 
assum ed to displace capital w hich  w ould  have been invested in  the U .S .) . S ince the M exican labor force is  
projected to grow  by  1.85%  per year from  1990-2025 , or 90% over a 35-year period, even  this h ighly  
optim istic estim ate w ou ld  provide jo b s  for on ly  a few  years’ net entrants into the M exican labor force. M ost o f  
the estim ates o f  the change in  M exican em ploym ent from  the m odels surveyed by  the U SIT C  are m uch sm aller. 
One other m odel (Sobarzo) im plies em ploym ent gains in  the range o f  5 .1  to 5 .8% ; the other estim ates range 
from  —0.9%  over ten years in on e version  o f  C lopper A lm on ’s m odel to + 2 .4 %  in one version  o f  R oland- 
H olst et al. ( o f  the U SIT C  Research Staff). A lm on ’s m odel is  the on ly  dynam ic one; all the others are static.
5 . On th is point see  the com pelling analysis o f  Learner (1992).
6 . T his problem  has been  em phasized in the studies by L evy  and van W ijnbergen and by R obinson et al. in  
U SIT C  (1 9 9 2 ), as w ell as b y  H inojosa-O jeda and R obinson (1992 ).
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T r a d e  T r e n d s
T a b l e  2  s h o w s  d a t a  o n  t h e  v a lu e ,  g r o w th ,  a n d  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  m e r c h a n d i s e  t r a d e  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a te s ,  C a n a d a ,  M e x i c o ,  a n d  o t h e r  L A C  c o u n t r i e s .  T h e  t o t a l  v a lu e  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ’ s t r a d e  ( e x p o r t s  
p l u s  i m p o r t s )  i s  a p p r o x im a t e ly  e q u a l  t o  t h a t  o f  C a n a d a ,  a  c o u n t r y  w i t h  o n e  s i x t e e n t h  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a  ( a n d  j u s t  o v e r  h a l f  t h e  G D P ) .  M e x i c o ’s  t o ta l  t r a d e  i s  o n l y  a b o u t  o n e  f i f th  o f  C a n a d a ’s. 
U .S .  t r a d e ,  n e a r l y  $ 9 0 0  b i l l i o n ,  d w a r f s  t h a t  o f  t h e  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .
I n  t e r m s  o f  g r o w t h  r a te s ,  t h e  m o s t  n o t a b l e  d i f f e r e n c e  is  t h a t  b e tw e e n  t h e  r a p id  g r o w t h  o f  U .S .  
a n d  C a n a d i a n  i m p o r t s  in  t h e  1 9 8 0 s  a n d  t h e  negative g r o w t h  o f  i m p o r t s  in  b o t h  M e x i c o  a n d  L a t in  
A m e r i c a  a s  a  w h o l e  d u r i n g  t h a t  d e c a d e .  W h e n  w e  c o n s i d e r  t h a t  t h e s e  a r e  g r o w t h  r a te s  o f  nominal 
i m p o r t  v a lu e s ,  t h e s e  n e g a t i v e  g r o w t h  r a te s  a r e  e v e n  m o r e  s t r i k in g .  T h e  d e p r e s s i o n  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  
d e m a n d  in  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  a  r e s u l t  o f  r i s i n g  i n te r e s t  r a te s ,  f a l l i n g  t e r m s  o f  t r a d e ,  t h e  d e b t  c r i s i s ,  a n d  
c o n t r a c t i o n a r y  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  p o l i c i e s ,  c l e a r l y  t o o k  a  t o l l  in  r e d u c i n g  t h e  c o n t i n e n t ’s a b i l i t y  t o  i m p o r t  
p r i m a r y  a n d  m a n u f a c t u r e d  g o o d s .
I t  is  s t r i k in g  t h a t  b o t h  M e x i c o  a n d  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a s  a  w h o l e  c o n t i n u e  to  r e ly  o n  p r i m a r y  
p r o d u c t s  f o r  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e i r  e x p o r t  r e v e n u e .  F o r  a l l  o f  L a t in  A m e r ic a ,  p r i m a r y  p r o d u c t s  a c c o u n t  
f o r  t w o  t h i r d s  ( 6 7 % )  o f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  e x p o r t s ,  a n d  e x c l u d i n g  M e x i c o  t h e  p r i m a r y  p r o d u c t  s h a r e  o f  o t h e r  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  i s  e v e n  h i g h e r  ( 7 0 % ) .  W h i l e  t h e s e  f i g u r e s  f o r  p r i m a r y  p r o d u c t s  i n c l u d e  o i l ,  
t h e  f a l l i n g  o i l  p r i c e s  o f  t h e  p o s t - 1 9 8 2  p e r io d  h a v e  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h a t  o i l  i s  n o  e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  p r o b l e m s  o f  v o l a t i l e  a n d  s o m e t i m e s  f a l l i n g  t e r m s  o f  t r a d e  f o r  p r i m a r y  c o m m o d i t y  e x p o r ts .  
F i g u r e  1 s h o w s  t h a t  t h e  t e r m s  o f  t r a d e  f o r  n o n - o i l  c o m m o d i ty  e x p o r t s  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  d e c l i n e d  
o v e r  t h e  p a s t  t h r e e  d e c a d e s  ( d e s p i t e  t h e  t e m p o r a r y  c o m m o d i ty  p r i c e  b o o m  o f  t h e  1 9 7 0 s )  a n d  f e l l  v e r y  
s h a r p l y  in  t h e  1 9 8 0 s .7 T h e s e  d e c l i n in g  t e r m s  o f  t r a d e  h a v e  h a m s t r u n g  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  e f f o r t s  o f  
c o u n t r i e s  r e ly i n g  o n  s u c h  e x p o r t s  t o  r e l i e v e  t i g h t  f o r e ig n  e x c h a n g e  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  s e r v i c e  t h e i r  d e b t s ,  a n d  
h e lp  f i n a n c e  t h e i r  e c o n o m i c  g r o w th .
M o s t  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  n a t i o n s  a r e  h o p i n g  t h a t  a  W H F T A  w o u l d  o p e n  t h e  d o o r s  f o r  t h e m  to  
d e v e l o p  m o r e  e x p o r t s  o f  m a n u f a c t u r e s  f o l l o w in g  t h e  E a s t  A s i a  m o d e l .  B u t  g i v e n  t h e  c u r r e n t  p a t t e r n  o f  
t r a d e  a n d  t h e  c o m p e l l i n g  l o g ic  o f  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n ta g e ,  a  W H F T A  m i g h t  i n s t e a d  r e in f o r c e  t h e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  o f  s o m e  L a t in  A m e r ic a n  c o u n t r i e s  in  p r i m a r y  p r o d u c t s .  M o s t  l i k e l y ,  t h o s e  
n a t i o n s  t h a t  a l r e a d y  h a v e  r e l a t i v e ly  w e l l - d e v e l o p e d  a n d  e f f i c i e n t  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s e c to r s  ( e .g . ,  M e x i c o ,  
B r a z i l ,  C o s t a  R i c a ,  a n d  t h e  D o m i n ic a n  R e p u b l i c )  w i l l  b e  in d u c e d  to  m o v e  f u r t h e r  in  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n ,  
w h i l e  t h e  o t h e r  n a t i o n s  w i l l  f i n d  th e m s e l v e s  s q u e e z e d  o u t  o f  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  m a r k e t s  a n d  r e l e g a t e d  to  
g r e a t e r  d e p e n d e n c y  o n  a g r ic u l t u r a l  a n d  m in e r a l  e x p o r ts .
7. See Sarkar (1986 ) on the falling com m odity terms o f  trade.
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T a b l e  2
V a l u e ,  G r o w th ,  a n d  C o m p o s i t i o n  o f  M e r c h a n d i s e  T r a d e  
f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  C a n a d a ,  M e x i c o ,  a n d  L A C
U .S . C a n a d a M e x ic o L A C
V a l u e  o f  t r a d e ,  1 9 9 0  
( $  b i l l i o n )
E x p o r t s 3 7 1 .5 1 2 5 .1 2 6 .7 1 2 3 .2
I m p o r t s 5 1 5 .6 1 1 5 .9 2 8 .1 1 0 1 .1
A v e r a g e  a n n u a l  g r o w t h  r a te s ,  
1 9 8 0 - 1 9 9 0  ( % )
E x p o r t s 3 .3 5 .9 3 .4 3 .0
I m p o r t s 7 .6 8 .4 - 1 . 1 - 2 . 1
C o m p o s i t i o n  o f  e x p o r t s ,  
1 9 9 0  ( % )
M a c h in e r y  a n d  t r a n s p o r t  
e q u i p m e n t 4 7 3 7 2 5 11
O t h e r  m a n u f a c t u r e s 31 2 6 19 2 1
P r i m a r y  p r o d u c t s 2 2 3 7 5 6 6 7
C o m p o s i t i o n  o f  im p o r t s ,  
1 9 9 0  ( % )
M a c h in e r y  a n d  t r a n s p o r t  
e q u ip m e n t 4 0 5 0 3 6 3 1
O t h e r  m a n u f a c t u r e s 3 6 3 3 3 7 3 5
P r i m a r y  p r o d u c t s 2 4 17 2 7 3 4
N o t e :  D a t a  f o r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  i n c l u d e  M e x ic o .
S o u r c e :  W o r ld  B a n k ,  World Development Report 1992, W o r ld  D e v e l o p m e n t  I n d i c a to r s  ( T a b l e s  1 4  a n d  
1 5 ) ,  a n d  c a l c u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  a u th o r s .
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T a b l e  3
U .S .  B i l a t e r a l  M e r c h a n d i s e  T r a d e  B a la n c e s  W i t h  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  
a n d  O t h e r  C o u n t r i e s ,  1 9 8 0 ,  1 9 8 5 ,  1 9 9 0  
( U S $  m i l l i o n )
Country 1980 1985 1990
W orld -3 6 ,1 7 8 -1 4 8 ,4 7 4 - 1 2 3 ,9 1 4
EEC 18,873 -2 2 ,6 2 3 2,541
Japan -1 2 ,1 8 3 - 4 9 ,7 4 9 - 4 4 ,4 8 5
Other A sia - 4 ,4 7 6 - 3 2 ,5 8 0 - 4 3 ,4 2 4
Canada - 6 ,6 0 4 - 2 2 ,1 7 6 -1 0 ,8 2 1
Other W estern H em isphere - 1 7 0 - 1 8 ,0 7 6 - 1 3 ,2 2 3
M exico 2,311 - 5 ,7 5 7 - 2 ,4 2 2
South A m erica 2 ,127 -1 1 ,5 0 5 - 1 3 ,0 6 3
A rgentina 1,838 - 4 4 6 - 4 8 5
B oliv ia - 1 7 19 - 7 2
Brazil 352 - 5 ,0 0 7 - 3 ,5 2 4
C hile 795 - 1 7 6 101
C olom bia 409 12 -1 ,3 7 1
Ecuador - 8 9 - 1 ,3 8 4 - 8 6 7
Paraguay 24 74 251
Peru - 2 7 1 - 6 5 6 - 7 4
Uruguay 80 - 5 1 0 - 1 9 1
V enezuela - 9 9 4 -3 ,4 3 1 - 6 ,8 3 1
Central A m erica and the Caribbean -4 ,6 0 8 - 8 1 4 2 ,262
C osta R ica 93 - 1 4 8 - 1 1 3
D om inican Republic - 3 3 - 2 8 9 - 1 6 9
El Salvador - 1 7 1 33 301
Guatemala 88 - 4 3 - 1 1 4
Haiti 47 - 1 0 122
Honduras - 9 9 - 1 2 5 2
Jamaica - 1 1 4 112 333
N etherlands A ntilles -2 ,2 3 1 - 4 0 8 89
Nicaragua 23 - 8 53
Panama 346 208 616
Trinidad &  Tobago - 1 ,7 7 4 - 8 0 0 - 6 4 6
Notes: Data for other A sia  for 1980 include an estim ate for Taiwan. Other western hem isphere includes all 
countries in the hem isphere except U .S. and Canada. R egional totals include countries not show n separately. 
South A m erica excludes the Guyanas, w hich are included in Central Am erica and Caribbean.
Source: International M onetary Fund, Direction o f Trade Statistics, various years, and authors’ calculations.
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— (%> increases) -  
1985-90 1980-90 1980
Shares o f U.S. total
----- (%) -----
1985 1990
World 220,781 213,146 393,106 -3.5% 84.4% 78.1% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
EEC 58,861 48,994 98,032 -16.8% 100.1% 66.5% 26.66% 22.99% 24.94%
Japan 20,790 22,631 48,585 8.9% 114.7% 133.7% 9.42% 10.62% 12.36%
Other Asia 28,781 28,639 60,774 -0.5% 112.2% 111.2% 13.04% 13.44% 15.46%
Canada 35,395 47,251 82,959 33.5% 75.6% 134.4% 16.03% 22.17% 21.10%
Other Western Hem. 38,745 31,020 53,960 -19.9% 74.0% 39.3% 17.55% 14.55% 13.73%
Mexico 15,146 13,635 28,375 -10.0% 108.1% 87.3% 6.86% 6.40% 7.22%
South America 17,149 10,780 15,106 -37.1% 40.1% -11.9% 7.77% 5.06% 3.84%
Argentina 2,630 721 1,179 -72.6% 63.5% -55.2% 1.19% 0.34% 0.30%
Bolivia 172 120 138 -30.2% 15.0% -19.8% 0.08% 0.06% 0.04%
Brazil 4,352 3,140 5,062 -27.8% 61.2% 16.3% 1.97% 1.47% 1.29%
Chile 1,354 682 1,672 -49.6% 145.2% 23.5% 0.61% 0.32% 0.43%
Colombia 1,736 1,468 2,038 -15.4% 38.8% 17.4% 0.79% 0.69% 0.52%
Ecuador 864 591 680 -31.6% 15.1% -21.3% 0.39% 0.28% 0.17%
Paraguay 109 99 307 -9.2% 210.1% 181.7% 0.05% 0.05% 0.08%
Peru 1,172 496 778 -57.7% 56.9% -33.6% 0.53% 0.23% 0.20%
Uruguay 183 64 145 -65.0% 126.6% -20.8% 0.08% 0.03% 0.04%
Venezuela 4,577 3,399 3,107 -25.7% -8.6% -32.1% 2.07% 1.59% 0.79%
Central America and 
the Caribbean 6,450 6,605 10,479 2.4% 58.7% 62.5% 2.92% 3.10% 2.67%
Costa Rica 498 422 992 -15.3% 135.1% 99.2% 0.23% 0.20% 0.25%
Dominican Republic 795 742 1,658 -6.7% 123.5% 108.6% 0.36% 0.35% 0.42%
El Salvador 273 446 556 63.4% 24.7% 103.7% 0.12% 0.21% 0.14%
Guatemala 553 405 759 -26.8% 87.4% 37.3% 0.25% 0.19% 0.19%
Haiti 311 396 478 27.3% 20.7% 53.7% 0.14% 0.19% 0.12%
Honduras 376 308 563 -18.1% 82.8% 49.7% 0.17% 0.14% 0.14%
Jamaica 305 404 944 32.5% 133.7% 209.5% 0.14% 0.19% 0.24%
Netherlands Antilles 449 428 542 -4.7% 26.6% 20.7% 0.20% 0.20% 0.14%
Nicaragua 250 42 68 -83.2% 61.9% -72.8% 0.11% 0.02% 0.02%
Panama 699 675 867 -3.4% 28.4% 24.0% 0.32% 0.32% 0.22%
Trinidad 680 504 430 -25.9% -14.7% -36.8% 0.31% 0.24% 0.11%
Notes: See Table 3 for notes on country definitions.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction o f  Trade Statistics, various years, and authors’ calculations.
Table 5
U.S. Merchandise Imports from Latin America and Other Countries, 1980, 1985, and 1990
Country 1980
Value 
— (US$ million) — 
1985 1990 1980-85
Growth 
— (percentage increases) —
1985-90 1980-90
Shares o f U.S. total
1980
y j w t w u /
1985 1990
World 256,959 361,620 517,020 40.7% 43.0% 101.2% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
EEC 39,988 71,617 95,491 79.1% 33.3% 138.8% 15.56% 19.80% 18.47%
Japan 32,973 72,380 93,070 119.5% 28.6% 182.3% 12.83% 20.02% 18.00%
Other Asia 33,257 61,219 104,198 84.1% 70.2% 213.3% 12.94% 16.93% 20.15%
Canada 41,999 69,427 93,780 65.3% 35.1% 123.3% 16.34% 19.20% 18.14%
Other Western
Hemisphere 38,915 49,096 67,183 26.2% 36.8% 72.6% 15.14% 13.58% 12.99%
Mexico 12,835 19,392 30,797 51.1% 58.8% 139.9% 4.99% 5.36% 5.96%
South America 15,022 22,285 28,169 48.3% 26.4% 87.5% 5.85% 6.16% 5.45%
Argentina 792 1,167 1,664 47.3% 42.6% 110.1% 0.31% 0.32% 0.32%
Bolivia 189 101 210 -46.6% 107.9% 11.1% 0.07% 0.03% 0.04%
Brazil 4,000 8,147 8,586 103.7% 5.4% 114.7% 1.56% 2.25% 1.66%
Chile 559 858 1,571 53.5% 83.1% 181.0% 0.22% 0.24% 0.30%
Colombia 1,327 1,456 3,409 9.7% 134.1% 156.9% 0.52% 0.40% 0.66%
Ecuador 953 1,975 1,547 107.2% -21.7% 62.3% 0.37% 0.55% 0.30%
Paraguay 85 25 56 -70.6% 124.0% -34.1% 0.03% 0.01% 0.01%
Peru 1,443 1,152 852 -20.2% -26.0% -41.0% 0.56% 0.32% 0.16%
Uruguay 103 574 336 457.3% -41.5% 226.2% 0.04% 0.16% 0.06%
Venezuela 5,571 6,830 9,938 22.6% 45.5% 78.4% 2.17% 1.89% 1.92%
Central America
and the Caribbean 11,058 7,419 8,217 -32.9% 10.8% -25.7% 4.30% 2.05% 1.59%
Costa Rica 405 570 1,105 40.7% 93.9% 172.8% 0.16% 0.16% 0.21%
Dominican Rep. 828 1,031 1,827 24.5% 77.2% 120.7% 0.32% 0.29% 0.35%
El Salvador 444 413 255 -7.0% -38.3% -42.6% 0.17% 0.11% 0.05%
Guatemala 465 448 873 -3.7% 94.9% 87.7% 0.18% 0.12% 0.17%
Haiti 264 406 356 53.8% -12.3% 34.8% 0.10% 0.11% 0.07%
Honduras 475 433 561 -8.8% 29.6% 18.1% 0.18% 0.12% 0.11%
Jamaica 419 292 611 -30.3% 109.2% 45.8% 0.16% 0.08% 0.12%
Neth. Antilles 2,680 836 453 -68.8% -45.8% -83.1% 1.04% 0.23% 0.09%
Nicaragua 227 50 15 -78.0% -70.0% -93.4% 0.09% 0.01% 0.00%
Panama 353 467 251 32.3% -46.3% -28.9% 0.14% 0.13% 0.05%
Trinidad 2,454 1,304 1,076 -46.9% -17.5% -56.2% 0.96% 0.36% 0.21%
Note: See Table 3 for notes on country definitions.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction o f Trade Statistics, various years, and authors’ calculations.
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T r e n d s  i n  U .S .  B i l a t e r a l  T r a d e
T h e  n e x t  t h r e e  t a b l e s  p r o v i d e  p e r s p e c t iv e  o n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ’ b i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  w i t h  t h e  
c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  W e s te r n  H e m is p h e r e  in  c o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  i t s  t r a d e  w i t h  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d .  T a b l e  3 
s h o w s  U .S .  b i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  b a la n c e s  f o r  1 9 8 0 ,  1 9 8 5 ,  a n d  1 9 9 0 .8 F r o m  1 9 8 0  t o  1 9 9 0 ,  t h e  U .S .  t r a d e  
d e f i c i t  w i t h  t h e  e n t i r e  w o r l d  w i d e n e d  f r o m  $ 3 6 .2  b i l l i o n  t o  $ 1 2 3 .9  b i l l i o n .9 M o s t  o f  t h a t  i n c r e a s e  w a s  
a c c o u n te d  f o r  b y  l a r g e r  d e f i c i t s  w i t h  J a p a n  a n d  o t h e r  A s i a n  c o u n t r i e s  ( p r i n c i p a l l y  S o u t h  K o r e a ,  
T a iw a n ,  a n d  C h i n a ) ,  a s  w e l l  a s  b y  a  r e d u c e d  s u r p l u s  w i th  t h e  E u r o p e a n  E c o n o m i c  C o m m u n i t y  ( E E C ) .  
H o w e v e r ,  t h e  U .S .  t r a d e  b a la n c e  w i t h  t h e  W e s te r n  H e m is p h e r e  a ls o  w o r s e n e d  b y  a b o u t  $ 1 7  b i l l i o n ,  
$ 4  b i l l i o n  w i t h  C a n a d a  a n d  $ 1 3  b i l l i o n  w i t h  L a t in  A m e r i c a .10 T h e  w o r s e n i n g  o f  t h e  U .S .  t r a d e  
b a la n c e  w i t h  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  f r o m  1 9 8 0  t o  1 9 9 0  w a s  m o r e  t h a n  a c c o u n te d  f o r  b y  a  $ 1 5  b i l l i o n  d e c l in e  
w i t h  S o u t h  A m e r ic a ,  a n d  a  $ 5  b i l l i o n  n e g a t i v e  s w in g  w i t h  M e x i c o  ( t h i s  h a s  s in c e  b e e n  r e v e r s e d 11), 
w h i l e  t h e  b a l a n c e  w i t h  C e n t r a l  A m e r i c a  a n d  t h e  C a r ib b e a n  i m p r o v e d  b y  a b o u t  $ 6  b i l l i o n  ( a b o u t  h a l f  o f  
w h i c h  i s  d u e  t o  c h e a p e r  o i l  im p o r t s  f r o m  T r in i d a d  a n d  T o b a g o  a n d  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  A n t i l l e s ) .
T a b l e  4  s h o w s  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t r e n d s  in  t h e  v a lu e  o f  U n i t e d  S t a te s  m e r c h a n d i s e  e x p o r t s  ( in  
c u r r e n t  o r  n o m in a l  d o l l a r s ) .  T h e  t o ta l  v a lu e  o f  U .S .  e x p o r t s  fell b y  3 .5 %  f r o m  1 9 8 0  t o  1 9 8 5 ,12 b u t  
t h e n  s h o t  u p  b y  8 4 .4 %  f r o m  1 9 8 5  to  1 9 9 0  f o r  a  g a in  o f  7 8 .1 %  o v e r  t h e  d e c a d e .  U .S .  e x p o r t s  t o  J a p a n  
a n d  t h e  r e s t  o f  A s i a  g r e w  a t  n o t a b l y  a b o v e - a v e r a g e  r a te s ,  w h i l e  e x p o r t s  t o  E u r o p e  g r e w  a t  l e s s  t h a n  
a v e r a g e  r a te s .  I n  t h e  W e s te r n  H e m is p h e r e ,  e x p o r t s  t o  C a n a d a  a l s o  g r e w  a t  a  r a te  t h a t  w a s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
a b o v e  a v e r a g e .  G r o w th  o f  e x p o r t s  t o  M e x i c o  w a s  o n ly  s l i g h t l y  a b o v e  a v e r a g e  o v e r  t h e  d e c a d e ,  b u t  in  
t h e  1 9 8 5 - 9 0  p e r io d  g r o w t h  w a s  a lm o s t  a s  f a s t  a s  e x p o r t s  t o  J a p a n  a n d  t h e  r e s t  o f  A s i a . 13 E x p o r t s  to  
a l l  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  ( L a t in  A m e r i c a  is  s h o w n  a s  o t h e r  W e s te r n  H e m is p h e r e  i n c l u d i n g  M e x i c o )  g r e w  
b y  o n l y  3 9 %  o v e r  t h e  d e c a d e ,  a n d  e x p o r t s  t o  S o u th  A m e r i c a  ( e x c l u d in g  t h e  G u y a n a s )  a c t u a l l y  fell b y  
n e a r l y  1 2 %  b e tw e e n  1 9 8 0  a n d  1 9 9 0 .
8. The U.S. trade balance improved somewhat in 1991, mostly as a result of the country’s economic 
recession and the falling value of the dollar (see Blecker, 1991b).
9. These data are taken from the International Monetary Fund, Direction o f Trade Statistics, various years. 
This source shows a notably larger deficit for the U.S. in 1990 than some U.S. government sources show. On a 
balance of payments basis, the U.S. merchandise trade deficit as reported by the Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, was only $108.9 billion for 1990 (revised as of June 1992). However, on a 
Census basis, exports (f.a.s.) less imports (c.i.f.) was -$123.4 billion in 1990. The IMF data are closer to a 
Census basis.
10. In this context, "Latin America" refers to all western hemisphere nations other than the U.S. or Canada.
11. By 1992, the U.S. had a merchandise trade surplus with Mexico of $5.4 billion (according to the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, "U.S. Merchandise Trade: December 1992," released on February 18, 
1992). This remarkable shift was due partly to the large capital outflows to Mexico, partly to the growing 
overvaluation of the peso, and partly to the U.S. recession.
12. This and all other growth rates in Tables 4 and 5 are total rates for the periods shown, not average 
annual rates.
13. Since 1991, U.S. exports to Mexico have been one of the fastest growing parts of U.S. trade.
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T h e  r e l a t i v e ly  s l o w  g r o w t h  o f  U .S .  e x p o r t s  t o  m o s t  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a l s o  s h o w s  u p  in  a  
r e d u c e d  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  s h a r e  o f  U .S .  e x p o r t s  ( l a s t  t h r e e  c o lu m n s  o f  T a b l e  4 ) .  T h e  t o t a l  L a t i n  A m e r i ­
c a n  s h a r e  f e l l  f r o m  1 7 .6 %  in  1 9 8 0  t o  1 3 .7 %  in  1 9 9 0 . W h i l e  t h e  M e x i c a n  s h a r e  ( i n c l u d i n g  c o m p o n e n t s  
f o r  a s s e m b ly  o p e r a t i o n s )  r o s e  s l i g h t l y ,  f r o m  6 .9 %  t o  7 .2 % ,  t h e  s h a r e  o f  S o u th  A m e r i c a  w a s  m o r e  t h a n  
h a lv e d ,  f r o m  7 .8 %  t o  3 .8 % .  M e a n w h i le ,  t h e  s h a r e s  o f  C a n a d a ,  J a p a n ,  a n d  o t h e r  A s i a n  c o u n t r i e s  r o s e  
s h a r p ly .
T a b l e  5 s h o w s  c h a n g e s  in  U n i t e d  S t a te s  im p o r t s  b e tw e e n  1 9 8 0  a n d  1 9 9 0 . T h e  t o t a l  v a l u e  o f  
U n i t e d  S t a te s  i m p o r t s  f r o m  t h e  e n t i r e  w o r ld  in c r e a s e d  b y  1 0 1 .2 % .  I m p o r t s  f r o m  A s i a  r o u g h l y  t r ip l e d ,  
h o w e v e r ,  w i t h  i n c r e a s e s  o f  1 8 2 .3 %  f r o m  J a p a n  a n d  2 1 3 .3 %  f r o m  t h e  r e s t  o f  A s ia .  A s id e  f r o m  
U r u g u a y ,  w h o s e  e x p o r t s  t o  t h e  U .S .  w e r e  m in u s c u l e  t o  b e g in  w i th ,  t h e  o n l y  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r y  
w h o s e  s a l e s  t o  t h e  U .S .  i n c r e a s e d  a t  a n  A s i a - l i k e  r a te  w a s  C h i le .  U .S .  i m p o r t s  f r o m  C h i l e  g r e w  b y  
1 8 1 .0 % ,  a l m o s t  t h e  s a m e  r a te  a s  f r o m  J a p a n .  O t h e r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  r e l a t i v e ly  r a p id  
g r o w t h  o f  s a l e s  in  t h e  U .S .  i n c lu d e d  C o s t a  R i c a  ( 1 7 2 .8 %  g r o w th ) ,  C o l o m b i a  ( 1 5 6 .9 % ) ,  a n d  M e x i c o  
( 1 3 9 .9 % ) ,  w i t h  A r g e n t i n a  a n d  B r a z i l  j u s t  b e h in d .  U .S .  im p o r t s  f r o m  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a s  a  w h o l e  g r e w  
b y  l e s s  t h a n  t h r e e  q u a r t e r s  o f  t h e  a v e r a g e  r a te  f o r  a l l  c o u n t r i e s  ( 7 2 .6 % ) .  T h e s e  f i g u r e s  m a k e  i t  c l e a r  
w h y  m a n y  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  n a t i o n s  m i g h t  v i e w  a  F T A  a s  e s s e n t ia l  f o r  i n c r e a s in g  t h e i r  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  
U .S .  m a r k e t .  O n l y  b y  a  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r a d i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t  c a n  m o s t  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  h o p e  to  
r e s t o r e  t h e  s h a r e s  o f  U .S .  im p o r t s  t h e y  h a d  a  d e c a d e  a g o .
F r o m  t h e  p e r s p e c t iv e  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  t h e s e  f i g u r e s  s h o w  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a l s o  a  t r e m e n d o u s  
r a n g e  in  t h e  d e g r e e  t o  w h i c h  L a t i n  A m e r ic a n  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  p o i s e d  t o  t a k e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  
t o  p e n e t r a t e  t h e  U .S .  m a r k e t .  B e y o n d  M e x i c o ,  a  f e w  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  ( e s p e c i a l l y  C h i le ,  
C o l o m b i a ,  a n d  C o s t a  R i c a )  h a v e  h a d  o u t s t a n d i n g  s u c c e s s  in  e x p o r t i n g  to  t h e  U .S .  in  t h e  p a s t  d e c a d e .
T r e n d s  i n  M u l t i l a t e r a l  T r a d e
C o n s i d e r a t i o n  n o w  s h i f t s  t o  t h e  b r o a d e r  m u l t i l a t e r a l  p e r s p e c t iv e  o f  W e s te r n  H e m is p h e r e  
c o u n t r i e s ’ t r a d e  w i t h  e a c h  o t h e r  a n d  w i t h  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r ld .  T a b l e  6  s h o w s  t h e  s h a r e s  o f  th e  
e x p o r t s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  C a n a d a ,  M e x ic o ,  a n d  th e  r e s t  o f  L a t in  A m e r i c a  g o i n g  t o  v a r io u s  c o u n t r i e s  
a n d  r e g io n s  a s  o f  1 9 9 0 .  T h e  d a t a  in  t h i s  t a b l e  s h o w  s t r i k in g  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  t h e  r e g io n a l  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  
t r a d e  in  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  t h e  W e s te r n  H e m is p h e r e .  B o t h  C a n a d a  a n d  M e x i c o  s e n d  a b o u t  7 3 %  o f  t h e i r  
e x p o r t s  ( b y  v a lu e )  t o  t h e  U .S .  T h e i r  in te r e s t  in  f r e e  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  U .S .  m a r k e t  is  c le a r .  B u t  o t h e r  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  e x c l u d i n g  M e x i c o  s e l l  o n  a v e r a g e  o n l y  a b o u t  3 1 %  o f  t h e i r  e x p o r t s  t o  t h e  
U .S .  T h e  E E C ’s  s h a r e  is  n o t  f a r  b e h in d :  2 6 % .
T h e s e  a v e r a g e  p e r c e n ta g e s  c o n c e a l  im p o r t a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  t h e  o t h e r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  
c o u n t r i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  b e tw e e n  t h e  n a t i o n s  o f  C e n t r a l  A m e r i c a  a n d  t h e  C a r ib b e a n ,  w h i c h  d o  e x p o r t  a  l o t  
t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  a n d  m a n y  S o u th  A m e r ic a n  c o u n t r i e s  ( n o t a b l y  A r g e n t in a ,  B r a z i l ,  P e r u ,  a n d  C h i l e )  
w h o s e  e x p o r t s  a r e  m o r e  o r i e n t e d  to w a r d  E u r o p e .  C le a r ly ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  t r a d e  o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  m a n y  o f  
t h e s e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  d o e s  n o t  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e y  p l a c e  a  h i g h  p r i o r i t y  o n  f o r m i n g  a  t r a d i n g  
b l o c  w i t h  t h e  U .S .  a n d  C a n a d a .  F o r  m a n y  o f  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  W H F T A  o p t i o n  s e e m s  t o  b e  o f  
i n t e r e s t  m a i n l y  b e c a u s e  o t h e r  a v e n u e s  t h a t  m ig h t  b e  s u p e r i o r — e s p e c i a l l y  g r e a t e r  a c c e s s  t o  a l l  i n d u s t r i a l  
c o u n t r y  m a r k e t s  v i a  m u l t i l a t e r a l  G A T T  n e g o t i a t i o n s  o r  in c r e a s e d  t r a d e  t h r o u g h  r e g io n a l  L a t in  
A m e r i c a n  F T A s — s e e m  t o  b e  b l o c k e d .  T h e r e  is  a l s o  t h e  f e a r  o f  l o s i n g  o u t  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t r a d e  a n d
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i n v e s tm e n t  d i v e r s io n  in  E u r o p e ,  t h r o u g h  t h e  s t r e n g th e n i n g  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t y  ( E C ) ,  a n d  in  
N o r t h  A m e r i c a ,  d u e  t o  t h e  N A F T A .
T a b l e  6  s h o w s  t h a t  i n t r a - L a t in  A m e r ic a n  t r a d e  is  o n l y  a  s m a l l  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  t h e  r e g i o n ’s  t o ta l .  
T r a d e  b e tw e e n  M e x i c o  a n d  t h e  r e s t  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  is  a lm o s t  n e g l i g i b l e ,  j u s t  5 %  o f  M e x i c a n  e x p o r t s  
a n d  b a r e l y  1 %  o f  o t h e r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  e x p o r t s .  E x c l u d i n g  M e x i c o ,  t h e  o t h e r  n a t i o n s  o f  L a t in  
A m e r i c a  c o n d u c t ,  o n  a v e r a g e ,  o n l y  1 6 %  o f  t h e i r  t r a d e  w i t h  e a c h  o th e r ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  d o  s e n d  a n  
a v e r a g e  o f  5 0 %  o f  t h e i r  e x p o r t s  t o  t h e  e n t i r e  W e s te r n  H e m is p h e r e .  A n d  L a t in  A m e r i c a  i s  f a r  f r o m  th e  
m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  e x p o r t  m a r k e t  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta te s .  I t  a c c o u n t s  f o r  j u s t  u n d e r  1 4 %  o f  U .S .  e x p o r t s ,  
a b o u t  e v e n l y  d iv id e d  b e tw e e n  M e x i c o  a n d  t h e  r e s t  o f  L a t in  A m e r ic a .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  C a n a d a  a c c o u n t s  f o r  
2 1 % ,  a n d  t h e  E E C  f o r  a b o u t  2 5 % .
T h e  in t r a -  a n d  i n te r r e g i o n a l  t r a d e  f l o w s  d e s c r ib e d  b y  t h e s e  d a t a  a r e  u n e v e n  a n d  a s y m m e t r ic .  
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  C a n a d a ,  M e x i c o ,  a n d  t h e  r e s t  o f  L a t in  A m e r i c a  a r e  a l l  f a r  m o r e  d e p e n d e n t  o n  t r a d e  w i t h  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  t h a n  v i c e - v e r s a .  W h i l e  t h i s  d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h e  e c o n o m i c  i m p o r t a n c e  t h a t  F T A s  w i th  
t h e  U .S .  c a n  h a v e  f o r  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s ,  i t  s h o u l d  a l s o  g i v e  C a n a d i a n s ,  M e x i c a n s ,  a n d  o t h e r  L a t in  
A m e r i c a n s  p a u s e  t o  c o n s i d e r  h o w  m u c h  p o l i t i c a l  b a r g a i n in g  l e v e r a g e  t h e y  c a n  e x p e c t  t o  h a v e  w i t h i n  a  
N A F T A  o r  W H F T A .  T h i s  s h o u ld  b e  o f  s p e c ia l  c o n c e r n  t o  t h e  s m a l l e r  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  a n d  C a r ib b e a n  
n a t i o n s  t h a t  d o  n o t  h a v e  e n jo y  t h e  l e v e r a g e  o f  a  M e x i c o ,  C h i le ,  o r  B r a z i l . 14
C o n c l u s i o n  o n  T r a d e  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t  I s s u e s
C o n s i d e r in g  t h e  h u g e  a s y m m e t r ie s  a n d  d i v e r g e n c e s  in  b o t h  l e v e l s  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  in  t r a d e  
f l o w s ,  t h e  p u r e ly  c o m m e r c i a l  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  a  W H F T A  s e e m s  w e a k  f o r  m a n y  c o u n t r i e s  in  t h e  
h e m i s p h e r e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in  S o u th  A m e r ic a .  E x te n d i n g  t h e  N A F T A  f r a m e w o r k  t o  e m b r a c e  t h e  r e s t  o f  
t h e  W e s te r n  H e m is p h e r e  w o u l d  b r i n g  t o g e t h e r  a  g r o u p  o f  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  d i s p a r a t e  d o m e s t i c  s t r u c tu r e s  
a n d  d i v e r s e  p a t t e r n s  o f  t r a d e .  S o m e  o f  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  S o u t h  A m e r ic a n  c o u n t r i e s  ( s u c h  a s  
A r g e n t in a ,  B r a z i l ,  C h i l e ,  a n d  P e r u )  c o n d u c t  m o s t  o f  t h e i r  e x p o r t  t r a d e  w i t h  n a t i o n s  o u t s i d e  t h e  W e s te r n  
H e m i s p h e r e 15 a n d  s e l l  m o r e  o f  t h e i r  e x p o r t s  t o  t h e  E C  t h a n  t o  t h e  U .S .  M a n y  C a r ib b e a n  a n d  C e n t r a l  
A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  p r o p o r t i o n a l ly  m o r e  o f  t h e i r  t r a d e  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  b u t  t h e y  a l r e a d y  
h a v e  p r e f e r e n t i a l  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  U .S .  m a r k e t  v i a  t h e  C B I .
T h e s e  a n o m a l i e s  r a i s e  t h e  q u e s t io n  w h y  t h e r e  is  s o  m u c h  i n t e r e s t  in  a  W H F T A .  P a r t  o f  th e  
a n s w e r  l i e s  m o r e  in  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  r e a lm  t h a n  in  t h e  e c o n o m ic .  T h e  E C  s e e m s  t o  b e  t u r n i n g  i n w a r d ,  n o t  
o n l y  in  r e g a r d  t o  t r a d e  b u t  a l s o  in  t e r m s  o f  i n v e s tm e n t  f l o w s ,  w h i c h  a r e  g o i n g  i n c r e a s in g l y  t o  lo w -  
w a g e  r e g io n s  w i t h i n  E u r o p e .
14. Similar considerations lead H. W. Singer to support a collective approach of Latin American countries to 
negotiating a WHFTA, in his contribution to this publication.
15. Exports to the entire western hemisphere, including the U.S., Canada, and all other countries, are only 
40.7% of total exports for Argentina, 37.3% for Brazil, 31.1% for Chile, and 29.7% for Peru, as of 1990 
(calculated from data in IMF, Direction o f Trade Statistics, 1991 Yearbook).
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Table 6
Shares of Merchandise Exports from the United States, Canada, 











World 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Industrial
countries0 63.89 87.81 73.48 91.75 68.00
USA 0.00 72.66 40.44 73.12 30.64
Canada 21.10 0.00 2.18 2.42 2.11
Japan 12.36 5.44 5.89 5.37 6.05
EEC 24.94 7.59 22.64 10.16 26.38
Developing
countries 35.05 7.63 24.14 7.56 29.11
Latin
America2 13.73 1.57 14.51 5.40 17.24
Mexico 7.22 0.37 0.81 0.00 1.06
Other Latin 




21.32 6.06 9.63 2.16 11.87
Total
Western




98.94 95.44 97.62 99.31 97.11
Notes:
a. Includes all countries in the western hemisphere except United States and Canada.
b. Includes all countries in the western hemisphere except United States, Canada, and Mexico.
c. Includes countries not shown separately.
d. Developing countries excluding Latin America (as defined in note a).
e. Total for the hemisphere, including United States, Canada, Mexico, and all of Latin America.
f. Does not add to 100.00 percent due to the exclusion of the former U.S.S.R. and certain other formerly 
Communist countries.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction o f Trade Statistics, 1991 Yearbook; and authors’ calculations.
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W h a t  w o u l d  b e  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  f o r  t r a d e  f l o w s  i f  a  W H F T A  w e r e  a c t u a l l y  f o r m e d  l a t e r  in  
t h i s  d e c a d e ?  A  f e w  h y p o t h e s e s  m a y  b e  v e n t u r e d .  O n e  is  t h a t  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  e x p o r t - o r i e n t e d  
m a n u f a c t u r e s  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  to  b e  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  l im i te d  p a r t s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ,  e s p e c i a l l y  M e x i c o ,  
c e r t a i n  C e n t r a l  A m e r i c a n  a n d  C a r ib b e a n  c o u n t r i e s ,  a n d  t h e  m o r e  i n d u s t r i a l l y  a d v a n c e d  S o u th  
A m e r i c a n  n a t i o n s  s u c h  a s  B r a z i l  a n d  A r g e n t in a .  M a n y  o f  t h e  p o o r e s t  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  n a t i o n s ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  i n  C e n t r a l  A m e r i c a  a n d  t h e  A n d e a n  r e g i o n ,  w i l l  f i n d  t h e i r  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  in  
p r i m a r y  p r o d u c t  e x p o r t s  r e i n f o r c e d .  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n s  w h o  h o p e  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  p a t h  o f  t h e  p r o s p e r o u s  
E a s t  A s i a n  N I C s  s h o u l d  r e m e m b e r  t h a t  K o r e a ,  T a i w a n ,  e t  a l .  a c h i e v e d  t h e i r  s t u n n i n g  s u c c e s s e s  i n  
e x p o r t - o r i e n t e d  i n d u s t r i a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  w i t h  s i g n i f i c a n t  g o v e r n m e n t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  a n d  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  u s e  
o f  t r a d e  p r o t e c t i o n ,  n o t  t h r o u g h  d e r e g u l a t e d  “ f r e e  m a r k e t s ”  o r  c o m p l e t e  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  ( A m s d e n  
1 9 8 9 ,  S m i th  1 9 9 1 ,  W a d e  1 9 9 0 ) .
W h i l e  a l l  t h e  n a t i o n s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  c o u ld  p o t e n t i a l l y  a t t r a c t  m o r e  f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t  in  
l o w - w a g e ,  l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e  m a n u f a c t u r e s ,  n o t  a l l  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  s u c c e e d .  T h e  e c o n o m i e s  o f  s c a l e  a n d  
s c o p e  t h a t  a r i s e  f r o m  i n v e s t i n g  i n  a  s m a l l  n u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  t e n d  to  k e e p  s u c h  i n v e s tm e n t  
c o n c e n t r a t e d  l a r g e l y  w h e r e  i t  i s  c u r r e n t l y  g o i n g .  M o r e o v e r ,  M e x i c o  a n d  t h e  C a r i b b e a n  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  
n a tu r a l  a d v a n t a g e s  i n  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  U . S .  m a r k e t  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  g e o g r a p h i c a l  p r o x i m i t y  a n d  r e l a t i v e ly  
l o w  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  c o s t s .  A l l  o f  t h e s e  a r e  o b s t a c l e s  t h a t  n a t i o n s  s u c h  a s  E c u a d o r ,  B o l iv i a ,  o r  P a r a g u a y  
w i l l  f i n d  d i f f i c u l t  t o  o v e r c o m e .  C o m p e t i n g  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  w h o  c a n  o f f e r  t h e  l o w e s t  w a g e s  a n d  l e a s t  
p r o t e c t i o n  o f  w o r k e r s ’ r i g h t s  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s a f e g u a r d s  is  n o t  a  b e n e f i c i a l  g a m e  to  p l a y .
F o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t  i n  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  a r e  s p e c i a l i z e d  in  p r i m a r y  p r o d u c t s  w o u l d  
u n d o u b t e d l y  i n c r e a s e  u n d e r  a  W H F T A ,  b u t  t h a t  i n v e s tm e n t  w o u l d  m o s t  l i k e l y  f l o w  to  t r a d i t i o n a l  
m in e r a l  a n d  a g r i c u l t u r a l  a r e a s .  A t  b e s t ,  s o m e  o f  t h e  p o o r e r  A n d e a n  c o u n t r i e s  c o u ld  h o p e  to  e m u l a te  
C h i l e  b y  m o v in g  i n to  n o n t r a d i t i o n a l  p r i m a r y  p r o d u c t s  s u c h  a s  w i n t e r  f r u i t s  a n d  v e g e t a b l e s  f o r  t h e  
U . S .  m a r k e t — b u t  e v e n  t h e r e  t h e y  w i l l  f a c e  s t i f f  c o m p e t i t i o n  f r o m  M e x i c o  a s  w e l l  a s  C h i l e .  M o r e  
c o u n t r i e s  t r y i n g  t o  s e l l  t h e  s a m e  p r o d u c t s  i n  t h e  s a m e  m a r k e t  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  is  a  s u r e  w a y  to  
d e p r e s s  t h e  c o m m o d i ty  t e r m s  o f  t r a d e  r a t h e r  t h a n  to  b o o s t  e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t .
T h e r e  i s  o n e  p o s i t i v e  c o m m e r c i a l  s c e n a r i o  t h a t  s e e m s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  p a r t s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  
t h a t  h a v e  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  t o  g a i n  f r o m  a c c e s s  t o  N o r t h  A m e r i c a n  m a r k e t s .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  i n i t i a l  
a t t r a c t i o n  o f  t h e  W H F T A  c o n c e p t  i s  m a i n l y  t o  s e c u r e  f r e e r  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  m a r k e t ,  a  
W H F T A  w o u l d  r e s u l t  i n  “ p l u r i l a t e r a l ”  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  a c r o s s  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .  N a t io n s  t h a t  a r e  
d i s a p p o in t e d  in  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  t h e i r  e x p o r t s  t o  t h e  U . S .  u n d e r  a  W H F T A  c o u ld  t r y  t o  r e o r i e n t  t h e i r  
t r a d e  t o w a r d  o t h e r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s .  T h e r e  a r e  p i t f a l l s  h e r e  t o o ,  d u e  t o  (1 )  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  m o s t  
o f  t h e  p o o r e r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  t e n d  to  e x p o r t  p r o d u c t s  t h a t  a r e  s u b s t i t u t e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  
c o m p l e m e n t s  ( e s p e c i a l l y  a g r i c u l t u r a l  c o m m o d i t i e s ) ,  a n d  (2 )  t h e  r i s k  t h a t  t h e  s m a l l e r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  
n a t i o n s  w i l l  b e  o v e r w h e l m e d  w i t h  m a n u f a c t u r e d  e x p o r t s  f r o m  t h e  l a r g e r  n a t i o n s  s u c h  a s  B r a z i l ,  t h u s  
s t i f l i n g  d o m e s t i c  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h e s e  a r e  t h e  s a m e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  h a v e  c o n t r i b u t e d  to  
t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  m o s t  e f f o r t s  a t  f o r m i n g  e f f e c t i v e  t r a d i n g  b l o c s  w i t h i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  o r  i t s  s u b r e g i o n s .
3 .  L a b o r  a n d  I n c o m e  D i s t r i b u t i o n
C u r r e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  im p a c t  o f  t h e  N A F T A  a n d  W H F T A  h a v e  c o n c e n t r a t e d  o n  
t r a d e  f l o w s .  A s  t h e  p r e v i o u s  d i s c u s s i o n  h a s  s h o w n ,  a  W H F T A  w o u l d  h a v e  a m b i g u o u s  e f f e c t s  o n  
h e m i s p h e r i c  t r a d e  p a t t e r n s ,  b u t  t h e r e  a r e  c l e a r  i n c e n t iv e s  f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  c a p i t a l  t o  r e l o c a t e  i n v e s tm e n t
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i n  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  a b u n d a n t  l a b o r  a n d  l o w  w a g e s  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  p r o d u c t i v i t y  a n d  q u a l i t y  c a n  b e  
m a i n t a i n e d .  T h e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  s u g g e s t  a  s h i f t  i n  a t t e n t i o n  to  i n v e s tm e n t  f l o w s  a n d  t h e i r  e f f e c t s  o n  
l a b o r .
M o s t  r e c e n t  a n a l y s e s  o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  N A F T A  o n  l a b o r  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  g r o u n d e d  in  
e m p i r i c a l  s t u d i e s  o f  t h e  N o r t h  A m e r i c a n  l a b o r  m a r k e t  a n d  h a v e  d e - e m p h a s i z e d  t h e  r o l e  o f  i n v e s tm e n t  
f l o w s  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t i n e n t . 16 D e s p i t e  t h e  e v id e n c e  f r o m  t h e  U . S . - C a n a d a  F T A ,  a n d  f r o m  t h e  r e c e n t  
o p e n in g  o f  t h e  M e x i c a n  m a r k e t  a n d  i ts  c h a n g e  in  i n v e s tm e n t  l a w s ,  e c o n o m i c  m o d e l e r s ’ g u e s s e s  a b o u t  
t h e  f u t u r e  d o m in a t e d  t h e  d e b a t e s  o v e r  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  N A F T A ,  a n d  i n s u f f i c i e n t  a t t e n t i o n  h a s  b e e n  
p a id  t o  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  e v id e n c e  o f  t h e  a c t u a l  t r e n d s  d u r i n g  t h e  c u r r e n t  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  t h e  N o r t h  
A m e r i c a n  m a r k e t .
I n  p a r t ,  t h e  e c o n o m i c  t h e o r i s t s  e x c u s e  t h e m s e l v e s  f r o m  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  f o r e i g n  
i n v e s tm e n t  b y  a s s u m i n g  t h a t  p r o d u c t s  m a d e  in  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s ,  e v e n  i f  t h e y  b e a r  t h e  s a m e  l a b e l ,  
a r e  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  b y  c o n s u m e r s .  T h i s  m a k e s  t r a d e  b e tw e e n  c o u n t r i e s  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  t h e
l o c a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  M N C s .  T o  a s s u m e  t h a t  U . S .  c o n s u m e r s  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  b e t w e e n  a  Z e n i t h  
t e l e v i s i o n  o r  S m i t h - C o r o n a  t y p e w r i t e r  m a d e  in  M e x i c o  o r  i n  t h e  U . S .  i s  i n s u p p o r t a b l e .
U n c o n s t r a i n e d  b y  t h e  e x i s t i n g  e v id e n c e ,  m o d e l e r s  h a v e  b e e n  f r e e  to  m a k e  a s s u m p t io n s  a b o u t  
t h e  f u t u r e  t h a t  i g n o r e  t h e  f a c t s  o f  t h e  N o r t h  A m e r i c a n  l a b o r  m a r k e t .  M o s t  o f  t h e  m o d e l s  s t a r t  a n d  e n d  
w i th  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n s t r u c t  o f  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e — a  “ w i n - w i n ”  s c e n a r i o .  W i t h  t w o  o f  t h e  
a s s u m p t io n s  r e q u i r e d  t o  m a k e  t r a d e  a d v a n t a g e o u s  t o  c o u n t r i e s — f u l l  - e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  b a la n c e d  
t r a d e — t h e  m o d e l s  c o n s t r a i n  c o u n t r i e s  t o  s p e c i a l i z e  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t s  t h e y  a r e  c o m p a r a t i v e l y  m o s t  
e f f i c i e n t  a t  p r o d u c i n g .
T h e  f u l l  e m p l o y m e n t  a s s u m p t io n  i g n o r e s  t h e  p a s t  2 0  y e a r s  o f  p o o r  p e r f o r m a n c e  b y  t h e  U . S .  
l a b o r  m a r k e t .  A v e r a g e  r e a l  w a g e s  o f  U . S .  w o r k e r s  o f  m o s t  e d u c a t i o n  l e v e l s  e x c e p t  p o s t g r a d u a t e  h a v e  
f a l l e n .  T h e  w e a k n e s s  o f  t h e  U . S .  l a b o r  m a r k e t  h a s  m a d e  U . S .  w o r k e r s  s k e p t i c a l  o f  e c o n o m i c  m o d e l s  
t h a t  a s s u m e  t h e  l a b o r  m a r k e t  t o  b e  i n  e q u i l i b r iu m  a n d  d e c l a r e  U . S .  w o r k e r s  t o  b e  o n  a  p a t h  t o  h i g h e r -  
w a g e s .  T h i s  p a p e r  c o n c e n t r a t e s  i n s t e a d  o n  t h e  a c tu a l  p a t t e r n  o f  e m p l o y m e n t  c r e a t i o n  a n d  w a g e  
c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  U . S .  e c o n o m y  w i t h o u t  t h e  a s s u m p t io n  o f  f u l l  e m p l o y m e n t .  T h e  f o c u s  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  is  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  o n  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  e v id e n c e  o f  t h e  l a s t  s i x  y e a r s ,  d u r i n g  w h i c h  M e x i c o  l o w e r e d  i t s  t a r i f f s  
a n d  l i f t e d  m a j o r  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  i n v e s tm e n t ,  a n d  t h e  U . S .  a n d  C a n a d a  e n t e r e d  a  F T A .
T a b l e  7  s h o w s  t h e  f l o w  o f  g o o d s  b e tw e e n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  M e x i c o ,  a n d  C a n a d a ,  a n d  t h e  
f l o w  o f  g o o d s  a m o n g  U . S . - o w n e d  a f f i l i a t e s  o p e r a t i n g  i n  C a n a d a  a n d  M e x i c o .  L o o k i n g  a t  a l l  N o r t h  
A m e r i c a n  t r a d e ,  4 2 %  ( $ 9 3 .1 8 / 2 2 0 . 7 5 )  c a n  b e  a c c o u n te d  f o r  b y  t h e  m o v e m e n t  o f  g o o d s  a m o n g  U . S . -  
o w n e d  a f f i l i a t e s  o p e r a t i n g  in  C a n a d a  a n d  M e x i c o .  O f  c o u r s e ,  m u c h  o f  t h e  t r a d e  b y  U . S .  
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s  i s  i n  t h e  U . S . - C a n a d a  f r e e  t r a d e  a r e a .  S t i l l ,  o f  t h e  a lm o s t  $ 2 5  b i l l i o n  t h a t  t h e  U . S .  
e x p o r t s  t o  M e x i c o ,  $ 7 . 6  b i l l i o n  a r e  s h i p m e n t s  t o  U . S .  m u l t i n a t i o n a l s  o p e r a t i n g  in  M e x i c o — r o u g h l y  
3 0  p e r c e n t  o f  U . S .  “ e x p o r t s . ”  A  s i m i l a r  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  U . S .  i m p o r t s  a r e  f r o m  U . S .  m u l t i n a t i o n a l s
16. The best summary of the models and their prediction of the impact on labor is by Stanford (1993). A 
more suspect summary is by Hinojosa-Ojeda and Robinson (1992), who assume that the U.S. faces a serious 
shortfall in labor supply well into the next century. This, they proclaim creates a labor market complementarity 
between the U.S. and Mexico, because of Mexico’s labor surplus. But Mishel and Texeira (1991) have shown 
that an honest evaluation of U.S. labor market indicators does not show any sign of a labor shortage developing.
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o p e r a t i n g  in  M e x i c o .  T h i s  m a y  s e e m  a  s m a l l  f i g u r e  w h e n  c o m p a r e d  to  U . S .  m u l t i n a t i o n a l s  a n d  t h e i r  
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  b u t  b e c a u s e  o f  p a s t  i n v e s tm e n t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  M e x i c o ,  U . S .  f i r m s  in  
M e x i c o  a r e  h i g h l y  c o n c e n t r a t e d  in  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  a n d  v i r t u a l l y  a b s e n t  i n  p r i m a r y  p r o d u c t s .  T h e  
p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n  n o t e d  t h a t  o v e r  h a l f  o f  M e x i c o ’s  e x p o r t s  a r e  i n  p r i m a r y  p r o d u c t s .  I n  t h a t  c o n te x t ,  
t h e  i n v o lv e m e n t  o f  U . S .  f i r m s  i s  n o t  s m a l l .  R e g a r d l e s s ,  a  l a r g e  a n d  g r o w i n g  p o r t i o n  o f  U . S . - M e x i c a n  
“ t r a d e ”  i s  l e s s  a b o u t  t h e  s h i p m e n t  o f  g o o d s  b a s e d  o n  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e s ,  a n d  m o r e  a b o u t  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  w h e r e  t o  p r o d u c e  a n  i t e m  b a s e d  o n  m in i m iz i n g  u n i t  l a b o r  c o s t s .  I n  o r d e r  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  
im p a c t  o f  a  F T A ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  m o d e l  t h e  b e h a v i o r  o f  U . S .  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  f i r m s .
T a b l e  8  s h o w s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  im p a c t  o f  d e c i s i o n s  o f  U n i t e d  S t a te s  M N C s  o n  p r o d u c t i o n  
w o r k e r s  i n  N o r t h  A m e r i c a .  T h e  t a b l e  c o m p a r e s  e m p l o y m e n t  b y  U . S .  m u l t i n a t i o n a l s  w i th  d o m e s t i c  
U . S .  e m p l o y m e n t ,  i t  s h o w s  U . S .  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  a f f i l i a t e  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  C a n a d a  a n d  M e x i c o  c o m p a r e d  
to  t o t a l  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  t h e  U . S .  t o  c a p t u r e  a l l  t h e  s o u r c e s  o f  j o b  c r e a t i o n  a n d  j o b  lo s s  a t  h o m e  
in c l u d i n g  n a t i o n a l  f i r m s  ( t h o s e  w i th  n o  f o r e i g n  a f f i l i a t e s )  a n d  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  w i t h  a f f i l i a t e s  i n  t h e  U . S .  
a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  “ p a r e n t s ”  o f  U . S .  m u l t i n a t i o n a l s .  T h e  a b s o l u t e  l e v e l  o f  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  a f f i l i a t e  
e m p l o y m e n t  a p p e a r s  s m a l l  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  t o t a l  f o r  a l l  U . S .  m a n u f a c t u r i n g ,  b u t  t h e  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e s e  
l e v e l s  a n d  t h e  t r e n d  o f  t h o s e  c h a n g e s  o v e r  t h e  l a s t  f e w  y e a r s  a r e  o f  g r e a t  i n t e r e s t .
A l t h o u g h  a l l  t h e  a b s o l u t e  f i g u r e s  f o r  M e x ic o  in  T a b l e  8  m a y  a p p e a r  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l ,  i n  f a c t  
t h e  annual changes i n  U . S .  M N C  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  M e x i c o  a r e  l a r g e  e n o u g h  to  h a v e  a  s u b s ta n t i a l  
im p a c t  o n  t h e  U . S .  l a b o r  m a r k e t .  T h e  n u m b e r  o f  w o r k e r s  a t  M N C  a f f i l i a t e s  i n  M e x i c o  r o s e  f r o m  
3 7 0 , 2 0 0  in  1 9 8 6  t o  4 6 2 , 5 0 0  in  1 9 9 0 ,  a n  i n c r e a s e  o f  9 2 , 3 0 0  o r  2 4 . 9 % .  T h e  t o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  U . S .  
d o m e s t i c  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  p r o d u c t i o n  w o r k e r s  w a s  m u c h  l a r g e r  t o  s t a r t  w i t h ,  a b o u t  1 2 .9  m i l l i o n  in  
1 9 8 6 .  T h i s  n u m b e r  i n c r e a s e d  b y  3 9 2 ,0 0 0  ( 3 % )  f r o m  1 9 8 6  to  1 9 8 9 ,  a n d  t h e n  f e l l  b y  2 9 5 , 0 0 0  f r o m  
1 9 8 9  to  1 9 9 0 ,  f o r  a  t o t a l  i n c r e a s e  o f  o n l y  9 7 , 0 0 0  ( 0 .8 % ) .  T h u s ,  a t  t h e  m a r g i n ,  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  j o b s  
c r e a t e d  b y  U . S .  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  a f f i l i a t e s  i n  M e x i c o  is  c o m p a r a b l e  i n  m a g n i t u d e  to  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  j o b s  
c r e a t e d  i n  t h e  U . S .  d o m e s t i c  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s e c t o r  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  T h e  c la im s  t h a t  M e x i c o  is  to o  
s m a l l  t o  h a v e  a n  a p p r e c i a b l e  e f f e c t  o n  t h e  U . S .  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  w o r k  f o r c e  a r e  t h e r e f o r e  n o t  c r e d i b l e .
I n  f a c t ,  t h e  t y p e  o f  c o m p a r i s o n  m a d e  in  T a b l e  8  a c t u a l l y  u n d e r s t a t e s  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h ic h  
c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  N o r t h  A m e r i c a n  l a b o r  m a r k e t  r e f l e c t  s h i f t s  a w a y  f r o m  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta te s  
a n d  C a n a d a .  T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  o n l y  t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  U . S .  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  a f f i l i a t e s  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  w h e n  
l o o k i n g  a t  C a n a d a  a n d  M e x i c o ,  w h i l e  a l l  f i r m s  a r e  i n c l u d e d  in  t h e  U . S .  d o m e s t i c  f i g u r e s .  T h u s ,  f o r  
e x a m p l e ,  t h e  d a t a  d o  n o t  i n c l u d e  j o b s  c r e a t e d  b y  J a p a n e s e  o r  E u r o p e a n  f i r m s  in  M e x i c a n  m a n u f a c ­
t u r i n g .  T h e  d a t a  m a y  a ls o  u n d e r c o u n t  U . S .  m u l t i n a t i o n a l s ’ t r u e  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  M e x i c o .  S o m e  U .S .  
c o r p o r a t i o n s  h a v e  u s e d  “ s h e l l ”  o p e r a t i o n s  t o  l im i t  t h e  r i s k  o f  o u t r i g h t  o w n e r s h i p  o f  a  M e x i c a n  p l a n t .  
T h e s e  s h e l l  o p e r a t i o n s  s t i l l  r e s u l t  i n  i n c r e a s e d  e m p l o y m e n t  in  M e x i c o  u n d e r  t h e i r  c o n t r o l  ( S in k in  
1 9 9 0 ) .
I n  1 9 8 6 ,  C a n a d i a n  w o r k e r s  a t  U . S .  m u l t i n a t i o n a l s  r e p r e s e n t e d  2 4 .1 %  ( 4 7 2 . 7 / l , 9 5 9 ) n  o f  
C a n a d i a n  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  w o r k e r s .  D e s p i t e  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  U . S .  m u l t i n a t i o n a l s  t o  t h e  C a n a d i a n  
l a b o r  m a r k e t ,  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  C a n a d i a n  w o r k e r s  i n  U . S .  f i r m s  f r o m  1 9 8 8  to  1 9 8 9  is  o f f s e t  b y  a  n e t  
i n c r e a s e  i n  t o ta l  C a n a d i a n  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  e m p l o y m e n t .  F r o m  1 9 8 8  t o  1 9 8 9 ,  C a n a d i a n  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
e m p l o y m e n t  i n c r e a s e d  0 . 9 % ,  f r o m  2 . 0 7 2  m i l l i o n  to  2 . 0 9  m i l l i o n .  I t  a l s o  m u s t  b e  r e m e m b e r e d  t h a t  a
17. ECD, Labour Force Statistics 1969-1989 (1991). Pages 84-85.
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N o r t h  A m e r i c a n  T r a d e ,  1 9 8 9  
A l l  T r a d e  a n d  T r a d e  b y  U . S .  F o r e i g n  A f f i l i a t e s  
O p e r a t i n g  in  M e x i c o  a n d  C a n a d a  
( $  b i l l i o n )
A l l  e x p o r t s  f r o m  E x p o r t s  f r o m  U . S .  m u l t i n a t i o n a l s
l o c a t e d  i n
E x p o r t s  t o U . S . C a n a d a M e x ic o U . S . C a n a d a M e x ic o
U . S . 8 7 .9 5 2 7 . 1 6 . . . 4 0 . 1 4 7 . 2 7
C a n a d a 7 8 .8 1 . . . 1 .4 3 3 8 .1 8 . . . . . .
M e x i c o 2 4 . 9 8 .5 2 . . . 7 . 5 9 . . .
T o ta l s 1 0 3 .7 9 8 8 .3 7 2 8 . 5 9 4 5 . 7 7 4 0 . 1 4 7 . 2 7
Source: U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Survey o f Current Business, Vol. 71 (October, 1991): Table 19, page 51 and S-16, S-17 
for all U.S. trade; IMF, Direction o f Trade Statistics, Yearbook 1991, page 156 for Canada-Mexico trade statistics; and 
authors’ calculations.
d e c l i n e  i n  e m p l o y m e n t  w i t h  U . S .  f i r m s  is  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a  d e c l i n e  i n  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  C a n a d a .  T h e  
s a l e  o f  a  U . S .  a f f i l i a t e  c o u ld  l e a v e  C a n a d i a n  e m p l o y m e n t  c o n s t a n t  b u t  d e c r e a s e  C a n a d i a n  e m p l o y m e n t  
i n  U . S .  a f f i l i a t e s .  A n d ,  w h i l e  t h e  t a b l e  i n c l u d e s  e m p l o y m e n t  g r o w t h  f o r  U . S .  w o r k e r s  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  
d i r e c t  f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t  i n  t h e  U . S . ,  t h e  t a b l e  i g n o r e s  g a in s  t h a t  C a n a d i a n s  m a y  h a v e  r e a l i z e d  f r o m  
d i r e c t  f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t  f r o m  c o u n t r i e s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s .
T h e s e  s h i f t s  i n  t h e  l o c a t io n  o f  e m p l o y m e n t  b y  U n i t e d  S t a te s  f i r m s  s h o u l d  b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  
c a r e f u l l y .  T h e  f a c t  t h a t  U . S .  f i r m s  h i r e d  a s  m a n y  M e x i c a n  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  w o r k e r s  a s  C a n a d i a n  b y  
1 9 9 0  d o e s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  m e a n  t h a t  U . S .  f i r m s  a r e  p a r t  o f  t h e  c a u s e  o f  t h e  d o w n t u r n  i n  t h e  C a n a d i a n  
l a b o r  m a r k e t .  B u t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  U . S .  f i r m s  in  1 9 9 0  w e r e  s t i l l  i n c r e a s in g  t h e i r  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  M e x ic o  
w h i l e  c u t t i n g  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  t h e  U . S .  a n d  C a n a d a  m a y  b e  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  t h e  s l o w  r e c o v e r y  in  
e m p l o y m e n t  i n  t h e  U . S .  a f t e r  t h e  r e c e n t  r e c e s s i o n .  F u r t h e r ,  s h o u l d  t h a t  p a t t e r n  c o n t i n u e ,  U . S .  a n d  
C a n a d i a n  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  e m p l o y m e n t  m a y  n o t  r e t u r n  t o  t h e i r  p r e r e c e s s i o n  l e v e l s .  T h e  p o i n t  t h a t  U . S .  
f i r m s  c r e a t e d  a lm o s t  a s  m a n y  n e t  n e w  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  j o b s  i n  M e x i c o  a s  i n  t h e  U . S .  b e tw e e n  1 9 8 6  a n d  
1 9 9 0  d o e s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  i m p l y  t h a t  t h e s e  s h i f t s  a r e  a  c a u s e  o f  t h e  d o w n t u r n  i n  t h e  U . S .  m a r k e t .  
H o w e v e r ,  t h e  d a t a  d o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  s u c h  s h i f t s  m a y  b e  p a r t  o f  t h e  e x p la n a t i o n  f o r  t h e  s l o w  r e c o v e r y  o f  
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  j o b s  s i n c e  t h e  1 9 9 0 - 9 1  r e c e s s i o n .
S u p p o r t e r s  o f  t h e  N A F T A  o f t e n  a r g u e d  t h a t  c h a n g e s  i n  t o t a l  j o b s  a r e  u n i m p o r t a n t ,  a n d  o n l y  
t h e  s e c to r a l  r e a l l o c a t i o n  o f  e m p l o y m e n t  m a t t e r s .  T h e y  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  N A F T A  w i l l  c a u s e  s o m e  lo s s  
o f  l o w - w a g e  j o b s  i n  t h e  U . S .  b u t  c la i m e d  t h a t  t h i s  w i l l  o n l y  f r e e  u p  A m e r i c a n  w o r k e r s  t o  e n t e r  m o r e  
h i g h l y  p a i d  j o b s  i n  o t h e r  s e c t o r s .  I n  f a c t ,  a b o u t  t h r e e  q u a r t e r s  o f  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  j o b s  c r e a t e d  in  
M e x i c o  b y  U . S .  f i r m s  in  t h e  l a s t  s e v e r a l  y e a r s  h a v e  b e e n  in  j u s t  t w o  s e c to r s :  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n
e q u i p m e n t  ( e s p e c i a l l y  a u to m o b i l e s  a n d  p a r t s ) ,  a n d  e l e c t r o n i c s .  M a n u f a c t u r e  o f  a u to m o b i l e s  i s  a  
h i g h l y  c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e  i n d u s t r y  w i t h  a b o v e - a v e r a g e  w a g e s ,  w h i l e  e l e c t r o n i c s  i s  a  “ h i g h - t e c h ”  i n d u s t r y
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T a b l e  8
E m p l o y m e n t  o f  M a n u f a c t u r in g  P r o d u c t i o n  W o r k e r s  i n  N o r t h  A m e r i c a ,  
a t  U . S .  M u l t i n a t io n a l  A f f i l i a t e s  i n  M e x i c o  a n d  C a n a d a ,  
a n d  D o m e s t i c  M a n u f a c t u r i n g  P r o d u c t i o n  W o r k e r s  i n  t h e  U . S . ,  1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0
N u m b e r s  o f  w o r k e r s  ( ’0 0 0 )
A n n u a l  c h a n g e  in  
n u m b e r  o f  w o r k e r s  ( 1 ,0 0 0 s )
U . S .  M N C  
a f f i l i a t e s T o ta l
d o m e s t i c
U . S .
U . S .  M N C  
a f f i l i a t e s T o ta l
d o m e s t i c
U . S .I n  C a n a d a  I n  M e x ic o I n  C a n a d a I n  M e x i c o
1 9 8 6 4 7 2 . 7 3 7 0 . 2 1 2 ,8 7 7 .0 . . .
1 9 8 7 4 6 9 . 7 3 7 7 . 0 1 2 , 9 7 0 .0 - 3 . 0 6 . 8 9 3 . 0
1 9 8 8 4 8 3 . 0 3 9 7 . 4 1 3 ,2 2 1 .0 1 3 .3 2 0 . 4 2 5 1 . 0
1 9 8 9 * 4 7 5 . 6 4 4 3 . 5 1 3 , 2 6 9 .0 - 7 . 4 4 6 .1 4 8 . 0
1 9 9 0 4 5 2 . 0 4 6 2 . 5 1 2 ,9 7 4 .0 - 2 1 . 1 1 8 .5 - 2 9 5 . 0
P e r c e n t  C h a n g e T o t a l  C h a n g e
1 9 8 6 - 1 9 8 9 0 .6 % 1 9 .8 % 3 .0 % 2 . 9 7 3 . 3 3 9 2 . 0
1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 - 4 . 4 2 4 . 9 0 . 8 - 2 0 . 7 9 2 . 3 9 7 . 0
* There is a break in employment data from 1988 to 1989 caused by the Benchmark Survey taken in 1989 that was more 
inclusive than for the annual data used in 1988. In the aggregate, the benchmark caused a net decline of 46.3 thousand 
workers in all U.S. affiliates—worldwide, and regardless of industrial sector. This is because there were more losses from 
affiliates leaving the survey, than gains from affiliates being added to the survey. However, there was a net gain in 
employment among affiliates through an increase in affiliates and an increase in employment in affiliates that operated in 
both 1988 and 1989. The effect of the benchmark is only for the year to year comparison from 1988 to 1989, and data 
before 1989 with 1989 and later. The net change in worldwide U.S. affiliate employment represents 17.5 percent of the 
gross change in worldwide affiliate employment. The effect'for individual countries may vary. A revision of the data is 
forthcoming possibly in 1993.
Source: U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Survey o f Current Business, Vol. 72 (August, 1992): Table 13.1 and Table 13.2, pages 
77-78; Vol. 71 (October, 1991): Table 20.1 and Table 20.2, pages 52-53; Vol. 70 (June, 1990): Table 6, page 37; Vol. 69 
(June, 1989): Table 7, page 33 for employment by U.S. multinationals in Canada and Mexico; U.S. Dept, of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, Hours, and Earnings, United States, 1909-90, Volume 1, Bulletin 2370 (March, 1991), page 61, 
Supplement to Employment, Hours, and Earnings, United States, 1909-90 (July, 1991), page 11, and authors’ calculations. 
Numbers for U.S. affiliates’ employment in Canada and Mexico is for all manufacturing workers. Employment in the U.S. 
is for production workers only. Employment in the U.S. includes all U.S. firms including U.S. multinationals, domestic 
U.S. and foreign direct investors in the U.S.
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Table 9
U.S. Multinationals and  U.S. Domestic Employment 
Manufacturing Production Workers in Selected  Industries in Mexico and  th e  U.S.,
(Thousands of workers, 1986-1980)
Mexican Employment in Nonbank 
U.S. Affiliates in Selected Industries
U.S. Domestic Employment of Production Workers 
in Selected Industries







Motor Vehicles & 
Equipment
1986 77.2 71.8 1,184.2* 1,258.6 j 670.7
1987 83.2 73.3 1,175.2* 1,279.0 ' 673.7
1988 98.6 84.1 1,113.7 1,274.2 j 668.3
1989 110.6 92.5 1,103.9 1,279.3 ' 664.9
1990 116.5 102.6 1,055.4 1,218.3 ' 615.2
Absolute Change Absolute Change
1986-1989 33.4 20.7 -8 0 .3
1
20.7 ' -5 .8
1986-1990 39.3 30.8 -128 .8 -4 0 .3  1 ■ -5 5 .5
Percent Change Percent Change
1986-1989 43.3% 28.8% -6 .8%
■
1.6% j -0 .9%
1986-1990 50.9 42.9 -1 0 .9 -3 .2  1 1 -8 .3
* For 1986 and 1987 these are the sum of production workers in the 1989 two digit code 36, i.e. SIC 361-369.
Source: U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Survey of Current Business. Vol. 72 (August, 1992): Table 13.1 and Table 13.2, pages 77-78; Vol. 71
(October, 1991): Table 20.1 and Table 20.2, pages 52-53; Vol. 70 (June, 1990): Table 6, page 37; Vol. 69 (June, 1989): Table 7, page 33 
for employment by U.S. multinationals in Mexico; U.S. Dept, of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Hours, and Earnings. United States, 1909- 
90. Volume 1. Bulletin 2370 (March, 1991) pages 61, 290, 329 and 332, Supplement to Employment, Hours, and Earnings. United States.
1909-90 (July, 1991), pages 11, 49, and 58; and authors’ calculations.
w i t h  c lo s e - t o - a v e r a g e  w a g e s . 18 T h e s e  t w o  i n d u s t r i e s  w o u l d  p r o b a b l y  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  i m p o r t a n t  o n e s  
f o r  t h e  U . S .  t o  k e e p  i f  i t  i s  t o  m o v e  in  a  h i g h - w a g e  d i r e c t i o n .  Y e t  t h e  r e c o r d  s h o w s  t h a t  t h e  U . S .  h a s  
b e e n  s t e a d i l y  l o s i n g  j o b s  i n  t h e s e  s e c to r s  o v e r  t h e  l a s t  f e w  y e a r s ,  w h i l e  U . S .  a f f i l i a t e s  h a v e  b e e n  
i n c r e a s i n g  j o b s  v e r y  r a p i d l y  i n  t h e s e  t w o  s e c t o r s  i n  M e x i c o .
T a b l e  9  s h o w s  e m p l o y m e n t  b y  U n i t e d  S t a te s  m u l t i n a t i o n a l s  i n  e l e c t r i c a l  a n d  e l e c t r o n i c  
p r o d u c t s  a n d  in  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  e q u ip m e n t  in  M e x i c o ,  1 9 8 6 - 9 1 ,  a lo n g  w i t h  t o t a l  d o m e s t i c  e m p l o y m e n t  
i n  t h e  a n a l o g o u s  i n d u s t r i e s .  M o t o r  v e h i c l e  a n d  e q u ip m e n t  p r o d u c t i o n  w o r k e r s  a r e  s h o w n  s e p a r a t e l y  
f o r  t h e  U . S .  b e c a u s e  m o s t  o f  t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  e q u ip m e n t  j o b s  i n  M e x i c o  a r e  i n  t h a t  i n d u s t r y ,  
w h e r e a s  t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  e q u ip m e n t  c a t e g o r y  f o r  t h e  U . S .  a l s o  c o m p r i s e s  t h e  a i r c r a f t ,  s h ip  b u i l d i n g ,
18. In 1990, the average hourly wage for production and nonsupervisory workers was $10.30 in electrical 
and electronic equipment and $14.59 in motor vehicles. These may be compared with averages of $10.02 for 
the entire private sector, and $10.83 for all manufacturing. Data are from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, Supplement to Employment, Hours, and Earnings, United States, 1909-90, July 1991.
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r a i l r o a d ,  a n d  a e r o s p a c e  i n d u s t r i e s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  e q u ip m e n t  c a t e g o r y  in  t h e  U . S .  
i n c l u d e s  s o m e  e m p l o y m e n t  t r e n d s  w h i c h  a r e  n o t  d i r e c t l y  c o m p a r a b l e  t o  t h o s e  i n  M e x i c o .
W h i l e  t o t a l  U n i t e d  S t a te s  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  p r o d u c t i o n  j o b s  i n c r e a s e d  b e t w e e n  1 9 8 6  a n d  1 9 8 9 ,  a s  
s h o w n  i n  T a b l e  8 ,  U . S .  d o m e s t i c  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  t h e s e  t w o  i n d u s t r i e s  l a g g e d  b e h i n d .  U . S .  
e m p l o y m e n t  i n  t h e  e l e c t r o n i c s  i n d u s t r y  d e c l i n e d  b y  8 0 , 3 0 0  w o r k e r s  ( 6 .8 % )  f r o m  1 9 8 6  t o  1 9 8 9 ,  w h ic h  
w a s  b e f o r e  t h e  U . S .  r e c e s s i o n .  I n  t h e  m e a n t im e ,  M e x i c a n  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  U . S .  f i r m s  i n  t h a t  i n d u s t r y  
i n c r e a s e d  b y  3 3 , 4 0 0  ( 4 3 .3 % )  d u r i n g  t h a t  p e r i o d .  U . S .  d o m e s t i c  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  m o t o r  v e h ic l e s  
d e c l i n e d  b y  5 , 8 0 0  w o r k e r s  ( 0 .9 % ) ,  w h i l e  o v e r a l l  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  e q u ip m e n t  ( i n c l u d i n g  
a i r c r a f t ,  e t c . )  i n c r e a s e d  b y  2 0 , 7 0 0  ( b a r e l y  1 . 6 % ) — j u s t  o v e r  h a l f  t h e  r a t e  f o r  a l l  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
( 3 .0 % ) .  M e x i c a n  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  U . S .  f i r m s  in  t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  e q u ip m e n t  i n d u s t r y  i n c r e a s e d  b y  
2 0 , 7 0 0  ( 2 8 .8 % )  d u r i n g  t h e  1 9 8 6 - 1 9 8 9  p e r i o d .
I f  w e  m o v e  t o  1 9 9 0 ,  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  i n  a l l  t h e  s e c to r s  s h o w n  in  T a b l e  9  f e l l  
d u r i n g  t h e  r e c e s s i o n .  B u t  e m p l o y m e n t  b y  U . S .  M N C s  in  M e x i c o  in  t h e s e  s a m e  i n d u s t r i e s  c o n t i n u e d  
t o  r i s e  i n  1 9 9 0 .  O v e r  t h e  w h o l e  p e r i o d  1 9 8 6  t o  1 9 9 0  t h e s e  t w o  s e c to r s  w e r e  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  7 0 , 1 0 0  
n e w  j o b s  a t  U . S .  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  a f f i l i a t e s  i n  M e x i c o ,  o r  7 5 .9 %  o f  t h e  9 2 , 3 0 0  t o t a l  n e w  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
j o b s  i n  t h o s e  a f f i l i a t e s  o v e r  t h a t  p e r i o d .  M e a n w h i l e ,  d o m e s t i c  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  t h e s e  t w o  s e c t o r s  f e l l  
b y  a  t o t a l  o f  1 8 4 ,3 0 0  j o b s  o v e r  t h e  s a m e  p e r i o d  e v e n  t h o u g h  t o t a l  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  j o b s  i n c r e a s e d  
s l i g h t l y  i n  1 9 9 0  o v e r  1 9 8 6  ( T a b l e  8 ) .  T h u s ,  i n  t h e  v e r y  t y p e  o f  i n d u s t r i e s  w h i c h  t h e  U . S .  s h o u l d  b e  
s e e k in g  t o  p r e s e r v e ,  t h e  j o b s  c r e a t e d  in  M e x i c o  w e r e  q u i t e  l a r g e  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  j o b s  l o s t  i n  t h e  U . S .
T h e  s h i f t  i n  w o r k e r s  w a s  m a tc h e d  b y  a  s h i f t  i n  p a s s e n g e r  c a r  p r o d u c t i o n  b y  t h e  “ B ig  T h r e e ” 
a u to  m a k e r s  ( C h r y s l e r ,  F o r d ,  a n d  G e n e r a l  M o t o r s ) .  I n  1 9 8 7 ,  8 7 .2 %  o f  p a s s e n g e r  c a r s  a s s e m b le d  in  
N o r t h  A m e r i c a  b y  t h e  B ig  T h r e e  w e r e  m a d e  in  t h e  U . S . ,  a n d  2 .3 %  w e r e  m a d e  in  M e x ic o  
( c a l c u l a t i o n s  b a s e d  o n  d a t a  p r e s e n t e d  in  H e r z e n b e r g  1 9 9 1 ) .  B y  1 9 8 9 ,  t h e  U . S .  s h a r e  f e l l  t o  8 3 .6 %  
a n d  t h e  M e x i c a n  s h a r e  g r e w  to  3 . 7 % .  I n  a b s o l u t e  t e r m s ,  U . S .  a s s e m b ly  o f  B ig  T h r e e  p a s s e n g e r  c a r s  
f e l l  f r o m  6 . 5  m i l l i o n  t o  5 . 8  m i l l i o n  c a r s  b e tw e e n  1 9 8 7  a n d  1 9 8 9 ;  a  f a l l  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  1 1 . 2 % .  I n  
M e x i c o ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  p r o d u c t i o n  f o r  t h e  B ig  T h r e e  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  1 6 7 ,0 0 0  t o  2 5 4 , 0 0 0  
a u to m o b i l e s ,  a n  i n c r e a s e  o f  5 2 . 1 % .
T h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ’ s h a r e  o f  p a s s e n g e r  c a r  a s s e m b ly  b y  a l l  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  i n  N o r t h  A m e r i c a  
d e c l i n e d  f r o m  8 6 .9 %  t o  8 3 . 4 % ,  w h i l e  M e x i c o ’s  p r o d u c t i o n  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  3 .4 %  to  5 . 4 % .  T h e  
l a r g e s t  s h i f t s  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  w e r e  b y  N i s s a n  a n d  V o l k s w a g e n :  t h e  U . S .  s h a r e  o f  N i s s a n ’s  N o r t h
A m e r i c a n  p r o d u c t i o n  f e l l  f r o m  6 6 .9 %  t o  5 7 . 1 % .  I n  1 9 8 7 ,  6 0 . 4 %  o f  V o l k s w a g e n ’s  p r o d u c t i o n  w a s  in  
t h e  U . S .  T h e  c o m p a n y  n o w  p r o d u c e s  a u to s  f o r  s a l e  i n  N o r t h  A m e r i c a  o n l y  in  M e x i c o .
T h e s e  t r e n d s  r a i s e  t h e  q u e s t io n  o f  w h y  U n i t e d  S t a te s  f i r m s  h a v e  b e e n  s h i f t i n g  e m p l o y m e n t  in  
t h e s e  p a r t i c u l a r  i n d u s t r i e s  r a p i d l y  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  S u p p o r t e r s  o f  t h e  N A F T A  o f t e n  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  
i n c e n t iv e s  f o r  s u c h  j o b  s h i f t s  a r e  m in i m a l ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  l o w  w a g e s  o f  M e x i c a n  w o r k e r s  a r e  o f f s e t  b y  
t h e i r  l o w e r  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  B u t  w h i l e  M e x i c a n  l a b o r  h a s  l o w  average p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  i t  c a n  b e  h i g h ly  
p r o d u c t i v e  i n  s e c to r s  w h e r e  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  h a s  b r o u g h t  i n  u p - t o - d a t e  t e c h n o l o g y  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t .  I n  
d o m e s t i c  c o r n  p r o d u c t i o n ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  M e x i c o ’s  p r o d u c t i v i t y  is  v e r y  l o w .  B u t  i n  s e c to r s  s u c h  a s  
e l e c t r o n i c s  a n d  a u to m o b i l e s ,  i t s  p r o d u c t i v i t y  h a s  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  b e e n  c o n v e r g i n g  o n  t h a t  o f  t h e  U . S .  
r a p i d l y .  A s  M e x i c o ’s  p r o d u c t i v i t y  h a s  a p p r o a c h e d  A m e r i c a ’s  i n  t h e s e  i n d u s t r i e s ,  M e x i c o ’s  w a g e s  
h a v e  r e m a i n e d  f a r  l o w e r .  M e x i c o  h a s  a c q u i r e d  a n  e n o r m o u s  c o m p e t i t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  in  u n i t  l a b o r  c o s t s  
( w a g e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  p r o d u c t i v i t y ) .
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T h e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  a n d  w a g e s  ( h o u r l y  c o m p e n s a t i o n )  o f  M e x i c a n  w o r k e r s  r e l a t i v e  t o  U . S .  
w o r k e r s  i n  e l e c t r o n i c s  a n d  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  e q u ip m e n t  a r e  s h o w n  i n  T a b l e  1 0 . T h e  p e r i o d  c o v e r e d  is  
1 9 7 5  t o  1 9 8 4 ,  t h e  l a t e s t  p e r i o d  f o r  w h i c h  d a t a  o n  s e c to r a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  a r e  a v a i l a b l e .  M u c h  o f  t h e  
c o n v e r g e n c e  in  p r o d u c t i v i t y  b e t w e e n  t h e  U . S .  a n d  M e x i c o  is  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  s h a r e  o f  t h e  M e x i c a n  
s e c to r  t h a t  i s  m a d e  u p  o f  U . S .  f i r m s .  W i t h  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  U . S .  i n v e s tm e n t  i n  M e x i c o  in  t h e s e  s e c to r s  
s i n c e  1 9 8 4 ,  i t  i s  v e r y  l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  e v e n  f u r t h e r  c o n v e r g e n c e  i n  p r o d u c t i v i t y .
T a b l e  1 0
M e x i c a n  L a b o r  P r o d u c t i v i t y  a n d  H o u r l y  L a b o r  C o m p e n s a t i o n ,  
a s  R a t i o s  o f  U . S .  L e v e l s ,  1 9 7 5 - 1 9 8 4
1 9 7 5 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4
E l e c t r o n i c  e q u ip m e n t P r o d u c t i v i t y 0 .6 3 0 . 7 4 0 . 6 6 0 .8 3
C o m p e n s a t i o n 0 . 2 4 0 . 2 4 0 . 2 0 0 . 1 5
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  e q u ip m e n t P r o d u c t i v i t y 0 .5 3 0 .6 1 0 . 5 9 0 . 5 7
C o m p e n s a t i o n 0 .3 1 0 . 2 8 0 . 2 0 0 .1 3
Note: Productivity is measured by value added per employee. Transportation compensation is for motor vehicle equipment.
Sources: Magnus Blomstrom and Edward N. Wolff, “Multinational Corporations and Productivity Convergence in
Mexico,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3141 (Cambridge, MA: October, 1989): Table 8, 
page 25; U.S. Dept, of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Productivity and Technology, Hourly Compensation 
Costs for Production Workers, 40 Manufacturing Industries, 34 Countries, 1975 and 1979-89, Unpublished Data (September, 
1990): pages 86 and 95; and calculations of the authors.
P r o d u c t i v i t y  i s  m e a s u r e d  a s  v a l u e  a d d e d  p e r  e m p l o y e e  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y .  T h e  t a b l e  a l s o  s h o w s  
w o r k e r  c o m p e n s a t i o n  c o s t  ( w a g e s  p l u s  m a n d a t e d  a n d  n e g o t i a t e d  b e n e f i t s  a n d  t a x e s )  d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n  t h e  
t w o  i n d u s t r i e s .  D u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  s h o w n ,  t h e  c o s t  o f  e m p l o y i n g  M e x i c a n  w o r k e r s ,  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  c o s t  
o f  U . S .  w o r k e r s ,  w a s  d e c l i n in g .  I n  e l e c t r o n i c s ,  M e x i c a n  w o r k e r s ’ w a g e s  f e l l  f r o m  2 4 %  t o  1 5 %  o f  
U . S .  w a g e s  i n  t h a t  i n d u s t r y ,  a n d  in  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  e q u ip m e n t  M e x i c a n  w o r k e r s  d r o p p e d  f r o m  3 1 %  o f  
U . S .  w a g e s  t o  1 3 % .  Y e t  i n  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  e q u ip m e n t ,  M e x i c a n  w o r k e r s  w e r e  b e t w e e n  5 3 %  a n d  6 1 %  
a s  p r o d u c t i v e  a s  U . S .  w o r k e r s .  I n  t h e  e l e c t r o n i c s  i n d u s t r y ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  e v e n  m o r e  s t a r k :  
M e x i c a n  w o r k e r s  w e r e  f r o m  6 3 %  t o  8 3 %  a s  p r o d u c t i v e  a s  U . S .  w o r k e r s .  T h u s  t h e  u n i t  l a b o r  c o s t s  
o f  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  M e x i c o  a r e  m u c h  l o w e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  U . S .  I t  w o u l d  n o t  b e  s u r p r i s i n g ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  to  
s e e  U . S .  c o m p a n i e s  s e e k in g  t o  i n c r e a s e  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  M e x i c o  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  U . S .  A n d  a g a i n ,  t h e s e  
a r e  n o t  l o w - w a g e  i n d u s t r i e s  b y  U . S .  s t a n d a r d s .  T h e s e  a r e  “ h i g h - t e c h ”  ( e l e c t r o n i c s )  a n d  c a p i t a l -  
i n t e n s i v e  ( t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  e q u ip m e n t )  i n d u s t r i e s .
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The effect of slow job creation in the U.S. is reflected in the stagnant wages and benefits of 
production workers in manufacturing. As a shift in investment would suggest, there is a possibility of 
wage convergence. The shift could lead to convergence in wages through two paths. First, if the 
shifts in employment are for similar positions, the wages of U.S. production workers would drop 
toward the Mexican wage level. Or, second, if low-wage U.S. jobs are not being created but 
Mexican jobs are created at higher wages, then wages would also converge. The shifts could lead to 
a divergence in wages if Mexican wages do not rise as fast through new job creation as U.S. or 
Canadian wages by the loss of the lowest-wage workers. But Table 11 (next page) shows that this is 
occurring only in Canada.
Table 11 shows that some convergence is taking place between wages in Mexico and the 
United States. The real wage of Canadian manufacturing production workers is increasing relative to 
the Mexican and U.S. work force. During the period 1986-1989 (before the U.S. and Canadian 
recession), convergence between U.S. and Mexican wages was the result of wages in the U.S. falling 
faster than wages in Mexico: -4.4% for the U.S. compared to Mexico’s -2.4%. But while U.S. 
manufacturing production wages and employment continued to fall during the U.S. recession, 
Mexico’s production wages and employment continued to rise. As a result, over the period 1986- 
1991, the convergence in wages is almost equally divided between a rise in Mexican wages (5.3% 
higher) and a fall in U.S. wages (6.1% lower). Mexican and Canadian wages diverged between 1986 
and 1989 because Canadian wages rose while Mexican wages fell. The effect of the Canadian 
recession was a slowing of Canadian wage growth. For the period 1986-1991, there is some 
convergence between Canadian and Mexican wages because Canadian wages did not rise as fast as 
Mexico’s.
The pattern of job creation and changes in wages for the period 1986-1990 is consistent with 
U.S. companies’ creating jobs in Mexico that are similar to those no longer being created in the U.S. 
These data on shifts in employment in specific industries, productivity differences, and compensation 
differences suggest that the current trends in employment location may be more than short-lived. It 
should be remembered that six years is a short period, and they include the most recent U.S. and 
Canadian recessions. The 1990 U.S. recession, as a macroeconomic phenomenon, had many causes 
and, measured by lost GDP, it was short and shallow. The correlation of employment and wage 
movements between the U.S. and Mexico in the 1986-1990 period does not prove a causal relation­
ship, and the effect of such a shift on the entire U.S. work force may not be entirely negative. If 
employment and wages are rising elsewhere, this trend—if it is a trend—would represent only part of 
the reshaping of the U.S. labor market.
The effect of slow job creation in U.S. manufacturing is also reflected in the wages of U.S. 
workers. Table 12 shows the wages of U.S. men, by education, for the period 1987-1990. The 
wages reported are weighted by the number of workers rather than by the number of hours to control 
for the bias of excluding low-wage workers during economic downturns. The table makes it clear 
that, for all education levels except two years of postgraduate college study, real wages have been 
falling. Since only 7.8% of the U.S. male work force has two years of postgraduate college study, 
this means that real wages have been falling for over 90% of U.S. men during this period. The table
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Table 11
Hourly Compensation* of Production Workers in Manufacturing 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States, 1986-1991
Real compensation in home currency Real compensation in US$, 1991 
(1991 prices)
Canada Mexico U.S. Canada Mexico U.S.
1986 19.29 6,221.23 16.46 $16.84 $2.06 $16.46
1987 19.15 5,813.88 16.19 16.71 1.93 16.19
1988 19.32 5,591.26 16.02 16.86 1.85 16.02
1989 19.41 6,071.21 15.73 16.93 2.01 15.73
1990 19.74 6,222.31 15.52 17.23 2.06 15.52
1991 19.84 6,549.00 15.45 17.31 2.17 15.45
Percent change: 
1986-1989 0.6% -2.4% -4.4% 0.5% -2.4% -4.4%
1986-1991 2.8 5.3 -6 .1 2.8 5.3 -6 .1
* Hourly compensation includes all payments made directly to the worker (pay for time worked—basic time and piece 
rates plus overtime premiums, shift differentials, other premiums, and bonuses paid regularly each pay period, and cost- 
of-living adjustments, pay for time not worked—vacations, holidays, and other leave, seasonal or irregular bonuses and 
other special payments, selected social allowances, and the cost of payments in kind—before payroll deductions of any 
kind) and employer expenditures for legally required insurance programs and contractual and private benefit plans.
Source: For wage data and exchange rates, U.S. Dept. Of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, International Comparisons of 
Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers in Manufacturing, 1991, Report 825 (June 1992) Table 4, page 8 and 
Table 6, page 10; for inflation adjustment using consumer price index, International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics, Volume XLV (April, 1992) Pages 150, 370 and 554; and calculations of the authors.
also shows the real wages of men in 1973, which reveal that the recent declines in wages are part of a 
longer-term trend. The lower price levels that are supposed to result from the lower unit labor costs 
embodied in imported goods have not been sufficient to benefit U.S. workers. Instead, the wages of 
U.S. workers have not kept pace with inflation. So far, only a tiny fraction of U.S. workers have 
benefited from the mix of U.S. trade and domestic policies.
In addition, the U.S. labor market has shown structural weakening since the late 1960s. 
Table 13 shows unemployment rates during each expansion and contraction of the U.S. economy, 
beginning with the peak in March 1969. Until July 1990, each successive peak followed a path of 
higher and higher unemployment, and even the July 1990 unemployment rate of 5.5% was still well 
above the rates at the cyclical peaks in 1969 and 1973. Up to 1982, each recession trough occurred
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Table 12
U.S. Men, All Industries, All Occupations, Real Wages 
(constant US$, 1991, 1973 and 1987-1990)
High-school High-school Four years of College plus 2
drop-out graduate college years
1973 11.48 13.50 18.99 21.09
1987 9.35 11.55 17.55 20.85
1988 9.29 11.43 17.38 20.74
1989 9.01 11.15 17.13 21.05
1990 8.70 10.88 17.14 21.20
Percentage change:
1987-1990 -7.0% -5.8% -2.3% 1.7%
1973-1990 -24.2% -19.4% -9.7% 0.5%
Source: Lawrence Mishel and Jared Bernstein, “Declining Wages for High School and College Graduates: Pay and Benefits 
Trends by Education, Gender, Occupation, and State, 1979-1991,’’ Economic Policy Institute (Washington, DC: 1992); and 
authors’ calculations.
at a higher and higher unemployment rate. While the most recent recession looks better by the 
criterion of theunemployment rate, it actually demonstrated worse labor-market performance by other 
criteria. With the number of jobs virtually unchanged for more than a year after the official recession 
trough (March 1991), the unemployment rate continued to rise well into the recovery and reached a 
maximum of 7.6% in June 1992 (shown as the most recent recession trough in the table).19
The data reviewed here show that the U.S. labor market has been deteriorating in its ability to 
provide rising real wages and expanding employment opportunities for the last 25 years. In light of 
this worsening performance, the enhanced freedom of firms to shift jobs under the NAFTA must be 
given careful consideration. The protection afforded to cross-border investment shifts under the 
NAFTA is far greater than the ability of labor markets to handle the resulting shifts in employment 
patterns, and there is no coordination of labor market policies across the three North American 
partners.
19. In the first 22 months after the cycle trough (March 1991 to January 1993), the increase of 498,000 jobs 
was only 0.5% of the pre-recession peak level of total employment. Except for the abortive 1980-81 recovery, 
this was far and away the slowest job growth in a recovery in any business cycle since the late 1960s. Based on 
authors’ calculations from unpublished U.S. Department of Labor, BLS data for 1992, and the U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, October 1992, for earlier data.
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Table 13 
Workers in the United States:
Peak-to-Peak and Trough-to-Trough Unemployment Rates 
(All civilian workers, seasonally adjusted)












Note: According to standard criteria, the last cyclical trough was reached in March 1991 when the unemployment rate
was only 6.8%. However, due to the unusually slow recovery that followed, unemployment continued to rise for 
more than a year and reached a peak of 7.6% in June 1992. The latter month is shown in the table.
Sources: Dates of business cycles (except trough in 1992), U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, Vol. 71 
(October 1991): page C-45. Unemployment rates, monthly, seasonally adjusted, U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Survey of 
Current Business, Vol. 71 (October 1991): page S-10, and U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Business Statistics, 1961-88 
(December 1989): page 249.
Indeed, labor market policies in the United States are not prepared to handle the quick shifts 
in conditions brought about by increased international capital mobility and economic integration. The 
inadequacy of U.S. policies can be inferred from the data on government spending on labor market 
programs. Table 14 compares public expenditure on labor market programs in the U.S., Canada, and 
Germany. Germany is shown since many like to compare the issues faced by the U.S. and Canada 
by the inclusion of Mexico in a NAFTA with the issues faced by Germany with the inclusion of Spain 
and Portugal in the EC. The data shown are for the same period shown above, 1986-1990.
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Public Expenditure on Labor-Market Programs as a Percentage 
Canada, Germany, and the United States, 1986-1990
Program 1986 1987 1988
of GDP 
1989 1990
Labor market training 0.35 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.27
Youth measures 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
All active measures“ 0.62 0.55 0.50 0.51 0.52
Income maintenance1 1.86 1.64 1.57 1.57
Labor market training 0.24 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.38
Youth measures 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04
All active measures“ 0.91 1.01 1.07 1.02 1.02
Income maintenance1* 1.32 1.36 1.36 1.22 1.16
Labor market training 0.12 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 1 0.10 0.09
Youth measures 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
All active measures“ 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.25
Income maintenance1* 0.56 0.51 0.44 0.47 0.60
* For the U.S. and Canada data are for fiscal years beginning and ending with calendar years
1986-87 and 1990-91.
a. Active labor market policies include public employment services and administration; labor
market training (including training for unemployed adults and those at risk, and training for 
employed adults); youth measures (including measures for unemployed and disadvantaged 
youth, and support of apprenticeship and related forms of general youth training); subsidized 
employment (including subsidies to regular employment in the private sector, support of 
unemployed persons starting enterprises and direct job creation in the public or non-profit 
sector); and, measures for the disabled (including vocational rehabilitation and work for the 
disabled).
b. Income maintenance includes unemployment compensation and early retirement for labor
market reasons.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (July 1991): pp. 239, 241, and 249.
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The shifts in job creation that are already occurring, and which are likely to accelerate under 
the NAFTA, imply that labor training and support for training youth will be very important. Though 
all three countries invest roughly equal percentages of their GDP on youth, Germany invests 
proportionally far more than the U.S. or Canada in training for adult workers. Even more disturbing 
is that during the period under discussion Germany was increasing its commitment to training as the 
U.S. and Canada decreased theirs. Canada began the period behind Germany in investment in active 
measures to shape its labor market (0.62% to Germany’s 0.91%), but ahead in the key area of 
training (0.35% to Germany’s 0.24%) and slightly behind in youth measures (0.02% to Germany’s
0.05%). Only in the area of youth measures are the U.S. and Germany investing at roughly the same 
rates. At the end of the period (1990) Germany was investing at a rate that was only 0.01% of GDP 
higher (0.04% for Germany to 0.03 for the U.S.) than for the United States. But, for total active 
labor market policies, the U.S. is investing in its work force at a rate that is one quarter that of 
Germany.
There is no support in the current pattern of job creation in the United States for the notion 
that more of the same policies will lead to increased incomes in the United States. Instead, the 
current pattern of slow creation of manufacturing production jobs in the U.S. and faster creation of 
those jobs outside the U.S. exacerbates a longer downward trend in the U.S. labor market. The labor 
market policies of the U.S. have been inadequate to reverse that trend, and are certainly inadequate to 
cope with even greater shifts in the labor market. This weak labor market gave U.S. workers great 
pause during the NAFTA debate. Policies that encourage a shift in U.S. investment in hopes of 
changing U.S. trade patterns to offset job losses from investment shift are not showing themselves to 
be sufficient to reverse deterioration in the U.S. labor market. Absent some other policies, if the 
logic of the NAFTA is pushed into a WHFTA, we would not expect any significant income growth in 
the United States from U.S. workers moving to higher wage jobs.
Table 15













Note: Data for 1989 and 1990 are, respectively, preliminary and estimated figures. 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI).
150
Beyond NAFTA: Employment, Growth, and Income-distribution Effects o f  a WHFTA
It is far from clear that losses for American workers are necessarily gains for Mexican 
workers. Table 11 showed that the real wages of Mexican production workers fell after Mexico 
joined GATT in 1986, and returned to that level only in 1990. Only since 1990 have they made real 
gains from the opening of the Mexican economy. The economy-wide gains of Mexican workers are 
even less clear. Table 15 shows wages as a share of Mexico’s GDP. Prior to the debt crisis, 
Mexican wages were between one third and two fifths of Mexico’s GDP—37.6% to 35.3%. After the 
debt crisis and before the opening of the Mexican economy, the share of wages fell to slightly under 
one third of GDP—28.3% to 29.4%. And after the opening of the Mexican economy in 1986, the 
wage share is estimated to have fallen to around one fourth to slightly less than one sixth of GDP: 
26.5% to 15.0%.
Of course, new job creation from foreign direct investment is only one element of the health 
in a labor market. Any positive effect can be easily dwarfed by macroeconomic policy. In 
particular, policies aimed at containing inflation by fiscal authorities, or currency management by 
central bankers can be more important. Workers in the hemisphere may not see the theoretical 
benefits touted by the economic modelers of trade because of macroeconomic forces that are more 
important. As an example, Mexico’s labor market may not be seeing the benefits of a shift in job 
creation because of measures taken to keep the peso’s exchange value high in order to control 
inflation, which produced high interest rates and a trade deficit in the early 1990s. The high interest 
rates in turn tend to shift GDP towards interest payments and away from wages unless productivity 
can increase at a very fast rate.
Table 16
Employment by Nonbank Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Parent Companies,
Other Western Hemisphere, Selected Countries and the Caribbean, 




Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia
Dominican
Republic Caribbean Venezuela
1977 976.9 108.0 435.7 10.1 61.3 46.6 49.1 101.2
1982 880.3 80.6 425.6 12.7 54.5 12.6 44.0 102.7
1983 799.7 82.1 377.0 12.6 54.0 10.9 41.8 83.4
1984 786.7 81.0 377.0 12.7 51.7 10.6 41.2 76.4
1985 764.6 70.9 392.0 11.9 50.2 7.4 32.5 74.3
1986 753.3 68.4 403.2 13.2 40.7 9.8 29.2 68.2
1987 795.1 68.4 432.7 12.9 44.2 9.7 29.5 74.3
1988 791.1 67.4 424.6 14.5 45.8 11.6 28.9 71.6
1989 780.7 60.3 440.1 18.6 39.4 18.1 28.0 60.1
1990 781.8 57.7 445.0 22.0 40.1 18.7 27.8 61.7
Note: “Other Western Hemisphere” is the Western Hemisphere excluding the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. The 
Caribbean column includes the Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Jamaica, the Netherlands Antilles, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and the United Kingdom Islands.
Source: U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, Vol. 71 (October 1991): Table 4, page 34; and 
Vol. 72 (August 1992), Tables 13.1 and 13.2, pages 77-78.
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Table 16 shows employment with United States multinationals in Latin America and the rest 
of the Western Hemisphere except Canada and Mexico, and in specific countries. This table shows 
total employment with U.S. multinationals including all industries. Overall employment with U.S.- 
based firms in the hemisphere is down from earlier. The pattern in most countries is a drop in 
economic activity following the debt crisis in 1982, with a slow recovery beginning in 1985-1986. 
Job creation from U.S. multinationals has followed the health of the local economies.
However, countries such as Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela show a persistent decline in 
job growth from U.S. foreign direct investment. The most dramatic growth has been in the Domini­
can Republic, though this is still far below the higher levels of the 1970s. The Dominican Republic, 
like Mexico, has an “in-bond” manufacturing sector that enjoys favorable duties in the United States. 
It is also closer to major U.S. markets than many other countries in the hemisphere.
Chile has also experienced growth, but not in manufacturing. Most Chilean jobs with United 
States-based companies are in other industries. If a WHFTA reinforces current trends, then it is not 
likely that many other countries will see investment-led job growth in manufacturing unless their 
economies are healthier. And it is possible that if barriers are lowered for intrahemispheric trade, the 
investment that has been induced to avoid trade barriers may not be present even if the local 
economies are healthier. Existing job creation patterns, like the trade patterns discussed in the 
previous section, may create more pitfalls for the poorer Latin American countries.
4. Foreign Investment and the Macroeconomics of Western Hemisphere Integration
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the main impetus for the NAFTA and WHFTA 
proposals, both for American business and for Latin American governments, is the prospect of 
massive new infusions of foreign investment (especially direct investment) into Latin America. This 
section will analyze recent trends in U.S. foreign investment in Mexico and what those trends imply 
for future growth and job creation in North America. As before, this study will consider the extent to 
which these trends are likely to be followed in the rest of Latin America under a WHFTA.
Creating an Integrated Capital Market
Although the NAFTA is, on the surface, a trade liberalization agreement, in fact it is just as 
concerned (if not more so) with investment liberalization. The NAFTA contains stringent and 
unprecedented guarantees for foreign investment in each country, intended mainly to secure U.S. 
multinational firms from nationalization or even more moderate restrictions on the mobility of their 
capital invested in Mexico. Coupled with provisions to liberalize trade in financial services, it is clear 
that the goal of the NAFTA is to create an integrated capital market along with an integrated goods 
market—although no integration of labor markets was contemplated. NAFTA will therefore have 
repercussions for capital flows both within North America and with other regions. This makes it 
imperative to consider the macroeconomic repercussions of what is really a free trade and investment 
agreement.
152
Beyond NAFTA: Employment, Growth, and Income-distribution Effects o f  a WHFTA
Macroeconomic Repercussions for the United States20
It is ironic that the prospects for increased capital mobility under NAFTA have been the 
source for the biggest projected gains and losses in output and employment for the United States. 
American NAFTA supporters such as Dornbusch (1991) and Hufbauer and Schott (1992) argue that 
an increased net capital outflow from the U.S. to Mexico will improve the U.S. current account 
balance, ceteris paribus, and thus raise U.S. GDP and employment.21 American NAFTA critics 
such as Koechlin et al. (1992) have assumed that increased foreign investment in Mexico comes 
largely if not exclusively at the expense of domestic investment in the U.S., thus causing losses of 
output and employment there.
To sort out this debate, it is necessary to recall the national income identity:
GDP = C + I + G +  ( X - M ) ,
where C is personal consumption expenditures, I is gross domestic investment, G is government 
purchases, X  is exports of goods and services, and M is imports of goods and services.22 Based on 
this identity, it is clear that both sides in the debate took only partial and incomplete approaches to the 
question of income determination (and employment determination, assuming employment is roughly 
proportional to GDP in the short run). The supporters looked mainly at the likely changes in the 
trade balance, X —M, arguing that these are likely to be positive for the U.S. The critics looked 
mainly at the domestic investment term 7, claiming that it is likely to be reduced in the U.S. Critics 
also tended to argue that the U.S. trade balance X—M would be decreased by the NAFTA, as the 
U.S. imports more labor-intensive manufactures from Mexico. Each side implicitly assumed that the 
effects considered by the other side either would not happen or would be inconsequential.
A more complete analysis must address both the question of how much foreign capital will be 
invested in Mexico as a result of the NAFTA, and the degree to which this capital will be diverted 
from domestic investment in the United States. Consider, for example, a decision by an American 
corporation to relocate a particular production activity from Michigan to Monterrey. This will entail 
capital outflows and, at least initially, reduced investment at the company’s facilities in the U.S. The 
question is whether that reduced investment will automatically be replaced by some other investment. 
Supporters of NAFTA essentially assumed that this corporation or other corporations would
20. The discussion in this section draws heavily on Blecker (1993), which provides a formal mathematical 
model for some of the relationships discussed here.
21. Of course, this argument implied that Mexico would have increased trade deficits. But this need not 
reduce employment in Mexico, and may even increase it, if one assumes that Mexican industry operates at full 
capacity. With output and employment constrained by available capital, a current account deficit brought about 
by increased capital inflows can relieve the domestic savings and foreign exchange constraints in a two-gap 
model, thus permitting increased investment and capital accumulation.
22. In the American national income accounts, public sector investment is included in G; most other 
countries’ national accounts include public sector investment in 7. Using GDP as the income aggregate, the 
trade balance (X—M) excludes net factor income (factor service receipts) from abroad. Those would be 
included if a GNP aggregate were used instead.
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necessarily fill the void by investing in new activities, perhaps targeted at exports to Mexico. Critics 
of NAFTA questioned whether this is likely to happen.
Traditional neoclassical economic theory, which assumes that investment is determined by 
available savings, implies that the savings thus released will necessarily find a more profitable outlet 
somewhere else in the country. But even that conclusion need not hold once the capital markets of 
the two countries are integrated. That is precisely why the capital market integration features of the 
NAFTA are so important. Even if investment is constrained by savings in the aggregate, in an 
integrated North American capital market that would only imply that North American savings would 
have to be used to finance investment somewhere in North America—not necessarily in the country 
where those savings originate. And if one takes the Keynesian view that investment is the indepen­
dent variable, and savings adjust (through changes in income levels and factor shares), then there is 
not even any sense in which there is a predetermined amount of savings “released” which must find 
an outlet somewhere. In that case, there could be no presumption of the foregone domestic 
investment being replaced.
The issue of capital flows is further complicated by the potential for investment diversion 
effects. For example, a U.S. (or foreign) corporation with operations in several countries could 
decide to increase its investments in Mexico at the expense of its investments in another developing 
country, rather than at the expense of its investments in the United States. This would bring new 
foreign capital into Mexico, but without producing capital outflows from the U.S. As an alternative, 
a foreign corporation seeking access to the U.S. market could decide to invest in Mexico rather than 
in the U.S. itself, once trade barriers were eliminated. This would reduce domestic investment in the 
U.S., but without creating a capital outflow from the U.S. that would improve the trade balance. 
Given these complexities, it is hard to know a priori whether the increase in (X—M) or decrease in I 
will predominate in the U.S. macroeconomy. The estimation of the relative importance of the 
different factors involved is an important priority for research on this topic.
Furthermore, the dynamics of the foreign capital flows must be considered. Presumably, a 
large capital outflow is the result of a stock-adjustment process. American firms respond to lower 
perceived risks and higher expected discounted profits from operations in Mexico, as a result of the 
trade and investment liberalization provisions of NAFTA, by increasing their desired stocks of capital 
in Mexico. Capital outflows then occur over time as needed to bring actual stocks of U.S. assets in 
Mexico into line with the new desired level. Considerable lags may prolong this adjustment process 
because of such factors as sunk costs in U.S. facilities, learning about suitable foreign locations, 
obtaining the necessary financing, training of workers, construction of new facilities, etc. Investment 
projects may also be delayed by slowdowns in demand growth (the accelerator effect) or shortfalls of 
cash flows (which may constrain external as well as internal financing in imperfect capital markets). 
In addition, some of the increased investment in Mexico is financed with locally raised capital, which 
does not result in capital outflows from the U.S.
Once the new level of desired foreign capital in Mexico is reached, we would expect the net 
new capital outflows from the U.S. to be reduced. At that point, the U.S. trade balance with Mexico
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would fall.23 At best, then, the prediction of huge net capital outflows is valid for the short-to- 
medium run, but is not likely to be sustained in the long run. And even this analysis assumes a stable 
adjustment of foreign capital in Mexico to a new desired level; the swings in the balance of payments 
could be even more dramatic if there is a boom-bust cycle characterize by overinvestment in Mexico 
in the short run followed by a subsequent withdrawal of capital as occurred in U.S. bank lending to 
Latin America in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
What will be sustained in the long run are the changes in the competitiveness of each 
country’s industries that follow from the new locational pattern of investment. In this respect, the 
long-term consequences for the U.S. trade balance could well be negative, once the net capital flows 
(and the associated exports of capital equipment produced in the U.S.) fall off. As argued in the 
previous section, if plants located in Mexico are able to combine highly productive modern 
technology with continued low wages to produce manufactured goods with comparatively low unit 
labor costs, they can undersell American products in a wide range of products including some that are 
apparently “capital-intensive” or “high-tech” (such as autos and electronics). Such competitive 
advantages could be offset by appreciation of the peso, by increased wages of production workers in 
Mexico, or by shifts of U.S. manufacturing into more knowledge-based products where labor costs 
are less important. But even if the net effects on U.S. employment are minimal in the long run, the 
gross job losses and dislocations in sectors such as automobiles, textiles, and electronics are likely to 
be considerable.
The integration of capital markets also has important implications for the exchange-rate 
dimension of the NAFTA and, by extension, of a WHFTA.24 The peso is somewhat overvalued in 
real terms. This is partly a deliberate consequence of Mexico’s anti-inflationary policies, and partly 
the result of the increased capital inflows into Mexico in recent years, and in turn helps to account for 
Mexico’s growing trade deficit in the early 1990s. Indeed, the real appreciation of the peso is an 
important “transmission mechanism” for endogenously making the trade balance adjust to the capital 
account surplus (just as occurred with the U.S. dollar in the early 1980s). If the NAFTA causes 
capital inflows into Mexico to grow even more, and if Mexico retains its current anti-inflationary 
fiscal and monetary policies, the peso could rise even more in real terms in the short run. This would 
help ameliorate the possible negative effects of any investment shifts on the U.S. by making Mexican 
products relatively less competitive and helping to ensure a bilateral U.S. trade surplus with Mexico 
over the first few years of the agreement. But this would also lessen some of the short-term gains to 
Mexico. And this is also a warning to other Latin American countries contemplating entering a 
WHFTA; Latin American countries have a long history of micro-level export-promotion policies that 
fail partly because of exchange rate misalignment.25
23. The current account balance would fall less than the trade balance due to increased net inflows of 
investment income. However, net investment income is not included in the (X—M) term when the national 
income identity is defined in terms of GDP.
24. The following discussion was suggested by a conversation with Daniel Schydlowsky.
25. Often, Latin American currencies have become overvalued as a result of high differential inflation rates 
(relative to the industrial countries) not fully offset by nominal devaluations. While the current Mexican case is 
similar in this regard, the Mexican government is doing this consciously as an anti-inflationary measure.
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In the long run, however, the overvaluation of the Mexican peso cannot be sustained 
indefinitely. Once the net capital inflows fall, there will be downward pressure on the peso and it 
will be in Mexico’s competitive interest to allow that to happen, assuming fears of high inflation have 
subsided by then. This would threaten the U.S. with trade deficits, but there would be little the U.S. 
could do as there is no agreement in the NAFTA to stabilize exchange rates. As in Europe, then, the 
integration of commodity and capital markets will bring pressures for exchange rate management, 
macroeconomic policy coordination, and possibly a monetary union. While no politicians in North 
America have dared to make such suggestions yet, the European experience suggests that they may 
not be far off. The recent conflict between Germany and the other countries in the European 
Monetary System (EMS) over interest rates and exchange-rate parities demonstrated the problems that 
smaller countries can face when the hegemonic power in a trading (and monetary) bloc decides to 
base its policies on domestic considerations, with no concern for the effects on the other states in the 
bloc.
These same dynamics of capital flows, investment shifts, and exchange-rate effects will be 
played out across Latin America to a greater or lesser extent, and with different variations, if a 
WHFTA is created. One would expect, however, that the total amount of U.S. capital that might 
move to Latin America over the next few decades is not unlimited, and that the addition of more 
countries to the Western Hemisphere trading bloc will only dilute the effects on any individual 
country such as Mexico. Thus, the formation of a WHFTA is not likely to add greatly to the 
aggregate costs and benefits to the U.S. of integrating its capital market with Mexico, but it could 
divert some of the gains Mexico hopes to realize to other Latin American countries. Indeed, the fear 
of diversion of capital to Mexico under a NAFTA may account in part for the interest of some other 
Latin American countries in joining a WHFTA when prospective trade gains alone are not likely to be 
large.
Recent Trends in U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America
It is often argued that the amounts of U.S. FDI in Mexico are inconsequential for its 
economy. It is true that the magnitudes are small, although how small depends on the basis of 
comparison. The largest predictions of job gains or losses for the U.S. from NAFTA are on the 
order of 500,000, less than 0.5% of total U.S. employment. Nevertheless, just as the job creation by 
U.S. MNCs in manufacturing in Mexico has been substantial in comparison with the job creation in 
domestic U.S. manufacturing, so the increases in U.S. FDI in manufacturing in Mexico have also 
been impressive.
Often, the magnitudes of FDI are dismissed as negligible by comparison with total U.S. gross 
private domestic investment, which has been on the order of $700-800 billion since 1987. But this 
total includes roughly $200 billion of residential investment, which is clearly internationally 
immobile, as well as some nonresidential structures and equipment that are also largely irrelevant to 
the issues in the NAFTA debate (e.g., commercial and office buildings). Since most of the concern 
in this debate is over the fate of American manufacturing, the most relevant benchmark is new plant 
and equipment expenditures (NP&EE) in domestic manufacturing.
Table 17 presents data on U.S. FDI in manufacturing to Mexico and other developing 
countries over the last five years, compared with U.S. domestic NP&EE in manufacturing. At first
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glance, even these FDI figures look small by comparison. As of 1991, total FDI in manufacturing in 
all developing countries was only about 4% of domestic NP&EE in manufacturing, of which about 
one third went to Mexico. But what is more noteworthy are the trends in these data. While U.S. 
domestic NP&EE rose by only 30% from 1987 to 1991, manufacturing FDI by U.S. multinationals in 
all developing countries rose by 69%, and U.S. manufacturing FDI in Mexico rose by 222% (i.e., 
more than tripled) during the first four years following Mexico’s liberalization of foreign investment 
rules.
The extent to which this extraordinary growth came at the expense of domestic investment in 
the United States versus foreign investment in other countries is impossible to tell. Some evidence for 
investment diversion is found in the fact that the Mexican share of all U.S. FDI in manufacturing in 
developing countries rose from 19% in 1987 to 35% in 1991. U.S. domestic NP&EE in 
manufacturing fell in 1991 due largely to the recession, but could possibly have been higher than it 
actually was if capital outflows to Mexico (and other countries) had not continued to be strong. It is 
plausible, although there is no definitive proof, to surmise that the unusually sluggish behavior of 
domestic investment in the U.S. economic recovery in 1991-92 may have been due, to some degree, 
to the fact that American and foreign companies were shifting their North American manufacturing 
investment to other nations such as Mexico.
Finally, the data in Table 17 may give some hints about the interest of other Latin American 
nations in a hemispheric FTA with similar provisions on foreign investment. After a boom in 1988- 
89, U.S. FDI in manufacturing in other Latin American countries fell off sharply in 1990 and 1991 
while the FDI in Mexico continued to grow. It is possible that the rest of Latin America was already 
feeling some diversion of U.S. FDI to Mexico. This would support the view that the rest of Latin 
America seeks a WHFTA in part as a defensive move to prevent Mexico from capturing a larger 
share of U.S. FDI (as well as trade) in the western hemisphere.
The Question of Markets
In all of the discussions of the NAFTA and WHFTA there has been remarkably little attention 
to the problem of generating effective demand sufficient to utilize fully the increased productive 
capacity that would result from greater capital flows and technology transfers. Indeed, there is 
considerable incongruity between the expectations of Mexicans and other Latin Americans that export- 
led growth will cure their economic ills on the one hand, and on the other the current concerns in the 
U.S. and the EC—the main sources of demand for Latin American exports—that the 1990s will be a 
decade of slow growth. It would be tragic for Latin America if it were to embark on a liberal trading 
regime for the first time in over a half century, only to find that the industrialized countries were 
entering a period of depressed global market expansion.
In the mid-1980s, the great motor of world demand growth was the expansionary fiscal policy 
of the United States under President Ronald Reagan. U.S. budget deficits, coupled with debt-financed 
spending by American businesses and households, contributed to huge trade deficits at a time when 
most foreign countries were pursuing contractionary macro policies (Blecker 1991a, 1992). The 
resulting trade surpluses for Japan, the former West Germany, and the East Asian NICs (principally 
South Korea and Taiwan) in the mid-1980s in turn stimulated their economies, and in the late 1980s 
led to pressures on those countries to appreciate their currencies and expand their demand in order to
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Table 17
U.S. Direct Investment in Manufacturing in Mexico and Other 








U.S. direct foreign investment 











1987 141.1 0.8 1.8 1.7 4.3
1988 163.5 1.3 3.0 1.6 6.0
1989 183.8 1.6 5.7 1.6 8.8
1990 192.6 2.4 3.2 2.4 8.1
1991 183.6 2.5 2.0 2.6 7.2
Percent of U.S. new plant and equipment expenditures
1987 0.56% 1.26% 1.19% 3.01%
1988 0.82% 1.86% 0.97% 3.65%
1989 0.86% 3.10% 0.84% 4.81%
1990 1.27% 1.66% 1.26% 4.18%
1991 1.39% 1.09% 1.44% 3.91%
Rate of increase, 1987-91
30.2% 221.9% 11.8% 57.8% 69.0%
Sources: U.S. direct investment abroad is from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of 
Current Business, various August issues; new plant and equipment expenditures for U.S. domestic manufacturing are from 
Bureau of the Census data reported in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic Indicators, June 1992, p. 10; 
and authors’ calculations.
redress the “global imbalances.” Thus soaring American demand for foreign products spilled over 
into an economic boom in the 1980s, a less than global boom since most of Latin America and sub- 
Saharan Africa were left out.
But the 1980s are past, and the proverbial chickens have come home to roost. In 1990-91 the 
U.S. suffered a recession which, although not unusually deep, was unusually prolonged. Although 
the recession officially ended in mid-1991, the annual growth rate from 1991 to 1992 was only 2.1%,
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and the prerecession peak real GDP of $4,902.7 billion (in constant 1987 dollars) in second quarter 
1990 was not surpassed until the third quarter of 1992.26 With a budget deficit on the order of $300 
billion, a national debt approaching $4 trillion, and an annual net interest bill of over $200 billion,27 
the U.S. government was unable to play its traditional countercyclical role in stimulating the economy 
during the recovery.
At the same time, U.S. corporations and households have been struggling with huge debt 
overhangs and are reluctant to increase capital expenditures. Banks in turn are seeking to restore 
their balance sheets after more than a decade of imprudent lending (which continued domestically 
after they were curtailed in Latin America) and are rationing credit even to creditworthy customers. 
The legacies of the excesses of the 1980s have become obstacles to renewed U.S. growth in the 
1990s.
In February 1993 President Clinton revealed his economic program, which combined a 
modest fiscal stimulus with larger tax increases, with the net effect of cutting the projected annual 
federal budget deficit by about $140 billion by 1997. This essentially contractionary shift in fiscal 
policy will further slow the medium-term growth of the U.S. economy while holding other factors 
constant. Reductions in long-term interest rates and further dollar depreciation could partly offset the 
contractionary effects of reducing the budget deficit, but the most likely scenario is for continued slow 
growth of the U.S. economy in the mid-1990s. Putting all this together, the prospects for rapid 
growth of the U.S. consumer market in the 1990s are poor.
The picture is not much better in other potential markets for Latin American exports. 
European growth has been slowed by the high interest-rate policy of Germany, adopted by the 
Bundesbank in response to the high fiscal costs of integrating the former East Germany into the 
Federal Republic. On the other side of the world, Japan is in a recession and most of the other major 
economies of East Asia are competitors of Latin America rather than potential markets.
For Latin America all of this implies that this is a particularly risky time to be putting all of 
its eggs in the one basket of a FTA with the United States. Especially if the Latin American nations 
are counting on exports to the U.S. to fuel their own recovery and growth, they could be setting 
themselves up for a major disappointment. Of course, their exports can grow in the short run as 
industry relocates to Mexico or other Latin America nations, either at the expense of American 
manufacturing or through investment diversion from East Asia. But these will be one-time static 
gains unless the overall U.S. market starts to grow again.
In this century, Latin America has had a long and sorry history of implementing new 
development strategies just when the conditions that motivated them passed. Import substitution 
policies were largely a response to the stagnation of the 1930s, when global depression led to 
collapsing commodity prices and the wartime shortages of the 1940s. But import substitution policies 
were pursued most strongly between the 1950s and the 1970s, when global markets were generally
26. Data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, "Gross Domestic Product: 
Fourth Quarter 1992 (Preliminary)," release of February 26, 1993, and U.S. Congress, Joint Economic 
Committee, Economic Indicators, December 1992.
27. Data from U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic Indicators, December 1992.
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booming and those developing nations that did choose an export-oriented strategy did relatively well. 
In the 1980s, the East Asian NICs took advantage of the United States’ open markets and demand- 
driven boom to achieve rapid export-led growth, while most Latin American countries were struggling 
to recover from the debt crisis and to implement “stabilization” and “structural adjustment” policies. 
Now, just when Asia and Europe are turning inward and the U.S. economy has stagnated, Latin 
America should think twice before accepting a WHFTA as the only framework for growth.
In this context, it is also important to consider the macroeconomic consequences of the 
distribution effects of the NAFTA or a WHFTA. The implication of the analysis in section 3 above 
is that these FTAs are likely to increase the share of profits (capital income) in national income both 
in the U.S. and abroad—in the U.S. by reducing the bargaining power of industrial workers, and in 
Mexico by raising the productivity of labor relative to real wages (which are likely to be held down 
by surplus labor supply). The redistribution of income toward profits could only be exacerbated in a 
wider WHFTA, if more poor countries end up competing over who can offer the lowest wages (as 
well as the lowest taxes and least regulatory controls) to foreign capital.
Structuralist macroeconomic theory (Taylor 1983, 1991) implies that such a redistribution 
toward capital can have a depressing effect on overall aggregate demand since workers have a higher 
marginal propensity to consume than capital owners. A redistribution of income toward profits thus 
raises the average saving rate by giving a greater weight to incomes that are saved at higher marginal 
rates. But this in turn reduces effective demand through the Keynesian “paradox of thrift.” This 
implies that even consumer demand (C in the national income identity above) could be adversely 
affected by FTAs with investment liberalization in the Western Hemisphere. And if that happens, 
Latin American nations counting on the U.S. market to fuel their own export-led growth will also 
suffer.
There are potential offsets to this loss of consumer demand from wage earners. Reduced 
prices of consumer goods due to production with cheaper labor could help to preserve purchasing 
power over tradeable consumption goods, although this would not help in regard to nontradeable 
goods and services. Investment demand, stimulated by the higher profitability, could substitute for 
consumption demand. Exports to other regions of the world economy such as Europe, Asia, or the 
Middle East could replace some domestic demand. And finally, demand for luxury consumption 
goods by upper-income groups throughout North and South America could substitute for workers’ 
demand for basics, a phenomenon already observed in the United States during the so-called 
consumption binge of the 1980s (Blecker 1991a). But all of these offsets, even if realized, would 
imply a new pattern of growth based on low wages and highly unequal income distribution, with the 
benefits of the growth skewed toward the wealthy throughout the trading bloc.
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5. Conclusion: The Political Economy of an Integrated Western Hemisphere
This paper has raised questions and point out potential problems with the NAFTA and its 
proposed successor, the WHFTA. Definitive answers to many of the questions posed here are not yet 
possible. Nevertheless, if the reader has thought critically about the current rush to form FTAs in the 
Western Hemisphere, and has taken seriously some of the likely obstacles, then this paper will have 
served to advance the discussion. At a minimum, the paper has suggested an agenda for future 
research on issues that are critical to understanding how FTAs will affect the majority of persons in 
the Western Hemisphere.
Hemispheric integration is far from a free lunch and far from certain to be the panacea it is 
often made out to be. This concluding section identifies the main policy issues that are likely to be 
important in future hemispheric negotiations and may determine the eventual social impact of the 
integration process.
NAFTA is no mere agreement to liberalize cross-border trade. It also contains a set of rules 
that provide guarantees to foreign investors and a set of restrictions on the kinds of domestic 
economic regulations and industrial policies member countries can adopt. It does allow for the 
continuance of some degree of consumer health and safety regulations, but it does less to prevent 
“environmental dumping” of pollution produced at the site of production. Moreover, it does little to 
guarantee the enforcement of humane labor standards and workers’ rights throughout North America. 
Thus goods that were produced in factories which dump toxic wastes or expose workers to harmful 
substances in one country could not effectively be kept out of the other countries under the NAFTA. 
Given the looser enforcement of such laws in Mexico today, NAFTA alone could provide incentives 
for multinational firms to circumvent U.S. environmental and labor standards by moving production 
to Mexico, and that would in turn make it harder to maintain and strengthen environmental and labor 
standards in the United States. A WHFTA patterned on the original NAFTA would only worsen 
these problems, especially if it encourages more countries to offer lax environmental protection and 
weak worker rights to attract foreign investment.
The history of modern efforts at economic integration shows that, if successful, the liberaliza­
tion of trade and investment eventually leads to moves for further social and political integration as 
well as macroeconomic policy coordination. The European Community is a case in point, in spite of 
its current difficulties. In an integrated North American market for goods and capital, citizens of all 
three countries will inevitably become more aware of conditions in neighboring countries. And since 
such an integrated market will make workers and communities in the three countries compete against 
each other for jobs, labor market conditions and social externalities throughout North America will 
become subjects of legitimate public debate and concern. Thus while NAFTA itself is likely to create 
pressures to level social regulations downward, there will be (and already are) countervailing political 
pressures to level them upward instead. The realization that investors have been protected far more 
than workers, consumers, or the environment led to calls for extending the protections of the NAFTA 
beyond what it initially encompassed.
These same considerations apply to the more strictly economic consequences of trade and 
investment liberalization. Potentially massive dislocations of labor in all the countries involved could 
have a regressive impact on income distribution even if net changes in employment are relatively 
small. These problems must largely be dealt with by domestic institutions and policies that can be
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adopted unilaterally by each member of NAFTA. In particular, there is a desperate need to 
strengthen policies such as adjustment assistance and labor retraining for workers who lose jobs, as 
well as to work on the eventual international harmonization and enforcement of labor standards. 
Mexico also has serious needs in this area and might require foreign financial assistance to address 
them. It would also be in the interest of the U.S. to provide such assistance, in order to relieve 
migration pressures. The manner in which these concerns were dealt with in the NAFTA will set 
important precedents for eventual WHFTA negotiations.
Finally, nations will not be able to combine their economies successfully to the degree implied 
by NAFTA without eventually having to coordinate their monetary and macroeconomic policies. This 
is a central lesson of the European experience, and it is confirmed by the fact that the recent lack of 
policy coordination between Germany and the other countries in the EMS made that system of 
exchange-rate parities unsustainable. All of North America will have to have reasonably consistent 
fiscal and monetary policies in order to keep interest rates and inflation rates in line, and thus to 
prevent destabilizing exchange-rate fluctuations and balance-of-payments crises. For all practical 
purposes, this means that the Bank of Canada and Banco de México will have to subordinate their 
monetary policies to the U.S. Federal Reserve until a more international monetary authority is 
established. In effect, the Canadian dollar and Mexican peso will have to be pegged more closely to 
the dollar, in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. Such problems of coordination would only be multiplied 
in a WHFTA.
In all of this, the need to provide expanding markets for the products of all member nations of 
the FTA (NA or WH version) will have to be met. Anti-inflationary policies, while necessary at 
times, have a contractionary bias, and if combined with regressive income distribution could lead to 
chronically depressed demand. Many of the problems this paper has identified, including especially 
the problems of labor dislocation, could be ameliorated if growth is robust and new jobs and 
opportunities are continuously created. A stagnant hemispheric economy, on the other hand, is bound 
to stir more conflict both within and between nations. There will have to be renewed attention on 
reviving domestic growth, consistent with maintaining low inflation and preventing environmental 
degradation. These are fine lines indeed to draw and walk, but if they are not handled correctly the 
whole process of Western Hemisphere integration is unlikely to succeed in the long run.
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Graciela Chichilnisky
Introduction: Trading Blocs and the GATT
Regional free trade zones have been unexpectedly successful in the last decade. Since 1980 the 
European Community enlarged significantly its membership and its scope. It now includes southern 
European countries, and market-integrating features allowing goods, people, services and capital to flow 
freely around an area accounting for about one fourth of world economic output.
In what appears to be a strategic response, the United States has entered into similar agreements 
with its neighbors. The recent trading and investment agreement with Canada was signed after many 
decades of doubtful consideration, and the trend is expanding to the rest of the Americas starting with 
Mexico. This trend is observed also in other regions. The six members of the Association of South East 
Asian Nations—Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei—have began this 
year to build their ASEAN free trade area AFTA as a future counterweight to other international trading 
blocks, even though at present most of their trade is with Europe, Japan and the US and not with each 
other. The Japanese have increasingly focused their economic attention in their own region, leading to 
more investment in and imports from the new East Asian manufacturing exporters. Even the Andean pact 
seems to be progressing in Latin America after several decades of aimless discussions, with MERCOSUR 
following suit.
The relationship between the multilateral trade system (MTS) and the success of the regional trade 
pacts raise disparate reactions. One view is that the emergence of regional trade pacts is a step in the 
right direction. In this view free trade is not defunct, but rather being organized and approached 
differently. But another, quite natural, reaction is to fear that “customs unions,” as regional free trade 
pacts are usually called, are inherently opposed to global free trade. Do custom unions increase free 
trade with insiders at the cost of diverting trade with outsiders? Since the classic works of Meade (1955) 
and Viner (1950) classifying the issues into trade creation and trade diversion, there has been little 
conceptual advance on this issue. But the issue is very alive today, and requires our full attention.
It is the purpose of this paper to re-examine the positive and negative aspects of trading blocs as 
they relate to gains from free trade. The paper is primarily a discussion of conceptual issues, although 
it is based on facts and on particular cases which are of interest to the trade liberalization in the 
Americas.
We take a somewhat different approach to a familiar issue. Rather than asking the standard 
question of whether regional blocs help or hinder global free trade, we ask a more detailed question: what 
type of customs union is likely to lead to a trade war between the blocs, and what type of custom union 
is, instead, likely to lead to expanded global trade. In practical terms: what type of trade policies within 
the blocs will provide economic incentives for expanding free trade.
We shall compare the impact on the world economy of free trade blocs organized around two 
alternative principles: one is traditional comparative advantages, the other is economies of scale. The 
aim is to determine how the patterns of trade inside the blocs determine the trade relations among the 
blocs.
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The paper has four parts. The first part reviews the existing economics of trading blocs, and uses 
this to explain the current situation in the EC and NAFTA. The second part presents a new conceptual 
approach to the economics of preferential trade, focusing on the internal organization of trading blocs and 
the economic incentives that this generates with respect to the rest of the world. The third part is a 
conclusion which pulls the arguments together for an evaluation of NAFTA and an American free trade 
zone, and of global free trade. The fourth part is an Appendix which provides a formal general 
equilibrium model of trading blocs with increasing returns to scale and proves the mathematical results 
which underlie the discussion in the text.
Part I. The Economics of Trading Blocs
Free Trade and Market Power
The last ten years have seen new developments in international trade, focusing on the study of 
economic dynamics and of market imperfections leading to strategic issues in game theory and industrial 
organization. But the central tenet of the theory remains the Pareto efficiency of the static and 
competitive world market. In competitive markets, free trade leads to Pareto efficient allocations. There 
is no way to make someone better off without making someone else worse off. This is a general 
proposition which holds for several countries and several markets interacting with each other 
simultaneously. Called the first theorem of welfare economics, the result that static competitive markets 
have Pareto-efficient equilibria seems to loom the larger, the more special cases of market imperfections 
are pointed out.
In view of the efficiency of competitive markets, the failure of the MTS to bring countries to an 
agreement about a world of free trade seems, at a first sight, irrational. It would appear that countries 
act as if they could, but prefer not to, achieve a Pareto efficient allocation. Indeed, some believe that 
the failure of GATT is simply a version of the well-known prisoners’ dilemma. The words “prisoners’ 
dilemma” are used to describe a generically inefficient situation, one which, with appropriate 
coordination, can be altered so as to increase the welfare of each and all players.
Such a view would be incorrect. The problems derive not from irrational behavior, nor from a 
lack of coordination or “prisoners’ dilemma.” The reason is that while free trade in competitive markets 
leads to Pareto optimal solutions, free trade may not lead to Pareto efficient allocations when the countries 
are large and have market power. For example, large countries may freely choose the quantities they 
export in order to manipulate to their advantage world market prices, much the same way that a 
monopolist freely chooses to supply a quantity that maximizes its profits considering its impact on prices, 
inducing Pareto inferior allocations. For free trade to be Pareto efficient markets must be competitive, 
and countries must have no market power. When countries are sufficiently large to have an impact on 
market prices, then they often have an incentive to impose tariffs on each other.
Furthermore, under classical assumptions, a move from tariffs to free trade will typically make 
some countries better off but other countries worse off. It is true that if a competitive allocation were 
reached, it would be Pareto efficient. But in a world with tariffs, as we have today, under traditional 
assumptions some country will loose if free trade is adopted.
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One may ask why large countries have protectionist incentives? The reason is that it is possible 
for large countries to improve their welfare by improving their terms of trade. This is of course not true 
in competitive markets where the traders, by definition, have no impact on prices. But the theory of 
trade proves that under traditional assumptions, a large country does have an economic incentive to 
impose tariffs on others. This is the standard theorem on the existence of optimal tariffs, which is 
discussed in more detail in Part II, below. A tariff can improve the terms of trade of a large country, 
even though it may distort its production and consumption. What the theorem says is that, under 
traditional assumptions, there is always an optimal tariff, one at which the gains from improving its terms 
of trade through tariffs exceeds the losses due to distortions. A textbook analysis of a simple case is 
found, for example, in Krugman and Obsfelt (1988). This theorem is widely accepted, understood and 
applied.
The argument in favor of optimal tariffs is not true for small countries. It is essential that the 
country should be large enough to have the ability to have an impact on prices. Furthermore the larger 
is the country, the more market power it has, and the more it can gain from imposing tariffs on others. 
The implication of this is that if a world of small competitive economies merges into a few trading 
blocks, then under traditional assumptions, after the blocks are formed, there are more incentives for 
imposing tariffs than before. In other words, regional free trade associations, under traditional 
conditions, lead to protectionism. The optimal tariff which we have just discussed is imposed by one 
country on others unilaterally. The theorem does not consider the possibility of retaliation by other 
countries. But what if they retaliate? What if other countries also impose tariffs in response?
We now move to a world of strategic considerations, a world with tariff wars. Each country 
imposes tariffs on each other, and does so strategically so as to maximize its welfare given the actions 
of others. The outcome of this tariff game was studied in Kennan and Riezman (1988, 1990). If each 
country chooses as its tariff the best response to the others’, a market equilibrium with tariffs is reached. 
We call this an optimal tariff equilibrium to distinguish it from the free trade equilibrium.
In an optimal tariff equilibrium some countries are better off than they would be at a free trade 
equilibrium, Kennan and Riezman (1988, 1990) and Riezman (1985). In other words, not all countries 
would benefit if the world were to move from the optimal tariff equilibrium into a world with free trade. 
Furthermore, these works show that the larger the country, the more it can improve its welfare at the 
optimal tariff equilibrium from the level that it could achieve at a free trade equilibrium
To a certain extent the current situation in the world economy can be described as an optimal 
tariff world. Each country imposes tariffs on others strategically. In this light the difficulties of the MTS 
have a reasonable explanation. The unwillingness of countries to agree to multilateral free trade is neither 
irrational nor a coordination problem. It is a rational response to economic incentives of countries with 
market power.
One immediate implication is that, under traditional conditions, regional trade blocs which 
increase the market power of the market participants will naturally lead to tariff wars. The larger is the 
market power of a trade bloc, the larger is its incentive to impose tariffs on others. Even after retaliatory 
moves are taken into account the same proposition holds: the larger the market power of the bloc, the 
greater is its possible gain from a tariff war. Therefore if the formation of regional trade blocs increases 
the market power of the participants, the creation of regional free trade zones encourages trade wars.
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We have remarked that the results on optimal tariffs and on the optimal tariffs equilibria hold 
under traditional assumptions. Since each of these results predicts that regional free trade zones create 
incentives against global free trade, it becomes crucial to examine the role of these traditional assumptions 
closely. For whenever these conditions are satisfied, regional free trade inevitably leads to trade wars. 
And the larger the free trade zones, the more likely is that they will lead to trade wars.
We shall examine these conditions in some detail in the next section. This examination will be 
conceptual, but focused on particular cases of immediate interest. Drawing on classical results on tariffs 
of A. Lerner (1936) and of L. Metzler (1949), and on new results on trading blocs with economies of 
scale Chichilnisky (1992) reported also in the Appendix, we shall show that if the blocs are organized 
internally around the principle of economies of scale, the optimal tariff theorem breaks down. This 
means that, under conditions of increasing returns, it is not true that a country is better off by the 
unilateral imposition of a positive tariff on its imports. But before we turn to the new results, we shall 
explore the implications of the optimal tariff theorem on the European Community and on NAFTA.
We shall argue that trade patterns can be based on traditional comparative advantages or on 
economies of scale. It is to a large extent a matter of policy choice. The trade policies within a trade 
bloc determine the extent to which the trade bloc will aid or hinder global free trade. The argument for 
this result, and its implications for trade policy, occupy the rest of this paper.
EC and NAFTA
We now turn to the possible motivation for the United States to form a free trade zone with its 
neighbors. The argument uses simple strategic considerations based on the results discussed in the 
previous section. NAFTA—and any further extension to a larger free trade zone in the Americas—can 
be seen as a strategic response by the U.S. to the creation of the European Community. The European 
Community is a free trade zone with a quarter of world output. In seeking to form a trading bloc with 
its natural trading partners in the Americas, the US appears to respond to the creation of more market 
power, with an attempt to create more market power. This is a rational response if the US expects a 
united Europe to impose tariffs on the rest of the world. The emergence of a region with increased 
market power generally provides an incentive to other regions to seek similar status.
More explanatory power still can be extracted from the results of Kennan and Riezman [12] [13] 
and Riezman (1985) on who wins trade wars. Following the creation of a custom union, the incentives 
are to create or join another free trade zone, but not at random. The economic incentive is to join 
another free trade zone with the largest possible market power. This result allows us to predict that the 
US should not only seek a free trade deal with Canada, but one with as many countries in the Americas 
as possible. The aim is to reach market power which exceeds that of a unified Europe.
Trade Creation and Diversion
Once a new free trade zone is created, how do we measure the gains and losses from trade? A 
naive view is that since free trade in competitive markets is Pareto efficient, any move towards free trade 
is positive. As we saw, this would not be correct. We argued that regional trade blocs, being larger than 
their components, will have more market power and therefore an incentive to impose tariffs against
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outsiders under traditional conditions. Therefore one of the first negative effects of the formation of a 
trading bloc is that it can hurt the countries outside these areas. We shall argue below that these negative 
effects can be mitigated if the trading patterns within the blocs are organized around economies of scale.
But are the damages of free trade zones limited to protectionism with the rest of the world? The 
answer to this question is generally no. There is a second danger in the formation of regional trade 
blocs. Even if the trading blocs are not accompanied by increased protectionism against the rest of the 
world, they can still lead to trade diversion. This means that a regional free trade bloc may lead to the 
wrong specialization within the bloc. The classical argument about trade diversion is found in Viner 
(1950), whose work remains a benchmark of analysis of preferential trade agreements. We shall 
summarize his argument here in order to show that, if trade within the blocs is organized around 
economies of scale, then Viner’s argument breaks down. With economies of scale, the negative effect 
of trade diversion can be mitigated.
Viner’s point is that there are “trade creating” free trade zones, in which the increase in imports 
by members from one another replaces domestic production. These are desirable. However, free trade 
blocs could also be “trade diverting” in the case that imports are diverted from a lower cost source 
outside the bloc to other sources inside the bloc which are less productive, but with more attractive prices 
after the tariffs were selectively dropped.
The extra trade among the members of the trading bloc is, generally, an improvement of welfare. 
The trade which is not additional but a diversion from efficient outside sources to less efficient insides 
sources, lowers welfare. If northern Europe is induced by the entry of southern Europe, to buy oil from 
Portugal rather than an equivalent from the US, and the US source is more efficient but less competitive 
after the tariffs are dropped in Europe, there has been a welfare loss. Generally speaking Viner’s 
approach evaluates free trade zones by the extent to which more trade is created, rather than existing 
trade diverted from one source to another.
Viner’s original insight remains central to the analysis of preferential free trade zones. But, in 
practice, it misses an important aspect. The increase size of the market can sometimes lead to more 
efficiency and competitiveness. Even in the cases where Viner’s analysis predicts welfare losses, namely 
when the trade bloc diverts trade from outside sources to less competitive inside sources, welfare can still 
increase with economies of scale.
Economies of scale can therefore have a major impact on trade policies. We shall argue in what 
follows that they can also limit another major negative effect of a trading bloc: the incentives for large 
blocs with market power to impose tariffs on others.
What does the empirical evidence show? It is widely believed that economies of scale were an 
important factor in the success of the Treaty of Rome. Economies of scale were central to the success 
of the European Common Market which was formed in 1958. While a strong possibility for trade 
diversion existed a priori in the EC, in reality huge inter-industry trade emerged in manufactures. The 
increase in market size and the associated rationalization in production led to efficiency gains which took 
precedence over possible trade diversion. Krugman (1991) discusses this issue in some detail, without 
however offering a conceptual relation between economies of scale and the economics of trading blocs.
169
Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere
Hopes for large benefits from both the US-Canada free trade agreement and Europe 1992 
rest largely on an increase in competition and rationalization. In the North American 
case, the estimate of Harris and Cox, which attempt to take account of competitive or 
industrial organization effects, suggest a gain for Canada from free trade that is about 
four times larger than those of standard models. In Europe the widely cited and 
somewhat controversial figure of 7 percent gain due to 1992 presented in the Cechini 
report Commission of the European Communities 1988 rests primarily on estimates by 
Alisdair Smith and Anthony Venables of gains from increased competition and 
rationalization.
In practice, therefore, economies of scale can eliminate trade diversion losses, and transform these 
into gains. I shall also argue below that they can also eliminate incentives for tariff wars between blocs, 
so that the formation of trading blocs can become a parallel, complementary effort towards the 
liberalization of world trade.
Part II. Trading Blocs with Economies of Scale
Intra- and Interbloc Trade
Although predictions are inherently dangerous in an area so circumscribed by political action, our 
conclusion is that regional free trade can have different effects on global markets and it should be to a 
certain extent the choice of well informed and reasonable economic agents which one will prevail. 
Regional trading blocs based on traditional comparative advantages will generally divert trade. They will 
also typically hinder the prospects of global negotiations. In this case, as the bloc has more market power 
than its parts, it has the incentive to impose larger tariffs on the rest of the world. Regional blocs then 
develop incentives for imposing tariffs against each other, and for engaging in trade wars. This type of 
regional free trade zone works against global free trade.
There is, however, an alternative. If the trade blocs expand trade based not on traditional 
comparative advantages but rather on increased productive efficiency and competitiveness that comes with 
economies of scale, matters could be quite different. In this latter case, the regional blocs could unleash 
an appetite for further expansion of trade. We shall argue that in this case the incentive for blocs to 
impose tariffs against each other is reduced, and in fact can be reversed by economic incentives in favor 
of trade expansion which accompanies economies of scale. The creation of trading blocs which are 
organized around economies of scale is therefore part of a broader trend towards increasingly open world 
markets.
The Americas: Traditional Comparative Advantages or Economies of Scale?
A central issue in our argument is the pattern of intrabloc trade. This issue is of particular 
importance in an American free trade zone. This is because of all the regions, the American area is the 
one whose trade is currently based on traditional comparative advantages and on the diversity among the 
traders’ economic development rather than on economies of scale.
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The matter is not only one of economic reality; it is also one of perceived economic reality. Both 
the European and the East Asian countries perceive gains from trade as a matter of exploiting economies 
of scale. The newly industrialized countries in Asia, and the Japanese, have a dynamic vision of 
comparative advantages. Moving up the ladder of comparative advantages in the production and trade 
of skilled labor manufactures, of consumer electronics, and of products based on specialized knowledge 
and on technological skill, are widespread priorities.
By contrast, within the sphere of influence of the United States, the vision of trade based on 
traditional comparative advantages still prevails. It permeates to a great extent the thinking about 
international trade at the government level, at the international organization level, at the academic, and 
even at the journalist level.
The European free trade zone is, to a certain extent, a zone of equals. To encourage this 
equality, the introduction of free mobility of labor has been one of the first steps in the European market 
integration of 1992.
The Americas, on the other hand, have the U.S. as a hegemon, a “hub” which concentrates on 
exporting manufactures and skill intensive goods to the “spokes” in exchange for their resources. The 
free mobility of labor between the hub and the spokes is an unspoken issue. It has not even been 
contemplated in the American negotiations for free trade. It has not been mentioned by any of the 
governments concerned that labor could move freely between the free trade partners, as it does in the EC 
region. In some cases, quite to the contrary, the free trade agreement has been mentioned as a way to 
limit the mobility of labor between the concerned countries.
To the extent that labor remains a fixed input of production within the countries of the American 
free trade zone, traditional comparative advantages based on labor will be invoked as a foundation for 
policy. The concern is that an American free trade zone, if it emerges, may reflect the historical patterns 
of trade between industrial and developing regions, which is usually called North-South trade.
Traditional Comparative Advantages and the Global Environment
Another reason for concern with respect to traditional comparative advantages arises from the 
current focus on the environment. Traditional comparative advantages emphasize the South’s 
concentration in the production and export of goods which deplete environmental resources, such as wood 
pulp and cash crops which overuse rain forests, or minerals whose combustion leads to the emission of 
greenhouse gases. Recent work in the area of North-South trade with environmental inputs to production 
shows that ill defined patterns of property rights on forests, fisheries, and arable land in developing 
countries may lead to a market-induced oversupply of goods which are intensive in the use of these 
resources as inputs, and to Pareto inefficient patterns of international trade. What appears as comparative 
advantages may simply be a reflection of a market failure in the developing countries. Social and private 
comparative advantages differ and social and private gains from trade may also differ in these 
circumstances. Traditional tax policies, levying duties on the use of such inputs in the South, may not 
work, and may indeed lead to more extraction of the resource and more exports of the resource intensive 
commodity. Indeed, it is shown in Chichilnisky that differences in property rights on inputs of 
production are sufficient to explain the patterns of trade between nations.
171
Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere
The environment is another reason for being concerned with traditional comparative advantages 
as a foundation for trade. Since two thirds of the current exports from Latin America are resources, and 
the main trade of Ecuador, Venezuela and Mexico with the U.S. is petroleum, this problem is very real. 
It is also very real with respect to trade in wood products which lead to the deforestation of the remaining 
tropical forests.1 Replacing traditional comparative advantages with economies of scale could be a 
necessary feature of a program of sustainable development.
Skilled Labor and External Economies of Scale
It seems desirable at this point to distinguish an important difference between two types of 
economies of scale: internal or external to the firm. The former are simply a reflection that each firm 
may be more efficient in the use of its inputs to production as the level of its output increases. The 
firm’s per unit costs decrease with the level of output. Such economies of scale are typical of industries 
which require large fixed costs, such as aerospace, airlines, and communications networks. This type 
of increasing returns, called internal, can lead to monopolistic competition or other forms of limitations 
to market entry. As such, there is a loss to the consumer in that the free market outcomes are typically 
not Pareto efficient.
External economies of scale lead to a decrease in per unit costs as the output expands, but they 
do so at the level of the industry or of the country as a whole. Each firm’s production function faces 
increasing cost per unit of output, i.e. decreasing returns to scale, which assures competitive behavior. 
However, as the industry as a whole expands, externalities are created which lead to increased 
productivity for all the firms. A good example is provided by the electronics industry. Each computer 
manufacturer faces a rather competitive market. On the other hand, as the overall level of output of the 
industry expands, knowledge about new technologies develops and this new knowledge, which is easily 
and rapidly diffused across the industry, leads to lower costs for all. Just about any industry which 
depends heavily on knowledge has this characteristic. In reality, the factor which leads to increasing 
returns is the skill of the labor force which embodies knowledge. Knowledge is typically diffused and 
can be captured and imitated sooner or later, and there are abundant examples in the software and 
hardware industry to prove this point.2 Knowledge creates skilled labor, and this in turn leads to 
increasing returns to scale, which usually, although not always, are external to the firm. Because of this 
skilled labor can simultaneously lead to economies of scale, and to competitive markets. The successful 
development experience of Korea, of Taiwan, and more recently of the Asian Tigers, shows that 
export-led policies based on skilled labor intensive goods, for example in consumer electronics, is 
generally more successful than those intensive in the use of inexpensive and uneducated labor. This point 
was developed formally in Chichilnisky (1981, 1986) and more recently in terms of development policies 
in Dadzie (1991).
This paper will concentrate on external economies of scale, which are closely connected with 
production systems based on skilled labor.
1. See Amelung (1991), Barbier et al. (1991), Brinkley and Vincent (1990), and Hyde and Neuman 
(1991).
2. Microsoft’s Windows excellent imitation of the Apple operating system was tested in U.S. courts 
and found without fault.
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Optimal Tariffs: Traditional Theory
It was noted above that a large country will typically impose tariffs so as to improve its terms 
of trade. In doing so it typically introduces distortions in its production and consumption. Here we shall 
show in a simple example how under traditional assumptions there is a tariff that improves welfare, in 
the sense that the gains from improved terms of trade exceed the losses from distortions. The analysis 
is completely standard, see e.g., Krugman and Obsfelt (1988), but it is included here in order to 
highlight the differences which arise in economies with increasing returns to scale. This is discussed in 
the next section.
The analysis in this section relies on one assumption and one simplification. Both are relaxed 
in the Appendix, which considers the general case. The assumption here is that the supply and demand 
curves of the economy are linear and exhibit decreasing returns to scale, and that there are no major 
income effects. The simplification is to neglect the impact of the tariff revenues on income; this is 
typically done in textbooks, and will also be done in this section. It is however explicitly analyzed in the 
Appendix.
We assume that the home country H has a demand curve with equation
D = a — bp (1)
where p is the domestic price of the good, and a supply curve
Q = e + f p .  (2)
Country H’s demand for imports is the difference,
D - Q = (a -  e) - (b + f)p (3)
Foreign export supply is also a straight line,
(Q* - D * )  = g + hpw, (4)
where pw is the world price. The internal price in country H exceeds the world price by the tariff:
P =Pw + t- (5)
In a world equilibrium imports must equal exports:
(a -  e) -  (b + f) x (pw + t) = q + hpw. (6 )
Solving equation (6) for t = 0 gives pf, the world price that would prevail without tariffs. Then a
tariff t alters the internal price to:
p = pf + th/(b + f  + h), (7)
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and the world price to
p w = p f -t(b + f ) / ( b  + / +  h) (8)
Note that if the parameters a, e, b, h and/  are all positive, then
pf < p  and pw > pf, (9)
implying that the tariff raises the internal price p  and lowers the world price p w.
It is clear that under these conditions it is always possible to find a tariff t that increases the 
country’s welfare. Let q1 and d, be the free trade levels of consumption and production. Since the 
internal price is higher after the tariff, domestic supply rises from q, to q2 and demand falls from d, 
to d2.
q2 = q, + tfh/(b + f  + h) (10)
and
d2 = d, - tbh/(b+f+h). (11)
The gain in welfare from a lower world price is the area of the rectangle in Figure 3, the fall 
in the price multiplied by the level of imports after the tariff:
gain in welfare = (d2 - qp xt(b + f)/(b + f  + h) =
t x (dj - q2) x (b + f)/(b + f  + h) - 12 x h(b + f)2/(b+ f  + h)2. (12)
Figure 1
Gains and Losses from Tariffs: Traditional Case
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The loss from distorted consumption and production is the sum of the areas of the two triangles 
in Figure 1 :
loss in welfare = (1/2) x (q2 - q,) x (p -,pf) + (1/2) x (dt - dp x (p - pf) =
t2 x (b + f) x h2/2(b + f +  h)2. (13)
Therefore the net effect on welfare is
gain - loss = tx  U - 12 xV. (14)
where U and V are constants. The net effect is the sum of a positive number times the tariff rate and a 
negative number times the square of the tariff rate. It follows that when the tariff is sufficiently small 
the net effect must be positive, since t2 is smaller than t for values of t near zero. This establishes that, 
when supply and demand are linear, income effects of the tariff income are neglected, and tariffs are 
small, there exists a positive tariff which increases the welfare of the country beyond that which can be 
obtained in free trade.
The size of the country matters. If the importing country is small, then foreign supply is highly 
elastic, i.e., h is very large, so from (8) we verify that the tariff has little or no effect on world prices 
p w while raising domestic prices p  almost one to one.
Optimal Tariffs with Economies of Scale
The argument in the previous section shows that a large country is better off by imposing tariffs 
than it is under free trade. This proposition holds under traditional conditions, one of which is that the 
supply of goods should increase with prices across market equilibria. In our example, this is formalized
by the parameters in the supply function in equation (2), which is upward sloping. However, this
assumption ceases to be valid with economies of scale. In such economies, the larger is the output the 
lower are the costs, and therefore, in principle, the lower are the prices. Then/ < 0 in equation (8), 
which in turn can lead to a negative welfare gain from the tariff from equation (12).
A good example of this phenomenon is provided by the electronics industry, for example 
computer hardware. The last fifteen years have seen a dramatic decrease in prices together with a 
dramatic expansion of output of computer hardware. This occurs because the expansion in output leads 
to rationalization and the corresponding increased efficiency in production. In the hardware industry this 
takes the form of technological change which improves productive efficiency and lowers the costs of the 
industry as a whole. Even though a technological breakthrough may in principle be patented, and 
therefore could be captured by one firm with the corresponding increase in its market power and 
deviation from competitive behavior, in practice the computer industry is very competitive. This is 
because the knowledge which drives the technological innovation in this industry is easily diffused.
A standard textbook analysis of such economies of scale can be found in Nicholson (1978, 
pp. 252-255), who documents that most studies of long-run cost curves have found that average costs 
decrease until they become constant. Examples provided are agriculture, electricity generation, railroads, 
and commercial banking, all activities which are broadly associated with economic development. The
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same textbook analysis explains how competitive markets can lead to a negative association of quantities 
and prices across equilibria. This was the content of the famous debate in the 1920s between 
J. H. Clapham, A. C. Pigou and D. H. Roberston, which was resolved positively, and which appeared 
in the Economic Journal between 1922 and 1924.3 Chichilnisky and Heal (1987) discussed in some detail 
the policy implications of international trade in economies with increasing returns to scale in a report on 
trade policies in the 1980s to the Secretary General of UNCTAD, and they arrive to similar conclusions.
The analysis of optimal tariffs in the last section breaks down when there are increasing returns 
to scale. In such economies there may be no gains from imposing tariffs, even if the country is large and 
has substantial market power. It will be useful to illustrate how this happens in a concrete case. Recall 
how tariffs increase welfare in the economy of the previous section. Tariffs increase welfare by lowering 
the world prices p w: this was seen in equation (7). The country’s terms of trade thus improve after the 
tariff. It imports fewer lower cost goods from the rest of the world. The welfare gains were computed 
in equation (12), which depend crucially on the fact that, after the tariff, the consumers pay lower prices 
for the goods they import.
However, this argument no longer holds with economies of scale. With economies of scale the 
world price may increase rather than decrease after the tariff. The welfare gains from tariffs are the drop 
in world prices times the quantity imported. But if the world price increases, the gains are transformed 
into losses.
The possibility that after a tariff the terms of trade deteriorate for the country was studied in 
Lerner (1936) and in Metzler (1949). They argue mostly in terms of income effects. A similar 
phenomenon occurs in our economy, but due to different causes. In contrast with the economy of the 
previous section, the parameter f in equation (8) is now negative rather than positive; this means that 
across equilibria the prices drop as quantities increase, or otherwise said, price increase when quantities 
drop. If the tariff decreases the quantity produced and traded, this will lower the productive efficiency 
of the economy. Costs increase and therefore prices increase too. The tariff defeats the gains from 
rationalization in production produced by the larger market size. This is represented in Figure 2 below. 
It shows a negative correlation between market clearing prices and the quantity of goods sold at an 
equilibrium, and how this leads to an increase in the world prices after the tariff, corresponding to a 
decrease in output.
After the tariff, the world price pw can be higher rather than lower as it is in the traditional case 
with decreasing returns to scale. The terms of trade for the country are therefore worse after the tariff. 
Consumers in the country are worse off because the price of their imports have increased. All of this 
is formally reflected in the systems of equations presented above. In equation (7) the parameter /  
describing the relation between supply and prices, which was previously positive, is now negative. In 
practical terms the following conditions are sufficient for the world price to increase rather than decrease 
after the tariff:
b < | / |  > h (15)
/  < 0, and b and h > 0
3. Nicholson (1978), p. 332.
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Figure 2
Losses from Tariffs with Economies of Scale
After the tariff, the world price p increases
rtliA B/<nniMTiies en sla  ^
These conditions are satisfied under a variety of circumstances. For example (15) holds when 
foreign export supply increases with, and is highly responsive to, prices (h > 0 and large), a reasonable 
assumption for the world, when the country has increasing returns to scale if  < O) and the quantity 
produced is more responsive to price than is the demand (b > O, b < \ f  | ).
The main condition is the existence of economies of scale in the economy if  < O). Under these 
conditions, the optimal tariff theorem is no longer true, as the countries may have no economic incentive 
to impose tariffs on others and they loose by restricting trade.
Consumer electronics, semiconductors, software production, banking and financial services, and 
just about any sector whose productivity depends mostly on knowledge and information have these 
characteristics. Software production is today actively developed in India as an export business. It is a 
sector which is simultaneously labor intensive and subject to informational economies of scale. As 
diready discussed, the remarkable economic development of the Asian Tigers over the last fifteen years 
profited from the expansion of their international trade of skilled-labor intensive products such as
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consumer electronics. This sector is simultaneously labor intensive and subject to informational 
economies of scale.
All the arguments just presented hold equally for countries or for trading blocs. To the extent 
that sectors with economies of scale expand within the free trade zone, the zone itself loses its economic 
incentives to use its market power to restrict trade and wage tariff wars against others.
III. Conclusions
The formation of trading blocs typically harms the global liberalization of markets when the blocs 
are themselves organized under the principle of traditional comparative advantages. Under these 
conditions, the larger the market power of the bloc the larger are its incentives to impose tariffs on 
others. Protectionism emerges from the increased market power of the traders.
Retaliation can lead to a tariff war between blocs. Furthermore under traditional assumptions, 
the larger country wins the tariff war. Therefore the larger the trading bloc, the more likely it is to 
impose tariffs and to win a trade war.
Trading blocs of this nature have no economic incentive to favor the negotiations under the MTS. 
They are better off with tariffs than with free trade. Indeed, the economic incentives of such trading 
blocs are contrary to the GATT’s intentions. This explains, to a certain extent, the slow pace of GATT 
negotiations.
The EC bloc was contrasted with NAFTA or with an eventual American free trade zone. The 
empirical evidence suggests that the EC trading bloc benefitted from increasing returns to scale.
NAFTA and any eventual WHFTA emerged as a strategic response to the increase market power 
of the European trading bloc. By contrast with the EC trading bloc, the emerging NAFTA appears to 
be organizing under the traditional theory of comparative advantage.
The lack of provision for the mobility of labor between the countries of the region reinforces this 
trend. NAFTA does not contemplate the mobility of labor between Mexico and the U.S. The lack of 
labor mobility tends to lock in the traditional comparative advantages between the countries within the 
area. Their trading on the basis of comparative advantages within the bloc will create incentives for trade 
wars between blocs.
A different scenario contemplates a NAFTA organized around economies of scale. Examples for 
such scenarios include Indian software trade, and the Asian Tigers’ specialization in consumer electronics. 
Typically, electronic-based industries have increasing returns derived from the creation and diffusion of 
knowledge as output expands. This leads to rationalization in production and to increased efficiency and 
thus lower costs. The expansion of output is accompanied by lower rather than higher prices. From the 
point of view of the exporter, these markets are less likely to be protected because the importer, having 
increasing returns to scale in this industry, has less incentives to rely on tariffs than it does in other 
industries with decreasing returns. With increasing returns, tariffs decrease trade and can increase world 
prices, thus decreasing the welfare of the importing country. Economies of scale produce incentives to 
expand trade.
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The issue is formalized by showing that economies of scale change the standard result of optimal 
tariffs. While under traditional conditions, a trading bloc is always better off with tariffs than it is with 
free trade, we showed that with increasing returns to scale this is no longer true. Tariffs decrease the 
size of the market, and therefore decrease productive efficiency in economies with increasing returns. 
This decrease in efficiency leads to larger rather than lower world prices, and the main purpose of the 
tariff, which is to improve the countries’ terms of trade, is defeated. Under these conditions trading blocs 
are better of with free trade, and with the corresponding expanded markets, than they are with tariffs. 
To the extent that NAFTA organizes itself around economies of scale in the international trade within the 
region, the incentives for a trade war between NAFTA and the EC are mitigated.
It seems useful to remind ourselves that the choice of products and of technology are to a large 
extent the subject of policy. They need in no way interfere with market efficiency. The first welfare 
theorem about the efficiency of competitive markets applies to a market with given technologies and with 
given products. The theorem does not explain how different technologies or products arise: it proves 
that once technologies and products are given, competitive markets lead to Pareto efficiency. Once the 
product mix and the technologies are chosen the market can operate efficiently. This implies that the 
organizing principles within the blocs—traditional comparative advantages or economies of scale—are, 
to a great extent, a matter of policy choice. Choosing different trade policies, for example, choosing 
technologies and the product mix, can be achieved without market distortions or loss of market efficiency. 
This point was already made by Meade (1971).
The emergence of an American trading bloc which reinforces the current tendency towards the 
exploitation of traditional comparative advantages is a source of concern. It has been argued in 
Chichilnisky (1981, 1986, 1987) that export led policies based on (unskilled) labor intensive products can 
defeat the goals of development and trade by depressing the country’s terms of trade and overall 
consumption. Trade between the countries of the Americas is organized today around traditional 
comparative advantages: labor and resource intensive exports from the South and capital and 
skill-intensive exports from the North. If the emergence of a WHFTA is based on similar principles, then 
not only may this continue a depressing growth trend in Latin America, but in addition it could create 
or reinforce incentives against the global liberalization of free trade.
We have argued that another reason to avoid trade policies between the countries of the Americas 
based on traditional comparative advantages is that they tend to deplete environmental assets such as 
forests, fisheries or fertile land, and overuse minerals which are exported by the developing countries to 
the North. Some of these minerals are the source of potentially dangerous C02 emissions. Petroleum 
exported from Mexico, Ecuador, and Venezuela to the United States fits this description. Indeed, any 
concept of sustainable development requires a rethinking of trade policies away from those based on 
comparative advantages. This general premise is particularly well suited to the NAFTA, and for the 
Americas as a whole, since two thirds of Latin American exports today are resources.
The main point of this paper is that the characteristics of trading policies within the trading blocs 
can determine the extent to which the blocs will favor or harm the global negotiations towards free trade. 
Trading policies based on comparative advantages are generally negative towards the GATT. We argued 
that trading policies based on economies of scale could have a positive effect towards global free trade: 
by mitigating the economic incentive of trade restrictions in favor of an expansion of world trade. The 
emergence of such trading blocs could advance in tandem with the liberalization of world trade.
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Appendix: Trading Blocs with Increasing Returns to Scale
This appendix develops an international trade model and proves formally the propositions on 
customs unions stated in the body of the paper.
The model presented here extends the North-South model introduced in Chichilnisky (1981,1986, 
1987) to the case of economies which trade in goods produced under conditions of increasing returns to 
scale, and proves formally the proposition that with increasing returns to scale, large countries can 
achieve higher welfare levels with free trade than with tariffs. This model considers Cobb-Douglas 
production functions, and it assumes that there exist economies of scale in production which are external 
to the firm, such as in the example of the electronic industry discussed in the text. The model describes 
two countries, 1 and 2, producing and trading two goods B (basic goods) and I (industrial goods) with 
each other; these goods are produced using two inputs, labor (L) and capital (K). The economies of the 
two countries are competitive, so that in each country prices are taken as given by consumers and 
producers. Producers maximize profits, and consumers maximize utility subject to their budget
constraints. Walras Law is satisfied, so that the value of the excess demand is equal to zero. At an 
equilibrium, goods and factors markets clear.
The increasing returns to scale considered here are “external” to the firm. This means that in 
the production functions, formalized below, there exists a parameter denoted y  which increases with the 
level of output of the economy. As the outputs of the economy expand, the production function varies, 
formalizing the notion that factors are more productive at higher levels of aggregate output. However, 
the firm takes this parameter y  as given—this is the assumption that the increasing returns are external 
to the firm. For each given value of the parameter y  the firm has constant returns to scale. The firms 
are therefore competitive, and in particular zero profits are achieved at an equilibrium.
Consider the model of one country first. The production functions are
B s = 7I?  K \ ~ a 
/ •  =  iL ^ K l
where a, ¡3 e (0,1), y is a positive parameter, L, and K, are the inputs of labor and capital in the B sector,
and L2 and K2 the inputs of labor and capital in the /  sector. The total amount of labor and capital in the
economy are L5 and K5, respectively. Prices are pB and p,; we assume that I is the numeraire so that
P, = I- (17)
Factor prices are denoted as usual: w for wages and r for rental on capital. We shall assume for 
simplicity that the demand for basic goods at an equilibrium is known:
B*=W (18)
so that by Walras Law the demand for industrial goods in equilibrium is given by
I d =  (wL* +  rK* -  PBBd), (19)
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because of zero profits. More general demand functions than those postulated in (18) can be given 
without a major effect on the results, see for example the various forms of demand functions utilized in 
Chichilnisky (1986). Indicating the equilibrium level of exports by X f m, and the equilibrium level of 
imports byXg  , the model of the world economy is formalized by the following equilibrium conditions:
p%Bs* +  J* = w mL* + r K * )(zero profits)
K*  =  K* =  Ki  + K 2 (capital market clears)
L* =  L* =  Li -+ L2 (labor market clears) (20)
£** =  B dm + X q (B  market clears)
I dm =  /** + X d' (I market clears)
Solving the Model
The model for the world economy consists of two countries, indicated with the indices 1 and 2, 
each specified as above. To solve the model, there are therefore five prices to be determined: the “terms 
of trade” pB, and two factor prices in each country, w and r. The quantities to be determined in an 
equilibrium are: the use of factors in each sector of each country: Kt, K2, Lt, L2, the outputs of the two 
goods 6 s and F, and the corresponding parameter 7  determining the external economies of scale, the 
exports and imports of each of the two goods in each of the two countries, X and X , and the demand 
for each good in each country, Bf* and Id*. There is a total of 27 variables to be determined 
endogenously, including all prices and quantities in all markets and both countries.
In the following proposition 1 we shall prove that all of these variables can be determined once 
the variable giving the terms of trade in equilibrium pB is known. Further, we shall prove that there 
exists one “resolving equation” that determines the equilibrium value of the terms of trade as a function 
of all the exogenous parameters of the model, of which there are six in each country: a, /3, o, B?*, Ls and 
K5, and a total of 1 2  in the world economy.
The Effects of a Tariff on Terms of Trade
Proposition 1: If the importing country 1 has external economies of scale,
7  = yB = B°, a > 1
and the foreign supply is highly elastic (d X g 2/dpB >0 and very large) then no tariff can increase 
the welfare o f the country relative to that which the country can achieve under free trade.
Proof:
Consider a world economy with two countries defined as in equations (16) (17) (18) (19) (20). 
We shall now solve the model by finding an explicit expression for the equilibrium terms of trade p*B in 
the world economy. This consists of writing the market clearing conditions in the B market, exports 
equal imports, and expressing it as a function of one variable: pB. From the terms of trade in 
equilibrium, we show that all other endogenous variables can be found. We shall use the indices 1 and
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2 to distinguish the parameters of the two countries. Note first that we have given no specification of 
demand or supply behavior outside of an equilibrium; in particular, there is no information for carrying 
out stability analysis. Since the model has constant returns to scale, profit maximizing supply functions 
are, as is standard, undefined. As is standard in models with constant returns to scale, we derive the 
equilibrium relations between supplies and prices from the condition of full employment of factors 




Since by assumption each firm takes the parameter 7  as given, from the production functions (16), 
marginal conditions and zero profits imply:
w  =  ‘y a ( L i / K i ) a~'ipB =
r =  7 ( 1  -  oc)1°Pb
w  =  7/3/f"1 (21)
r =  7(1 -  fi)#
so that
-  =  [ i lZ f O ] , ,  m d -  =
w oc w 0 (22)
and in particular
|( i  - M ,
1 [ w - ° ) r  a i )
The next step is to define an equation (called the “resolving equation” and denoted F = 0) which yields 
the equilibrium value of the terms of trade pB as a function of all the exogenous parameters of the model
of which there are 1 2  as listed above, and from which all other endogenous variables at equilibrium are
explicitly computed.
Indicating logarithms with the symbol ” ~  ”, the four equations in (21) can be rewritten as:
w  =  (a — l)/j_+ a  +  'pb +  7 
r =  alx +  (1 — a) + pB +  7
w =  { 0 - 1 ) 7 2 +  P +  1  (24)
r =  Ph  +  ( 1  -  /?) +  7 -
so that
(“  — ® +  Pb =  (ft — l ) h  +  0  (25)
Q?i + (1 — a) + pb  = 0 h  + (1 — 0)
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or, equivalently,
(a  -  l)?i +  ( 1  -  P %  =  (3 ~ p b ~  a
a h  ~  PI2 =  ( l ~ P )  - P B -  ( l ~ a ) .  (26)
Solving for k,  / 2  gives:
r _  [(/? ~  PB ~  a ) ( - P )  ~  (1 ~  /?)[(! - P ) ~ P B ~ {  1 ~  a)] (27)
[0 - a ]
and
7  _  [(a -  1 ) [ ( 1  -  p) -  pB -  ( 1  -  a)] -  \(p - P b -  5)a]]
h  ~  ¡¿ T a j  • (28)
From (27) and (28) we obtain:
and
( P - a )
( P - a )
where _  \(p -  q ) (—/?) -  (1 -  >g)[(l ~ P ) -  (1—Qf)]]
( / * - « )
[(a -  !)[(! -  P) -  (1 -  q)] ~ a(P -  5)
and (P — a)  ’




l2 =  eBp1J ^ ~ aK
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Now,
h  =  ** L‘ ~  Ll =  l^ I<S ~  K or L' = L‘ ~  ~  K \ )  (31)
and
h =  L \ / K i  => h  =  lxK x so that Ls -  l2(I<s -  K x) =  lxK x (32)
or K x{lx -  h)  =  Ls -  l2I<s =» K\  =  (Ls -  l2K*)l{ lx -  l2).
(33)
From (13), (32), and (33) we obtain:
„  _  (L - -  W )  (34)
and 1 (*i “
^ - ■ A w - h n  (35)
which together with (30) gives the levels of supply of labor and capital used in each sector, at an 
equilibrium as a function of the equilibrium level of the relative price of 5:
eAL‘ A *  , w . a, (36)
( e * - e * )  Pb
and
K > =  -  e < V  -  ' B) K ‘
(37)
Expressions (16) and (36) give the quantity of B and /produced at each level of relative prices, pB. Now 
taking 7  = 1, we denote these as <f>(pB) and i/(ps), respectively. Therefore from (16) we obtain the 
equilibrium level of outputs as a function of equilibrium prices:
B* = 7  <t>(pB) (38)
and
F = 7 '/'(Pa)-
Note that this does not fully express outputs as an explicit function of equilibrium prices because 7  = 
7 (5 ). To obtain outputs as explicit functions of equilibrium prices we must also find out the equilibrium 
value of 7  = 7 *(5), which is a “fixed point” problem, since 7  depends on 5  and 5  depends on 7 . This 
is solved as follows.
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The economy has increasing returns which are external to the firm, and the parameter y  increases with 
the level of output of B and 7:
y = B°. (39)
At an equilibrium, equations (38) and (39) must be satisfied simultaneously, i.e.,
7  =  M (Pb)T
(40)
= ya<t>(pB)a> or Y1" = <t>(pBT
so that
7 = <KpB)ff/(M-
Therefore at an equilibrium from (38) we obtain a relation between the outputs of B and 7, and pB:
bs = <j>(pBy +m~a) (4i)
r  = f(pBy +U(]-a)
Note that when o > 1, 6 = a + 1/1-a < 0 so that when Bs = <t)(pB)a+m'a) decreases with pB across 
equilibria, since <j>(pB) is an increasing function of pB for each fixed y, see Figure 3.
If a -* 1, d -» -oo.
To solve the model we now consider the market clearing condition in B. At a world equilibrium, the B 
market must clear so that:
B * ' ( P b  + 1) -  B - ' \ pb + t )  =  B ‘*(p b ) -  a « ( M ) ,  o r
F(pB, t )  =  B ^ i p e  +  t) -  B - ' \ pb + t) -  B - ' \ Pb ) +  B d3(pB) =  0. <42)
From (18) (19) (21) (30) and (41), equation (42) is a function of the variable pB alone, which we call a
reduced form “resolving” equation for this model. Solving this equation gives the equilibrium values of 
pB from where all other variables can be computed as shown above. The model is thus solved.
We may now study the changes in the terms of trade as a function of the tariff t. By the implicit function 
theorem: _ d F / d t
a p B / d t = a m ;
- ( d ( B d■' -  B‘-l /d (p B +  t ) <43)
d B d’' /d ( p B + 1) +  d B d’2/dpB -  dB*-'/d{pB +  t ) -  d B ^ / d p s
By the assumptions on demand for B, if a, > 1, then 8Bs l/8{pB + t) < 0 and therefore the numerator 
of (43) is negative. The denominator is also negative, so that 8pB!8t >  O. As the tariff t increases, pB 
also increases. The terms of trade of the country decrease, since it imports B and must now pay more 
for it, as we set out to prove.
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Figure 3
PB
Each firm faces an upward cost curve. The country as a 
whole faces a downward cost curve due to 
external economies of scale.
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RULES OF ORIGIN IN A 
WESTERN HEMISPHERE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
N. David Palmeter
Introduction
The purpose of a free trade area is to confer a tariff preference to the products of its members, 
and rules are needed to determine what products are entitled to the preference. These “rules of origin,” 
as they usually are called, provide the legal basis for determining the “nationality” of a product — 
whether it “originates” in the territory of a member of the free trade area for purposes of the preference.
When goods are produced entirely within the territory of a member of the area, for example, an 
agricultural product, origin is clear. But when materials imported from outside the area are incorporated 
in an article produced within the area, difficult questions can and do arise. If countries A and B have 
established a free trade area, an article produced in country C will not be given duty free treatment by 
A simply because it has been transshipped to A through B. Something must be done in B to transform 
the article from C into a product of J3. Rules of origin are used to establish what that “something” is.
Since free trade areas confer tariff preferences only on the products of their members, they also, 
of necessity, discriminate against the products of nonmembers. A more accurate term for a “free trade” 
area would be “preferential trade” area. Similarly, a more accurate term for “rules of origin” would be 
“rules of preference” because these rules are used to determine origin for purposes of the preference 
only. When it is necessary to determine origin for other purposes, different rules generally are used.
In the United States the rules used to determine origin for most-favored nation (MFN) tariff rates 
and for country-of-origin marking purposes are different from the rules used to determine origin under 
the Generalized System of Preferences; these rules differ from those used in the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative, and all of them are different from the rules used to determine origin in antidumping 
proceedings. Still other rules of origin are used to determine eligibility for government procurement. 
Rules of origin in the U. S.-Israel Free Trade Area (USIFTA), the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
(CUSFTA), and the proposed North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) differ from each other 
and from all other U.S. rules of origin. Thus, the fact that an article “originates” in a particular country 
under FTA rules does not necessarily mean that it originates in that country for other purposes.
The first part of this paper examines different rules or methods used to determine origin. The 
second part surveys the rules used in a variety of preferential trade blocs. Harmonization of rules of 
origin are the subject of the third section, and the fourth section addresses policy issues that arise in the 
context of rules of origin. The final section summarizes and concludes the paper.
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Methods of Determining Origin
Various rules or methods are used to determine origin, and each method has advantages and 
disadvantages; none has proved to be totally satisfactory. Adoption of one particular rule of origin simply 
amounts to acceptance of one set of shortcomings over others. Some rules of origin, however, have 
fewer shortcomings than others.
Change in Tariff Heading
Under a rule based on change in tariff heading, or CTH, an article completed in one country from 
materials originating in another will be deemed to originate in the country of completion if the processing 
there is sufficient to change the tariff classification of the imported materials to a specified degree.
CTH appears to be the “wave of the future” in rules of origin, at least for international 
agreements. It was the basis of the proposal by the United States to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) to relax international rules of origin, and it was largely accepted in the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. 1 It is the basis of the rule used in the CUSFTA, the NAFTA, and the Mercado 
Comiin del Sur (MERCOSUR).
Rules of origin in the CUSFTA and NAFTA are set out in terms of the widely used Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System (harmonized system or HTS), which classifies articles at a 
two-digit chapter level, a four-digit heading level, a six-digit subheading level, and an eight-digit 
statistical level.
The case of tomato catsup and tomato paste offers an example. Catsup is classified in chapter 
21 of the HTS, under item 2103.20, while tomato paste is classified in chapter 20, under HTS item 
2002.90. The CUSFTA rule of origin provides that the operations necessary to convert a product 
classified in any chapter other than chapter 2 1 , into a product classified in that chapter, will confer 
preferential origin on the chapter 21 product. Thus, tomato catsup (chapter 21) produced from imported 
tomato paste (chapter 20) originates where the catsup is produced for CUSFTA preference purposes.
Under NAFTA, however, the rule is different. Conversion of tomato paste imported from outside 
NAFTA into tomato catsup within NAFTA will not confer origin on the catsup for preferential purposes. 
The formulation of the rule is that a change to item 2103.20 (tomato catsup) from any other chapter, 
except subheading 2002.90 (tomato paste) will confer origin. Thus, if fresh tomatoes (item 0702) are 
converted to tomato paste within NAFTA, and the paste then is made into catsup, also within NAFTA, 
the catsup would qualify for the preference; but if the paste is imported, the preference for catsup will 
be denied.
1. N. David Palmeter, "The U.S. Rules of Origin Proposed to GATT: Monotheism or Polytheism?", 24 
Journal of World Trade No. 2, p. 25, (April 1990); Edume Navarro, "Rules of Origin in GATT" in Bourgeois, 
Vermulst, and Waer (Eds.), Rules of Origin in International Trade: A Comparative Study (University of Michigan 
Press 1993).
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These two rules demonstrate some of the advantages and some of the disadvantages of the CTH 
system. Among the advantages is the fact that once a rule is decided, it can be stated clearly and 
unambiguously, and it is easy for those in the trade to learn. The disadvantage lies in the method by 
which the substance of the specific rule is decided. Under CTH as it is used in the CUSFTA and 
NAFTA, there is no single “rule” of origin, such as a rule that states that any change at the two-digit, 
or the four-digit, or the six-digit level will confer origin. The CUSFTA and die NAFTA use change at 
all of these levels (and also at the eight-digit level) to determine origin, depending upon the product. 
Instead of a general rule or principle of origin, there are hundreds of individual rules in each of the 
agreements. 2 Thus, CTH is the method used to determine origin of catsup in both the CUSFTA and the 
NAFTA, but the specific rules for catsup in the two pacts are different.
This absence of a general rule or principle for determining origin is perhaps the major 
shortcoming of CTH, one that would be no surprise to political realists or to economists of the public- 
choice persuasion. It renders CTH susceptible to capture by industries interested in minimizing their 
exposure to competition. In NAFTA, in the case of tomato catsup it was apparently easy for an industry 
interested in minimizing competition from tomato paste outside the three-country area to fashion a 
product-specific rule denying hie preference to catsup made from the imported tomato paste. There is 
no other apparent reason for the change in NAFTA from the CUSFTA rule. In 1992, Chile was the 
leading foreign supplier of tomato paste to the United States. Thus, Chilean tomato paste can be used 
in catsup that will enjoy preferential treatment under the CUSFTA, but none of it will have that privilege 
under NAFTA. Mexico was the second leading supplier of tomato paste to the U.S. in 1992.3
These facts would seem to justify the tentative assumption that the rule was changed at the behest 
of the Mexican producers of tomatoes or tomato paste, who presumably would benefit at the expense of 
their competitors in Chile. But this assumption depends upon further assumptions, such as the assumption 
that most tomato catsup in NAFTA is made outside Mexico, that the MFN duty rate in Mexico for catsup 
is significant compared to the advantages the NAFTA preference would offer, and that the Mexican 
market is important to the catsup producers in Canada and the United States. Otherwise, Canadian and 
U.S. producers of catsup might not find the NAFTA benefits significant enough to switch from their 
current Chilean suppliers of tomato paste.
The very fact that we are able only to speculate about the “policy” behind this particular rule 
illustrates the ease with which CTH may be captured by specific companies or industries. The stated 
rules are, superficially, comprehensible to all, but their rationale rarely is. The rules of origin for tomato 
catsup in the CUSFTA and the NAFTA are stated clearly and unambiguously, but the rationale is
2. By one count, the CUSFTA contains 1,498 separate rules of origin spread among the 20 pages of the 
revelvant annex to the FTA. See David Palmeter, "The FTA Rules of Origin: Boon or Boondoggle?" in Dearden, 
Hart, and Steger (Eds.) Living With Trade: Canada, The Free Trade Agreement, and the, GATT, pp. 41, 47 
(Institute for Research on Public Policy and Centre for Trade Policy and Law, Ottawa, 1989). There appears to 
be no public count of the number of separate rules of origin in the NAFTA, but the number of pages in the relevant 
annex (Annex 401) listing the specific rules is 148 (pp. 3-150). Extrapolation would suggest, therefore, that the 
number is in excess of 11,000.
3. In 1992, according to statistics published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, the United States imported 
22,112 metric tons of tomato paste, 8,754 (39.6% of the total) from Chile and 6,634 (30.0%) of the total from 
Mexico.
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apparent for neither. And while we may speculate, we do not know and probably would have difficulty 
learning the rationale for the change.
Tariff schedules are lengthy, complex, and tedious. A section of a tariff schedule usually will 
be comprehensible only to those familiar in detail with the products, processes, and economics of the 
industry. The hundreds of pages and thousands of lines of a tariff schedule offer countless opportunities 
for similar rules, rules that sometimes may amount to a covenant not to compete. A well-known example 
from the CUSFTA is the rule that the production of aged cheese from fresh milk does not confer origin. 4 
This rule suggests that elements of the Canadian and American dairy industries agreed to stay on their 
own sides of the border, hardly a “free” trade stance. NAFTA has become notorious for rules of this 
kind:
...NAFTA contains a catalog of special-interest measures. It is a free-trade 
agreement, perhaps, but one full of protectionism for certain companies.
Through special domestic-content regulations known as rules of origin, for 
instance, General Motors Corporation would get a leg up on Honda Motor 
Company in Mexico. U.S. textile makers would be able to shut out India’s 
market. Zenith would be able to use changes in tariff rules to check incursions 
by low-cost Korean imports. 5
CTH, as noted above, is not, accurately speaking, a “rule” of origin or preference; rather, it is 
a “method” for establishing rules of origin or preference. By itself, it is neutral, neither desirable nor 
undesirable as a trade policy instrument. Desirability depends upon the hundreds, even thousands, of 
individual rules that are established and their effectiveness in achieving trade policy goals.
CTH also presumes that origin can be determined by a quick glance at the tariff schedule. Very 
often this will be the case. The rule for tomato catsup is clear, even if its rationale is not. But sometimes 
a glance at the tariff schedule will not produce a clear answer because it is not always apparent where 
in the tariff schedule a particular item should be classified. Tariff classification disputes have been a 
mainstay of the practice of customs lawyers for generations. They are likely to continue to be a source 
of dispute and work for lawyers, as attested by the well-known controversy in the United States over the
4. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 27 International Legal Materials 281, Annex 301.2. Section 1 of 
Annex 301.2 requires a change at the chapter level of the Harmonized System to confer origin; changes within 
chapters will not suffice. All dairy products are included within a single chapter, Chapter 4, of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule. Consequently, the origin of manufactured dairy products such as cheese, always will be the 
country in which the milk was produced, regardless of where the cheese was made. Indeed, as the rule is written, 
fresh milk is not considered substantially transformed for FTA purposes even if a magician could change it into 
bird’s eggs or honey, since these too, are included in Chapter 4.
5. Bob Davis, "Sweetheart Deals—Pending Trade Pact with Mexico, Canada Has a Protectionist Air," Wall 
Street Journal, 22, July 1992, p. 1.
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question of whether imported minivans should be classified as passenger cars or as trucks.6 CTH is not, 
therefore, completely free from subjective or political influences in its application.
Another problem with CTH is its tendency to become outdated if the underlying tariff schedule 
is not kept current. When dealing with a particular product area, tariff schedules usually specify the major 
products within the area, and then provide a “basket” heading for all other related products. In rapidly 
developing product areas there is a tendency for the trade to move into the basket category as newly 
developed products replace those listed in the schedule. This problem can be remedied by keeping the 
tariff schedule up to date, but if the tariff schedule involved requires international negotiation, this may 
not always be easy. What industries in one country may see as “updating,” industries in another may see 
as a threat. It seems unlikely that any significant change would be made in a tariff schedule without the 
concurrence of the industries concerned, effectively giving a veto to those who believe they would face 
increased competition as a result of the change.
Finally, CTH can be burdensome and expensive. For example, producers who wish to take 
advantage of the free trade agreements between the European Communities and the individual European 
Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries, which are based on CTH, must maintain records establishing the tariff 
classification not only of finished products but also of all raw and intermediate materials imported from 
third countries. The costs of the border formalities needed to administer this system have been estimated 
to amount to at least three percent of the value of the goods concerned, while the total economic cost has 
been estimated to amount to at least five percent of that value. This burden is enough to lead exporters 
of up to 25 percent of presumably eligible trade to forego the preference and simply pay the MFN duty.7 
Anecdotal evidence suggests the phenomenon of exporters declining the preference to avoid the paperwork 
also occurs in FTA trade. 8
Value Added
The requirement that a minimum value be added to imported materials to confer origin for the 
finished product on the importing country may be employed as a separate rule of origin or in conjunction
6. See "Japan Official Blasts Push to Raise Minivan Tariff," Wall Street Journal, 9 March 1993, Section B, 
p. 6; "Welfare Compromise for Auto Makers," New York Times, 18 February 1993, Section A, p. 22; "Japan 
Threatens to Go to GATT If U.S. Boosts Minivan Tariffs," Journal of Commerce, 17 February 1993, Section A, 
p. 3; "Bill Would Increase Tariffs on Mutipurpose Vehicle Imports," 9 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1126, 
1 July 1992; "When is a Truck?,” Washington Post, 22 Feb. 1989, p. A16, col 1; "If It Quacks Like a Truck, It 
is a Truck," Washington Tariff & Trade Letter, 20 Feb. 1989, p. 3; another example, in the context of the FTA, 
is sweeteners. See, "Canadian Sugar Refiners Voice Opposition to U.S. Customs Tariff Change on Sweeteners," 
6 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 176, 8 Feb. 1989.
7. Jan Herin, "Rules of Origin and Differences Between Tariff Levels in EFTA and in the EC," European Free 
Trade Association, Occasional Paper No. 13.
8. See, e.g., G. Pierre Goad, "The new hat trick: figuring out the country of origin isn’t worth the trouble," 
Wall Street Journal, 24 September 1992; "Certification documents, rules of origin highlight business frustration with 
FTA," 7 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 911, 20 June 1990; "Complicated rules of origin set by FTA discourage 
exporters, GM official says," 6 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1355, 18 October 1989. These examples also 
referred to the complexity of value-added requirements, which are often used along with CTH.
195
Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere
with another rule. Because processing and assembly often do not result in meaningful tariff changes, 
value added is often used to supplement CTH when parts and components are assembled into a final 
product. The Canada-U.S. FTA, NAFTA, and MERCOSUR are free trade agreements with CTH rules 
of origin supplemented by value added.
Like CTH, value added has the advantage of being a rule that may be stated plainly and 
unambiguously but, like CTH, value added may also be more certain in its statement than in its 
application. While CTH is subject to capture by special interests, value added may avoid capture by 
anyone, including governments, and that too can be a problem.
The statement of a value added “rule” is simple: for example, 50 percent of the value must be 
added in a country before origin will be conferred on that country. But calculation of value added 
frequently depends upon resolution of complex and controversial accounting issues. This adds both cost 
and uncertainty. Lengthy and costly audits are an inherent part of any rule based on value added since 
the claims of exporters must be verified. These impose a continuing administrative cost well beyond that 
which prevails with other rules of origin. Uncertainty is heightened under a value-added system because 
origin is never finally determined until audits are completed, and that can take years. If the auditors 
disagree with the calculations of the parties, enormous, unexpected demands for payment of duties may 
result. 9 Whatever else value added may be as a rule of origin, certain and efficient it is not.
Perhaps most important, under value-added rules origin may change in unpredictable and 
uncontrollable ways that avoid “capture” even by governments. Origin may change from one day to the 
next because of fluctuations in exchange rates or in costs of materials. Moreover, operations that confer 
origin when performed in one country may not do so when performed in another because of different 
labor costs. In NAFTA, for example, origin—and preference eligibility—will be conferred more easily 
under value added on higher-wage Canadian and U.S. operations than on lower-wage Mexican operations. 
In this way a value added rule may distort economic efficiencies and divert investment from where it 
might otherwise occur. 10
9. Value added was the source of the "Honda Controversy" between Canada and the U.S. under the origin rules 
of the FTA. See, David Palmeter, "The Honda Decision: Rules of Origin Turned Upside Down," 32A Free Trade 
Observer (CCH Canadian) June 1992.
10. NAFTA provides that value added may be calculated on the basis of either a transaction value method or 
a net cost method.
Transaction value method:
TV - VNM
RVC = ...............  x 100
TV
where RVC is the regional value content, expressed as a percentage; TV is the transaction value of the good adjusted 
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Specified Process
Under a specified process system, rules are drawn in terms of particular industrial operations. 
The system shares with CTH the advantages of a clear and unambiguous statement of individual rules, 
but it also shares with CTH the problem of obsolescence, as technical developments may tend to overtake 
the texts of specific rules. More important, specified process shares with CTH a susceptibility to capture 
by industries that may not always view trade expansion as a worthy goal.
When governments base rules on the details of industrial processes, the industries concerned are 
likely to have a major influence in the formulation of these rules. Industries, after all, will have more 
expertise than governments in their own processes. For example, since 1984 the United States has used 
a specified process system for its textile rules of origin. These rules are widely perceived to have been 
driven by the protectionist interests of the textile and apparel industries in the U.S . 11 The NAFTA rules 
of origin for textiles and textile products implement many of the 1984 U.S. textile rules of origin. 
Indeed, the NAFTA rules for textiles and apparel are even more restrictive than the 1984 U.S. rules.
Specified process rules are dissimilar to CTH rules in at least one important respect. They are 
not based on an agreed set of descriptions, such as a common tariff schedule. They are therefore likely 
to be even more difficult to negotiate in a multilateral context. To the extent that specified process rules 
of origin are used in free trade agreements, they seem to be used (as in NAFTA) primarily as a 
supplement to other rules.
Substantial Transformation
The basic rule of origin used in the United States is the “substantial transformation” rule. Strictly 
speaking, all rules of origin are substantial transformation rules—the substantiality of a transformation 
is defined by change in tariff heading, or by value added, or by specified processes. As the term 
“substantial transformation” is used in the U.S., however, it has come to mean the determination of 
origin case by case, a methodology congenial to common-law legal systems. Its advantages are those of
NC-VNM
R  VC = --------------- X 100
NC
where RVC is the regional value content expressed as a percentage; NC is the net cost of the good; and VNM is 
the value of non-originating materials used by the producer in the production of the good. North American Free 
Trade Agreement, Art. 402.2.
11. Craig R. Giesse and Martin J. Lewin, "The Multifiber Arrangement: ’Temporary’ Protection Run Amuck," 
19 Law and Policy in International Business 51, 129 ff. (1987); N. David Palmeter, "Rules of Origin or Rules of 
Restriction? A Commentary on a New Form of Protectionism, "11 Fordham International Law Journal 1,26 (1987).
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that system: the slow, incremental development of the rule built upon its application to specific factual 
situations, reasoning from one case to the next. 12
By building upon precedent, reasoning by analogy, and taking one step at a time, such a system 
can establish sound, predictable rules. Nevertheless, the system has been criticized in the United States 
as inherently imprecise and subjective. 13 This debate, however, is irrelevant to the question of a rule 
of origin for a WHFTA. Regardless of whether the substantial transformation system works well within 
a particular national legal system, it would be difficult to use as an international standard. In the Western 
Hemisphere, only Canada and the United States use the common law system, and even they did not use 
substantial transformation as the rule of origin in their FTA. A substantial-transformation rule based on 
the common-law case method will succeed only if there is, at the top of the system, a court charged 
ultimately with deciding appealed cases and creating the case law upon which the system depends. No 
such international court exists, nor is one likely to be established for a free trade area. Consequently, 
substantial transformation is likely to be unworkable as a rule of origin for a free trade area.
Examples of Rules of Origin in Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions
Andean Group
The signatories to the Cartagena Agreement, establishing the Andean Group (Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) have established rules of origin based on CTH, supplemented generally 
by a 50-percent value-added rule. 14
12. As explained by one of the leading legal scholars in the U.S.:
It is a three-step process described by the doctrine of precedent in which a proposition descriptive 
of the first case is made into a rule of law and then applied to a next similar situation. The steps 
are these: similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case is 
announced; then the rule of law is made applicable to the second case.
Edward H. Levi, An Introduction To Legal Reasoning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 1-2.
13. John P. Simpson, "Reforming Rules of Origin," Journal of Commerce, Oct. 4, 1988, p. 12A, col. 2.
14. Andean Group, Commission Decision 293 — Special Norms for Determining the Origin of Goods (March
21, 1991) 32 International Legal Materials 172 (1993). The value added rule specifies that "In the case of Bolivia 
and Ecuador this percentage shall be 60 percent." Article 1(e). It is not clear from this translated text whether 
goods from Bolivia and Ecuador shall be subjected to this higher amount, or whether Bolivia and Ecuador may apply 
this higher amount to goods from other members of the Group.
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ASEAN Free Trade Area
The 1992 Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme for the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area provides that a product shall be deemed to be originating from ASEAN Member States 
if at least 40 percent of its content originates from any member state. 15
Australia-New Zealand CER
The 1983 Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relationship (CER) relies on a 50 percent 
value added standard. It also requires that the last process performed in the manufacture of the goods 
involved be performed in the territory of the exporting member state. 16
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
The primary rule of origin in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement is change in tariff heading. 
This is supplemented by a 50-percent value-added test for many products. 17
European Communities Association Accords
The EC has a variety of preferential trade arrangements which may be considered regional, such 
as the agreements with the countries of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific Countries (ACP), the Mashreq countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) and the Magreb 
countries (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia). The rules of origin vary somewhat from agreement to 
agreement, but in general they are based on CTH supplemented by specified processing requirements and, 
in some cases, value added. 18
15. Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, Protocol 1 Concerning the Definition of the Concept of "Originating 
Products" and Methods of Administrative Cooperation, O.J. (1990) L84/8.
16. Keith Steele and Daniel Moulis, "Country of Origin: The Australian Experience," in Bourgeois, Vermulst, 
and Waer (Eds.), Rules of Origin in International Trade: A Comparative Study. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1993.
17. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Part Two, Ch. Three; See also the following comments by the author 
of this paper: "Rules of Origin in the U.S.," in Bourgeois, Vermulst, and Waer (Eds.), Rules of Origion in 
International Trade: A Comparative Study (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1993); "The FTA Rules of 
Origin and the Rule of Law," Proceedings of the Seventh Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, 128 Federal Rules Decisions 500 (1990); "The FTA Rules of Origin: Boon or Boondoggle?" in 
Dearden, Hart, & Seger (Eds.), Living With Free Trade: Canada, The Free Trade Agreement And The GATT 
(Institute for Research and Public Policy, Ottawa, 1989); and "The Canada-U.S. FTA Rule of Origin and a 
Multilateral Agreement," International Business Lawyer No. 11, p. 513 (1988).
18. Paul Waer, "EC Rules of Origin," in Bourgeois, Vermulst, and Waer (Eds.) Rules of Origin in International 
Trade: A Comparative Study (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1993).
199
Trade Liberalization in the Western Hem isphere
European Free Trade Association
The rule of origin used by EFTA (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, 
and Switzerland) is based on specified process supplemented by a 50 percent value added test for certain 
products. In some respects, however, the EFTA rule may be seen as a very liberal CTH system because 
most of the specified processes are described in four-digit CTH terms. Conversion of materials not 
falling within a four-digit classification into an article in that classification generally will suffice to confer 
preferential EFTA origin. 19
Israel-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
The 1985 Free Trade Agreement between Israel and the U.S. uses the common law substantial 
transformation test, apparently the only free trade agreement to do so. This probably results from Israel’s 
willingness to “sign on” to the existing U.S. rule when the FTA was negotiated, something Canada 
declined to do three years later. The Israel-U.S. FTA also contains a 35-percent value-added 
requirement. For purposes of calculating whether 35 percent of value has been added by the exporting 
party, the value of products of the other party may be counted for as much as 15 percent of the final 
value, thereby reducing the value-added requirement to as low as 20 percent. 20 These rules parallel the 
rules of origin for the Caribbean Basin Initiative. 21
Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR)
The Treaty of Asunción, establishing MERCOSUR among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay, established an origin rule based on CTH, supplemented with a 50 percent value added 
requirement for processing operations. CTH in MERCOSUR is based on the tariff nomenclature of the 
Latin American Integration Association. 22
19. Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association (Stockholm, 4 January 1960), Article 4, 
Annex B, Schedule I.
20. Israel-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 24 International Legal Materials 653, Annex 3:5.
21. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, tit. Ill, subtit. A, 97 Stat. 369, 384-395
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2706).
22. See Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay: Treaty Establishing a Common Market, 31 International Legal
Materials 1041, Annex II.
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North America Free Trade Agreement
NAFTA establishes CTH as the primary rule of origin for preferential trade among Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States. This is supplemented by value added, particularly in the case of textiles, 
apparel, and electronic products, by specified process. NAFTA also contains fairly elaborate procedures 
for verifying claims of origin. Exporters and importers will be required to furnish signed certificates of 
origin.23 Records relating to origin must be kept for a minimum of five years. 24 Government officials 
from each party may conduct origin verifications at the premises of exporters or producers in the territory 
of other parties. 25 If exporters or producers refuse to permit a verification visit, they may lose 
preferential tariff treatment for the article that would have been the subject of the visit. 26
Harmonization of Rules of Origin
The proliferation of different rules of origin has led to a number of attempts to harmonize them, 
but virtually no progress has been made. In 1976, The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) produced a compendium of rules of origin used by OECD countries. This 
compendium was followed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 
preparing a 1982 compendium dealing with rules of origin applicable to developing countries under 
different preference arrangements. In 1982 the Customs Cooperation Council (CCC) produced a 
comparative study of rules of origin.27
Earlier, in 1973, the CCC approved the Kyoto Convention, which was designed to simplify and 
harmonize customs procedures including rules of origin. However, the Kyoto Convention merely 
describes origin systems in use and does not set forth mandatory requirements. In 1981, the GATT 
Secretariat prepared a note on rules of origin, and in 1982 ministers agreed to study the rules of origin 
used by GATT’s Contracting Parties.28
Not much more was heard of rules of origin internationally until well into the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, but in the late 1980s, developments in three important areas served to focus more attention 
on the problems posed by rules of origin: (1 ) increased use of preferential trading arrangements, including 
regional arrangements, with varying rules of origin; (2 ) an increased number of origin disputes growing 
out of quota arrangements, such as the Multifiber Arrangement and the “voluntary” steel export restraints 
applicable to the U.S.; and (3) increased use of antidumping laws, particularly by the EC and the U.S.,
23. NAFTA Art. 501 and Art. 502.
24. NAFTA Art. 505.
25. NAFTA Art. 506.
26. Ibid.
27. See U.S. International Trade Commission, The Impact o f Rules o f Origin on U.S. Imports and Exports, 
USITC Pub. 1695 (May 1985).
28. Ibid.
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and subsequent claims of “circumvention” of antidumping restraints through the use of third country 
facilities.
In September 1989, the U.S. submitted a comprehensive proposal concerning rules of origin to 
GATT. The U.S. called for a two-step program leading to eventual harmonization of rules of origin. In 
Step One, the Customs Cooperation Council would provide three reports to the GATT. The first report 
would identify where change of classification within the Harmonized System of Tariff Nomenclature 
would result in the transformation of a product sufficient to confer origin, and where change in tariff 
classification alone may not be adequate. The second report would identify product areas which typically 
are subject to a variety of rules of origin, or rules different from “the primary rule of origin” used by 
various countries. The third report would identify non-MFN policies and programs (such as preferences) 
that are subject to special rules of origin. In Step Two, the Contracting Parties to GATT—using the three 
studies — would, within a year, negotiate an international agreement harmonizing rules of origin. 29
The Final Act of the Uruguay Round Agreement signed on December 15, 1993, contains a Rules 
of Origin Agreement that is basically the U.S. proposal. It would apply to all rules of origin used in 
nonpreferential commercial policy instruments, thus retaining the distinction between rules of origin and 
rules of preference. 30 However, as preferential trading arrangements proliferate, rules of preference 
become correspondingly important. Rules of preference are becoming the rules of origin that really 
count. Thus, if the GATT agreement on rules of origin harmonizes only nonpreferential rules, its value 
will be limited.
29. The text of the U.S. proposal is reproduced and discussed in N.David Palmeter, "The U.S. Rules of Origin 
Proposal to GATT: Monotheism or Polytheism?", supra note 1.
30. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Final Act Embodying The Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Section II-11, Article 1.
1. For the purposes of Parts I to IV of this agreement, rules of origin shall be defined as those 
laws, regulations and administrative determinations of general application applied by any member 
to determine the country of origin of goods provided such rules of origin are not related to 
contractual or autonomous trade regimes leading to the granting of tariff preferences going beyond 
the application of Article 1:1 of the GATT 1994.
2. Rules of origin referred to in paragraph 1 shall include, all rules of origin used in 
nonpreferential commercial policy instruments, such as in the application of: most-favored-nation 
treatment under Articles I, II, III, XI and XIII of the GATT 1994; antidumping and countervailing 
duties under Article VI of the GATT 1994; safeguard measures under Article XIX of the GATT 
1994; origin marking requirements under Article IX of the GATT 1994; and any discriminatory 
quantitative restrictions or tariff quotas. They shall also include rules of origin used for 
government procurement and trade statistics.
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Policy Issues
Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas
Article XXIV of GATT permits contracting parties to enter into customs unions and free trade 
areas covering substantially all of their trade. In a customs union, the members adopt a common external 
tariff; in a free trade area, each member retains its own external tariff. 31 Rules of origin are more 
important to free trade areas than to customs unions because of this tariff differential. All other things 
being equal, processing operations involving materials and components from outside a free trade area 
would tend to be located in the territory of the member country with the lowest external tariff. Thus, by 
lowering their external tariffs, free trade area members might “compete” more successfully for investment.
D uty D rawback
Duty drawback is the repayment to an exporter of the duty paid on imported materials included 
in an exported product. The GATT Subsidies Code provides that the remission or drawback of import 
charges is not a subsidy if the amount paid is not in excess of the amount levied on imports that are 
physically incorporated in the exported goods.32 Because the rules of origin of all free trade areas allow 
third country materials, suitably altered, to count as a product of the area, the question of drawback must 
be addressed.
If drawback among members of the free trade area continues, the effect will be to confer the 
benefits of the free trade area on many third country suppliers. For example, parts from a third country 
supplier transformed into a preference-eligible product would be dutiable when they enter the first free 
trade area country. If that duty were refunded to the user of those parts when the finished product is 
shipped to another free trade area country, the parts effectively would have entered the free trade area free 
of duty. For this reason, internal duty drawback in a free trade area trade is likely to be discontinued.
Another reason why internal duty drawback is likely to be discontinued in a free trade area is that 
it would otherwise provide an incentive to locate plants outside the largest market in the free trade area 
to obtain the benefit of drawback for sales in that market. For example, in NAFTA the largest market 
is the U.S. If 80 percent of the NAFTA sales of a product occur in the U.S., then sales from a plant 
located there would benefit from drawback of U.S. customs duty only on the 20 percent of its output 
which is sold in Canada and Mexico. Conversely, if the plant were located in Canada or Mexico, sales 
would benefit from drawback on the 80 percent of its output destined for the U.S., as well as on the 
smaller portion destined for markets in the territory of the other partner.
On the other hand, with internal drawback eliminated, investment would tend to occur in the 
country with the lowest external duty, all other factors being equal, with the consequent incentive to lower
31. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XXIV: 8.
32. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, Annex "Illustrative List of Subsidies," paragraph (i). This means that drawback of duties on 
materials consumed in the manufacturing process, but not physically incorporated in the exported goods (such as 
polishes), are liable to countervailing duties.
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external duty rates. A further effect of internal drawback elimination is to impose the level of protection 
of the importing country throughout the free trade area. For example, if the duty on a part in Mexico is 
10 percent and in the U.S. 5 percent, the part imported into Mexico and incorporated in a finished 
subassembly there will carry the burden of the 1 0  percent duty when exported and included in a finished 
product in the U.S. Because this phenomenon also could influence the location of investment, some 
members of a free trade area might prefer limited duty drawback, enough to equalize with the level of a 
lower external tariff in the territory of the importing partner.
Rules of Origin and “DUP” Activities
Brian Hindley has observed that, “Persons who are in favor of an active and ’strong’ trade policy 
are likely to favor rules of origin that foreign producers can satisfy only with difficulty and considerable 
expense. Protectionist policies will not hit their targets squarely without such rules of origin. ” 33
“Strong” rules of origin have been used increasingly in recent years, for trade restricting 
purposes. 34 Frequently this has been in the context of antidumping investigations. At other times the 
issue has been quota eligibility, particularly for textiles, apparel, and steel products. As production 
becomes increasingly global, rules of origin have become an increasingly effective protectionist weapon.
Free trade areas, however, are not intended to be protectionist. Their very purpose is to create 
trade, not to restrict it. Yet free trade areas can be more trade-diverting than trade-creating, and rules of 
origin can further trade diversion at the expense of trade creation. It is possible, for example, that 
producers of tomato catsup in the U.S. and Canada will import more tomato paste from all sources than 
they do now and thereby increase overall trade. It is also possible, however, that they will merely 
substitute Mexican tomato paste for Chilean tomato paste and thereby only divert trade.
Whether trade diversion will or will not be the result of catsup-tomato paste rule of NAFTA (or 
whether it was the intended result), the potential for trade diversion in NAFTA and other regional 
arrangements is great. The formulation of product-specific rules of origin is, by its nature, very much out 
of the practical control of generalists and government officials at the policy level, and very much in the 
practical control of specialists who represent concerned industries. An industry will support a trade pact 
only if its particular rule of origin is to its satisfactory to that industry. Rarely will there be any effective 
opposition. The most likely opposition to one country’s advocates of a trade restrictive or diverting rule 
is another country’s industry that would benefit from a liberal rule. No doubt at times supporters of a 
liberal rule have prevailed. But often the solution is likely to be the one reached in the FTA on fresh milk 
and aged cheese, where the industries effectively said to each other, “You stay on your side of the border, 
and we will stay on our side.”
33. Brian Flindley, Foreign Direct Investment: The Effects o f Rules o f Origin, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, Discussion Paper 30, at 13 (1990).
34. See, generally, N. David Palmeter, "Rules of Origin or Rules of Restriction: A Commentary on a New 
Form of Protectionism," 11 Fordham International Law Journal 1 (1987).
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Rules of this kind result from what Jagdish Bhagwati calls “directly unproductive profit-seeking 
(DUP) activities.” He pronounces DUP appropriately as “dupe. ” 35 Examples of DUP activities given 
by Bhagwati include:
(1 ) tariff-seeking lobbying that is aimed at earning pecuniary income by changing the tariff and 
therefore factor incomes;
(2 ) revenue-seeking lobbying that seeks to divert government revenues towards oneself as 
recipient;
(3) monopoly-seeking lobbying whose objective is to create an artificial monopoly that generates 
rents; and
(4) tariff evasion or smuggling that de facto reduces the tariff (or quota) and generates returns 
by exploiting the price differential between the tariff-inclusive legal and the tariff-free illegal 
imports. 36
To this list might be added rules of origin lobbying in free trade agreements, the objective of 
which is to (1 ) increase one’s own exports, at the expense of more competitive suppliers outside the free 
trade area; (2) block increased competitive imports from within the free trade area; (3) tailor the rule so 
that one’s own specific multicountry operations benefit from the preference while those of one’s 
competitors do not (this may be particularly easy to do with complex, high-technology products); and 
(4) if all else fails, recall the lesson of the Canadian and U.S. dairy industries, and support a rule that 
effectively blocks trade.
Of the various methods for formulating origin rules, CTH and specified process are particularly 
susceptible to this kind of manipulation. Unfortunately, CTH is otherwise the most practical basis for 
establishing rules of origin for free trade areas. Consequently, governments, whose interest is in 
liberalizing trade through free trade areas, must guard against the frustration of their policies by those 
who do not share their interest. The potential for undermining the trade-creating goals of governments 
with trade-diverting and trade-inhibiting rules of origin is great. “For political reasons,” Richard Gardner 
has observed, “the reduction in trade barriers which takes place in such systems [i.e., preferential trade 
areas] will probably do more to give the participating countries sheltered markets against the outside 
world than it does to stimulate vigorous competition between them. ” 37 Rules of origin are a major 
weapon in the arsenal of those who would wish to do this.
35 Jagdish Bhagwati, "Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities," in J. Eatwell (Ed.) The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 845-847 (Stockton Press, 1987), reprinted in Jagdish Bhagwati (Douglas A. 
Irwin, Ed.) Political Economy And International Economics 129 (Cambridge: MIT Press 1991).
36. Ibid.
37. Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective 14 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1980 ed.).
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Freer Trade Through Complexity
Rules of origin can be used to divert or limit trade in free trade agreements only to the extent that 
origin is important economically. If MFN tariffs are high, then origin is important; if quotas restrict 
imports from outside countries, then origin may be even more important.
By the same token, rules of origin bring complexity to the trading system, and complexity serves 
only to add cost and to inhibit trade. In the preferential EC-EFTA trade, as we have noted, the total 
economic cost of rules of origin has been estimated at five percent of the value of the traded goods, 
leading exporters of up to 25 percent of the presumably eligible trade to forego the preference and simply 
pay the MFN duty. 38
This suggests that the way to reduce the risk that rules of origin will “do more to give the 
participating countries sheltered markets against the outside world” than they do “to stimulate vigorous 
competition between them” is to continue with multilateral efforts to reduce MFN trade barriers even as 
regional free trade agreements are being pursued. If the multilateral effort is undertaken successfully, 
at some point more and more exporters in the free trade area will take the option some of the EC and 
EFTA exporters have taken and will simply ignore the preference as something that costs more than it 
is worth. The free trade area would become irrelevant, and that, paradoxically, would be the result most 
in keeping with the trade-creating goals of the designers of free trade areas.
Summary and Conclusion
Rules of origin—or, more accurately, rules of preference—are necessary for free trade areas. 
They establish which goods are entitled to the preference and which are not. No method of determining 
origin is completely satisfactory, but for free trade areas, change in tariff heading, or CTH, probably is 
best. CTH, however, is particularly susceptible to influence by special interests who prefer to divert or 
restrict trade and, therefore, to defeat the purpose behind the negotiation of free trade agreements — freer 
trade among the members of the agreement and, therefore, freer trade overall. Rules of origin also add 
to the cost of trade by adding further administrative complexity to the process. The best way to 
overcome these problems and to further the goals of a free trade agreement is, paradoxically, to reduce 
the importance of that agreement and, consequently, the importance of rules of origin by also reducing 
barriers to trade from sources outside the free trade area.
38. Herin, supra, note 7.
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HEMISPHERIC FREE TRADE AND THE RESTRICTIONS 
OF THE MULTI-FIBER ARRANGEMENT
Isidoro A. Hodara
Introduction
One of the goals of the forthcoming Summit of the Americas is to discuss the merits of a 
hemispheric free trade zone. Whatever its final form, the creation of a free trade zone will be 
accompanied by the reduction or elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers that restrict trade between 
member nations. Among nontariff barriers applied by the United States—and to a lesser degree 
Canada—are restrictions on textile and apparel trade under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA). These 
represent quantitative restrictions that currently affect, or have the potential of affecting, exports from 
at least ten countries within the Western Hemisphere. Textile and apparel exports are significant for a 
number of Latin American and Caribbean nations, and the elimination of those restrictions merits careful 
analysis in the context of negotiations regarding market access.
The purpose of this study is to examine these restrictions within the framework of the creation 
of a hemispheric free trade zone. The study will evaluate the impact of these restrictions on the flow of 
intrahemispheric trade as well as the multilateral effects of liberalization of the MFA, as a result of the 
GATT Uruguay Round.
After a brief introduction to the basic issues involved in MFA restrictions, the first section 
examines the repercussions of MFA restrictions on intrahemispheric trade. The second section analyzes 
the effects of those restrictions, as well as the effects of their elimination in a hemispheric free trade zone. 
Hemispheric exporters’ participation in total textile and apparel imports is also considered, as well as the 
fact that corresponding customs tariffs would be eliminated at the same time.
The third section is a review of issues relevant to the objectives of this study. It includes brief 
analyses of the possible impact of the Uruguay Round with regard to textile and apparel trade, as well 
as how this subject was dealt with in negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). This analysis provides the framework for reviewing the Multi-Fiber Arrangement’s 
restrictions in the negotiation of a hemispheric free trade zone.
The final section proposes recommendations and conclusions for an adequate treatment (review) 
of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement’s restrictions in the negotiation of a hemispheric free trade zone.
The Multi-Fiber Arrangement and Intrahemispheric Trade
The MFA is a sectoral mechanism for the regulation of the essential components of international 
trade in textiles and apparel. While conceived under the aegis of GATT, the MFA’s provisions contradict 
the essence of GATT, especially with respect to nondiscrimination and the application of quantitative 
restrictions.
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In accordance with the MFA, quotas (negotiated bilaterally or eventually unilaterally imposed) 
can be applied for limiting the penetration of textile and apparel imports from certain countries. The only 
countries to implement these restrictions on imports, however, have been developed nations. As a result, 
the nations whose flows of trade have been restricted have almost exclusively been developing nations. 
In the hemispheric context, this has meant that the United States and, to a lesser extent, Canada, have 
imposed these measures to restrict the exports of textiles and apparels.
This special statute has regulated international trade in textiles and apparel, with few exceptions, 
for more than 30 years. The original MFA—which emerged from the Long-Term Agreement on 
International Trade of Textiles and Cotton—has been renewed four times. As Cable (1987) reminds us, 
it is important to remember that the subject of textiles and apparel has generally been marginalized in 
successive multilateral negotiation sessions. In fact, both the Kennedy Round and the Tokyo Round 
included specific measures that required the acceptance of the MFA as a condition for tariff negotiations 
in the area of textiles and apparel.
Quantitative restrictions designed to help (or inspired by) the MFA1 generally contain specific 
limits on physical volume according to product categories for the exporting country in question. These 
limits represent maximum levels for imports originating from that country, starting with a cessation of 
trade in the years the agreement is reached. We are not referring to tariff quotas or limitations on a 
preferential tariff, given that trade within the established quota pays tribute to the full tariff and cannot 
exceed those limitations, except for those marginal flexibility measures between quotas for different 
products or during different years. Each quota has a corresponding growth rate, usually under 6  percent, 
and in the United States for products made of cotton it reaches an annual rate of only 1 percent. In 
certain cases involving extrahemispheric exporting nations, the United States has even managed to impose 
reductions on the levels of certain quotas.
Superimposed on this structure of specific limitations on individual products in some cases one 
or several limitations are added which, for example, establish a maximum volume that can be exported 
from that place of origin as a totality of textile and apparel products and occasionally for subcategories 
of those products. Naturally, in order to have restrictive effect, this added limit ends up being less than 
the aggregate established limits for different individual products that are not subject to the individual 
quota.
In addition to these effective restrictions, there also exists the possibility of calling an exporting 
nation in for consultation in order to initiate the process for establishing a quota on products for which 
one has not been established. The consultations can be the result of the terms of the MFA (especially 
in the conditions outlined in Article 4) or of the incorporation of a clause into the corresponding bilateral 
agreement through which the exporting nation accepts resorting to this measure. The United States is 
notorious for concluding agreements by adopting this second alternative. A more specific measure in this 
regard, and one that is also used by the U.S., is that of establishing in the corresponding bilateral 
agreement not a quota but rather a volume amount from which the process of consultation and setting a 
quota automatically emerges.
1. This calculation is used to include similar measures applied to counties that are not members of the MFA. 
As we shall see, this also occurs within the context of intrahemispheric trade.
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In general, the implementation of the MFA restrictions remains in the hands of the exporting 
country. The range of restrictions agreed to is incorporated into a Bilateral Textile Agreement that needs 
to be made known to the Textile Monitoring Agency that was created by the MFA. Once the nature of 
the MFA restrictions is so described, we are clearly discussing selective safeguarding, one that allows 
for discrimination between different suppliers and presents a significant obstacle to market access, since 
a limitation set in this fashion cannot, in principle, be exceeded.
In theory, if quotas are binding only when the level of trade reaches the established limit, 
practical experience demonstrates that the quota distribution system will, only with difficulty, reach a 
level of utilization that prevents waste; therefore, this underscores Rafaelli’s opinion (1990) that, if a 
quota is applied at the 80 percent-85 percent level, it is reasonable to assume that trade would have 
exceeded the quota level in the absence of such a restriction.
More clearly, it is also important to point out the existence of certain special limits applied by 
the United States. These limits concern the special regime established in the bilateral agreement with 
Mexico and the special access program created for the nations of the Caribbean Basin Initiative.
Both are inextricably linked to the use of United States tariff item HTS 9.802.00.80 (previously 
known as TSUS 807). The use of this measure affords apparel and certain manufactured textiles made 
with cloth manufactured and cut in the United States access to the U.S. market. These items pay only the 
custom rights corresponding to the value added outside of the U.S.
Both the Special Arrangement with Mexico as well as the Special Access Program for the 
Caribbean contain special limitations on these types of arrangements calculated more generously than 
normal specific limitations. In addition, these special limitations (in the case of Caribbean nations, 
referred to as guaranteed access levels or GALs) are easily increased each time the exporting country 
requires it, unless the existence of market irregularities can be proven; therefore these special agreements 
are less restrictive than those normally associated with MFA restrictions.
Restrictions imposed on traditional exporters have created opportunities for new suppliers, who 
tend to see the imposition of MFA restrictions in a positive light when applied to their competitors. The 
new suppliers temporarily enjoy the best of both worlds: competitors are limited and their own products 
are able to penetrate those markets without restrictions. When their exports grow to a level where a 
quota is imposed they become incorporated into the group of traditional exporters and the opportunity 
is created for more new suppliers.
The latter would thus have an ambiguous attitude toward liberalization of MFA restrictions. They 
have the assurance that they will not face restrictions in the future in exchange for their competitors’ 
remaining free from restrictions. A similar process occurs with those nations most recently incorporated 
into the group of traditional suppliers. They were the last to benefit from quotas imposed on other 
suppliers and presumably will be the first to lose that advantage if restrictions are removed.
To this, one needs to add that despite MFA terms regarding equal treatment, the quotas represent 
very different levels of the same product for different suppliers. Those with quotas that significantly 
surpass their foreseeable trade value obtain unrestricted guaranteed levels of access and will not have the 
same attitude toward liberalization as those under binding quotas.
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Finally, countries that benefit from more liberal systems view with apprehension the erosion of 
their relative advantage by a more generalized liberalization.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the situation could be described as follows:
• The United States maintained MFA restrictions on textile and apparel trade with
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, Peru, 
and Uruguay, all member nations of the MFA. Similar measures were applied to
Haiti, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago, nations that are not members of the MFA.
• Canada also applied MFA restrictions on certain products originating from Brazil 
and Uruguay.
United States agreements with nations in the hemisphere, with the exception of those recently 
signed with Brazil and Mexico, affect a relatively small number of products. Those with Brazil and 
Mexico have more complete coverage, added limitations, and preagreed consultation provisions.
Members of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, 
Jamaica, Haiti, and Trinidad and Tobago) have textile agreements that include a significant number of 
guaranteed access levels (GALs). In general, these quota assignments—reserved for products 
manufactured with cloth made and cut in the United States—do not represent a strict reduction on export 
growth. That is, a quota level applicable to exports of manufactured apparel not made with textiles made 
and cut in the U.S. coexists with the GAL and has the same characteristics of MFA restrictions as other 
agreements.
The most recent version of the agreement with Mexico has been significantly liberalized. In 
1988, a special system was created which is similar to the creation of the GALs for countries of the CBI. 
This special system was expanded in 1990 to eliminate quotas for about 50 products and increase 
remaining quotas by an average of 25 percent. Furthermore, flexibility to accommodate changes in 
fashion was also added. The agreement with Mexico is one of the least restrictive of those applied by 
the United States.
The remaining MFA restrictions maintained by the United States with respect to the nations of 
the hemisphere can be summarized as follows:
• Brazil: about 30 specific limitations on individual or groups of products and an 
added limit on total textile exports.
• Costa Rica: three specific limitations plus an equal number of GALs for the same 
products.
• Colombia: only one specific limitation in the agreement’s most recent version.
• Dominican Republic: a dozen specific limitations with GAL assignments for seven 
of those products.
• El Salvador: only one specific limitation.
210
H e m isp h e r ic  F re e  T ra d e  a n d  th e  R e s tr ic tio n s  o f  th e  M u lti-F ib e r  A rra n g e m e n t
• Guatemala: one specific limitation accompanied by the respective GAL assignment.
• Haiti: half a dozen specific limitations and four GAL assignments.
• Jamaica: fifteen specific limitations and a dozen GAL assignments.
• Panama: two specific limitations.
• Peru: a dozen specific limitations and two added limitations for two groups of 
products (all cotton and all wood products, respectively).
• Trinidad and Tobago: ten specific limitations and a similar number of GAL
assignments.
• Uruguay: six specific limitations concentrated primarily on wool products, including
limits for cardado knits and combed knits.
MFA restrictions applied by Canada on Brazil and Uruguay apply to only a small number of 
products (in the case of Uruguay there is only one specific limitation).
To place these restrictions in the context of those applied to other suppliers, it is worth noting 
that the United States has maintained—especially with Eastern suppliers—MFA restrictions that have a 
much broader coverage, to which a greater number of additional limitations are added for the totality, 
or portion of product categories.
Typically, the MFA restrictions applied by the United States on traditional Asian suppliers (Japan, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and China) contain not only broader coverage but also 
measures that provide for smaller quota increases and less flexibility in the use of quotas. In general, 
those restrictions provide quotas of a higher volume in absolute value, as these countries were among the 
first suppliers to unleash the application of quotas (historically, Japan was the first, in the mid-1950s, 
before the creation of international textile agreements).
In conclusion, the narrower coverage allows for the characterization of MFA restrictions applied 
to Latin American and Caribbean nations as less rigorous than those applied to other suppliers. In fact, 
for countries that specialize in a relatively small number of products, a limited number of quotas can 
bring about similar effects as would a greater coverage of quotas for a more diversified supplier nation. 
On the other hand, the potential impact of measures that allow for consultation and the incorporation of 
a new product in the quota system when the new product demonstrates a greater penetration into the 
market should not be underestimated.
Nevertheless, while the four most traditional Asian suppliers represent at least 36 percent of total 
United States imports of textiles and apparel, the total from Latin American and Caribbean nations is less 
than half that amount (16.5 percent). At the same time, a little over half of total exports of textiles and 
apparel from Latin American countries consists of exports originating in nations that are beneficiaries of 
the CBI, which generally count on diminished restrictions through the assignment of GALs.
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Any attempt to determine the relative degree of inherent restrictions on hemispheric exports vis-a- 
vis those Asian nations should include the analysis carried out by Erzan and Yeats (1992) based on the 
methodology developed by Erzan (1990). Erzan and Yeats concluded that hemispheric textile and apparel 
exports face less severe restrictions than those applied to the major Asian suppliers. The benefits of free 
trade with the United States would be seriously restricted unless the most hard-core barriers are reduced 
or eliminated, among them are those that affect textiles and apparel.
Effects of Liberalization
In the previous section an evaluation of the range of MFA restrictions affecting 
intrahemisphere trade led to the following conclusions:
• MFA restrictions applied by the United States, and to a lesser degree Canada, affect 
the textile and apparel exports of over a dozen Latin American and Caribbean 
nations.
• MFA restrictions applied by the United States on Mexican exports have undergone 
recent liberalization and contain a special system. (As will be shown in Section III, 
the NAFTA Treaty provides for even greater liberalization.)
• Countries of the CBI have a more liberal system than the norm, thanks to the Special 
Access Program and the assignment of GALs.
• Estimates show that the MFA restrictions on Latin American and Caribbean exports 
are less rigorous than those imposed on the principal Asian suppliers.
An examination of the impact of a liberalization of MFA restrictions requires a review of the 
degree of penetration of Latin American and Caribbean textile and apparel exports in the United States 
market and a review of estimates of the current effects of those restrictions. Second, it is necessary to 
analyze the results of a liberalization which, in the context of a hemispheric free trade zone, would 
include both MFA restrictions as well as tariffs.
It is appropriate to consider first the participation of Latin American and Caribbean nations in 
the United States market. Restrictions imposed by Canada have a much smaller reach and are more 
focused on specific countries and products.
United States data for the 12 months ending October 31, 1992, (U.S. Department of Commerce 
1992b) show that Latin America and the Caribbean shared a level of participation of 16.5 percent of total 
U.S. textile and clothing imports. Of these, 8.7 percent were from countries belonging to the CBI. 
Among the principal suppliers are Mexico (ranking seventh), the Dominican Republic (tenth), Brazil 
(fifteenth) and Costa Rica (nineteenth).
If only apparel is considered, the portion of the total supplied by Latin American and Caribbean 
countries climbs to 21 percent, and the level for the countries of the CBI reaches 15.6 percent. Among 
the most important countries of origin for apparel imported by the United States are the Dominican
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Republic (fifth), Mexico (eighth), Costa Rica (eleventh), Guatemala (sixteenth), Jamaica (seventeenth), 
and Honduras (nineteenth).
All of these countries implement special access programs that provide relatively less rigorous 
MFA restrictions. The one exception is Honduras, on whose exports no MFA restrictions were applied.
With regard to nonapparel textile exports (e.g., knits), the fall of the region’s position occurs 
mostly among members of the CBI (the respective levels of market penetration are 11 percent and 
2.09 percent). This is congruent with the concentration of these nations in the exports of apparel using 
knits made and cut in the United States. In this area, the participation of the principal regional suppliers 
is more concentrated: Mexico (eighth) and Brazil (tenth) represent three quarters of total exports from 
Latin American and Caribbean nations.
More specific data, for example in the area of wool apparel, show that the region’s share reaches 
23.3 percent, but for countries of the CBI it is 16.5 percent The principal regional suppliers are the 
Dominican Republic (second in the general ranking), Guatemala (sixth), Colombia (ninth), Costa Rica 
(twelfth), Uruguay (fifteenth), and Mexico (seventeenth). These are averages based on a large number 
of products and product variations.
The fact that the system of textile management in the United States classifies products under 
nearly 1 0 0  categories, and that these are further differentiated according to market sectors, fashions, 
seasons, etc., requires more precise analysis at the product and individual variation levels. Countries of 
the CBI recently exported between 45 percent and 50 percent of total U.S. imports in categories 352 
(cotton lingerie), 633 (men’s jackets made of synthetic and artificial fibers), and 639 (bras, etc.); and 
between 30 percent and 45 percent in categories 347 (men’s cotton pants), 435 (women’s wool jackets), 
651 (pajamas made of synthetic and artificial fibers), and 652 (men’s underwear).
When penetration reaches significant levels, the conclusion may be reached that production is 
competitive in quality and price. This is one of the necessary (although not sufficient) conditions for 
expecting trade expansion as long as liberalization of restrictions is obtained.
To predict which products or categories will most be affected by preferential liberalization of 
MFA restrictions, the following conditions would have to be monitored constantly in order to consider 
such factors as, for example, fashion:
• a level of penetration by exports that allows us to infer the existence of a minimum 
level of competition (the indicators previously discussed were mostly a sum of 
various different products);
• the main competitors in this area are extrahemispheric suppliers subject to MFA 
restrictions. If the main competitors belong to the hemisphere, then the possibility 
of obtaining net advantages for the region as a result of a free trade zone is reduced; 
and if competitors are extrahemispheric but not subject to quotas (i.e., developed 
nations) then there is less chance that a hemispheric liberalization will improve 
conditions of competition significantly;
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• the customs rights applicable to third parties be important in order that they reinforce 
the hemispheric preference derived from the elimination of MFA restrictions; and
• that actual exports to the United States are not disproportionately at the mercy of 
partial liberalization schemes (e.g., the special system for Mexico or the Special 
Access Program for countries of the CBI), because the effects of liberalization would 
be diluted.
Another factor that requires review is estimates of the effects of MFA restrictions that appear in 
specialized literature. For a compilation of sources of those estimates, refer to GATT (1990). Also see 
Cable (1987), Erzan (1990), Hamilton (1990), Keesing and Wolf (1980), and Rafaelli (1990).
The most concise qualitative analysis comes from Rafaelli. He has pointed out that the MFA has 
hurt consumers of importing countries through higher prices, and those of exporting countries by reducing 
their potential income and employment opportunities and causing a suboptimal assignment of resources 
in both importing and exporting nations.
Other effects on exporting nations include limitation of competitive exports; disorganization of 
certain lines of products; transfer of resources to less effective product lines; discouragement of distortion 
of investment; changes to more sophisticated products and improvement of their quality (as a response 
to fixed quotas on physical volume); transfer of production to third countries; search for guarantee access 
through the acceptance of restrictions; problems associated with the management and use of quotas; and 
political costs of these restrictions.
GATT (1990) compiles estimates of global income lost as a result of exports that did not take 
place. It cites a study of the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) which indicates that 
the value of U.S. exports by suppliers subject to MFA restrictions would increase by 20.5 percent for 
textiles, 36.5 percent for apparel, and globally, by 35 percent. It also cites a study published in the IMF 
Staff Papers which concludes that textile exports from developing nations to the principal nations of the 
OECD could grow by up to 82 percent, and exports of apparel by 93 percent.
Another study by the UNCTAD cited in the GATT document states that growth would be 
78 percent and 135 percent, respectively, for textiles and apparel, if tariffs and contingencies were to 
disappear simultaneously. Finally, an estimate based on a general equilibrium model and considering all 
supplier developing countries suggests increases in global textile and clothing exports of about 244 percent 
in the United States and 214 percent in Canada. The potential increase of exports must be contrasted with 
the reduction of income that would result from the loss of contingency income. When dealing with 
administrative quotas on the part of exporters, it is possible to appropriate income associated with the 
assistance of the quota under certain circumstances. The same USITC study estimates growth of exports 
of $5.8-6.0 billion and a loss of income of $1.6 trillion.
One of the conditions for bringing about the creation of contingency income is a binding quota. 
As was previously mentioned, this would occur with less frequency in Latin America and the Caribbean 
than in certain Eastern supplier nations because this amount would be less than proportional to the 
hemispheric participation in total United States textile and apparel imports for the region. In any case, 
it is worth remembering that this income constitutes a transfer of income and is therefore not comparable 
to exports, which require real resources for their creation.
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Previous estimates are more general than those required in this study. Occasionally they refer 
to all developed nations, not just the United States and Canada, or all developing supplier nations, and 
not just Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition, they refer to the erga omnes liberalization of 
MFA restrictions, and not to a preferential dismantling in the context of hemispheric free trade. For this 
reason they should be considered only as points of reference for more refined calculations.
The study that focuses more specifically on the issues presented in this section is that of Erzan 
and Yeats (1992). It analyzes the eventual consequences of a liberalization of MFA restrictions 
maintained by the United States toward Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay.
Starting from relatively conservative hypotheses, this study concludes that in the short term we 
should not expect an explosion of exports as a result of the elimination of MFA restrictions imposed by 
the United States on exports from these five nations, although significant increases would occur, 
especially for products subject to effective quotas. Nevertheless, the study also adds that even for 
products that do not face effective quotas, the expansion of exports would be considerable if customs 
rights were also eliminated, an extreme measure inherent in the process of creating a hemispheric free 
trade zone.
United States tariffs on textiles and apparel are several times higher than those imposed on other 
industrial products; they also contain a considerable degree of progressive increases. In this regard, see 
Yeats (1987), who points out that the effective protection of wool knits in the U.S. is about 85.8 percent. 
This might be an extreme case, as is verified in the fact that the U.S. customs tariff is a bit of an anomaly 
since the abnormally high rights of wool knits (about 34 percent) are greater even than that of articles 
of clothing made with those knits. This point is well illustrated in the study by Mudge Rose Guthrie 
Alexander and Ferden and IBERC (1990).
Erzan and Yeats conclude by examining the considerable possibilities for expansion of exports. 
Factors that lead to excessive optimism in this regard are:
• the possibility of a multilateral liberalization, which would erode the value of 
preferential advantages, and
• the fact that eventual dismantling would be accompanied by some transitory 
safeguarding measure specifically for textiles and apparel.
Background for Negotiations
This section examines various issues that should be taken into account in negotiating the chapter 
on textiles and apparel in the general context of a hemispheric free trade zone. It will analyze various 
possible results of the Uruguay Round and will refer to the treatment of this issue in the negotiation of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement.
It is crucial to refer to the results of the Uruguay Round with regard to textiles. In fact, the 
liberalization of MFA restrictions in the heart of a hemispheric free trade zone must take into account 
the existence of a multilateral liberalization that will be undertaken at about the same time. It seems 
reasonable to propose that in order for the liberalization of the hemispheric free trade zone to be truly
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preferential (i.e., that it grant most favorable treatment to member nations), it must be broader, deeper, 
and quicker than what would be negotiated multilaterally.
In this section, it is assumed that the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement will 
conform to the outline in the corresponding chapter of the Final Act (GATT 1993). The liberalization 
discussed in that Final Act starts from the premise of the Punta del Este Declaration which established 
the objective of formulating ways to integrate textile and apparel trade into the GATT, based on 
strengthened values and disciplines. Added to this was the decision midway through the round that a 
progressive integration process should start as soon as the round was completed.
The essential components of the planned liberalization program include:
• the commitment not to establish new restrictions beyond those that exist when the 
agreement from the Uruguay Round is implemented, except as a result of that 
agreement or GATT rules;
• upon official implementation of the agreement, products which made up 16 percent 
of textile and apparel trade in 1990 will be integrated. This liberalization, like 
subsequent ones, should include products from all stages of the production process 
such as tops and yarns, fabrics, made-up textile products, and clothing (Article 2, 
paragraph 6 );
• approximately by early 1997, the same will occur with products that in 1990 made 
up 17 percent of trade (Article 2, paragraph 8 .a);
• beginning in approximately 2 0 0 1 , an additional 18 percent will be incorporated 
(Article 2, paragraph 8 .b);
• starting in 2004, all of the remaining textile and apparel sector will be integrated into 
the GATT, thus eliminating all restrictions under the Agreement (Article 2, 
paragraph 8 .c);
• during the first phase of the agreement (36 months) the limit on each MFA 
restriction will increase annually by 16 percentage points over the growth rate 
originally predicted (Article 2, paragraph 13);
• during the second stage (from the 37th to the 84th months) limits on remaining 
restrictions will increase by an additional 25 percent (Article 2, paragraph 14 [i]);
• during the third phase (from the 85th to the 120th months) the additional increase 
will be 27 percent (Article 2, paragraph 14 [ii]);
• the signatories agree to collaborate to prevent the circumvention of the agreement’s measures 
through complex loopholes or false origin declarations (Article 5);
• a specific safeguard mechanism for the transition period can be applied to any textile 
or apparel product except those where each importing party has been integrated into
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the rules of the GATT. This has to do with a discriminating safeguard, specific to 
each product, with traits similar to current MFA restrictions however (this would 
require additional conditions in order to secure adoption, see Article 6 ); and
• the agreement states that by approximately the beginning of 2004, without possibility
of postponement. The textile and apparel sector will be fully integrated into the 
GATT (Article 9).
It is also relevant to discuss how this subject was dealt with in the negotiations leading to the 
establishment of the NAFTA because of the precedent it established. This is true even if the Mexican 
experience does not turn out to be 100 percent transferable to the hemispheric level. In addition, if 
hemispheric integration does not adopt a "hub-and-spokes" 2 system, then NAFTA measures present an 
extremely significant precedent. This does not mean (as Weintraub [1995] has argued) that what has 
already been negotiated will be adopted, and certainly disagreements will emerge with regard to 
arrangements about the transition period.
At any rate, the NAFTA provisions will prevail over those of the MFA and the Final Act. The 
liberalization of trade takes into account four basic elements: the elimination of quotas, the reduction of 
tariffs, the establishment of sectoral rules, and the creation of specific safeguards for textiles and apparel.
Quotas
When the treaty takes effect, it will eliminate the bilateral agreement that established the current 
MFA restrictions between the United States and Mexico for Mexican products that satisfied the conditions 
spelled out in the original agreement. For textiles and apparel manufactured in Mexico that do not 
comply with the original rules set forth in the treaty, quotas in 97 of the 111 current categories will be 
eliminated. Of those that remain, ten will be eliminated over the course of seven years, and four others 
over ten years. It will not be possible to impose new quotas unless they are specifically called for in the 
measures of the treaty that deal with individual safeguards.
Tariffs
Once the treaty takes effect, the highest United States tariffs will be eliminated and tariffs not 
greater than 20 percent will be imposed on Mexican textiles and apparel. Starting at that level, a 
progressive tariff dismantling will begin, and its final deadline will be no more than 10 years. At the 
beginning of that process, the United States will have to eliminate tariffs on Mexican products, which 
represent about 45 percent of exports to that market.
2. The term “hub-and-spokes” in the original document was coined by R. Wonnacott in Canada to refer to 
the case of a main associate with free access to imports from various nations, but where each of these nations would 
have that access only to the products of the principal associate. To examine the results of such a plan, see, inter 
alia, Krueger (1995) and Weintraub (1995).
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Origin
Fairly strict conditions apply. The majority of textiles and articles of clothing are considered to 
be "of origin" if they are manufactured using cloth made in the region. In the case of knits, it requires 
that the fiber come from one of the member nations.
The exception will be products made of silk, linen, or other similar materials (those not produced 
in North America). They will be covered by preferential treatment as long as final processing is carried 
out in one of the member nations. At the same time, a general review of the rules of origin for textiles 
and apparel will take place at the beginning of 1998.
For products produced in Mexico that do not comply with requirements regarding origin of 
textiles and apparel, tariff preference quotas are established for access to the United States and Canada. 3 
With this agreement, the limit on Mexican exports of manufactured textiles is equivalent to about 78 
million square meters of cloth, and for nonmanufactured textiles, the limit is equivalent to about 31 
million square meters. It was also agreed that a process allowing for yearly adjustment to the limitations 
on the preferential tariff quotas would be put into place.
Safeguards
A system specific to the sector of textiles and apparel was established for the transition period. 
According to this system, the safeguard mechanism consists of the re-establishment for up to three years 
of the tariff at the level that existed prior to the treaty’s taking effect for goods that comply with origin 
requirements. Once the period for applying the safeguard is over, then there is a return to the process 
of tariff reductions ending in the dismantling of customs rights in the time specified in the treaty.
This safeguard, which is applicable to products "of origin," can be used only once for any given 
product. Further, the country that uses this safeguard mechanism will have to compensate the exporting 
country by giving it concessions of an equivalent value in the same textile and apparel sector.
With regard to products that do not comply with the agreed origin requirements, the safeguarding 
mechanism would consist of the imposition of quotas which must respect the trade levels that existed prior 
to its establishment. These quantitative restrictions can be maintained for up to three years and cannot 
be applied to trade between the United States and Canada. Thus defined, these safeguards for products 
that do not comply with origin rules are parallel MFA restrictions that were described in Section I of this 
study.
The preceding review is intended as an analysis of the major issues to be considered in 
negotiations on textiles and apparel in the context of a hemispheric free trade zone.
3. The free trade agreement between the U.S. and Canada included similar quotas for both countries, and the 
quotas for Canada were increased during the NAFTA negotiations.
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Hemispheric Free Trade and the MFA: Conclusions and Recommendations
This paper concludes by offering some guidelines for negotiations on the textile and apparel 
industry (especially with regard to MFA restrictions) within the context of the creation of a hemispheric 
free trade zone. The point of reference for these guidelines is the liberalization of hemispheric trade, and 
the first is that the process of multilateral liberalization and regional liberalization of MFA restrictions 
might occur simultaneously.
It seems obvious that the regional preferential process should be, first and foremost, at least as 
favorable as the multilateral one. This means that any subsequent advantage resulting from the 
multilateral preference process should be transferred to the regional preference process, through the use 
of a principle similar to that of a most favored nation. However, this is not sufficient to ensure that 
preference will be given to the regional partners. To ensure this, formulas must be devised to guarantee 
greater speed, coverage, or depth (or all three) to the regional dismantling of MFA restrictions. 
Specifically, this concept means that if the regional negotiation is completed prior to the multilateral one, 
the former should contain within it elements that tie progress in liberalization to results from the latter.
A second important point has to do with the need to exercise extreme care with respect to any 
transitory textile and apparel agreement. It would not make sense for the liberalization process to 
reintroduce the same type of restriction it seeks to eliminate. In any case, its use should be guided by 
strict and objective criteria for determining exceptions. Flexible and effective dispute settlement 
mechanisms would ensure the management of objective criteria and limit discretionary use and the 
possibility of discrimination. At the same time, it would be appropriate to establish parallel safeguards 
in a future multilateral liberalization. Each time a specific product is integrated into the GATT, the 
possibility of involving a more severe safeguard than called for in the multilateral agreement should be 
eliminated in the regional context.
Third, the negotiation of rules of origin is extremely important. In this regard, cumulative 
criteria of origin should be provided so that products and goods of each and every member nation of the 
free trade zone should contribute to the "origin" of a given product. This contradicts hub-and-spokes 
logic and allows, for example, for Uruguayan cotton to be threaded in Argentina, knit in Brazil, 
manufactured in Uruguay, and finally enter the United States free of taxes and restrictions as long as 
these nations are part of the free trade zone.
The opposite scenario requiring bilateral "origin" criteria would produce several problems. Each 
pair of countries (for example, the United States and one Latin American or Caribbean nation) would 
incur unnecessary management difficulties, would benefit the manufacturers of intermediate goods of one 
party for no reason, and reduce the benefits of a more efficient allocation of resources.
In addition, excessively strict rules of origin can become a powerful instrument for protecting 
those products or processes which emerge as essential in order to confer the character of "origin" on a 
particular product. Simple principles such as changes in tariff headings are not enough in the textile 
production chain when they can be achieved without the need to implement substantial modifications on 
manufactured products (e.g., transforming cloth into sheets). Recognizing their insufficiency (in some 
cases) should not lead us to the extreme of negotiating restrictive "origin" clauses for all textile products 
(no fewer than 800 groupings at a 6 -digit level on the harmonized system). In any case, the rigor of 
origin regulations should diminish as the multilateral liberalization process erodes regional preferences.
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In the event that both processes result in the elimination of MFA restrictions, the preference would thus 
be limited to tariff margins. Therefore, it is also reasonable to expect a relaxation of specific origin 
requirements with respect to textiles and apparel.
A fourth point, closely tied to the previous one, is that of tariff contingencies such as those first 
established during negotiations between the United States and Canada, and later during NAFTA 
negotiations. The existence of preferences for products that do not comply with origin conditions is a 
result of precisely the rigor of origin requirements. With origin rules that are too strict, these 
contingencies are virtually essential, but they can become superfluous with reasonable origin norms. It 
is important to remember that the establishment of contingencies is often accompanied by the creation of 
interests that seek their perpetuation without considering the national interest. Eventually, we could see 
the dismantling of these contingencies together with the relaxation of rules of origin.
A fifth point is that of equity considerations tied to the existence of different points of departure 
in the liberalization process. With regard to MFA restrictions on hemispheric trade, this means taking 
into account the difference between the system currently applied to countries of the CBI and the system 
that corresponds to other countries in the hemisphere. The relatively advantageous point of departure 
derived from the more liberal special access program applied to Caribbean nations might end up being 
an initial disincentive for those countries searching for a greater liberalization of MFA restrictions. If 
we are talking about a free trade zone, then the starting point for that process would be a dismantling that 
is applied to all members of that zone and inevitably erodes any advantage at the initial stage. One 
alternative would be the creation of transitional measures that can maintain a certain degree of preference 
for some during the transition period. This could be achieved by looking for measures that would result 
in greater speed, breadth, and depth in the liberalization process for the entire region, rather than through 
artificially slowing the process in favor of nations that start with a slight advantage in the process.
Finally, we need to consider that a free trade zone involves mutual obligations. For that reason, 
certain sectors in some nations of the hemisphere should not be surprised if, at the same time that 
liberalization of MFA restrictions occurs, it also becomes necessary to proceed to a certain degree of 
liberalization of textile and apparel imports in those nations. Only the United States and Canada would 
resort to the use of MFA restrictions, but different measures have contributed to the maintenance of local 
production just ahead of foreign competition in other nations, including that of hemispheric neighbors.
In any case, putting an end to the statute of exceptional protection for the textile and apparel 
industry in the hemisphere would mean benefits for consumers and producers and would reduce some of 
the most flagrant distortions. Even when considering a discriminatory liberalization with respect to extra- 
hemispheric nations, this would constitute a move in the right direction, especially if accompanied by 
multilateral liberalization of MFA restrictions.
The issues reviewed in this section link specific safeguards, rules of origin, tariff contingencies, 
existence of different points of departure and generalization of the liberalization do not constitute an 
exhaustive discussion of the range of issues that should guide the negotiations. This study has highlighted 
the most significant issues affecting the textile and apparel sectors and the dismantling of MFA 
restrictions in the context of the establishment of a hemispheric free trade zone. A successful negotiation 
of a chapter on textiles and apparel will represent an important contribution to the process of trade 
liberalization in the Western Hemisphere.
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SAFEGUARDS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE FREE TRADE AREA
James H. Cassing
Introduction
Safeguards are temporary government actions to protect an importing country’s economy or its 
industries from import surges and other unforeseen factors. In the typical case, a range o f import 
restrictions is invoked without regard to “fairness” or “dumping” arguments. The sanctions are justified 
by various legal and political concepts that have been built into national and international trade rules. One 
such precedent, the “escape clause,” descends directly from the United States-Mexican Trade Agreement 
o f another era. Other forms o f safeguards range from the legalities o f various GATT articles— especially 
Article XIX— to the “gray areas” of voluntary export restraints and the panoply o f orderly marketing 
agreements such as the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA). More recently, especially in the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), negotiators discovered unplowed ground such as “safeguards” from the 
impact o f differential environmental standards.
Safeguards presented difficult issues in negotiations for freer trade at both the regional level, as 
with NAFTA, and the multilateral level, as with the Uruguay Round, and there were deep divisions both 
between and within developed and developing countries. In part the divisions reflected the vagueness of 
GATT articles regarding safeguards. More to the point, questions o f when and how to tailor exceptions 
to GATT articles or regional trading bloc rules quickly collide with issues of national sovereignty and 
raise internal policy debates that cannot easily be disciplined by external rules. It is certainly not clear 
whether contracting parties to freer trade arrangements will ever agree on exceptions to the rules without 
the guarantee o f “exceptions to the exceptions” and so on.
In a regional trade pact such as a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Agreement (WHFTA), the 
problems that frustrated safeguards negotiators in the multilateral GATT rounds remain, and new ones 
arise. This paper will examine safeguards in the context o f the countries o f the Western Hemisphere and 
identify where the issue is likely to assist or hinder progress toward a WHFTA. The paper will expose 
potential conflict in existing policies or positions with respect to safeguards and highlight prospects for 
resolution. The experiences o f the Western Hemisphere nations in forging various regional trading blocs, 
as well as positions in the Uruguay Round and earlier GATT rounds, will inform the discussion.
Section I briefly reviews current thinking about the political and economic rationale for safeguards. 
An issue that quickly arises is the extent to which the WHFTA nations even agree on the purpose of 
safeguards. Section II considers the desirability o f keeping safeguards within the multilateral framework 
and describes the divisions that surrounded safeguards within the Uruguay Round, such as over selectivity, 
degressivity, surveillance, and the legitimization o f “gray area” measures. This section also discusses 
safeguards in the NAFTA and in the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) documents. 
Again the various positions o f the WHFTA nations are the focus. Finally, Section III briefly considers 
safeguards more broadly defined— environmental issues, labor conditions, trade adjustment assistance, and 
so on— and searches for conflict and consensus. This last section also offers a summary and some 
conclusions.
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I. Economic and Political Rationale for Safeguards, and WHFTA Country Positions
Before the Western Hemisphere nations can negotiate a safeguards position, there needs to be 
agreement on what safeguards are supposed to accomplish. Policy makers and social scientists justify 
safeguard responses to market disruptions— including for balance of payments reasons— on grounds of 
both efficiency and equity. (See, for example, Corden 1974, Deardorff 1987, or Mayer 1991; and the 
references therein.) The efficiency defense, in turn, may include both economic efficiency (owing to 
adjustment costs) and political efficiency through helping negotiators agree to a politically palatable free 
trade agreement (Perez-Lopez 1991).
International trade and the movement to freer trade, as through a WHFTA, presents a challenge. 
On the one hand, the opportunity to trade along lines o f international comparative advantage offers a 
source o f growth and prosperity. The relatively more efficient industries o f each nation can expand while 
the relatively less-efficient ones contract. The real national income o f every country rises as nations trade 
for goods they produce comparatively less efficiently. On the other hand, however, there will ordinarily 
be some adjustment in the industrial composition during the transition to a WHFTA or after the 
agreement, due simply to changes in the international economy. But this adjustment is not without cost. 
Some vocal opposition to trade liberalization, and more generally to changing comparative advantage, can 
be expected— especially if a very large and sudden adjustment were necessary. This raises the possibility 
that slowing any required adjustment due to the initial agreement, unanticipated import surges, or balance- 
of-payments difficulties after the agreement is justified on economic or political grounds.
Thinking is changing, and there is no consensus among WHFTA countries on whether the 
justification for safeguard protection is more political or more economic. This undoubtedly reflects real 
differences between the economies involved. There is, for example, a history of greater state ownership 
among some Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries, and market signals might be quite distorted 
internally compared with, say, the United States or Canada. This might well strengthen the economic 
argument for safeguards in some countries. The same might be said o f labor unionization in Argentina 
and perhaps Brazil.
At the same time, however, the attitudes o f Latin American governments toward state ownership 
are changing. In the steel industry, for example, it was the Latin American governments that first 
embraced privatization fully, as part of market reform. And various safeguards were explicitly put into 
place in order to ease the transition (USITC 1992a).
In any case, the WHFTA countries do at least agree that society might prefer to avoid any sudden 
large trade-related dislocations. (For a discussion of the theoretical issues, see, for example, Corden 1974, 
Cassing and Hillman 1981, Deardorff 1987, Mayer 1992.) And policy makers may in fact find it 
impossible to enter into FTA rules without the guarantee of being able to relax those rules under certain 
conditions (Sykes 1990; see also Cassing 1980, Swan 1989). Safeguards are bound to be an integral part 
of any WHFTA.
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II. Negotiating a WHFTA in a GATT-Compatible Framework: The Treatment o f Safeguards
Since World War II many GATT contracting parties have concluded regional trade agreements. 
The negotiations— certainly those involving the United States, Canada, and Mexico— have usually been 
in accord with GATT rules. In any case, the discussion proceeds on the assumption that the WHFTA will 
aim at essential GATT compatibility, as has been the case with both the CUSFTA and the NAFTA.
While one o f the pillars of the GATT is the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle of 
nondiscrimination found in Article I, a major exception to the principle resides in Article XXIV, which 
governs the creation and operation o f regional trade arrangements. If  the WHFTA is to be compatible 
with the GATT, then issues arise as to what forms of safeguards are permissible and the extent to which 
GATT-acceptable language is in fact acceptable to the WHFTA nations. O f particular concern here are 
traditional divisions among WHFTA nations over the use, or misuse, o f GATT safeguards.
Article XXIV allows both customs unions and free-trade areas. The logic o f the drafters was at 
least in part a recognition that regional trade agreements might serve as stepping stones to freer world 
trade. At the same time there was concern that nations might use the article to discriminate among trading 
partners with respect to only a few products, so-called preference arrangements. Therefore Article XXIV 
clearly requires that restrictions be eliminated on “substantially all the trade” between the countries, that 
while gradual elimination of barriers is allowed there must be a schedule for completion o f reductions 
“within a reasonable length o f time,” and that barriers against nonmembers must not be raised beyond 
preagreement levels.
Despite the concern over preference arrangements, the GATT drafters provided for six exceptions 
to the requirements o f Article XXIV. These are Article XI, which deals with quotas to protect agricultural 
supports, Articles XII, XIII, XIV, and XV, which deal with restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes, 
and Article XX, which allows restrictions for purposes o f health, safety, and law enforcement. This paper 
will also consider the role o f Article XIX in a WHFTA and focus especially on some of the sharp 
disagreements this article has engendered; it notes in passing that the GATT also contains Articles XXVIII 
and XXV, which deal with means for permanently withdrawing a tariff binding and sanctioning voted 
waivers. While these two forms o f safeguards may be important for WHFTA countries, there is currently 
no controversy surrounding these articles.
Trade Restrictions to Deal With Import Surges
Economists debate the efficiency of safeguards aimed to ameliorate import surges, but such 
safeguards do provide the political crutch (or insurance) for sovereign states to enter into otherwise 
binding agreements. Certainly the necessity o f such political insurance is almost a consensus position 
among the WHFTA countries. The issue, then, is whether there is any agreement in interpretation of 
GATT rules governing safeguards for particular industries.
While the GATT embraces safeguards, the relevant article at the industry level is Article XIX, 
which has been and still is the focus of much debate. This review follows current legal thinking and 
recent practice that interpret Article XIX as a sanction o f free trade areas. Article XIX provides 
governments an escape from GATT obligations by allowing trade barriers to safeguard producers seriously 
injured by trade liberalization. It also contains provisions for foreign compensation for or retaliation
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against subsequent losses incurred abroad. However, Article XIX does not address nondiscrimination as 
embodied in Article I. This becomes a sharp issue for any FTA.
Briefly, this “escape clause” is activated as follows:
1. It must be shown that imports o f a product are increasing in either absolute or relative terms, 
and the increase must be caused by unforeseen developments and GATT obligations.
2. It must also be demonstrated that domestic producers o f competitive products are seriously 
injured or threatened with serious injury, and that this injury or threat is caused by the 
increased imports.
3. If  (1) and (2) above are shown, then an importing country is entitled to suspend “such” GATT 
obligations in respect o f such product for such time as necessary to prevent or remedy the 
injury.
4. The importing country must consult with contracting parties that have a substantial interest as 
exporters. I f  no agreement is reached, exporters have the right to suspend “substantially 
equivalent concessions.”
5. Various procedures are defined under GATT or national laws (see especially Jackson 1989).
There is a certain logic to all of this. But in the GATT, what you see is rarely what you get. 
Article XIX is not always interpreted in a way consistent with the intent o f the text. International trade 
lawyers find the language o f Article XIX “extraordinarily oblique” and instead find explanation in the 
historical development o f the language (Sampson 1988, Jackson 1969, 1989).
Some early interpretations greatly weakened the stringency o f conditions for resorting to Article 
XIX. Injury was delinked from trade liberalization, the importing country was ceded much of the power 
to determine injury to the exclusion of exporters, and it was determined that injury from imports could 
be serious even with no increase in imports (Sampson 1988, Jackson 1989). What is more, agricultural 
trade lies largely outside the control of Article XIX. In addition, many invocations o f the article have 
been in cases that “patently fell far short o f the requirements of the article” (GATT 1979). Table 1 
(p. 237) recounts formal use o f Article XIX among the WHFTA countries. Clearly the U.S. and Canada 
account for most o f the formal actions over the years and would join the EC as the leading filers overall.
By the end o f the Tokyo Round, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the evolution o f Article 
XIX. A safeguards special group achieved little consensus. Developing countries expected exemptions 
from safeguard measures o f developed countries, and developed countries could not agree on the 
legitimacy o f unilateral action by importers or country selectivity in the application of measures. A 
committee worked beyond the Tokyo Round to develop a system with “greater uniformity and certainty” 
(GATT 1980). The Punta del Este Declaration considered a safeguards agreement “o f particular 
importance to strengthening the GATT system” and called for “objective criteria for action” (GATT 1986).
Nonetheless, the language o f the CUSFTA and of the NAFTA simultaneously retains the GATT 
framework for global actions and, notwithstanding the discussion o f what is allowed by Article XXIV, 
makes provision for bilateral emergency actions as well. Thus all o f the key divisions regarding
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safeguards are retained because o f the GATT treatment for global actions and amplified by the bilateral 
(trilateral) actions allowed as well as selective treatment o f FTA members even with regard to global 
actions.
Next is a consideration o f the general issues that might divide WHFTA countries along the lines 
o f multilateral treatment generally, treatment o f WHFTA nations during and after a transition period, and 
treatment o f nonmembers. The review begins with special reference to the past Uruguay Round 
negotiations and then to the CUSFTA and the NAFTA accords.
Potential Conflict Over the GATT’s Treatment of Safeguards
Among GATT members— including the WHFTA countries—the more obvious divisions involve 
those developed countries most likely to invoke safeguards and those developing countries and NICs most 
likely to be adversely affected by such invocation. For both groups, a key concern is balance in moving 
toward objective criteria for action and adjustment. If  the criteria are too lenient, the transparency and 
certainty sought may come at the cost of easy access to protection. Indeed, if remedies are extended to 
legitimize the so-called gray-area measures or do not impose credible degressive provisions for adjustment, 
what remains of the GATT? International trade provides an opportunity for mutual gain through 
adjustment and change, not through arrest or blockage o f required adjustment.
At the other extreme, if  the safeguard criteria are too stringent, then industries will simply bypass 
the rules and seek amelioration through the domestic political process with an appeal to national 
sovereignty. By one estimate, the share o f American imports subject to restraint (especially “voluntary” 
ones) rose in the 1980s from one eighth to one quarter (The Economist, 1990). Worldwide actions are 
reported in Table 2. As an alternative, and again as is happening now, recourse will be made to “unfair 
trade” practices and “dumping.” It is never enough to view one code or agreement in isolation.
Viewed as a question o f balance, the Uruguay Round stumbling blocks provide a guide to at least 
some of the potential WHFTA divisions. There were essentially three questions.
1. Should discipline be tightened in order to:
a. restrict the import-restraining tools such as VERs,
b. enforce degressivity, and
c. increase surveillance?
Or,
2. Should it entail either or both of:
a. bringing VERs and other gray-area measures into the GATT, and
b. legitimizing country selective restraint measures?
And, in any case,
3. Should adjustment assistance be explicit when safeguards are applied?
Simply from the standpoint of the WHFTA countries, not to mention the EC and other GATT 
members, there is little agreement on the answers to these questions. While the WHFTA countries at least
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might agree on some version o f points (lb ) and (lc), the other points are potentially contentious. (For 
discussion see Wolff, 1983; Hoekman, 1989.)
Selectivity
In the Uruguay Round, the EC tabled a proposal for country-selective application o f safeguard 
measures. This was at odds with the LAC country positions. The United States position on country 
selectivity is officially still ambiguous. Part o f the confusion at least is that it is difficult to oppose 
country selectivity and yet favor gray-area measures such as VERs.
In search o f consensus, WHFTA countries might agree that a potential trap in any freer trade 
negotiations is to lose sight of what safeguards should theoretically accomplish in the first place. The key 
is to define “harm” in economic terms so that the national interest will be represented. Good safeguard 
provisions should work in the direction of adjustment for trade, as discussed in Section II above. Any 
agreement thus needs to enfranchise and mobilize the proponents o f change, including consumers and 
potential exporters within the importing countries, and it also needs to address the losses o f the industries 
affected.
From this perspective, country selectivity is surely difficult to justify. The Multi-Fiber 
Arrangement (MFA) proves only too well how such restraints tend to multiply while the most efficient 
exporters are successively punished. Selectivity tends to weaken the proponents o f change (especially 
among the developing countries) in its “divide and conquer” approach. Nondiscrimination at least shifts 
the burden o f adjustment back where it should be, in the importing country.
Gray-Area Measures
Gray-area measures— VERs, OMAs, etc.— are almost inherently discriminatory and so would be 
at odds with the positions o f any countries that favor nonselective application o f safeguards. However, 
there is some support for recognizing negotiated restraints as a legitimate safeguard. For better or worse, 
the potential legitimization o f gray-area measures has introduced new ideas that might be pursued in a 
WHFTA. For example, the International Textiles and Clothing Bureau (ITCB) members, the EC, and 
ASEAN tabled three proposals for phasing out the MFA by recognizing it as a sort o f safeguard and then 
applying the degressivity requirements o f the GATT for safeguards. The issue then becomes, what is the 
price in terms o f safeguard allowances which must be paid? Well-defined adjustment would be essential.
Most developing countries— including the LAC countries— mistrust the use o f gray-area measures 
as temporary safeguards. The MFA illustrates their cost to developing countries. While exporting 
countries receive substantial rents from the controls (Trela and Whalley 1988; Hamilton, de Melo, and 
Winters 1992; Cassing and Hu 1992), administering the system has itself proved expensive and has the 
potential to discourage the most efficient producers, who cannot always get licenses. Many such 
safeguards cause developing countries headaches and cost valuable resources not only in defending 
themselves abroad from actions but also in the domestic administration o f a complex system of restraints 
imposed by developed countries reluctant to adjust to shifting comparative advantage (Cassing and Parker
1990).
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Duration and Degressivity
Safeguards are supposed to be temporary. In the words o f the GATT, parties are to apply 
safeguards only “to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury.” 
In practice the interpretation here differs across countries. In the United States, safeguards are to be 
phased out over five years with the possibility o f a three-year extension. Canada in the past has also 
provided for the gradual diminution o f safeguard measures. At the same time, however, many countries 
including the U.S. and Canada have begun to embrace the French concept o f “organized free trade” which 
focuses on “market penetration” and seems to legitimize gray-area measures. These “temporary” 
safeguards may never be repealed.
More generally, Sampson (1988) has pointed out that duration and degressivity can be tricky. In 
practice, maximum durations tend to become minimums, and degressivity has led to higher initial 
protection than might otherwise have been sanctioned.
Surveillance
The surveillance issue rests on what constitutes “harm” and “cause.” Currently each nation 
assesses “harm” to an industry or the overall economy in a way proscribed by the trade laws o f each 
country. For example, in the United States the “escape clause” resides in Section 201 o f the Trade Act 
o f 1974, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act o f 1988. In order to gain temporary 
relief for an industry it must be shown that imports are a “substantial cause” o f injury to a domestic 
industry. The injury determination is made by the U. S. International Trade Commission (ITC) which, 
in turn, becomes an obvious pressure point in a 201 case. (See especially Swan 1989 and Maruyama 1989 
for a discussion o f the evolution and interpretation o f Section 201.) What is more, it is ultimately left to 
national law or politics to determine what has transpired in a declining industry. Need it be said that there 
have been many controversial interpretations o f economic data?
Compensation
One o f the reasons frequently cited for the failure o f nations to use safeguards and instead resort 
to more dubious remedies is the compensation clause o f Article XIX.3. This has led New Zealand to 
propose the elimination of compensation in return for more discipline with respect to duration and 
permissible responses. Whatever the ultimate agreement, there seem to be some consensus among policy 
makers and scholars that the compensation clause has seriously undercut legitimate applications of 
safeguards. (See, for example, Tan 1990, Schott 1989, and various papers in Baldwin and Richardson 
1991.)
Required Adjustment Assistance
Some have proposed explicit adjustment assistance when safeguards are applied. Nonetheless, 
nearly everyone agrees that safeguards need to encourage— and not discourage— adjustment, and some 
have argued that adjustment assistance is an obvious approach. However, so far this is largely viewed as 
an internal issue. Much the same could surely be said for the WHFTA negotiations as well. (For a
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discussion o f the merits o f a more pro-active adjustment policy, see Lawrence and Litan 1986, Richardson 
1982.)
Potential Conflict over Treatment of WHFTA Members:
Safeguards in the CUSFTA, the NAFTA, and Beyond
The formation of a regional trading bloc raises a number o f issues beyond those already addressed 
in the GATT. Here we will assume that the WHFTA—as with the CUSFTA and the NAFTA— is going 
to be roughly GATT-consistent but that WHFTA countries may want to continue with their various 
interpretations o f what the GATT allows.
The WHFTA is likely to incorporate some version o f Article XIX, notwithstanding the discussion 
above o f its legality in a free trade agreement. The United States, Canada, and Mexico have in the 
CUSFTA and the NAFTA made clear their position with regard to safeguards in a FTA. This position 
is divided into bilateral actions— or members in this case— and global actions. There are also transition 
emergency actions and continuing emergency actions. The transition period to free trade is five to ten 
years, or sometimes less.
Selectivity
The CUSFTA and the NAFTA treatment o f safeguards raises many of the thorny issues 
confronting the WHFTA. First, the CUSFTA allows for bilateral safeguard remedies during the transition 
when as a result o f the reduction or elimination o f a duty there is serious injury to a domestic industry 
o f one member caused by imports of the other. Presumably, such emergency action can be enacted only 
as a result o f net trade creation and not mere trade diversion.
The NAFTA largely retains the CUSFTA wording but rewrites the articles more stringently for 
cases involving all three countries. For example, during the transition period safeguards can be activated 
against an imported good to “prevent the injury” as well as merely to “remedy” it. Also, textile and 
apparel goods are dealt with as special cases.
In the WHFTA, such transitional safeguards are less straightforward. Would the remedies be 
applied selectively only to the WHFTA members deemed to be the cause o f the serious injury? Or would 
the remedies be applied to all WHFTA members? This is particularly at issue because o f trading 
arrangements already in place— MERCOSUR, CARICOM, ALADI, Andean Pact, and CBI— means that 
tariffs are not applied uniformly across WHFTA countries and so general reductions are likely to create 
trade from some members (those facing higher barriers now) and leave trade essentially unchanged from 
other members (those with preferential access to some members markets already). Nonselectivity would 
therefore harm some WHFTA members relative to their current positions. Yet during the post-GATT 
Round the position o f most LAC countries was against selectivity on the grounds that selectivity facilitates 
the divide-and-conquer strategy o f some developed-country industries.
In the CUSFTA, the parties retain their Article XIX rights but exclude the other member if global 
action is taken and imports from the other member are only “in the range o f five percent to ten percent 
or less.” In the WHFTA, such wording might preclude effective safeguard action if, for example, 80
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percent of imports for a WHFTA member come from 16 WHFTA countries, each with 5 percent of the 
import market. Also, appeal to global actions may end up falling disproportionately on a few members 
of the WHFTA.
The NAFTA recognizes this problem and addresses it with some new wording. In particular, 
a Party is not considered to contribute a “substantial share” to the imports if it is “not among the top five 
suppliers of the good subject to the proceeding, measured in terms of import share during the most recent 
three-year period.” Also, the wording of the NAFTA allows for the possibility that in exceptional 
circumstances the imports from two Parties may be considered collectively in determining contribution 
to serious injury.
The LAIA permits two or more members to negotiate separately on tariff regimes. However, 
the negotiations are supposed to be designed to be incorporated into the LAIA multilateral system, and 
even though there are these so-called “partial scope” agreements, the spirit at least is nonselective.
The Andean Group allows for safeguards in a number of ways including “tariff snap-back,” a 
clause that allows a signatory to withdraw concessions under specific circumstances. This is not unlike 
the provisions of the CUSFTA and the NAFTA and should provide some room for consensus. The issue 
with regard to selectivity seems to come down on the side of nonselectivity.
The MERCOSUR is largely nonselective with respect to members but has adopted some bilateral 
working groups to deal with special problems during a transition period. The CACM is in somewhat of 
the same position following a rocky period in 1970 when Honduras demanded special relief measures 
owing to the war with El Salvador. Honduras in fact withdrew from the group in December 1970 and 
often insists on signing bilateral agreements.
Gray-Area Measures
During the Uruguay Round, there was some disagreement in the positions of the WHFTA 
members regarding VERs. For example, Chile prohibits by law government involvement in voluntary 
export restraints, although private business is free to conduct business as it will in this regard (GATT,
1991). Yet some of the WHFTA nations have actively and openly embraced market sharing as part of 
various regional integration attempts. For example, the Argentine-Brazil Economic Integration Pact 
(ABEIP) of July 1986 explicitly adopted a protocol that called for triggered safeguard measures geared 
to import surges and bilateral deficits. While this and subsequent regional agreements are an advance 
over LAFTA—which effectively ended with the LAIA of 1980—there is still a preoccupation with 
bilateral imbalances even at the industry level. While this probably reflects the earlier belief that 
economies of scale were the raison d’etre for regional trading blocs, there nonetheless remains some 
commitment to “orderly markets” and the ABEIP has seen more than its share of orderly marketing 
arrangements in the name of safeguards—e.g. the steel protocol, the food exemptions, and the automotive 
industry exemptions (Manzetti, 1990). (More generally, see also Bawa, 1980; Llerena, 1988.)
The U.S. position in the GATT, CUSFTA, and NAFTA generally opposed safeguard application 
of GATT-illegal gray area measures, not to say that the U.S. always takes its own advice. U.S. trade 
law in fact is conservative in the sense that it has the same roots as the GATT “escape clause. ” Remedies
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largely reside only in duties, and tariff-rate quotas, although orderly marketing agreements also are 
sanctioned.
In the NAFTA accords, textile and apparel goods are treated differently from other imports for 
reasons o f safeguards and are explicitly exempted from the rules o f Chapter 8 o f the NAFTA. This, of 
course, reflects the U.S. and Canada involvement in the Multi-Fiber Arrangement and concerns over 
Mexico’s potential in this area. Nonetheless, it is a sort of legitimization o f the gray-area world of 
voluntary export restraints.
Duration and Degressivity
The CUSFTA and the NAFTA allow for a maximum duration o f three years for safeguards 
applied bilaterally during the transition period. Global actions are governed by current law, again three 
years duration for the U.S. Degressivity is not explicitly called for in the CUSFTA, although it is in the 
NAFTA during the allowed one year extension o f safeguard relief.
The main issue that arises here is whether or not the WHFTA countries can agree on a maximum 
allowable duration for safeguards and on a timetable for phasing them out. This issue arises with respect 
both to the transition period and beyond.
Another important issue that arises in the WHFTA here is related to the selectivity issue above. 
In the Uruguay Round, as in previous GATT rounds, several WHFTA countries argued for exceptional 
treatment on the grounds of being less developed countries, as is allowed by the GATT. But this raises 
the possibility o f differential treatment regarding both the duration and degressivity o f safeguards. There 
are two possibilities: Different countries may be allowed exemptions from the safeguards o f other 
countries, or a given country may be allowed a longer duration for safeguards than another country.
Closely related to the degressivity issue is the question o f tariff bindings. For example, Colombia 
reduced tariffs substantially in 1990 and 1991, but the new duties are not bound in the GATT and this 
raises the possibility that any tariffs raised as “safeguards” could be quite high initially in order to thwart 
degressivity for a time.
Surveillance
Once again the issue here is what constitutes harm, since WHFTA member countries need to be 
able to monitor the use o f safeguards in various situations. The CUSFTA is explicit only in the sense that 
it adopts the language of the GATT and current United States and Canadian trade law. Thus the language 
speaks o f “substantial cause o f serious injury” and actions justified “to the extent necessary to remedy the 
injury.” The NAFTA replaces this language slightly, but substantively, to include “remedy or prevent the 
injury.” This reflects the U.S. wording in trade law and derives from concern with inventories as a source 
o f potential import surges. Also o f concern might be the preoccupation of many LAC countries in 
previous regional trade agreements with “harm” incurred through balance-of-payments problems not 
generally attributable to the misfortunes o f a particular industry. In the ABEIP, for example, bilateral 
deficits were used as a measure o f harm. Deficits in excess of 10 percent were enough to justify some
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actions. And Brazil unilaterally applied “stabilization policy tariffs” in 1986-87 while Uruguay delayed 
joining the ABEIP due to a cumulative trade deficit with both Argentina and Brazil.
Surveillance poses many thorny issues, but it may also provide the format for successful discussion 
o f safeguards. Consider in particular the need to assess “harm” from an economy-wide perspective. A 
useful institution would be one that mandates a report of the effects of safeguards on all segments o f the 
domestic, WHFTA, and world economies. In particular, any assessment of “harm” must include impact 
on domestic consumers.
In the NAFTA, the investigating authorities are the Canadian International Trade Tribunal, the 
Secretaria de Comercio y Fomento Industrial, and the United States International Trade Commission. 
Given current legal interpretations and past performance, there is probably continued underrepresentation 
of consumer interests.
Compensation
The issue o f compensation relates mainly to global safeguard actions rather than to actions among 
WHFTA countries as part of any transition to freer trade. Here the NAFTA, like the CUSFTA, adopts 
the language of the GATT referring to “substantially equivalent” concessions as the price o f taking 
safeguard actions. The questions that confront the WHFTA nations are whether they want to be treated 
as a bloc when nonmembers owe compensation, and whether the WHFTA nations want to compensate 
members differently than nonmembers.
During the transition the NAFTA and the CUSFTA do not provide for compensation since 
emergency actions take the form of moving back to earlier MFN rates. However, the WHFTA nations 
could debate the possibility of compensation during the transition to freer trade. The questions then arise, 
what form should compensation take, and should certain WHFTA nations be exempt on development or 
other grounds? Another approach would be to reduce compensation owing to safeguards and instead 
extract compensation from countries that resort to safeguards in a way that violates stricter conditions for 
their use. Brazil at least was vocal in the Uruguay Round on the issue o f compensation and has hinted 
at a resurrection of some variation of the Brazil-Uruguay formula o f the 1960s, which would penalize 
violators o f the safeguards code by requiring financial compensation (Abreu and Fritsch 1989).
Required Adjustment Assistance
Among the WHFTA countries, the U.S. has the most extensive adjustment assistance programs, 
while most WHFTA nations have some version— sometimes ad hoc— of unemployment insurance. 
Notwithstanding the arguments for and against mandated adjustment assistance in the WHFTA, the issue 
is probably a nonstarter in initial negotiations, given the complications of harmonizing the conditions 
under which adjustment assistance is required. No WHFTA nation made this issue a priority in the 
Uruguay Round, and it did not appear in the final CUSFTA or NAFTA documents.
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Nonmembers
The main issue with respect to nonmembers is how they might react to any WHFTA safeguards 
policy or (for that matter) to the very notion o f a WHFTA. If the WHFTA stays essentially within a 
GATT-compatible framework, then there is at least a reduced potential for conflict. Nonetheless, while 
it is not the focus o f this paper, the whole notion of trading blocs may create an adversarial mindset that 
would complicate future moves toward worldwide trade liberalization. Certainly the NAFTA has 
engendered some consternation and concern in East and Southeast Asia.
Other GATT Safeguards
Among the safeguards sanctioned by the GATT beyond Article XIX, there are special provisions 
for agriculture and for balance-of-payments requirements. Brazil, for example, has justified nontariff 
import measures on balance-of-payments grounds as in Article XVIIIb. Many WHFTA countries, 
including the United States and Canada, variously appeal to the exceptions for agriculture in the GATT 
to justify “safeguards” for the agricultural sector and beyond.
There is potential room for sharp disagreement on some o f these safeguards. The essential 
problem is that the GATT itself has features that inherently divide developed and developing countries. 
This led to divisions in the multilateral rounds and will surely lead to divisions in the WHFTA 
negotiation. The origin o f these divisions resides in the earlier GATT rounds. Developing countries had 
little incentive to participate since they were exempt from reciprocity. Major exportable agricultural 
products were excluded from the negotiations, “special and differential” treatment was accorded through 
the GSP, and GATT sanctioned infant-industry and balance-of-payments protection in Articles XVIIIc and 
XVIIIb.
The principal issue here is that if the WHFTA is going to be GATT-compatible, then the WHFTA 
countries except for the United States and Canada are guaranteed many safeguard remedies in the name 
of development and structural imbalance in the economy. And as recently as Punta del Este, Brazil led 
a coalition o f developing countries formed to maintain dual-track treatment. Thus a sharp conflict could 
arise if it is felt that some nations can make concessions for freer trade and then simply fall back on 
Article XVIIIb or XVIIIc to withdraw concessions.
At the same time, many LAC agricultural producers have expressed disappointment with the 
GATT’s treatment o f trade in agriculture. In particular, they perceive that the developed countries use 
GATT exceptions simply to exclude the agricultural exports of the less-developed countries.
The solution seems to be that some of the WHFTA countries will need to bind their tariff 
schedules more securely and agree to more stringent limitations on the use o f balance-of-payments escape 
clauses in Article XVIIIb. Some commentators have suggested that reducing the scope of actions to be 
taken under a balance-of-payments escape clause would make bargaining more likely and improve policy 
making in developing countries (Fritsch 1989). In the same spirit, the United States and Canada may be 
forced to re-examine their positions on effective exclusion of major agricultural products from the GATT.
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Agriculture-related Safeguards
Since its inception in 1947, the GATT has de-emphasized agricultural matters as the United States 
and the EC have obtained implicit recognition o f their respective domestic policies. These include 
“safeguard” treatment provided to agriculture through various exemptions such as Article XI, which 
permits import restrictions to enforce standards or domestic agricultural support policies. In the NAFTA, 
no trilateral agreement on agriculture was possible. Rather, Canada signed a separate bilateral accord with 
Mexico while the CUSFTA accord governs trade in agriculture between the U.S. and Canada. Thus, for 
example, Canada retains its “snap-back” provisions for reinstating tariffs in order to correct market 
distortions in agriculture. Also, Canada retains its protection for the dairy, poultry, and egg sectors 
(USITC 1992).
For WHFTA nations like Argentina that are efficient food producers, these exceptions are 
perplexing. Several WHFTA nations would quickly agree with Argentina— for example, Brazil, Colombia, 
and Uruguay (Caimes Group members), as well as Mexico (Cirio and Otero 1989). Nonetheless, given 
the precedent of moving from the CUSFTA to the NAFTA, we can expect that the United States and 
Canada will be reluctant to embrace significant domestic reforms. Much here will undoubtedly depend 
on how the agriculture agreement o f the Uruguay Round is finally implemented.
Balance-of-payments and Infant-industry Related Safeguards
Several WHFTA countries frequently appeal to safeguard protection on balance-of-payments 
grounds. Brazil, for example, represents 60 percent o f South America’s GDP and 36 percent o f its foreign 
trade. In the past Brazil has used import controls to deal with payments problems. Such controls have 
included, for instance, the Financial Operations Tax (IOF) on import-related exchange rates— in effect a 
15-percent surcharge on imports (United Nations 1985). And recently, Argentina applied a series of 
measures to raise taxes on imports in order to deal with some of the consequences o f tying the peso 
closely to the U.S. dollar as part o f Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo’s anti-inflation plan (Nash 1992).
More generally, and without denying the potential benefits o f freer trade, it simply may not be 
realistic to negotiate further WHFTA trade liberalization with heavily indebted LAC countries that are not 
tied to a financial package that provides for the possibility o f adverse trade effects in the short and 
medium terms. Certainly from the “political efficiency” case for safeguards alluded to earlier, some sort 
o f agreement on temporary balance-of-payments-related trade actions is probably indispensable in a 
WHFTA. (See, for example, the discussion in Abreu and Fritsch 1989.)
Another potentially deep division between WHFTA countries with regard to safeguards lies in the 
use o f trade and other policies to promote industrialization. While official attitudes are changing, there 
is not a total rush to abandon some “enlightened guidance” by government policy to nurture certain 
industries, legally justified in the GATT by an infant-industry argument. While not the primary focus o f 
this paper, it will be one of the tasks o f the safeguards surveillance code to monitor the use o f the infant 
industry argument— or, for the United States, the use o f temporary “industrial policy” actions.
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The “New Safeguards” and Concluding Remarks
As increasingly disparate economies pursue free trade areas, tensions are bound to increase. One 
form such tensions took in the NAFTA negotiations was a call for “safeguards” from lax environmental 
or labor standards. Similar issues will undoubtedly arise in any WHFTA negotiation. In his contribution 
to this publication, Pearson points out that such issues are really questions o f domestic policy and are 
probably best left out o f the negotiations. Safeguards are not meant to be permanent and certainly are not 
intended to safeguard an industry from another nation’s source o f comparative advantage, even if  that does 
reside in low environmental standards. To open up such essentially domestic issues would certainly be 
problematic for the WHFTA negotiations.
More generally, the safeguards issue in the WHFTA is bound to be sufficiently complex to 
generate some consensus and much conflict. In the GATT, CUSFTA, and NAFTA negotiations, 
safeguards have been a source o f some divisions with some consensus on surveillance and degressivity 
but no general agreement on gray-area measures and other issues. If  there is any guidance in these 
negotiations and from the experience of various other LAC trade negotiations, it is surely that the nations 
should first seek agreement on precisely what safeguards are meant to accomplish. For example, some 
criteria o f adjustment, efficiency, viability, and focus may serve as a start. As important, there is near- 
universal agreement on at least one thing: Without the flexibility o f safeguard exceptions, WHFTA 
negotiators will be severely constrained in what they can table and ultimately negotiate.
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Table 1
Article XIX Actions Notified to GATT, 1950-88 (WHFTA Countries)
IN V O K IN G  P A R T Y P R O D U C T D A T E
IN T R O D U C E D
U .S. Women’s fur felt 
hats and hat 
bodies
1 Dec 50
U .S. Hatter’s fur 9 Feb 52
U .S . Dried figs 30 Aug 52
U .S . Alsflce clover seed 1 July 54
U .S . Bicycles 19 Aug 55






U .S . Safety pins 29 Nov 57
Canada Frozen peas 12 Feb 58
U .S . Clinical
thermometers
22 May 58
U .S . Lead and Zinc 1 Oct 58




U .S . Cotton typewriter 
ribbon cloth
22 Sept 60




U .S . Wilton and 
velvet carpets
17 Jun 62
Peru Lead Arsenate 
and valves
23 Feb 63
Canada Turkeys 17 Nov 67
Canada Potatoes 12 Sept 68
Canada Corn 30 Oct 68
U .S . Pianos 21 Feb 70
Canada Motor gasoline 7 May 70




Canada Fresh and 
preserved strawberries
21 May 71
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U .S . Ceramic tableware 
articles
1 May 72
Canada Fresh cherries 30 Jun 73
U .S . Ball bearings 1 May 74
Canada Cattle, beef,veal 12 Aug 74
Canada Worsted spun 
acrylic yams
1 Jan 76
U.S. Specialty steel 14 Jun 76
Canada Work gloves 1 Jul 76
Canada Textured polyester 7 Jul 76
Canada Double-knit fabrics 8 Oct 76
Canada Beef and veal 18 Oct 76
Canada A  range of clothing 
items
29 Nov 76
U .S . Non-rubber footwear 28 Jun 77
U .S . Color T V  receivers 1 Jul 77
Canada Footwear 5 Dec 77
U .S . CB radio receivers 11 A pr 78
U .S . High carbon 
ferrochromium
11 Nov 78
U .S . Industrial fasteners 26 Dec 78
U .S . Clothespins 23 Feb 79
U .S . Porcelain-on-steel 
cooking ware
1 Jan 80
U .S . Prepared or 
preserved mushrooms
2 Dec 80
Canada Non-leather footwear 24 Nov 81
Canada Leather footwear 9 Jul 82
Canada Yellow onions 27 Oct 82
U .S . Motorcycles 16 A pr 83
U .S . Specialty steel 20 Jul 83
Chile Sugar 26 Jul 84
Chile Wheat
Canada Fresh, chilled and 
frozen beef, and veal
1 Jan 85
Chile Edible vegetable oils 28 Sept 85
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Table 2
Voluntary Export Restraint Arrangements, 1987
P R O D U C T IM P O R T IN G  C O U N TR IE S E X P O R T IN G
C O U N T R IE S
S T E E L E U R O P E A N  C O M M U N IT Y A U S T R A L IA , A U S T R IA , B R A Z IL , 
B U L G A R IA  C Z E C H O S L O V A K IA , 
F IN L A N D , H U N G A R Y , JA P A N  S O U T H  
K O R E A , N O R W A Y , P O L A N D , R O M A N IA , 
S O U T H  A F R IC A , S W E D E N , V E N E Z U E L A
U N IT E D  S T A T E S A R G E N T IN A , A U S T R A L IA , A U S T R IA , 
B R A Z IL , B U L G A R IA , 
C Z E C H O S L O V A K IA , E U R O P E A N  
C O M M U N IT Y , E A S T  G E R M A N Y , 
F IN L A N D , H U N G A R Y , JA P A N , S O U T H  
K O R E A , M E X IC O , N O R W A Y , P O L A N D , 
P O R T U G A L , R O M A N IA , S O U T H  A F R IC A , 
SPA IN  V E N E Z U E L A , Y U G O S L A V IA , 
T A IW A N
M A C H IN E  T O O L S E U R O P E A N  C O M M U N IT Y JA P A N
U N IT E D  S TA TE S W E S T  G E R M A N Y , JA P A N , 
S W IT Z E R L A N D , T A IW A N
M O T O R  V E H IC L E S C A N A D A JA P A N , S O U T H  K O R E A
E U R O P E A N  C O M M U N IT Y JA P A N
N O R W A Y S O U T H  K O R E A
U N IT E D  S TA T E S JA P A N
TE L E V IS IO N S E U R O P E A N  C O M M U N IT Y JA P A N , S O U T H  K O R E A
U N IT E D  S TA TE S S O U T H  K O R E A
V ID E O T A P E  A N D E U R O P E A N  C O M M U N IT Y JA P A N , S O U T H  K O R E A
C A S S E T T E  R E C O R D S U N IT E D  S TA TE S S O U T H  K O R E A
F O O T W E A R C A N A D A S O U T H  K O R E A , IT A L Y , SPAIN, T A IW A N  
JA P A N , S O U T H  K O R E A
N O R W A Y  
U N IT E D  K IN G D O M
S O U T H  K O R E A , T A IW A N
T E X T IL E S  A N D A U S T R IA S IN G A P O R E
A P P A R E L C A N A D A M A L D IV E S , P A K IS TA N , V IE T N A M  
M O R O C C O , T U N IS IA , T U R K E Y
E U R O P E A N  C O M M U N IT Y C H IN A , P A K IS TA N  
C H IN A , S O U T H  K O R E A ,
F IN L A N D P A K IS TA N
JA P A N C H IN A
C H IN A , C O S T A  R IC A , E G Y P T , IS R A E L,
N O R W A Y M A L D IV E S , M A U R IT IU S , P A K IS TA N ,
U N IT E D  S TA TE S S O U T H  A F R IC A
A G R IC U L T U R A L  P R O D U C TS E U R O P E A N  C O M M U N IT Y A R G E N T IN A , A U S T R A L IA , A U S T R IA , 
B R A Z IL , B U L G A R IA , C A N A D A ,C H IL E , 
C H IN A , C Z E C H O S L O V A K IA , H U N G A R Y  , 
IC E L A N D , IN D O N E S IA , N E W  Z E A L A N D , 
P O L A N D , R O M A N IA , S O U T H  A F R IC A , 
T H A IL A N D , U R U G U A Y , Y U G O S L A V IA
S TA IN L E S S  S T E E L  F L A T W A R E W E S T  G E R M A N Y S O U T H  K O R E A
U N IT E D  K IN G D O M S O U T H  K O R E A
L E A T H E R  C L O T H IN G N O R W A Y S O U T H  K O R E A
L U M B E R U N IT E D  S TA TE S C A N A D A
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DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN A 
WESTERN HEMISPHERE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Blair Hankey
The purpose of this paper is to examine the potential role and form of dispute settlement in a 
Western Hemisphere Free Trade Agreement (WHFTA). The paper will outline generic forms of 
international dispute settlement and examine the structure and functioning of dispute settlement 
mechanisms in existing subregional trade agreements in the hemisphere. It will then explore issues 
pertinent to dispute settlement in a WHFTA. Finally, the paper will consider whether some interim 
dispute settlement arrangement might be applied prior to the formation of a hemispheric FTA.
Introduction
The dispute settlement mechanisms in existing Western Hemisphere trade agreements range from 
the permanent Tribunal of the Andean Common Market, which is empowered to issue binding decisions 
with direct application, to the minimalist arbitration procedures of the Caribbean Community, which can 
issue only nonbinding advisory opinions. The trade agreements are a part of these mechanisms which 
include several customs unions intended to evolve into common markets, as well as various bilateral free 
trade agreements.
The architecture of international agreements should be appropriate to their function. Applying 
this principle to dispute settlement procedures, it follows that the nature of such procedures should be 
appropriate to the rules they interpret and apply. The more comprehensive* detailed, and intrusive (into 
subject matter generally considered domestic) are the rules, the more formal, automatic, and binding the 
dispute settlement procedures should be. Since modern trade agreements increasingly demonstrate the 
characteristics mentioned, it is not surprising that more attention is being devoted to dispute, settlement 
in negotiation and implementation of trade agreements.
In addition to the general movement toward more formal, automatic, and binding dispute 
settlement mechanisms in international trade agreements, there are particular circumstances in the Western 
Hemisphere that are likely to elevate the importance of dispute settlement: asymmetry in power, size, 
and wealth between the United States and the other countries of the hemisphere; significant differences 
in cultural, political, and legal traditions between the U.S. and Latin America; and the complex, diffuse 
power structure of the U.S. Taken together, these factors make it highly unlikely the U.S. will 
participate in a hemispheric trading arrangement involving an elaborate set of supranational institutions 
such as those of the European Community (EC).
The absence of formal dispute settlement procedures in an international agreement leaves the 
relative power of the parties essentially unchanged from the situation before the agreement. Whenever 
there is a great difference in the relative power of the parties, or when an agreement is much more 
important to some parties than to others, the weaker parties may be concerned that they will suffer the 
same disadvantages in a dispute arising after the agreement as they did prior to the agreement unless it 
includes dispute settlement procedures. Such circumstances are obviously present in this hemisphere: 
the economy of the United States greatly exceeds in size the combined economies of all the other
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countries. Trade between the U.S. and any other country of the hemisphere will always be relatively 
much more important to the other country than to the U.S.
Trading relationships within North America illustrate this point. The GDP of the United States 
is approximately ten times the size of Canada’s and thirty times the size of Mexico’s. Thus, while 
bilateral trade between the U.S. and both Canada and Mexico is in rough balance, that trade is ten times 
more important to Canada than it is to the U.S. and thirty times more important to Mexico. Any 
retaliatory action would therefore have a much greater impact on Canada or Mexico than it would on the 
U.S. These differences weaken the bargaining power of the smaller parties in the absence of dispute 
settlement procedures. Such procedures, at least in theory, give the parties equal weight under the law 
of the agreement, and therefore should neutralize the power differential between them. It is precisely this 
neutralizing character of dispute settlement procedures that makes them such an attractive—and even 
crucial—feature for smaller partners in trading agreements. Converse considerations make dispute 
settlement procedures a sensitive and difficult issue for a great power like the United States.
While the political leadership of the United States, particularly the members of the legislative 
branch, may be instinctively reluctant to surrender the advantages that flow naturally from wealth and 
size, other considerations propel the U.S. to accept formal dispute settlement mechanisms in agreements 
with hemispheric trading partners. One such consideration is the general desire for friendly, mutually 
beneficial economic and political relations. Dispute settlement mechanisms can facilitate such 
relationships by avoiding the escalation of trade disputes that could complicate and disrupt bilateral 
relations. By resolving disputes in a routine and standardized manner, dispute settlement prevents the 
escalation of rhetoric, the spiral of retaliatory trade actions, or the linkage with other issues that could 
sour the overall relationship.
Another consideration is the desire for predictability that is common to business interests in all 
countries, including the United States. While some businesses in the U.S. will no doubt prefer to rely 
on superior negotiating leverage to protect their interests, many others will share an interest in minimizing 
the risk that a particular dispute might escalate. While trade disputes typically involve a single industry, 
retaliatory measures frequently affect industries other than those involved in the dispute since the 
retaliating state often does not import substantial quantities of the product at issue from the state that is 
the object of the retaliation. The results and targets of retaliation are inherently unpredictable. 1
In the period since World War II, the common security interests of the principal trading nations, 
particularly the United States, have acted as an important restraining influence over the use of economic 
muscle to force the resolution of trade disputes. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise on 
the international agenda of economic issues relative to security concerns, the U.S. may feel less 
constrained in the use of its economic leverage in disputes with trading partners in the hemisphere. 
However, to the extent that political rivalry with the former Soviet Union may be replaced by economic 
rivalry with the European Community (EC) and Japan, the U.S. may still find it prudent not to rely too 
frequently on the use of economic force to resolve trade disputes within the hemisphere. This observation 
applies particularly to relations with states such as those in the southern cone, whose trade with the EC 
or other trading partners may be relatively more important than their trade with the U.S.
1. This observation applies to the sections imposed by the U.S. under Section 301. See Johnson and Winner, 
“Section 301: A New Direction in U.S. Trade Policy?” In Private Investors Abroad—Problems and Solutions in 
International Business in 1987 (Southwestern Legal Foundation), 1987, at 5-9.
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Types of Dispute Settlement
Not all conflicts between governments can be classified as disputes. Most of the trade-related 
differences that arise between governments are addressed through diplomatic and other intergovernmental 
contacts and do not escalate into disputes. Many trade agreements including, for example, the Canada- 
U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) contain various notification and consultation provisions that aim 
to prevent small differences from developing into serious disputes. 2
This paper is concerned with differences that have become “defined, controverted and serious in 
contrast to other more amorphous, less focused, and less serious types of frictions, concerns, grievances, 
complaints or differences. ” 3 Such a dispute may be defined as “a specific disagreement concerning a 
matter of fact, law or policy in which a claim or assertion of one party is met with a refusal, counterclaim 
or denial by another. ” 4
Dispute settlement provisions contained in international agreements include a range of mechanisms 
or procedures, from notification and consultation to compulsory, binding third-party adjudication. These 
procedures can be classified as (a) consultative, (b) conciliatory, (c) advisory (i.e., nonbinding) 
arbitration, and (d) binding arbitration or adjudication.
Notification, Consultation, and Negotiation
International agreements frequently include provisions requiring one party to notify the other(s) 
of any actions or measures that may affect the operation of the agreement and to enter into consultations 
about the matter. The consultations may be subject to a time limit that can be extended only by 
agreement of the parties. The governments can seek to resolve the issue through direct negotiations at 
this stage; failure to do so often entitles the aggrieved party to proceed to a further stage of dispute 
resolution, typically involving the introduction of a third party into the process.
Although parties tend to favor this technique because of the almost absolute control they exercise 
over both the process and the solution, it has the considerable disadvantage of being based inevitably on 
a compromise that may turn on factors other than the merits of the case. This disadvantage may be 
magnified if one party is substantially weaker than the other, or if one party perceives that it has the 
better case on legal or other merits.
2. See M. Jean Anderson and Jonathan T. Fried, “Dispute settlement between governments: the U.S.-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement in operation”, XVII Canada-U.S. Law Journal 1991.
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Conciliation or Mediation5
Some agreements require that when the parties are unable to reach a negotiated settlement within 
fixed time limits, either party may refer the dispute to third-party mediation or conciliation. Conciliation 
procedures take various forms and techniques. Agreements that provide for conciliation generally establish 
a permanent commission that facilitates negotiations and acts as, or appoints, a mediator. Mediation 
procedures sometimes include the issuing of a neutral statement o f facts. Governments under pressure 
from private interests may find it useful to be able to rely on the views o f an impartial third party in 
justifying a settlement to its own nationals.
Such consultations are frequently confidential. While confidentiality can avoid the political 
embarrassment that may result from public negotiation or arbitration, it may not compel the attention of 
the offending party. Moreover, a solution is likely to be based more on compromise than on principle, 
and hence will not effectively neutralize differences in negotiating power.
Advisory (i.e., Nonbinding) Arbitration
The essential difference between conciliation or mediation and advisory or nonbinding arbitration 
is that a mediator typically does not issue a report other than perhaps a neutral statement o f facts, but an 
arbitrator typically issues a report that assigns blame to one party and recommends a solution. This 
difference is crucial. Even though in law an arbitrator’s report may be nonbinding, it fundamentally alters 
the relative positions o f the parties in respect to the dispute. Passing judgment on the merits tends to 
make it more feasible politically for the offending party to mend its ways. Certainly it becomes easier 
for the aggrieved party to retaliate. The issue is changed from whether a given measure violates the 
agreement to whether the offending party will honor its international obligations. The offending party is 
provided with an objective rationale for modifying its behavior without being seen to succumb to pressure 
from the other party.
The dispute settlement procedures of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) fall 
in the nonbinding category, inasmuch as panel reports become binding on the parties only after they are 
adopted by the Contracting Parties acting through the GATT Council. Since the Council operates by 
consensus in such matters, any Contracting Party, including a party to the dispute, can prevent adoption 
o f a panel report.
Binding Arbitration or Adjudication6
Agreements providing for compulsory and binding dispute settlement procedures represent a very 
significant surrender o f sovereign power, inasmuch as the parties not only assume obligations, but also 
confer on the third party the power to interpret their obligations and to order remedies to bring the 
offending party into compliance with these obligations.
5. The terms conciliation and mediation are used interchangeably.
6. The term “arbitration” is generally applied to a third-party dispute settlement procedure wherein the tribunal 
or panel is constituted in order to address a specific dispute or group of disputes, and then dissolved. Adjudication 
generally refers to third-party dispute settlement by a permanent court or tribunal.
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The provision for compulsory, binding arbitration—the international equivalent o f litigation— 
tends to encourage governments to settle disputes through negotiation, as arbitration carries many of the 
same disadvantages as domestic litigation. Binding arbitration and particularly adjudication take both the 
process and the solution out of the hands of the parties and can easily produce a settlement that, however 
much it conforms to the rules o f an agreement, satisfies the practical interests o f both parties far less than 
would a negotiated solution crafted to the particular circumstances o f the parties and the issue.
Since mandatory, binding arbitration goes farthest in neutralizing differences in power, it tends 
to be favored by smaller states that have the most to gain by subjecting their international relations to a 
strong legal order.7
Dispute Settlement Procedures in Existing Western Hemisphere Trade Agreements
Several bilateral and subregional trade agreements establish free trade arrangements, customs 
unions, or common markets among the countries of the Western Hemisphere. All these agreements 
contain some variation o f the consultative and conciliation procedures identified in the preceding section. 
These agreements also provide for some form of advisory or binding arbitration procedure. It is this 
aspect o f dispute settlement, i.e., the role o f the third-party arbitration in the overall process, that 
constitutes the focus o f this paper.
The analysis o f these procedures in trade agreements already in force in the hemisphere is 
constrained by several factors. First, apart from the Chapter Nineteen dispute settlement provisions o f  the 
CUSFTA, and to a much lesser extent the dispute settlement provisions o f the Andean Common Market 
(Ancom), these provisions appear to have been rarely invoked. Consequently, there is little history or 
jurisprudence to examine.
Second, apart from the dispute settlement mechanisms of the CUSFTA, there is an extreme paucity 
o f published material on the negotiating history or functioning o f these mechanisms. No such literature 
appears to be available in English. The discussion is therefore limited to an examination o f the legal texts 
that establish the role and competence of these tribunals.
Finally, because virtually all of the subregional and bilateral trade agreements are currently either 
being constituted or renegotiated, the provisions on dispute settlement in the published texts o f these 
agreements are often already outdated or will soon become so.
Examination o f these texts discloses a considerable range in the kind o f arbitral or adjudicatory 
procedures. In the following analysis, these mechanisms are ranked in terms o f their compulsoiy and
7. The Court of Justice of the European Communities represents the most comprehensive and highly developed 
example of compulsory, binding adjudication in international trade agreements. Actions may be brought to the 
Court by the EC Commission, by member states, by institutions of the Community, or by private parties. Its 
judgements have direct application, that is, they have binding legal force on the parties to the case without further 
judicial, legislative, or executive action by other Community or national organs. Its judgements not only settle the 
particular disputes before it, but also constitute a body of jurisprudence that construes and elaborates contested 
provisions of the EC Treaties and secondary legislation. The Court also issues, upon request, preliminary and 
binding rulings on questions concerning Community law referred to it by the domestic courts of member states.
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binding character. At one end of the spectrum (that is, having the most compulsory jurisdiction) is the 
Andean Tribunal or Court of Justice, while at the other end of the spectrum (that is, having the most 
consensual jurisdiction) is the dispute settlement mechanism of the Caribbean Common Market 
(CARICOM).
The Andean Court of Justice
The Andean Court of Justice, or Andean Tribunal, is the permanent tribunal of the Andean 
Common Market (ANCOM) . 8 The treaty establishing the Court was signed in 1979 and entered into 
force in 1983.9
The Court is composed of five justices, one from each of the five member states of the ANCOM. 
The Court’s essential role is the interpretation of the law of the ANCOM . 10 The Court has three 
functions: to nullify decisions of other organs of the Community that are in violation of the Cartagena 
Agreement, to issue findings of noncompliance and orders suspending or restricting the benefits of 
member states that are not in compliance with the jurisdictional norms of the Community, and to render 
advisory opinions on questions of Community law referred to it by the domestic courts of member states.
Nullification of Community Decisions
Parties that can bring actions for nullification include the member states, the Commission, the 
Junta, 11 and national or juridical persons who have been injured by laws or regulations issued by 
Community organs. 12 Once the Court has issued an order of nullification, the Community organ in 
question (i.e., the Commission or Junta) must adopt the measures necessary to implement the Court’s 
decision. 13
8. Agreement on Subregional Integration (The Cartagena Agreement), done May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910 (1969). 
The original signatories of the Cartagena Agreement were Chile, Columbia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. 
Subsequently, Venezuela joined in 1973. Chile withdrew from the Agreement in 1976. Decision 102 of the 
Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, October 30, 1976.
9. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, May 23, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1203 (1979) 
(entered into force May 7, 1983). The permanent seat of the Court is Quito, Ecuador. The Court scheduled its 
first meeting for December 1983. See “Venezuela aprobo el tratado que crea et Tribunal de Justicia del Acuerdo 
de Cartegena,” Interacion Latinoamericano, September 1983, p. 63.
10. This law has four elements: the Treaty of Cartagena, the Andean Court of Justice Treaty, the Decisions of the 
Commission, and the Resolutions of the Junta. Andean Court of Justice Treaty, Art. 1.
11. The Junta is the governing council comprised of representatives of the governments of the member states.
12. Ibid., Art. 17, 19.
13. Ibid., Art. 22.
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Actions Against Member States
A member country must first bring a complaint of noncompliance against another member country 
to the Junta. If the offending country fails to comply with a decision issued by the Junta, the Junta may 
refer the case to the Court, which will issue a decision that can include sanctions for noncompliance. 14 
Member states can also bring complaints against other member states directly to the Court if the Junta 
fails to act upon the complaint or finds in favor of the accused country. 15 If a member state fails after 
three months to comply with a decision the Court has rendered against it, the Court may restrict or 
suspend benefits under the Agreement of the noncomplying party, after considering the views of the 
Junta. 16
Advisory Opinions
National courts of the member states can refer issues of Community law to the Court for 
interpretation. 17 If the national court’s decision is not subject to appeal, the proceeding must be stayed 
until the Andean Court has ruled. Decisions of the Andean Court interpreting community law are binding 
upon national courts. 18
The jurisdiction of the Andean Court is closely modeled after that of the European Court of 
Justice. The ANCOM, like the EC, aims to create a common market, and it is endowed with a similar 
set of supranational institutions. Unfortunately, the ANCOM has been in a state of crisis throughout most 
of the 1980s and, until very recently, has made little progress in the formation of a common market. 
While an assessment of the ANCOM experience lies outside the scope of this paper, it would appear that 
the failure until now of the ANCOM to achieve its objectives has been largely the result of political and 
economic factors rather than of institutional weaknesses.
The Andean Court is an institution with a constitution and jurisdiction befitting the ambitious aims 
of the ANCOM. Unfortunately, the small number of cases that the Andean Court has tried and the very 
cursory and abstract nature of the published accounts of those cases, do not permit any considered 
assessment of the jurisprudence of the Court or its functioning within the Andean system.
Other Latin American Trade Agreements
Four trade agreements among Latin American countries have dispute settlement mechanisms that 
are similar in their essential characteristics. These agreements are the Latin American Free Trade 
Agreement (LAFTA), now succeeded by the Latin American Integration Association, generally known
14. Ibid., Art. 23.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., Art. 25.
17. Ibid., Art. 28,
18. Ibid., Art. 31.
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by its Spanish acronym, ALADI; the Central American Common Market; the MERCOSUR; and the 
Mexico-Chile Free Trade Agreement.
The dispute settlement mechanisms in each of these agreements share three characteristics. First, 
the dispute settlement procedures include arbitration before an ad hoc panel. The number o f arbitrators, 
the method of their appointment, and the provisions for rules of procedure and expenses vary from one 
agreement to another. Second, the arbitration jurisdiction is compulsory. In the event that agreement is 
not achieved through direct negotiation or the good offices o f the governing body of the agreement, the 
aggrieved party has a right to refer the dispute to arbitration. The consent o f the other party or o f the 
governing body is not required in order to refer the matter to arbitration. Third, the decision o f the 
arbitration panel is binding. The panel’s decision does not have to be adopted or ratified by the governing 
body in order to become binding, and the aggrieved party does not require the authorization o f the 
governing body in order to take compensatory measures.
The nature o f the remedy provided to the prevailing party in the arbitration differs in the various 
agreements. The Agreement o f the Central American Common Market does not specify the nature o f the 
remedy, but simply states that “the decision o f the arbitration tribunal . . . shall have the effect o f res 
judicata  for all the contracting parties as it refers to any aspect o f the interpretation or application o f the 
clauses o f this Treaty.”19 The FAFTA Protocol for the Settlement o f Disputes provides that, in the event 
a party fails to comply with the decision o f an arbitration panel, the party affected by such non-compliance 
may “limit or suspend concessions . . .  to the defaulting party.”20 The MERCOSUR Protocol on Dispute 
Settlement provides that if one party does not comply with an arbitral decision, the other party may apply 
compensatory measures such as the suspension o f concessions.21 The Chile-Mexico Free Trade 
Agreement provides for a draconian sanction in the event o f noncompliance: the other party may suspend 
the operation o f the agreement.22
The dispute settlement procedures of these agreements apply only between states party to the 
agreements. Apart from the Ancom, none o f the other Latin American trade agreements provides for 
“standing” or the right o f access to the dispute settlement panels by parties other than member states; nor 
can actions be brought against parties other than member states. Moreover, none o f these agreements 
provides for direct application of the tribunals’ decisions. The remedy has in every case to be 
implemented by further legislation or executive action o f the government of a state party.
19. See Article XXVI, General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, in Basic Documents on 
International Economic Law, Stephen Zamora and Ronald A. Branc, 1990, pp. 529-543. The dispute settlement 
provisions of the Treaty establishing the Central American Common Market are now undergoing renegotiation and 
revision.
20. See Treaty of Montevideo creating a Latin American Free Trade Area, ibid., pp. 549-568.
21. MERCOSUR: Protocol for the Resolution of Disputes, done at Brazilia, Dec. 16, 1991, unpublished text.
22. Article 33, Acuerdo de Complementacio Economica entre Chile y Mexico, unpublished text.
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Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA)
The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) provides for two principal kinds o f dispute 
settlement. These are, first, a general dispute settlement mechanism under Chapter Eighteen o f the 
Agreement, and second a dispute settlement mechanism for antidumping and countervailing duty issues 
under Chapter Nineteen o f the Agreement. The Chapter Eighteen mechanism includes nonbinding 
arbitration procedures similar to those found in many other trade agreements modeled on the procedures 
of the GATT. The Chapter Nineteen procedure, however, is unique to the FTA and represents an 
important innovation in international dispute settlement.
Chapter Eighteen provides for advisory arbitration by ad hoc panels for any disputes that arise 
under the Agreement which cannot be resolved by direct bilateral negotiations or by the Commission.23 
Although arbitration by the panels is compulsory in the sense that it must proceed if requested by either 
party, it is not binding unless agreed in advance by the parties in relation to a particular dispute.24 The 
one exception is disputes on safeguard measures, as reports rendered by panels on safeguard issues are 
binding, and the prior consent of the parties is not required to confer this binding jurisdiction. In all other 
cases, the reports o f panels are advisory.
The agreement does provide that:
Upon receipt o f the final report of the panel, the Commission shall agree on the resolution 
o f the dispute, which normally shall conform with the recommendation o f the panel. 
Whenever possible, the resolution shall be nonimplementation or removal o f a measure 
not conforming with this Agreement or causing nullification or impairment . . .  or, failing 
a resolution, compensation.25
If the Commission has not agreed on a resolution within 30 days after receipt o f the panel’s report, 
and a party considers that its “fundamental” rights or benefits under the agreement are impaired by the 
contested measure, the party is then free to suspend the application o f benefits o f equivalent effect.26
23. The Commission is comprised of the United States Trade Representative and the Canadian Minister of 
International Trade, or their designees.
24. This option for binding arbitration has not as yet been utilized.
25. Art. 1807.8.
26. Art. 1807.9. The NAFTA text adopts a general dispute settlement regime similar to that in Chapter Eighteen 
of the FTA, but with some significant adjustments, largely in the method by which rosters of panelists are formed 
(single, consensus roster instead of separate national roster, see Art. 2009) and panels selected (“reverse selection” 
by which one country must select from among the other countries’ nationals on the roster—see Art. 2011). Also, 
unlike the FTA, the NAFTA permits third-country and noncountry panel chairmen. Ibid. In addition, under the 
NAFTA binding dispute settlement is available to determine whether one country’s retaliation in response to another 
country’s failure to comply with a panel report is itself “manifestly excusive.” See Art. 2019.
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The Chapter Nineteen procedure for resolution o f disputes on antidumping and countervailing duty 
measures is the subject of another paper in this series,27 and will be addressed only briefly here. Under 
Chapter Nineteen, binational panels replace judicial review by national courts o f antidumping and 
countervailing duty determinations by national administrative agencies. These panels apply the law of the 
party whose measure is contested. Either party has the right to challenge the final determinations o f the 
other party’s administrative agencies before a panel, and the decisions o f panels are final and binding.
Since the parties were unable to reach agreement during the negotiations o f the FTA on dumping, 
subsidy, or countervailing duty issues, there is no substantive law o f the agreement to apply. Thus, the 
Chapter Nineteen dispute settlement mechanism essentially represents a procedural solution to a subject 
on which the parties were unable to reach substantive agreement. Since some disposition o f these issues 
was a political sine qua non for Canada to enter into a free trade agreement with the U.S., this procedural 
solution was a means o f allowing the agreement to go forward.
The principal objectives o f the Chapter Nineteen procedure are to provide for impartial application 
of the respective national laws and to obtain a more expeditious final resolution than is provided by the 
multitiered national systems o f judicial review. Because of several commercially significant and highly 
politicized countervailing duty measures that the U.S. imposed on Canadian imports during and 
immediately prior to the FTA negotiations, the Canadian public, business community, and federal and 
provincial governments were extremely sensitive to allegations that countervailing duty and antidumping 
decisions o f U.S. administrative and quasi-judicial agencies were subject to political influence from 
domestic producers channeled through their Congressional representatives.
The Chapter Nineteen dispute settlement procedure was intended to be only a interim measure 
(five to seven years) pending substantive agreement on dumping, subsidy, and countervailing duty issues. 
Flowever, most observers agree that the procedure is working well,28 and many constituencies in both 
countries favor making the procedure a permanent function of the FTA (or its successor) in the event 
agreement is not reached on the underlying issues.
Caribbean Common Market
The dispute settlement procedure o f the Common Market of the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) is closely patterned after the pre-1988 GATT dispute settlement procedure, and resembles 
in its general outline the CUSFTA Chapter Eighteen settlement procedure.
The Council (the governing body comprised o f representatives o f the member states) must refer 
any dispute to an ad hoc tribunal at the request o f any “concerned” member state. If  the Council or 
Tribunal finds that any objective or benefit under the agreement is being frustrated, the Council “may,” 
by majority vote, make to the member state concerned such “recommendations” as it considers
27. See Gilbert R. Winham and Heather A. Grant in their contribution to this publication.
28. See, for example, Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Binational Dispute Settlement under Chapters 18 and 19 o f the 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: An Interim Appraisal (December, 1990), Administrative Conference of the 
U.S.; and Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Binational Dispute Settlement under Chapters 18 and 19 o f the Canada-United 
States Free Trade Agreement: An Update (April, 1991), Administrative Conference of the U.S.
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appropriate. I f  the member state does not comply with the Council’s recommendation, the Council “may,” 
by majority vote, authorize any member state to suspend such obligations in relation to the offending state 
as the Council considers appropriate.29
This procedure is compulsory in that the Council must refer the issue to a tribunal at the request 
o f any concerned party. However, the arbitration decision is advisory in that the Council, not the tribunal, 
formulates and “recommends” the remedy and authorizes retaliatory measures.
This procedure represents an improvement over the GATT procedure, inasmuch as (at least in 
theory) the Council acts by majority vote— not consensus, as in the GATT— and therefore a party to the 
dispute cannot block the formulation and adoption o f a remedy consistent with the tribunal’s report. The 
procedure resembles the CUSFTA procedure in the nonbinding character o f the tribunal’s decisions. It 
may be regarded as having a more binding character than the FTA, inasmuch as the Council acts by 
majority vote, a procedure that is unworkable in a bilateral agreement where both states are necessarily 
parties to any dispute and where a majority is not an operative concept. The CARICOM procedure is 
clearly inferior to the FTA and the post-1988 GATT procedure in the absence o f fixed time limits for the 
various stages in the dispute resolution process. In this respect, the Caribbean Treaty displays its vintage 
(1973). The treaty, including its dispute settlement provisions, is currently being revised.
Issues
Applicable Law and Relation to GATT
One would expect that the law applied under the dispute settlement procedures o f an international 
trade agreement would be the law of the agreement, that is, the rules that constitute its substance. 
However, this is by no means always so. Although the substantive rules contained in the agreement will 
almost always form one source o f the norms applied in a dispute settlement procedure under the 
agreement, these rules are not the only source or even necessarily the most important source o f the 
applicable law.
Some bilateral and regional international trade agreements are essentially “GATT-plus” 
agreements. They add to, and occasionally subtract from, the body of international trade rules comprised 
by the GATT and its subsidiary agreements. The GATT, for example, forms part of the law of the EC. 
The CUSFTA affirms the parties’ rights and obligations to each other under pre-existing international 
agreements to which they are both party, including, by implication, the GATT.30 Moreover, certain 
articles o f the FTA “affirm” or “incorporate” into the agreement specific GATT provisions.31
29. Article 11 of Annex to the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community in Basic Documents on International 
Economic Law, supra note 20, Vol. II, p. 664.
30. Art. 104.
31. Articles 501 (national treatment) and 1201 (exceptions) “incorporate” specific GATT provisions; Articles 602 
(technical standards) and 1302 “affirm” obligations under specific GATT provisions and its subsidiary Codes; 
Article 1902.2(d)(1) precludes changes to national antidumping or countervailing duty law that are inconsistent with 
the relevant provisions of the GATT and with the Antidumping and Subsidies Codes.
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The CARICOM and the various Latin American agreements reviewed here do not have the explicit 
GATT-plus structure of the FTA. That may be, in part, because the objectives of these agreements are 
so much more ambitious than those of the FTA. However, it is possible that general or specific 
incorporation o f GATT obligations into these agreements would strengthen their legal and policy structure.
In the MERCOSUR agreement, the parties “undertake to abide by commitments made prior to the 
date o f signature” o f the agreement. While only agreements negotiated under the framework o f the Latin 
American Integration Association (ALADI) are specifically mentioned, this general undertaking 
presumably also includes the GATT.32
The Chile-Mexico FTA provides that arbitration panels will take into consideration the provisions 
of the agreement, as well as the rules and principles o f other international agreements, in reaching their 
decisions.33 Thus, the GATT would appear to.be incorporated at least as a subsidiary source o f legal 
norms in the dispute settlement process.
The incorporation by one means or another o f GATT rules into bilateral and regional trade 
agreements, and the use o f GATT rules in dispute settlement procedures under these agreements, raises 
a number o f interesting issues. The most important of these is the relationship between, on the one hand, 
the law of the GATT as interpreted by GATT dispute settlement panels and applied by the GATT Council 
and the Contracting Parties and, on the other hand, the law of the GATT as interpreted by dispute 
settlement panels under bilateral and regional agreements and applied by their governing bodies and 
member states.
One can well imagine the kind o f problems that will almost certainly arise at some point when 
GATT obligations are first interpreted and applied in one manner under a bilateral regional agreement such 
as the CUSFTA and then interpreted and applied in another manner within the GATT itself. For example, 
in 1987, a GATT panel established at the request o f the U.S. issued a report ruling that Canadian 
prohibitions on the export o f unprocessed salmon and herring violated the GATT. Canada subsequently 
replaced the offending regulations with a landing requirement that had the same practical effect as the 
export ban.
The U.S. then challenged the Canadian landing requirements before the first Chapter Eighteen 
dispute settlement panel initiated under the FTA, alleging that the new Canadian landing requirements also 
violated Canada’s GATT obligations that had been incorporated into the FTA. The FTA panel found that 
Canadian landing requirements as then implemented also violated the GATT, but it recommended a 
solution, which the parties eventually applied in a somewhat altered form, that modified rather than struck 
down the Canadian regulations. It is not inconceivable that a third party with an interest in the matter, 
such as Japan (which imports large quantities o f the fish in question), could go to the GATT and obtain 
a stricter interpretation of GATT obligations than was issued by the FTA panel. In that case, it is unlikely 
the U.S. would rest content with the FTA panel’s more liberal interpretation.
The incorporation of GATT obligations into other agreements also raises issues o f choice of 
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agreements may be settled in either forum at the discretion o f the complaining party.34 However, once 
the dispute settlement provisions o f FTA Chapter Eighteen or the GATT have been initiated with respect 
to any matter, the procedure initiated must be used “to the exclusion o f any other.” Since the FTA came 
into force, both parties have taken the other party to dispute settlement under FTA procedures, in respect 
o f certain disputes involving GATT obligations and under GATT procedures in other disputes involving 
similar GATT obligations. In certain instances, the factors influencing choice of forum may be technical, 
for example, whether the offending measure was initiated before or after the FTA came into force. In 
other instances, however, a party appears to have been moved by tactical and political considerations 
related to the outcome of the proceeding. To the extent that the offending measure is thought to be looked 
upon with disfavor by other GATT Contracting Parties, a party to the FTA may consider it advantageous 
to go to that forum.
At least one international trade agreement in the hemisphere, the Andean Common Market 
(ANCOM), provides that its adjudicatory body, the Andean Court o f Justice, has exclusive jurisdiction 
over disputes arising under the agreement, so forum shopping is not permitted.
The GATT, o f course, is not the only international agreement that can be applied in dispute 
settlement procedures. For example, as already mentioned, the MERCOSUR specifically requires its 
member states to “abide by commitments” in prior agreements signed in the framework o f ALADI.35 
Presumably, therefore, dispute settlement tribunals formed under the MERCOSUR can turn to these 
agreements as sources o f applicable law.
As trade agreements infringe on other policy areas such as the environment, questions will arise 
whether or not international trade dispute settlement procedures ought to look to sources o f law outside 
trade agreements, for example, agreements concerning the environment.36
A final source o f legal norms sometimes applied in international dispute settlement procedures is 
the national laws o f the parties to the disputes. In certain instances, such as the Chapter Nineteen 
procedure under CUSFTA, the agreement explicitly requires the application of domestic law. In other 
instances, for example where there may be effective lacunae or ambiguity on some issue in the 
international agreement, dispute settlement panels will look to national laws as presumptive indications 
o f international obligations.
Structure o f  Dispute Settlement Procedures
Consistent with the principle that form should follow substance, the structure o f dispute settlement 
procedures should, to a considerable degree, reflect the objectives o f the agreements and the content of
34. Art. 1806.
35. Art. 8.
36. Several recent GATT panel decisions, such as the U.S.-Mexico dolphin/tuna dispute, have been strongly 
criticized by environmental groups in the U.S. and elsewhere for ignoring environmental considerations in their 
decisions.
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the rules they interpret. The more pervasive and intrusive the rules, and the more ambitious the objectives 
of the agreement, the more compulsory and binding the dispute settlement procedures should be.
If  the parties aim to create an agreement with broad scope and intrusive obligations, they might 
want a dispute settlement mechanism that has the stature and continuity necessary to participate actively, 
through its jurisprudence, in the development of the juridical structure of the agreement. In general, the 
dispute settlement procedures in existing hemispheric trade arrangements appear to be consistent with the 
objectives of these agreements, or at least with the current stage o f realization of those objectives. The 
principal exception would appear to be the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), which currently has 
a weak, and reportedly virtually unutilized, dispute settlement procedure relative to its ambitious aims.
One structural issue to be addressed both in existing agreements and any WHFTA is adjudicatory 
versus arbitral procedures. The principal advantage o f a permanent tribunal is that it is better able than 
are ad hoc arbitration panels to develop a consistent jurisprudence over the longer term. Such a 
jurisprudence not only increases the clarity o f the agreement but it also effectively develops the agreement, 
certainly in terms o f its precision, and in terms of its scope. Thus adjudication can perform a function 
in international agreements analogous to the role o f the judiciary in domestic legal systems. The 
permanent character o f a tribunal can also add weight and prestige to its decisions. The European Court 
o f Justice is the leading example of the dynamic role that a judicial body can play in building an effective 
supranational economic entity.
However, the principal advantage o f a permanent judicial body— its capacity to develop a 
consistent jurisprudence— can also be a major disadvantage. Since an ad hoc panel is typically dissolved 
after it has decided a single dispute, it has limited power and therefore limited opportunity to offend the 
parties or damage the operation o f the agreement. A permanent tribunal, however, could potentially 
develop a line o f jurisprudence that could seriously prejudice the interests o f one or more o f the parties, 
and render the entire agreement unacceptable to them. The potential for damage as well as constructive 
development is therefore considerable.
A middle ground between a purely ad hoc panel and a permanent tribunal is a panel selected from 
a pre-established roster o f panelists.37 The more the roster is selected by consensus, the smaller the 
roster, and the more automatic the system of panel selection (for example, rotation or drawing o f lots 
rather than negotiation, unilateral selection, or preemptory strikes), the more the procedure will approach 
adjudication.
One factor to consider in deciding between adjudication or ad hoc arbitration is the number, length 
and complexity o f the cases that will come before the tribunal. Will a permanent tribunal have enough 
work to keep its members busy? This potential objection is sometimes addressed by allowing the 
members o f the tribunal certain other forms o f employment, such as academic appointments, that do not 
create unacceptable conflicts with their judicial responsibilities.
In the event some kind o f WHFTA is formed, it is most unlikely, at least in its early stages, that 
the scope, content, and level o f the obligations it establishes will warrant the creation of a permanent 
tribunal.
37. This is the system used in most international trade agreements, including the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement (CUSFTA).
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Common vs. Civil Law
The countries of Latin America all possess legal and administrative systems based on the 
Napoleonic Code or civil law traditions. The U.S., Canada, and the countries o f the English-speaking 
Caribbean, on the other hand, have legal and administrative systems based on the Anglo-Saxon or common 
law tradition. While these traditions have contributed to the development o f different legal and 
administrative cultures, the significance of these differences for the operation of dispute mechanisms in 
international trade agreements should not be exaggerated.
These differences have never presented insuperable or even substantial obstacles to the operation 
o f international dispute settlement mechanisms, insofar as such mechanisms apply some form of 
international law, such as the law of the agreement itself, or the law o f other international agreements such 
as the GATT, or both. International law generally may be regarded as a hybrid o f the common and civil 
law traditions, while more closely resembling civil law systems.
The coexistence o f common and civil law systems of the member states of the EC does not appear 
to be a problem in the operation o f the European Court o f Justice. Moreover, it is notable that civil and 
common law systems coexist quite successfully in certain national or subnational jurisdictions such as 
Canada and Louisiana.
Problems are more likely to arise when the law being applied is the national law of one o f the 
parties to the dispute, as sometimes happens in international investment or commercial arbitrations. Such 
problems could also occur if  a procedure analogous to that in Chapter Nineteen o f the CUSFTA were to 
be applied.
A related issue is the significance (if any) o f the Calvo Doctrine, to which most Latin American 
governments have traditionally adhered. This doctrine holds that nationals of foreign states must rely 
exclusively on the national judicial system of the host state in settling investment and other disputes, and 
that accordingly a right to international dispute settlement procedures in such cases does not exist and 
ought not to be granted.38 The Calvo Doctrine, however, applies to disputes where at least one o f the 
parties is a private (natural or legal) person. It does not apply to intergovernmental disputes. The Latin 
American states have frequently resorted to binding arbitration procedures in disputes between themselves. 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that all the trade agreements among Latin American states examined in this 
paper include binding dispute settlement procedures, whereas the two agreements between or among 
countries with common law traditions (the CUSFTA and CARICOM) contain general dispute settlement 
procedures of a nonbinding character.
The Calvo Doctrine could take on a greater significance if  settlement procedures for disputes 
involving private parties were to be included in a trade agreement. U.S. policy is to insist upon the 
inclusion o f dispute settlement procedures for investment disputes involving U.S. nationals in all bilateral
38. The doctrine first stated by the Argentine Jurist, Carlos Calvo, provides strictu sensu that a government is not 
bound to indemnify aliens for losses or injuries sustained by them in consequence of domestic disturbances or civil 
war, where the state is not at fault, and that therefore foreign states are not justified in intervening, by force or 
otherwise, to secure the settlement of claims of their nationals on account of such losses or injuries. See Black’s 
Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, 1990, p. 205. The doctrine has become associated with a general prohibition against 
international dispute settlement procedures in disputes involving private parties.
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investment agreements.39 It should be noted, however, that the investment provisions o f the CUSFTA 
are specifically excluded from the dispute settlement provisions o f that agreement.
An Integrative Role fo r  Dispute Settlement
The question has been raised whether a common hemispheric system o f dispute settlement might 
promote integration among subregional trade associations such as the ANCOM, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, 
CACM, and NAFTA, and therefore play a catalytic role in the evolution toward a WHFTA.
As the discussion in this paper rests on the premise that dispute settlement procedures must be 
appropriate to the agreements they interpret and apply, there would seem to be little point in creating a 
general dispute settlement mechanism in the absence o f an agreement with substantive rules governing 
trade between the parties. It is, o f course, possible that the countries o f the hemisphere may wish to have 
a hemispheric dispute settlement procedure applying the law of the GATT among themselves. However, 
such an arrangement would appear to offer few, if any, advantages and many disadvantages. The primary 
disadvantage is the absence o f any convincing rationale for the interposition o f a level o f dispute 
settlement applying GATT law between the GATT itself and the various subregional trade agreements.
While a general international trade dispute settlement mechanism for the hemisphere probably 
should await the conclusion o f a substantive hemispheric trade agreement, it may be worth considering 
whether some kind o f arrangement for international arbitral review of the application o f national trade laws 
could usefully precede the conclusion of a general hemisphere-wide agreement. This arrangement would 
involve a procedure similar to that employed under Chapter Nineteen of the CUSFTA.
The Chapter Nineteen mechanism applies only to antidumping and countervailing duty measures. 
A hemispheric arrangement would likewise apply to national antidumping and countervailing duty 
measures, but could also apply to other measures taken under national laws that affect international trade 
or investment. These would include safeguards and customs issues, as well as trade-related intellectual 
property, investment, and services issues.
The primary objective of such a system would be to insure that national laws that affect the 
interests o f other trading partners in the hemisphere would be applied fairly and impartially. A secondary 
objective would be to insure that non-nationals would obtain expeditious settlement of claims that national 
administrative measures were applied against them in a manner inconsistent with the applicable national 
laws. These objectives— access to neutral, binational, or multinational panels that would ensure that 
national laws covering certain subject matters are applied to non-nationals fairly, objectively, 
expeditiously, and without domestic political influences— would, of course represent a major change from 
the way domestic judicial systems currently work. Although the idea is radical, its results could be very 
beneficial in promoting the kinds of basic changes in their economic and political structures that many 
Latin American governments and other constituencies appear to be seeking.
The national administrative structures would, at least in principle, be left undisturbed by such an 
arrangement. Although their work would be subject to review by binational or multinational tribunals,
39. See Jesswald W. Salacuse, “BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on 
Developing Countries” in XXIV The International Lawyer 1990, 665, pp. 672-673.
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it would doubtless have a very significant impact on the way national authorities applied their laws in 
matters that affected the interests of non-nationals. What would be changed, and substantially so, would 
be the judicial systems, since national judicial systems would lose their jurisdiction over all cases dealing 
with certain matters involving non-nationals.
The greatest advantage of such a system is that it would greatly increase confidence among 
investors, traders, service providers, and other foreign business interests and thereby promote increased 
participation by foreign interests in Latin American economic development. Concerns about lack o f due 
process and impartial consideration o f claims under the existing administrative and judicial systems have 
had some chilling effect on investment and trade. The system proposed here could help to relieve those 
doubts.
Another advantage is that it would bring together trade officials, lawyers, judges, and consultants 
and familiarize them with the legal and administrative structures and modes o f operation in other 
countries. Such a process could lead over the long term toward some harmonization of administrative and 
judicial cultures o f the hemisphere.
O f course, some measure o f harmonization of administrative law would have to precede the 
establishment of such a system, as there would need to be some rough equivalence in the powers of 
judicial review among countries participating in the hemispheric review system. Country A would not 
be prepared to subject measures adopted under its national administrative procedures to binational or 
multinational review at the instance o f a foreign national from Country B, unless the relationship between 
Country B ’s administration and judicial system would make a similar review of measures adopted under 
Country B ’s national administrative procedures a meaningful process.
Chapter Nineteen of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides that the 
Mexican administrative system for applying antidumping and countervailing duty measures, as well as the 
system for providing judicial review of such administrative decisions, will undergo a radical change in 
order to make the Mexican system susceptible to the dispute settlement procedures adapted from Chapter 
Nineteen on the CUSFTA.40 It is possible that some Latin American countries will be less interested in 
making these kinds of sweeping changes in their administrative and judicial systems in order to have 
access to such a procedure. This may, in particular, be the case for countries such as those o f the southern 
cone, whose economies are less strongly linked with the U.S. than are the economies o f Central America 
and the Caribbean.
Nationals of some Latin American countries may have more confidence in the administrative and 
judicial procedures o f the U.S. and Canada than vice-versa, and therefore may not believe that a system 
of hemispheric arbitral review would advance their interests. However, it is not impossible that the 
business communities in Latin America will see in such a system a means of opening and reforming their 
own administrative and judicial systems.
Obviously, the idea is radical in its implications for change in the hemisphere and will need further 
study and discussion before it can be determined whether it has any potential appeal for governments.
40. See NAFTA Art. 1904.15 and Annex 1904.15, Schedule of Mexico.
259
T ra d e  L ib e ra liza t io n  in  th e  W estern  H em isp h e re
If  the idea proves to have merit, it would be prudent to begin by adopting the system for some 
specific, rather narrow subject matter such as antidumping and countervailing duty measures. As the 
current mechanism of frontier barriers such as high tariffs, quotas, and licensing systems are abolished or 
reduced, the countries o f Latin America are bound to turn to measures o f contingent protection such as 
antidumping, countervailing duties, safeguard measures, or all three. The imposition o f such measures 
will probably bring them into conflict with other trading parties. The countries of the hemisphere might 
therefore soon find themselves in a situation where a Chapter Nineteen-type mechanism would have 
considerable attraction. The process of negotiation o f an agreement to put in place a system of 
hemispheric arbitral review would itself have a very beneficial effect in terms o f educating lawyers, 
officials, and businessmen about other countries’ administrative and legal systems.
Before undertaking active consideration of such a system, other countries in the hemisphere will 
no doubt wish to observe how the Chapter Nineteen mechanism o f the NAFTA is applied and functions 
in and for Mexico.
Latin American nationalist concerns related to the Calvo Doctrine are bound to be aroused by this 
idea and may well be sufficiently strong to defeat it. It is also possible that the U.S. will not be willing 
to concede to the other countries o f the hemisphere the kind o f arrangement it has offered its two closest 
neighbors.
Conclusion
Dispute settlement mechanisms in existing subregional and bilateral trade agreements in the 
hemisphere differ markedly in terms of their compulsory and binding character. In general, the level of 
obligation the parties owe to the dispute settlement procedure appears to reflect the level o f the economic 
integration sought under the various agreements. The failure to date o f the various Latin American and 
Caribbean integration movements to achieve their ambitious goals does not appear to be attributable to 
the absence of suitable dispute settlement mechanisms.
If and when the countries o f the hemisphere decide to enter into a hemispheric free trade 
agreement, the dispute settlement mechanisms they adopt will no doubt be appropriate to the level of 
integration they seek. The dispute settlement mechanism will probably be the most important o f the 
supranational institutions operating under such an agreement, because the U.S. is unlikely to agree to 
surrender sovereignty to either an international secretariat or an intergovernmental legislative body in 
which it can be outvoted by the other parties to an agreement. It has, however, agreed to various forms 
o f neutral objective dispute settlement by bi- or multinational tribunals, o f which the Canada-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) is the most relevant to this study. A carefully constructed and effective 
dispute settlement mechanism may be the most promising of the various institutions that could help 
equalize disparate economic influence in hemispheric relations and promote the development of 
supranational legal regimes governing trade and other economic relations among the countries o f the 
Western Hemisphere.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE FREE TRADE AND UNITED STATES TRADE LAWS:
THE ROLE OF SECTION 301
Steven L. Husted
Introduction
A Western Hemisphere free trade area confronts its negotiators with many challenges, chief 
among them whether and how to handle existing United States trade laws that could affect trade relations 
between the U.S. and the other WHFTA countries even after an agreement is reached. One such law is 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. It authorizes the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to negotiate, 
under threat of trade retaliation, the reduction of foreign-government-imposed impediments to trade.
The use of this law, dubbed "aggressive unilateralism" by some trade policy experts, has 
increased in the past decade, prompted by the United States Congress, which supports strengthening 
various elements of the statute. Guatemala was the target of the first Section 301 case filed in 1975. 
Through early 1992, nine more cases were initiated against Latin American countries, and several are 
still in progress. In addition, in the first year of a supplementary 301 provision known as Super 301, the 
government of Brazil was branded as one of only three priority countries for market access negotiations, 
and an additional 301 case was initiated by the USTR.
The increased use of Section 301 has been a source of conflict and controversy in the international 
community. Actions taken under this law are often perceived as an unreasonable intrusion into national 
trade policies.1 One of Canada’s chief goals during the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) 
talks was to gain special exclusion from certain trade laws, including Section 301.
What Canada achieved was the creation of a dispute settlement mechanism designed to achieve 
expeditious and fair resolution to disagreements. This mechanism offers several approaches to dispute 
settlement including consultations, mediation, binding arbitration, and recourse to outside experts and 
panels. The negotiators of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) agreed to a similar 
format.
The existence of the CUSFTA dispute settlement mechanism, however, in no way supersedes the 
authority granted to the USTR. There have already been two 301 cases filed against Canada since the 
trade agreement between the two countries was signed, and one resulted in trade retaliation. A third case 
was resolved using the new dispute mechanism.
Section 301 has been discussed in other forums. Most recently, the European Community (EC) 
targeted Section 301 for negotiation in the Uruguay Round.2 U.S. negotiators warned that Congress 
would refuse to ratify any agreement that limited the provision.
1. See Moreira (1990) for an example of the Brazilian view of Section 301.
2. See Julie Wolf, "EC seeks removal of U.S. trade law as part of accord," The Wall Street Journal, November 
5, 1991, pg. A14, column 3.
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It is conceivable that, absent an agreement to the contrary within a WHFTA pact, the use of 
Section 301 against WHFTA countries will increase. First, if the WHFTA negotiations are successful, 
then trade will rise and U.S. direct foreign investment will almost certainly expand in the WHFTA 
countries. As this happens, U.S. firms will undoubtedly experience problems that cause them to seek 
remedies under Section 301. The greater the amount of trade at stake, the more likely is the U.S. 
government to respond to political pressure to pursue the case. Moreover, if the agreement is successful 
in expanding Latin American exports to the United States, then U.S. trade negotiators will enjoy 
increased leverage in any future negotiations over bilateral disputes. With greater leverage comes the 
likelihood of additional complaints.
Finally, given the likelihood that the current Uruguay Round will fail to produce an agreement 
on lowering various nontariff barriers, there will be even more pressure by the United States Congress 
and various exporter groups to seek to lower barriers within the context of regional trade agreements. 
If unsuccessful in such talks, then the only recourse may be the unilateral use of Section 301. Thus, there 
are good reasons for the WHFTA countries to consider the impact of the completion of a WHFTA pact 
on the use of Section 301.
This paper will examine the role of Section 301 in trade relations between the other countries of 
the WHFTA and the United States, and it will discuss and analyze options available to these other 
countries with respect to this law. It will also review the history of Section 301 with reference to disputes 
between the United States and other WHFTA countries, study the Canada-U.S. approach to dispute 
settlement, and propose some options for WHFTA.
Section 301 as an Instrument of U.S. Trade Policy
Definition o f  the Statute and Administrative Procedures
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and 
again by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, provides broad authority to the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) to negotiate the elimination of any act, policy, or practice of a 
foreign government that is viewed to be (a) inconsistent with the provisions of, or otherwise denies the 
United States benefits under, any trade agreement; or (b) an unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory 
burden or restriction on U.S. commerce. Should negotiations fail to produce the desired result, then the 
USTR has authority under this statute to retaliate against those practices by imposing trade sanctions or 
by ordering the suspension or withdrawal of U.S. trade concessions.
The statute was first incorporated into U.S. trade law in order to provide a mechanism for giving 
American firms access to the consultation and dispute settlement mechanisms of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).3 Since that time the law has been changed to go well beyond trade 
disputes covered by GATT. For instance, according to the law in its present form, U.S. commerce 
includes international trade in goods or services as well as foreign direct investments by U.S. citizens that 
have implications for trade in goods or services.
3. For more on the relationship between Section 301 and the GATT dispute settlement process, see Feketekuty 
(1990).
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The law also details the types of policies, acts, or practices the USTR is directed to see 
eliminated. "Unjustifiable" practices are those that violate or are inconsistent with U.S. international 
rights. "Discriminatory" practices are those that deny most-favored-nation treatment to U.S. commerce. 
The term "unreasonable" refers to acts, policies, or practices that are not necessarily illegal or 
inconsistent with U.S. international legal rights but are viewed as being unfair. Examples of such 
practices identified in the 1988 amendment to Section 301 include (a) denial of investment or trade 
opportunities; (b) denial of adequate protection of intellectual property rights; (c) tolerance of systematic 
anticompetitive activities by foreign firms; (d) foreign export targeting; and (e) foreign practices deemed 
to be antilabor, such as (i) laws restricting the rights of labor unions to organize or bargain collectively, 
(ii) laws allowing child or forced labor, and (iii) failure by governments to provide standards for 
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational health and safety.
A 301 case begins in one of two ways. It may start with a petition filed with the USTR 
requesting action and setting forth allegations in support of the request. The USTR has 45 days to decide 
whether to initiate an investigation. The alternative is that the USTR may initiate an investigation, either 
on his or her own or at the direction of the President of the United States.
The statute spells out several deadlines for possible action. At the outset of an investigation, the 
USTR is required to request consultations with the foreign country regarding the issues of the case. The 
goal of these consultations is the negotiation of a binding agreement to eliminate the practice or policy 
that interferes with U.S. commerce, or agreement of the foreign country to provide compensation, 
preferably to the U.S. sector that was originally harmed by the policy or practice. If the foreign country 
is a signatory with the United States of a trade agreement such as GATT or the CUSFTA, and 
consultations do not produce an agreement at the end of the consultation period specified in the 
agreement, or after 150 days from the start of the consultations, whichever is shorter, then the matter is 
to be taken to formal dispute settlement procedures provided under the agreement.
Regardless of whether or not formal dispute settlement is involved, the USTR has a clear deadline 
for announcing determinations regarding the grounds for action and the actions to be taken in the event 
that consultations fail. In cases involving formal dispute settlement, the deadline is the earlier of the 30 
days after the end of dispute settlement proceedings or 18 months after the initiation of the investigation. 
In most other cases the deadline is 12 months after the case is initiated, except for cases involving an 
allegation of the denial of intellectual property rights protection, where the deadline is six months after 
initiation. Any actions taken by the United States against recalcitrant foreign governments usually must 
be imposed within 30 days of the USTR’s announcement, although delays are possible.
Under the most recent provisions of the act, retaliation is required if the USTR determines that 
U.S. rights under a trade agreement are being denied or that foreign practices are unjustifiable and a 
burden or restriction on U.S. commerce. Retaliation can take several forms including suspension or 
withdrawal of trade concessions, imposition of duties, or other trade restrictions.
Exceptions to mandated action include cases where the United States has received an unfavorable 
determination or ruling under GATT or other trade agreement dispute settlement process, cases where 
the USTR determines that the foreign country is taking steps to eliminate the problem or provide 
compensation, and cases where retaliation would adversely affect the economy or national security of the 
United States.
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If the USTR determines that foreign practices are unreasonable or discriminatory, then mandatory 
action is not required. However, according to the law, the USTR is to take "all appropriate and feasible 
action" to eliminate the offending policy or practice. Again, the statute provides the USTR with the 
authority to impose retaliation or to suspend or withdraw trade concessions.
History o f  Section 301 Cases
Through early 1992, 88 Section 301 cases have been initiated by the USTR.4 Table 1 provides 
some details of each of these cases. The first Section 301 case was filed on July 1, 1975, against the 
Government of Guatemala on behalf of Delta Steamship Lines, Inc., which complained that Guatemala 
discriminated against foreign shippers when it required that certain cargoes shipped to Guatemala be 
carried on Guatemalan vessels. Negotiations between the petitioner and the National Shipping Line of 
Guatemala produced an agreement and the case was terminated in the summer of 1976.
Asian countries have been the most important target of Section 301: 13 cases have been initiated 
against Japan; eight against Korea; six against Taiwan; four against India; three against Thailand; and two 
against China. European countries have been the second most important target of Section 301 cases.5 
Twenty-nine cases have been initiated against one or more countries of the EC. In addition, Austria, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the former U.S.S.R. have each been involved in separate Section 301 
actions.
Countries of Latin America are the third most frequent target of Section 301 actions, with eleven 
cases since 1975. In addition to the Guatemalan case described above, Brazil and Argentina have each 
been involved in five Section 301 cases.6 Canada is the only other country to have been charged in 
Section 301 actions: it has been involved in eight cases.7
The use of Section 301 rose dramatically during the Reagan administration, due in part to a 
switch in trade policy in 1985. At that time, the United States had been experiencing record trade deficits 
for several years and the U.S. Congress demanded increased protection. To counter these demands, 
President Reagan announced a new policy that called for international macroeconomic policy coordination 
to facilitate a decrease in the value of the dollar, which at that time was rising in value. The new policy
4. This total includes both standard and self-initiated Section 301 actions as well as self-initiated Super 301 and 
Special 301 initiatives. In the country totals that follow, one case (Case #10) is included in both the EC and the 
Japanese totals.
5. Three of the cases filed against Japan (Cases #74-#76) and two of the cases filed against India (Cases #77-#78) 
were self-initiated by the USTR as part of the Super 301 exercise mandated by legislation included in the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
6. One of the cases initiated against Brazil (Case #73) was part of the Super 301 initiative.
7. One of these cases (Case #58) did not involve bilateral consultations. Rather, the case grew out of a settlement 
between the United States and Canada over subsidized softwood lumber exports to the United States. In this case, 
the Section 301 statute enabled the President to impose a tariff on softwood lumber imports from Canada. This 
tariff was then immediately repealed when Canada instituted a pre-negotiated export tariff on the product. For more 
on this case, see below. Two cases (Cases #80 and #87) have been initiated since the formation of the CUSTA.
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urged American firms to take greater advantage of measures available to them to fight "unfair" trade in 
American markets by pursuing antidumping or countervailing duty cases, and it promised that the U.S. 
government would make more vigorous use of Section 301 in order to open foreign markets to U.S. 
goods.
To demonstrate its commitment to this change in policy, the government initiated several Section 
301 cases, including cases against Japan, Korea, and Brazil. By initiating these cases, the government 
confirmed that it had an interest in achieving a successful resolution to these disputes, thereby raising the 
stakes in the negotiating process. These were the first cases ever initiated by the USTR. Since 1985, 
19 more have been self-initiated, and such cases now account for 25 percent of all Section 301 actions.
Several of the most recent self-initiations have come because the Section 301 statute has been 
strengthened in recent trade legislation. In 1989, under the Super 301 provisions of the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the USTR announced that it had identified several practices of three 
countries, Japan, Brazil, and India, that burdened or restricted U.S. commerce.8 These practices included 
barriers to foreign investment and foreign insurance sales by India, import licensing practices of Brazil, 
and the Japanese government’s procurement practices that affected U.S. exports of supercomputers and 
satellites. The passage and subsequent implementation of Super 301 lead to considerable outcry from 
U.S. trading partners, who viewed these actions as violations of international law.9 Indeed, none of the 
three countries identified as "unfair" traders agreed, at first, to even enter into negotiations with the 
United States.
All three sets of cases have now been resolved, although the role played by Super 301 in 
achieving these results is questionable. For instance, in May 1990 the USTR, Carla Hills, announced 
that, due to dramatic changes in Brazilian trade policy instituted by the newly elected government, she 
was terminating the case against Brazil. Several cases against Japan were terminated in June 1990, 
following the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements and the completion of the Structural Impediments 
Initiative talks. Hills also terminated the two Super 301 cases against India in June 1990, announcing 
that issues involving investment and services were being negotiated in the Uruguay Round.
Another provision of the 1988 trade bill has led to additional self-initiations. This provision, 
known as Special 301, requires that the USTR identify countries that fail to provide adequate protection 
of intellectual property rights. On May 1, 1991, Hills initiated Special 301 cases against India and the 
Peoples’ Republic of China.
Cases Involving Latin America
Latin America’s experience with Section 301 has for the most part been limited to U.S. trade 
disputes with Argentina or Brazil. Several of these cases have been quite contentious, and ultimately
8. Korea and Taiwan escaped being also named as priority countries by agreeing at the eleventh hour to reduce 
certain trade barriers affecting U.S. exports.
9. For a critical appraisal of Section 301 and Super 301, see Bhagwati (1990). For a defense of these policies, see 
Feketekuty (1990).
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produced no resolution and led to U.S. retaliation. This section describes several of the Latin American 
Section 301 cases in greater detail.
Case #24: Argentine Hides. In October 1981 the (U.S.) National Tanners’ Council (NTC) filed 
a petition with the USTR alleging a breach by Argentina of the 1979 U.S.-Argentina 
hides agreement. It called for U.S. concessions on imports of corned beef and cheese 
and reduced U.S. tariffs on Argentine cattle-hide leather. In return, Argentina agreed 
to convert its export ban on cattle hides into an export tariff (initially at 20%) and to 
begin a series of reductions in that tariff to eliminate it by October 1981. The NTC 
argued that Argentina had failed to institute the final two reductions in the tariff. They 
also charged Argentina with maintaining a minimum export price on hides greater than 
the transaction price and assessing the export tax on the higher price, thereby raising an 
additional barrier to the export of Argentine hides.
The effect of these practices, the NTC argued, was to give Argentine tanners an artificially cheap 
source of raw cattle hides and thus an unfair advantage in U.S. and third-country markets. The USTR 
initiated an investigation of the case in November 1981 and consulted with the Argentine government on 
two different occasions. The talks did not produce any agreement, and in October 1982, President 
Reagan terminated the hides agreement and increased the U.S. tariff on leather imports.
Case #49: Brazil Informatics. In September 1985, as part of the new trade policy initiative of 
President Reagan, the USTR self-initiated a Section 301 case against the informatics 
policies of Brazil.10 The case was begun in reaction to a 1984 Brazilian law that codified 
and extended policies followed since the 1970s to promote a national informatics 
industry. The USTR listed four elements of the informatics law as targets for 
elimination: a market reserve policy that restricts production and sales of certain products 
to Brazilian firms; administrative burdens including lengthy inspections of imported goods 
or the denial of their entry into the Brazilian market; prohibition of foreign investment 
in certain informatics sectors; and failure to provide intellectual property rights protection 
for foreign computer software. The USTR estimated in its initial documentation of the 
case that the Brazilian policy had imposed annual lost sales of $340-$450 million on U.S. 
makers of computer hardware and software.
Following four fruitless bilateral discussions, President Reagan determined that the Brazilian 
informatics policy was "unreasonable" in October 1986. At that time, he order the USTR to notify 
GATT of the U.S. intention to suspend tariff concessions for Brazil and to effect such suspension when 
appropriate. However, he postponed ordering retaliation and continued the case until December 30. In 
December, the USTR suspended the case with respect to market reserve and administrative burdens on 
imports, citing improvements in Brazil on these matters. However, President Reagan threatened 
retaliation within six months should continued negotiations fail to achieve progress on intellectual property 
protection and on investment issues.
10. Informatics refers to those industries that incorporate digital technology, including computers, computer parts, 
communications switching equipment, instruments, process controls, optical and electronic components, and 
computer software.
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On June 30, 1987, the USTR suspended that portion of the case dealing with intellectual property 
rights protection based on Brazilian legislative action toward enactment of a bill that would provide 
copyrights to computer software. By November, however, misunderstandings re-emerged and the 
negotiations again collapsed. The President announced his intention to prohibit the import of Brazilian 
informatics products and to raise duties (to 100%) on $105 million of other Brazilian products. But 
before retaliation was implemented the Brazilian legislature enacted a new software copyright law. In 
February 1988, retaliation was indefinitely postponed. Later that year, the USTR announced that it did 
not wish to pursue retaliation, although it would continue to monitor Brazilian practices toward U.S. 
firms.
Case #53: Argentina Soybeans and Soybean Products. In April 1986, the (U.S.) National 
Soybean Processors Association (NSPA) filed a petition against the practices of the 
Argentine government with respect to its system of export taxes on soybeans and soybean 
products. The complaint raised by NSPA was over the differential in the export taxes 
assessed against raw soybeans and processed soybean products; in 1986 the export tax 
on soybeans was 28.5 percent and 16.5 percent on soybean oil and meal. NSPA argued 
that the higher tax on raw soybeans discouraged their export and artificially lowered their 
price inside Argentina. This, NSPA maintained, provided an implicit subsidy to soybean 
processors and represented a major factor for the declining share of U.S. products in 
third-country markets. The goal of the NSPA petition was a reduction in the differential.
The U.S. soybean growers association also supported the NSPA petition and urged the 
USTR to take a position in its negotiations that the differential should be removed by 
raising the lower of the two taxes to the higher level.
Following bilateral consultations, President Reagan suspended the investigation in May 1987, 
when Argentina assured the United States that it was planning to eliminate its export taxes. In February 
1988, Argentina reduced the differential by 3 percent. However, later that year Argentina instituted a 
tax rebate scheme on soybean product exports, and consultations were resumed. The tax rebate scheme 
was suspended in December 1988. As of early 1992, the export tax differential was still in place, 
standing at 6 percent; the USTR continues to consult with Argentina periodically over its policies toward 
its soybean processing industry.
Case #61: Brazil Pharmaceuticals. In June 1987, the (U.S.) Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association (PMA) filed a petition complaining of Brazil’s lack of process and patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals. In particular, pharmaceutical products had not been 
patentable since 1945 and processes were excluded from patent protection in 1969. The 
PMA claimed in their petition that this lack of protection enables pirate producers to 
import and/or copy raw materials as well as finished products without the burden of 
covering the cost of innovation. As an additional hindrance to foreign producers, in 
some cases Brazil restricted imports of foreign products when domestic pirated products 
were available in the local market, banned foreign investment that would compete with 
Brazilian-owned pharmaceutical companies, and placed strict price controls on many 
drugs. The PMA estimated that the cost of these policies in terms of lost exports over 
the period 1979-1986 stood at $204 million.
The USTR initiated an investigation in July 1987 and requested bilateral consultations. Talks 
were not held until the following February, and they achieved no progress on the issue. In July 1988,
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President Reagan declared Brazil’s policy to be unreasonable and a burden on U.S. commerce. In 
October 1988, retaliatory 100-percent ad valorem tariffs were imposed on $39 million worth of Brazilian 
exports to the United States, including certain paper products, nonbenzenoid drugs, and consumer 
electronics. In June 1990, the Brazilian government announced that it would seek legislation to provide 
patent protection for pharmaceutical products and the process of their production. One day later, the 
USTR announced that it would terminate the application of retaliatory duties on Brazilian goods. In May 
1991, the USTR reported that although the Brazilian government had submitted patent legislation to its 
congress, the proposed law contained certain deficiencies.
These four cases illustrate many interesting points about Section 301 trade policy. First, it is not 
surprising that major trade disputes have arisen between the United States and Brazil and Argentina. 
These latter two countries are major markets in Latin America, and until recently they have followed 
import-substitution development policies that adversely affect U.S. exports. In addition, these countries 
share comparative advantage with the United States in certain agricultural products. Policy changes by 
any one of the three that affect its agricultural exports could influence the markets for the others. Thus 
the policy emphasis of the United States has been on these countries.
Second, the scope of actions that can bring on a case goes well beyond GATT-proscribed 
activities. Indeed, none of these cases involved claims of GATT violations, and none led to the use of 
the GATT dispute settlement mechanism. Two of the cases, Brazil Informatics and Brazil 
Pharmaceuticals, did involve disputes over investment and intellectual property rights issues wherein 
international codes of conduct are currently being negotiated in the Uruguay Round. Thus, the use of 
Section 301 in these instances demonstrates the increasing willingness of the United States to anticipate 
the results of the GATT negotiations by writing its own rules of "acceptable" conduct in these aspects 
of trade policy and attempting to force compliance of these rules on other countries.
The Argentina Soybeans case illustrates that the United States is fully prepared to dictate rules 
to other countries that it routinely violates at home; its chief complaint was the differential export tariff 
imposed by Argentina. This tariff clearly conforms to the principle of maintaining positive effective rates 
of protection on higher value-added goods; a practice identical in effect to escalating import tariffs by 
stages of processing. Such tariff escalation is common in the United States.11
The Argentina Soybeans case is interesting for several other reasons. It illustrates the lack of 
economic analysis that goes into the construction of a case or the decision to initiate an investigation. 
In particular, recall that the case involved a claim that Argentina’s export tariff system helped contribute 
to a loss of U.S. market share in third-country markets. Clearly, if Argentine producers were able to 
undersell U.S. firms despite having to pay a 16.5 percent export tariff, it seems only logical that the 
Argentines would have an even greater market share in the absence of such taxes. Even if the doubtful 
analysis of NSPA had theoretical merit, the USTR initiated an investigation without any empirical 
evidence of a relationship between Argentine tariff policies and world market conditions. Indeed, the law 
does not require that any such evidence ever be provided by petitioners in the case.
In addition, the case illustrates the ability of powerful sectors in the U.S. economy to influence 
U.S. policy. Indeed, the support of the soybean growers’ lobby for this case rested on a U.S. negotiating
11. See, for example, Table 6.7 in Husted and Melvin (1990, pg. 178).
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t a r g e t  o f  c lo s in g  t h e  t a r i f f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  b y  r a i s in g  th e  l o w e r  o f  t h e  t w o  t a r i f f s ,  t h u s  m a k i n g  " v o l u n t a r y "  
e x p o r t  r e s t r a i n t  a n  u n s t a t e d  b u t  c l e a r  g o a l  o f  t h e  p e t i t i o n .  T h e i r  d i r e c t i o n  g u i d e d  s o m e  o f  t h e  e a r l y  g o a l s  
o f  t h e  b i l a t e r a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n s .  I t  is  i r o n i c ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  t h e  u l t i m a t e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  c a s e  t h r o u g h  th e  
l o w e r i n g  o f  t h e  e x p o r t  t a x e s  ( a n d  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t i a l )  c l e a r l y  h e lp e d  t h e  A r g e n t in e  e c o n o m y  a n d  h u r t  b o t h  
e le m e n t s  ( g r o w e r s  a n d  p r o c e s s o r s )  o f  t h e  U . S .  s o y b e a n  i n d u s t r y .
T h e  e x a m p l e s  a b o v e  i l l u s t r a t e  o n e  f i n a l  p o i n t  c o n c e r n in g  U . S .  t r a d e  p o l i c y .  T h e  i s s u e s  r a i s e d  b y  
t h e  U . S .  g o v e r n m e n t  c l e a r l y  p r o d u c e d  a c r i m o n y  o n  b o t h  s id e s .  T h e  a tm o s p h e r e  s u r r o u n d i n g  th e  
d i s c u s s i o n s  h a s  b e e n  h e a t e d ,  w i t h  t h e  U . S .  s i d e  o f t e n  c la im in g  t h a t  p r o m is e s  t h a t  h a d  b e e n  m a d e  w e r e  
l a t e r  b r o k e n .  I n  t h e s e  c a s e s ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  h a s  b e e n  w i l l i n g  to  r a i s e  t h e  s t a k e s  i n  t h e  d i s p u t e  b y  s e l f -  
i n i t i a t i n g  c a s e s ;  i t  h a s  r e p e a t e d l y  t h r e a t e n e d  r e t a l i a t i o n  a n d  h a s  i m p o s e d  i t  o n  s e v e r a l  o c c a s i o n s .  I t  h a s  
r e f u s e d  to  a l l o w  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  s u c h  a s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  e c o n o m ic  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  t o  s e r v e  a s  
a n  e x c u s e  f o r  p o l i c i e s  i t  c o n s i d e r s  u n f a i r .
Economic Analysis of Section 301
D e s p i t e  i t s  r e c e n t  p r o m in e n c e  a s  a  m a j o r  t o o l  o f  U . S .  t r a d e  p o l i c y ,  r e l a t i v e ly  l i t t l e  t h e o r e t i c a l  o r  
e m p i r i c a l  a n a l y s i s  h a s  b e e n  d e v o te d  to  t h e  t o p ic .  O n e  e x c e p t i o n  is  M c M i l l a n  ( 1 9 9 0 )  w h o  a r g u e s  t h a t  b o t h  
t h e  d i s t r i b u t i v e  a n d  t h e  e f f i c ie n c y  im p a c ts  o f  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  c a n  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  in  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  a  s im p le  
g a m e  o f  d i v i d i n g  a  d o l l a r . 12 S u p p o s e  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  t w o  b a r g a i n e r s ,  A  a n d  B ,  w h o  s e e k  to  d i v i d e  $1  
b e t w e e n  t h e m .  I f  t h e y  a g r e e ,  A  r e c e iv e s  z ,  w h i c h  h e  v a lu e s  a t  r z  ( r > 0 )  w h i l e  B  r e c e iv e s  1 -z ,  w h i c h  B  
v a lu e s  a t  1 -z .  B a r g a i n i n g  p r o c e e d s  i n  s e q u e n c e ,  w i t h  A  m a k i n g  a n  o f f e r ,  f o l l o w e d  b y  a  c o u n t e r o f f e r  f r o m  
B  i f  B  r e j e c t s  t h e  f i r s t .  T h e  p r o c e s s  o f  a l t e r n a t in g  o f f e r s  c a n  c o n t i n u e  in d e f i n i t e ly ;  h o w e v e r ,  a t  e a c h  s te p  
t h e r e  i s  a  s m a l l  b u t  n o n z e r o  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  b a r g a i n i n g  m ig h t  b r e a k  d o w n  f o r e v e r .  S h o u l d  t h a t  o c c u r ,  
t h e n  t h e  f a l l b a c k  l e v e l s  o f  u t i l i t y  f o r  A  a n d  B  a r e  f a a n d  f b r e s p e c t iv e l y .
I f  e a c h  p l a y e r  is  f u l ly  r a t i o n a l  i n  h i s  e x p e c ta t io n s  a b o u t  t h e  b e h a v i o r  o f  t h e  o t h e r  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n  
o n  b o t h  s i d e s  is  p e r f e c t ,  t h e n  t h e  u n i q u e  e q u i l i b r iu m  o u tc o m e  to  t h i s  g a m e  is  t h a t  A  r e c e iv e s  a  p a y o f f  o f  
[ r  +  f a -  r f b] / r 2  a n d  B  r e c e iv e s  [1 +  fb - ( f a/ r ) ] / 2 .  A s  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  t o  t h i s  g a m e  c l e a r l y  i l l u s t r a t e s ,  e a c h  
b a r g a i n e r ’s  p a y o f f  r i s e s  t h e  l a r g e r  h i s  o w n  f a l l b a c k  p o s i t i o n  a n d  f a l l s  t h e  l a r g e r  h i s  o p p o n e n t ’s .  I n  o t h e r  
w o r d s ,  t h e  o p t io n s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  t h e  c o l l a p s e  o f  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a f f e c t  t h e  t e r m s  o f  t h e  a g r e e m e n t .  
T h i s  i l l u s t r a t e s  h o w  t h e  r e t a l i a t i o n  a u th o r i t y  p r o v i d e d  to  t h e  U S T R  b y  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  is  d e s i g n e d  t o  im p r o v e  
t h e  n e g o t i a t i n g  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s .  T h a t  i s ,  r e t a l i a t i o n  b y  c o u n t r y  A  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  a  c o l l a p s e  
i n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w o u l d  l o w e r  fb, i m p r o v i n g  A ’s  b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  c o u n t e r r e t a l i a t i o n  b y  B  
w o u l d  l o w e r  f a a n d  A ’s  u l t i m a t e  p a y o f f .  A s  t h e  m o d e l  a l s o  c l e a r l y  s h o w s ,  t h e  m o r e  A  v a lu e s  i t s  p a y o f f  
f r o m  t h e  g a m e  ( i . e . ,  t h e  l a r g e r  t h e  v a lu e  o f  r ) ,  t h e  s t r o n g e r  is  A ’s  b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n .
T h e s e  d y n a m i c s  h e lp  u s  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  s o m e  im p l i c a t io n s  a b o u t  t h e  u s e  o f  S e c t i o n  3 0 1 .  F i r s t ,  t h e  
r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  c a s e s  t h a t  h a v e  b e e n  a im e d  a t  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  
s e v e r a l  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  o f  A s i a  c o u ld  w e l l  b e  d u e  to  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  e x p o r t  a  
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  s h a r e  o f  t h e i r  o u t p u t  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s .  T h u s ,  U . S .  r e t a l i a t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  
w o u l d  c l e a r l y  d a m a g e  t h e i r  f a l l b a c k  p o s i t i o n s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  l im i t e d  a b i l i t y  to  
c o u n t e r r e t a l i a t e  c r e d i b l y  a g a i n s t  U . S .  c o m m e r c e .  T h u s ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  k n o w s  g o i n g  i n to  t h e  d i s p u t e  
t h a t  i t  i s  b a r g a i n i n g  f r o m  a  p o s i t i o n  o f  s t r e n g th  a n d  is  p r e p a r e d  to  u s e  i t  t o  a c h i e v e  i ts  g o a l s .  T h e  m o d e l
12. M cM illan  attributes this gam e to Binm ore, Rubenstein, and W olinsky (1986).
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a ls o  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  is  l ik e l y  t o  b e  m o s t  s u c c e s s f u l  i f  i t  p i c k s  t a r g e t s  w h e r e  t h e  c o s t  to  
f o r e i g n e r s  o f  e n d in g  t h e  p r a c t i c e  is  r e l a t i v e ly  s m a l l .  A s  M c M i l l a n  n o t e s ,  t h i s  c o u ld  l e a d  t o  n e g o t i a t e d  
b i l a t e r a l  s o l u t io n s  t h a t  d i v e r t  t r a d e  i n  f a v o r  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  r a t h e r  t h a n  t r u l y  o p e n in g  m a r k e t s  to  
g l o b a l  c o m p e t i t i o n . 13
A  m a j o r  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  t h e  m o d e l  d e s c r i b e d  a b o v e  is  t h a t  i n f o r m a t io n  is  p e r f e c t .  I n  r e a l  
s i t u a t i o n s ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h i s  is  u n l ik e l y  t o  b e  t h e  c a s e .  V a r i o u s  g a m e  t h e o r e t i c  m o d e l s  o f  b a r g a i n i n g  s h o w  
t h a t  w h e n  n e g o t i a t o r s  h a v e  p r i v a t e  i n f o r m a t io n ,  t h e  l ik e l ih o o d  r i s e s  o f  e i t h e r  a  b r e a k d o w n  i n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
o r  a n  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  l e n g t h  o f  t im e  r e q u i r e d  to  r e a c h  a  s o l u t io n .  T h i s  is  b e c a u s e  n e g o t i a t o r s  a t t e m p t  
t o  b e n e f i t  f r o m  t h e i r  p r i v a t e  i n f o r m a t io n .  T h u s ,  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  p r i v a t e l y  h e ld  i n f o r m a t i o n  m a y  l e a d  to  
a n  i n e f f i c i e n t  o u t c o m e ,  i n c l u d i n g  r e t a l i a t i o n .
T h e  m o s t  r e c e n t  t h e o r e t i c a l  w o r k  o n  S e c t io n  3 0 1 - ty p e  p o l i c y  m e c h a n i s m s  i s  b y  E a t o n  a n d  E n g e r s  
( 1 9 9 2 ) .  T h i s  p a p e r  d e s c r i b e s  h o w  t h r e a t s  a n d / o r  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s a n c t i o n s  a f f e c t  t h e  
b e h a v i o r  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  c o u n t r y .  M o r e  p r e c i s e ly ,  t h e  p a p e r  a s s u m e s  t h e  e x i s te n c e  o f  a  c o u n t r y ,  S ,  t h a t  
s e e k s  t o  e n c o u r a g e  a  c e r t a i n  l e v e l  o f  b e h a v i o r ,  a ,  o f  a n o th e r  c o u n t r y ,  T ,  b y  t h r e a t e n i n g  a n d  t h e n  p o s s i b l y  
im p o s in g  e c o n o m i c  s a n c t i o n s ,  s ,  o n  t h a t  c o u n t r y .  U t i l i t y  i n  S  ( i n  T )  is  a n  i n c r e a s in g  ( d e c r e a s in g )  f u n c t i o n  
o f  a .  U t i l i t y  i n  b o t h  is  d e c r e a s in g  in  s .  P a r t i e s  i n t e r a c t  b y  m a k i n g  a l t e r n a t e  m o v e s .  S  b e g in s  b y  
a n n o u n c i n g  a  d e s i r e d  l e v e l  o f  a  t h a t  i t  w a n t s  T  to  p u r s u e .  T  t h e n  d e c i d e s  w h e t h e r  i t  w i l l  c o m p l y .  T h e n  
S  d e c i d e s  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t o  im p o s e  s a n c t i o n s ,  a n d  s o  o n .
T h e r e  a r e  m a n y  p o s s ib l e  e q u i l i b r i a  t o  g a m e s  o f  t h e  s o r t  t h e  a u th o r s  e x p lo r e .  T h e y  f o c u s  o n  th e  
l im i t  o f  f i n i t e  h o r i z o n  e q u i l i b r i a  a n d  s h o w  th a t  e q u i l i b r i a  e x i s t  w h i c h  s u s t a i n  a  n a r r o w  r a n g e  o f  p o s s ib l e  
l e v e l s  o f  a c t i o n  b y  t h e  t a r g e t  c o u n t r y .  T h i s  r a n g e  c o u ld  i n c l u d e  z e r o  a c t i o n  a n d / o r  f u l l  c o m p l i a n c e .  T h e  
w i d t h  o f  t h e  r a n g e  d e p e n d s  u p o n  e a c h  p a r t y ’s t o u g h n e s s  i n  t e r m s  o f  i t s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  b e a r  t h e  c o s t  o f  
s a n c t i o n s .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  m o r e  p a t i e n t  is  a  p a r t y  a n d  th e  t o u g h e r  i t  i s ,  t h e  b e t t e r  i t  d o e s .  A s  w a s  t h e  
c a s e  w i t h  M c M i l l a n ’s  m o d e l ,  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  s a n c t i o n s  m a y  b e  m o s t  e f f e c t i v e  w h e n  t h e  t a r g e t ’s 
g a in s  f r o m  t r a d e  a r e  l a r g e  a n d  t h e  s e n d e r ’s s m a l l .  T h u s ,  S e c t io n  3 0 1  m a y  b e  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e  w h e n  a im e d  
a t  m a j o r  U . S .  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s  t h a n  a g a i n s t  c o u n t r i e s  s u c h  a s  I n d i a  t h a t  d o  n o t  t r a d e  e x t e n s i v e l y  w i t h  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a te s .
T h e  f e a t u r e  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  t h e  E a t o n  a n d  E n g e r s  m o d e l  f r o m  M c M i l l a n ’s is  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i n  t h e  
f o r m e r  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  s a n c t i o n s  l o w e r s  t h e  u t i l i t y  o f  t h e  s a n c t i o n s - i m p o s i n g  c o u n t r y .  T h i s  i s  c l e a r l y  
t h e  c a s e  i n  t h e  r e a l  w o r l d ,  w h e r e i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta te s  h a s  r e p e a t e d l y  d e m o n s t r a t e d  r e s t r a i n t  i n  i t s  u s e  o f  
S e c t i o n  3 0 1  s a n c t i o n s .  A s  n o t e d  a b o v e ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  h a s  o f t e n  b e e n  r e lu c t a n t  t o  im p o s e  s a n c t i o n s ,  
a n d ,  i n  s e v e r a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  i t  h a s  l i f t e d  t h e m  o n  t h e  p r o m i s e  o f  a  c h a n g e  in  b e h a v i o r .
T h e  p a p e r  a l s o  s h o w s  t h a t  a  t h r e a t  o f  s a n c t io n s  m a y  b e  s u f f i c ie n t  to  i n d u c e  t h e  d e s i r e d  b e h a v i o r .  
I n d e e d ,  M i l n e r  ( 1 9 9 0 )  a n d  H u d e c  ( 1 9 9 0 )  d o c u m e n t  h o w  th e  i n i t i a l  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  S u p e r  3 0 1  a n d
13. The exam ple that M cM illan cites is the settlem ent o f  a 1985 case betw een Korean and the U nited States over  
trade in  insurance. The settlem ent m erely guaranteed greater market access for tw o U .S . firm s. A nother exam ple 
is the sem iconductor agreement signed in 1986 betw een the U nited States and Japan. A m ong other things, this 
agreem ent called for foreign market share to rise in Japan to 20 percent o f  sem iconductor sales w ith in  five  years. 
W hen the U nited States retaliated in 1987 over violations o f  the agreement it com plained that U .S . market share 
was not grow ing at a rate sufficient to achieve the market share target. For more on the trade diverting aspects o f  
Section 3 01 , see Bhagwati (1988 ), especially  pp. 124-125.
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S p e c ia l  3 0 1  i n d u c e d  s e v e r a l  c o u n t r i e s  to  u n d e r t a k e  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  a n d  p r o t e c t  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y  
r i g h t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  a v o i d  b e in g  t a r g e t e d  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s .
Section 301 in the Context of a Free-Trade Area
Dispute Settlement in the CUSFTA
A  m a j o r  g o a l  f o r  C a n a d a  in  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  o f  t h e  C U S F T A  w a s  to  e s t a b l i s h  a n  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
f r a m e w o r k  t h a t  w o u l d  i n s u l a t e  C a n a d a  f r o m  w h a t  i t  c o n s i d e r e d  to  b e  t h e  v a g a r i e s  o f  U . S .  t r a d e  p o l i c y . 14 
I n  t h e  e n d ,  t h e  C U S F T A  d i d  n o t  c h a n g e  t h e  t r a d e  l a w s  o f  e i t h e r  c o u n t r y .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  d i d  
c r e a t e  t w o  d i s p u t e - s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m s  d e s i g n e d  to  a r b i t r a t e  d i s a g r e e m e n t s . 15 O n e  o f  t h e s e  
m e c h a n i s m s ,  C h a p t e r  N i n e t e e n ,  p e r m i t s  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  b i n a t i o n a l  p a n e l s  t o  a r b i t r a t e  d i s p u t e s  t h a t  a r i s e  
o v e r  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  a n t i d u m p in g  o r  c o u n te r v a i l i n g  d u t y  l a w s  i n  e i t h e r  c o u n t r y .  W i t h  o n e  a d d i t i o n a l  
e x c e p t i o n ,  C h a p t e r  E i g h t e e n  o f  t h e  C U S F T A  p r o v i d e s  f o r  a  m e c h a n i s m  f o r  a d d r e s s i n g  a l l  o t h e r  d i s p u t e s  
t h a t  m i g h t  a r i s e  b e t w e e n  th e  U n i t e d  S ta te s  a n d  C a n a d a  o n  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  a n d  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
C U S F T A  o r  o n  a n y  a c t i o n  t a k e n  b y  e i t h e r  t h a t  i s  v i e w e d  b y  th e  o t h e r  t o  n u l l i f y  o r  i m p a i r  a n y  b e n e f i t  t h a t  
c o u n t r y  e x p e c t e d  u n d e r  t h e  a g r e e m e n t . 16 T h u s ,  C h a p t e r  E ig h t e e n  o f f e r s  a  f o r u m  f o r  r e a c h in g  b i l a t e r a l  
s e t t l e m e n t  o f  m a n y  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  c a s e s .
C h a p t e r  E i g h t e e n  p r o v i d e s  f o r  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  C a n a d a - U n i t e d  S t a te s  T r a d e  C o m m i s s io n  
( C U S T C )  c o m p o s e d  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  f r o m  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  h e a d e d  b y  th e  p r i n c i p a l  g o v e r n m e n t  
o f f i c i a l s  i n  c h a r g e  o f  t r a d e  p o l i c y .  T h e  C U S T C  e x a m in e s  a n y  m e a s u r e  t h a t  a f f e c ts  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
a g r e e m e n t  a n d  t h a t  c a n n o t  b e  s o l v e d  in  b i l a t e r a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n s .  I f  t h e  C U S T C  c a n n o t  r e s o l v e  t h e  p r o b l e m  
w i t h i n  3 0  d a y s  i t  m a y  r e f e r  t h e  d i s p u t e  t o  a  p a n e l  f o r  a r b i t r a t i o n .  T h e  p a n e l  is  c o m p o s e d  o f  f i v e  
m e m b e r s ,  t w o  o f  w h o m  m u s t  b e  f r o m  th e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  t w o  o f  w h o m  m u s t  b e  f r o m  C a n a d a .  T h e  
f i f t h  p a n e l i s t  s e r v e s  a s  c h a i r m a n  a n d  c a n  b e  f r o m  e i t h e r  c o u n t r y .  P a n e l i s t s  a r e  c h o s e n  f r o m  a  r o s t e r  o f  
p r o s p e c t i v e  m e m b e r s  m a i n t a i n e d  b y  t h e  C U S T C .  O n c e  th e  p a n e l  is  a p p o in t e d ,  e a c h  s i d e  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  
t o  a t  l e a s t  o n e  h e a r i n g  b e f o r e  t h e  p a n e l  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p r o v i d e  w r i t t e n  s u b m i s s i o n s  a n d  
r e b u t t a l  a r g u m e n t s .  U n l e s s  p r e v i o u s l y  a g r e e d ,  t h e  p a n e l  h a s  t h r e e  m o n th s  t o  p r e s e n t  a n  i n i t i a l  r e p o r t  
c o n ta i n in g  f i n d in g s  o f  f a c t ;  i t s  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  t h e  m e a s u r e  a t  i s s u e  is  o r  w o u l d  b e  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  o b l ig a t io n s  o f  t h e  a g r e e m e n t ;  a n d  i t s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  i f  a n y ,  f o r  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  
d i s p u t e .  T h e  p a n e l  m a y  a l s o  p r o v i d e  p r e l i m i n a r y  e s t im a te s  o f  t h e  t r a d e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  m e a s u r e  a t  i s s u e .
F o l l o w i n g  t h e  i n i t i a l  r e p o r t ,  e a c h  c o u n t r y  h a s  tw o  w e e k s  t o  p r o v i d e  c o m m e n ts ;  t h e s e  c o m m e n ts  
o r  a n y  a d d i t i o n a l  p a n e l  f i n d in g s  m a y  b e  i n c o r p o r a t e d  in to  a  f i n a l  r e p o r t  t h a t  is  t o  b e  d e l i v e r e d  t o  t h e  
C U S T C  w i t h i n  3 0  d a y s  o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  r e p o r t .  I f  m u tu a l ly  a g r e e d  u p o n ,  t h e  a r b i t r a t i o n  p r o c e s s  is  b i n d i n g  
f o r  b o t h  s i d e s ,  w i t h  t h e  p a n e l  r e p o r t  p r o v i d in g  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  a  s o l u t io n  t o  t h e  d i s p u t e .  I f  n o t ,  t h e  p a n e l  
r e c o m m e n d s  a  s o l u t i o n  to  t h e  C U S T C ,  w h i c h  i n  t u r n  is  r e q u i r e d  to  r e s o l v e  t h e  p r o b l e m .  I n  t h e  e v e n t
14. For m ore on the Canadian perception o f  U .S . trade p o licy , see Rugman (1988).
15. B ello  et al. review  the operation o f  these m echanism s from  their inception through m id -1991.
16. Bilateral disputes over the operation o f  financial institutions other than insurance com panies are handled under 
a separate m echanism  (Chapter Seventeen) also established in the agreement.
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t h a t  a l l  m e c h a n i s m s  f a i l ,  e i t h e r  p a r t y  c a n  w i t h h o ld  b e n e f i t s  o f  e q u a l  e f f e c t  o r  t e r m i n a t e  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  
u p o n  s i x  m o n t h s ’ n o t i c e . 17
Cases Involving Canada
C a n a d a  h a s  b e e n  t h e  t a r g e t  o f  e ig h t  S e c t io n  3 0 1  c a s e s .  T h e  t h r e e  m o s t  r e c e n t  h a v e  b e e n  i n i t i a t e d  
s i n c e  t h e  i n c e p t io n  o f  t h e  C U S F T A  o r  h a v e  m a d e  u s e  o f  t h e  C U S F T A  d i s p u t e - s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m .  
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e s e  c a s e s  a r e  u s e f u l  i n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  h o w  th e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  u t i l i z e s  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  w i t h  a  
p a r t n e r  c o u n t r y  o f  a  f r e e  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t ;  a  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  c a s e s  f o l lo w s  .
C a s e  # 5 5 :  C a n a d a  F i s h .  O n  A p r i l  1 , 1 9 8 6 ,  I c ic le  S e a f o o d s  a n d  n i n e  o t h e r  c o m p a n i e s  w i t h  f i s h  
p r o c e s s i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  i n  W a s h i n g t o n  a n d  s o u t h e a s t e r n  A l a s k a  f i l e d  a  p e t i t i o n  w i t h  U S T R  
a l l e g in g  t h a t  C a n a d a ’s  p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  e x p o r t s  o f  u n p r o c e s s e d  s o c k e y e  s a l m o n ,  p i n k  
s a l m o n ,  a n d  h e r r i n g  w e r e  i n  v i o l a t i o n  o f  G A T T  A r t i c l e  X I ,  w h ic h  p r o h i b i t s  m o s t  e x p o r t  
r e s t r i c t i o n s .  T h e  U S T R  in i t i a t e d  a n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o n  M a y  1 6 ,  1 9 8 6 ,  a n d  c o n d u c t e d  
s e v e r a l  b i l a t e r a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  w i t h  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  C a n a d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t .  T h e s e  
c o n s u l t a t i o n s  f a i l e d  t o  p r o v i d e  a  s a t i s f a c to r y  r e s o l u t i o n  to  t h e  i s s u e ,  a n d  t h e  c a s e  w a s  
r e f e r r e d  to  th e  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m  o f  G A T T .  C a n a d a  a r g u e d  b e f o r e  t h e  
d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p a n e l  t h a t  w h i l e  i ts  e x p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  d i d  i n d e e d  v i o l a t e  G A T T  A r t i c l e  
X I ,  t h e y  w e r e  i n t e g r a l  t o  C a n a d a ’s w e s t - c o a s t  f i s h e r ie s  c o n s e r v a t i o n  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  
r e g im e .  C a n a d a  m a i n t a i n e d  th a t  i t s  p o l i c i e s  w e r e  c o v e r e d  b y  G A T T  A r t i c l e  X X ,  w h i c h  
a l l o w s  m e a s u r e s  r e l a t i n g  to  t h e  c o n s e r v a t io n  o f  e x h a u s t i b l e  r e s o u r c e s .  T h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  
w o n  a  f a v o r a b l e  p a n e l  d e c i s i o n  f r o m  G A T T  i n  1 9 8 8 ;  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  w a s  a d o p te d  b y  th e  
G A T T  C o u n c i l  i n  M a r c h  1 9 8 8 .
A l t h o u g h  C a n a d a  a n n o u n c e d  in  M a r c h  1 9 8 8  th a t  i t  w o u l d  n o t  o p p o s e  t h e  p a n e l  d e c i s i o n ,  i t  
m a i n t a i n e d  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  i t s  p o l i c i e s  w e r e  b a s e d  o n  l e g i t im a te  f i s h e r y  c o n s e r v a t i o n  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  
c o n c e r n s .  H e n c e ,  i t  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  a s  o f  J a n u a r y  1 9 8 9  it  w o u l d  r e p l a c e  t h e  e x p o r t  b a n  w i t h  a  l a n d i n g  
r e q u i r e m e n t  s y s t e m  t h a t  w o u l d  b e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  G A T T .  T h i s  n e w  s y s te m  c a l l e d  f o r  l a n d i n g  a n d  
i n s p e c t i o n  o f  a l l  f i s h  p r i o r  t o  e x p o r t .  I n  A u g u s t  1 9 8 8 ,  t h e  U S T R  i n f o r m e d  th e  C a n a d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  t h a t  
t h e  p r o p o s e d  r e q u i r e m e n t s  w o u l d  n o t  s a t i s f a c to r i l y  r e m e d y  C a n a d a ’s  G A T T  v i o l a t i o n  s i n c e  t h e y  w o u l d  
b e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  G A T T  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  C U S F T A ,  w h i c h  w a s  t h e n  p e n d in g  e n t r y  i n to  f o r c e .
C a n a d a  d e l a y e d  r e p e a l  o f  i t s  e x p o r t  b a n ,  a n d  in  M a r c h  1 9 8 9  t h e  U S T R  d e t e r m i n e d  t h a t  t h e  b a n  
d e n ie d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a  r i g h t  t o  w h i c h  i t  w a s  e n t i t l e d  b y  t h e  G A T T .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t im e ,  t h e  U S T R  
c a l l e d  f o r  a  p u b l i c  h e a r i n g  to  b e  h e ld  in  A p r i l  1 9 8 9  to  c o n s i d e r  p o s s ib l e  t r a d e  a c t i o n s  a g a i n s t  C a n a d a  a s  
a  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  O n e  d a y  b e f o r e  t h e  p u b l i c  h e a r i n g ,  t h e  C a n a d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  r e p e a l e d  i ts  
e x p o r t  p r o h i b i t i o n  a n d  r e p l a c e d  i t  w i t h  r e g u la t i o n s  r e q u i r i n g  a l l  P a c i f i c  r o e  h e r r i n g  a n d  s a l m o n  c a u g h t  
i n  C a n a d i a n  w a t e r s  t o  b e  b r o u g h t  t o  s h o r e  i n  B r i t i s h  C o l u m b i a  p r i o r  t o  e x p o r t .  I n  a n  e x c h a n g e  o f  l e t t e r s  
d u r i n g  t h e  f o l l o w in g  m o n th ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta te s  a n d  C a n a d a  a g r e e d  to  s u b m i t  C a n a d a ’s  p o l i c y  o f  l a n d i n g  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  t o  a  C U S F T A  d i s p u t e  p a n e l .
17. For m ore on the operation o f  the dispute settlem ent m echanism s under the C U ST A , see A nderson and Rugman  
(1990) and (1991).
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I n  O c t o b e r  1 9 8 9 ,  t h e  p a n e l  i s s u e d  i ts  f i n a l  r e p o r t ,  i n  w h i c h  i t  f o u n d  t h a t  C a n a d a ’s  1 0 0 - p e r c e n t  
l a n d i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  v i o l a t e d  C U S F T A  A r t i c l e  4 0 7 ,  w h i c h  p r o h i b i t s  G A T T - i n c o n s i s t e n t  e x p o r t  
r e s t r i c t i o n s .  T h e  p a n e l ’s r e p o r t  w a s  n o t  b i n d in g ;  i t  d i d  c o n ta i n  s e v e r a l  a l t e r n a t iv e  s o l u t io n s  a v a i l a b l e  to  
C a n a d a .  O n e  a l t e r n a t iv e ,  t h e  p a n e l  s a id ,  w a s  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  m o r e  l im i t e d  l a n d i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  t o  t h e  
e x t e n t  j u s t i f i e d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  a r e a s  o n  c o n s e r v a t io n  g r o u n d s .  B a s e d  o n  t h e  p a n e l  r e p o r t ,  t h e  U S T R  
d e t e r m i n e d  t h a t  t h e  l a n d i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  d e n ie d  U . S .  r i g h t s  u n d e r  t h e  C U S F T A .
O n  F e b r u a r y  2 3 ,  1 9 9 0 ,  t h e  C U S T C  d e c i d e d  u p o n  a n  i n t e r i m  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  d i s p u t e .  T h e  
p r i n c i p a l  e le m e n t s  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’s  d e c i s i o n  w e r e  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  w o u l d  b e  g u a r a n t e e d  a  2 5  
p e r c e n t  s h a r e  o f  a t - s e a  e x p o r t s  o f  C a n a d i a n  h e r r i n g  a n d  s a l m o n  a n d  t h a t  t h e  f i s h  e x p o r t e d  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a te s  w o u l d  b e  s u b j e c t  t o  a t - s e a  v e r i f i c a t i o n  a n d  s a m p l i n g .  B a s e d  o n  t h i s  s e t t l e m e n t ,  t h e  U S T R  
t e r m i n a te d  i ts  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  in  J u n e  1 9 9 0 .
C a s e  # 8 0 :  C a n a d a  I m p o r t  R e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  B e e r .  D u r i n g  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  o f  t h e  C U S F T A ,  
n e i t h e r  s i d e  c o u ld  c o n v in c e  t h e  o t h e r  t o  l o w e r  e x i s t i n g  b a r r i e r s  o n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  i n  
b e e r .  I n s t e a d ,  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  g r a n d f a t h e r e d  s t a te  a n d  p r o v i n c i a l  l a w s  r e g u l a t i n g  b e e r  
t r a d e  i n  p l a c e  a t  t h e  t im e ,  w i t h  b o t h  s id e s  a g r e e in g  n o t  t o  e r e c t  n e w  b a r r i e r s .  O n  J u n e  
2 9 ,  1 9 9 0  t h e  U S T R  i n i t i a t e d  a n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  c o m p l a in t s  b y  G .  H e i l e m a n  B r e w i n g  
C o m p a n y ,  I n c .  t h a t  C a n a d a ’s i m p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  b e e r —i n c l u d i n g  l i s t i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  m a r k - u p s ,  a n d  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  w e r e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  
G A T T  a n d  t h e  C U S F T A .  I n  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 0 ,  t h e  S t r o h  B r e w i n g  C o m p a n y  f i l e d  a  
p e t i t i o n  c o m p l a in i n g  a b o u t  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  a n d  p r i c i n g  p r a c t i c e s  o f  O n t a r io  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  i m p o r t e d  b e e r .  I n  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 0 ,  t h e  U S T R  d e c i d e d  t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e s e  a d d i t i o n a l  
c o m p l a in t s  i n to  i t s  o n g o i n g  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
A t  t h e  h e a r t  o f  t h i s  c a s e  is  t h e  a u th o r i t y  o v e r  l i q u o r  c o n t r o l  g i v e n  t o  i n d iv i d u a l  p r o v i n c e s  b y  th e  
C a n a d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t .  P r o v i n c i a l  l i q u o r  b o a r d s  h a v e  m o n o p o ly  o n  t h e  i m p o r t a t i o n  o f  b e e r  a n d  o t h e r  
a l c o h o l  i n to  a  p r o v i n c e ,  w h e t h e r  f r o m  a  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y  o r  a n y  o t h e r  p r o v i n c e .  C a n a d i a n  i m p o r t e r s  a n d  
c o n s u m e r s  c a n n o t  b y p a s s  t h e  p r o v i n c i a l  b o a r d  b y  i m p o r t i n g  d i r e c t l y .  E a c h  p r o v i n c e  r e q u i r e s  l i c e n s e s  to  
m a n u f a c t u r e ,  k e e p ,  o r  s e l l  b e e r  i n  i t s  t e r r i t o r y .  W i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  t w o  p r o v i n c e s ,  i m p o r t e d  b e e r  m u s t  
b e  s o l d  t o  l o c a l  l i q u o r  b o a r d s ,  w h i c h  in  t u r n  r e q u i r e  o r  a r r a n g e  d e l i v e r y  t o  t h e i r  o w n  c e n t r a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
c e n t e r s .  R e t a i l  p r i c e s  o f  b e e r  i n c l u d e  c u s t o m s  d u t ie s  a n d  f e d e r a l  a n d  p r o v i n c i a l  t a x e s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  v a r i o u s  
m a r k - u p s  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  th e  b o a r d s .  M a r k - u p s ,  c h a r g e s ,  a n d  m in i m u m  p r i c i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t s  a r e  
s o m e t i m e s  a p p l i e d  d i f f e r e n t l y  b e t w e e n  im p o r t e d  a n d  d o m e s t i c  b e e r s .
I n  F e b r u a r y  1 9 9 1 ,  t h e  U . S .  c o m p l a in t  w a s  r e f e r r e d  to  a  G A T T  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p a n e l . 18 T h e  
U n i t e d  S t a te s  a s k e d  t h e  p a n e l  t o  d e c l a r e  t h e  C a n a d i a n  b e e r  p r a c t i c e s  c o n t r a r y  t o  G A T T  a r t i c l e s  I I  ( s e c u r i t y  
o f  t a r i f f  c o n c e s s i o n s ) ,  I I I  ( n a t i o n a l  t r e a tm e n t ) ,  X I  ( e l i m in a t i o n  o f  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s ) ,  a n d  X V I I  
( o p e r a t i o n  o f  s t a te  t r a d i n g  e n t e r p r i s e s ) .  I n  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 1 ,  t h e  p a n e l  r e l e a s e d  a  r e p o r t  f i n d i n g  s e v e r a l  o f  
t h e  p r o v i n c i a l  l i q u o r  p r a c t i c e s  t o  b e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  G A T T .  I n  J a n u a r y  1 9 9 2 ,  t h e  U S T R  d e t e r m i n e d  
t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  h a d  b e e n  d e n ie d  r i g h t s  e n t i t l e d  t o  i t  u n d e r  t h e  G A T T  a n d  r e q u e s t e d  c o m m e n t  o n  
p o s s i b l e  t r a d e  a c t i o n s .
18 . T h e  U n i te d  S ta te s  c h o se  to  ta k e  i ts  c o m p la in t  to  th e  G A T T  ra th e r  th a n  th e  C U S T A  d is p u te  se t tle m e n t 
m e c h a n ism  b e c a u se  e x is tin g  p ro v in c ia l  b a r r ie r s  h a d  b e e n  g ra n d fa th e re d  in to  th e  C U S T A .
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I n  A p r i l  1 9 9 2 ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  C a n a d a  r e a c h e d  a n  a g r e e m e n t  t o  s e t t l e  t h e i r  d i s p u t e  o v e r  
p r o v i n c i a l  b e e r  p r a c t i c e s .  H o w e v e r ,  b e f o r e  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  c o u ld  b e  i m p l e m e n t e d ,  O n t a r i o  a n n o u n c e d  a  
1 0  c e n t  p e r  c a n  t a x  o n  b e e r  s o l d  i n  t h e  p r o v i n c e .  S in c e  m o s t  C a n a d i a n  b e e r  is  s o l d  i n  b o t t l e s  w h i l e  m o s t  
i m p o r t e d  b e e r  i s  s o l d  i n  c a n s ,  t h e  t a x  f e l l  m o r e  h e a v i l y  o n  im p o r t s .  T h e  O n t a r i o  g o v e r n m e n t  a l s o  
a n n o u n c e d  a  $ 2 .5 3  p e r  c a s e  w a r e h o u s e  c h a r g e  o n  im p o r t e d  b e e r .  T h e  U . S .  g o v e r n m e n t  p r o t e s t e d  t h e s e  
n e w  t a x e s ;  i n  J u l y  1 9 9 2 ,  i t  r e t a l i a t e d  w i t h  t r a d e  s a n c t i o n s  o f  $ 2 . 6 0 - $ 3 . 0 0  p e r  c a s e  o n  b e e r  i m p o r t e d  f r o m  
O n t a r i o .  O n  t h e  s a m e  d a y  t h a t  t h e s e  d u t ie s  w e r e  a n n o u n c e d ,  t h e  C a n a d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  c o u n t e r e d  w i t h  
c o m p a r a b l e  t a r i f f s  o n  U . S .  b e e r  i m p o r t s .  B o t h  t a r i f f s  r e m a in  i n  p l a c e .
C a s e  # 8 7 :  C a n a d a  S o f t w o o d  L u m b e r .  T h e  C a n a d a  s o f t w o o d  l u m b e r  c a s e  a r o s e  o v e r  a  
d i s a g r e e m e n t  o v e r  t h e  e n f o r c e m e n t  o f  a  s e t t l e m e n t  t o  a  1 9 8 6  c o u n te r v a i l i n g  d u t y  ( C V D )  
c a s e i n  w h i c h  a  g r o u p  o f  U . S .  l u m b e r  p r o d u c e r s  f i l e d  a  c o m p l a in t  w i t h  t h e  U . S .  
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  C o m m e r c e  ( U S D O C )  a n d  t h e  U . S .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r a d e  C o m m i s s io n  
( U S I T C )  a l l e g in g  t h a t  t h e  l o w  f e e s  c h a r g e d  b y  C a n a d i a n  p r o v i n c e s  t o  c l e a r  t i m b e r  f r o m  
g o v e r n m e n t  l a n d s  r e p r e s e n t e d  a n  i m p l i c i t  s u b s id y  to  C a n a d i a n  l u m b e r  p r o d u c e r s .  B e f o r e  
t h e  c a s e  w a s  c o m p l e te d  t h e  t w o  c o u n t r i e s  s i g n e d  a  m e m o r a n d u m  o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h a t  
c a l l e d  f o r  C a n a d a  to  c o l l e c t  a  15  p e r c e n t  ad valorem e x p o r t  t a r i f f  o n  s o f t w o o d  l u m b e r  
e x p o r t s  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s . 19
O v e r  t im e ,  v a r i o u s  p r o v i n c e s  i n s t i t u t e d  " r e p la c e m e n t  m e a s u r e s "  ( i n c l u d i n g  i n c r e a s e s  i n  s t u m p a g e  
f e e s )  t h a t  s e r v e d  t o  s h i f t  t h e  c o s t s  o f  C a n a d i a n  t im b e r l a n d  m a i n t e n a n c e  t o  t h e  C a n a d i a n  l u m b e r  i n d u s t r y .  
A s  t h e s e  m e a s u r e s  w e r e  i n t r o d u c e d ,  C a n a d a ,  w i t h  t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  b e g a n  t o  l o w e r  i ts  
e x p o r t  t a r i f f  b y  a n  e q u iv a l e n t  a m o u n t .  B y  1 9 8 7 ,  t h e  e x p o r t  t a r i f f  o n  l u m b e r  f r o m  B r i t i s h  C o l u m b i a  w a s  
z e r o ,  a n d  b y  1 9 9 0  t h e  U S D O C  a g r e e d  t h a t  t h e  a c t i o n s  t a k e n  b y  Q u e b e c  h a d  r e p l a c e d  a l l  b u t  3 .1  p e r c e n t  
o f  t h e  t a x .  A s  s u c h ,  C a n a d a  a n n o u n c e d  i n  l a t e  1 9 9 1  t h a t  i t  w a s  t e r m i n a t in g  t h e  m e m o r a n d u m  o f  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a n d  t h e r e b y  i ts  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  e x p o r t  t a x .
T h e  U S T R  r e s p o n d e d  im m e d ia t e l y  t o  t h e  C a n a d i a n  a c t i o n  b y  s e l f - i n i t i a t i n g  a  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  a g a i n s t  C a n a d a  a n d  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h a t  t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  C a n a d a  w e r e  u n r e a s o n a b l e  a n d  b u r d e n  
o n  U . S .  c o m m e r c e .  S h e  i n s t r u c t e d  th e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  T r e a s u r y  t o  im p o s e  b o n d i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o n  
C a n a d i a n  s o f t w o o d  l u m b e r  i m p o r t s  o n  a  p r o v i n c e - s p e c i f i c  b a s i s  a t  t h e  ad valorem r a t e s  t h a t  h a d  b e e n  
c o l l e c t e d  b y  th e  C a n a d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t .  T h i s  b o n d i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t  w o u l d  r e m a i n  i n  p l a c e  u n t i l  t h e  
c o m p l e t i o n  o f  a  C V D  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  b y  t h e  U . S .  g o v e r n m e n t .
S u b s e q u e n t ly ,  t h e  U S D O C  a n d  t h e  U S I T C  u n d e r t o o k  a  C V D  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  T h e  U S D O C  
d e t e r m i n e d  t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  v a r i o u s  f e d e r a l  a n d  p r o v i n c i a l  p o l i c i e s  w a s  t o  p r o v i d e  a  s u b s i d y  o f  6 .5 1  
p e r c e n t  o n  s o f t w o o d  l u m b e r  e x p o r t s .  T h e  U S I T C  f o u n d  t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  s u b s id y  w a s  t o  i n j u r e  U S  
l u m b e r  p r o d u c e r s .  T h u s ,  a  c o u n te r v a i l i n g  d u t y  w a s  i n t r o d u c e d  o n  C a n a d i a n  l u m b e r  i m p o r t s .  T h e  
C a n a d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  p r o t e s t e d  t h e s e  f i n d in g s  a n d  a p p e a le d  th e  c a s e  t o  a  C h a p te r  N i n e t e e n  p a n e l  u n d e r  
t h e  C U S F T A .  T h e  p a n e l  r u l e d  i n  f a v o r  o f  C a n a d a .
19. A  temporary im port duty o f  15 percent a d  valorem  was im posed by the U nited States for the ten day period  
betw een the signing o f  the mem orandum o f  understanding and the date w hen Canada began collecting  its export tax. 
The authority to im pose this temporary tariff cam e from  Section 301 (Case # 5 8 ), w hen the President determ ined  
that the Canadian tim ber practices w ere an unreasonable burden on U .S . com m erce.
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Section 301 a n d  the Negotiation of a W H F T A
Concerns of the United States
E a c h  y e a r  s i n c e  1 9 8 5 ,  t h e  O f f i c e  o f  t h e  U S T R  h a s  p u b l i s h e d  t h e  National Trade Estimate Report 
on Foreign Trade Barriers ( h e r e a f t e r  Trade Estimates Report), w h i c h  p r o v i d e s  o f f i c i a l  e s t im a te s  o f  t h e  
d e g r e e  t o  w h i c h  f o r e i g n  p r a c t i c e s  a n d  p o l i c i e s  a c t  a s  a  b a r r i e r  t o  U . S .  c o m m e r c e ;  i t s  p u b l i c a t i o n  is  
m a n d a t e d  b y  t h e  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  s t a t u t e . 20 W h i l e  n o t  e x p l i c i t l y  a c t i n g  a s  a  g u i d e  t o  c u r r e n t  o r  f u t u r e  S e c t i o n  
3 0 1  a c t i o n s ,  t h i s  d o c u m e n t  s e r v e s  t o  i n d ic a te  v a r io u s  n a t i o n a l  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  m a y  b e  o f  c o n c e r n  t o  t h e  
U S T R .  M o r e o v e r ,  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  a  g u id e  t o  C o n g r e s s ,  w h i c h  m o n i t o r s  c a r e f u l l y  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  
S e c t i o n  3 0 1 .  T h e  S e n a te  F i n a n c e  C o m m i t te e  r e c e n t l y  r e q u e s t e d  t h e  U S I T C  to  u n d e r t a k e  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  
s t u d y  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  s t a t e  o f  U . S .  m a r k e t  a c c e s s  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ,  a n d  i n  J u n e  1 9 9 2  t h e  U S I T C  r e l e a s e d  
i t s  f i n d i n g s . 21 T h e  m a t e r i a l  c o n ta i n e d  i n  t h e s e  d o c u m e n t s  s p e l l s  o u t  m a j o r  o b j e c t iv e s  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a te s  i n  a n y  W H F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n s ;  i f  t h e s e  g o a l s  a r e  n o t  m e t ,  t h e  c h a n c e s  o f  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  a p p r o v a l  a r e  
g r e a t l y  d i m i n i s h e d .
A c c o r d i n g  to  t h e s e  d o c u m e n t s ,  t h e  c h i e f  c o n c e r n  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  i n  i t s  c u r r e n t  c o m m e r c i a l  
r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  i s  i n s u r i n g  a d e q u a te  p r o v i s i o n  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  i n te l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  
( I P R ) .22 A r g e n t i n a ,  C h i l e ,  C o l o m b i a ,  a n d  V e n e z u e la  a r e  o n  t h e  S p e c ia l  3 0 1  " w a t c h  l i s t "  o f  c o u n t r i e s  
t h a t ,  i n  t h e  v i e w  o f  U S T R ,  d o  n o t  p r o v i d e  a d e q u a te  I P R  p r o t e c t i o n .  B r a z i l  is  o n e  o f  o n l y  f o u r  c o u n t r i e s  
o n  a  S p e c ia l  3 0 1  " p r i o r i t y  w a t c h  l i s t . " 23 24 I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  1 9 9 2  Trade Estimates 
Report w a s  c r i t i c a l  o f  t h e  I P R  p o l i c i e s  o f  E c u a d o r ,  E l  S a l v a d o r ,  G u a t e m a l a ,  a n d  P a r a g u a y .
I n  a n y  W H F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  c a n  b e  e x p e c te d  to  d e m a n d  t h a t  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  
c o u n t r i e s  a d o p t  a n d  e n f o r c e  I P R  p r o t e c t i o n  m e a s u r e s  a t  l e a s t  a s  s t r i n g e n t  a s  t h o s e  r e c e n t l y  u n d e r t a k e n  b y  
M e x i c o .  S t e p s  i n  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n  h a v e  r e c e n t l y  b e e n  t a k e n  b y  A r g e n t i n a ,  C h i l e ,  a n d  t h e  A n d e a n  P a c t
20 . The T rad e  Estim ates R epo rt attempts to provide an inventory o f  the m ost important foreign  barriers to U .S . 
exports o f  goods and services and barriers affecting U .S . investm ent and intellectual property rights. T his inventory  
is presented on a country by country basis and includes "if feasible" quantitative estim ates o f  the im pact o f  these 
p olic ies on  the value o f  U .S . exports. M uch o f  this inform ation is obtained from  U .S . em bassies and is anecdotal 
and h igh ly  suspect. This is especially  true for the data contained in the first several reports. In addition, the report 
provides inform ation on  trade barriers in  only a subset o f  the many trading partners o f  the U nited States. The Latin  
A m erican countries d iscussed  in  the 1992 report are Argentina, Brazil, C hile, C olom bia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, M exico , Paraguay, and V enezuela.
21 . See U nited States International Trade C om m ission, U .S . M a rk e t Access in  L a tin  A m erica : Recent L ib e ra liz a tio n  
M easures  a n d  R em ain ing  B a rrie rs  (W ith  a  Special Case Study on C h ile ), Publication 2 521 , June 1992.
22 . This has been confirm ed in  private d iscussions w ith representatives from  U STR .
23 . There are ongoing Section 301 cases against the IPR polic ies o f  the other three countries.
2 4 . Canada is also on  the "watch” list, largely because o f  its com pulsory licensing provisions for pharmaceuticals. 
M exico  had been named to the first "priority watch" list in 1988. H ow ever, fo llow in g  enactm ent o f  leg isla tion  to 
m odernize protection o f  patents, trademarks, and trade secrets, the U STR  dropped M exico  from  all Special 301 lists 
in  A pril 1990 . IPR protection has ceased to be an issue o f  contention betw een M exico  and the U nited States.
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c o u n t r i e s ,  b u t  c o n c e r n s  r e m a i n  in  t h e  U . S .  g o v e r n m e n t  e v e n  i n  t h e s e  c a s e s .  T h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  i s  l i k e l y  
t o  p u s h  f o r  a g r e e m e n t s  i n  a  W H F T A  t h a t  c o m m i t  m e m b e r s  t o  t h e  I P R  c o d e  n e g o t i a t e d  i n  t h e  U r u g u a y  
R o u n d  o r  t o  u n d e r t a k e  e q u iv a l e n t  o b l ig a t io n s  s h o u l d  t h e  r o u n d  f a i l .
A n o t h e r  a r e a  o f  m a j o r  c o n c e r n  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  w i l l  b e  i s s u e s  r e l a t e d  t o  d i r e c t  f o r e i g n  
in v e s tm e n t .  T h e  U . S .  c a n  b e  e x p e c te d  to  s e e k  r e m o v a l  o f  l im i t a t i o n s  o n  f o r e i g n  e q u i t y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  a n d  
i t  a l s o  o p p o s e s  v a r i o u s  t r a d e - r e l a t e d  i n v e s tm e n t  m e a s u r e s  s u c h  a s  t r a d e  b a l a n c i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o n  f o r e i g n  
f i r m s .
A  f i n a l  i s s u e  r e p e a t e d l y  c i t e d  i n  t h e  Trade Estimates Report a s  a  p r o b l e m  a r e a  f o r  U . S .  
c o m m e r c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  g o v e r n m e n t  p r o c u r e m e n t  p o l i c i e s  o f  c o u n t r i e s  s u c h  a s  B r a z i l  a n d  C o l o m b i a  t h a t  
d i s c r i m i n a t e  i n  f a v o r  o f  l o c a l ly  p r o d u c e d  g o o d s .  T h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  i s  l i k e l y  t o  s e e k  m o r e  c o m p e t i t i v e  
p r o c u r e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s  a n d  t h e  e l i m in a t io n  o f  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  t r e a t m e n t  f o r  l o c a l  s u p p l i e r s .
Options for Negotiation
A l l  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m s  m e n t i o n e d  a b o v e  c o u ld  b e c o m e  t a r g e t s  o f  f u t u r e  3 0 1  a c t i o n s  a n d  w i l l  w i t h o u t  
d o u b t  b e  d i s c u s s e d  in  a n y  W H F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  G i v e n  t h a t  U . S .  a p p r o v a l  o f  a n y  W H F T A  p a c t  d e p e n d s  
i n  p a r t  o n  m e e t in g  a t  l e a s t  s o m e  o f  t h e  g o a l s  d e s c r i b e d  a b o v e ,  a n  i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  
W H F T A  c o u n t r i e s  b e c o m e s ,  w h a t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w i l l  t h e y  s e e k  to  p u t  i n  p l a c e  t h a t  w i l l  s e r v e  t o  a r b i t r a t e  
f u t u r e  d i s p u t e s ,  t h e r e b y  r e d u c i n g  t h e  n e e d  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t o  r e s o r t  t o  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  ( o r  o t h e r  t r a d e  
r e m e d ie s )  a n d  b u i l d i n g  p o l i t i c a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  a g r e e m e n t .
T h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  a  s t r o n g  d i s p u t e - s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m  a t  t h e  h e a r t  o f  a  W H F T A  c a n n o t  b e  
o v e r s t a t e d .  T r a d e  i s  m u c h  l e s s  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  t h a n  i t  i s  f o r  a n y  o t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  m e m b e r  
o f  W H F T A .  T h i s  f a c t  s t r e n g t h e n s  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  t o  u s e  S e c t i o n  3 0 1 .  A s  H a n k e y  n o t e s  
i n  h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h i s  p u b l i c a t i o n ,  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s  " g i v e  t h e  p a r t i e s  e q u a l  w e i g h t  u n d e r  
t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  a g r e e m e n t ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  s h o u l d  n e u t r a l i z e  t h e  p o w e r  d i f f e r e n t i a l  b e t w e e n  t h e m . " V a r i o u s  
a s p e c t s  o f  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m s  e n h a n c e  t h i s  p r o c e s s ;  t h e s e  a s p e c t s  m u s t  b e  n e g o t i a t e d .
F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a  c r u c i a l  e l e m e n t  o f  t h e  m e c h a n i s m  w i l l  b e  w h e t h e r  t h e  p a r t i e s  a c c e p t  t h e  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o f  t h e  p a n e l  p r o c e s s  a s  b i n d i n g  o r  n o n b i n d in g .  I n  t h e  C U S F T A ,  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  
d e c i s i o n s  a r e  b i n d i n g  o n l y  i f  b o t h  p a r t i e s  a g r e e  t o  t r e a t  t h e m  a s  s u c h .  T h e  l im i t e d  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  t h e  
p r o c e s s  t o  d a t e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  b o t h  s i d e s  p r e f e r  n o n b i n d in g  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f r o m  p a n e l s ,  w i t h  u l t i m a t e  
s e t t l e m e n t  o f  d i s a g r e e m e n t s  f a s h i o n e d  b y  t h e  p o l i t i c i a n s  t h a t  m a k e  u p  t h e  C U S T C .  W h i l e  n o n b i n d i n g  
a r b i t r a t i o n  i s  m o r e  f l e x i b l e ,  i t  r e v e r s e s  t o  a t  l e a s t  s o m e  d e g r e e  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  p o w e r  t h a t  t h e  m e c h a n i s m  
i s  s u p p o s e d  to  c o n v e y  t o  t h e  a g r e e m e n t .  A f t e r  a l l ,  i f  a g r e e m e n t s  a r e  u l t i m a t e l y  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s ,  t h e n  n e g o t i a t o r s  f r o m  t h e  m o s t  p o w e r f u l  c o u n t r y  i n v o lv e d  i n  t h e  d i s p u t e  w i l l  h a v e  a n  
u p p e r  h a n d  in  f a s h i o n i n g  a  r e s o l u t i o n . 25 T h u s ,  g i v e n  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  t h r o u g h  i t s  u s e  o f  S e c t i o n  
3 0 1 ,  i s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  q u i t e  i n t r u s i v e  i n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  a l t e r  f o r e i g n  p r a c t i c e s ,  e q u i t y  i n t e r e s t s  w o u l d  s e e m  
t o  a r g u e  f o r  a  b i n d i n g  p a n e l  p r o c e s s .
2 5 . A n d e r s o n  a n d  R u g m a n  (1 9 9 0 )  a re  q u i te  c r i t ic a l  o f  th e  fa c t  th a t  n o n e  o f  th e  C h a p te r  E ig h te e n  c a s e s  d e c id e d  to  
d a te  h a v e  in v o lv e d  b in d in g  p a n e l  d e c is io n s . T h e y  w r i te ,  " [W jh a t  is  r e q u ir e d  is  n o t  p o l i t ic iz a t io n  b y  p u t t in g  th e  
p ro b le m  b a c k  in to  th e  h a n d s  o f  p o l i t ic ia n s ,  b u t  r a th e r  a  s t r o n g e r  in d e p e n d e n t  b o d y  th a t  c a n  te l l  e i th e r  fe d e ra l 
g o v e rn m e n t  th a t  a  p r a c t ic e  h a s  to  b e  c h a n g e d ."  A n d e rs o n  a n d  R u g m a n , p .  4 1 ,  fo o tn o te  1 6 8 .
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A n o t h e r  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s  t h a t  m u s t  b e  n e g o t i a te d  h a s  t o  d o  w i t h  w h o  is  e n f r a n c h i s e d  b y  th e  
m e c h a n i s m .  N e i t h e r  G A T T  n o r  C h a p t e r  E ig h t e e n  o f  C U S F T A  p e r m i t s  p r i v a t e  p a r t i e s  t o  i n i t i a t e  d i s p u t e  
s e t t l e m e n t  c a s e s  a g a i n s t  t h e  p r a c t i c e s  o f  f o r e i g n  g o v e r n m e n t s .  T h u s ,  i n  t h o s e  i n s t a n c e s  w h e r e  U . S .  f i r m s  
f e e l  t h a t  t h e y  h a v e  b e e n  h u r t  b y  f o r e i g n  p r a c t i c e s ,  t h e y  m u s t  f i r s t  m a k e  t h e i r  c a s e  t o  t h e  U . S .  g o v e r n m e n t ,  
w h i c h  i n  t u r n  i n i t i a t e s  a  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  in v e s t i g a t i o n .  C o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  g o a l s  o f  t h e  s t a tu t e ,  t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  
a  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  c a s e  b y  t h e  U . S .  g o v e r n m e n t  m a y  e x a c e r b a t e  t e n s io n s  a n d  s l o w  d o w n  th e  p r o c e s s  o f  
a c h i e v i n g  a n  a g r e e m e n t .  T h i s  is  e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  i n  t h o s e  i n s t a n c e s  w h e r e  p a s t  t r a d e  d i s p u t e s  w i t h  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a te s  h a v e  b e e n  r a n c o r o u s .  I f  p r i v a t e  p a r t i e s  w e r e  a l l o w e d  d i r e c t  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  p r o c e s s ,  a s  u n d e r  
C h a p t e r  N i n e t e e n  o f  t h e  C U S F T A ,  t h e  u s e  o f  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  w o u l d  l ik e l y  b e  l im i t e d  t o  t h e  m o s t  e g r e g i o u s  
c a s e s  w h e r e  t h e  w e i g h t  o f  t h e  U . S .  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  r e a c h in g  a  s e t t l e m e n t  w o u l d  b e  v i e w e d  a s  e s s e n t i a l .
A n o t h e r  w a y  t o  r e d u c e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f r i c t i o n s  is  t o  i n i t i a t e  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  e a r l i e r  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s .  
P a n e l s  c o u ld  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  t h e  o n s e t  o f  b i l a t e r a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a f t e r  a  p o l i t i c a l  i m p a s s e  i s  
m e t . 26 F i n a l l y ,  i f  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  d i s p u t e  w e r e  a s k e d  t o  c a l c u l a te  t h e  n e t  b e n e f i t  t o  b o t h  p r o d u c e r s  a n d  
c o n s u m e r s  i n  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s  f r o m  e l i m in a t in g  t h e  o f f e n d i n g  p r a c t i c e ,  p a n e l s  c o u ld  i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e s e  d e ta i l s  
i n to  t h e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  a n d  f r i v o lo u s  c o m p l a in t s  m ig h t  b e  d e t e r r e d .
Conclusion
S e c t i o n  3 0 1  o f  U . S .  t r a d e  p o l i c y  a u th o r i z e s  t h e  U S T R  t o  n e g o t i a t e  t h e  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  
g o v e r n m e n t  p r a c t i c e s  v i e w e d  b y  th e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  to  a f f e c t  U . S .  c o m m e r c e  a d v e r s e l y .  A l o n g  w i th  
n e g o t i a t i n g  a u t h o r i t y ,  t h e  s t a tu t e  e m p o w e r s  t h e  U S T R  to  o r d e r  t r a d e  r e t a l i a t i o n  a g a i n s t  r e c a l c i t r a n t  
c o u n t r i e s .  S in c e  i t s  i n c e p t io n  i n  1 9 7 4 ,  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  h a s  b e e n  a  s o u r c e  o f  c o n f l i c t  a n d  c o n t r o v e r s y  b e tw e e n  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  s o m e  o f  i t s  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s ;  i t s  u s e  t o  o p e n  f o r e i g n  m a r k e t s  h a s  b e e n  w i d e ly  l a b e l e d  
a s  " a g g r e s s i v e  u n i l a t e r a l i s m . "
T h i s  p a p e r  h a s  s o u g h t  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  r o l e  o f  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  i n  c u r r e n t  U . S .  t r a d e  p o l i c y  a n d  to  
s p e c u la t e  a b o u t  t h e  r o l e  t h is  s t a tu t e  m ig h t  p l a y  i n  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  a  W H F T A .  T h e  p a p e r  r e a c h e s  t h e  
f o l l o w in g  c o n c l u s i o n s .
F i r s t ,  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  w i l l  n o t  d i s a p p e a r  e v e n  a f t e r  a  W H F T A  is  p u t  i n  p l a c e .  T h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  h a s  
b e g a n  t w o  c a s e s  a g a i n s t  C a n a d a  b e tw e e n  1 9 8 9  a n d  1 9 9 1 ,  a n d  u s e d  t h e  d i s p u t e - s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m  in  
t h e  C U S F T A  to  s e t t l e  t h i r d  c a s e .  M o r e o v e r ,  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  is  e x t r e m e l y  p o p u l a r  i n  C o n g r e s s .  F u t u r e  t r a d e  
l e g i s l a t i o n  m a y  s t r e n g t h e n  s o m e  o f  i t s  p r o v i s i o n s ,  a n d  t h e  C l i n t o n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i s  l i k e l y  t o  m a k e  g r e a t e r  
u s e  o f  e x i s t i n g  a u th o r i t y .  H o w e v e r ,  i t  i s  e x t r e m e l y  u n l ik e l y  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  w o u l d  e v e r  b e  s o  
u n r e s t r a i n e d  i n  i t s  u s e  o f  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  a s  t o  t h r e a t e n  o r  u n d e r m i n e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a g r e e m e n t s  s u c h  a s  G A T T  
o r  t h e  C U S F T A .
O v e r  t im e ,  d i s p u t e s  w i l l  a r i s e  b e tw e e n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  o n e  o r  m o r e  o f  i t s  W H F T A  t r a d i n g  
p a r t n e r s .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  a  w e l l - f u n c t i o n i n g  d i s p u t e  m e c h a n i s m  is  a  n e c e s s a r y  p a r t  o f  a n y  W H F T A .  S u c h  
a  m e c h a n i s m  w o u l d  b a l a n c e  t h e  u n e q u a l  e c o n o m i c  p o w e r  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  w i t h  i t s  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s .  
I n  s u c h  a  m e c h a n i s m ,  S e c t i o n  3 0 1  w o u l d  s e r v e  a s  a  v e h ic l e  f o r  b r i n g i n g  a  U . S .  c o m p l a in t  t o  a  d i s p u t e  
p a n e l .  I f  t h e  d i s p u t e  p r o c e s s  is  w i d e ly  v i e w e d  a s  f a i r  a n d  a b o v e  p o l i t i c s ,  t h e n  U . S .  i n t e r e s t s  c a n  b e  
s e r v e d  w h i l e  t e n s io n s  a r e  d e f u s e d .
26 . This change in  the process has been suggested by B ello  et al. (1991).
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S e c t i o n  3 0 1  C a s e s
T a r g e t  C o u n try
D a te
F i l e d
S e l f -  D a te  
I n i t i a t e d aR e s o lv e d N a t u r e  o f  C a s e
GATT
c o n s u l t a t i o n s R e t a l i a t i o n b
G u a te m a la 7 - 1 - 7 5 No 6 - 2 9 - 7 6 c a r g o  r e s t r i c t i o n s No
C an a d a 7 - 1 7 - 7 5 No 3 - 1 4 - 7 6 e g g  i m p o r t  q u o t a s No
EC 8 - 7 - 7 5 No 7 - 2 1 - 8 0 im p o r t  l e v i e s  o n  e g g s No
EC 9 - 2 2 - 7 5 No 1 - 5 - 7 9 m in .  p r i c e s /  c a n n e d  g o o d s Y es
EC 1 1 - 1 3 - 7 5 No 6 - 1 9 - 8 0 m a l t  e x p o r t  s u b s i d i e s No
EC 1 2 - 1 - 7 5 No f l o u r  e x p o r t  s u b s i d i e s Y es E x p o r t  E n h a n c e m e n t P ro g ra m  c o u n t e r  s u b s i d i e s
EC 3 - 3 0 - 7 6 No 6 - 1 8 - 8 0 v a r i a b l e  l e v y  o n  s u g a r Y es
EC 3 - 3 0 - 7 6 No 1 - 5 - 7 9 c a t t l e  f e e d  r u l e s Y es
T a iw a n 3 - 1 5 - 7 6 No 1 2 - 1 - 7 7 t a r i f f s  o n  a p p l i a n c e s No
EC & J a p a n 1 0 - 6 - 7 6 No 1 2 - 9 - 7 8 d e f l e c t i o n  o f  s t e e l  t r a d e No
EC 1 1 -1 2 - 7 6 No 8 - 1 0 - 8 6 c i t r u s  t a r i f f s Y es 40% t a r i f f  o n  EC p a s t a
J a p a n 2 - 1 4 - 7 7 No 3 - 3 - 7 8 m a r k e t  a c c e s s  f o r  s i l k Y es
J a p a n 8 - 4 - 7 7 No 1 2 -8 5 l e a t h e r  q u o t a s Y es r a i s e d  t a r i f f s  & r e c e i v e d  t r a d e  c o m p e n s a t io n
USSR 1 1 -1 0 - 7 7 No 7 - 1 2 - 7 9 m a r in e  i n s u r a n c e  m o n o p o ly No
C an a d a 8 - 2 9 - 7 8 No 1 0 - 3 0 - 8 4 t a x e s  o n  U .S .  a d v e r t i s i n g No e n a c t e d  m i r r o r  l e g i s l a t i o n
EC 1 1 - 2 - 7 8 No 8 - 1 - 8 0 w h e a t  e x p o r t  s u b s i d i e s No
J a p a n 3 - 1 4 - 7 9 No 1 - 6 - 8 1 im p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n s / c i g a r s Y es
A r g e n t i n a 5 - 2 5 - 7 9 No 7 - 2 5 - 8 0 m a r in e  i n s u r a n c e  m o n o p o ly No
J a p a n 1 0 -2 2 - 7 9 No 1 - 6 - 8 1 p i p e  t o b a c c o  r e s t r i c t i o n s Y es
K o re a 1 1 - 5 - 7 9 No 1 2 - 2 9 - 8 0 m a r k e t  a c c e s s  ( i n s u r a n c e ) No
S w i t z e r l a n d 1 2 - 6 - 7 9 No 1 2 - 1 1 - 8 0 e y e g l a s s  s t a n d a r d s No
EC 8 - 2 0 - 8 1 No 6 - 2 8 - 8 2 s u g a r  e x p o r t  s u b s i d i e s Y es
EC 9 - 1 7 - 8 1 No p o u l t r y  e x p o r t  s u b s i d i e s Y es
A r g e n t i n a 1 0 - 9 - 8 1 No 1 1 -1 6 - 8 2 b r e a c h  o f  h i d e s  a g r e e m e n t No e n d e d  a g r e e m e n t  & r a i s e d  t a r i f f s
EC 1 0 - 1 6 - 8 1 No 9 - 1 5 - 8 7 p a s t a  e x p o r t  s u b s i d i e s Y es im p o s e d  t a r i f f s
EC 1 0 - 2 3 - 8 1 No 1 2 - 1 - 8 5 c a n n e d  f r u i t  p r o d ,  s u b s i d i e s Y es
A u s t r i a 1 2 - 2 - 8 1 No 7 - 2 0 - 8 3 s p e c i a l t y  s t e e l  s u b s i d i e s Y es n e g o t i a t e d  v o l u n t a r y  e x p o r t  r e s t r a i n t  (VER)
EC ( F r a n c e ) 1 2 - 2 - 8 1 No 7 - 2 0 - 8 3 s p e c i a l t y  s t e e l  s u b s i d i e s Y es n e g o t i a t e d  VER
EC ( I t a l y ) 1 2 - 2 - 8 1 No 7 - 2 0 - 8 3 s p e c i a l t y  s t e e l  s u b s i d i e s Y es n e g o t i a t e d  VER
S w eden 1 2 - 2 - 8 1 No 7 - 2 0 - 8 3 s p e c i a l t y  s t e e l  s u b s i d i e s Y es n e g o t i a t e d  VER
EC (U .K .) 1 2 - 2 - 8 1 No 7 - 2 0 - 8 3 s p e c i a l t y  s t e e l  s u b s i d i e s Y es n e g o t i a t e d  VER
C an a d a 6 - 3 - 8 2 No 9 - 2 3 - 8 2 r a i l c a r  e x p o r t  s u b s i d i e s Y es b e c a m e  c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  d u t y  (CVD) c a s e
EC (B e lg iu m ) 6 - 2 3 - 8 2 No 7 - 2 0 - 8 3 s p e c i a l t y  s t e e l  s u b s i d i e s Y es n e g o t i a t e d  VER
C an a d a 7 - 2 7 - 8 2 No s u b s i d i e s :  f r o n t - e n d  l o a d e r s Y es
B r a z i l 1 0 -2 5 - 8 2 No 1 1 -8 5 s h o e  i m p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n s Y es
J a p a n 1 0 - 2 5 - 8 2 No 1 2 -8 5 s h o e  i m p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n s Y es r a i s e d  t a r i f f s  & r e c e i v e d  t r a d e  c o m p e n s a t io n
K o re a 1 0 -2 5 - 8 2 No 8 -8 3 s h o e  i m p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n s No
T a iw a n 1 0 - 2 5 - 8 2 No 1 2 -1 9 - 8 3 s h o e  i m p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n s No
K o re a 3 - 1 6 - 8 3 No 1 2 -1 5 - 8 3 s t e e l  r o p e  s u b s i d i e s Y es
B r a z i l 4 - 1 6 - 8 3 No s o y  p r o d u c t s  s u b s i d i e s Y es
EC ( P o r t u g a l ) 4 - 1 6 - 8 3 No s o y  p r o d u c t s  s u b s i d i e s Y es
EC (S p a in ) 4 - 1 6 - 8 3 No s o y  p r o d u c t s  s u b s i d i e s Y es
T a iw a n 7 - 1 3 - 8 3 No 3 - 2 2 - 8 4 r i c e  e x p o r t  s u b s i d i e s No
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Introduction
T h e  u s e  o f  a n t i d u m p in g  ( A D )  d u t i e s  a n d  c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  d u t i e s  ( C V D s )  t o  p r e v e n t  o r  r e m e d y  
u n f a i r  t r a d e  p r a c t i c e s  h a s  b e e n  a n  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e  d u r i n g  r e c e n t  m u l t i -  a n d  b i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  
P a r t i e s  d i f f e r  o n  t h e  r o l e  t h e y  b e l i e v e  r e m e d ie s  t o  u n f a i r  t r a d e  p r a c t i c e s  s h o u l d  p l a y  in  t r a d e  p o l i c y ,  a n d  
t h i s  d i s a g r e e m e n t  h a s  l e d  t o  i n c o n s i s t e n t  a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e s e  r e m e d ie s .  T h e  r e s u l t  i s  a n  “ u n e v e n  p l a y i n g  
f i e l d ”  f o r  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s . 1 I t  h a s  b e c o m e  e v id e n t  t h a t  m o r e  s t a n d a r d i z e d  r u l e s  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  
g o v e r n i n g  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  r e m e d ie s  a r e  r e q u i r e d .  O t h e r  m e a s u r e s  m u s t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  f o r  
i n c l u s i o n  in  r e g io n a l  a g r e e m e n t s  t o  a c h i e v e  t h e  d e s i r e d  s e c u r i t y  o f  a c c e s s  t o  a  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r ’s  m a r k e t  
i n  o r d e r  t o  f o s t e r  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  in  a  c o m p e t i t i v e  e n v i r o n m e n t .
T h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  A D  d u t i e s  a n d  C V D s  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  w a s  o n e  o f  C a n a d a ’s  m a j o r  
g r i e v a n c e s  d u r i n g  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  o f  t h e  f r e e  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t  ( C U S F T A )  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s . 2 
I n i t i a l l y  C a n a d a  t r i e d  t o  g a in  a  b l a n k e t  e x c e p t i o n  f r o m  U . S .  t r a d e  r e m e d y  l a w s ,  b u t  t h i s  w a s  u n o b t a i n a b le .  
A s  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  C a n a d a  p l a c e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  e f f o r t  o n  n e g o t i a t i n g  a  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m  in to  
t h e  C U S F T A  t h a t  w o u l d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  r e d u c e  C a n a d a ’s  e x p o s u r e  t o  t h e  u s e  o f  A D  d u t i e s  a n d  C V D s  b y  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s .
T h e  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m  u l t i m a t e ly  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n to  C h a p t e r  1 9  o f  t h e  C U S F T A  
p r o v i d e s  f o r  t h e  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  o f  A D  d u t y  a n d  C V D  a c t i o n s  b y  m e a n s  o f  b i n a t i o n a l  p a n e l s . 3 M o r e  
s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  i t  p r o v i d e s  e x p o r t e r s  a n d  i m p o r t e r s  t h e  o p t i o n  o f  t a k i n g  a  d i s p u t e d  A D  o r  C V D  a c t i o n  t o  a  
b i n a t i o n a l  p a n e l  w i t h  b i n d i n g  p o w e r s  i n  l i e u  o f  s e e k in g  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  b y  a  d o m e s t i c  c o u r t .  B e c a u s e  
i n d iv i d u a l s  f r o m  b o t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  C a n a d a  s i t  o n  t h e  p a n e l s ,  i t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  a s s u m e d  t h a t  
b i n a t i o n a l  p a n e l s  p r o m o t e  g r e a t e r  c o n s i s t e n c y  a n d  o b j e c t iv i t y  i n  A D  a n d  C V D  c a s e s .  P e r h a p s  b e c a u s e  
o f  t h e s e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  i t  h a s  b e e n  o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  s u c c e s s f u l  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m s  d e v e l o p e d  
i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .
T h e r e  i s  n o  q u e s t io n  t h a t  t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  a  A D  o r  c o u n te r v a i l i n g  a c t i o n  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  
o f  a  d u t y  c a n  h a v e  s e r i o u s  c o n s e q u e n c e s  f o r  e x p o r t e r s  o r  i m p o r t e r s .  G i v e n  t h e  s e r i o u s n e s s  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  
a t  s t a k e ,  c o m b i n e d  w i t h  t h e  t e n d e n c y  t o w a r d  i n c r e a s in g  u s e  o f  u n f a i r  t r a d e  r e m e d i e s ,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  b e  g i v e n  t o  n e g o t i a t i n g  a n  C U S F T A - l i k e  m e c h a n i s m  f o r  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  A D  a n d  C V D  
d i s p u t e s  i n to  a  p r o s p e c t i v e  W H F T A .
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2 8 3
Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere
T h e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  C U S F T A  C h a p te r  1 9  m e c h a n i s m  le a d s  s o m e w h a t  o b v i o u s l y  t o  i t s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
a s  a  m o d e l  f o r  a  W H F T A .  W h a t  r e m a in s  a t  i s s u e  i s  w h e t h e r  t h i s  m e c h a n i s m  c a n  b e  a p p l i e d  e f f e c t i v e ly  
in  a  c o n s i d e r a b l y  b r o a d e r  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t  s u c h  a s  a  W H F T A ,  g i v e n  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  t h a t  e x i s t  b e tw e e n  t h e  
l e g a l  a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  o f  t h e  p r o s p e c t i v e  n e g o t i a t i n g  p a r t i e s .  T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  p a p e r  i s  t o  
e x a m i n e  s o m e  o f  t h e  o b s t a c l e s  t o  a n d  i m p l i c a t io n s  o f  e x t e n d i n g  t h e  C U S F T A ’s  C h a p t e r  1 9  d i s p u t e  
s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m  t o  a  W H F T A  b y  u s i n g  M e x i c o  a s  a  r e f e r e n c e  p o i n t  f o r  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n .  M e x i c o  is  
c h o s e n  b e c a u s e  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  o f  C h a p te r  1 9  in  t h e  N o r t h  A m e r ic a n  F r e e  T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t  ( N A C U S F T A )  
r a i s e d  m a n y  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m s  t h a t  m a y  l a t e r  r e q u i r e  s o l u t io n  e i t h e r  in  e x t e n d i n g  N A C U S F T A  t o  n e w  
m e m b e r s  o r  in  c r e a t i n g  a  b r o a d e r  h e m i s p h e r i c  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t .
T o  a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  a  C h a p te r  1 9  m e c h a n i s m  f o r  a  W H F T A  o r  N A C U S F T A ,  i t  is  
f i r s t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  e x a m i n e  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  A D  a n d  C V D  a c t io n s  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e .  T h e  
p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  r e v i e w  is  t w o f o l d .  F i r s t ,  i t  s e r v e s  t o  s e t  o u t  t h e  b a s i c  t e n e t s  u n d e r l y i n g  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  
t h e s e  m e a s u r e s  t o  r e m e d y  u n f a i r  t r a d e  p r a c t i c e s .  S e c o n d ,  i t  i l l u s t r a te s  t h e  p a r a l l e l  b e tw e e n  C a n a d a ’s 
b a r g a i n in g  p o s i t i o n  u n d e r  t h e  C U S F T A  to  t h a t  o f  M e x i c o  a n d  o t h e r  W H F T A  n a t i o n s  v i s  a  v i s  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a te s .  A  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  m a j o r  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  C h a p t e r  1 9  a n d  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  to  d a te  f o l l o w s  th e  
h i s t o r i c a l  a n a ly s i s .
History a n d Development of A D  and C V D s
O n e  o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  o b j e c t iv e s  o f  t h e  G A T T  is  t o  p r o m o te  s e c u r e  a c c e s s  t o  f o r e i g n  m a r k e t s  s o  t h a t  
b u s i n e s s e s  w i l l  h a v e  c o n f id e n c e  t h a t  w h e n  t h e y  e x p o r t  t h e i r  p r o d u c t s  t h e y  w i l l  n o t  e n c o u n t e r  u n f a i r  o r  
u n f o r e s e e n  i m p e d i m e n t s  in  c o m p e t in g  f o r  a  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n s u m e r  m a r k e t .  D u m p i n g  a n d  u n r e s t r i c t e d  
s u b s id i z a t i o n  h a v e  lo n g  b e e n  r e c o g n i z e d  a s  s e r io u s  o b s t a c l e s  t o  t h i s  o b j e c t iv e .  D u m p i n g  i s  g e n e r a l l y  
u n d e r s t o o d  a s  t h e  s a l e  o f  g o o d s  o n  a  f o r e i g n  m a r k e t  a t  a  p r i c e  l e s s  t h a n  t h a t  a t  w h i c h  t h e  p r o d u c t  i s  s o ld  
o n  t h e  s e l l e r ’s d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t ,  w h e r e a s  a  s u b s id y  i s  t h e  g r a n t i n g  o f  a  b e n e f i t ,  u s u a l l y  b y  a  g o v e r n m e n t ,  
a t  a n y  s t a g e  o f  a  g o o d ’s m a n u f a c t u r e ,  p r o d u c t i o n ,  o r  e x p o r t .
G e n e r a l  c o n c e r n  a b o u t  t h e  h a r m f u l  e f f e c t s  o f  d u m p in g  a n d  s u b s id i z a t i o n  r e s u l t e d  in  t h e i r  i n c l u s i o n  
in  t h e  G A T T  n e g o t i a t i o n s  in  1 9 4 7 .  T h e s e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  c o n c l u d e d  w i t h  t h e  i n s e r t i o n  o f  a  r e m e d y  u n d e r  
A r t i c l e  V I  o f  t h e  F i n a l  A g r e e m e n t ,  w h i c h  a l l o w s  C P s  t o  t h e  G A T T  t o  t a k e  u n i l a t e r a l  a c t i o n  t o  o f f s e t  t h e  
e f f e c t s  o f  d u m p i n g  o r  s u b s id i e s  o n  t h e i r  d o m e s t i c  i n d u s t r y  t h r o u g h  t h e  u s e  o f  A D  a n d  C V D s .4
A r t i c l e  V I  a l l o w s  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  a n  A D  d u t y  a g a i n s t  a n  i m p o r t e d  g o o d  w h e n  i t  i s  b e in g  
d u m p e d  o n  t h e  f o r e i g n  m a r k e t  a n d  is  c a u s in g  o r  t h r e a t e n i n g  to  c a u s e  “ m a t e r i a l  i n ju r y  t o  a n  e s t a b l i s h e d  
i n d u s t r y . . . o r  m a t e r i a l l y  r e ta r d [ s ]  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  d o m e s t i c  i n d u s t r y . ”  A  C V D  m a y  b e  a p p l i e d  t o  a n  
im p o r t e d  g o o d  t o  o f f s e t  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  a  f o r e i g n  s u b s id y  w h e n  i t  a l s o  c a u s e s  o r  t h r e a t e n s  t o  c a u s e  i n ju r y  
t o  t h e  d o m e s t i c  i n d u s t r y  o r  i m p e d e s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  s u c h  in d u s t r y .
T h e  G A T T  p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  A D  a n d  C V D s  r e p r e s e n t e d  m in i m a l  c o m m i tm e n t  t o  r e a l  c o n t r o l  o v e r  
t h e s e  p r a c t i c e s ,  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t ly  t h e s e  t r a d e  r e m e d ie s  b e c a m e  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  d e v i c e s  in  t h e m s e l v e s .  T h i s  
r e a l i z a t i o n  p a v e d  t h e  w a y  f o r  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  A n t i d u m p i n g  a n d  S u b s id i e s  C o d e s  d u r i n g  t h e  K e n n e d y  a n d  
T o k y o  R o u n d s  in  1 9 6 9  a n d  1 9 7 9 ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .  T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e s e  C o d e s  w a s  t o  d e f in e  m o r e  p r e c i s e ly
4 . J o h n H . Jackson and E dw in A . Verm ulst, ed s., A ntidum ping  L a w  an d  P rac tice : A  C om p ara tive  Study, Ann  
Arbor: The U niversity o f  M ichigan Press, 1989, p. 6.
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t h e  c o n d u c t  e x p e c te d  o f  C P s  in  t h e i r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  a n d  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  d u m p in g  a n d  s u b s id y  p r a c t i c e s  s o  
t h a t  t h e  f r e e  f l o w  o f  g o o d s  w a s  n o t  j e o p a r d i z e d  b y  t h e i r  u n f a i r  u s e .
T h e  f i r s t  A n t i d u m p i n g  C o d e ,  c o n c l u d e d  in  1 9 6 7 , w a s  r e p la c e d  in  1 9 7 9  b y  a  n e w  C o d e 5 t h a t  s e t s  
o u t  m o r e  e x p l i c i t  r e q u i r e m e n t s  g o v e r n in g  a  c o u n t r y ’s  c o n d u c t  o f  i t s  a n t i d u m p in g  a n d  in ju r y  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  
a n d  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  d u t i e s  o r  p r i c e  u n d e r ta k in g s .  T h e  n e w  C o d e  h a s  b e e n  l a r g e ly  s u c c e s s f u l  in  
a c h i e v i n g  a  g r e a t e r  s t a n d a r d i z a t io n  o f  a n t i d u m p in g  p r a c t i c e s  a m o n g  C P s . 6
I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  S u b s id i e s  C o d e ,7 a l s o  n e g o t i a te d  d u r i n g  t h e  T o k y o  R o u n d ,  h a s  n o t  b e e n  a s  u s e f u l  
in  s t a n d a r d i z i n g  w o r l d  p r a c t ic e .  L ik e  t h e  A n t i d u m p i n g  C o d e ,  t h e  S u b s id i e s  C o d e  i m p o s e s  s o m e  g r e a t e r  
p r o c e d u r a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  u p o n  s i g n a to r i e s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  e v a l u a t i n g  s u b s id i e s  a n d  a s s e s s in g  C V D s .  
H o w e v e r ,  o w i n g  t o  t h e  c o n f l i c t  b e tw e e n  t r a d i n g  n a t i o n s  o n  t h e  l e g i t im a c y  o f  s u b s id i e s  in  d o m e s t i c  
e c o n o m i e s ,  a n d  h e n c e  a  l a c k  o f  c o o p e r a t i v e  s u p p o r t ,  t h e  S u b s id i e s  C o d e  is  e s s e n t i a l l y  w e a k  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
la w . M o r e o v e r ,  u n l i k e  t h e  A n t i d u m p i n g  C o d e ,  t h e  S u b s id i e s  C o d e  h a s  n o t  y e t  b e e n  i n c o r p o r a t e d  in to  
G A T T ,  a l t h o u g h  s i g n a to r i e s  a r e  o b l ig e d  to  i m p l e m e n t  i t s  p r o v i s i o n s  i n to  t h e i r  d o m e s t i c  l a w s .8
W h e r e a s  d u m p in g  is  g e n e r a l l y  c o n s i d e r e d  a n  u n f a i r  p r a c t i c e ,  a l l  f o r m s  o f  s u b s id i e s  a r e  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  c o n s i d e r e d  u n f a i r  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  c o u n te r v a i l a b l e .  I n  i t s  p r e a m b le ,  t h e  S u b s id i e s  C o d e  
r e c o g n i z e s  t h e  d u a l  n a tu r e  o f  s u b s id i e s :  t h e y  c a n  b e  i n s t r u m e n t a l  in  p r o m o t i n g  i m p o r t a n t  d o m e s t i c  p o l i c y  
o b j e c t iv e s ,  w h i l e  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  p o s s ib l y  h a r m i n g  a  f o r e i g n  i n d u s t r y ’s c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s .  T h e  C o d e ’s 
o b j e c t iv e  i n  d e f in i n g  w h e n  a n d  h o w  a  s u b s id y  m a y  b e  c o u n te r v a i l e d  is  t o  b a la n c e  t h e  h a r m  o f  a  s u b s id y  
a g a i n s t  t h e  i n ju r i o u s  e f f e c t s  o f  a  C V D .
A s  b e tw e e n  m e m b e r  s t a te s ,  t h e r e  i s  c o n s i d e r a b le  d i s p a r i t y  in  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  s u b s id i e s  a n d  
C V D s .9 B y  f a r  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  c o u n t r y  o n  t h i s  m a t t e r  is  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s .  T h e  U .S .  g o v e r n m e n t  
t a k e s  a  s t r o n g  p o s i t i o n  o p p o s i n g  t h e  u s e  o f  s u b s id i e s ,  a n d  i t  h a s  b e e n  t h e  m o s t  f r e q u e n t  u s e r  o f  t h e  C V D  
m e c h a n i s m  in  a n  e f f o r t  t o  p r o t e c t  U .S .  p r o d u c e r s  f r o m  c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h  s u b s id i z e d  im p o r t s .  S u b s id i e s  
a n d  C V D s  t h e r e f o r e  b e c o m e  i m p o r t a n t  t r a d e  i s s u e s  f o r  n a t i o n s  w i t h  e x t e n s i v e  t r a d e  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta te s .
5. O fficia lly  titled Agreem ent on Im plem entation o f  A rticle VI o f  the General Agreem ent on Tariffs and 
Trade.
6. F inger and O lechow ski, ib id ., p. 156.
7 . O ffic ia lly , Agreem ent on Interpretation and A pplication o f  A rticle V I, X V I, and XXIII o f  the General 
A greem ent on  Tariffs and Trade.
8. Other Latin A m erican and Caribbean states that signed the Subsidies C ode in 1979 are Brazil, C hile, and 
U ruguay.
9 . J. M ichael F inger and Julio N ogues, "International Control o f  Subsidies and Countervailing Duties," The 
W o rld  B ank  Econom ic R eview  1:4, p. 712.
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A s  a  s i g n a to r y  t o  b o t h  C o d e s ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  i m p l e m e n t e d  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  e a c h  t h r o u g h  t h e  
T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t s  A c t  ( T A A )  o f  1 9 7 9 . T h e  A c t  r e s t r u c t u r e d  t h e  U .S .  u n f a i r  t r a d e  r e m e d y  s y s t e m  in  a  
p o l i t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  m a n n e r .  F r o m  1 9 5 4  to  t h e  e n a c tm e n t  o f  t h e  T A A ,  b u r e a u c r a t i c  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
t h e  t r a d e  r e m e d y  s y s te m  h a d  b e e n  d i v id e d  b e tw e e n  t h e  T r e a s u r y  D e p a r t m e n t ,  w h i c h  m a d e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  
o f  d u m p i n g  o r  s u b s id y ,  a n d  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r a d e  C o m m i s s io n  ( I T C ) ,  w h i c h  h a n d le d  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  o f  
i n ju r y .  I n  1 9 7 9 ,  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  f o r m e r  w a s  s h i f t e d  t o  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r a d e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  C o m m e r c e .  S in c e  t h a t  d e p a r t m e n t  w a s  p e r c e iv e d  a s  b e in g  m o r e  s y m p a th e t i c  t o  i m p o r t e r s  
t h a n  t h e  T r e a s u r y  D e p a r t m e n t  h a d  b e e n ,  t h i s  w a s  w i d e ly  r e g a r d e d  a s  a  m o v e  to  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  u s e  o f  t r a d e  
r e m e d ie s  b y  U .S .  c o n s t i t u e n t s . 10
T i t l e  V I I  o f  t h e  T A A  in c o r p o r a te d  t h e  T o k y o  R o u n d  A n t i d u m p i n g  C o d e  i n to  U .S .  d o m e s t i c  la w , 
b u t  in  t h e  p r o c e s s  s e v e r a l  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  w e r e  m a d e .  F i r s t ,  e n h a n c e d  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  i n f o r m a t io n  a c c u m u l a t e d  
a n d  u s e d  in  A D  d u t y  c a s e s  w a s  p r o v i d e d  t o  im p o r t e r s  a n d  e x p o r te r s  o f  g o o d s  u n d e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  S e c o n d ,  
r e g io n a l  m a r k e t s  w e r e  g i v e n  s t a n d in g  to  i n i t i a t e  A D  c a s e s .  T h i r d ,  i m p o r t e r s  w e r e  g i v e n  g r e a t e r  i n f lu e n c e  
in  n e g o t i a t i n g  u n d e r t a k in g s  b y  e x p o r te r s  in  l i e u  o f  A D  d u t ie s ,  a n d  a  f o u r th  c h a n g e  m a d e  i t  e a s i e r  f o r  
p e t i t i o n e r s  t o  i n i t i a t e  A D  c a s e s .  T h e  c o m b i n e d  e f f e c t  o f  t h e s e  c h a n g e s  w a s  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  A D  a c t i o n s .
R e g a r d i n g  C V D s ,  t h e  m a i n  im p a c t  o f  t h e  T A A  o f  1 9 7 9  w a s  t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e  T o k y o  R o u n d  
S u b s id y  C o d e  i n to  U .S .  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  a n d  e s p e c i a l l y  t o  i n t r o d u c e  a  m a t e r i a l  i n ju r y  r e q u i r e m e n t  i n to  U .S .  
C V D  p r a c t i c e .  T h e  o b l ig a t io n  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  i n ju r y  ( o n  p r o d u c t s  c o m i n g  f r o m  S u b s id y  C o d e  s i g n a to r i e s  
o n l y )  w a s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  c h a n g e  t o  U .S .  p r o d u c e r s ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  w o u l d  a p p e a r  t h a t  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  
“ m a t e r i a l ”  i n ju r y  l i k e l y  d i d  n o t  a d d  m u c h . 11 O t h e r  p r o c e d u r a l  c h a n g e s  in  t h e  T A A  f a c i l i t a t e d  C V D  
p e t i t i o n s  a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e d u r e .12
10. R odney de C. G rey, U n ited  States T rade  P o licy  L eg is la tio n : A  C anad ian  View. Montreal: The Institute 
for Research and Public P olicy , 1982, 56.
11. M aterial injury was defined in  the T A A  as "harm w hich  is not inconsequential, immaterial or unim portant," 
Section 7 71 (7 ). W ashington trade law yer M atthew Marks has observed: "I can on ly  conclude . . .  that the 
substitution o f  a material injury standard o f  sim ple injury under the Trade A ct o f  1979 has had little, i f  any, effect 
on  the C om m ission ’s administration o f  the A nti-D um ping A ct and countervailing duty law  to date". T ext o f  letter 
o f  31 July 1980 o f  M atthew Marks to Rodney Grey, cited in G rey, ib id .,  p. 46.
12. Prior to the T A A , the Trade A ct o f  1974 had expanded C V D  procedures in  U .S . law , especially  regarding 
jud icia l review . The A ct provided for a right o f  appeal to a Custom s Court, w hich later becam e the Court o f  
International Trade (C IT). Manufacturers and producers in the U nited States w ere g iven  standing to pursue an 
appeal. P reviously , on ly  importers had that right. A dditionally, parties w ere g iven  the right to have jud icia l review  
o f  negative findings and to challenge the amount o f  a C V D  finding in addition to the finding itself.
The Trade A ct o f  1974 both facilitated the use o f  C V D s and it im proved the procedural safeguards 
associated w ith those procedures. For exam ple, writing about the pre-1974 period, Stanley M etzger has noted, 
”[o]ne o f  the m ost striking aspects o f  countervailing duty administration in  the U nited States is the alm ost total lack  
o f  procedural safeguards in  offic ia l proceedings. N either statute, nor regulations make any provision  for hearings 
and the usual ancillary procedures according substantial elem ents o f  procedural due process to parties or countries 
affected by a countervailing duty im position. The lack o f  procedural safeguards is peculiarly disturbing in  v iew  o f  
the very great d iscretion delegated to the secretary o f  the treasury and, through him , to the Bureau o f  Custom s."
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T h e  g r e a t e r  t r a n s p a r e n c y  in  t h e  r u l e s  a n d  r e g u la t i o n s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  p r o c e d u r a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  g o v e r n in g  
A D  a n d  C V D  a c t i o n s  i n c o r p o r a te d  in to  t h e  T A A ,  m a d e  i t  e a s i e r  f o r  i m p o r t e r s  in  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  t o  
p e t i t i o n  f o r  A D  o r  C V D  a c t i o n s  a n d  t o  s e e k  r e v i e w  o f  t h o s e  a c t i o n s  t h r o u g h  t h e  j u d i c i a l  s y s te m .  T h e  r e s u l t  
w a s  a  s h a r p  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  a c t i o n s  l a u n c h e d  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  s in c e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  
a m e n d m e n t s  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  b y  t h e  T A A  ( a n d  t h e  T r a d e  A c t  o f  1 9 7 4 ) .  P r i o r  t o  1 9 7 0  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  
r e s o r t e d  t o  A D  o r  C V D  a c t i o n s  o n l y  o c c a s i o n a l l y ;  f o r  e x a m p le ,  a s  n o t e d  b y  H a r t :  “ [ b j e t w e e n  th e  
e n a c tm e n t  o f  t h e  f i n a l  c o u n te r v a i l i n g  d u t y  s t a tu t e  in  1 8 9 7  a n d  1 9 6 9 ,  o n l y  s o m e  6 5  c o u n te r v a i l i n g  d u t y  
o r d e r s  w e r e  i s s u e d ,  r o u g h l y  o n e  a  y e a r . ” 13 T h i s  c o n t r a s t s  s h a r p l y  w i t h  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i m m e d ia t e l y  
f o l l o w in g  p a s s a g e  o f  t h e  T A A ,  w h e r e  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  i n i t i a t e d  2 8 0  C V D  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  o v e r  t h e  p e r io d  
1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 5 .14 A g a i n s t  C a n a d a ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  i n i t i a t e d  11 n e w  C V D  c a s e s  o v e r  t h e  p e r io d  1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 7 .
T h e r e  a r e  t w o  a p p r o a c h e s  t o  t h e  u s e  o f  A D  a n d  C V D s .  O n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  t h e s e  m e a s u r e s  c a n  b e  
s e e n  a s  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  r e m e d y  o r  o f f s e t  u n f a i r  t r a d e  p r a c t i c e s  b y  f o r e i g n  g o v e r n m e n t s  o r  e x p o r te r s .  A s  a n  
a l t e r n a t iv e ,  t h e y  c a n  b e  s e e n  a s  a  s y s te m  o f  c o n t i n g e n c y  p r o t e c t i o n ,  o r  “ m e a s u r e s  o f  ’s t a n d - b y  p r o t e c t i o n ’ 
o r  t e c h n i q u e s  o f  a d m i n i s t e r e d  t r a d e . ” 15 C o n t in g e n c y  p r o t e c t i o n  is  e s p e c i a l l y  p r o v i d e d  o n  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  
o f  s p e c i f i c  i n d u s t r i e s  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a  c o m p l i c a t e d  b o d y  o f  t r a d e  r e g u la t i o n s .  T h e  s y s te m  is  d i s c r e t e  a n d  
h i g h l y  l e g a l i s t i c ,  a n d  i t  i s  a n  a l t e r n a t iv e  t o  a  m o r e  g e n e r a l  a p p r o a c h  t o  t r a d e  p o l i c y  b a s e d  o n  m u l t i l a t e r a l  
t a r i f f  r e d u c t io n s  o r  c o d e s  o f  c o n d u c t .  T h e  u s e  o f  c o n t i n g e n c y  p r o t e c t i o n — o r  t r a d e  r e m e d ie s  — in c r e a s e d  
in  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  b u t  w h e r e a s  t h e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  A D  d u t i e s  is  f a i r l y  e v e n l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  b e tw e e n  t r a d i n g  n a t i o n s ,  
C V D s  a r e  p r i n c i p a l l y  a  U .S .  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t .16 A s  a p t l y  d e s c r i b e d  b y  P a t r i c k  M e s s e r l i n ,  “ [ t ] o  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  t h e  [ S u b s id i e s ]  [ C ] o d e  is  a n  i n s t r u m e n t  t o  c o n t r o l  s u b s id i e s .  T o  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d ,  i t  
is  a n  i n s t r u m e n t  t o  c o n t r o l  U .S .  c o u n te r v a i l i n g  d u t i e s . ” 17
Stanley D . M etzger, L o w erin g  N o n ta r if f  B a rrie rs : U .S . L a w , P ractice  an d  N eg o tia tin g  Objectives, W ashington, D.C.: 
The B rookings Institution, 1979, 105.
13. M ichael Hart, "The Future on  the Table: The Continuing N egotiating A genda under the Canada-United  
States Free-Trade A greem ent.” Paper presented at a conference held at the U niversity o f  Ottawa, Faculty o f  Law  
(C om m on L aw ), M ay 5 , 1989, p . 39 .
14. F inger and N ogu es, ib id ., p. 708.
15. G rey, ib id . , p. 8.
16. F inger and N ogues note that over 1980-1985 , A D  actions initiated by three G A TT C Ps w ere as fo llow s: 
U nited States, p . 280; EC, p . 254; and Canada, p p .219 , 708.
17. Patrick M esserlin, "Public Subsidies to Industry and Agriculture and C ountervailing D uties."  Paper 
prepared for the European M eeting on the P osition  o f  the European C om m unity in  the N ew  G A TT Round. Spain, 
O ctober 2 -4 , 1986, as referred to in  F inger and O lechow ski, ib id ., p. 156.
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I n  v i e w  o f  t h e  f r e q u e n t  u s e  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  o f  u n f a i r  t r a d e  r e m e d ie s  d u r i n g  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  c o u n te r v a i l i n g  d u t ie s ,  C a n a d a  r e c o g n i z e d  t h e  n e e d  to  a c h i e v e  m o r e  s e c u r e  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  U .S .  
m a r k e t  u n d e r  t h e  C U S F T A ,  g i v e n  i t s  h i g h  d e p e n d e n c e  o n  t r a d e  w i t h  t h e  U .S .  a n d  t h e  l i k e l ih o o d  o f  i ts  
i n c r e a s e d  d e p e n d e n c e  in  t h e  f u tu r e .  S e c u r i t y  o f  a c c e s s  t h e r e f o r e  b e c a m e  o n e  o f  t h e  m a j o r  g o a l s  o f  C a n a d a  
in  t h e  C U S F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n .
D u r i n g  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  C a n a d a  o r i g in a l ly  h o p e d  t o  a c h i e v e  a n  e x c l u s i o n  f r o m  t h e  s c o p e  o f  U .S .  
u n f a i r  t r a d e  r e m e d y  la w s .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  n e v e r  c o n s i d e r e d  t h i s  p r o p o s a l  a  s e r i o u s  o p t io n .  
C a n a d a ’s  a l t e r n a t e  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  a  l i s t  o f  “ a c c e p t a b le ”  a n d  “ u n a c c e p t a b l e ”  s u b s id i e s  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  
th e  p a r t i e s  i n v o lv e d  c a m e  to  a  s i m i l a r  im p a s s e .
C a n a d a ’s  l a c k  o f  s u c c e s s  in  n e g o t i a t i n g  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  e i t h e r  o f  t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  in to  t h e  C U S F T A  
l e d  i t  t o  s u g g e s t  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  a n  i n te r im  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m  in  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  g iv e  
C a n a d a  s o m e  i n d i r e c t  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  u s e  o f  U .S .  t r a d e  r e m e d y  l a w s  a g a i n s t  C a n a d i a n  g o o d s .  F o r  
C a n a d a ,  t h e  m e c h a n i s m  w a s  f u n d a m e n ta l  t o  c lo s in g  a  d e a l .  H a d  t h e  p r o p o s a l  b e e n  r e j e c t e d  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a te s ,  C a n a d a  w o u l d  n o t  h a v e  s i g n e d  t h e  a g r e e m e n t .  O n l y  h o u r s  b e f o r e  t h e  d e a d l i n e ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  
a g r e e d  t o  a  b i n d i n g  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m  c o v e r i n g  A D  a n d  C V D s .
D i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  o n  A D  a n d  C V D s  is  i n c lu d e d  in  C h a p te r  19  o f  t h e  C U S F T A ,  a n d  i t  h a s  t h r e e  
p a r t s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  p a r t i e s  a g r e e d  t o  c o n t i n u e  n e g o t i a t i n g  o n  d u m p in g  a n d  s u b s id y  i s s u e s  a n d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
a l t e r n a t iv e  r u l e s  w i t h i n  s e v e n  y e a r s ,  i f  p o s s ib l e .  A  w o r k i n g  g r o u p  w a s  c r e a te d  t o  p u r s u e  t h i s  t a s k ,  b u t  b o th  
c o u n t r i e s  a g r e e d  t o  n e g o t i a t e  i s s u e s  o f  d u m p in g  a n d  s u b s id y / c o u n te r v a i l  in  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  U r u g u a y  R o u n d  
in  l i e u  o f  b i l a t e r a l  t a l k s .
S e c o n d ,  t h e  p a r t i e s  a g r e e d  t h a t  a m e n d m e n t s  t o  e i t h e r  c o u n t r y ’s  A D  o r  C V D  l a w s  w o u l d  b e  s u b j e c t  
t o  c o n s t r a i n t s  o f  n o t i f i c a t i o n  a n d  c o n s u l t a t i o n ,  a n d  t h a t  s u c h  a m e n d m e n t s  w o u l d  b e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  r e l e v a n t  
p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  G A T T  a n d  o t h e r  m u l t i l a t e r a l  a c c o r d s ,  a n d  t h e  C U S F T A  i t s e l f .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  p a r t i e s  a g r e e d  
t o  s u b m i t  p r o p o s e d  l e g i s l a t i v e  c h a n g e s  t o  a  b in a t i o n a l  p a n e l  ( s e e  b e lo w )  f o r  a n  a d v i s o r y  o p i n i o n  o n  t h e  
c o n s i s t e n c y  o f  t h e  c h a n g e  w i t h  e x i s t i n g  o b l ig a t io n s  u n d e r  i n te r n a t i o n a l  la w .
T h i r d ,  t h e  p a r t i e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  b i n a t io n a l  p a n e l s  t o  r e p la c e  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  b y  d o m e s t i c  c o u r t s  o f  
f i n a l  A D  o r  C V D  d e te r m i n a t i o n s  b y  n a t i o n a l  a g e n c ie s .  E a c h  p a r ty  a g r e e d  t o  r e ta in  i t s  o w n  A D  a n d  C V D  
p r a c t i c e s — w h i c h  in  a n y  c a s e  w e r e  f a i r l y  s i m i l a r — a n d  t o  m a k e  a v a i l a b l e  b i n a t i o n a l  p a n e l s  t o  p e r s o n s  w h o  
w o u l d  o t h e r w i s e  h a v e  b e e n  e n t i t l e d  t o  j u d i c i a l  r e v ie w  u n d e r  d o m e s t i c  la w . T h e  p a n e l ’s  m a n d a t e  i s  t o  
c o n s i d e r  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e c o r d  o f  t h e  c a s e  a p p e a le d  a n d  d e c id e  w h e t h e r  t h e  f i n a l  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  w a s  
m a d e  in  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  a p p l i c a b l e  d o m e s t i c  l a w . 18
P a n e l s  a r e  c o m p o s e d  o f  f i v e  m e m b e r s  c h o s e n  f r o m  a  r o s t e r  o f  t r a d e  e x p e r t s ,  p r i m a r i l y  l a w y e r s ,  
e s t a b l i s h e d  in  e a c h  c o u n t r y .  T w o  p a n e l i s t s  a r e  s e l e c te d  b y  e a c h  c o u n t r y ,  a n d  t h e  f i f t h  is  c h o s e n  j o i n t l y ,  
o r  b y  l o t  w h e n  t h e r e  i s  n o  a g r e e m e n t  o n  t h e  f i n a l  m e m b e r .  I n  p r a c t ic e ,  t h e  f i f th  m e m b e r ’s n a t i o n a l i t y  h a s  
a l t e r n a t e d  b e tw e e n  t h e  t w o  c o u n t r i e s  f r o m  o n e  p a n e l  t o  t h e  n e x t .
18. C U SF T A , A rticle 1902.
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T h e  s t a n d a r d  o f  r e v ie w  t o  b e  a p p l i e d  b y  t h e  p a n e l  is  t h e  s t a n d a r d  a p p l i c a b l e  in  t h e  c o u n t r y  w h e r e  
t h e  A D  o r  C V D  w a s  m a d e .  I n  C a n a d a ,  t h e  t e s t  is  w h e t h e r  t h e  a g e n c y  ( a )  f a i l e d  t o  o b s e r v e  a  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
n a tu r a l  j u s t i c e  o r  o t h e r w i s e  a c t e d  b e y o n d  o r  r e f u s e d  t o  e x e r c i s e  i t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n ;  ( b )  e r r e d  in  l a w  in  m a k i n g  
i ts  d e c i s i o n  o r  o r d e r ,  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  e r r o r  a p p e a r s  o n  t h e  f a c e  o f  t h e  r e c o r d ;  o r  ( c )  b a s e d  i t s  d e c i s i o n  
o r  o r d e r  o n  a n  e r r o n e o u s  f i n d in g  o f  f a c t  t h a t  w a s  m a d e  in  a  p e r v e r s e  o r  c a p r i c i o u s  m a n n e r  o r  w i t h o u t  
r e g a r d  t o  t h e  m a t e r i a l  b e f o r e  it .  I n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  t h e  t e s t  is  w h e t h e r  t h e  a g e n c y ’s d e c i s i o n  is  
u n s u p p o r t e d  b y  s u b s t a n t i a l  e v id e n c e  o n  t h e  r e c o r d ,  o r  i s  o t h e r w is e  n o t  in  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  d o m e s t i c  
l a w s . 19
I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  p a n e l s  a r e  n o t  a u th o r i z e d  to  c r e a te  s u b s t a n t iv e  l a w  b u t  m u s t  a c t  
c o n s i s t e n t l y  w i t h  t h e  l a w s  o f  t h e  im p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y .  D e t e r m in a t io n s  o f  d u m p in g  a n d  s u b s id i z a t i o n  c a n  
b e  d i f f e r e n t  in  e a c h  c o u n t r y  b u t  w i l l  s t i l l  b e  u p h e ld  a s  l o n g  a s  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a g e n c y  m a d e  i ts  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  in  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  d o m e s t i c  la w .
R e v i e w  o f  t h e  p a n e l ’s  d e c i s i o n  is  v e r y  l im i te d .  T h e r e  is  n o  a p p e a l  m e c h a n i s m  in  t h e  C U S F T A  
t o  c h a l l e n g e  a  p a n e l ’s  f i n d in g s  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  o f  l e g a l  o r  f a c tu a l  e r r o r .  T h e  e x t r a o r d in a r y  c h a l l e n g e  
p r o c e d u r e s  c a n  b e  i n v o k e d  o n l y  w h e n  t h e r e  a r e  a l l e g a t io n s  o f  g r o s s  m i s c o n d u c t ,  b i a s ,  s e r i o u s  c o n f l i c t  o f  
i n te r e s t ,  o r  o t h e r  m a t e r i a l  v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  r u l e s  o f  c o n d u c t  b y  a  p a n e l i s t ;  o r  t h e r e  is  a  s e r i o u s  d e p a r t u r e  
f r o m  a  f u n d a m e n ta l  r u l e  o f  p r o c e d u r e  b y  t h e  p a n e l ;  o r  i f  t h e  a c t i o n  b y  t h e  p a n e l  i s  m a n i f e s t l y  i n  e x c e s s  
o f  i t s  p o w e r s ,  a u th o r i t y ,  o r  j u r i s d i c t i o n ;  a n d  w h e n  a n y  o f  t h e  a c t i o n s  o u t l i n e d  a b o v e  m a t e r i a l l y  a f f e c te d  
t h e  p a n e l ’ s d e c i s i o n  o r  t h r e a t e n e d  t h e  i n te g r i ty  o f  t h e  r e v i e w  p r o c e s s .20
T h r o u g h  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 2 , 3 0  C h a p te r  1 9  c a s e s  a n d  o n e  E x t r a o r d in a r y  C h a l l e n g e  h a d  b e e n  
i n i t i a t e d .21 O f  t h e s e ,  2 4  w e r e  d i r e c te d  a g a i n s t  U .S .  a g e n c ie s  [ th e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  C o m m e r c e  ( D O C )  o r  t h e  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r a d e  C o m m i s s io n  ( I T C ) ] .  F i f t e e n  o f  t h e s e  c a s e s  h a v e  b e e n  c o m p l e t e d  a n d  n i n e  r e m a in  
a c t iv e .  S i x  h a v e  b e e n  i n i t i a t e d  a g a i n s t  C a n a d i a n  a g e n c ie s  [ R e v e n u e  C a n a d a  ( R C )  o r  t h e  C a n a d i a n  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r a d e  T r ib u n a l  ( C I T T ) ] .  T h r e e  o f  t h e s e  c a s e s  h a v e  b e e n  c o m p l e te d ,  a n d  t h r e e  r e m a in  a c t iv e .  
O n e  o f  t h e  s i x  c a s e s  a g a i n s t  C a n a d i a n  a g e n c ie s  w a s  l a u n c h e d  b y  a  C a n a d i a n  p e t i t i o n e r ,  a n d  t h e  r e s t  w e r e  
b r o u g h t  b y  U .S .  p e t i t i o n e r s .  A l l  o f  t h e  c a s e s  a g a i n s t  U .S .  a g e n c ie s  w e r e  b r o u g h t  b y  C a n a d i a n  p e t i t i o n e r s ,  
a l t h o u g h  in  s e v e n  o f  t h e s e ,  U .S .  p e t i t i o n e r s  w e r e  a l s o  p r e s e n t .  O v e r a l l ,  C a n a d i a n s  h a v e  b e e n  t h e  m a j o r  
u s e r s  o f  C h a p t e r  1 9  p r o c e d u r e s ,  a n d  t h e  m a in  r e s p o n d e n t s  h a v e  b e e n  U .S .  a g e n c ie s .
T h e  r e s u l t s  o f  C h a p te r  1 9  a c t io n s  a r e  t h a t  a b o u t  h a l f  o f  t h e  c a s e s  r e s u l t e d  in  a  r e m a n d  in  w h o l e  
o r  in  p a r t ;  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  w a s  r e tu r n e d  t o  t h e  a g e n c y  f o r  “ a c t i o n  n o t  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e
19. C U SF T A , A rticle 1911 defines the standard o f  review . In Canada the standard o f  review  under the 
C U SF T A  is adopted from  s. 18 .1 (4 ) o f  the F e d e ra l C o urt Act, S.C. 1985, c.F-7 as amended, w h ile  the standard o f  
review  applicable in the U nited States is adopted from s .5 1 6 A (b )(l)  o f  the T a r if f  A ct o f  1930. See generally Gary 
H orlick and Amanda D eB usk, "The Functioning o f  the U .S.-Canada Free Trade Agreem ent D ispute R esolution  
Panels," in Leonard W averman, ed., N eg o tia tin g  a n d  Im p lem enting  a  N o rth  A m erican  F re e  T rade Agreem ent, The 
Fraser Institute, Toronto, 1992, 1; and, Stewart Abercrombie Baker, "Chapter N ineteen: The A ntidum ping and 
C ountervailing D uty Laws," U npublished Article, 1991.
20 . C U SF T A , A rticle 1904.
21 . Status Report o f  Cases (chapters 18 and 19) Canada-U.S. FTA Binational Secretariat, Canadian Section, 
N ovem ber 1992.
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p a n e l ’ s d e c i s i o n . ” 22 I n  t h e  t w o  C a n a d i a n  c a s e s  t h a t  h a v e  b e e n  c o m p l e te d ,  t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  t h e  a g e n c y  w e r e  
a f f i r m e d  in  o n e  p a n e l  a n d  r e m a n d e d  in  t h e  o th e r .  F o r  t h e  c o m p l e te d  U .S .  c a s e s ,  f o u r  w e r e  r e m a n d e d  a n d  
f o u r  w e r e  a f f i r m e d .23 I n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  t h e  C o u r t  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r a d e  a c h i e v e d  a p p r o x im a t e ly  
s i m i l a r  r e s u l t s  in  t h e  p e r io d  p r i o r  t o  t h e  C U S F T A .
T h e  o v e r a l l  j u d g m e n t  o f  t h e  C h a p te r  1 9  m e c h a n i s m  is  t h a t  t h e  p a n e l  p r o c e s s  h a s  w o r k e d  
e f f e c t i v e ly .  I n  a  l e n g t h y  r e v i e w  o f  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  in  t h e  C U S F T A ,  P r o f e s s o r  A n d r e a s  L o w e n f e l d  o f  
N e w  Y o r k  U n i v e r s i t y  h a s  w r i t t e n  t h a t  “ [a ] 11 t h i n g s  c o n s i d e r e d ,  t h e  u n i q u e  b i n a t io n a l  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  
m e c h a n i s m s  c r e a te d  b y  t h e  C a n a d a - U n i t e d  S t a te s  F r e e  T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t  h a v e  w o r k e d  e x t r a o r d in a r i l y  
w e l l . ” 24 L o w e n f e l d  n o t e s  t h a t  t h e  p a n e l s  h a v e  c o n s c i e n t i o u s ly  a p p l i e d  t h e  l a w  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  in  w h i c h  th e  
c a s e  a r o s e ,  a n d  d e c i s i o n s  h a v e  n o t  r e f l e c t e d  a  b ia s  f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  t r a d e  r e m e d y  l e g i s l a t i o n .  M o s t  i m p o r t a n t ,  
p a n e l s  h a v e  n o t  r e f l e c t e d  n a t i o n a l  b ia s ,  a n d  p a n e l i s t s  h a v e  d e a l t  o b j e c t iv e ly  w i t h  l e g a l  i s s u e s .
A D  Duties and C V D s  U n d e r  a N A F T A 25
L ik e  C a n a d a  in  t h e  C U S F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  M e x i c o  a im e d  t o  a c h i e v e  g r e a t e r  a n d  m o r e  s e c u r e  
a c c e s s  t o  t h e  U .S .  m a r k e t  b y  n e g o t i a t i n g  a  N A F T A  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  C a n a d a .  I n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  
M e x i c o  h a s  i n c r e a s in g l y  f o u n d  i t s e l f  a t  t h e  r e c e iv i n g  e n d  o f  U .S .  A D  a c t i o n s .26 B e tw e e n  1 9 8 0  a n d  1 9 9 0 , 
U .S .  c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  i n i t i a t e d  e ig h t  a c t i o n s  a g a i n s t  M e x i c a n  p r o d u c e r s .27 A l t h o u g h  A D  p r a c t i c e s  h a v e  
b e c o m e  m o r e  s t a n d a r d i z e d  a m o n g  G A T T  m e m b e r s ,  t h e r e  r e m a in s  s o m e  d i s c r e p a n c y  in  t h e i r  u s e  a n d  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  d u e  t o  t h e  l a c k  o f  p r e c i s i o n  in  t h e  w o r d i n g  o f  t h e  G A T T ’s  A D  r u l e s  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s ,
22 . F T A , Art. 1904(8).
2 3 . C ases can be remanded in  w hole or in part, hence a "remand" may be a relatively insignificant action.
2 4 . Andreas F . L ow enfeld , "Binational D ispute Settlem ent under Chapters 18 and 19 o f  the Canada-United  
States Free Trade Agreem ent: A n Interim Appraisal" Adm inistrative Conference o f  the U nited States, D ecem ber  
1990, p . 78 .
25 . M ichael Hart, A  N o rth  A m erican  F re e  T rade  Agreement, Ottawa: Centre for Trade P olicy  and Law, 1990, 
pp. 126-127.
26 . Stephen J. P ow ell, Craig R . G iesse, and Craig L. Jackson, "Current A dm inistration o f  U .S . A ntidum ping  
and C ountervailing D uty Laws: Im plications for Prospective U .S .-M ex ico  Free Trade Talks," 11 N orthw estern  
J o u rn a l o f  In te rn a tio n a l L a w  an d  Business (1990), p. 179. M exico has not encountered the sam e problem  w ith  
countervailing duty actions as Canada since it signed the "Understanding on Subsidies and C ountervailing Duties" 
w ith the U nited States in 1986 and pursuant to its obligations under the Agreem ent, substantially altered its subsidy  
practice. See C elia  R. Siac, "Does M exico Subsidize too  M uch? Perceptions versus Reality," Toronto: C .D . H ow e  
Institute Com m entary N o . 36, February 1992, p. 6.
27 . T hese include: Carbon Steel W ire Rod; O il Country Tubular Goods; W elded Steel W ire Fabric; Porcelain- 
O n-Steel C ooking Ware; Certain Fresh Cut F low ers; Portland Hydraulic Cement; Certain Steel Pails and Gray 
Portland C em ent & Clinker; taken from  U .S . ITC Annual Reports 1980-1989.
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a l t h o u g h  n o t  t o  t h e  s a m e  e x t e n t  a s  w i t h  C V D s .28 B i n a t i o n a l  r e v i e w  a s  e x i s t s  in  C h a p t e r  1 9  o f  t h e  
C U S F T A  c a n  r e d u c e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a b u s e  b y  p r o m o t i n g  t h e  c o n s i s t e n t  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  d o m e s t i c  t r a d e -  
r e m e d y  l a w s  a n d  r e g u la t i o n s  t h r o u g h  th e  i n v o lv e m e n t  o f  p a n e l i s t s  f r o m  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  a r e  p a r t y  t o  t h e  
d i s p u t e .  A  C h a p t e r  1 9 - l ik e  m e c h a n i s m  c o u ld  p r o v i d e  a n  a d e q u a te  l e g a l  s o l u t io n  t o  a n  o t h e r w i s e  p o l i t i c a l  
p r o b l e m .
H o w e v e r ,  e v e n  th o u g h  t h e  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m  in  C h a p te r  1 9  o f  t h e  C U S F T A  h a s  
w o r k e d  w e l l  in  a  b i l a t e r a l  c o n te x t  b e tw e e n  C a n a d a  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  t h i s  s u c c e s s  d o e s  n o t  m e a n  t h a t  
i t  is  n e c e s s a r i l y  s u i t a b l e  f o r  N A F T A  o r  o t h e r  a g r e e m e n t s .  T h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  C U S F T A ’s  d i s p u t e  
s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m  t o  M e x i c o  r a i s e s  a  v a r i e t y  o f  o b s t a c l e s  a n d  c o n c e r n s .  T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  
is  t o  d i s c u s s  s o m e  o f  t h e s e  o b s t a c l e s  a n d  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  e x t e n d i n g  a  C h a p t e r  1 9 - l ik e  m e c h a n i s m  to  
N A F T A .  T h e  f o l lo w in g  d i s c u s s i o n  is  c e r t a i n l y  n o t  e x h a u s t i v e ,  b u t  i t  p r o v i d e s  s o m e  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  w h a t  
p r o b l e m s  o r  c o n c e r n s  w e r e  n e g o t i a t e d  b e f o r e  a g r e e m e n t  o n  t h i s  p o i n t  w a s  r e a c h e d .
B e f o r e  d e lv i n g  in to  t h e  i s s u e s  r a i s e d  b y  t h e  q u e s t io n  o f  e x t e n d i n g  a  C h a p t e r  1 9  m e c h a n i s m  to  
N A F T A ,  i t  is  u s e f u l  t o  o u t l i n e  b r i e f l y  t h e  n a tu r e  o f  M e x i c o ’s c u r r e n t  u n f a i r - t r a d e - r e m e d y  s y s te m .
Mexico’s A D  and  C V D  System
M e x i c o ’s  p r i m a r y  l a w s  g o v e r n in g  A D  d u t y  a n d  C V D  a c t i o n s  a r e  t h e  F o r e i g n  T r a d e  R e g u la t o r y  
A c t 29 ( A c t )  a n d  R e g u la t i o n s  A g a i n s t  U n f a i r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r a d e  P r a c t i c e s  ( R e g u l a t i o n s ) . 30 T h e  a g e n c y  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  A D  a n d  C V D  a c t i o n s  is  t h e  S e c r e ta r ía  d e  C o m e rc io  y  F o m e n to  In d u s t r ia l  ( S E C O F I ) ,  a  
d i v i s io n  o f  t h e  B u d g e t  a n d  F i n a n c e  M i n i s t r y ,  w i t h  t h e  C o m is ió n  d e  A ra n c e le s  y  C o n tro le s  a l  C o m e rc io  
E x t e r io r  ( C A C C E ) 31 p r o v i d in g  c o n s u l t a t i v e  s u p p o r t ,  p a r t i c u l a r ly  o n  t h e  i s s u e  o f  d u t y  a s s e s s m e n t s .
S E C O F I  c o n d u c t s  u p  t o  t w o  in v e s t i g a t i o n s  l e a d in g  t o  p r o v i s i o n a l  d u t y  a s s e s s m e n t s  a n d  a  t h i r d  
c u lm i n a t i n g  in  a  f i n a l  d e te r m i n a t i o n .  I n  o r d e r  t o  m a k e  a  p o s i t i v e  f i n d in g ,  S E C O F I  m u s t  d e t e r m i n e  t h a t  
a n  u n f a i r  p r a c t i c e  ( d u m p in g  o r  s u b s id i z a t i o n )  e x i s t s  in  c o n ju n c t io n  w i t h  a  f i n d in g  o f  i n ju r y  t o  t h e  d o m e s t i c  
i n d u s t r y .  F in a l  a f f i r m a t i v e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  m a y  b e  a p p e a le d  b y  M e x i c a n  i m p o r t e r s  t o  t h e  F e d e r a l  F i s c a l  
T r ib u n a l  ( F F T )  o n  g r o u n d s  o u t l i n e d  in  t h e  C ó d ig o  F is c a l  ( F i s c a l  C o d e )  s u c h  a s  i n c o m p e te n c e  o f  o f f i c i a l s  
o r  a  b r e a c h  o f  f o r m a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  M e x i c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  p r o v i d e s  a  s u p p l e m e n t a l  r e m e d y  
k n o w n  a s  a m p a ro  t h a t  c a n  b e  r e q u e s t e d  w h e r e  a  g u a r a n t e e d  in d iv i d u a l  r i g h t  w a s  b r e a c h e d  d u r i n g  th e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e s s  a n d  h a d  a n  im p a c t  o n  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  t h e  a c t i o n .  T h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  a m p a r o  
p r o c e d u r e  a n d  r e m e d y  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  in  g r e a t e r  d e ta i l  b e lo w .
28 . W illiam  B. Carm ichael, "Review o f  the Custom s Tariff, (A ntidum ping) A ct," Subm ission to the Gruen  
R eview  Canberra, 1986, as referred to in  Finger and O lechow ski, ib id ., p. 159.
29 . D ecreto por el que se Crea la Ley Reglamentaria del A rtículo 131 de la C onstitución P olítica  de los Estados 
U nidos M exicanos en M ateria de C om ercio Exterior, D .O ., Jan. 13, 1986.
30 . R eglam ento Contra Prácticas D esleales del C om ercio Internacional, D .O ., N ov . 2 5 , 1987.
31 . C A C C E can be translated as the Com m ittee on Foreign Trade Tariffs and C ontrols. Ernesto R ubio del 
C ueto, "Countervailing D uties A ffecting U nited States-M exican Trade", 12 H ouston  Jo u rn a l o f  In te rn a tio n a l L a w  
(1990 ) p. 323.
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M e x i c o ’s  A D  p r o v i s i o n s  w e r e  i n v o k e d  3 5  t im e s  b e tw e e n  1 9 8 7  a n d  1 9 8 9 . F i f t e e n  o f  t h e s e  c a s e s  
w e r e  a g a i n s t  U .S .  im p o r t s ,  t h e  m a j o r i t y  i n i t i a t e d  in  1 9 8 7 . O n l y  f o u r  w e r e  i n i t i a t e d  in  1 9 8 8  a n d  1 9 8 9 ,  a n  
i n d i c a t i o n  o f  a  d e c l i n e  in  t h e i r  u s e .32 M e x i c o ’s C V D  p r o v i s i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  in v o k e d  c o n s i d e r a b l y  l e s s  
o f t e n ,  w i t h  o n l y  o n e  c a s e  a g a i n s t  M a l a y s i a  o v e r  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  p e r io d .
Technical Issues of Incorporating Mexico Into a Chapter 19 System
F r o m  a n  o r g a n iz a t i o n a l  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  C h a p t e r  1 9  p r o v i s i o n s  t o  M e x i c o  r a i s e d  b o th  
t e c h n i c a l  a n d  s u b s t a n t iv e  c o n c e r n s .  T h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  t e c h n i c a l  i m p e d i m e n t s  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n .  
F i r s t ,  t h e  C h a p te r  1 9  m e c h a n i s m  o f  t h e  C U S F T A  w a s  d r a f t e d  in  a  b i l a t e r a l  c o n t e x t  r a t h e r  t h a n  in  a  
t r i l a t e r a l  o r  m u l t i l a t e r a l  o n e .  T h e  q u e s t io n  a r o s e  w h e t h e r  t h e  m e c h a n i s m  s h o u l d  b e  a m e n d e d  t o  a l l o w  
t r i n a t i o n a l  ( a s  o p p o s e d  t o  b i n a t i o n a l )  r e v ie w .  T h e r e  a r e  a  n u m b e r  o f  f o r m s  s u c h  a n  a m e n d m e n t  c o u l d  h a v e  
t a k e n .  O n e  o p t io n ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  w a s  b in a t i o n a l  r e v i e w  b y  t h e  p a r t i e s  d i r e c t l y  i n v o lv e d  in  t h e  d i s p u t e ,  w i t h  
t h e  t h i r d  p a r t y  h a v i n g  a  r i g h t  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  t h e  h e a r i n g  a s  a  l i t i g a n t  b u t  w i t h o u t  n a t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
o n  t h e  p a n e l .  T h i s  o p t i o n  r e q u i r e s  r e l a t i v e ly  m i n o r  c h a n g e s  t o  t h e  c u r r e n t  s t r u c tu r e  a n d  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  
m e c h a n i s m .  T r in a t io n a l  p a n e l  r e v i e w  m a y  n o t  b e  a s  a p p e a l i n g  s i n c e  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  a  c o u n t r y  n o t  
i n v o lv e d  in  t h e  d i s p u t e  c o u ld  c o m p l i c a t e  r a th e r  t h a n  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s .  I n  t h e  e n d ,  
b i n a t i o n a l  d i s p u t e  r e s o l u t i o n  w a s  n e g o t i a t e d  i n to  t h e  N A F T A .
T h e  s e c o n d  a n d  t h i r d  t e c h n i c a l  i s s u e s  a r e  m o r e  s e r i o u s  a n d  in v o lv e  M e x i c o ’s  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e  
s e c o n d  p r o b l e m  d e a l s  d i r e c t l y  w i t h  M e x i c o ’s  a d h e r e n c e  t o  t h e  C a lv o  D o c t r in e  o f  l a w ,  w h i c h  h o l d s  t h a t  
l e g a l  d i s p u t e s  b e tw e e n  M e x i c a n  a n d  f o r e i g n  b u s i n e s s  p a r tn e r s  m u s t  b e  s e t t l e d  t h r o u g h  M e x i c a n  in te r n a l  
r e m e d ie s  r a t h e r  t h a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o n e s .33 S o m e  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  s t a te s ,  i n c l u d i n g  M e x i c o ,  h a v e  a d o p te d  
a  p r o v i s i o n  in  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  t h a t  r e q u i r e  f o r e ig n e r s  w h o  h a v e  b e e n  g r a n te d  c e r t a i n  c o m m e r c i a l  r i g h t s  
t o  a b s t a i n  f r o m  s e e k in g  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e i r  g o v e r n m e n ts  s h o u l d  a  d i s p u t e  a r i s e .  T h i s  c l a u s e  r a i s e d  th e  
i s s u e  w h e t h e r  r e c o u r s e  t o  b i n a t i o n a l  p a n e l s  w a s  v a l i d  u n d e r  M e x i c a n  l a w ,  i n a s m u c h  a s  t h e  p a n e l s  m ig h t  
b e  p e r c e iv e d  a s  g r a n t i n g  a  f o r m  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  b y  a  f o r e i g n  g o v e r n m e n t . 34 T h is  p r o v i s i o n  d i d  n o t  p o s e  a  
r e a l  t h r e a t  t o  a d o p t i n g  b i n a t i o n a l  r e v ie w  u n d e r  N A F T A ,  h o w e v e r .  I t  w a s  e f f e c t i v e ly  d e a l t  w i t h  e a r l y  in  
t h e  C h a p t e r  1 9  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  I n  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  a  W H F T A ,  t h i s  i s s u e  w i l l  a r i s e  a g a in :  m a n y  L a t i n  
A m e r i c a n  s t a t e s  i n c o r p o r a te  a  f o r m  o f  C a lv o  c la u s e  in  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u t io n s .
T h e  t h i r d  t e c h n i c a l  p r o b l e m  in v o lv e s  M e x i c o ’s w r i t  o f  a m p a r o ,  w h i c h  w a s  m e n t i o n e d  e a r l ie r .  
T h e  w r i t  o f  a m p a r o  is  a  l e g a l  d e v ic e  t h a t  p r o v i d e s  a  p r o c e s s  a n d  r e m e d y  t o  r e d r e s s  v i o l a t i o n s  o f  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  p r o t e c t e d  in d iv i d u a l  r i g h t s  t h a t  h a v e  c a u s e d  a  p e r s o n  i n ju r y .35 A r t i c l e  1 0 3  o f  M e x i c o ’s
32 . U SIT C , R eview  o f  T rade an d  Investm ent M easures by M exico , USITC Report N o. 2275  (A pril 1990), pp. 
4-17.
33 . D r. James C . Baker and L ois J. Y oder, "ICSID and the C alvo Clause a Hindrance to Foreign  D irect 
Investm ent in  the LD C s", 5 O hio  State Jo u rn a l on D ispu te  Resolution  (1989 ), p. 75.
34 . D onald R . Shea, The C a lvo  C lause: A  P rob lem  o f  In te r-A m erican  an d  In te rn a tio n a l L a w  an d  D ip lom acy , 
M inneapolis: U niversity o f  M innesota Press, p. 6.
35 . For an in-depth d iscussion  o f  am p aro  see Hector F ix  Zamudio, "A B r ie f Introduction to  the M exican Writ 
o f  A m p a ro " 9 C a lifo rn ia  Western In te rn a tio n a l L a w  Journal, (1979), 306-348 .
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c o n s t i t u t i o n  e s t a b l i s h e s  t h e  b a s i s  o f  r e c o u r s e  t h r o u g h  a n  a m p a r o  p r o c e e d in g ,  a n d  A r t i c l e  1 0 7  r e g u la t e s  i ts  
o p e r a t io n .  I n  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  A D  a n d  C V D  a c t i o n s ,  w h e n  a l l  o t h e r  r e m e d ie s  h a v e  b e e n  e x h a u s t e d ,  t h e  w r i t  
o f  a m p a r o  p r o v i d e s  r e c o u r s e  f o r  i n f r in g e m e n t s  o f  i n d iv i d u a l  r i g h t s  t o  d u e  p r o c e s s  b y  S E C O F I ,  a s  
e s t a b l i s h e d  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  14  o f  t h e  C o n s t i tu t i o n .
T h e r e  a p p e a r  t o  b e  t w o  p o s s ib l e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  d e v ic e  f o r  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  b i n a t i o n a l  r e v i e w  
i n to  N A F T A .  F i r s t ,  a m p a r o  m a y  b e  u s e d  t o  c h a l l e n g e  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  o f  a  la w ,  s u c h  a s  w h e t h e r  
b i n a t i o n a l  r e v i e w  v i o l a t e s  A r t i c l e  2 7  o f  t h e  M e x i c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  ( w h i c h  r e q u i r e s  r e c o u r s e  t o  M e x i c a n  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  f o r  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  d i s p u t e s  i n v o lv i n g  f o r e ig n e r s ,  i .e . ,  t h e  C a lv o  c la u s e  d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e ) .  I f  a  
c o u r t  f i n d s  t h e  l a w  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  i t  c o u ld  c o n c e iv a b l y  i n v a l i d a t e  t h e  s p e c i f i c  d e c i s i o n  o v e r  w h i c h  
a m p a r o  w a s  i n v o k e d  w i t h o u t  s t r i k in g  d o w n  t h e  l a w  i ts e l f .
T h e  s e c o n d  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  a m p a r o  o n  b in a t i o n a l  r e v ie w  i n v o lv e s  m o r e  d i r e c t l y  r e c o u r s e  t o  a m p a r o  
f o r  v i o l a t i o n s  o f  i n d iv i d u a l  p r o c e d u r a l  a n d  s u b s ta n t iv e  r i g h t s  d u r i n g  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
p r o c e e d in g s ,  a n d  n o t  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  o f  t h e  l a w  u n d e r  w h i c h  a  d e c i s i o n  w a s  m a d e .  I n  s u c h  c a s e s ,  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e v i e w s  o f  S E C O F I ’s f in a l  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  b y  t h e  F e d e r a l  F i s c a l  T r ib u n a l  c a n  b e  s u b j e c t  t o  
r e v i e w  b y  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t s ,  c o l l e g i a t e  c o u r ts ,  o r  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  ( d e p e n d i n g  o n  a  v a r i e t y  o f  f a c to r s ) .
I n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e e d in g s  in  t h e  N A F T A  c o n te x t ,  t h e  i s s u e s  t h a t  a r i s e  a r e  o f  a  d u a l  n a tu r e .  O n e  
t y p e  i n v o lv e s  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  a m p a r o  o n  t h e  r i g h t  t o  j u d i c i a l  r e v ie w ,  w h e r e  p e t i t i o n e r s  s e e k  r e v i e w  o f  
S E C O F I ’s  a c t i o n s  in  d o m e s t i c  c o u r t s  in  p l a c e  o f  b i n a t i o n a l  r e v ie w .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  r e c o u r s e  t o  a m p a r o  
w o u l d  a p p e a r  t o  b e  l im i te d  t o  M e x i c a n  i m p o r t e r s  a n d  e x p o r te r s ,  t h e r e b y  e x c l u d i n g  r e c o u r s e  b y  
n o n r e s i d e n t s .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  g r o u n d s  f o r  r e v ie w  in  a n  a m p a r o  a c t i o n  a r e  n o t  t r a n s p a r e n t .  T h i s  l a c k  o f  
t r a n s p a r e n c y  m a k e s  i t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  f o r e i g n e r  n a t i o n a l s  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  h o w  t h e  m e c h a n i s m  w o r k s  a n d  h o w  
t h e  l a w  is  a p p l i e d .
T h e  s e c o n d  t y p e ,  w h i c h  is  o f  f a r  g r e a t e r  c o n c e r n  f o r  b in a t i o n a l  r e v ie w ,  is  t h a t  t h e  a m p a r o  p r o c e s s  
c o u ld  u n d e r m i n e  t h e  f i n a l i t y  o f  p a n e l  d e c i s io n s .  B e c a u s e  t h e  r i g h t  t o  p e t i t i o n  r e v i e w  o f  a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
d e c i s i o n  u n d e r  a m p a r o  is  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ly  e n t r e n c h e d ,  i f  a  p a r ty  m e e t s  t h e  b a s i c  r e q u i r e m e n t s  t o  i n v o k e  
a m p a r o ,  i t  is  l i k e l y  t h a t  t h i s  r e m e d y  c a n n o t  b e  d e n ie d .  I f  t h i s  is  t h e  c a s e ,  d e c i s i o n s  b y  b i n a t i o n a l  p a n e l s  
w o u l d  b e  s u b j e c t  t o  r e v i e w  b y  a  s u p e r i o r  d o m e s t i c  c o u r t .  T h i s  r e v i e w  w o u l d  n e g a t e  o n e  o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  
p u r p o s e s  o f  t h e  b i n a t i o n a l  p a n e l ,  w h i c h  is  t o  b e  t h e  f i n a l  a r b i t e r  i n  a n  A D  o r  C V D  d i s p u te .
Issues Raised by Chapter 19
N u m e r o u s  s u b s t a n t iv e  i s s u e s  w e r e  a l s o  r a i s e d  in  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  a  C h a p te r  19 - l i k e  m e c h a n i s m  to  
M e x i c o .  T w o  r e q u i r e d  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  F i r s t ,  t h e  C U S F T A  m e c h a n i s m  in  t h e  t r i l a t e r a l  c o n te x t  c o n te m p la t e s  
t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  M e x i c a n  l a w  b y  t h e  r e v ie w i n g  b o d y  t o  d i s p u t e s  i n v o lv i n g  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  a n  u n f a i r  
t r a d e  p r a c t i c e .  T h e  p r o b l e m  c a n  b e  s t a te d  in  t h i s  m a n n e r :  b e c a u s e  o f  a  c o m m o n  l e g a l  b a c k g r o u n d  in  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  C a n a d a ,  t h e  d i s p u t e  m e c h a n i s m  in  C h a p t e r  1 9  o f  t h e  C U S F T A  in h e r e n t l y  c o n ta i n s  
c e r t a i n  s t a n d a r d s  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  d u e  p r o c e s s  a n d  j u d i c i a l  r e v ie w .  H o w e v e r ,  c o n c e r n  w a s  r a i s e d  d u r i n g  th e  
N A F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n s  t h a t ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  d i f f e r i n g  l e g a l  a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  t r a d i t i o n s  in  M e x i c o ,  t h e  
s t a n d a r d s  o f  d u e  p r o c e s s  a n d  j u d i c i a l  r e v ie w  i n h e r e n t  in  t h e  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  m e c h a n i s m  b e tw e e n  C a n a d a  
a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  w o u l d  b e  l o w e r e d  in  t h e  t r i l a t e r a l  c o n te x t .  A m o n g  o t h e r  t h in g s ,  t h e s e  c o n c e r n s  
f o c u s e d  o n  t h e  e n f o r c e m e n t  o f  d e a d l in e s ,  t h e  s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  w r i t t e n  r e c o r d  f o r  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w ,  a n d  th e  
a b s e n c e  o f  p o t e n t i a l  b i a s  in  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  A D  a n d  C V D  a c t io n s .
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S e c o n d ,  t h e r e  a r e  s p e c i f i c  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  M e x i c o ’s t r a d e - l a w  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a n d  t h o s e  o f  
C a n a d a  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta te s .  T h e  M e x i c a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  is  l e s s  f a v o r a b l e  t o  a f f e c te d  p a r t i e s  t h a n  th e  
C a n a d i a n  a n d  U .S .  s y s te m s ,  a n d  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  w i l l  h i g h l i g h t  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  d u e  c o u r s e  f o l l o w in g  
a  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l l y  l o w e r  s t a n d a r d  o f  d u e  p r o c e s s  a n d  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  i n h e r e n t  in  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  M e x i c a n  l a w  t o  t r a d e  d i s p u te s .  T h e  c o n c l u s i o n  w i l l  d e s c r ib e  h o w  t h e s e  i s s u e s  h a v e  b e e n  d e a l t  w i t h  in  
N A F T A .
I t  h a s  b e e n  s t a te d  t h a t  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  C U S F T A ’s  m e c h a n i s m  i s  l a r g e ly  d u e  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
C a n a d a  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  s h a r e  s i m i l a r  l e g a l  t r a d i t i o n s  a n d  u n f a i r  t r a d e  r e m e d y  s y s te m s .  O n e  o f  t h e  
o v e r r i d i n g  f a c t o r s  in  t h e  N A F T A  s i t u a t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  p a r t i e s  d o  n o t  s h a r e  a  c o m m o n  l e g a l  t r a d i t io n .  
M e x i c o ’s  s y s te m  is  b a s e d  o n  t h e  c iv i l  la w ,  w h e r e a s  C a n a d a  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  h a v e  s y s t e m s  b a s e d  o n  
t h e  c o m m o n  la w . A  g e n e r a l  c o m p a r i s o n  b e tw e e n  M e x ic a n  c iv i l  l a w  a n d  t h e  c o m m o n  l a w  in  C a n a d a  a n d  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  i s  b e y o n d  t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h i s  p a p e r .  F o r  o u r  p r e s e n t  p u r p o s e s  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  s u g g e s t  
t h a t  t h e  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  a n d  i n te r p r e t a t i o n  o f  l a w  in  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  s y s t e m s  i s  c o n c e p tu a l ly  
d i f f e r e n t  a n d  u l t i m a t e ly  r e s u l t s  in  a  d i s p a r i t y  b e tw e e n  t h e  t w o  s y s t e m s .36
T h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  t h e  t w o  s y s te m s  w e r e  n o t  a  b a r r i e r  t o  e x t e n d i n g  C h a p t e r  1 9  t o  N A F T A .  
H o w e v e r ,  t h e  l a c k  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  M e x i c a n  a n d  A m e r ic a n  o r  C a n a d i a n  l a w y e r s  a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  w i t h  
e a c h  o t h e r ’s  l e g a l  s y s t e m s  w o u l d  d o u b t l e s s  h a v e  g e n e r a te d  s o m e  l a c k  o f  c o n f id e n c e  in  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
o f  t h e  p a n e l  p r o c e s s  in  N A F T A . 37 A l t h o u g h  n o  t r a n s i t i o n a l  p e r io d  w a s  i n c o r p o r a te d  i n to  t h e  N A F T A  
C h a p te r  1 9  t o  e n s u r e  l a w y e r s  a n d  o f f i c i a l s  a d e q u a te  t i m e  t o  f a m i l i a r i z e  t h e m s e l v e s  w i t h  f o r e i g n  p r o c e d u r e s  
o f  j u d i c i a l  r e v ie w ,  i t  a p p e a r s  l i k e l y  t h a t  s o m e  t im e  w i l l  p a s s  b e f o r e  M e x i c o ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  h a s  a n  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e  c h a n g e s  t o  i t s  u n f a i r  t r a d e  r e m e d y  r u l e s  a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  r e q u i r e d  u n d e r  
t h e  N A F T A .  T h e  t i m e  l a p s e  s h o u l d  h e lp  e n s u r e  a  h i g h e r  le v e l  o f  c o n f id e n c e  in  t h e  m e c h a n i s m  a l l  a r o u n d .
A  m a j o r  p r o b l e m  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  a  C h a p te r  1 9 - l ik e  m e c h a n i s m  w a s  s u i t a b l e  f o r  N A F T A  i n v o lv e d  
d i f f e r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  t h e  m a n n e r  o f  c o n d u c t i n g  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e e d in g s  in  M e x i c o  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  C a n a d a .  I n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  C a n a d a  i t  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  e x t r e m e l y  i m p o r t a n t  to  
i n c o r p o r a t e  p r o c e d u r a l  s a f e g u a r d s  in to  t h e  s t r u c tu r e  a n d  r e g u la t i o n s  g o v e r n in g  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  a n  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a g e n c y  in  o r d e r  t o  p r o t e c t  i n d iv i d u a l s  f r o m  p o t e n t i a l  a b u s e  o f  s t a te  a u th o r i t y .  W h e n  a  
s u p e r i o r  b o d y  i s  a s k e d  to  r e v i e w  t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  b o d y  t o  s e e  i f  i t  w a s  m a d e  in  
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  l a w ,  t h i s  c a n  i n c l u d e  m a k i n g  a  f i n d in g  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  t h e  a g e n c y  a c t e d  o u t s i d e  t h e  s c o p e  
o f  i t s  p o w e r s  o r  w h e t h e r  i t  b r e a c h e d  a  p r o c e d u r a l  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  t h e r e b y  a f f e c t i n g  a n  i n d i v i d u a l ’s  r i g h t  to  
d u e  p r o c e s s  o r  n a tu r a l  j u s t i c e .
36 . For exam ple, w h ile  law  is created under the com m on law  by judges interpreting legislation  in  conjunction  
w ith cases establishing legal precedents, the c iv il law  tradition is rule based, w ith  lim ited authority g iven  to judges 
to actually im pose their ow n interpretation on the legislation . C ivil law judges look  at the text o f  specific  rules to  
determ ine whether the text applies to  a specific fact situation. Under the com m on law , jud ges have the pow er to 
m odify or add to the law  through the application o f  specific rules o f  interpretation. See Fernando Orrantia, 
"Conceptual D ifferences B etw een the C iv il Law System  and the Com m on Law System ", 19 Southwestern U niversity  
L a w  Review, (1990), pp. 1164-1165.
37 . Peter M orici: "Trade Talks w ith  M exico: A  T im e for R ealism ", U npublished A rticle, U niversity o f  M aine, 
A pril 1991 , p . 38.
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A s  i n d ic a te d  e a r l ie r ,  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  C h a p te r  1 9  is  t h a t  i t  r e q u i r e s  a  b i n a t i o n a l  p a n e l  t o  a s s e s s  
w h e t h e r  a n  a g e n c y  m a d e  i ts  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  in  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  d o m e s t i c  la w . C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  i f  s p e c i f i c  
p r o c e d u r a l  s a f e g u a r d s  g o v e r n in g  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  a n  a g e n c y ’s i n v e s t i g a t i o n  a n d  d u t y  a s s e s s m e n t s  a r e  n o t  
i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n to  o n e  p a r t y ’s  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s y s te m ,  t h e  r e s u l t  i s  a  l o w e r  v a lu e  o f  b i n a t i o n a l  r e v i e w  f o r  
a l l  p a r t i e s  i n v o lv e d  in  a  d i s p u te .
I n  C a n a d a  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  t h e r e  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  h i g h  s t a n d a r d s  o f  t r a n s p a r e n c y ,  d u e  p r o c e s s ,  
a n d  s t r u c tu r a l  s a f e g u a r d s  t o  g u a r a n t e e  a n  a b s e n c e  o f  b i a s  in  t h e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h e s e  s t a n d a r d s  
a r e  i n c o r p o r a te d  i n to  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e e d in g s  a n d  e n s u r e  t h a t  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  m a d e  in  a  
q u a s i - j u d i c i a l  m a n n e r .  I n  M e x i c o ,  t h e  s t a n d a r d  o f  t h e s e  t h r e e  a s p e c t s  o f  M e x i c o ’s  t r a d e  r e m e d y  s y s te m  
a r e  d i f f e r e n t  a n d  h a v e  s e r io u s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  b in a t i o n a l  r e v ie w .
T ra n s p a re n c y
T r a n s p a r e n c y  i s  a  k e y  e l e m e n t  o f  t h e  l a w  g o v e r n in g  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  C a n a d i a n  a n d  U .S .  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  b o d ie s .  T h e  s t a n d a r d  o f  t r a n s p a r e n c y  in  C a n a d a  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  g e n e r a l l y  r e q u i r e s  
t h a t  t h e  l a w  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a g e n c y  b e  c l e a r  a n d  c o n c i s e  a n d  a c c e s s i b l e  t o  t h e  p u b l ic .  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  a g e n c y ’s  c o n d u c t  in  p e r f o r m i n g  i ts  d u t i e s  m u s t  b e  e v id e n t  s o  t h a t  i t s  p r a c t i c e  c a n  b e  
p r o p e r l y  r e v i e w e d  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  t h e  a g e n c y  f u l f i l l e d  i ts  d u t i e s  in  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  l a w .38
T h e s e  s a m e  s t a n d a r d s  a r e  n o t  i n h e r e n t  a s p e c t s  o f  M e x i c o ’s  u n f a i r  t r a d e  l a w  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  
M e x i c o ’s s y s te m  is  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  v e r y  g e n e r a l  r u l e s  a n d  r e g u la t i o n s  p r o v i d in g  S E C O F I  w i t h  b r o a d  
d i s c r e t i o n a r y  p o w e r s  t o  p e r f o r m  i ts  d u t ie s .  S E C O F I ’s p o w e r s  o f  d i s c r e t i o n  e m a n a te  in  p a r t  f r o m  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  t h e r e  is  l im i t e d  t r a n s p a r e n c y  in  h o w  S E C O F I ’s i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  a n d  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  o f  u n f a i r  t r a d e  
p r a c t i c e s  a r e  a c t u a l l y  c a r r i e d  o u t .  T h i s  f a c t  h a s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  s t a n d a r d  o f  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  u n d e r  a  
C h a p te r  1 9 - l ik e  m e c h a n i s m .
M o r e  s p e c i f i c a l ly ,  t w o  e x a m p l e s  h i g h l i g h t  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  t r a n s p a r e n c y  a n d  t h e  p r o b l e m s  t h i s  p o s e s  
t o  t h e  s t a n d a r d  o f  r e v ie w .
F i r s t ,  S E C O F I ’s  t i m e  f r a m e  f o r  c o n d u c t i n g  i ts  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  a n d  m a k i n g  i ts  a s s e s s m e n t s  d o e s  n o t  
r e f l e c t  t h e  o n e  e n v i s io n e d  b y  t h e  R e g u la t io n s .  I n  f a c t ,  n u m e r o u s  d e a d l i n e s  g o v e r n in g  v a r io u s  s t a g e s  o f  
t h e  p r o c e e d in g s  a r e  n o t  a d h e r e d  to .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  la w ,  S E C O F I  i s  r e q u i r e d  to  i n i t i a t e  a n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
w i t h i n  f i v e  d a y s  o f  r e c e ip t  o f  a  p e t i t io n .  I f  i t  f i n d s  s u f f i c ie n t  e v id e n c e  to  s u s ta i n  a  p r e l i m in a r y  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  d u m p in g  o r  s u b s id i z a t i o n  in  c o n ju n c t io n  w i t h  a n  i n ju r y  f in d in g ,  a  s e c o n d  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
m u s t  b e  c o n d u c t e d ,  a n d  a  r e v i s e d  a s s e s s m e n t  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  a p p r o p r i a te  a m o u n t  o f  t h e  d u t y  m u s t  b e  m a d e  
w i t h i n  3 0  d a y s  o f  t h e  c o m m e n c e m e n t  o f  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t io n .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  R e g u la t i o n s ,  t h e  f in a l  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  m u s t  b e  c o m p l e t e d  w i t h in  6 0  d a y s  o f  t h e  s t a r t  o f  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  I n  f a c t ,  S E C O F I ’s 
p r a c t i c e  d o e s  n o t  f o l l o w  t h i s  s c h e d u le .  S E C O F I  u s u a l ly  l a u n c h e s  a  f o r m a l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  w i t h i n  t h r e e  
m o n th s  o f  r e c e iv i n g  a  p e t i t io n ,  a n d  r e q u i r e s  a t  l e a s t  a  w e e k  ( a l t h o u g h  i t  c o u ld  t a k e  a s  lo n g  a s  a  m o n th )
38 . For exam ple, in  Canadian and U .S . A D  and C V D  actions, the agency is ob liged  to com plete an 
adm inistrative record (A R ) o f  the evidence provided by counsel for the parties in a case. D ecisions o f  the agency  
must be substantiated by the evidence in the A R . A  review ing court (or a binational panel) w ill scrutinize the same 
evidence used by the agency (i.e . the A R ), and i f  it finds the agency’s decision  cannot be substantiated by 
evidence,the action can be remanded to the agency.
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b e f o r e  a  f i r s t  p r o v i s i o n a l  a s s e s s m e n t  is  m a d e .39 T h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  d e a d l i n e s  is  w i d e s p r e a d  t h r o u g h o u t  
M e x i c o ’s  u n f a i r  t r a d e  l a w  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  a l t h o u g h  S E C O F I  is  r e q u i r e d  t o  c o m p l e t e  i ts  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  w i t h i n  s i x  m o n th s ,  i t  u s u a l ly  t a k e s  b e tw e e n  15 a n d  18  m o n th s  f o r  c o m p l e t i o n  o n c e  th e  
p r o c e e d in g s  a r e  i n i t i a t e d ,  o r  18  t o  2 1  m o n th s  f r o m  t h e  f i l i n g  d a te .40
A  s e c o n d  p r o b l e m  w i t h  t r a n s p a r e n c y  in  M e x i c o ’s t r a d e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  r e la te s  t o  t h e  c o m p i l a t i o n  
o f  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e c o r d .  T h e r e  a r e  n o  e x p l i c i t  p r o v i s i o n s  in  t h e  R e g u la t i o n s  o u t l i n i n g  w h a t  s h o u ld  
c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e c o r d .  S E C O F I  c a n ,  th e r e f o r e ,  e f f e c t i v e ly  d e t e r m i n e  w h a t  s h o u l d  o r  s h o u l d  
n o t  b e  i n c l u d e d  in  t h e  w r i t t e n  r e c o r d .  T h is  u s e  o f  d i s c r e t i o n  m e a n s  t h a t  t h e  r e c o r d  c o m p i l e d  i s  i n a d e q u a t e  
f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  s u b s e q u e n t  j u d i c i a l  r e v ie w  u n d e r  a  C h a p te r  1 9 - l ik e  m e c h a n i s m .  A  d e t a i l e d  r e c o r d  o f  
t h e  a g e n c y ’s  a c t i o n s  i s  c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  a p p e a l  p r o c e s s .  W i t h o u t  a  p r o p e r  r e c o r d ,  a  b i n a t i o n a l  p a n e l  c a n n o t  
e f f e c t i v e ly  r e v i e w  t h e  a g e n c y ’s p r a c t i c e s  a n d  d e te r m i n e  w h e t h e r  t h e  c h a l l e n g e d  o r d e r  w a s  d e a l t  w i th  
p r o p e r l y .
T h e  a b s e n c e  o f  s u f f i c i e n t  t r a n s p a r e n c y  in  a n  a g e n c y ’s  g o v e r n in g  l e g i s l a t i o n  a n d  p r a c t i c e  m a y  
a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t  a  p a r t y ’s  i n te r e s t s .  T h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  a s  t o  t h e  t i m e  f r a m e  f o r  S E C O F I ’s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  a n d  
d u t y  a s s e s s m e n t s  m a y  i m p a i r  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  p a r t i e s  t o  p r e p a r e  p r o p e r l y  f o r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i v e  
a n d  a s s e s s m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  f o r  p a y m e n t  o f  t h e  d u ty .  M o r e o v e r ,  p a r t i e s  m a y  b e  u n a b le  t o  c r i t i c i z e  
a n  a g e n c y  f o r  u n f a i r  t r e a tm e n t  w h e r e  t h e  a g e n c y  a p p e a r s  t o  h a v e  a c t e d  w i t h in  i t s  b r o a d  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  
p o w e r s .  T h i s  p r o b l e m  is  c o m p o u n d e d  b y  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a n  a b s e n c e  o f  c le a r  g u i d e l i n e s  g o v e r n i n g  th e  
c o m p i l a t i o n  o f  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e c o r d  m e a n s  t h a t  a  s u p e r i o r  b o d y  c a n n o t  f u l l y  k n o w  h o w  a n  a g e n c y  
p e r f o r m e d  i t s  d u t i e s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i t  c a n n o t  a s s e s s  p r o p e r l y  w h e t h e r  t h e  a g e n c y ’s a c t i o n s  m e t  p r o c e d u r a l  
s t a n d a r d s  i n t e n d e d  t o  p r o t e c t  i n d iv i d u a l s  f r o m  a b u s e  o f  a g e n c y  p o w e r .
D u e  P ro c e s s
S E C O F I ’s n o n a d h e r e n c e  t o  t h e  d e a d l i n e s  e n v i s io n e d  b y  t h e  R e g u la t i o n s  r a i s e s  a n o t h e r  m a j o r  
c o n c e r n  a b o u t  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  C h a p t e r  1 9  in  t e r m s  o f  t h e  s t a n d a r d  o f  d u e  p r o c e s s  in  M e x i c o ’s  u n f a i r  t r a d e  
l a w  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  D u e  p r o c e s s  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  i n d iv i d u a l s  w h o s e  i n te r e s t s  a r e  a f f e c te d  b y  a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
a c t i o n  b e  g i v e n  a d e q u a te  n o t i c e  o f  t h e  a c t i o n  a n d  s u f f i c ie n t  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  r e s p o n d  to  i t .  M e x i c o ’s 
d e a d l i n e s  d i d  n o t  m e e t  G A T T  s t a n d a r d s  o f  d u e  p r o c e s s  a t  t h e  t im e  i t  b e c a m e  a  C o n t r a c t in g  P a r t y  t o  t h e  
G A T T ,  t h e r e f o r e  M e x i c o  e x t e n d e d  t h e m  in  p r a c t ic e .  F lo w e v e r ,  u n d e r  b i n a t i o n a l  r e v i e w  t h e  d e a d l i n e s  a s  
s e t  d o w n  in  t h e  R e g u la t i o n s  a r e  a p p l i c a b l e  b e c a u s e  t h e y  r e f l e c t  t h e  w r i t t e n  la w ,  e v e n  t h o u g h  t h e y  a re  
c o n t r a r y  t o  G A T T  s t a n d a r d s  a n d  a r e  n o t  a d h e r e d  t o  b y  S E C O F I .
I n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  t h e  a n a l o g o u s  r e m e d y  to  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  a  p r o v i s i o n a l  d u t y  u n d e r  M e x i c o ’s 
R e g u la t i o n s  r e q u i r e s  t h e  p o s t i n g  o f  a  c a s h  b o n d  f o r  e v e r y  a l l e g e d l y  s u b s id i z e d  o r  d u m p e d  p r o d u c t ,  b u t  i t  
c a n n o t  b e  i m p o s e d  u n t i l  a t  l e a s t  9 0  d a y s  a f t e r  t h e  f i l i n g  o f  a n  A D  o r  C V D  p e t i t i o n .  C a n a d a  u s u a l l y  m a k e s  
i t s  d u m p i n g  o r  s u b s i d y  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  w i t h in  9 0  d a y s ,  a t  w h i c h  t i m e  i t  m a y  i m p o s e  p r o v i s i o n a l  d u t i e s .
39 . U SIT C , R eview  o f  T rade an d  Investm ent M easures by M exico , USITC Report N o. 2275  (April 1 9 9 0 ) ,pp. 4-
14.
4 0 . R egarding tim e frame, it appears SE C O FI’s actual practice is more liberal than its written regulations. 
H ow ever, SE C O FI’s practice disadvantages exporters by creating legal uncertainty about deadlines; and, w here  
procedures drag on  extensively , by requiring exporters to pay duties w h ile  making a final determ ination.
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B o t h  t h e s e  s i t u a t i o n s  a l l o w  t h e  a f f e c te d  i n d u s t r y  t o  p a r t i c i p a te  t o  s o m e  e x te n t  in  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  a n d  
a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  p r o v i s i o n a l  d u ty .
A  c l e a r  e x a m p l e  o f  a  l o w e r  s t a n d a r d  o f  d u e  p r o c e s s  in  M e x i c o ’s  s y s te m  is  r e f l e c t e d  b y  t h e  t im e  
f r a m e  e s t a b l i s h e d  u n d e r  t h e  R e g u la t i o n s  f o r  S E C O F I  t o  c o n d u c t  i t s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  a n d  d u t y  a s s e s s m e n t s .  
S E C O F I  m u s t  i n i t i a t e  a n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  w i t h in  f i v e  d a y s  o f  r e c e iv i n g  a  p e t i t i o n .  M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  R e g u la t i o n s  
c o n te m p la t e  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  a  f i r s t  p r o v i s i o n a l  d u t y  w i t h in  f i v e  d a y s  o f  t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  
N o t i c e  o f  b o t h  t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  a n d  th e  f i r s t  p r o v i s i o n a l  d u t y  a s s e s s m e n t  m u s t  b e  
p u b l i s h e d  in  t h e  Diario Oficial.41 T h e s e  d e a d l i n e s  c o n c e iv a b l y  p e r m i t  t h e  s i m u l t a n e o u s  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
i n i t i a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  a n d  t h e  im p o s i t i o n  o f  a  p r o v i s i o n a l  d u ty .  U n d e r  t h e s e  l e g a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a  
p o t e n t i a l  r e s p o n d e n t  c o u ld  b e  l e f t  u n a w a r e  o f  b o t h  t h e  p r e l i m in a r y  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  u n t i l  i t  i s  p u b l i s h e d  a n d  
t h e  p r o v i s i o n a l  d u t y  u n t i l  i t  i s  i m p o s e d .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  a n  i n te r e s t e d  p a r ty  c o u ld  in  l a w  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  p a y  
a  d u t y  w i t h o u t  f o r e w a r n i n g  o r  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p a r t i c i p a te  in  t h e  a s s e s s m e n t  p r o c e s s .  A n  a d d i t i o n a l  p o i n t  
i s  t h a t  S E C O F I  b a s e s  i t s  f i r s t  p r o v i s i o n a l  d u t y  a s s e s s m e n t  o n  i n f o r m a t io n  f r o m  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d a t a  b a n k ,  
a n d  n o t  o n  d a t a  f r o m  t h e  s p e c i f i c  i n d u s t r y ,  a n d  t h i s  p r e v e n t s  e x p o r te r s  f r o m  p r o v i d in g  i n f o r m a t io n  in  
s u p p o r t  o f  t h e i r  i n d iv i d u a l  c i r c u m s ta n c e s .
T h e  M e x i c a n  s y s te m  c u r r e n t ly  p r o v i d e s  a  l o w e r  s t a n d a r d  o f  d u e  p r o c e s s  t h a n  t h a t  in  C a n a d a  a n d  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  w h o  h a s  t h e  a u th o r i t y  t o  a p p e a l  a  f i n a l  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  S E C O F I .  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  Codigo Fiscal, o n l y  i m p o r t e r s  o f  g o o d s  m a y  a p p e a l  a  f i n d in g  o f  a n  u n f a i r  t r a d e  p r a c t i c e ;  
e x p o r t e r s  a n d  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c e r s  a r e  p r o h i b i t e d  f r o m  d o i n g  s o .  T h u s ,  C a n a d i a n  a n d  U .S .  e x p o r t e r s  a r e  
c u r r e n t ly  u n a b le  t o  a p p e a l  d e c i s i o n s  b y  S E C O F I  a n d  w o u l d  t h e r e f o r e  b e  u n a b le  t o  r e q u e s t  b i n a t i o n a l  
r e v i e w  u n d e r  a  C h a p t e r  1 9  m e c h a n i s m .
Structural Safeguards
A n o t h e r  e l e m e n t  i m p o r t a n t  t o  t h e  c o m m o n  l a w  n o t io n  o f  e f f e c t i v e  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  is  t h e  
r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a g e n c ie s  a c t  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o r  s e m i - i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .  I n  
t h e  c a s e  o f  A D  a n d  C V D  d e te r m i n a t i o n s ,  t h i s  is  n e c e s s a r y  in  o r d e r  t o  d e p o l i t i c i z e  t h e  p r o c e s s  a n d  e n s u r e  
g r e a t e r  o b j e c t i v i t y  in  t h e  a g e n c i e s ’ d e c i s io n s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  i t  is  c o n s i d e r e d  i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  t h e  i n ju r y  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  a n d  d u m p in g  a n d  s u b s id y  a s s e s s m e n t s  b e  m a d e  b y  t w o  d i f f e r e n t  a g e n c i e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  
p r e v e n t  p o t e n t i a l  b i a s  in  t h e  f i n a l  d e c i s io n .
T h e  U .S .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r a d e  C o m m i s s io n  ( I T C )  a n d  t h e  C a n a d i a n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r a d e  T r ib u n a l  
( C I T T )  a r e  i n d e p e n d e n t  b o d i e s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  m a te r i a l  in ju r y  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s .  M o r e o v e r ,  t h e i r  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  a r e  m a d e  in d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  t h e  d u m p in g  o r  s u b s id y  f i n d in g s  b y  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r a d e  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  ( I T A )  o f  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  C o m m e r c e  ( D O C )  a n d  t h e  A s s e s s m e n t  P r o g r a m s  D i v i s i o n  o f  
R e v e n u e  C a n a d a  ( R C ) .  T h e  r o l e s  o f  t h e  C I T T ,  I T C ,  a n d  I T A  a s  r e g u la to r y  a g e n c ie s  a r e  b o th  a d ju d i c a t o r y  
a n d  i n v e s t i g a t i v e .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  I T A  is  a  b r a n c h  o f  t h e  D O C ,  i t  a c t s  in  a  q u a s i - j u d i c i a l  m a n n e r  a n d  
i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  t h e  D O C .  R e v e n u e  C a n a d a ’s  s i t u a t i o n  is  s o m e w h a t  d i f f e r e n t .  I t  d o e s  n o t  t e c h n i c a l l y  
c o n f o r m  t o  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  s e m i - i n d e p e n d e n c e  s in c e  i t  is  m o r e  c lo s e l y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h e  f e d e r a l  
r e v e n u e  d e p a r t m e n t ,  a n d  t h i s  f a c t  h a s  b e e n  c r i t i c i z e d  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta te s .  H o w e v e r ,  i t s  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  
a r e  r e v i e w a b le  a c c o r d in g  to  t h e  s a m e  s t a n d a r d s  a s  t h e  i n ju r y  f i n d in g s  o f  t h e  C I T T  a n d  a r e  t h e r e f o r e  a t
41 . The D ia r io  O fic ia l  is M ex ico ’s equivalent to the C an a d a  G azette  and the F e d e ra l R egister in the U nited  
States.
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l e a s t  m i n i m a l l y  a c c e p ta b le .  I n  s p i t e  o f  R C ’s  u n i q u e  s i t u a t io n ,  t h e  s e m i - i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  a g e n c ie s  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  d u m p i n g  a n d  s u b s id y  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  is  s t i l l  c o n s i d e r e d  a n  i m p o r t a n t  q u a l i t y  f o r  e f f e c t i v e  
j u d i c i a l  r e v ie w .
A s  i n d ic a te d  a b o v e ,  d u m p in g  a n d  s u b s id y  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  a s  w e l l  a s  i n ju r y  f i n d in g s  a r e  m a d e  in  
M e x i c o  b y  S E C O F I ,  e f f e c t i v e ly  i t s  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  C o m m e r c e ,  a n d  in f lu e n c e d  b y  C A C C E ,  a n  i n t e r a g e n c y  
w o r k i n g  g r o u p  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  o f f i c i a l s  f r o m  S E C O F I  a n d  o t h e r  e x e c u t i v e  a g e n c ie s .  T h e  Comisión de 
Aranceles y  Controles al Comercio Exterior a d v i s e s  S E C O F I  o n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  d u t y  t o  b e  a p p l i e d  a n d  t h e  
c o n t e n t  o f  S E C O F I ’s  f i n a l  r e s o l u t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  i n v e s t i g a te d  m e r c h a n d i s e .
S E C O F I  i s  n e i t h e r  i n d e p e n d e n t  n o r  s e m i - i n d e p e n d e n t  f r o m  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .  M o r e o v e r ,  d u m p in g  
a n d  s u b s id y  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  m a d e  in d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  i n ju r y  a s s e s s m e n t s .  G i v e n  t h i s  f a c t ,  
t h e r e  i s  c o n c e r n  t h a t  S E C O F I ’s  f i n d in g s  m a y  b e  e i t h e r  p o l i t i c a l l y  i n f lu e n c e d  o r  a f f e c t e d  b y  i t s  f i n d in g s  
in  t h e  o t h e r  c a t e g o r y  ( i .e . ,  a  f i n d in g  o f  d u m p in g  c o u ld  b e  c o n s t r u e d  a s  p r o v i d in g  e v id e n c e  t h a t  t h e r e  is  
i n ju r y ) .
W i t h o u t  t r a n s p a r e n c y  in  t h e  l a w s  a n d  p r o c e e d in g s ,  h i g h  s t a n d a r d s  o f  d u e  p r o c e s s  a n d  th e  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  o r  s e m i - i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  b o d ie s ,  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  is  h o l l o w  a n d  in e f f e c t iv e .  
S E C O F I ’ s  b r o a d  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  p o w e r s  w h i c h  r e s u l t  f r o m  t h e  l a c k  o f  t r a n s p a r e n c y  in  M e x i c o ’s  u n f a i r  t r a d e  
l a w  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  c r e a te  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  S E C O F I ’s d e a d l in e s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  d u t y  a s s e s s m e n t s ,  t o  b e  
i n f lu e n c e d  b y  in te r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t .  W i t h o u t  t h e  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  h i g h e r  s t a n d a r d s  in  t h e  w a y  
M e x i c o ’s  t r a d e  l a w  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  is  c o n d u c te d ,  a  C h a p te r  1 9  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m  in  N A F T A  
w o u l d  n o t  b e  s u i t a b l e .
D u e  p r o c e s s  a n d  t h e  s t a n d a r d  o f  j u d i c i a l  r e v ie w  a s id e ,  t h e r e  a r e  s p e c i f i c  e l e m e n t s  o f  M e x i c o ’s 
u n f a i r  t r a d e  l a w  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t h a t  a r e  n o t  a s  f a v o r a b le  t o  a f f e c te d  p a r t i e s  a s  t h e  e q u iv a l e n t  C a n a d i a n  a n d  
U .S .  p r o v i s i o n s .  T h e  f o l lo w in g  w i l l  f o c u s  o n  s o m e  o f  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s .
I n  M e x i c o ,  t h e  p r o c e e d in g s  c u lm i n a t i n g  in  a  f in a l  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  a r e  in  p r a c t i c e  c o n s i d e r a b ly  l o n g e r  
t h a n  in  C a n a d a  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s .  I n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  a  f i n a l  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  m u s t  b e  m a d e  b e tw e e n  
2 0 5  a n d  3 0 0  d a y s  a f t e r  a  c o u n te r v a i l i n g  d u t y  p e t i t i o n  i s  f i l e d  o r  b e tw e e n  2 8 0  a n d  4 2 0  d a y s  a f t e r  t h e  f i l i n g  
o f  a n  a n t i d u m p in g  p e t i t i o n .  I n  C a n a d a ,  t h e  C I T T  m u s t  m a k e  i ts  f i n a l  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  w i t h i n  1 2 0  d a y s  a f t e r  
r e c e iv i n g  n o t i c e  o f  t h e  p r e l i m in a r y  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  f r o m  R e v e n u e  C a n a d a .  A s  i n d ic a te d  e a r l i e r ,  in  M e x i c o ,  
t h e  c o m p l e t e  p r o c e s s  c u lm i n a t i n g  in  a  f i n a l  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  u s u a l ly  t a k e s  18  t o  2 1  m o n th s  f r o m  t h e  d a t e  t h e  
p e t i t i o n  is  f i l e d .  T h e  l e n g t h  o f  t h e  p r o c e e d in g s  c a n  h a v e  a n  im p a c t  o n  in te r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  i n  M e x i c o  in  p a r t  
b e c a u s e  o n c e  a  p r e l i m in a r y  d u m p in g  o r  s u b s id y  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  is  m a d e  a n d  a  p r o v i s i o n a l  d u t y  i s  i m p o s e d ,  
t h e  a f f e c t e d  i m p o r t e r s  m u s t  c o n t i n u e  p a y in g  t h e  d u ty  u n t i l  i t  i s  e i t h e r  f i n a l i z e d  o r  r e v o k e d .  T h i s  c o u ld  
b e  c o s t l y  a n d  d e t r i m e n t a l  t o  b o t h  i m p o r t e r s  a n d  p r o d u c e r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  w h e r e  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  f i n d i n g  is  
d e t e r m i n e d  t o  b e  u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d  in  s u b s e q u e n t  i n v e s t i g a t io n s .
A n o t h e r  d i f f e r e n c e  a m o n g  t h e  p a r t i e s ’ l a w s  in v o lv e s  t h e  t i m i n g  o f  r e v i e w  o f  d u t y  o r d e r s .  A n n u a l  
r e v i e w  o f  d u t y  o r d e r s  i s  r e q u i r e d  in  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  w h i l e  i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  f o r  d u m p i n g  v a l u e s  a n d  
s u b s i d y  a m o u n t s  i n  C a n a d a  a s  w e l l .  T h e  C I T T  m a y  r e v i e w  i ts  i n ju r y  f i n d in g s  a t  i t s  d i s c r e t i o n .  H o w e v e r ,  
i f  a  r e v i e w  is  n o t  i n i t i a t e d  w i t h in  f i v e  y e a r s  o f  t h e  o r ig in a l  o r d e r ,  t h e  o r d e r  i s  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  r e s c i n d e d .  
I n  M e x i c o ,  s u c h  r e v i e w  is  d i s c r e t i o n a r y .  I t  c a n  b e  i n i t i a t e d  b y  S E C O F I  a t  t h e  r e q u e s t  o f  a n  i n te r e s t e d  
p a r ty  o r  e x  o f f i c i o ,  w h e r e  i t  a p p e a r s  j u s t i f i e d  in  d o i n g  s o .  O n c e  a g a in ,  i t  i s  S E C O F I ’s  d i s c r e t i o n  t h a t  m a y  
u n f a v o r a b l y  a f f e c t  C a n a d i a n  a n d  U .S .  e x p o r te r s .  U n d e r  M e x i c a n  l a w  t h e r e  i s  n o  c o n s i s t e n c y  in  S E C O F I ’s
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i n i t i a t i o n  o f  r e v i e w  p r o c e e d in g s .  M o r e o v e r ,  S E C O F I  is  u n d e r  n o  o b l ig a t io n  t o  d o  s o .  T h u s ,  t h e r e  
c u r r e n t ly  e x i s t s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  t h a t  S E C O F I ’s  i n i t i a t i o n  o r  n o n i n i t i a t i o n  o f  a  r e v ie w  c o u ld  b e  p o l i t i c a l l y  
i n f lu e n c e d .
T o  s u m  u p  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n ,  i t  is  a p p a r e n t  t h a t  M e x i c o ’s  A D  a n d  C V D  s y s te m  d i f f e r s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
f r o m  t h a t  o f  C a n a d a  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta te s .  Y e t  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  n e g o t i a t i n g  a  b i n a t i o n a l  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  
m e c h a n i s m  i n to  t h e  C U S F T A  w a s  t h e  u n d e r ly i n g  c o m p a t ib i l i t y  o f  C a n a d i a n  a n d  A m e r i c a n  l a w  a n d  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r a c t i c e .  I n  s e e k in g  to  n e g o t i a t e  a  s i m i l a r  m e c h a n i s m  i n to  t h e  N A F T A ,  s o m e  b a s i c  
a c c o m m o d a t i o n  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  M e x i c o  w a s  c le a r l y  r e q u i r e d  in  o r d e r  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  s t a n d a r d s  o f  j u d i c i a l  
r e v i e w  a n d  d u e  p r o c e s s  i n h e r e n t  in  t h e  C U S F T A  m e c h a n i s m .  T h is  s a m e  c h o ic e  w i l l  f a c e  o t h e r  p a r t i e s  
s e e k in g  t o  n e g o t i a t e  a  W H F T A  o r  t o  a c c e d e  t o  N A F T A .  T h e  e x t e n t  o f  M e x i c o ’s  a c c o m m o d a t i o n  a n d  th e  
c h a n g e s  t o  C h a p t e r  1 9  u n d e r  t h e  N A F T A  is  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  c o n c l u d i n g  d i s c u s s io n .
Conclusion
T h e r e  w e r e  s i m i l a r i t i e s  b e tw e e n  C a n a d a ’ s a n d  M e x i c o ’s  a p p r o a c h  t o  A D  a n d  C V D s  in  a  r e g io n a l  
t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t ,  a n d  t h e s e  m a y  p r o v i d e  c lu e s  a s  t o  h o w  t h i s  i s s u e  m i g h t  p l a y  o u t  in  a  W H F T A .  F i r s t ,  
b o t h  C a n a d a  a n d  M e x i c o  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  r e s o r t  t o  u n f a i r  t r a d e  r e m e d ie s  b y  t h e  l a r g e r  t r a d e  p a r tn e r — th e  
U n i t e d  S t a te s — c o u ld  th r e a t e n  s e c u r i t y  o f  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  U .S .  m a r k e t  a n d  th e r e b y  u n d e r c u t  t h e  v a l u e  o f  a  
t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t .  S e c o n d ,  b o th  C a n a d a  a n d  M e x i c o  s o u g h t  a n  e x c e p t i o n  f r o m  U .S .  u n f a i r  t r a d e  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  
b u t  f a i l e d .  T h i r d ,  C a n a d a  a n d  M e x i c o  t r i e d  t o  n e g o t i a t e  a  b r o a d e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o v e r  t h e  u s e  o f  A D  
d u t i e s  a n d  C V D s ,  b u t  t h e s e  e f f o r t s  a l s o  f a i l e d .42 F in a l l y ,  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s  s e t t l e d  o n  a  b i n d i n g  d i s p u t e  
s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m  b u i l t  a r o u n d  a n  in te r n a t i o n a l i z e d  f o r m  o f  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  o f  d o m e s t i c  a g e n c y  a c t io n s ,  
a s  a  s u r r o g a t e  f o r  a  m o r e  p e r m a n e n t  s o l u t io n  t o  t h e  p r o b le m  o f  a n t i d u m p in g  a n d  c o u n te r v a i l  b e tw e e n  c lo s e  
t r a d i n g  p a r tn e r s .
T h e r e  w e r e  t h r e e  i m p o r t a n t  c h a n g e s  n e g o t i a te d  t o  C h a p te r  1 9  s o  t h a t  M e x i c o ,  C a n a d a ,  a n d  th e  
U n i t e d  S t a te s  c o u ld  r e a c h  a g r e e m e n t  in  t h e  N A F T A .  F i r s t ,  t h e  N A F T A  i n c lu d e s  a  s e c t i o n  ( A r t i c l e  1 9 0 7 :3 )  
t h a t  o u t l i n e s  d e s i r a b l e  q u a l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  a n t i d u m p in g  a n d  c o u n te r v a i l i n g  d u t y  l a w s .43 
T h is  c h a n g e ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  t w o  f o l lo w in g  c h a n g e s ,  w a s  a d d e d  t o  N A F T A  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  M e x i c o ’s  t r a d e  
r e m e d y  s y s te m  w o u l d  b e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  C a n a d a  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  t o  m a k e  a  C h a p te r  
1 9  m e c h a n i s m  s u i t a b l e ;  a n d  i f  n o t ,  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  a d e q u a te  r e m e d ia l  p r o v i s i o n s  a r e  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n to  t h e  
a g r e e m e n t  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t i e s .
T h e  r a t i o n a l e  u n d e r ly i n g  t h e s e  c h a n g e s  is  t h a t  C h a p t e r  19  p r e s u p p o s e s  t h a t  a  b in a t i o n a l  p a n e l  w i l l  
a p p ly  t h e  d o m e s t i c  l a w  o f  t h e  p a r ty  w h o s e  a g e n c y ’s d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  b e in g  c h a l l e n g e d .  A s  s u g g e s t e d  
e a r l i e r ,  w h e r e  a  p a r t y ’s  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e d u r e s ,  s t a tu t e s ,  o r  s t a n d a r d s  o f  j u d i c i a l  r e v ie w  d o  n o t  m a tc h ,  
o r  a t  l e a s t  c o m e  c lo s e  t o ,  t h o s e  f o u n d  in  t h e  o t h e r  P a r t i e s ’ u n f a i r  t r a d e  r e m e d y  s y s te m s ,  i n t e r e s t e d  n a t i o n a l s
4 2 . In case o f  A D  duties, such an understanding m ight be the use o f  national com petition p o licy  as an 
alternative to A D  actions. For C V D s, an understanding m ight be a Subsidies C ode negotiated on  a N orth A m erican  
basis, or the adoption o f  a Subsidies C ode in the Uruguay Round.
4 3 . For exam ple, "publish notice o f  initiation o f  investigations"; "provide d isclosure o f  relevant inform ation  
. . .  [including] . . .  an explanation o f  the calculation or the m ethodology used to determ ine the margin o f  dumping 
or the amount o f  subsidy"; and so forth.
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o f  t h o s e  o t h e r  P a r t i e s  m a y  n o t  r e c e iv e  a  s t a n d a r d  o f  d u e  p r o c e s s  e q u iv a l e n t  t o  t h a t  e x t e n d e d  b y  t h e i r  
g o v e r n m e n t s  t o  f o r e i g n  e x p o r te r s .
S e c o n d ,  t h e  N A F T A  in c l u d e s  a  s e c t i o n  ( A n n e x  1 9 0 4 .1 5 ( d )  S c h e d u le  B )  t h a t  o u t l i n e s  a  s e r i e s  o f  
2 0  o b l i g a t o r y  a m e n d m e n t s  t o  M e x i c o ’s  u n f a i r  t r a d e  r e m e d y  r e g im e  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  C a n a d a  a n d  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a te s .  T h e  p r o p o s e d  a m e n d m e n t s  a r e  m a i n l y  p r o c e d u r a l  a n d  a r e  i n t e n d e d  t o  a d d r e s s  t h e  l o w  
s t a n d a r d s  o f  d u e  p r o c e s s  t h a t  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  M e x i c o ’s u n f a i r  t r a d e  r e m e d y  l e g i s l a t i o n .44
F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e r e  a r e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  t h a t  M e x i c a n  l e g i s l a t i o n  p r o v i d e  e x p l i c i t  t i m e t a b l e s  f o r  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e e d in g s ,  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  b y  in te r e s t e d  p a r t i e s ,  a n d  t i m e l y  a c c e s s  t o  a l l  n o n c o n f id e n t i a l  
i n f o r m a t io n .  T h e  M e x i c a n  l a w  t h a t  a l l o w s  f o r  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  d u t i e s  o n l y  f i v e  d a y s  a f t e r  r e c e i p t  o f  a  
p e t i t i o n  m u s t  b e  c h a n g e d ,  a n d  M e x i c o ’s r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  p a r t i e s  h a v in g  s t a n d in g  t o  r e q u e s t  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  
m u s t  b e  e x p a n d e d  t o  i n c l u d e  f o r e i g n  p r o d u c e r s  a n d  e x p o r te r s  f o r m e r l y  e x c l u d e d  f r o m  s e e k in g  j u d i c i a l  
r e v i e w  o f  a n  a g e n c y ’s  d e te r m i n a t i o n .  P e r h a p s  m o s t  im p o r t a n t ,  M e x i c o  w i l l  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  c o m p i l e  a  
c o m p r e h e n s iv e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e c o r d  o f  t h e  p r o c e e d in g s  o f  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  a g e n c y  a n d  a  d e ta i l e d  
s t a t e m e n t  o f  l e g a l  r e a s o n i n g  u n d e r ly i n g  t h e  a g e n c y  d e te r m i n a t i o n ,  w h i c h  is  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  j u d i c i a l  r e v ie w  
b y  a  b i n a t i o n a l  p a n e l .
T h i r d ,  u n d e r  t h e  t i t l e  o f  “ S a f e g u a r d i n g  t h e  P a n e l  R e v ie w  S y s t e m ,”  t h e  N A F T A  in c l u d e s  a  s e c t i o n  
( A r t i c l e  1 9 0 5 )  t h a t  p r o v i d e s  r e m e d ie s  i f  a  P a r ty  d o e s  n o t  c o m p l y  w i t h  i ts  o b l ig a t io n s  u n d e r  C h a p t e r  19 . 
I f  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  a  p a r t y ’s  d o m e s t i c  l a w  p r e v e n t s  a  b in a t i o n a l  p a n e l  f r o m  c a r r y i n g  o u t  i t s  f u n c t i o n s ,  
t h e  N A F T A  p r o v i d e s  r e c o u r s e  t o  c o n s u l t a t i o n  a n d  t h e n  t o  a  s p e c ia l  c o m m i t t e e  o f  t h r e e  i n d iv i d u a l s  s e l e c te d  
f r o m  t h e  s a m e  r o s t e r  u s e d  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  E x t r a o r d in a r y  C h a l l e n g e  C o m m i t t e e s .45 I f  t h e  
c o m m i t t e e  f i n d s  a  p a r t y  h a s  n o t  c o m p l i e d  w i t h  C h a p te r  1 9 , t h e  c o m p l a in i n g  p a r ty  c a n  s u s p e n d  b i n a t i o n a l  
p a n e l  r e v i e w  o r  e q u iv a l e n t  “ a p p r o p r i a t e ”  b e n e f i t s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h a t  p a r ty .  A r t i c l e  1 9 0 5  f u r t h e r  p r o v i d e s  
t h a t  b i n a t i o n a l  p a n e l  r e v ie w s  b e tw e e n  t h e  d i s p u t in g  p a r t i e s  w i l l  b e  s t a y e d ,  a n d  w i l l  r e v e r t  t o  d o m e s t i c  
c o u r t s  i f  n e c e s s a r y ;  a n d  i t  g i v e s  t h e  p a r ty  c o m p l a in e d  a g a i n s t  r i g h t s  t o  r e ta l i a te  in  k i n d  t o  a  s u s p e n s io n  o f  
b i n a t i o n a l  p a n e l  r e v i e w  b y  t h e  c o m p l a in i n g  p a r ty .
I n  t h e  e v e n t  t h e  p a r ty  i n i t i a l l y  c o m p l a in e d  a g a i n s t  r e m o v e s  t h e  c a u s e  f o r  c o m p l a in t ,  p r o v i s i o n  is  
m a d e  t o  r e c o n v e n e  a  s p e c ia l  c o m m i t t e e  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  s i t u a t io n ,  a n d  t h e n  t o  t e r m i n a t e  c o u n te r m e a s u r e s  i f  
a p p r o p r i a te .  T o  s u m  u p ,  g i v e n  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  h i s t o r y  o f  C h a p te r  19  in  t h e  C U S F T A ,  i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  a  
s p e c ia l  c o m m i t t e e  w o u l d  a r i s e  b e tw e e n  C a n a d a  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  b u t  i t  m a y  f o r m  a  u s e f u l  s a n c t i o n  
t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  M e x i c o  ( o r  a n y  o t h e r  c o u n t r y  a c c e d i n g  to  t h e  N A F T A )  a d o p t s  t h e  d o m e s t i c  p r a c t i c e s  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  i m p l e m e n t  A r t i c l e  19 . H o w e v e r ,  i t  is  u n l ik e l y  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  C h a p te r  1 9  to  M e x i c o  c o u ld  
s u r v i v e  a n y  s u b s t a n t i a l  u s e  o f  A r t i c l e  1 9 0 5 , s in c e  t h a t  a r t i c l e  e s s e n t i a l l y  s i g n a l s  a  b r e a k d o w n  o f  t h e  
u n d e r t a k i n g s  o f  C h a p t e r  1 9  i ts e l f .
I f  o t h e r  W e s te r n  H e m is p h e r e  n a t i o n s  w e r e  t o  a c c e d e  to  N A F T A  o r  n e g o t i a t e  a  W H F T A ,  i t  i s  l ik e ly  
t h a t  a  C h a p t e r  1 9 - l ik e  m e c h a n i s m  w o u l d  a p p e a l  t o  t h e m  f o r  t h e  s a m e  r e a s o n  i t  a p p e a l e d  t o  C a n a d a  o r  
M e x i c o .  A  W H F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n  w o u l d  a l s o  r a i s e  s o m e  o f  t h e  i s s u e s  f a c e d  in  t h e  N A F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n ,  
s u c h  a s  t h e  r o l e  o f  a m p a r o  ( w h i c h  h a s  b e e n  w i d e ly  a d o p te d  in  S o u th  A m e r i c a  f r o m  t h e  M e x i c a n  l e g a l
44 . It is probable that M exico provides greater due process in practice than that required by M exican law .
45 . Extraordinary C hallenge C om m ittees w ere provided for in  the FT A  to permit an appeal from  a binational 
panel d ecision  on grounds, inter alia, o f  m isconduct or abuse o f  power. The N A F T A  has a sim ilar provision.
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s y s te m )  a n d  t h e  C a lv o  d o c t r i n e  in  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  n a tu r e  a n d  p r o c e d u r a l  
s t a n d a r d s  o f  A D  a n d  C V D  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  a n d  a s s e s s m e n t s  a n d  t h e i r  c o n s e q u e n t  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  s t a n d a r d s  
o f  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  a n d  d u e  p r o c e s s  u n d e r  a  C h a p te r  1 9 - l ik e  m e c h a n i s m .
T h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  C h a p te r  1 9 - l ik e  p r o c e d u r e s  t o  a  W H F T A  w o u l d  l ik e l y  h a v e  s o m e  p o s i t i v e  p a y o f f  
f o r  C a n a d a  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta te s .  C a n a d a  w o u l d  g a in  b e c a u s e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  b in a t i o n a l  r e v i e w  o f  u n f a i r  
t r a d e  a c t i o n s — w h ic h  w a s  o r i g in a l ly  a  C a n a d i a n  d e m a n d — w o u l d  b e  m o r e  f i r m l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  in  N o r t h  
A m e r i c a n  t r a d e  p o l i c y .  F o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  t h e  i s s u e  is  m o r e  c o m p l i c a te d .  O n e  w o u l d  e x p e c t  t h e r e  
w o u l d  b e  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  a n y  p e r c e iv e d  w e a k e n i n g  o f  U .S .  c o n t r o l  o v e r  u n f a i r  t r a d e  r e m e d ie s .  
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  a  C h a p te r  1 9 - l ik e  p r o c e s s  m ig h t  g iv e  a n  a d v a n t a g e  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  ( a n d  C a n a d a )  b y  
c u r b i n g  t h e  e x p a n s io n  o f  A D  a n d  C V D  u s e  in  i t s  s o u th e r n  n e ig h b o r s .
M e x i c o  is  n o w  t h e  t h i r d - l a r g e s t  u s e r  o f  A D  a c t i o n s  w o r l d w i d e ,  a n d  a n y  e x p a n s io n  o f  A D  a n d  
C V D  p r a c t i c e s  in  S o u t h  A m e r i c a  c o u ld  l im i t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  A m e r i c a n  e x p o r t s  in  t h e  f u tu r e .  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e r e  is  n o  g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  o t h e r  W e s te r n  H e m is p h e r e  n a t i o n s  w i l l  c o n d u c t  u n f a i r  t r a d e  
r e m e d y  p r o c e d u r e s  in  t h e  m a n n e r  A m e r i c a n  e x p o r te r s  m ig h t  f e e l  e n t i t l e d  t o .  I r o n i c a l l y ,  t h e  l e s s  f o r e i g n  
p r a c t i c e s  c o n f o r m  t o  A m e r i c a n  n o t io n s  o f  d u e  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  i n c e n t iv e  t o  n e g o t i a t e  a  d i s p u t e  
s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m .  I f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  is  s e r i o u s l y  i n te r e s t e d  in  n e g o t i a t i n g  a  W H F T A ,  i t  i s  l ik e l y  
t o  n e g o t i a t e  a s  w e l l  a n  i n te r n a t i o n a l i z e d  l e g a l  r e g im e  t o  s e t  l im i t s  o n  t h e  n a t io n a l  u s e  o f  u n f a i r  t r a d e  
r e m e d ie s  l ik e  A D  a n d  C V D s .
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Introduction
T h i s  p a p e r  a n a l y z e s  i s s u e s  a t  t h e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  t w o  a c t i v e  a r e a s  i n  t r a d e  p o l i c y — r e v i t a l i z a t i o n  
o f  r e g io n a l  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  a r r a n g e m e n t s  a n d  e f f o r t s  t o  h a r m o n i z e  t r a d e  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c i e s .
N e i t h e r  a r e a  is  n e w .  E c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  a t t e m p t s  i n  t h e  W e s t e r n  H e m i s p h e r e  r e a c h  a t  l e a s t  a s  
f a r  b a c k  a s  1 8 5 4  a n d  t h e  t r e a t y  b e tw e e n  th e  U n i t e d  S ta te s  a n d  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  t h a t  p e r m i t t e d  d u t y - f r e e  t r a d e  
i n  c e r t a i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s  b e tw e e n  t h e  U . S .  a n d  C a n a d a .  T h e s e  a t t e m p t s  a l s o  i n c l u d e  a  r e c i p r o c i t y  
t r e a t y  b e t w e e n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  C u b a  ( 1 9 0 3 )  a n d  a  p r o p o s e d  c u s t o m s  u n i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  U . S .  a n d  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a  ( 1 8 9 0 ) . 1 I n  m o r e  r e c e n t  y e a r s  t h e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  F r e e  T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t ,  t h e  A n d e a n  
C o m m o n  M a r k e t ,  a n d  t h e  C e n t r a l  A m e r i c a n  C o m m o n  M a r k e t  a t t e m p t e d  to  s p u r  r e g io n a l  t r a d e  a n d  
d e v e l o p m e n t ,  w i t h o u t  n o t a b l e  s u c c e s s  i n  t h e i r  i n i t i a l  y e a r s .
A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  b e tw e e n  t r a d e  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t  f l o u r i s h e d  b r i e f l y  i n  t h e  1 9 7 0 s  a n d  
m a d e  s u b s t a n t i a l  t h e o r e t i c a l ,  e m p i r i c a l ,  a n d  p o l i c y  c o n t r i b u t i o n s . 2 T h e  im p e tu s  f o r  t h e  r e s e a r c h  a t  t h a t  
t im e  w a s  t h e  s u r g e  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u la t i o n s  a n d  c o n c e r n  f o r  e f f e c t s  o n  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s ,  a n d  t h e  1 9 7 2  
U n i t e d  N a t io n s  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  t h e  H u m a n  E n v i r o n m e n t  ( S t o c k h o lm  C o n f e r e n c e )  w h i c h ,  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t im e ,  
s e n s i t i z e s  a n a l y s t s  t o  p o s s ib l e  i n t e r a c t io n s  b e t w e e n  t r a d e  a n d  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  i s s u e  l a y  
d o r m a n t  f o r  m o s t  o f  t h e  1 9 8 0 s .
I n t e r e s t  i n  b o t h  p o l i c y  a r e a s  h a s  b e e n  r e in v i g o r a t e d  in  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  T h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s - C a n a d a  
F r e e  T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t  o f  1 9 8 7 ,  E C - 9 2 ,  t h e  e f f o r t s  t o  c o m p l e te  i n t e g r a t i o n  i n  E u r o p e  a n d  c r e a t e  a  s i n g l e  
m a r k e t ,  a n d  s u r p r i s i n g l y  r a p i d  p r o g r e s s  i n  n e g o t i a t i n g  a  N o r t h  A m e r i c a n  F r e e  T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t  
( N A F T A )  t o  i n c l u d e  M e x i c o ,  a l l  u n d e r s c o r e  t h e  n e w  v i t a l i t y  o f  r e g io n a l  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n .  T h e  t r a d e -  
e n v i r o n m e n t  i s s u e  h a s  r e - e m e r g e d  i n  a  s o m e w h a t  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  m a n n e r ,  a n d  m u c h  a t t e n t i o n  h a s  b e e  p a id  
t o  c o n f l i c t s  a n d  p o t e n t i a l  c o n f l i c t s  b e tw e e n  t r a d e  p o l i c i e s  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c i e s .  W h i l e  s u c h  c o n f l i c t  
c a n  b e  e a s i l y  e x a g g e r a t e d ,  t h e r e  a r e  p o i n t s  a t  w h i c h  t r a d e  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g im e s  n e e d  t o  b e  
r e c o n c i l e d .
E c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  i t s e l f  c a s t s  a  b r i g h t e r  l i g h t  o n  c e r t a i n  t r a d e - e n v i r o n m e n t  q u e s t io n s :  t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m p e t i t i v e  e f f e c ts  o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  
h a r m o n i z i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  r e l a t e d  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s  t o  c r e a t e  a  u n i f i e d  m a r k e t .  M o r e o v e r ,  e c o n o m i c  
i n t e g r a t i o n ,  l ik e  a n y  e f f o r t  a t  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ,  w i l l  c h a n g e  t h e  l e v e l  a n d  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d
1. Latin A m erica turned dow n the custom s union on  the sensib le grounds that Europe, w hich  provided Latin  
A m erica w ith  90  percent o f  its im ports, w ould not be pleased w ith overt tariff discrim ination. See Benjam in H. 
W illiam s, E conom ic  F o re ig n  P o licy  o f  the U n ited  States. (N ew  York: H oward Fertig, 1967).
2 . See, for exam ple, Charles Pearson and W endy Takacs, "International E conom ic Im plications o f  
Environm ental C ontrol," C om m ission on International Trade and Investm ent P o licy , Papers, V o l. 1 
(W ashington, D .C .: G PO , 1971); Ingo W alter (ed .), Studies in  In te rn a tio n a l E n v iro nm enta l Econom ics  (N ew  
York: W iley-Interscience, 1976); Organization for E conom ic Cooperation and D evelopm ent, The P o llu te r  Pays 
P rin c ip le  - D e fin itio n  - Analysis  - Im p lem entation  (Paris: O E C D , 1975).
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c o n s u m p t i o n  a n d  h e n c e  a f f e c t  d e m a n d s  o n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e s o u r c e s .  F i n a l l y ,  n e g o t i a t i n g  a n  e c o n o m i c  
i n t e g r a t i o n  a g r e e m e n t  p r o v i d e s  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  e s t a b l i s h  n e w  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  p o l i c i e s  a m o n g  
t h e  m e m b e r  c o u n t r i e s .
T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  p a p e r  is  to  s o r t  t h r o u g h  th e  i s s u e s  a t  t h e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  t r a d e  a n d  th e  
e n v i r o n m e n t ,  w i t h  s p e c ia l  a t t e n t i o n  to  p a r t i c u l a r  q u e s t io n s  a r i s in g  f r o m  e c o n o m ic  i n t e g r a t i o n .  T h e  p a p e r  
i s  d i v i d e d  i n to  f o u r  s e c t i o n s .  S e c t i o n  I  p r o v i d e s  a n  a n a l y t i c a l  f r a m e w o r k  b y  b r i e f l y  r e v i e w i n g  r e l e v a n t  
t h e o r y ,  s e t t i n g  f o r t h  a  t a x o n o m y  o f  i s s u e s ,  a n d  e x a m i n in g  t h e  i s s u e s  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  e c o n o m i c  
i n t e g r a t i o n .  S e c t i o n  2  c o n s i d e r s  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a n d  e m p i r i c a l  d i m e n s i o n s  o f  t h e  t r a d e - e n v i r o n m e n t  
q u e s t i o n ,  w i t h  a n  a n a l y s i s  o f  G A T T  r u l e s  a n d  a  b r i e f  r e v i e w  o f  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s e a r c h .  S e c t i o n  3  e x a m i n e s  
h o w  t r a d e  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  o b j e c t iv e s  a r e  r e c o n c i l e d  ( i f  i n d e e d  t h e y  a r e )  i n  t h r e e  i n t e g r a t i o n  
a g r e e m e n t s ,  t h e  E C ,  t h e  U . S . - C a n a d a  F r e e  T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t ,  a n d  t h e  N A F T A .  T h e  f i n a l  s e c t i o n  p u t s  
f o r w a r d  s o m e  t h o u g h t s  o n  h o w  t r a d e  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  o b j e c t iv e s  m ig h t  b e  r e c o n c i l e d  i n  a  b r o a d e r  
W e s t e r n  H e m i s p h e r e  f r e e  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t .
T h i s  s t u d y  is  o n l y  a n  i n t r o d u c t i o n  to  t h e  i s s u e s .  T h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  t r a d e  a n d  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  is  
c o m p l e x ,  a n d  t h e  q u e s t io n s  i t  r a i s e s  d e s e r v e  d e t a i l e d  r e s e a r c h  a s  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  in  
t h e  W e s t e r n  H e m i s p h e r e  p r o c e e d s .
I. Analytical F r a m e w o r k
T r a d e  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t  i s s u e s  a r e  d i v e r s e .  A n  o r g a n iz in g  f r a m e w o r k  is  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a p p ly  
r e l e v a n t  t h e o r y  a n d  a n a l y z e  p o l i c y .  A t  t h e  r i s k  o f  o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n ,  m o s t  i s s u e s  c a n  b e  g r o u p e d  in to  
f o u r  c a t e g o r i e s :
(a )  t h e  t r a d e  e f f e c t s  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  ( t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  
i s s u e ) ,
( b )  t h e  t r a d e  e f f e c t s  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  r e l a t e d  p r o d u c t  r e g u la t i o n s ,
( c )  t h e  u s e  o f  t r a d e  m e a s u r e s  t o  s e c u r e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  o b j e c t iv e s ,  a n d
( d )  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e f f e c ts  o f  t r a d e  a n d  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  ( t r a n s b o u n d a r y  p o l lu t i o n )  a r e  n o t  t h e m s e l v e s  a  s e p a r a t e  
c a t e g o r y .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  i f  t h e y  a r e  p r e s e n t  t h e y  m a y  m o d i f y  t h e  a n a l y s i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  I n  s i m i l a r  f a s h i o n ,  
r e g io n a l  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  is  n o t  i t s e l f  a  s e p a r a t e  c a t e g o r y ,  b u t  w h e n  f o l d e d  i n to  t h e s e  f o u r  c a t e g o r i e s  
m a y  c h a n g e  th e  a n a l y s i s .  T h i s  p a p e r  e x a m in e s  t h e s e  f o u r  s e t s  o f  i s s u e s  i n  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  r e g io n a l  
e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n .  A  r e v i e w  o f  r e l e v a n t  c o n c l u s i o n s  f r o m  t h e o r y  w i l l  b e  u s e f u l .
Theoretical Considerations
F o u r  s t r a n d s  o f  e c o n o m i c  t h e o r y  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h i s  p a p e r ’s  a n a l y s i s  o f  t r a d e - e n v i r o n m e n t  i s s u e s .  
F i r s t ,  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  f a c t o r  e n d o w m e n t  t h e o r y  o f  t r a d e  h a s  b e e n  e x te n d e d  to  i n c l u d e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l
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r e s o u r c e s . 3 T h e  b a s i c  a p p r o a c h  is  t o  r e c o g n i z e  t h a t  c o u n t r i e s  d i f f e r  i n  t h e i r  s u p p l y  o f  a n d  d e m a n d  f o r  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  a n d  h e n c e  th e  i m p l i c i t  p r i c e  o f  t h e i r  s e r v i c e s .  T h i s  a r i s e s  f r o m  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
p h y s i c a l  a s s i m i l a t i v e  c a p a c i t y  ( t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  to  a b s o r b  w a s t e s  a n d  r e n d e r  t h e m  h a r m l e s s ) ,  
e c o n o m i c  s t r u c t u r e s ,  i n c o m e  l e v e l s ,  a n d  p r e f e r e n c e s .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  g o o d s  d i f f e r  i n  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  u s e  o f  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s e r v i c e s ,  e i t h e r  a s  d i r e c t  p r o d u c t i o n  in p u t s  ( s o i l  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  q u a l i t y ,  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o c e s s  
w a t e r )  o r  i n  t h e i r  w a s t e  p r o f i l e s .  I t  f o l lo w s  t h a t  d i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  r e l a t i v e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
e n d o w m e n t s  a n d  d e m a n d s  f o r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s e r v i c e s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  c o n v e n t i o n a l  f a c t o r  e n d o w m e n t s  
( l a b o r  a n d  c a p i t a l ) ,  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  a n d  th u s  a r e  s o u r c e s  o f  g a in s  f r o m  t r a d e .  
M o r e o v e r ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  a s  c o u n t r i e s  m o v e  to  i n c o r p o r a t e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o s t s  i n  p r o d u c t  p r i c e s  t h r o u g h  
d i r e c t  r e g u l a t i o n ,  p o l l u t i o n  t a x e s ,  o r  o t h e r  m e a s u r e s ,  p r i o r  t r a d e  d i s t o r t i o n s  a r i s i n g  f r o m  u n p r i c e d  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e s o u r c e s  w i l l  b e  r e d u c e d .  C h a n g e s  i n  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  a r e  t o  b e  e x p e c te d  
a n d  w e l c o m e d .  I n  s h o r t ,  t r a d e  c a n  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  e f f i c ie n t  u s e  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  p r o v i d e d  
t h a t  p r o d u c t  p r i c e s  r e f l e c t  t h e  f u l l  s o c i a l  c o s t  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  i n c l u d i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  a n d  
r e s o u r c e  d e p l e t i o n  c o s t s .  C o n v e r s e ly ,  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  e q u a l i z e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o s t s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  i n  t h e  
f a c e  o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e n d o w m e n t s  a n d  d e m a n d  f o r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s e r v i c e s  w o u l d  b e  
i n e f f i c i e n t  a n d  w o u l d  r e d u c e  g a in s  f r o m  t r a d e .  I t  w o u l d  a l s o  l e a d  t o  m i s a l l o c a t i o n  a n d  m i s u s e  o f  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e s o u r c e s .
T h r e e  c a v e a t s  a r e  i n  o r d e r .  F i r s t ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s e r v i c e s  a r e  s e l d o m  p r i c e d  i n  c o m p e t i t i v e  
m a r k e t s ,  a n d  t h e i r  s o c i a l  p r i c e  a n d  th e  r e s u l t i n g  p a t t e r n  o f  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  u n u s u a l  
u n c e r t a i n t y .  S e c o n d ,  p a r t i a l  i n c l u s i o n  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o s t s  i n  p r o d u c t  p r i c e  b y  o n e  c o u n t r y  b u t  n o t  b y  
a n o t h e r  m a y  o r  m a y  n o t  im p r o v e  r e s o u r c e  a l l o c a t io n  a n d  w e l f a r e  g l o b a l l y .  E f f i c i e n c y  i n  t r a d e  i s  a g a i n  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e t e r m i n e .  T h i r d ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  c a n  h a v e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e f f e c t s .  H e n c e  f i x in g  
t h e  p r i c e  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e s o u r c e s  t h r o u g h  a  n a t i o n a l  c a l c u lu s  o f  b e n e f i t s  a n d  c o s t s  m a y  b e  s u b o p t i m a l  
f r o m  a  g l o b a l  p e r s p e c t iv e .
T h e  s e c o n d  h e lp f u l  s t r a n d  is  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  d o m e s t i c  d i s t o r t i o n s  a n d  th e  r e l a t e d  t h e o r y  o f  th e  
s e c o n d  b e s t .  T h e  p r i n c i p a l  c o n c l u s i o n  f r o m  th a t  t h e o r y  is  t h a t  p o l i c y  s h o u l d  b e  d i r e c t e d  to  c o r r e c t i n g  
m a r k e t  d i s t o r t i o n s  a t  t h e i r  s o u r c e .  E n v i r o n m e n ta l  e x t e r n a l i t i e s — d i s t o r t i o n s — a r i s e  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  
c o n s u m p t i o n ,  n o t  i n  t r a d e  p e r  s e .  T h i s  im p l i e s  t h a t  t r a d e  m e a s u r e s  a r e  n o t  f i r s t - b e s t  i n s t r u m e n t s  f o r  
a c h i e v i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  o b j e c t iv e s .  T r a d e  m e a s u r e s  m a y  o r  m a y  n o t  i m p r o v e  w e l f a r e .
T h e  t h i r d  t h e o r e t i c a l  s t r a n d  c o m e s  f r o m  th e  g r o w i n g  l i t e r a t u r e  o n  m a n a g i n g  t r a n s b o u n d a r y  
p o l l u t i o n  a n d  g lo b a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o b l e m s .  T h a t  l i t e r a t u r e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  f o r  e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
a g r e e m e n t  t o  r e d u c e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l lu t i o n ,  s o m e  s y s te m  o f  p a y m e n t s  o r  s a n c t i o n s  m a y  b e  n e c e s s a r y  to  
c o n t r o l  f r e e  r i d e r s  a n d  s e c u r e  w i d e s p r e a d  c o m p l i a n c e .4 B e c a u s e  m e c h a n i s m s  f o r  d i r e c t  p a y m e n t s  a r e  
u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  a n d  b e c a u s e  t h e  r a n g e  o f  n o n e c o n o m i c  s a n c t i o n s  i s  l im i t e d ,  t h e r e  is  p r e s s u r e  t o  u s e  t r a d e  
m e a s u r e s — e i t h e r  i n d u c e m e n t s  o r  c o e r c io n — to  s e c u r e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  o b j e c t iv e s .
3. H orst Siebert, "Environmental Protection and International Specialization," W eltw irtschaftliches A rch iv , 
1974; R. Pethig "Pollution, W elfare, and Environmental P olicy in the Theory o f  Comparative Advantage,"  
Jo u rn a l o f  E n v iro nm enta l Econom ics an d  M anagem ent, 1976.
4 . For a general d iscussion  see Scott Barrett, "The Problem  o f  G lobal Environm ental Protection," O xfo rd  
R eview  o f  E conom ic  P o licy, V o l. 6 , N o . 1, Spring 1990.
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F i n a l l y ,  p o l i t i c a l  e c o n o m y  t h e o r y  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  u n d e r  c e r t a i n  a s s u m p t io n s ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i n t e r e s t  
g r o u p s  m a y  r e i n f o r c e  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  i n t e r e s t s  a n d  in c r e a s e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  o r  i n e f f i c i e n t  u s e  
o f  r e s t r i c t i v e  t r a d e  m e a s u r e s  f o r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p u r p o s e s . 5
Trade Effects of Environmental Regulations of Production
T h e  m a i n  t r a d e  i s s u e  is  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s .  E n v i r o n m e n ta l  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  t h r o u g h  e f f l u e n t  
a n d  e m i s s i o n  s t a n d a r d s ,  i n p u t  o r  t e c h n o l o g y  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  z o n in g ,  o r  p o l l u t i o n  t a x e s  a l l  i n c r e a s e  
p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s .  T h e  t r a d e  e f f e c t s  a r e  r e v i e w e d  in  S e c t i o n  I I ,  b e lo w .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  s e c to r s  w i t h  h ig h  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  c o s t s  r e l a t i v e  t o  o t h e r  i n d u s t r i e s  a n d  r e l a t i v e  f o r  f o r e i g n  s u p p l i e r s ,  w i l l  lo s e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m p e t i t i v e  p o s i t i o n .  I f  e x c h a n g e  r a te s  m o v e  to  a d ju s t  t h e  t r a d e  b a l a n c e ,  s e c to r s  w i t h  l o w  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  c o s t  s h o u l d  g a in  i n  t h e i r  i n te r n a t i o n a l  c o m p e t i t i v e  p o s i t i o n s .
I n  g e n e r a l  t h e s e  s h i f t s  i n  c o s t s  a n d  t r a d e  w i l l  im p r o v e  g lo b a l  e f f i c i e n c y  i n  t h e  u s e  o f  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e s o u r c e s .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e r e  a r e  c e r t a i n  l e g i t im a te  a r e a s  o f  c o n c e r n .  A  l a r g e ,  r a p i d  c h a n g e  
i n  c o m p e t i t i v e  p o s i t i o n s  m a y  in v o lv e  s h o r t - r u n  a d ju s tm e n t  c o s t s  a t  t h e  i n d u s t r y  o r  f i r m  l e v e l ,  a n d  s o m e  
f o r m  o f  t r a n s i t i o n a l  a d ju s tm e n t  a s s i s t a n c e  m a y  b e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  e f f i c ie n t .  M o r e o v e r ,  i f  f o r e i g n  
c o m p e t i t o r s  f a i l  t o  e s t a b l i s h  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t a n d a r d s  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t h e i r  a s s i m i l a t i v e  c a p a c i t y ,  i n c o m e ,  
e t c . ,  a n  i m p l i c i t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  “ s u b s i d y ” is  p r e s e n t ,  a n d  t r a d e  r e m a in s  d i s t o r t e d .  T h i s  r a i s e s  t h e  q u e s t io n  
o f  w h e t h e r  a  b o r d e r  a d ju s tm e n t  s c h e m e — t a r i f f s  a n d  e x p o r t  r e b a t e s — to  n a r r o w  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o s t  
d i f f e r e n c e s  i s  d e s i r a b l e .  F o r  a  s m a l l  c o u n t r y  w i th  n o  m a r k e t  p o w e r  o r  a b i l i t y  t o  i n f lu e n c e  f o r e i g n  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  b o r d e r  m e a s u r e s  w o u l d  b e  w e l f a r e  r e d u c i n g .  A  r e b a t e  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
c o n t r o l  c o s t s  a t  t h e  b o r d e r  w o u l d  m a i n t a i n  t h e  w e d g e  b e tw e e n  p r i v a t e  a n d  s o c i a l  p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s ,  
m a i n t a i n  e x c e s s i v e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  p o l lu t i n g  p r o d u c t ,  a n d  “ s u b s i d i z e ” e x p o r t s .  A n  o f f s e t t i n g  t a r i f f  o n  
i m p o r t s  w o u l d  m a i n t a i n  e x c e s s i v e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  i m p o r t  c o m p e t in g  p r o d u c t  a n d  i n c r e a s e  d o m e s t i c  
p r i c e s .  T h e  l a r g e  c o u n t r y  c a s e  is  m o r e  c o m p l i c a te d .  I f  b o r d e r  m e a s u r e s  w e r e  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  r a i s in g  
f o r e i g n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t a n d a r d s  t o  t h e i r  s o c i a l  o p t im u m ,  t h e  t r a d e  a n d  r e s o u r c e  a l l o c a t i o n  d i s t o r t i o n  
w o u l d  d i s a p p e a r ,  t h e  b o r d e r  m e a s u r e s  w o u l d  b e c o m e  r e d u n d a n t ,  b u t  t h e  h o m e  c o u n t r y  w o u l d  h a v e  d e n ie d  
i t s e l f  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  i m p o r t  “ s u b s i d i z e d ” p r o d u c t s .  I f  u n s u c c e s s f u l ,  t h e  w e l f a r e - r e d u c in g  e f f e c t s  r e -  
e m e r g e .
T w o  s e r i o u s  p r a c t i c a l  p r o b l e m s  w i t h  b o r d e r  a d ju s tm e n t  a r e  t h e  d i f f i c u l ty  i n  a c c u r a t e ly  d e t e r m i n i n g  
th e  s o c i a l l y  o p t im a l  l e v e l s  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  in  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  a n d  th e  p o s s i b l e  c a p t u r e  o f  s u c h  
a  s c h e m e  b y  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  i n t e r e s t s .  T h e  b r o a d e r  q u e s t io n  is  w h e t h e r  t h e  t r a d e  s y s t e m  is  r o b u s t  e n o u g h  
t o  b e  u s e d  a s  a  t o o l  f o r  s e c u r i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  o b j e c t iv e s .  T h e r e  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  n o  c a s e  f o r  
o f f s e t t i n g  l e g i t im a te  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  c o s t s ,  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  w h i c h  a r e  s o u r c e s  o f  
g a in s  f r o m  t r a d e .
A n o t h e r  a r e a  o f  c o n c e r n  is  t h e  f i n a n c in g  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  c o s t s .  E v e n  i f  a l l  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t a n d a r d s  a r e  o p t im a l ,  i f  o n e  c o u n t r y ’s g o v e r n m e n t  s u b s id i z e s  a n d  a  s e c o n d  r e q u i r e s  t h e  
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  t o  p i c k  u p  t h e  c o s t ,  t r a d e  r e m a in s  d i s t o r t e d .  T h e  O E C D  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i s  p r o b l e m  w a s  th e  
a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  P o l l u t e r  P a y s  P r i n c i p l e  ( 1 9 7 2 ) ,  u n d e r  w h i c h  g o v e r n m e n t s  u n d e r t a k e  t o  a v o id  s u b s id i e s  
f o r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  c o s t s  i n c u r r e d  in  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c to r .  T h e  P P P  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  e f f i c i e n c y  i n  t r a d e
5 . Craig V ance Grasstek, "The Political Econom y o f  Trade and the Environment," in Patrick L ow  (ed .), 
In te rn a tio n a l T rad e  an d  the E nvironm ent (W ashington, D .C .: W orld Bank D iscussion  Paper N o . 159, 1992).
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a n d  i n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e s o u r c e  u s e .  T h e  P P P  d o e s  p e r m i t  s o m e  t r a n s i t i o n a l  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  i n d u s t r y .  T h e  
G A T T  s u b s id y  p r o v i s i o n s  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  m o r e  f u l ly  i n  S e c t i o n  I I ,  b e lo w .
T h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  a d d s  t w o  n e w  e le m e n t s  t o  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  i s s u e .  F i r s t ,  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s  m a y  o b j e c t  t o  s h i f t i n g  h i g h ly  p o l lu t i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  a b r o a d  e v e n  i f  n o  t r a n s n a t i o n a l  
p o l l u t i o n  is  i n v o lv e d .  T h i s  r e f l e c t s  t h e  g e n e r a l l y  s t r o n g e r  g l o b a l  w e l f a r e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
c o m m u n i ty .  B u t  s u c h  a  p e r s p e c t i v e  i n t r o d u c e s  t h e  “ e c o - i m p e r i a l i s m ” p r o b l e m ,  i n  w h i c h  o n e  c o u n t r y  
a t t e m p t s  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e  i ts  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  w i t h o u t  d i r e c t l y  b e a r i n g  t h e  c o s t  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n .
S e c o n d ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s  m a y  b e l i e v e  t h a t  a  c o n c e r n  f o r  c o m p e t i t i v e  lo s s  i n h ib i t s  s t r o n g  d o m e s t i c  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u la t i o n s ,  a n d  th u s  t h e y  m a y  f a v o r  m e a s u r e s  s u c h  a s  b o r d e r  a d ju s tm e n t s  t o  r e l i e v e  
d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c e r s  o f  s o m e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r e s s u r e .  T h i s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  u n d e r l i e s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
c o in c i d e n c e  o f  i n t e r e s t s  b e tw e e n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a n d  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  g r o u p s .
R e g io n a l  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  in c r e a s e s  t h e  s a l i e n c y  o f  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  i s s u e .  A s  b o r d e r  
b a r r i e r s  a r e  d i s m a n t l e d ,  d o m e s t i c  r e g u la t i o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u la t i o n s  b u t  a l s o  c o m p e t i t i o n  
p o l i c y ,  m i n i m u m  w a g e  l e g i s l a t i o n  a n d  a  h o s t  o f  o t h e r  g o v e r n m e n t  i n t e r v e n t i o n s  t h a t  a f f e c t  p r o d u c t i o n  
c o s t s ,  b e c o m e  m o r e  im p o r t a n t .  B e c a u s e  r e g io n a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  n o w  e x te n d s  t o  f r e e i n g  u p  c a p i t a l  f l o w s  a n d  
d i r e c t  i n v e s tm e n t ,  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  m o t i v a t e d  r e lo c a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  m a y  a l s o  i n c r e a s e .  
T h e  e m p i r i c a l  e v id e n c e  is  r e v i e w e d  b e lo w .
T h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  o f  a  r e g io n a l  e c o n o m ic  i n t e g r a t i o n  a g r e e m e n t  p r o v i d e s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  
h a r m o n i z a t i o n  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u l a t i o n  o n  p r o d u c t i o n .  S o m e  t h e o r e t i c a l  w o r k  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  c e r t a i n  
r e g u l a t o r y  s t r u c t u r e s  ( e . g . ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  n o r m s ,  t a x  s t r u c tu r e s )  n e e d  n o t  b e  h a r m o n i z e d  ex ante i n  
r e g io n a l  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  b u t  w i l l  e m e r g e  ex post t h r o u g h  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o m p e t i t i o n  ( c o u n t r i e s  c o m p e t e  t h r o u g h  
t h e i r  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s ) . 6 I t  i s  f u r t h e r  a r g u e d  t h a t  l o c a t io n a l  a r b i t r a g e  n e e d  n o t  r e s u l t  i n  a  l o w e r  l e v e l  
o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  q u a l i t y ,  b u t  s h o u l d  l e a d  to  l o n g - r u n  h a r m o n i z a t io n  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c i e s .  A l l  t h i s  
s u p p o s e s  t h a t  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s e s  r e v e a l  n a t i o n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  a n d  t h a t  t r a n s b o u n d a r y  p o l l u t i o n  is  
a b s e n t .  T h e  a r g u m e n t  w a s  d e v e l o p e d  in  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  E u r o p e a n  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  a n d  w h e t h e r  i t  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  
t o  W e s t e r n  H e m i s p h e r e  i n t e g r a t i o n  i s  a n  o p e n  q u e s t io n .
Trade Effects of Environmentally Related Product Standards
P r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s — f o r  e x a m p l e ,  a u to  e m i s s io n  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a n d  p e s t i c i d e  r e s i d u e  
s t a n d a r d s — s h o u l d  b e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  f r o m  p r o d u c t i o n  r e g u la t i o n s .  T h e  f o r m e r  p r o t e c t  t h e  h e a l t h ,  s a f e t y ,  
a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t  i n  t h e  c o n s u m in g  c o u n t r y ,  w h i l e  t h e  l a t t e r  p r o t e c t  t h e  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r y . 7 T h e  
d i s t i n c t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  is  n o t  s o  c l e a r  w h e n  t r a n s b o u n d a r y  p o l l u t i o n  is  p r e s e n t .  E n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  r e l a t e d
6 . H orst Siebert, "The Harm onization Issue in  Europe: Prior A greem ent or a C om petitive P rocess?” in  Horst 
Siebert (ed .) , The C om pletion  o f  the In te rn a l M a rk e t  (Tubingen: J. C . B . M ohr, 1990).
7 . The specialized  literature distinguishes betw een technical standards, w hich  are voluntary and drawn up by  
private bod ies, such as the International Standards Organization (ISO) and technical regulations, w hich are 
established by public law . W e fo llow  the com m on practice o f  using the term  product standards to indicate 
technical regulations. U nited National Industrial D evelopm ent Organization, In te rn a tio n a l P roduct Standards: 
Trends a n d  Issues (Vienna: U N ID O , P P D 182, January 1991).
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p r o d u c t  r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  a  s u b s e t  o f  p r o d u c t  r e g u la t i o n s  g e n e r a l l y  a n d  p o s e  n o  n e w  t h e o r e t i c a l  i s s u e s  ( a p a r t  
f r o m  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t r a n s b o u n d a r y  p o l lu t i o n ) .  T h e i r  n u m b e r  a n d  s c o p e  h a s  g r o w n  r a p i d l y ,  h o w e v e r ,  
a n d  t h e y  a r e  p r o v i n g  to  b e  h i g h l y  c o n te n t io u s .
P r o d u c t  r e g u la t i o n s  p o s e  t w o  t r a d e  p r o b l e m s .  F i r s t ,  r e g u la t i o n s  d r a w n  u p  b y  i m p o r t i n g  
( c o n s u m in g )  c o u n t r i e s  o s t e n s i b ly  m a y  b e  i n t e n d e d  to  p r o t e c t  h e a l t h ,  s a f e t y  a n d  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  b u t  m a y  
i n  f a c t  b e  c o v e r t  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  d e s i g n e d  f o r  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  p u r p o s e s .  S e p a r a t i n g  l e g i t im a te  m e a s u r e s  f r o m  
c o v e r t  p r o t e c t i o n  is  d i f f i c u l t ,  a s  t h e  i n te n t  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  e f f e c t  m u s t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d .  ( G A T T  t r e a t m e n t  o f  
p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s  i s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  S e c t i o n  I I . )  S e c o n d ,  e v e n  a b s e n t  c o v e r t  p r o t e c t i o n ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s  f r a g m e n t  m a r k e t s  a n d  i n c r e a s e  d e s i g n ,  p r o d u c t i o n ,  i n v e n t o r y  a n d  s e l l i n g  
c o s t s .
H a r m o n i z i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  r e l a t e d  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s  i n te r n a t i o n a l l y  w o u l d  r e d u c e  c o v e r t  
p r o t e c t i o n  f r o m  a r b i t r a r y  n a t i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s  a n d  in c r e a s e  e f f i c ie n c y  i n  t r a d e .  H a r m o n i z a t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  
p r e s e n t s  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o b l e m s .  A p p r o p r i a t e  s t a n d a r d s  m a y  w e l l  d i f f e r  f r o m  c o u n t r y  t o  c o u n t r y ,  
b e c a u s e  o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  a s s i m i l a t i v e  c a p a c i t y ,  in c o m e  l e v e l s ,  a n d  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  t o l e r a t e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
r i s k .  I f  s t a n d a r d s  w e r e  h a r m o n i z e d  a t  a  “ l o w ” l e v e l ,  s o m e  c o u n t r i e s  w o u l d  c o n f r o n t  s t a n d a r d s  b e lo w  
t h e i r  o p t im a l  l e v e l  ( t h e  l e a s t  c o m m o n  d e n o m i n a to r  p r o b l e m ) ;  i f  h a r m o n i z e d  a t  a  “ h i g h ” l e v e l ,  o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s  w o u l d  c o n f r o n t  s t a n d a r d s  m o r e  c o s t l y  t h a n  t h e i r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  w a r r a n t .
O n c e  a g a i n  r e g io n a l  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  d o e s  n o t  a l t e r  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  t h e  i s s u e  b u t  i n c r e a s e s  
s a l i e n c y .  R e g io n a l  f r e e  t r a d e  is  i n c o m p le t e  w i t h o u t  t h e  u n i f o r m i t y  o f  p r o d u c t  r e g u l a t i o n s  i f  a  s i n g l e  
m a r k e t .  B u t  u n i f o r m  s t a n d a r d s  m a y  b e  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  e c o n o m i c  a n d  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n d i t i o n s .  A s  d i s c u s s e d  b e lo w ,  t h is  h a s  b e e n  a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  d i f f i c u l t  p r o b l e m  i n  t h e  E C  
a n d  a g a i n  i n  t h e  N A F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n s .
Trade Measures to Secure International Environmental Objectives
T h i s  i s s u e  o v e r l a p s  w i t h  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s ,  a s  b o r d e r  a d ju s tm e n t  t o  e q u a l i z e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  
c o s t s  m a y  b e  s u p p o r t e d  f o r  e i t h e r  t r a d e  a n d  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  r e a s o n s ,  o r  t o  i n f lu e n c e  f o r e i g n  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  b e h a v i o r ,  o r  b o t h .  I t  a l s o  o v e r l a p s  w i t h  t h e  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d  i s s u e ,  i f  p r o d u c t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
a r e  d r a w n  u p  to  i n c l u d e  r e g u la t i o n  o f  th e  m a n n e r  in  w h ic h  p r o d u c t s  a r e  p r o d u c e d .
F o r  a n a l y t i c a l  p u r p o s e s  i t  m a y  b e  u s e f u l  t o  s e p a r a t e  tw o  s i t u a t i o n s :  u n i l a t e r a l  u s e  o f  t r a d e  
m e a s u r e s  ( s a n c t i o n s ,  i n d u c e m e n t s )  t o  c h a n g e  f o r e i g n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y ;  a n d  t r a d e  p r o v i s i o n s  
i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a g r e e m e n t s .  W i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  f i r s t ,  ( 1 )  o n l y  c o u n t r i e s  
w i t h  s o m e  m a r k e t  p o w e r  ( t e r m s  o f  t r a d e  o r  m a r k e t  a c c e s s )  c a n  r e s o r t  t o  t h e s e  m e a s u r e s ,  ( 2 )  t r a d e  
s a n c t i o n s  w i l l  b e  e f f i c i e n t  o n ly  i f  t h e y  l e a d  to  c o r r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e x t e r n a l i t y  a t  i ts  
s o u r c e ,  a n d  (3 )  t h e  u s e  o f  t r a d e  m e a s u r e s  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p u r p o s e s  is  c u r r e n t l y  s u b j e c t  
to  c e r t a i n  G A T T  d i s c ip l i n e s .
T o  e l a b o r a t e ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t r a d e  c a r r o t s  a n d  s t i c k s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  o n l y  t o  r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  
c o u n t r i e s .  B u t  t h i s  p o i n t s  t o  a n  a s y m m e t r y  b e tw e e n  c o e r c iv e  a n d  in d u c e m e n t  m e a s u r e s :  t h e  c o e r c in g  
c o u n t r y  i s  u n d e r  n o  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  t h e  b e n e f i t s  f r o m  f o r e i g n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  e x c e e d  th e  
c o s t s — i t  i s  s i m p ly  a n  e x e r c i s e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t  p o w e r — w h e r e a s  a  c o u n t r y  o f f e r i n g  a  t r a d e  
in d u c e m e n t ,  s a y ,  l o w e r in g  a  t a r i f f  i n  e x c h a n g e  f o r  a  c o m m i tm e n t  t o  i m p r o v e  f o r e i g n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l
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p r o t e c t i o n ,  b e a r s  a  “ c o s t ” a n d  w i l l  p r e s u m a b l y  c o n s i d e r  t h e  b e n e f i t  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  t h a t  c o s t . 8 T r a d e  
l i b e r a l i z i n g  i n d u c e m e n t s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  h a v e  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  a d v a n t a g e  o f  r e d u c i n g  r a t h e r  t h a n  r a i s i n g  t r a d e  
b a r r i e r s .  A  t r a d e  s a n c t i o n  t h a t  f a i l s  t o  c h a n g e  f o r e i g n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  b e h a v i o r  s i m p ly  r e d u c e s  h o m e  a n d  
w o r l d  w e l f a r e .  M o r e o v e r ,  c e r t a i n  t y p e s  o f  t r a d e  m e a s u r e s — f o r  e x a m p l e ,  a  c o u n te r v a i l i n g  d u t y  a g a i n s t  
a n  i m p l i c i t  f o r e i g n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s u b s id y  t h a t  r e s u l t s  i n  a  f o r e i g n  e x p o r t  t a x — m ig h t  o r  m ig h t  n o t  i m p r o v e  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n . 9 T h e  t r a d e  s a n c t i o n  m a y  h a v e  c o r r e c t e d  t h e  t r a d e  d i s t o r t i o n  ( s u b s id i z e d  
e x p o r t s )  b u t ,  b y  f a i l i n g  to  d e a l  a t  t h e  s o u r c e ,  m a y  i n c r e a s e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a b u s e .
T r a d e  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a g r e e m e n t s  a r e  i n c r e a s in g l y  c o m m o n . 10 O n e  
p u r p o s e ,  m e n t i o n e d  a b o v e ,  is  t o  d i s c ip l i n e  f r e e  r i d e r s  a n d  b r o a d e n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  H o w  o f t e n  t h i s  is  
n e c e s s a r y ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  a n  o p e n  q u e s t io n .  I n - p r i n c i p l e  a g r e e m e n t s  t h a t  a r e  s t r u c t u r e d  s o  t h a t  a l l  m e m b e r s  
a r e  m a d e  b e t t e r  o f f ,  u s i n g  s id e  p a y m e n t s  i f  n e c e s s a r y ,  s h o u l d  a t t r a c t  t h e  r e q u i s i t e  n u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s .  
I f  s u f f i c i e n t  p a y m e n t s  c a n n o t  b e  m a d e ,  t h e  w e l f a r e  i m p r o v e m e n t  o f  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  is  c a l l e d  in to  
q u e s t i o n . 11 M o r e o v e r ,  f r e e  r i d e r s  w i l l  c o m e  i n to  e x i s t e n c e  o n ly  i f  a n  a g r e e m e n t  i s  r e a c h e d .  I f  c o u n t r i e s  
a r e  a w a r e  t h a t  t h e i r  f a i l u r e  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  w o u l d  s c r a p  a  p o t e n t i a l  a g r e e m e n t ,  t h e i r  c h o ic e  is  b e t w e e n  th e  
c o s t  t o  t h e m  o f  n o  a g r e e m e n t  a n d  t h e  n e t  c o s t  ( i n c l u d i n g  s i d e  p a y m e n t s )  o f  j o i n i n g .  B y  i n t r o d u c i n g  a n  
a d d i t i o n a l  t r a d e  s a n c t i o n  c o s t ,  t h e y  b e c o m e  “ f o r c e d  r i d e r s , ” a n d  t h e  a s y m m e t r y  b e tw e e n  c o e r c i v e  a n d  
in d u c e m e n t  s c h e m e s  i s  a g a i n  r e l e v a n t .
A  s e c o n d  f u n c t i o n  o f  t r a d e  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a g r e e m e n t s  i s  t o  im p r o v e  
t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  a g r e e m e n t .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t r a d e  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n  c o n t r o l s  m a y  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  d i r e c t  
c o n s u m p t i o n  c o n t r o l s .  T h e  n u m e r o u s  c o n v e n t i o n s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a f f i c  i n  w i l d l i f e  a p p e a r  t o  
f a l l  i n to  t h i s  c a t e g o r y ,  a s  d o e s  t h e  B a s e l  C o n v e n t i o n  o n  t h e  C o n t r o l  o f  T r a n s b o u n d a r y  M o v e m e n t s  o f  
H a z a r d o u s  W a s te s  a n d  T h e i r  D i s p o s a l .  T h e  p r i n c i p a l  i s s u e  h e r e  is  t o  b e  a s s u r e d  t h a t  t r a d e  c o n t r o l s  a r e  
t h e  m o s t  e f f i c i e n t / l e a s t  c o s t ly  m e a s u r e s  a v a i l a b l e .
T h e  u s e  o f  t r a d e  m e a s u r e s  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  o b j e c t iv e s  i s  r e l e v a n t  t o  r e g io n a l  
e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n .  T h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  l e a d i n g  to  i n t e g r a t i o n  p r o v i d e  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  c h a n g e  f o r e i g n  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r a c t i c e s .  T h e  p r o s p e c t i v e  b e n e f i t s  f r o m  i n t e g r a t i o n  p r o v i d e  a  p o t e n t i a l  v e h i c l e  f o r  
c o m p e n s a t i o n .  H o w  t h e s e  m a y  b e  u s e d  is  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  S e c t io n s  I I I  a n d  I V .
8. This is a very m ercantilist v iew , in w hich low ering a tariff is v iew ed  as a concession , or cost.
9 . The export tax may encourage inefficient local processing and resource w aste. Indonesia’s export tax and 
subsequent export ban on logs and the consequent increase in local processing is said to have w asted up to 10 
percent o f  w ood  volum e as compared to international input/output perform ance in w ood  processing. D onald  
Hanna, F is c a l P o lic ies  an d  E nvironm enta l Outcom es: Some Exam ples fro m  Indonesia  (W ashington, D .C .: The 
W orld Bank, 1991), as cited by Carlos Alberto Prim o Braga, "Tropical Forests and Trade Policy: The C ase o f  
Indonesia and Brazil," in  L ow  (ed .), In te rn a tio n a l T ra d e ...,  op. cit.
10. O f 127 multilateral environm ental agreements betw een 1933 and 1990, 17 contain trade provisions. U .S . 
C ongress, O ffice o f  T echnology A ssessm ent, T rade  an d  E nvironm ent: Conflicts and  O pportun ities  (W ashington, 
D .C .: U .S . GPO , M ay 1992).
11. At a h igh  level o f  abstraction, the benefit to som e parties must be sufficient to com pensate those w ho lose  
for a Pareto im provem ent.
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C o n c e r n  f o r  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e f f e c t s  o f  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  is  v e r y  r e c e n t .  S o m e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
w o r k  is  n o w  b e in g  p u b l i s h e d ,  b u t  i t  i s  b y  n o  m e a n s  c o m p r e h e n s i v e . 12 P e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t  b a s i c  q u e s t io n  
i s  w h e t h e r  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  h a r m s  o r  i m p r o v e s  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t .  T h e  a n s w e r  d e p e n d s  u p o n  w h a t  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c i e s ,  i f  a n y ,  a r e  i n  p l a c e .  I f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  is  a b s e n t ,  t h e n  i t  i s  e a s y  e n o u g h  
t o  s h o w  t h a t  w h e n  t r a d e  l e a d s  t o  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  p o l l u t i o n  in t e n s i v e  g o o d s ,  t h e  h o m e  
e n v i r o n m e n t  s u f f e r s ,  w h e r e a s  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  in  “ c l e a n ” i n d u s t r i e s  r e d u c e s  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t r e s s ,  a t  l e a s t  
a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l .  M o r e  g e n e r a l l y ,  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  r e d u c e s  s o m e  d i s t o r t i o n s  b u t ,  a s  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  
t h e  s e c o n d  b e s t  r e m i n d s  u s ,  w e l f a r e  l o s s e s  f r o m  u n c o r r e c t e d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d i s t o r t i o n s  m a y  o u t w e i g h  t r a d e  
e f f i c i e n c y  g a in s .
T h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c to r  i s  o f t e n  u s e d  f o r  i l l u s t r a t i o n . 13 P r o d u c t io n ,  c o n s u m p t i o n  a n d  t r a d e  s t a r t  
f r o m  h i g h l y  d i s t o r t e d  p a t t e r n s .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  r i c h  c o u n t r i e s  s u b s id i z e  a n d  p r o t e c t  a g r i c u l t u r e ;  p o o r  c o u n t r i e s  
t a x  a n d  p r o v i d e  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t i v e  r a te s  o f  p r o t e c t i o n .  M o d e l l i n g  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  f i r s t  r e q u i r e s  
e s t im a t i n g  t h e  e f f e c t s  o n  p r i c e ,  p r o d u c t i o n ,  a n d  c o n s u m p t i o n  l e v e l s  a n d  p a t t e r n s ,  a n d  t h e n  th e  f u r t h e r  s t e p  
o f  t r a c i n g  t h e s e  c h a n g e s  b a c k  t o  i n t e r m e d i a t e  i n p u t  u s e  ( e . g . ,  f e r t i l i z e r )  a n d  d e m a n d  f o r  p r i m a r y  i n p u t s  
( s o i l s ,  w a t e r ) ,  t o  b u i l d  a  p r o f i l e  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d e m a n d s .  S p e c i f i c a l ly ,  t h e r e  is  c o n c e r n  t h a t  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
e x p a n s i o n  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  t h e  u s e  o f  c h e m i c a l s  a n d  i n t e n s i f y  d e f o r e s t a t i o n  i f  
p r o t e c t i v e  p o l i c i e s  a r e  n o t  i n  p l a c e . 14 M u c h  d e p e n d s  o n  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  a n d  l a n d  t e n u r e  a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  
a s  w e l l  a s  c o n t r o l s  o n  o f f s i t e  e x t e r n a l i t i e s . 15
T h e o r e t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  c o n f r o n t s  f u r t h e r  
c o m p l i c a t i o n s .  T r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  m a y  i t s e l f  e n c o u r a g e  b e t t e r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  i t  is  
f r e q u e n t l y  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  i n c o m e  g a in s  f r o m  t r a d e  c o n t r i b u t e  to  h i g h e r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t a n d a r d s  a n d  
e n f o r c e m e n t . 16 T h r e e  p o i n t s  s e e m  c le a r .  F i r s t ,  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  i t s e l f  d o e s  n o t  c a u s e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
d e t e r i o r a t i o n .  S e c o n d ,  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  m a y  i n c r e a s e  t h e  n e e d  f o r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  m e a s u r e s .
12. K ym  A nderson and Richard Blackhurst (ed s.), G reening W o rld  T rade Issues (Ann Arbor: U niversity o f  
M ichigan Press, 1992); Ram on L opez, "The Environm ent as a Factor o f  Production: The E conom ic G row th and 
Trade P olicy  Linkages," in L ow  (ed .), In te rn a tio n a l T rade . . . ,  op. cit.
13. K ym  A nderson, "Effects on the Environm ent and W elfare o f  Liberalizing W orld Trade: The C ases o f  
C oal and Food," in  A nderson and Blackhurst (ed s.), G re e n in g ..., op. cit; C. Ford R unge, "Environmental 
E ffects o f  Trade in  the Agricultural Sector" (St. Paul: U . o f  M innesota Center for International F ood  and 
Agricultural P o licy , July 1992).
14. A nderson, how ever, argues that as trade liberalization tends to equalize agricultural prices w orldw ide, the 
reduction in  agricultural chem ical use in  developed countries w ould  not be matched by increased use in  
develop ing countries, as the developing country agriculture w ill be (relatively) labor using and chem ical sparing. 
A nderson, "E ffects..." , op. cit.
15. G ershon Feder et a l., L a n d  P o lic ies  an d  F a rm  P roductiv ity  in  T h a ila n d  (Baltimore: Johns H opkins Press, 
for The W orld Bank, 1988).
16. Robert Lucas, D avid W heeler and Hem amala H ettige, "Economic D evelopm ent, Environm ental R egulation  
and the International M igration o f  T oxic  Industrial Pollution" in  L ow  (ed .), In te rn a tio n a l T ra d e ... ,  op. cit.
310
Regional Free Trade and the Environment
F i n a l l y ,  f o r  r e s o u r c e  m a n a g e m e n t  p u r p o s e s ,  i t  i s  h i g h ly  d e s i r a b l e  t o  i m p r o v e  m o d e l s  t h a t  l i n k  t r a d e  
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  to  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e s o u r c e s . 17
T h e s e  c o n c l u s i o n s  a r e  r e l e v a n t  f o r  b o t h  g lo b a l  ( i . e . ,  M F N )  a n d  r e g io n a l  t r a d e  l ib e r a l i z a t i o n .  
T h e r e  a r e ,  h o w e v e r ,  tw o  d i f f e r e n c e s  w o r t h  n o t in g .  F i r s t ,  r e g io n a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  a r r a n g e m e n t s — f r e e  t r a d e  
a r e a s  o r  c u s t o m s  u n i o n s — a r e  p r e f e r e n t i a l  a n d  h e n c e  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y .  C o n s e q u e n t l y  a  t r a d e  d i s t o r t i o n  
a lw a y s  r e m a i n s ,  a n d  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  t h a t  d i s t o r t i o n  w i t h  a n y  u n c o r r e c t e d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  
r e q u i r e s  s p e c ia l  a n a l y s i s .  O n e  e x a m p l e  m ig h t  b e  i f  N A F T A  in c r e a s e s  t r a d e  d i v e r s i o n  i n  s u g a r ,  a n d  t h i s  
l e a d s  t o  g r e a t e r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t r e s s  i n  n o n m e m b e r  C a r i b b e a n  c o u n t r i e s .  S e c o n d ,  r e g io n a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  
a m o n g  c o n t i g u o u s  c o u n t r i e s  o r  l i t t o r a l  s t a t e s  s h a r i n g  a  c o m m o n  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e  m a y  i n t e n s i f y  
t r a n s b o u n d a r y  e f f e c t s .  T h i s  h a s  b e e n  a  c e n t r a l  i s s u e  i n  N A F T A .
II. Institutional a n d  Empirical Aspects
G A T T  p r o v i s i o n s  b e a r i n g  o n  t r a d e  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t  a r e  r e l e v a n t  t o  r e g io n a l  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n .  
M o s t  i m p o r t a n t ,  G A T T  r e g u la t e s  t r a d e  m e a s u r e s  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s  a n d  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  a r e a s ,  b o t h  
o f  w h i c h  a r e  c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  i n te g r a t i o n - e n v i r o n m e n t  d e b a t e .  M o r e o v e r ,  r e g u la t i o n s  i n c o r p o r a t e d  in  
r e g io n a l  a g r e e m e n t s  m a y  p a r a l l e l  G A T T  p r o v i s i o n s  a s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  E C  la w  r e g a r d i n g  p r o d u c t  
s t a n d a r d s . 18 F i n a l l y ,  r e g io n a l  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  a r r a n g e m e n t s  m u s t  b e  G A T T - c o n s i s t e n t  f o r  G A T T  
m e m b e r s .
Q u a n t i t a t i v e  e s t im a te s  o f  t h e  t r a d e  a n d  in v e s tm e n t  e f f e c ts  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  a n d  o f  
t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e f f e c t s  o f  t r a d e  l ib e r a l i z a t i o n ,  a r e  a l s o  i m p o r t a n t  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  w h e t h e r  p u r p o r t e d  
i s s u e s — f o r  e x a m p l e ,  i n d u s t r i a l  r e lo c a t i o n — w i l l  b e  s i g n i f i c a n t  o r  t r i v i a l  i n  W e s t e r n  H e m i s p h e r e  e c o n o m i c  
i n t e g r a t i o n .  T h is  s e c t i o n  e x a m in e s  G A T T  p r o v i s i o n s  a n d  t h e n  s u m m a r i z e s  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s e a r c h .
T h e  G A T T  on Environmental Issues
Product Standards. G A T T  d o e s  n o t  r e q u i r e  h a r m o n i z a t io n  o f  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  a s  
l o n g  a s  t h e  t e s t s  o f  n o n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  a n d  n a t io n a l  t r e a tm e n t  a r e  m e t ,  a n d  t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n  ( w i t h  
e x c e p t i o n s )  a g a i n s t  t h e  u s e  o f  n o n t a r i f f  t r a d e  m e a s u r e s  is  r e s p e c t e d ,  m e m b e r s  c a n  e s t a b l i s h  w h a t e v e r  
p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s  t h e y  w i s h  t o  s e c u r e  n a t io n a l  o b j e c t iv e s  f o r  h e a l t h ,  s a f e t y ,  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n .  
M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  “ g e n e r a l  e x c e p t i o n s ”  p r o v i s i o n  ( A r t i c l e  X X )  a l l o w s  c o u n t r i e s  t o  t a k e  m e a s u r e s  t h a t  w o u l d  
o t h e r w i s e  v i o l a t e  G A T T ,  i f  t h e s e  m e a s u r e s  a r e  n o t  a p p l i e d  “ i n  a  m a n n e r  w h i c h  w o u l d  c o n s t i t u t e  a  m e a n s  
o f  a r b i t r a r y  o r  u n j u s t i f i a b l e  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  b e tw e e n  c o u n t r i e s  w h e r e  t h e  s a m e  c o n d i t i o n s  p r e v a i l ,  o r  a  
d i s g u i s e d  r e s t r i c t i o n  o n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e . ” A r t i c l e  X X  e x p l i c i t l y  i n c l u d e s  m e a s u r e s  “ ( b )  n e c e s s a r y  to  
p r o t e c t  h u m a n  h e a l t h ,  a n im a l  o r  p l a n t  l i f e  o r  h e a l t h ;  . . . ( g )  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  c o n s e r v a t i o n  o f  e x h a u s t i b l e
17. A ctually , concentration on trade liberalization is too narrow an approach. The environm ental effects o f  all 
relevant trade and production effects should be m odelled. It m akes little  d ifference i f  the production  
externalities arise from  exports or goods sold  dom estically. For a start see the contributions in  John Sutton  
(ed .) , A g ric u ltu ra l T rad e  and  N a tu ra l Resources, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1988).
18. A rticle 36  o f  the EC Treaty parallels G ATT A rticle X X , the exceptions clause.
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n a tu r a l  r e s o u r c e s  i f  s u c h  m e a s u r e s  a r e  m a d e  e f f e c t iv e  i n  c o n ju n c t io n  w i t h  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  d o m e s t i c  
p r o d u c t i o n  o r  c o n s u m p t i o n . ”
G A T T  p a n e l s  h a v e  c o n s i d e r e d  f i v e  c a s e s  i n  w h i c h  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  u s e d  A r t i c l e  X X  f o r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  m e a s u r e s . 19 I n  t w o  c a s e s  t h e  p a n e l s  f o u n d  t h e  t r a d e  r e s t r a i n t s  t o  b e  u n r e l a t e d  to  
r e s o u r c e  c o n s e r v a t i o n . 20 I n  t h e  T h a i l a n d - U .S .  c ig a r e t t e  c a s e  t h e  p a n e l  f o u n d  T h a i  i m p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
t o  b e  n o t  “ n e c e s s a r y ” i n  t h a t  l e s s  r e s t r i c t i v e  t r a d e  m e a s u r e s  w e r e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  p r o t e c t  h e a l t h  i n  T h a i l a n d .  
I n  t h e  U . S .  S u p e r f u n d  c a s e ,  t h e  p a n e l  f o u n d  t h a t  a  d i s p u t e d  U .S .  t a x  o n  c h e m ic a l  p r o d u c t s  f o r  c le a n - u p  
p u r p o s e s  w a s  a  t a x  o n  p r o d u c t s  a n d  h e n c e  e l i g i b le  f o r  b o r d e r  a d ju s tm e n ts  ( i . e . ,  t h e  t a x  c o u ld  b e  l e v i e d  
o n  i m p o r t s )  a s  is  n o r m a l l y  t h e  c a s e ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  t a x  w a s  n o t  r e l e v a n t .  I n  
t h e  U . S . - M e x i c o  t u n a - d o l p h i n  c a s e ,  t h e  p a n e l  f o u n d  t h a t  t h e  U . S .  r e s t r i c t i o n  o n  i m p o r t e d  t u n a  w a s  n o t  
j u s t i f i e d  b e c a u s e ,  a m o n g  o t h e r  r e a s o n s ,  A r t i c l e  X X  a p p l i e d  o n l y  t o  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  h e a l t h  o r  l i f e  o r  
n a tu r a l  r e s o u r c e s  w i t h i n  t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y . 21 T h e s e  c a s e s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  G A T T  
h a s  b e e n  a t t e m p t i n g  to  r e f i n e  i t s  r u l e s  o n  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s ,  b u t  c e r t a i n l y  n o t  a lw a y s  t o  t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s .
T h e  G A T T  S t a n d a r d s  C o d e  is  a l s o  r e l e v a n t . 22 T h e  C o d e  r e a f f i r m s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  n a t i o n a l  
t r e a tm e n t  a n d  M F N ,  e n c o u r a g e s  b u t  d o e s  n o t  r e q u i r e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s ,  e n c o u r a g e s  t h e  m o r e  
e f f i c i e n t  p e r f o r m a n c e  o v e r  d e s i g n  s t a n d a r d s ,  p r o v i d e s  f o r  n o t i f i c a t i o n  a n d  f o r e i g n  c o m m e n t  i n  s e t t i n g  
r e g u l a t i o n s ,  a n d  e s t a b l i s h e s  a  d i s p u t e - s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e .  S o m e  3 7 8  e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  r e l a t e d  
n o t i f i c a t i o n s  w e r e  m a d e  b e tw e e n  1 9 8 0  a n d  1 9 9 0 ,  b u t  n o  c a s e s  h a v e  b e e n  b r o u g h t  i n to  a n d  r e s o l v e d  u n d e r  
t h e  C o d e ’s  d i s p u t e - s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s . 23 T h is  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  e i t h e r  t r a d e  d i s p u t e s  f r o m  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  r e l a t e d  p r o d u c t  r e g u la t i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  m in im a l  o r  t h e r e  is  n o  c o n f id e n c e  i n  t h e  d i s p u t e -  
s e t t l e m e n t  m e c h a n i s m .
T w o  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  U r u g u a y  R o u n d  a r e  w o r t h  n o t in g .  F i r s t ,  a  s e p a r a t e  a g r e e m e n t  c o v e r i n g  
s a n i t a r y  a n d  p h y t o s a n i t a r y  m e a s u r e s  is  t o  b e  h i v e d  o f f  a n d  th e  s c i e n t i f i c  b a s i s  f o r  p r o d u c t  r e g u l a t i o n  is  
e m p h a s i z e d .  S e c o n d ,  i n  s o m e  v e r s i o n s  o f  t h e  p r o p o s e d  U r u g u a y  R o u n d  a g r e e m e n t ,  p r o v i s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  
s t a n d a r d s  w o u l d  b e  e x t e n d e d  t o  c o v e r  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  p r o c e s s  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n  m e t h o d s .  B o t h  c h a n g e s  h a v e  
p o t e n t i a l l y  f a r - r e a c h i n g  e f f e c ts .  T h e r e  is  a n  a c t i v e  d e b a t e  w h e t h e r  i t  i s  d e s i r a b l e  o r  f e a s i b l e  t o  l o o k  to  
“ s o u n d  s c i e n c e ” a s  t h e  p r i m e  a u t h o r i t y  o n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u la t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t s ,  a n d  w h e t h e r  G A T T  ( o r  
t h e  p r o p o s e d  W T O )  i s  t h e  p l a c e  t o  d o  s o .  A l s o ,  i f  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  p e r m i t t e d  t o  l im i t  i m p o r t  o f  p r o d u c t s
19. For a review  see O T A , T rade  an d  E n v iro nm ent.. . ,  op. cit.
20 . In one case the U .S . had banned tuna imports from  Canada fo llow in g  Canadian seizure o f  U .S . tuna boats 
in  Canadian waters. In the second case Canada restricted the export o f  certain unprocessed herring and salm on, 
and the G A T T  panel found this was not done for conservation purposes. See p . 53 , below .
21 . O T A , T rade  a n d  E n v iro n m e n t..., op. cit.
22 . G A T T  A greem ent on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1979.
23 . The U .S . attempted to bring the U .S .-E C  b eef horm one dispute to the C ode’s dispute settlem ent procedures 
but w as blocked by the EC. The U .S . subsequently acted unilaterally through Section 301 o f  the 1974 Trade 
A ct, fo llow in g  w hich  a U .S .-E C  B eef H orm one Task Force was established. O T A , T rade a n d  E n v iro n m e n t..., 
op. cit.
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b a s e d  o n  t h o s e  p r o d u c t s  ’ p r o c e s s  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n  m e t h o d s , t h e  u n i l a t e r a l  e x t e n s i o n  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  n o r m s  
in t e r n a t i o n a l l y  w o u l d  a p p e a r  t o  b e  f a r  e a s i e r . 24
T o  s u m m a r i z e ,  t h e r e  a r e  f o u r  u n r e s o l v e d  q u e s t io n s  i n  G A T T ’s  r u l e s  o n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  r e l a t e d  
p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s .
1 . S h o u l d  c o u n t r i e s  b e  p e r m i t t e d  t o  c o n t r o l  i m p o r t s ,  n o t  o n l y  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  
p r o d u c t ’s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  b u t  a l s o  a s  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t ’s p r o c e s s  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n  
m e t h o d s ?
2 .  S h o u l d  c o u n t r i e s  b e  p e r m i t t e d  t o  c o n t r o l  i m p o r t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o t e c t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e s o u r c e s  o r  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  o f  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ?
3 . T o  w h a t  e x t e n t  m u s t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u la t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t s  b e  b a s e d  o n  s c i e n t i f i c  
c r i t e r i a  a n d  e v id e n c e ,  a n d  h o w  is  t h a t  t o  b e  a c c o m p l i s h e d ?
4 .  H o w  s h o u l d  t h e  a m b i g u o u s  t e r m s  in  A r t i c l e  X X — f o r  e x a m p l e ,  “ a r b i t r a r y  o r  
u n j u s t i f i a b l e , ” “ d i s g u i s e d  r e s t r i c t i o n , ”  a n d  “ n e c e s s a r y  t o ” — b e  i n t e r p r e t e d ?
Production Regulations (the competitiveness issue). G A T T  d o e s  n o t  d i r e c t l y  c o n c e r n  i t s e l f  w i t h  
c h a n g e s  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m p e t i t i v e  p o s i t i o n  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u la t i o n s  o r  i n d e e d  m o s t  
o t h e r  c a u s e s .  O n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  G A T T  p r o v i d e s  a  s e t  o f  r u l e s  t h a t  p e r m i t  p r o d u c t i o n - c o s t  c h a n g e s  t o  b e  
r e f l e c t e d  i n  n e w  t r a d e  p a t t e r n s  a n d  f l o w s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  G A T T  d o e s  r e g u la t e  s u b s id i e s  a n d  t h o s e  
p r o v i s i o n s  a r e  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  i s s u e  a t  h a n d .
G A T T  p r o h i b i t s  e x p o r t  s u b s id i e s  f o r  n o n p r i m a r y  p r o d u c t s ,  p e r m i t s  e x p o r t  s u b s id i e s  f o r  p r i m a r y  
p r o d u c t s  b u t  n o t  i n  a  m a n n e r  t h a t  a l l o w s  a n  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y  to  c a p t u r e  m o r e  t h a n  a n  “ e q u i t a b l e ” s h a r e  
o f  w o r l d  t r a d e ,  a n d  p e r m i t s  d o m e s t i c  s u b s id i e s ,  b u t  n o t  i f  s u c h  s u b s id i e s  i n c r e a s e  e x p o r t s  o r  r e d u c e  
i m p o r t s  a n d  s e r i o u s l y  p r e j u d i c e  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .  T h e  G A T T  S u b s id i e s  C o d e  l i s t s  e x p o r t  
s u b s id i e s ,  e l a b o r a t e s  o n  “ e q u i t a b le  s h a r e , ”  a n d  l i s t s  d o m e s t i c  s u b s id i e s  f o r  w h i c h  t h e r e  is  n o  i n t e n t i o n  o f  
r e s t r i c t i n g  u s e  ( i n c l u d i n g  R  &  D  s u b s id i e s  a n d  s u b s id i e s  f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  r e d e p l o y m e n t  t o  a v o id  c o n g e s t i o n  
a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o b l e m s ) .
I f  G A T T - i n c o n s i s t e n t  s u b s id i e s  a r e  f o u n d  t o  b e  p r e s e n t ,  c o u n te r v a i l i n g  d u t ie s  a r e  p e r m i t t e d .  B u t  
t h e i r  i m p o s i t i o n  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  f o r e i g n  s u b s id y  c a u s e s  o r  t h r e a t e n s  m a t e r i a l  i n j u r y  t o  a  d o m e s t i c  
i n d u s t r y ,  a n d  t h e  d u t y  is  l im i t e d  t o  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  s u b s id y .  T h e  m a t e r i a l  i n ju r y  r e l a t e s  to  
c o m m e r c i a l  i n j u r y  i n  t h e  i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y ,  n o t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d a m a g e  i n  t h e  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y .  T h e  
p u r p o s e  o f  s u b s id y - c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  d u t y  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  G A T T  is  t w o f o l d :  t o  l im i t  o r  p r e v e n t  s u b s id i e s  f r o m  
c r e a t i n g  t r a d e  d i s t o r t i o n s ,  a n  e f f i c ie n c y  o b j e c t iv e ;  a n d  to  m a i n t a i n  a  p e r c e p t i o n  t h a t  t h e  t r a d e  s y s t e m  is  
“ f a i r , ” n e c e s s a r y  t o  m a i n t a i n  p o l i t i c a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  l i b e r a l  t r a d e .
24 . N ote the G A TT does permit import lim its i f  the imports are produced w ith prison labor. For excellent 
historical analysis o f  A rticle X X , and the congruence o f  ecolog ica l and labor issues in  trade rules, see Steve  
C ham ovitz, "Exploring the Environm ental E xceptions in G A TT A rticle XX" {Journa l o f  W o rld  Trade, V o l. 25 , 
N o. 5 , October 1991), and C ham ovitz, "Environmental and Labor Standards in  Trade” {The W o rld  Econom y, 
V ol. 15, N o .3, M ay 1992).
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T h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  t y p e s  o f  “ e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s u b s i d i e s . ” F i r s t ,  g o v e r n m e n t s  m a y  p r o v i d e  f i n a n c ia l  
s u p p o r t ,  i n c l u d i n g  t a x  r e l i e f ,  t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c to r  f o r  p o l l u t i o n  a b a t e m e n t  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n .  
T h i s  a s s i s t a n c e  is  n o t  p e r m i t t e d ,  e x c e p t  i n  t r a n s i t i o n a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  u n d e r  t h e  P o l l u t e r  P a y s  P r i n c i p l e  
a d o p te d  b y  t h e  O E C D  i n  1 9 7 2 .  F i n a n c i a l  s u b s id i e s  m a y  a l s o  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  G A T T  r u l e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  
r e l a t e d  t o  e x p o r t s .  F i n a n c i a l  s u b s id i e s  m a y  b e  c o u n te r v a i l a b l e ,  d e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  f o r m  t h e y  t a k e .
F r o m  a  p u r e l y  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t a n d p o in t ,  s u b s id i e s  f o r  p o l l u t i o n  a b a t e m e n t  h a v e  m ix e d  r e s u l t s .  
O n  th e  o n e  h a n d ,  t h e y  m a i n t a i n  t h e  d i v e r g e n c e  b e tw e e n  m a r k e t  p r i c e s  a n d  s o c i a l  c o s t s  a n d  p e r p e t u a t e  a  
m i s a l l o c a t i o n  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e s o u r c e s .  O n  th e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s  a r g u e  t h a t  b y  w e a k e n i n g  
i n d u s t r y  o p p o s i t i o n ,  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  s u b s id i e s  p e r m i t s  g o v e r n m e n t s  t o  m o v e  m o r e  r a p i d l y  t o w a r d  s t r o n g  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u la t i o n .  E x c e p t  f o r  t h e  U . S . ,  C a n a d a ,  a n d  M e x i c o ,  W e s t e r n  H e m i s p h e r e  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  
n o t  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  O E C D  a n d  a r e  n o t  b o u n d  b y  th e  P o l l u t e r  P a y s  P r i n c ip l e .  W h e t h e r  t o  i n s i s t  o n  t h e  
P P P  i n  r e g i o n a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  i s  t h u s  a  k e y  i s s u e .  A n o t h e r  i s s u e  t h a t  m a y  e m e r g e  i s  w h e t h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  f o r  p o l l u t i o n  c le a n u p  m ig h t  b e  c o u n te r v a i l a b l e .  T h e  m o s t  l i k e l y  e x a m p l e  w o u l d  b e  
W e s t e r n  a id  t o  E a s t e r n  E u r o p e a n  f i r m s ,  b u t  i f  U . S .  f u n d s  a r e  m a d e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  M e x i c o  i n  N A F T A ,  a  
p o t e n t i a l  G A T T  c o n f l i c t  e m e r g e s .
S e c o n d ,  g o v e r n m e n t s  m a y  o f f e r  s u b s id i e s  f o r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  s o u n d  a c t i v i t i e s ,  a s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  
t a k i n g  f r a g i l e  s o i l s  o u t  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  o r  s u b s id i z in g  c o n s u m p t i o n  o f  c l e a n  f u e l s .  I n  p r i n c i p l e  s u c h  
s u b s id i e s  a r e  d i s t o r t i o n - c o r r e c t i n g  a n d  to  c o u n te r v a i l  t h e m  w o u l d  b e  u n d e s i r a b l e .  H o w e v e r ,  i f  t h e  s u b s id y  
is  g r a n t e d  f o r  t h e  u s e  o f  a  p r o d u c t ,  i t  s h o u l d  b e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h e  im p o r t e d  a s  w e l l  a s  d o m e s t i c a l l y  
p r o d u c e d  p r o d u c t s  t o  a v o id  a  t r a d e  d i s t o r t i o n .
T h i r d ,  a n d  p e r h a p s  m o s t  d i f f i c u l t ,  a r e  “ i m p l i c i t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s u b s i d i e s ” i n  w h i c h  a  c o u n t r y  
c h o o s e s  a r t i f i c i a l l y  l o w  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t a n d a r d s ,  o r  f a i l s  t o  e n f o r c e  s t a n d a r d s ,  w i t h  a  v i e w  t o  i m p r o v i n g  
i ts  t r a d e  p o s i t i o n  o r  a t t r a c t i n g  f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t .  T h e  e x i s te n c e  o f  s u c h  a  “ p o l l u t i o n  h a v e n ” s t r a t e g y  is  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e t e r m i n e  b e c a u s e ,  a s  a r g u e d  e a r l i e r ,  a p p r o p r i a t e  s t a n d a r d s  a r e  c o u n t r y - s p e c i f i c .  A l l e g a t io n s  
o f  i m p l i c i t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s u b s id i e s  a r e  n o t  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ;  U .S .  w a t e r  a n d  p u b l i c  l a n d -  
g r a z i n g  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  l o w e r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i n p u t  c o s t s  h a v e  a ls o  b e e n  c i t e d .
G i v e n  c u r r e n t  G A T T  s u b s id y  r u l e s ,  i t  i s  u n l ik e l y  t h a t  im p l i c i t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s u b s i d i e s ,  i f  t h e y  
e x i s t ,  w o u l d  b e  c o u n t e r v a i l a b l e .25 N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h i s  r e m a in s  a  h o t  i s s u e  a n d  l e g i s l a t i o n  t o  o f f s e t  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  c o s t  d i f f e r e n c e s  a t  t h e  b o r d e r  h a s  b e e n  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  C o n g r e s s .  
W h e t h e r  a n d  h o w  i m p l i c i t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s u b s id i e s  a r e  t o  b e  t a k e n  u p  in  r e g io n a l  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  
is  a n o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  u n r e s o l v e d  i s s u e .
GATT and International Environmental Agreements. S e v e r a l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a g r e e m e n t s  c o n t a i n  t r a d e  p r o v i s i o n s .  A m o n g  t h e  b e s t  k n o w n  a r e  t h e  M o n t r e a l  P r o t o c o l ,  w h i c h  r e s t r i c t s  
t r a d e  i n  C F C s  a n d  p o t e n t i a l l y  r e s t r i c t s  t r a d e  i n  p r o d u c t s  w h o s e  p r o d u c t i o n  u s e s  C F C s ,  a n d  th e  
E n d a n g e r e d  S p e c ie s  A c t . 26 I t  i s  n o w  c l e a r  t h a t  s o m e  t r a d e  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a g r e e m e n t s  m a y  
c o n f l i c t  w i t h  G A T T  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  E x c e p t  f o r  t h e  p o s s ib i l i t y  t h a t  r e g io n a l  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  m i g h t  b e  
a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  r e g io n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a g r e e m e n t s  w i t h  t r a d e  p r o v i s i o n s ,  t h e  c o m p a t ib i l i t y  o f  G A T T  a n d
25 . The environm ental subsidy question is not new . See Charles Pearson, "Environmental Control C osts and 
Border Adjustments" (N a tio n a l T ax  Jou rn a l X X V II, N o . 4 , D ecem ber 1974).
26 . G A T T  has taken up this issue in its revitalized Trade and Environment W orking Group.
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a g r e e m e n t s  is  n o t  d i r e c t l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  i n  t h e  W e s t e r n  
H e m is p h e r e .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  c o m p a t ib i l i t y  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a g r e e m e n t s  w i t h  regional trade agreements 
is  a n  i s s u e  a n d  w a s  a d d r e s s e d  i n  N A F T A  ( s e e  S e c t i o n  I I I  b e lo w ) .
Empirical Research
Q u a n t i t a t i v e  w o r k  o n  t r a d e - e n v i r o n m e n t  i s s u e s  f a l l s  i n to  t w o  g r o u p s :  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
r e g u l a t i o n s  o n  t r a d e  a n d  in v e s tm e n t  f l o w s ,  w h i c h  b e a r s  o n  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  i s s u e ;  a n d  e s t im a te s  o f  t h e  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e f f e c t s  o f  t r a d e  a n d  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n .  R e s e a r c h  o n  t h e  l a t t e r  q u e s t i o n  i s  b o t h  v e r y  r e c e n t  
a n d  v e r y  l im i t e d ,  a n d  t h e r e  a r e  n o  s y s te m a t i c  s t u d i e s  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  r e l a t e d  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s  a n d  
t h e i r  e f f e c t  o n  t r a d e . 27 A l t h o u g h  m o s t  o f  t h e  s t u d i e s  r e v i e w e d  b e lo w  d i d  n o t  e x p l i c i t l y  c o n s i d e r  r e g io n a l  
e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  t h e i r  r e s u l t s  a r e  n e v e r t h e l e s s  o f  i n te r e s t .
Trade and Investment Effects of Environment Policies. J u d i t h  D e a n  h a s  p r o v i d e d  a  g o o d  r e v i e w  
o f  e m p i r i c a l  w o r k  t h r o u g h  1 9 9 0 .28 O n  th e  b a s i s  o f  s tu d i e s  r e v i e w e d ,  s h e  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  
e v id e n c e  o f  a n y  s i g n i f i c a n t  im p a c t  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  c o s t s  o n  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  t r a d e .  S h e  r e a c h e s  
a  s i m i l a r  c o n c l u s i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  i n v e s tm e n t  a n d  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l o c a t i o n . 29 O n e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  s m a l l  
t r a d e  e f f e c t  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  t h a t  p o l l u t i o n  a b a t e m e n t  c o s t s  t e n d  to  b e  a  s m a l l  c o m p o n e n t  o f  t o ta l  p r o d u c t i o n  
c o s t s ,  a n d  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  differences i n  a b a t e m e n ts  h a v e  n a r r o w e d  a s  a l l  O E C D  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  
e s t a b l i s h e d  r e l a t i v e l y  s t r o n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u la t i o n s  a n d  h a v e  a d o p te d  t h e  P P P . 30 T h e  m in i m a l  im p a c t  
o n  a g g r e g a t e  i n v e s tm e n t  f l o w s  t h r o u g h  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t io n s  ( M N C s )  m ig h t  b e  e x p la i n e d  b y  th e  
r e l a t i v e  u n i m p o r t a n c e  o f  p o l l u t i o n  a b a t e m e n t  r e g u la t i o n s  a s  c o m p a r e d  t o  o t h e r  l o c a t io n a l  
d e t e r m i n a n t s — c o s t  a n d  q u a l i t y  o f  l a b o r ,  a c c e s s  t o  r a w  m a t e r i a l s ,  m a r k e t  s i z e ,  a n d  h o s p i t a b l e  b u s i n e s s  
c l i m a t e .  M N C  i n v e s tm e n ts  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  m a y  a l s o  b u i l d  i n  p o l l u t i o n  a b a t e m e n t  t o  t a k e  
a d v a n t a g e  o f  o f f - t h e - s h e l f ,  c l e a n  t e c h n o l o g y  i n  a n t i c ip a t i o n  o f  a  f u t u r e  t i g h t e n in g  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
r e g u l a t i o n s  o r  t o  a v o id  c o n t r o v e r s y  a n d  m a i n t a i n  g o o d  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  h o s t  c o u n t r i e s .
O n  t h e i r  f a c e s ,  t h e s e  a r e  r e a s s u r in g  c o n c l u s i o n s .  I f  t h e  t r a d e  a n d  i n v e s tm e n t  e f f e c t s  a r e  m in i m a l ,  
t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  i s s u e  d i m i n i s h e s  a n d  t h e r e  is  l e s s  r e a s o n  to  d e la y  s t r o n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  in  
e i t h e r  h o m e  o r  h o s t  c o u n t r i e s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  s t u d i e s  t h r o u g h  1 9 9 0  a r e  n o t  c o n c l u s i v e .  O n e
2 7 . For an early effort see Charles Pearson, E nvironm enta l P o lic ies  and  T h e ir  T rade  Im p lication s  f o r  
D eve lop ing  Countries, w ith  Special Reference to  F ish  an d  Shell F ish , F ru it  and  Vegetables  (N ew  Y ork, 
U N C T A D /S T /M D /2 6 , 1982). M ore recently see Keith K ozlo ff and C . Ford R unge, "International Trade in  the 
F ood  Sector and Environm ental Q uality, Health and Safety: A  Survey o f  P olicy  Issues" (m im eo, U niversity o f  
M innesota, M ay 1, 1991).
28 . Judith D ean, "Trade and the Environment: A  Survey o f  the Literature," in  L ow  (ed .) , In te rn a tio n a l 
T ra d e ... ,  op . cit.
29 . In a series o f  interesting country studies Leonard concluded that several countries (Ireland, Spain, M exico  
and Rom ania) may have fo llow ed  a "pollution haven" strategy in  the 1970s but have since changed their 
approach. H . Jeffery Leonard, P o llu tio n  and  the Struggle f o r  W o rld  P roduct (N ew  York: Cam bridge U niversity  
Press, 1988).
30 . O E C D , P o llu tio n  C o ntro l an d  A batem ent Expenditures in  O E C D  C ountries  (Paris: O EC D  Environm ental 
M onographs N o . 38 , N ovem ber 1990).
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s h o r t c o m i n g  is  t h a t  a l l  f o c u s e d  o n  i n d u s t r i a l  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  c o s t s  a n d  d i d  n o t  c o n s i d e r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  
m o t i v a t e d  r e g u la t i o n s  o n  n a tu r a l  r e s o u r c e  s e c to r s .  M o r e o v e r ,  m e t h o d o l o g ic a l  a n d  d a t a  c o n s t r a i n t s  d i d  
n o t  a l l o w  m o s t  o f  t h e  s t u d i e s  t o  p i c k  u p  m o r e  m ic r o  i m p a c t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d i m e n s i o n  o f  
M e x i c o ’s  maquiladora i n d u s t r i e s . 31 T h i r d ,  r e c e n t  a n d  p r o s p e c t i v e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  m a y  
in v o lv e  g r e a t e r  c o s t s  a n d  c h a n g e  t h e  p i c t u r e .  C o n t r o l s  o f  g r e e n h o u s e - g a s  e m i s s io n s  a r e  a  c a s e  i n  p o i n t .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  r e g io n a l  f r e e  t r a d e  a n d  r e g io n a l  f r e e  i n v e s tm e n t  m a y  c r e a t e  c o n d i t i o n s  u n d e r  
w h i c h  p r e v i o u s l y  s u p p r e s s e d  c o m p e t i t i v e  e f f e c ts  r e v e a l  t h e m s e l v e s .  F o r  a l l  t h e s e  r e a s o n s ,  t h e  
c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  i s s u e  h a s  n o t  b e e n  l a id  t o  r e s t .
S e v e r a l  n e w  s t u d i e s  ( p o s t - 1 9 9 0 )  c a s t  n e w  l i g h t  o n  t h e  t r a d e  a n d  i n v e s tm e n t  e f f e c t s  o f  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u la t i o n s .  G r o s s m a n  a n d  K r u e g e r  u s e  c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l  d a t a  t o  e s t im a te  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  p e r  
c a p i t a  i n c o m e  o n  t h r e e  t y p e s  o f  a i r  p o l lu t i o n .  T h e y  f i n d  t h a t  tw o  p o l l u t a n t s ,  s u l p h u r  d i o x id e  a n d  d a r k  
m a t t e r ,  f o l l o w  a n  i n v e r t e d  “ U ” p a t h ,  i n c r e a s in g  u p  to  p e r  c a p i t a  G N P  le v e l s  o f  $ 4 , 0 0 0 - 5 , 0 0 0  a n d  
d i m i n i s h i n g  a t  h i g h e r  l e v e l s . 32 T h e y  s p e c u la te  t h a t  t h i s  m ig h t  b e  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  i n c o m e - e l a s t i c  d e m a n d  
f o r  a  c l e a n e r  e n v i r o n m e n t  r e s u l t i n g  in  s t r o n g e r  p o l l u t i o n  r e g u la t i o n s  a n d  e n f o r c e m e n t .  I f  s o ,  i t  i m p l i e s  
t h a t  c o s t  d i f f e r e n c e s  a n d  t r a d e  e f f e c ts  s h o u l d  n a r r o w  a t  h i g h e r  in c o m e  le v e l s .
G r o s s m a n  a n d  K r u e g e r  a l s o  e x a m in e  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  m a q u i l a d o r a  a c t i v i t y  i n  M e x i c o ,  a n d  th e  
c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  U . S .  i m p o r t s  f r o m  M e x i c o .  U s in g  e c o n o m e t r i c  t e c h n i q u e s ,  t h e y  f i n d  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  t r a d e — f a c t o r  i n t e n s i t i e s  a n d  U . S .  t a r i f f  r a t e s — a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  s e c to r a l  
c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  i m p o r t s ,  b u t  p o l lu t i o n - a b a t e m e n t  c o s t s  b y  s e c to r  a r e  n o t .  T h i s  f i n d in g  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  th e  
p o l l u t i o n  h a v e n  e f f e c t  h a s  b e e n  a b s e n t  o r  m in im a l .
S o m e  i n d i r e c t  e v id e n c e  o f  t h e  e f f e c ts  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  c o s t s  i n  U . S . - M e x i c o  
t r a d e  is  a l s o  a v a i l a b l e  i n  r e s e a r c h  b y  P a t r i c k  L o w . 33 H i s  s t u d y  s i m u la t e d  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  s i m u l t a n e o u s ly  
c r e a t i n g  f r e e  t r a d e  b e t w e e n  t h e  U . S .  a n d  M e x i c o  a n d  a d d in g  b a c k  i n  a n  i m p o r t  d u t y  e q u iv a l e n t  t o  U . S .  
e x p e n d i t u r e  o n  p o l l u t i o n  a b a t e m e n t  i n  “ d i r t y  i n d u s t r i e s ” ( p o l lu t i o n  c o n t r o l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  e x c e s s  o f  0 .5  
p e r c e n t  o f  c o s t s ) .  T w o  f i n d in g s  a r e  o f  i n t e r e s t .  F i r s t ,  p o l lu t i o n - in t e n s i v e  p r o d u c t s  a c c o u n te d  f o r  o n ly  
11 p e r c e n t  o f  M e x i c o ’s e x p o r t s  t o  t h e  U .S .  ( 1 9 8 9 ) ,  b u t  g r e w  a t  a n  a v e r a g e  r a t e  o f  9  p e r c e n t  d u r i n g  th e  
1 9 8 0 s ;  s e c o n d ,  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  a  p o l l u t i o n  a b a t e m e n t  e q u a l i z a t i o n  t a x  w o u l d  a m o u n t  t o  o n l y  a  tw o -  
p e r c e n t  e x p o r t  lo s s  t o  M e x i c o .  T h e  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  f i n d in g  is  t h a t  b e c a u s e  e q u a l i z i n g  c o s t  
d i f f e r e n c e s  w o u l d  h a v e  l i t t l e  t r a d e  e f f e c t ,  c u r r e n t  c o s t  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  h a v e  m in i m a l  im p a c t  o n  t r a d e  f l o w s .
L u c a s ,  W h e e l e r ,  a n d  H i l l i g e 34 u s e  E P A ’s T o x ic  R e le a s e  I n v e n to r y  d a ta  a n d  U N  s e c to r a l  o u t p u t  
d a t a  t o  t e s t  s e v e r a l  h y p o t h e s e s  b e a r i n g  o n  th e  t r a d e  a n d  in v e s tm e n t  e f f e c ts  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u la t i o n .  
T h e y  f i n d  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e  p o l l u t i o n  in te n s i t y  o f  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  ( m e a s u r e d  b y  
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  e m i s s io n s  p e r  u n i t  G N P )  h a s  a n  i n v e r t e d  U  r e l a t i o n  to  p e r  c a p i t a  i n c o m e ,  a  f i n d in g
31. But see the studies by Patrick L ow  and by Gene Grossman and A lan Krueger, review ed below .
32 . Gene Grossm an and A lan Krueger, "Environmental Impacts o f  a N orth A m erican Free Trade Agreement"  
(Cam bridge, M assachusetts: N BE R  W orking Paper 3914 , N ovem ber 1991).
33 . Patrick L ow , "Trade M easures and Environmental Quality: the Im plications for M ex ic o ’s Exports," in Low  
(ed .) , In te rn a tio n a l T ra d e .. . ,  op. cit.
34 . Lucas et a l., "Econom ic D ev e lo p m en t ...,” op. cit.
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c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  G r o s s m a n  a n d  K r u e g e r .  ( R e c a l l  t h a t  G r o s s m a n  a n d  K r u e g e r  u s e d  a m b i e n t  a i r  q u a l i t y  a n d  
n o t  e m i s s i o n  a n d  e f f l u e n t  d a t a . )  T h e y  f u r t h e r  f i n d  s o m e  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  s t r i c t e r  r e g u l a t i o n  
o f  p o l l u t i o n - i n t e n s i v e  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  O E C D  h a s  l e d  t o  l o c a t io n a l  d i s p l a c e m e n t ,  b u t  t h e y  a c k n o w l e d g e  
t h a t  t h i s  m a y  b e  a n  a r t i f a c t  o f  r e s t r i c t i v e  t r a d e  p o l i c i e s  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  c o s t  
d i f f e r e n c e s .
P a t r i c k  L o w  a n d  A l e x a n d e r  Y e a t s  u s e  d a t a  o n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  c o s t s  b y  i n d u s t r y  a n d  t r a d e  
d a t a  d i s a g g r e g a t e d  b y  c o u n t r y  a n d  s e c to r  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  w h e t h e r  “ d i r t y ” i n d u s t r i e s  m i g r a t e . 35 T h e y  f i n d  
t h a t  ( a )  t h e  s h a r e  o f  “ d i r t y  p r o d u c t s ” i n  w o r l d  t r a d e  d e c l i n e d  f r o m  1 9  p e r c e n t  t o  1 6  p e r c e n t  b e t w e e n  1 9 6 5  
a n d  1 9 8 8 ,  a n d  ( b )  t h e  s h a r e  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  i n  d i r t y  i n d u s t r y  t r a d e  d e c l i n e d  f r o m  7 8 %  to  7 4 %  in  
t h e  s a m e  p e r i o d ,  w h i l e  t h e  s h a r e  o f  n o n i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  i n  d i r t y  g o o d s  t r a d e  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  2 2  p e r c e n t  
o f  2 6  p e r c e n t .  T h i s  l a t t e r  f i n d in g  is  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  c o s t  
d i f f e r e n c e s  a f f e c t  t r a d e  p a t t e r n s ,  b u t  is  n o t  c o n c l u s i v e .  N o r  d o e s  i t  n e c e s s a r i l y  j u s t i f y  p o l i c y  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
f o r  c o s t  h a r m o n i z a t i o n .
N e x t ,  a  n e w  ex ante s t u d y  b y  P i g g o t t ,  W h a l l e y ,  a n d  W ig l e  i n v e s t i g a t e s  t h e  p o s s i b l e  e f f e c t  o n  
w o r l d  t r a d e  o f  a  m u l t i l a t e r a l  r e d u c t i o n  b y  5 0 %  o f  c a r b o n  e m i s s io n s  o v e r  t h e  4 0 - y e a r  p e r i o d ,  1 9 9 0 -  
2 0 3 0 . 36 U s in g  a  s i x - r e g i o n  c o m p u t a b le  g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r iu m  ( C G E )  m o d e l  t h a t  e x c l u d e s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c a p i t a l  f l o w s  o r  t r a d i n g  i n  c a r b o n  e m i s s io n  p e r m i t s ,  a n d  a s s u m i n g  c o n s u m p t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  p r o d u c t i o n  
r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  t h e y  e s t im a te  v e r y  l a r g e  r e d u c t io n s  i n  t h e  v o l u m e  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e  ( u p  to  8 3 %  f o r  o i l  e x p o r t e r s  
a n d  5 3 %  f o r  a g g r e g a t e  g lo b a l  t r a d e  a m o n g  t h e  r e g io n s ) .  W h i l e  d i f f e r e n t  m o d e l i n g  a s s u m p t io n s  m ig h t  
y i e l d  s m a l l e r  t r a d e  l o s s e s ,  t h e  s t u d y  d o e s  u n d e r s c o r e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  new e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i n i t i a t i v e s  m a y  
h a v e  m u c h  m o r e  p r o f o u n d  t r a d e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  t h a n  h a v e  b e e n  f e l t  i n  t h e  p a s t .  T h e  s t u d y  a l s o  u n d e r s c o r e s  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  c o n s u m p t i o n -  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n - b a s e d  r e s t r i c t i o n  o n  w e l f a r e  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  a  p o i n t  
t h a t  h a s  b e e n  m a d e  e l s e w h e r e  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  a n d  b e a r s  d i r e c t l y  o n  t h e  i s s u e  o f  s i d e  p a y m e n t s  to  
e n c o u r a g e  c o m p l i a n c e .
F i n a l l y ,  e v e n  i f  i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s h o w  t h a t  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  l a r g e - s c a l e  r e l o c a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  
t r a d e  because o f  i n t e r c o u n t r y  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y ,  i t  i s  n o t  a t  a l l  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  t h a t  i s  p r o x i m a t e l y  l in k e d  to  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  i n v e s tm e n t  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n  f o r  
e x p o r t . 37 T h e  U . S . - M e x i c a n  b o r d e r  r e g i o n  is  p e r h a p s  t h e  b e s t  e x a m p le .  B y  1 9 9 1 ,  1 ,4 4 0  m a q u i l a d o r a  
o p e r a t i o n s  e m p l o y e d  3 4 0 ,0 0 0  w o r k e r s  a n d  g e n e r a t e d  $ 3 .5  b i l l i o n  i n  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e .  T h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  
a c t i v i t y ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  c h e m ic a l -  a n d  w a t e r - i n t e n s i v e  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  h a s  b e e n  s e r i o u s  a i r ,  w a t e r ,  a n d  s o i l  
p o l l u t i o n ,  a n d  s e v e r e  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  p r o b l e m s .
T o  s u m m a r i z e ,  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  t h r o u g h  1 9 9 0  p o i n t e d  t o w a r d  m in i m a l  a g g r e g a t e  t r a d e  a n d  i n v e s tm e n t  
c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u la t i o n .  T h e  m o r e  r e c e n t  ex post s t u d i e s  s h o w  t h a t  s o m e  
e f f e c t  o n  t r a d e  a n d  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l o c a t i o n  c a n n o t  b e  r u l e d  o u t .  M o r e  m i c r o  w o r k  o n  U . S . - M e x i c a n  t r a d e
35 . Patrick L ow  and A lexander Y eats, "Do D irty Industries M igrate," in  L ow  (ed .) , In te rn a tio n a l T ra d e ... ,  op. 
cit.
36 . John P iggott, John W halley and Randall W ig le , "International Linkages and Carbon R eduction Initiatives,"  
in  A nderson and Blackhurst (ed s.), The G re e n in g ..., op. cit.
37 . Peter Em erson and Elizabeth W allace Bourbon, "The Border Environm ent and Free Trade" (Environm ental 
D efen se Fund, A ustin , T exas, for the North A m erican Institute, N ovem ber, 1991).
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is  i n c o n c l u s i v e ;  G r o s s m a n  a n d  K r u e g e r  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  c o s t s  d o  n o t  
e x p la i n  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  m a q u i l a d o r a  p r o d u c t i o n ,  b u t  s e v e r a l  s t u d i e s  h a v e  d o c u m e n t e d  s o m e  s e v e r e  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o b l e m s  in  t h e  b o r d e r  r e g io n .  Ex ante s t u d i e s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  i f  s e r i o u s  e f f o r t s  t o  c o n t r o l  
g r e e n h o u s e - g a s  e m i s s io n s  a r e  u n d e r t a k e n ,  t h e  e f f e c ts  w i l l  b e  a  d i f f e r e n t  o r d e r  o f  m a g n i t u d e .  T h e  t r a d e  
e f f e c t s  w i l l  d e p e n d  in  l a r g e  p a r t  o n  th e  s p e c i f i c s — p r o d u c t i o n  v s .  c o n s u m p t i o n  r e s t r i c t i o n ,  r e a l l o c a t i o n  o f  
w o r l d  p r o d u c t i o n  t h r o u g h  in v e s tm e n t  f l o w s ,  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d i n g  in  e m i s s i o n  p e r m i t s ,  
a n d  w h e t h e r  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a r e  t i e d  t o  t h e  c a r b o n  c o n te n t  o f  f u e l s .  T h e  g l o b a l  w a r m in g  q u e s t i o n ,  w h i l e  
i m p o r t a n t ,  is  q u i t e  f a r  r e m o v e d  f r o m  e f f o r t s  a t  r e g io n a l  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n .
Environmental Effect of Trade. T u r n i n g  th e  q u e s t io n  a r o u n d ,  o n e  m a y  a s k  w h a t  a r e  t h e  e f f e c ts  
o f  t r a d e  o r  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  o n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  q u a l i t y .  V e r y  l i t t l e  w o r k  h a s  b e e n  d o n e ,  b u t  s o m e  
p r e l i m i n a r y  e v id e n c e  i s  a v a i l a b l e .
F i r s t ,  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  o p e n  t r a d e  ( o r  i n v e s tm e n t )  r e g im e s  m a y  h a v e  s p a r e d  c o u n t r i e s  s o m e  p o l l u t i o n  
p r o b l e m s .  L u c a s  e t  a l .  f o u n d  t h a t  “ t o x i c  d i s p l a c e m e n t ” h a s  b e e n  f o c u s e d  o n  r e l a t i v e ly  c l o s e d  f a s t -  
g r o w i n g  e c o n o m i e s ,  a n d  h a s  n o t  b e e n  e v id e n t  i n  c o u n t r i e s  o p e n  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e .  O n e  r e a s o n  m ig h t  
b e  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  i n d u s t r y ,  w i t h  o p e n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  e n g a g e  in  
r e l a t i v e ly  c le a n ,  l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e  m a n u f a c t u r e s .38 A n o t h e r  r e a s o n  m ig h t  b e  g r e a t e r  a c c e s s  o f  o p e n  
e c o n o m i e s  t o  n e w ,  c l e a n e r  t e c h n o l o g ie s .  T h i s  i s  g i v e n  s o m e  c o n f i r m a t i o n  in  a  s t u d y  o f  W h e e l e r  a n d  
M a r t i n . 39 T h e y  i n v e s t i g a t e d  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i f f u s i o n  a n d  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e r m o m e c h a n i c a l  p u l p i n g  i n  t h e  
w o o d  p u l p  i n d u s t r y ,  a  c l e a n  t e c h n o l o g y  a s  c o m p a r e d  to  c h e m i c a l - b a s e d  m e t h o d s .  T h e i r  i n t e r e s t i n g  
c o n c l u s i o n  is  t h a t  t h e  c l e a n  t e c h n o l o g y  w a s  a d o p te d  e a r l i e r  a n d  i t s  u s e  g r e w  f a s t e r  i n  c o u n t r i e s  w h o s e  
p r i c e  s t r u c t u r e  is  l e s s  d i s t o r t e d ,  o r  m o r e  o p e n  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e .
M o r e  g e n e r a l l y ,  a  n u m b e r  o f  s t u d i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  w o r k  b y  G r o s s m a n  a n d  K r u e g e r  a n d  b y  L u c a s  
e t  a l . ,  h a v e  f o u n d  t h e  i n v e r t e d  U  p a t t e r n  o f  p o l l u t i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  p e r - c a p i t a  i n c o m e .  A l s o ,  a  p o s i t i v e  
r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  o p e n  t r a d e  r e g im e s  a n d  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  h a s  b e e n  f i r m l y  e s t a b l i s h e d .  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
o p e n  t r a d e  o r  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ,  t h r o u g h  t h e i r  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c ts  o n  in c o m e  l e v e l s ,  m a y  c o n t r i b u t e  to  
i m p r o v e m e n t s  i n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  q u a l i t y .
S e c to r - s p e c i f i c  r e s e a r c h  o n  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  o n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  q u a l i t y  i s  j u s t  
b e g in n i n g .  A g r i c u l t u r e  is  a n  o b v i o u s  c h o ic e .  T h e r e  a r e  a  n u m b e r  o f  m o d e l s  t h a t  e s t im a te  t h e  p r i c e ,  
p r o d u c t i o n ,  c o n s u m p t i o n  a n d  t r a d e  e f f e c ts  o f  v a r io u s  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  s c h e m e s .  T h e  n e x t  s t e p  i s  t o  t r a n s l a t e  
t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  c h a n g e s  in to  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  v a r i a b l e s  s u c h  a s  a  p r i m a r y  r e s o u r c e s  u s e  ( l a n d ,  w a t e r ,  s o i l )  
a n d  i n t e r m e d i a t e  i n p u t s  w i t h  a d v e r s e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e f f o r t s  ( f e r t i l i z e r ,  p e s t i c i d e s ) .  T h e  f i n a l  s t e p  w o u l d  
b e  t o  e s t im a te  c o s t s  a n d  b e n e f i t s  f r o m  th e  n e w  v e c t o r  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e s o u r c e  d e m a n d s ,  b y  c o u n t r y  a n d  
r e g i o n ,  t o  e s t a b l i s h  w e l f a r e  c h a n g e s .
A n d e r s o n  h a s  m a d e  a  s t a r t . 40 B a s e d  o n  h i s  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  m o d e l  d e v e l o p e d  w i t h  
T y e r s ,  p r i c e  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n  c h a n g e s  b y  c o u n t r y  a n d  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t  a r e  e s t im a te d .  B e c a u s e  p r o d u c e r
38. Lucas et a l., "Economic D evelop m en t...,"  op. cit.
39 . D avid  W heeler and Paul M artin, "Prices, P olic ies and the International D iffusion  o f  C lean T echnology,"  in  
L ow  (ed .) , In te rn a tio n a l Trade, op. cit.
40 . A nderson, "Effects on the E nvironm ent...,"  op. cit.
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p r i c e s  a r e  h i g h e r  i n  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  a n d  b e c a u s e  t h e  u s e  o f  f a r m  c h e m i c a l s  is  p o s i t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  
w i t h  p r o d u c e r  p r i c e s ,  t h e  r e a l l o c a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  f o l lo w in g  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  s h o u l d  r e d u c e  g l o b a l  c h e m ic a l  
u s e  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e .  A n d e r s o n  f u r t h e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  a  r e a l l o c a t i o n  o f  l a b o r  t o w a r d  a g r i c u l t u r a l  e m p l o y m e n t  
i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  m ig h t  r e d u c e  u r b a n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o b l e m s .  F i n a l l y ,  h e  a r g u e s  t h a t  a n  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  e x p a n s io n  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  is  u n l ik e l y  t o  c a u s e  w h o l e s a l e  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  t r o p i c a l  r a i n  
f o r e s t s ,  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  t h e  e la s t i c i ty  o f  l a n d  f a r m e d  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  p r o d u c e r  p r i c e s  i s  l o w ,  a  
c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  a t  o d d s  w i t h  a  s t u d y  b y  L u t z . 41 O t h e r  s t u d i e s  h a v e  d o c u m e n t e d  th e  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o b l e m s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  t r a d e  p o l i c i e s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  th e  
C o m m o n  A g r i c u l t u r a l  P o l i c y  o f  t h e  E C . 42 T h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  t h i s  i n i t i a l  r e s e a r c h  is  t h a t  t h e  h i g h  l e v e l  
o f  d o m e s t i c  a n d  t r a d e  d i s t o r t i o n s  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d e t e r i o r a t i o n .  B y  i m p l i c a t i o n ,  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  w i l l  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  im p r o v e m e n t .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  a l l  o f  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  c a u t i o n s  
t h a t  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ,  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  p o l i c i e s  d i r e c t e d  a t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  a n d  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  
f a i l u r e s ,  m a y  a g g r a v a t e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d e t e r io r a t i o n .
T h e  O E C D  h a s  c o m m i s s i o n e d  s t u d i e s  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n  o f  t r a d e  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t  i n  f o u r  o t h e r  
s e c t o r s — t r a n s p o r t ,  e n e r g y ,  f i s h e r i e s ,  a n d  f o r e s t r y  p r o d u c t s .  W h i l e  t h e s e  s t u d i e s  r e m a i n  r e s t r i c t e d  a n d  
c a n n o t  b e  q u o t e d  d i r e c t l y ,  t h r e e  c o n c l u s i o n s  s t a n d  o u t .  F i r s t ,  a s  i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  t r a d e ,  t r a d e  c o n t r o l s  c a n  
m i s a l l o c a t e  g l o b a l  u s e  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a n d  n a tu r a l  r e s o u r c e s  a n d  l e a d  t o  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d e g r a d a t i o n .  
S e c o n d ,  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  i t s e l f  is  s e l d o m  i f  e v e r  t h e  u l t i m a t e  c a u s e  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d e g r a d a t i o n ,  b u t  
t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  in the absence of policies that correct externalities and property rights failures c a n  
i n c r e a s e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t r e s s .  T h i s  u n d e r s c o r e s  t h e  n e e d  f o r  c a r e f u l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t r a d e  
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  m e a s u r e s .  T h i r d ,  e a c h  s e c to r  h a s  u n i q u e  f e a t u r e s — e n v i r o n m e n t a l ,  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  m a r k e t  
s t r u c t u r e ,  a n d  p o l i c y — a n d  t h e r e  i s  n o  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  d e t a i l e d  s t u d i e s  a t  t h e  s e c to r  l e v e l  f o r  e f f e c t i v e  
r e s o u r c e  m a n a g e m e n t .
F i n a l l y ,  i n  t h e  s t u d y  m e n t i o n e d  a b o v e ,  G r o s s m a n  a n d  K r u e g e r  h a v e  i n v e s t i g a t e d  t h e  l i k e l y  e f f e c t s  
o f  N A F T A  o n  p o l l u t i o n  l e v e l s  i n  M e x i c o .  U s in g  t h e  t r a d e / i n v e s t m e n t  m o d e l  o f  B r o w n ,  D e a r d o r f f ,  a n d  
S t e r n ,  w h i c h  e s t im a te s  p r o d u c t i o n  e f f e c ts  b y  s e c to r ,  a n d  U . S .  E P A  T o x i c  R e le a s e  I n v e n t o r y  d a t a  b y  
s e c t o r ,  t h e y  e s t im a te  t h e  p o l l u t i o n  im p a c t  o f  a  F T  A  w i t h  M e x i c o .  G r o s s m a n  a n d  K r u e g e r  f i n d  t h a t  i f  
t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  a lo n e  is  c o n s i d e r e d ,  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  a  n e t  r e d u c t i o n  o f  t o x i c  r e le a s e  f r o m  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
in  M e x i c o .  T h e  r e a s o n  is  M e x i c o ’s  s h i f t  o u t  o f  p o l lu t i o n - in t e n s i v e  s e c to r s  ( e . g . ,  c h e m i c a l s )  t o  r e l a t i v e l y  
c l e a n ,  l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e  s e c to r s .  I f ,  a t  t h e  s a m e  t im e ,  t h e r e  is  a n  i n v e s tm e n t  c o m p o n e n t  t o  N A F T A  
( m o d e l e d  a s  a  1 0 - p e r c e n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  M e x i c o ’s  c a p i t a l  s t o c k ) ,  t h e  o v e r a l l  e x p a n s io n  o f  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
a c t i v i t y  o v e r w h e l m s  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  s h i f t ,  a n d  t h e r e  is  a  n e t  i n c r e a s e  i n  p o l l u t i o n  i n  M e x i c o ’s 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s e c to r .  T h e r e  a r e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  s e r i o u s  p r o b l e m s  i n  u s i n g  U . S .  p o l l u t i o n - i n t e n s i t y  d a t a  to  
e s t im a te  M e x i c o ’s  p o l l u t i o n  p r o f i l e ,  a n d  w i t h  t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  m o d e l  c h a n g e s  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  t e c h n o l o g y  t h a t  
m a y  a c c o m p a n y  n e w  i n v e s tm e n t .  A l s o  t h e  s t u d y  a d d r e s s e s  o n l y  p o l l u t i o n  f r o m  m a n u f a c t u r i n g .  I t  d o e s  
n o t  c o n s i d e r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e f f e c t s  o f  N A F T A  i n  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c to r .
4 1 . Ernst Lutz, "Agricultural Trade Liberalization: Price Changes and Environmental Effects," as reported by  
R unge, "Environmental E ffects ...,"  op. cit.
42 . R unge, "Environmental E ffects ...,"  op. cit; Sutton (ed .) A g ric u ltu ra l T ra d e .. . ,  op. cit; P. Faeth et a l., 
P ay in g  the F a rm  B il l :  U .S . A g ric u ltu ra l P o licy  and  the Transition  to Sustainable A g ric u ltu re  (W ashington, D .C .:  
W orld R esources Institute, 1991).
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III. Three Regional Agreements
H o w  h a v e  t r a d e  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  o b j e c t iv e s  b e e n  r e c o n c i l e d  i n  t h r e e  r e g io n a l  e c o n o m i c  
i n t e g r a t i o n  a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  t h e  E C ,  t h e  U . S . - C a n a d a  F r e e  T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t  ( C U S F T A )  a n d  t h e  N o r t h  
A m e r i c a n  F r e e  T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t  ( N A F T A ) ?  W h a t  l e s s o n s ,  i f  a n y ,  d o  t h e s e  h o l d  f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  
i n t e g r a t i o n  a t t e m p t s  i n  t h e  W e s t e r n  H e m is p h e r e ?
European Experience
I n  a s s e s s in g  t h e  E C ’s  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  r e c o n c i l i n g  r e g io n a l  f r e e  t r a d e  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  o b j e c t iv e s ,  
a n d  t h e  l e s s o n s  f r o m  t h a t  e x p e r i e n c e  f o r  f u t u r e  e c o n o m ic  i n t e g r a t i o n  in  t h e  W e s t e r n  H e m i s p h e r e ,  t h e  
u n i q u e  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  E C  m u s t  b e  b o r n e  i n  m in d .  F i r s t ,  t h e  E C  c r e a t e d  s u p r a n a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  s u r r e n d e r  o f  n a t io n a l  s o v e r e i g n t y ,  a l l  w i t h  t h e  o b j e c t iv e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  u n i o n .  
T h i s  g i v e s  t h e  E C  a u t h o r i t y  a n d  i n s t r u m e n t s  t o  h a r m o n i z e  t r a d e  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c i e s ,  f e a t u r e s  t h a t  
a r e  n o t  f o u n d  i n  t h e  C U S F T A  o r  N A F T A  a n d  a r e  u n l ik e l y  t o  b e  p a r t  o f  n e w  W e s t e r n  H e m i s p h e r e  
i n t e g r a t i o n  a r r a n g e m e n t s .  S e c o n d ,  a n d  a g a i n  u n l ik e  t h e  C U S F T A  a n d  N A F T A ,  t h e  f o r m e r  E C  is  a  
f u n c t i o n i n g  c o m m o n  m a r k e t  w i t h  f r e e  f l o w  o f  p e o p le  f r o m  o n e  m e m b e r  c o u n t r y  t o  a n o th e r .  B e c a u s e  
c i t i z e n s  o f  t h e  E C  h a v e  th e  r i g h t  t o  l iv e  a n d  w o r k  in  t h e  c o u n t r y  o f  t h e i r  c h o ic e ,  t h e  c a s e  f o r  u n i f o r m  
m in i m u m  a m b i e n t  a n d  w o r k p l a c e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t a n d a r d s  is  s t r e n g th e n e d .  T h i r d ,  t h e  f o r m e r  E C  
c o n t r o l l e d  f u n d s  ( a b o u t  1 .2  b i l l i o n  E C U  f o r  1 9 8 9 - 9 3 )  t h a t  c a n  b e  u s e d  to  b r i n g  u p  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
p e r f o r m a n c e  i n  t h e  p o o r e r  m e m b e r s .  T h i s  c o n t r o l  o f  f u n d s  is  n o t  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  C U S F T A ,  a l t h o u g h  th e  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  f i n a n c i a l  a n d  t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e  f o r  M e x i c o  h a s  b e e n  a n  i s s u e  i n  N A F T A .  F o u r t h ,  t h e  
s p a t i a l  p r o x i m i t y  o f  f o r m e r  E C  m e m b e r s  m e a n t  t h a t  t r a n s b o u n d a r y  p o l l u t i o n  is  a  m o r e  s e r i o u s  c o n c e r n  
t h a n  i s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  t h e  c a s e  i f  N A F T A  is  e x p a n d e d  to  o t h e r  W e s t e r n  H e m is p h e r e  c o u n t r i e s .  F i f t h ,  t h e  
p h y s i c a l  p r o x i m i t y  o f  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  f o r m e r  E C ,  c o m b in e d  w i t h  a  h i g h  l e v e l  o f  i n t r a - E C  t r a d e ,  i m p l i e d  
t h a t  t h e  c u s t o m a r y  v i e w  o f  p r o d u c t  p o l l u t i o n  a s  p r i n c i p a l l y  a  p r o b l e m  f o r  t h e  i m p o r t i n g  a n d  c o n s u m in g  
c o u n t r y  w a s  w e a k e n e d .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i t  m a k e s  g r e a t e r  s e n s e  t o  d e v e l o p  a  u n i f o r m  E C  p o l i c y  w i t h  r e g a r d  
t o  d e t e r g e n t s ,  o r  a u to  e m i s s io n s ,  t h a n  i t  w o u l d  b e  f o r  t h e  U . S .  a n d  A r g e n t i n a  t o  d o  s o  t h e m s e l v e s .  A l l  
t h e s e  u n i q u e  f e a t u r e s  s u p p o r t e d  g r e a t e r  h a r m o n i z a t io n  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y  i n  t h e  E C  t h a n  i n  W e s t e r n  
H e m i s p h e r e  i n t e g r a t i o n .
P r i o r  t o  t h e  S in g le  E u r o p e a n  A c t  ( 1 9 8 7 ) ,  t h e r e  w a s  n o  e x p l i c i t  l e g a l  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  E C  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a c t i o n . 43 A c t io n s  t h a t  w e r e  t a k e n  w e r e  j u s t i f i e d  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  3 0  o f  t h e  T r e a t y  o f  R o m e ,  
w h i c h  g r a n t e d  f r e e  m o v e m e n t  o f  g o o d s  a n d  s e r v i c e s ;  A r t i c l e  1 0 0 ,  w h i c h  p r o v i d e d  f o r  h a r m o n i z i n g  l a w s  
t h a t  a f f e c t  t h e  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  c o m m o n  m a r k e t ;  a n d  A r t i c l e  1 3 5 , w h i c h  p e r m i t s  t h e  C o m m u n i t y  t o  t a k e  
m e a s u r e s  t o  a t t a i n  C o m m u n i t y  o b j e c t iv e s  n o t  e x p r e s s l y  p r o v i d e d  e l s e w h e r e .  A r t i c l e  3 0 ,  h o w e v e r ,  a l l o w s  
e x c e p t i o n s  t o  f r e e  m o v e m e n t  o f  g o o d s  j u s t i f i e d  i n  p a r t  o n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  g r o u n d s .
T h e  S i n g l e  E u r o p e a n  A c t  w e n t  f u r t h e r .  A r t i c l e  1 0 0  s t a te s  t h a t  C o m m i s s io n  p r o p o s a l s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  h e a l t h ,  s a f e t y ,  a n d  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  w i l l  “ t a k e  a s  a  b a s e  a  h i g h  l e v e l  o f  p r o t e c t i o n ” ; A r t i c l e  1 3 0 R  s t a te s  
t h a t  t h e  o b j e c t iv e s  o f  C o m m u n i t y  a c t i o n s  s h a l l  b e  t o  p r e s e r v e  a n d  p r o t e c t  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  p r o t e c t  h u m a n  
h e a l t h ,  a n d  to  p r o m o t e  t h e  r a t i o n a l  u s e  o f  n a tu r a l  r e s o u r c e s .  A r t i c l e  1 3 0 R  g o e s  o n  to  e n d o r s e  t h e
4 3 . C om m ission  o f  the European Com m unities, European  Com m unity, E n v iro nm enta l L eg is la tion , Vol. 1, 
G en era l P o licy  (Luxem bourg: O ffice o f  O fficial Publications o f  the EC, 1992); E n viro nm enta l P o lic y  in  the  
E u ro pean  C om m unity  (Luxem bourg: O ffice o f  O fficial Publications o f  the EC, 1990).
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p r i n c i p l e  o f  p r e v e n t i v e  a c t i o n ,  t h e  r e c t i f i c a t i o n  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d a m a g e  a t  i t s  s o u r c e ,  a n d  t h e  p o l l u t e r -  
p a y s  p r i n c i p l e .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  S in g le  E u r o p e a n  A c t  a l l o w e d  t h e  C o u n c i l  t o  t a k e  s o m e  d e c i s i o n s  b y  
q u a l i f i e d  m a j o r i t y  a n d  a l l o w e d  m e m b e r s  t o  m a i n t a i n  o r  a d o p t  m o r e  s t r i n g e n t  w o r k e r  o r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
p r o t e c t i o n  l a w s ,  p r o v i d e d  t h e y  w e r e  n o t  p r o t e c t i o n i s t . 44
I n  i m p l e m e n t in g  i ts  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o g r a m ,  t h e  f o r m e r  E C  h a d  a v a i l a b l e  n o n b i n d in g  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a n d  r e s o l u t i o n s ,  b i n d in g  r e g u la t i o n s ,  a n d  d i r e c t i v e s .  D i r e c t iv e s  m u s t  b e  i m p l e m e n t e d  
b y  t h e  l a w s  a n d  r e g u la t i o n s  o f  m e m b e r  s t a te s  w i t h i n  s p e c i f i e d  t im e s .  T h e  d i r e c t i v e  w a s  t h e  m a i n  
i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  f o r m e r - E C  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y ,  a n d  i t  i s  a  v e r y  f l e x i b l e  i n s t r u m e n t .  I n  c e r t a i n  c a s e s  
d i r e c t i v e s  c a n  b e  v e r y  g e n e r a l ,  s e t t i n g  b r o a d  g o a l s  a n d  e n c o u r a g in g  c o o p e r a t i o n ,  u s e f u l  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  w h e n  
t h e  C o u n c i l  c a n n o t  a g r e e  o n  a c tu a l  p o l l u t i o n  l im i t s .  M o r e  o f t e n  d i r e c t i v e s  c o u ld  s e t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  q u a l i t y  
s t a n d a r d s ,  l e a v i n g  m e m b e r s  l a t i t u d e  i n  t h e  m e t h o d  o f  c o n t r o l  o r  s p e c i f i c  e m i s s io n  l im i t s  f o r  i n d iv i d u a l  
p o l l u t e r s .  I n f r e q u e n t l y ,  d i r e c t i v e s  s e t  s p e c i f i c  e f f l u e n t  o r  e m i s s io n  s t a n d a r d s .  T h e  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n ,  a n d  e n f o r c e m e n t  o f  d i r e c t i v e s  c a n  a l s o  l e a d  t o  d a w d l in g  o r  c i r c u m v e n t i o n  
b y  m e m b e r  s t a te s .  E x a m p l e s  o f  E C  d i r e c t i v e s  r a n g e d  f r o m  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  m i g r a t o r y  b i r d s  to  
p r o h i b i t i o n  o n  t h e  i m p o r t  o f  c e r t a i n  s e a l  p u p s ,  r e d u c t i o n  o f  a u to  p o l l u t i o n ,  t e s t i n g  o f  c h e m i c a l s ,  c o n t r o l  
o f  a s b e s t o s ,  a n d  m o r e .
T h e  m a i n  p r i n c i p l e s  u n d e r l y i n g  f o r m e r  E C  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y  a r e  o f  s o m e  i n t e r e s t .  T h e y  
i n c l u d e  t h e  p r e v e n t i o n  p r i n c i p l e ,  t h e  p o l l u t e r  p a y s  p r i n c i p l e  ( w h i c h  s u p p o r t s  b o t h  t r a d e  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
g o a l s ) ,  a n d  t h e  subsidiary principle,45 T h is  l a s t  is  e s p e c i a l l y  im p o r t a n t .  I t  m e a n s  t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a n d  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  s h o u l d  r e s i d e  a t  t h e  l o w e s t  l e v e l  o f  a u t h o r i t y  t h a t  h a s  
c o m p e t e n c e  to  m a n a g e  t h e  p r o b l e m  a t  h a n d .  T h e  i m p l i c a t i o n  i s  t h a t  a  p u r e l y  l o c a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
p r o b l e m ,  p e r h a p s  a  l a n d - u s e  q u e s t io n ,  s h o u l d  b e  s u b j e c t  t o  n a t i o n a l  o r ,  b e t t e r  y e t ,  l o c a l  c o n t r o l ,  a n d  n o t  
b e  s u b j e c t  t o  E C  c o n t r o l .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t r a n s b o u n d a r y  p o l l u t i o n  s u c h  a s  p o l l u t i o n  o f  t h e  R h i n e  w o u l d  
r e q u i r e  m u l t i m e m b e r ,  o r  p e r h a p s  E C - le v e l  d e c i s i o n  a n d  c o n t r o l .  T h e  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  s u b s id i a r y  
p r i n c i p l e  f o r  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t s  is  t h a t  u n l e s s  s e r i o u s  h e a l t h  o r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d a m a g e  o r  t r a n s n a t i o n a l  
p o l l u t i o n  a r e  a t  i s s u e ,  m e m b e r  s t a te s  s h o u l d  b e  f r e e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e i r  o w n  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s ,  a n d  
h a r m o n i z a t i o n  o f  t h o s e  s t a n d a r d s  a t  t h e  E C  l e v e l  is  n o t  n e c e s s a r y .  T h e  s u b s id i a r y  p r i n c i p l e ,  c o m b i n e d  
w i t h  t h e  doctrine of mutual recognition, d e s c r i b e d  b e lo w ,  is  t h e  E C ’s a t t e m p t  t o  r e c o n c i l e  t h e  d e s i r e  f o r  
f r e e  f l o w  o f  g o o d s  and m a i n t a i n  t h e  r i g h t  t o  e s t a b l i s h  s t a n d a r d s  r e f l e c t i n g  lo c a l  ( m e m b e r  s t a te )  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n d i t i o n s  a n d  p r e f e r e n c e s .
T h i s  c o m p l i c a t e d  s y s te m  is  s t i l l  e v o lv i n g .  T h e  h i s t o r y  o f  E C  p o l i c y  d e a l i n g  w i t h  p r o d u c t  
s t a n d a r d s  is  i n s t r u c t i v e .  T h e  E C  h a s  a n  o b v i o u s ,  s t r o n g  i n t e r e s t  i n  h a r m o n i z i n g  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s ,  
i n c l u d i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  r e l a t e d  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s ,  i f  i t  is  t o  c r e a t e  a  s i n g l e ,  u n i f i e d  m a r k e t .  O t h e r w i s e  
t h e  p r e - e x i s t i n g  w e b  o f  n a t i o n a l l y  d e t e r m i n e d  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s ,  f r o m  t h e  p e r m i t t e d  i n g r e d i e n t s  i n  f o o d  
p r o d u c t s  t o  s a f e t y  d e v ic e s  f o r  t r a c t o r s ,  w o u l d  i n c r e a s e  p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s  a n d  f r a g m e n t  t h e  m a r k e t ,  a n d  
c o u ld  b e  d r a w n  u p  f o r  c o v e r t  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  p u r p o s e s .  E a r l y  e f f o r t s  a t  h a r m o n i z i n g  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s  a t
4 4 . C om m ission  o f  the European C om m unities, European Community Environmental Legislation 1967-1987 
(B russels, EC Directorate General for Environm ent, Consumer Protection and N uclear Safety).
4 5 . Hank Folm er and Charles H ow e, "Environmental Problem s and P o licies in  the Single European Market" 
(Environmental and Resource Economics 1, 1991). See also A rticle 130R  o f  the Treaty.
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t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t y  l e v e l  w e r e  u n i m p r e s s iv e ,  i n  p a r t  b e c a u s e  C o u n c i l  d i r e c t i v e s  r e q u i r e d  
u n a n i m i t y . 46 T h e  s i t u a t i o n  h a s  im p r o v e d  s o m e w h a t  s in c e  t h e  m id - 1 9 8 0 s .  T h e  S i n g l e  E u r o p e a n  A c t  
s t a te s  t h a t  d i r e c t i v e s  a r e  t o  b e  a c c e p t e d  b y  q u a l i f i e d  m a j o r i t y .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  C a s s i s  d e  D i j o n  d e c i s i o n  
b y  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t y  i n  t h e  m id - 1 9 8 0 s  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  e m e r g in g  doctrine of natural recognition. 
I n  C a s s i s  d e  D i j o n ,  t h e  c o u r t  f o u n d  th a t  a  G e r m a n  l a w  r e q u i r i n g  l i q u e u r s  t o  h a v e  a  m i n i m u m  a lc o h o l  
c o n te n t  o f  3 2 % ,  a n d  w h i c h  p r e v e n t e d  t h e  s a l e  o f  a  F r e n c h  l i q u e u r ,  Cassis de Dijon, w i t h  a n  a lc o h o l  
c o n te n t  o f  o n l y  1 5 .2 6 % ,  w a s  n o t  l e g a l  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  w a s  n o  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  l a w .  I n  
t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  m u tu a l  r e c o g n i t i o n ,  a  m e m b e r  g o v e r n m e n t  c o u ld  m a i n t a i n  i ts  o w n  s t a n d a r d s  o n  p r o d u c t s  
p r o d u c e d  a n d  s o l d  w i t h i n  i t s  t e r r i t o r y ,  b u t  i t  c o u ld  n o t  p r e v e n t  t h e  s a l e  w i t h i n  i ts  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t s  
t h a t  m e t  t h e  s t a n d a r d s  o f  o t h e r  m e m b e r  s t a te s  u n l e s s  i t  c o u ld  s h o w  t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  s t a n d a r d  w a s  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  p r o t e c t  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  o r  d e f e n d  t h e  c o n s u m e r .  I n  a  f u r t h e r  e l a b o r a t i o n ,  t h e  C o u r t  r u l e d  t h a t  
a  m e m b e r  c o u ld  n o t  s to p  th e  i m p o r t a t i o n  a n d  s a l e  o f  a  p r o d u c t  c o n ta i n in g  a d d i t i v e s  t h a t  w e r e  i l l e g a l  i n  
t h e  i m p o r t i n g  m e m b e r  s t a te  b u t  l e g a l  i n  t h e  e x p o r t i n g  m e m b e r  s t a t e ,  u n l e s s  i t  c o u ld  b e  s h o w n  t h a t  t h e  
a d d i t i v e  w a s  d a n g e r o u s  a n d  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  r e s p o n s e  w a s  n o t  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e .  T h e  G e r m a n  Reinheitsgebot 
s e t t i n g  b e e r  p u r i t y  s t a n d a r d s  f a i l e d  t h i s  t e s t .
T h e s e  i n n o v a t i o n s  i n  m e l d i n g  f r e e  i n t e r n a l  t r a d e  o b j e c t iv e s  w i t h  t h e  d e s i r e  t o  m a i n t a i n  s o m e  
p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d - s e t t i n g  a u th o r i t y  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  h a v e  h a d  s o m e  s u c c e s s .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  E C  n o  
l o n g e r  n e e d e d  to  c o n c e r n  i t s e l f  w i t h  s e t t i n g  s o - c a l l e d  n o n e s s e n t ia l  s t a n d a r d s — t h e s e  c a n  b e  s e t  a t  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  w i t h  m u tu a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  a s s u r i n g  f r e e  m a r k e t  a c c e s s  f o r  o t h e r  m e m b e r s .  B u t  t h e  d o c t r i n e  
d o e s  n o t  e x t e n d  t o  r e g u la t i o n s  o f  m o s t  i n t e r e s t  h e r e — t h o s e  t h a t  p r o t e c t  h e a l t h  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t .  A s  i t  
s t o o d ,  t h e  E C  a t t e m p t e d  to  s e t  ( h ig h )  m in i m u m  s t a n d a r d s ,  b u t  a l l o w  m e m b e r s  t o  s e t  e v e n  h i g h e r  s t a n d a r d s  
i f  t h e y  c a n  b e  j u s t i f i e d  a s  n e c e s s a r y  a n d  p r o p o r t i o n a t e .
T h e  D a n i s h  b o t t l e  b i l l  c a s e  w a s  a  c r i t i c a l  t e s t  o f  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i o r i t i e s  o f  t r a d e  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
i n t e r e s t s .  I n  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 8 0 s  D e n m a r k  p a s s e d  l e g i s l a t i o n  r e q u i r i n g  b e e r  a n d  s o f t  d r i n k s  b e  s o l d  i n  r e u s a b l e  
c o n t a i n e r s . 47 T h i s  d i s a d v a n t a g e d  o t h e r  E C  p r o d u c e r s  w i t h  a  r e l a t i v e ly  s m a l l  s h a r e  o f  t h e  D a n i s h  m a r k e t .  
T h e  E C  C o m m i s s i o n  t o o k  D e n m a r k  to  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o u r t  a n d  a r g u e d  t h a t  D e n m a r k ’s  l a w  w a s  i n  
v i o l a t i o n  o f  a r t i c l e  3 0 ,  i n  p a r t  o n  t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  t h e  m e a s u r e  w a s  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  t o  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
o b j e c t iv e  a n d  t h a t  o t h e r  b e v e r a g e s  ( e . g . ,  m i l k )  w e r e  e x c l u d e d .  T h e  E u r o p e a n  C o u r t  u l t i m a t e l y  r u l e d  in  
f a v o r  o f  D e n m a r k ,  w i t h  t h e  i m p l i c i t  m e s s a g e  th a t  t r a d e  r u l e s  m u s t  i n  s o m e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  y i e l d  to  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  o b j e c t iv e s .
I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  i s s u e  o f  h a r m o n i z i n g  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s  w i t h i n  t h e  f o r m e r  E C ,  t h e  i s s u e  o f  a  
m e m b e r  s e e k in g  c o m p e t i t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  b y  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a r t i f i c i a l l y  l o w  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  p r o d u c t i o n  p o l l u t i o n  
h a s  n o t  y e t  b e e n  n o t a b l y  d i f f i c u l t  o r  c o n t r o v e r s i a l .  W h i l e  i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  c e r t a i n  E C  d i r e c t i v e s  a p p l i e d  to  
a l l  E C  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t y ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  d i r e c t i v e  r e q u i r i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  im p a c t  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  l a r g e -  
s c a le  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  s e n s i t i v e  p r o j e c t s  s u c h  a s  r e f i n e r i e s ,  t h e r m a l  p o w e r  s t a t i o n s ,  a n d  i n t e g r a t e d  
c h e m i c a l  i n s t a l l a t i o n s ,  a n d  t h a t  s o m e  o t h e r  d i r e c t i v e s  c o n ta i n  d e t a i l e d  e f f l u e n t  a n d  e m i s s i o n  s t a n d a r d s  
( s u c h  a s  f o r  a s b e s t o s )  t h a t  w e r e  u n i f o r m  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  E C ,  t h e r e  w a s  n o  e f f o r t  t o  e q u a l i z e  i n d u s t r i a l
46 . D avid  V o g e l, "Protective R egulation and Protectionism  in  the European Community: the Creation o f  a 
C om m on M arket for F ood and Beverages" (m im eo, prepared for C onference o f  the European Studios 
A ssociation , G eorge M ason U niversity , M ay 1991 .)
47 . O T A , T rad e  an d  Environm ent, op. cit.
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p o l l u t i o n  a b a t e m e n t  c o s t s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  E C .  I n d i v id u a l  c o u n t r i e s  c a n  a n d  d o  s e t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t a n d a r d s  
o n  p r o d u c t i o n  t h a t  l e a d  t o  d i f f e r e n t  c o s t s .
T h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s  w h y  th e  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  i s s u e  h a s  b e e n  m u te d  i n  E u r o p e a n  r e g io n a l  
i n t e g r a t i o n .  F i r s t ,  t h e  E C  h a d  a  d i r e c t i v e  s u p p o r t i n g  th e  p o l l u t e r  p a y s  p r i n c i p l e  ( P P P ) ,  a n d  t h i s  m o d e r a t e s  
t r a d e  d i s t o r t i o n s  f r o m  d i f f e r e n t  f i n a n c in g  r e g im e s .  S e c o n d  ( a s  p r e v i o u s l y  n o t e d ) ,  i n d u s t r i a l  p o l l u t i o n  
c o n t r o l  c o s t s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  a  v e r y  s m a l l  f r a c t i o n  o f  t o ta l  c o s t s ,  a n d  t h e  s c o p e  f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l o c a t i o n  o n  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o s t  g r o u n d s  h a s  b e e n  p e r c e iv e d  a s  l im i te d .  T h i r d ,  p o l i c y  m a k e r s  h a v e  a p p a r e n t l y  a c c e p t e d  
t h e  c o n v e r g e n c e  t h e o r y  o f  H o r s t  S i e b e r t  ( a l s o  m e n t i o n e d  e a r l i e r ) .  T h e  T a s k  F o r c e  r e p o r t  a n a l y z i n g  th e  
l ik e l y  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  im p a c t s  o f  t h e  S in g le  E u r o p e a n  A c t  a n d  E C  9 2  e x p l i c i t l y  n o t e s  t h a t  t h e  c o m p l e t i o n  
o f  t h e  i n t e r n a l  m a r k e t  w o u l d  f a c i l i t a t e  “ lo c a t io n a l  a r b i t r a g e ” i n  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t y ,  b u t  o v e r  t i m e  t h e  lo w -  
s t a n d a r d s  c o u n t r y  w o u l d  s u f f e r  i n c r e a s in g  p o l l u t i o n  a n d  w o u l d  h a v e  in c e n t iv e  t o  r a i s e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
s t a n d a r d s .  T h i s  w o u l d  l e a d  to  ex post c o n v e r g e n c e  t h r o u g h  a  “ c o m p e t i t i v e  p r o c e s s . ” 48 C o m p a r e d  to  
t h e  N A F T A  p r o c e s s ,  t h i s  r e l i a n c e  o n  m a r k e t - b a s e d  c o n v e r g e n c e  i n  t h e  E C  is  a  r e m a r k a b l y  s a n g u i n e  v i e w  
o f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t - c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  i s s u e .
M u t e d  a t t e n t i o n  to  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  i s s u e  m a y  n o t  c o n t i n u e .  T h e  S i n g l e  E u r o p e a n  A c t  
p r o v i d e d  f o r  E C - l e v e l  a u th o r i t y  t o  s e t  c o m m u n i ty - w id e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y  a s  i t  r e l a t e s  t o  p r o d u c t i o n  
p o l l u t i o n ,  a n d  i t  m a y  b e c o m e  m o r e  a c t i v e  i n  e x e r c i s in g  t h a t  a u th o r i t y .  T h e  p r o s p e c t i v e  e x p a n s io n  o f  w h a t  
is  n o w  t h e  E U ,  a n d  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  c o m m e r c i a l  a g r e e m e n t s  w i t h  E a s t e r n  E u r o p e a n  c o u n t r i e s  w h o s e  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t a n d a r d s  h a v e  b e e n  n o t o r i o u s l y  l a x ,  m a y  b e  t h e  t r i g g e r  f o r  a  m o r e  a c t i v i s t  p o l i c y .  
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  i n  M a r c h  1 9 9 1  w h a t  w a s  t h e n  t h e  E C  a n n o u n c e d  a  t w o - s t a g e  p r o g r a m  a im e d  a t  h a r m o n i z i n g  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y . 49 I n  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e ,  c e r t a i n  m in i m u m  a n t i p o l lu t i o n  m e a s u r e s  w o u l d  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  
w i t h  s t r i c t e r  v o l u n t a r y  s t a n d a r d s  b y  i n d iv i d u a l  m e m b e r  s t a te s .  I n  t h e  s e c o n d  s t a g e ,  a l l  E C  m e m b e r s  
w o u l d  h a v e  t o  m e e t  a  s e t  o f  s t a n d a r d s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to  t h e  h i g h e s t  l e v e l  t h a t  c o u ld  b e  “ r e a s o n a b l y  
e n v i s a g e d  i n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  l a t e s t  s c i e n t i f i c  a n d  t e c h n o l o g ic a l  f i n d i n g s . ” T h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  t h i s  p r o p o s e d  
p l a n  i s  m o t i v a t e d  b y  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  c o n c e r n s  i s  n o t  k n o w n .
F i n a l l y ,  f o r  c o m p l e t e n e s s ,  w e  s h o u l d  m e n t i o n  t h a t  t h e  E C  d i s c o v e r e d  a n  i s s u e  r a i s e d  i n  S e c t i o n  
I  o f  t h i s  p a p e r ,  t h e  im p a c t  o f  r e g io n a l  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  o n  t h e  E u r o p e a n  e n v i r o n m e n t .  T h e  T a s k  F o r c e  
R e p o r t  i s  m a i n l y  d i r e c t e d  t o w a r d  t h i s  q u e s t i o n ,  a n d  a d d i t i o n a l  w o r k  a t  t h e  O E C D  is  l o o k in g  a t  p a r t i c u l a r  
s e c to r s  i n  t h e  E C  s u c h  a s  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  a n d  e n e r g y .
T o  s u m m a r i z e  t h e  E C  e x p e r i e n c e :
I s s u e  1. E n v i r o n m e n ta l l y  R e la t e d  P r o d u c t  S t a n d a r d s .  T h i s  p r o v e d  c o n te n t io u s .  D e s p i t e  
C o m m u n i t y - l e v e l  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  a u t h o r i t y ,  a n d  a  d e s i r e  t o  c r e a t e  a  s i n g l e  
m a r k e t ,  t h e  E C  d i d  n o t  f i n d  i t  f e a s i b l e  t o  s e t  s i n g l e ,  h a r m o n i z e d  s t a n d a r d s  t h r o u g h o u t  
t h e  C o m m u n i t y .
4 8 . E u ro p e a n  C o m m u n ity  T a s k  F o rc e ,  Task F o rce  R eport on the E nvironm ent an d  the In te rn a l M a rk e t  
(B m sse ls :  E u ro p e a n  C o m m iss io n , 1 9 8 9 ), p p . 8 .8 ,  8 .9 .
4 9 .  In te rn a tio n a l E n v iro nm enta l R eporter, A p r il  10 , 1 9 9 1 , p .  1 87 .
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I s s u e  2 :  E n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  R e la t e d  R e g u la t i o n  o f  P r o d u c t io n .  T h i s  w a s  n o t  c o n te n t io u s ,  a n d
t h e r e  w a s  n o  s e r i o u s  e f f o r t  a t  e q u a l i z i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  c o s t s  w i t h i n  t h e
r e g io n .  H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  m a y  c h a n g e  in  t h e  f u t u r e .
I s s u e  3 : T h e  E n v i r o n m e n ta l  E f f e c t s  o f  R e g io n a l  T r a d e  L ib e r a l i z a t i o n .  T h i s  q u e s t i o n  w a s  n o t
c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e  e a r l y  y e a r s  o f  t h e  E C .  I t  w a s  s t u d i e d  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  E C - 9 2 ,  
a n d  o n e  s u p p o s e s  t h a t  w h e n  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c ts  a r e  i d e n t i f i e d ,  t h e  C o m m u n i t y  w i l l  
a t t e m p t  t o  a d d r e s s  th e m .
T h e  United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement
D e s p i t e — o r  p e r h a p s  b e c a u s e  o f — s t r o n g  t r a d e  a n d  in v e s tm e n t  l i n k s ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  C a n a d a  
h a v e  h a d  a  l o n g  h i s t o r y  o f  c o m m e r c i a l  d i s p u t e s .  T h e  U . S . - C a n a d a  F T  A  is  l a r g e l y  a n  e f f o r t  t o  r e s o l v e  
t h e s e  d i s p u t e s .  T h e  U . S .  a n d  C a n a d a  h a v e  a l s o  h a v e  a  l o n g  h i s t o r y  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a n d  n a t u r a l - r e s o u r c e  
m a n a g e m e n t  d i s p u t e s .  W h a t  i s  p e r h a p s  r e m a r k a b l e  f r o m  t h e  v a n ta g e  p o i n t  o f  1 9 9 2  i s  t h a t  q u e s t i o n s  o f  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  a n d  n a tu r a l  r e s o u r c e  c o n s e r v a t io n  p l a y e d  s u c h  a  s m a l l  r o l e  i n  t h e  F T A  
n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  a n d  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  c o n f l i c t  b e tw e e n  t r a d e  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n ,  s o  d o m in a n t  i n  
t h e  N A F T A  p r o c e s s  f i v e  y e a r s  l a t e r ,  a p p a r e n t l y  w a s  s c a r c e ly  c o n s i d e r e d ,  a t  l e a s t  b y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  
c o n c e r n e d .
T h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  F T A  s e r v e d  to  a c h i e v e  t h r e e  o b j e c t iv e s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  U . S .  w a s  i n c r e a s in g l y  
f r u s t r a t e d  d u r i n g  1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 4  in  i ts  e f f o r t s  t o  l a u n c h  a  n e w  r o u n d  o f  m u l t i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  t a l k s  u n d e r  G A T T  
a u s p i c e s . 50 I t  s a w  t h e  F T A  a s  a n  a l t e r n a t iv e  v e h ic l e  f o r  m o v in g  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  a h e a d  w h i l e  t h e  
G A T T  p r o c e s s  c h u g g e d  o n .  S e c o n d ,  t h e r e  w a s  a  g e n u in e  d e s i r e  a m o n g  p o l i c y  m a k e r s  a n d  p a r t s  o f  t h e  
b u s i n e s s  c o m m u n i t i e s  i n  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s  t o  s e c u r e  t h e  a d v a n t a g e s  o f  l i b e r a l i z e d  t r a d e  a n d  i n v e s tm e n t  o n
a  r e g i o n a l  l e v e l .  T h i s  w a s  p e r h a p s  m o r e  i n te n s e  i n  C a n a d a ,  w h i c h  m a i n t a i n e d  a  r a t h e r  h i g h  l e v e l  o f
p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  i t s  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c to r  a n d  n e e d e d  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  to  im p r o v e  g l o b a l  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s .
T h i r d ,  a n d  e q u a l l y  i m p o r t a n t ,  b o t h  g o v e r n m e n ts  w i s h e d  to  m in i m iz e  o r  e l i m in a t e  c e r t a i n  p r o d u c t -  
s p e c i f i c  f r i c t i o n s  t h a t  m a r r e d  c o m m e r c i a l  r e l a t i o n s .  C h i e f  a m o n g  t h e s e  w e r e
( 1 )  d i s p u t e s  i n  e n e r g y  t r a d e ;
C a n a d a  c u t  o i l  e x p o r t s  t o  t h e  U . S .  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  t h e  f i r s t  A r a b  e m b a r g o ,  
s o u g h t  t o  t e r m i n a t e  e n e r g y  e x p o r t s  a n d  l im i t  f o r e i g n  in v e s tm e n t  i n  t h e  
e n e r g y  s e c to r ,  a n d  e n g a g e d  in  d i f f e r e n t i a l  p r i c i n g  o f  d o m e s t i c  a n d  e x p o r t  
s a l e s  i n  n a tu r a l  g a s  a n d  e le c t r i c i t y ;  t h e  U .S .  a t  v a r io u s  t im e s  c o n t r o l l e d  
w e l l - h e a d  p r i c e s  f o r  n a tu r a l  g a s  t o  t h e  d i s a d v a n t a g e  o f  C a n a d i a n  
s u p p l i e r s ,  d e n i e d  l o w - c o s t  A l a s k a n  c r u d e  to  C a n a d i a n  r e f i n e r s ,  a n d
50 . A t the 1982 G A T T  M inisterial M eeting, the U .S . failed to get a firm  com m itm ent for a new  trade round. 
The U ruguay R ound w as finally launched in 1986.
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a b a n d o n e d  a  n a tu r a l  g a s  p i p e l i n e  f r o m  A l a s k a  th a t  w o u l d  h a v e  t r a v e r s e d  
C a n a d a . 51
( 2 )  i n v e s tm e n t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  C a n a d a ;
C a n a d a  h a d  i n t r o d u c e d  t h e  F o r e i g n  I n v e s t m e n t  R e v ie w  A c t  i n  1 9 7 3  
w h i c h ,  a m o n g  o t h e r  p r o v i s i o n s ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  a  “ s i g n i f i c a n t  b e n e f i t ” 
c r i t e r i o n  f o r  n e w  f o r e i g n  in v e s tm e n ts  i n  C a n a d a  a n d  e n c o u r a g e d  f i r m s  to  
m a k e  m in i m u m  e x p o r t  a n d  l o c a l  c o n te n t  c o m m i tm e n t s . 52
( 3 )  a  s e r i e s  o f  r a t h e r  b i t t e r  a n t i d u m p in g  a n d  c o u n te r v a i l i n g  d u t y  d i s p u t e s ;  a n d
T h e  m o s t  f a m o u s  w a s  t h e  a l l e g e d  l o w  s t u m p a g e  f e e s  f o r  C a n a d i a n  
s o f t w o o d  l u m b e r ,  w h i c h  t h e  U . S .  a r g u e d  a m o u n t e d  to  a  c o u n te r v a i l a b l e  
s u b s id y ,  a n d  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  w h i c h  p r o v e d  to  b e  a  p o l i t i c a l  p r e r e q u i s i t e  
f o r  t h e  U . S .  t o  f i n a l i z e  t h e  C U S F T A .
( 4 )  i n c r e a s in g  s t r a in s  i n  t h e  1 9 6 5  A u t o m o t i v e  P r o d u c t s  T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t
U n d e r  t h e  A u t o  P a c t ,  C a n a d a  o p e r a t e d  a  d u t y  r e m i s s io n  p l a n  i n  w h i c h  
n o n - N o r t h  A m e r i c a n  p r o d u c e r s  i n  C a n a d a  ( J a p a n  a n d  G e r m a n y )  r e c e iv e d  
a  d u t y  w a i v e r  f o r  t h e i r  i m p o r t s  in to  C a n a d a  i f  t h e y  p r o d u c e d  a n d  
e x p o r t e d  f r o m  C a n a d a ,  a  d e v ic e  t h e  U . S .  p r o p e r l y  v i e w e d  a s  a n  e x p o r t  
s u b s id y .
A l t h o u g h  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  w e r e  c e n t r a l  t o  t w o  o f  t h e s e  f o u r  d i s p u t e  a r e a s  ( e n e r g y  a n d  s o f t w o o d  l u m b e r ) ,  
t h e  i s s u e s  w e r e  n o t  i d e n t i f i e d  o r  p r e s e n t e d  a s  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  o r  c o n s e r v a t i o n  q u e s t io n s .
U . S . - C a n a d i a n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a n d  r e s o u r c e  d i s p u t e s  h a v e  c o v e r e d  a  w i d e  s p e c t r u m .  E x a m p l e s  
g o  b a c k  t o  t h e  T r a i l  S m e l t e r  C a s e  ( 1 9 3 5 )  i n  w h i c h  e m i s s io n s  f r o m  a  C a n a d i a n  s m e l t e r  w e r e  f o u n d  t o  b e  
d a m a g i n g  t h e  U . S .  e n v i r o n m e n t .  T h e  d i s p u t e  w a s  r e s o l v e d  b y  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a r b i t r a t i o n ,  a n d  i t  b e c a m e  
a n  i m p o r t a n t  p r e c e d e n t  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  l a w .  S u b s e q u e n t  e x a m p l e s  i n c l u d e  j o i n t  p o l l u t i o n  
o f  t h e  G r e a t  L a k e s ,  a c id  r a i n  ( m a in ly  f r o m  t h e  U . S .  t o  C a n a d a ) ,  N o r t h  A t l a n t i c  f i s h i n g  r i g h t s ,  a n d  t w o  
G A T T  A r t i c l e  X X  c a s e s  i n v o lv i n g  f i s h  ( a  U .S .  b a n  o n  t u n a  i m p o r t s  f r o m  C a n a d a  a n d  a  C a n a d i a n  
r e s t r i c t i o n  o n  e x p o r t  o f  h e r r i n g  a n d  s a lm o n ) .  T h e  m o s t  p o l i t i c a l l y  s e n s i t i v e  o f  t h e s e  i s s u e s  a t  t h e  t im e  
t h e  C U S F T A  w a s  b e in g  n e g o t i a t e d  w a s  a c i d  r a in .
D e s p i t e  n u m e r o u s  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a n d  n a tu r a l - r e s o u r c e  c o n t r o v e r s i e s ,  a n d  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
C U S F T A  m a d e  m a j o r  p o l i c y  c h a n g e s  i n  e n e r g y  t r a d e ,  i t  d o e s  n o t  a p p e a r  t h a t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n c e r n s  
p l a y e d  m o r e  t h a n  a  m i n o r  r o l e  i n  t h e  C U S F T A .  W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s ,  t h e r e  w a s  n o  a t t e m p t
51 . Philip  V erleger, "Implications o f  the Energy Provisions," in Jeffrey Schott and Murray Smith (ed s .), The 
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: The Global Impact (W ashington, D .C .: Institute for International 
E conom ics, 1988).
52 . Jeffrey Schott and Murray Sm ith, "Services and Investment," in  Schott and Smith (ed s .), The Canada- 
United States..., op . cit.
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t o  h a r m o n i z e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t a n d a r d s  o r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o s t s  r e l a t e d  t o  p r o d u c t i o n .  T h i s  m a y  b e  b e c a u s e  
t h e  d i s p a r i t y  i n  s t a n d a r d s  o r  c o s t s  w a s  m i n o r  ( C a n a d i a n  p u b l i c  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  m e a s u r e d  
a s  e i t h e r  a  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P  o r  p e r  c a p i t a  e x c e e d e d  U . S .  e x p e n d i t u r e s  f o r  t h e  d e c a d e  1 9 7 6 - 1 9 8 6 .  
C o m p a r a t i v e  d a t a  o n  p r i v a t e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  a r e  n o t  a v a i l a b l e . ) . 53
I t  i s  n o t  a c c u r a t e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t o  s a y  t h a t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n c e r n s  w e r e  e n t i r e l y  a b s e n t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
i n  C a n a d a . 54 A n t i c i p a t i n g  f e a r s  o f  U .S .  e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s  t h a t  N A F T A  w o u l d  l e a d  t o  a  w e a k e n i n g  o f  
U . S .  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t a n d a r d s ,  s o m e  C a n a d i a n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  g r o u p s  d i d  o p p o s e  t h e  F T A ,  a s  d i d  t h e  N e w  
D e m o c r a t i c  P a r t y ,  p a r t l y  o n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  g r o u n d s .  A p p a r e n t l y ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t  w a s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p r o d u c e  
e v id e n c e  t h a t  U . S .  p r a c t i c e s  w e r e  a t  l o w e r  s t a n d a r d s .  A l t h o u g h  u l t i m a t e ly  u n s u c c e s s f u l  i n  m o d i f y i n g  t h e  
F T A ,  C a n a d i a n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  g r o u p s  m a d e  a  v i g o r o u s  c a s e  a g a i n s t  t h e  F T A  b y  u s i n g  m a n y  o f  t h e  
a r g u m e n t s  t h a t  w o u l d  s u r f a c e  i n  N A F T A .  T h e y  h a v e  s i n c e  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  F T A ,  i n  i t s  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n ,  
h a s  u n d e r m i n e d  C a n a d i a n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n . 55
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s ,  t h e  C U S F T A  f o l lo w s  G A T T  l a n g u a g e  a n d  a l l o w s  c o u n t r i e s  to  
e s t a b l i s h  d o m e s t i c  s t a n d a r d s  a s  t h e y  p e r c e iv e  t h e i r  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t . 56 T h e  F T A  d o e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  
e n c o u r a g e  h a r m o n i z a t i o n  a n d  e s t a b l i s h e s  a  c o n s u l ta t iv e  p r o c e s s  to  f a c i l i t a t e  h a r m o n i z a t i o n . 57 M o r e o v e r ,  
t h e  F T A  o f f e r s  a  c h o ic e  o f  v e n u e s  f o r  b r i n g in g  d i s p u t e s .  A s  m e n t i o n e d  in  f o o t n o te  2 0  a b o v e ,  a  G A T T  
d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p a n e l  h a d  f o u n d  C a n a d a ’s  p r o h i b i t i o n  a g a i n s t  e x p o r t  o f  u n p r o c e s s e d  h e r r i n g  a n d  s a l m o n  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  G A T T ,  a s  i t  w a s  n o t  p r i m a r i l y  a im e d  a t  t h e  c o n s e r v a t io n  o f  e x h a u s t i b l e  n a tu r a l  r e s o u r c e s  
( A r t i c l e  X X ) .  C a n a d a  a c c e p t e d  t h e  p a n e l  d e c i s i o n  i n  1 9 8 8 ,  b u t  i n  1 9 8 9  i n t r o d u c e d  n e w  r e g u la t i o n s  
r e q u i r i n g  l a n d i n g  o f  c e r t a i n  s a l m o n  a n d  r o e  h e r r i n g . 58 T h e  U . S .  d i s p u t e d  t h e  n e w  r e g u l a t i o n s  a n d  c h o s e  
t o  b r i n g  t h e  q u e s t i o n  b e f o r e  a  C U S F T A  p a n e l .  T h a t  p a n e l  r u l e d  i n  f a v o r  o f  t h e  U . S .  A  s e c o n d  c a s e  
b r o u g h t  b e f o r e  a n  F T A  p a n e l  i n v o lv e d  a  U . S .  l a w  s e t t i n g  m in i m u m  s i z e  f o r  l o b s t e r s  i m p o r t e d  o r  s o l d  i n  
t h e  U . S .  C a n a d a  o b j e c t e d  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  t h e  r e g u la t i o n  v i o l a t e d  G A T T  A r t i c l e  X I ,  a n d  c o u ld  n o t  
b e  j u s t i f i e d  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  I I I  ( p e r m i t t i n g  i n t e r n a l  r e g u la to r y  m e a s u r e s  t h a t  d o  n o t  f a v o r  d o m e s t i c  o v e r  
i m p o r t e d  p r o d u c t s ) .  T h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  p a n e l  a g r e e d  w i t h  t h e  U . S .  p o s i t i o n .
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  t w o  r e m a in i n g  i s s u e  a r e a s  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  S e c t i o n  I — t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e f f e c ts  
o f  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  a n d  th e  u s e  o f  t r a d e  m e a s u r e s  to  s e c u r e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  o b j e c t i v e s — it
5 3 . O E C D , Pollution Control..., op. cit.
5 4 . G. Bruce D o em  and Brian T om lin, Faith and Fear (Toronto: Stoddart, 1991).
5 5 . Steven  Shrybman, "Selling Canada’s Environm ent Short: The Environm ental Case A gainst the Trade 
Deal" (Toronto: prepared for Canadian Environmental Law A ssociation); Steven Shrybman, "Selling the 
Environm ent Short: A n Environmental A ssessm ent o f  the First T w o Years o f  Free Trade B etw een Canada and 
the U nited States" (Toronto: prepared for Canadian Environmental Law A ssociation , M ay 1991).
56 . Specifica lly , the C U S F T A  incorporates G A TT A rticles X I and X X .
57 . The governm ent o f  Canada has challenged U .S . asbestos regulations as a vio lation  o f  G A T T  and C U SF T A  
obligations, claim ing the rules are not "necessary." A lso , the U .S . has investigated Canadian subsidies for 
pollu tion  abatement in  the nonferrous metal industry under the im plem enting provisions o f  the C U SF T A . 
Shrybman, "Selling the Environment Sh ort...,"  op. cit.
58 . O T A , Trade and Environment..., op. cit.
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s e e m s  f a i r  t o  s a y  t h e y  p l a y e d  n o  s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  i n  t h e  C U S F T A .  T h e r e  w a s  n o  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p a c t  
a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  C U S F T A .  T h e r e  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  n o  a t t e m p t  b y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  e i t h e r  c o u n t r y  t o  u s e  
t h e  C U S F T A  a s  a  v e h ic l e  f o r  a l t e r i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y  i n  t h e  o t h e r  c o u n t r y .
T h e  Environmental Issue in N A F T A
E n v i r o n m e n ta l  c o n c e r n s  h a v e  b e e n  d o m in a n t  i n  t h e  N A F T A  p r o c e s s  a n d  o n l y  a  b r i e f  r e v i e w  c a n  
b e  i n c l u d e d  h e r e .  T h e r e  a r e  a  n u m b e r  o f  r e a s o n s  w h y  s u c h  c o n c e r n s  h a s  b e e n  p r o m i n e n t  i n  N A F T A ,  
i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  C U S F T A .  F i r s t ,  t h e  d i s p a r i t y  i n  l a b o r  c o s t s  a u to m a t i c a l l y  r a i s e d  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  
i s s u e .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  d i s p a r i t y  i n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t a n d a r d s  a n d  e n f o r c e m e n t  b e t w e e n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s  a n d  
M e x i c o  is  f a r  g r e a t e r  t h a n  b e tw e e n  t h e  U .S .  a n d  C a n a d a ,  r e i n f o r c i n g  c o n c e r n  f o r  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  
i s s u e .  T h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  a  M e x i c a n  “ p o l l u t i o n  h a v e n ” h a d  g r e a t e r  c r e d i b i l i t y .  T h i r d ,  s e r i o u s  
t r a n s b o u n d a r y  a i r  a n d  w a t e r  p o l l u t i o n  p r o b l e m s  h a v e  b e e n  d o c u m e n t e d  a n d  p u b l i c i z e d .  B e c a u s e  U .S .  
t r a d e  l a w  f o r  m a n y  y e a r s  a l l o w e d  p a r t i a l  f r e e  t r a d e  a n d  e n c o u r a g e d  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  m a q u i l a d o r a  
i n d u s t r i a l  p l a n t s ,  a n d  b e c a u s e  t h e  e n s u i n g  p o l l u t i o n  p r o b l e m s  h a d  b e e n  l e f t  u n t e n d e d ,  f u l l  f r e e  t r a d e  
w i t h o u t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  w a s  s e e n  to  p o s e  a n  e v e n  g r e a t e r  p r o b l e m .  F o u r t h ,  t h e  c o n c u r r e n t  t u n a -  
d o l p h i n  d i s p u t e  w i t h  M e x i c o  i n c r e a s e d  c o n c e r n  a m o n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s  f o r  a d d r e s s i n g  t h e  t r a d e -  
e n v i r o n m e n t  q u e s t io n .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  B u s h  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’s  n e e d  t o  s e c u r e  a n  e x t e n s i o n  o f  f a s t - t r a c k  
a u t h o r i t y  f r o m  C o n g r e s s  i n  S p r i n g  1 9 9 1  p r o v i d e d  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  U . S .  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  g r o u p s  t o  p r e s s  
f o r  i n c l u s i o n  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  m e a s u r e s  i n  N A F T A  a n d  p a r a l l e l  a r r a n g e m e n t s .
E n v i r o n m e n ta l  g r o u p s  i n  t h e  U . S .  ( a n d  s o m e  i n  M e x ic o )  h a d  f o u r  b r o a d  o b j e c t iv e s :  F i r s t ,  t o  
s e c u r e  b o r d e r  c l e a n - u p ;  s e c o n d ,  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  i n t e g r i t y  o f  U n i t e d  S t a te s  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  h e a l t h  s t a n d a r d s  a s  t h e y  r e l a t e  t o  p r o d u c t s ;  t h i r d ,  t o  u s e  t h e  N A F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n s  t o  i m p r o v e  g e n e r a l  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c i e s  ( p a r t i c u l a r ly  e n f o r c e m e n t )  i n  M e x i c o ;  a n d  f o u r t h ,  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  t r a d e  
a g r e e m e n t s  c o u ld  i n  f a c t  b e  “ g r e e n e d ” to  a  d e g r e e  n o t  p e r c e i v e d  a s  p r e s e n t  i n  G A T T .
T h e  B u s h  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  w a n t e d  t o  k e e p  N A F T A  e s s e n t i a l l y  a  t r a d e  a n d  i n v e s tm e n t  a g r e e m e n t ,  
b u t  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  i t  m u s t  t a k e  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s ’ c o n c e r n s  s e r i o u s l y .  I t  c o m m i t t e d  i t s e l f  i n  M a y  
1 9 9 1  t o  a n  “ a c t i o n  p l a n ” t h a t  i n c l u d e d  ( a )  p a r a l l e l  n e g o t i a t i o n s  t o  d e v e l o p  a  p l a n  f o r  s o l v i n g  b o r d e r  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o b l e m s ,  (b )  a  c o m m i tm e n t  t o  u n d e r t a k e  a n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  
o f  U . S . - M e x i c o  t r a d e ,  ( c )  a  p l e d g e  to  e x c lu d e  f r o m  U . S .  m a r k e t s  p r o d u c t s  t h a t  d o  n o t  m e e t  U . S .  h e a l t h ,  
s a f e t y  o r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t a n d a r d s ,  a n d  (d )  a  c o m m i tm e n t  t o  a p p o in t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  t o  t r a d e  
a n d  a d v i s o r y  b o a r d s . 59 A l t h o u g h  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  h a d  p l e d g e d  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  i n c l u d e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
i s s u e s  r e l a t e d  t o  t r a d e  i n  N A F T A ,  th e  g o v e r n m e n t s  o f  t h e  U . S . ,  C a n a d a ,  a n d  M e x i c o  w i s h e d  t o  k e e p  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  m e a s u r e s  a s  u n c o n n e c t e d  t o  N A F T A  a s  p o s s i b l e . 60 T h i s  h a s  b e e n  t e r m e d  t h e  “ p a r a l l e l  
t r a c k ” a p p r o a c h . 61
59. Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, North American Free Trade (W ashington, D .C .: Institute for  
International E conom ics, 1992).
60 . C ham ovitz, "Environmental and Laborer Standards," op . cit.
61 . O T A , Trade and Environment..., op. cit.
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T h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e s e  e f f o r t s  c a n  b e  t o u c h e d  u p o n  o n l y  b r i e f l y  h e r e .  I n  F e b r u a r y  1 9 9 2  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a te s  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  P r o t e c t i o n  A g e n c y  a n d  i ts  c o u n t e r p a r t  M e x i c a n  a g e n c y ,  S E D U E ,  r e l e a s e d  t h e i r  j o i n t  
b o r d e r  c l e a n - u p  p l a n ,  a n d  t h e  U . S .  r e l e a s e d  i ts  i n t e r a g e n c y  r e v i e w  ( c o o r d i n a t e d  b y  t h e  U . S .  T r a d e  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e )  o f  t h e  t r a d e - e n v i r o n m e n t  l in k s  w i t h  M e x i c o . 62 T h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  h a s  a l s o  i n d i c a t e d  i t  
w o u l d  s e e k  $ 2 4 1  m i l l i o n  f o r  b o r d e r  c le a n - u p  f o r  f i s c a l  1 9 9 3 .  T h e  t h r e e  g o v e r n m e n t s  c o m p l e t e d  N A F T A  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  i n  A u g u s t  1 9 9 2 ,  a n d  a  f in a l  t e x t  w a s  r e a d y  b y  S e p te m b e r ) .
T h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  N A F T A  i n c l u d e  th e  f o l l o w i n g . 63 F i r s t ,  N A F T A  s t a t e s  a s  a  
p r i m a r y  p u r p o s e  t h e  p r o m o t i o n  o f  s u s t a i n a b l e  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  a n d  th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  t r a d e  i n  a  m a n n e r  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  a n d  c o n s e r v a t io n .  N e i t h e r  “ e n v i r o n m e n t ” n o r  “ s u s t a i n a b l e  
d e v e l o p m e n t ”  is  e x p l i c i t l y  m e n t i o n e d  in  G A T T .  S e c o n d ,  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s ,  a l t h o u g h  it  
e n c o u r a g e s  m e m b e r s  t o  h a r m o n i z e  t h e i r  s t a n d a r d s  u p w a r d s ,  N A F T A  a f f i r m s  t h e  r i g h t  o f  m e m b e r s  t o  
c h o o s e  t h e  l e v e l  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  t h a t  e a c h  c o n s i d e r s  a p p r o p r i a t e  a n d  a l l o w s  t h e m  to  a d o p t  s t a n d a r d s  a n d  
s a n i t a r y  a n d  p h y t o s a n i t a r y  m e a s u r e s  m o r e  s t r i n g e n t  t h a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s ,  b u t  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  
s t a n d a r d s  h a v e  s c i e n t i f i c  b a s i s .  I n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  d i s p u t e s ,  p a r t i e s  h a v e  a  c h o ic e  o f  v e n u e  ( G A T T  o r  
N A F T A ) ,  t h e  b u r d e n  o f  p r o o f  i s  p l a c e d  o n  t h e  c o m p l a in i n g  p a r t y ,  a n d  t h e  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p a n e l  m a y  
c a l l  o n  s c i e n t i f i c  e x p e r t s .
T h i r d ,  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  a n d  r e l a t e d  “ p o l l u t i o n  h a v e n ” q u e s t io n ,  N A F T A  s t a t e s  t h a t  
i t  i s  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  e n c o u r a g e  in v e s tm e n t  b y  r e l a x in g  h e a l t h ,  s a f e ty ,  o r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  m e a s u r e s ,  a n d  
a  P a r t y  s h o u l d  n o t  “ w a i v e  o r  o t h e r w i s e  d e r o g a t e  f r o m ,  o r  o f f e r  t o  w a i v e  o r  d e r o g a t e  f r o m ,  s u c h  m e a s u r e s  
a s  a n  e n c o u r a g e m e n t  f o r  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  a c q u i s i t i o n ,  e x p a n s io n  o r  r e t e n t i o n  i n  i t s  t e r r i t o r y  o f  a n  
i n v e s tm e n t  o f  s u c h  i n v e s t o r . ” W h i l e  t h i s  l a s t  p r o v i s i o n  m a y  c a t c h  t h e  m o s t  b l a t a n t  c a s e s  o f  f o r e i g n  
i n v e s tm e n t  s e e k in g  r e l i e f  f r o m  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u la t i o n s ,  i t  d o e s  n o t  d i r e c t l y  a d d r e s s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  t h e m s e l v e s  a r e  d r a w n  u p  w i t h  a  v i e w  to  o f f e r i n g  a  l o w  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o s t  l o c a t i o n  f o r  
p r o d u c t i o n .  N A F T A  d o e s  p e r m i t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s c r e e n i n g  o f  n e w  i n v e s tm e n ts .
F o u r t h ,  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  u s i n g  t r a d e  m e a s u r e s  t o  s e c u r e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  o b j e c t iv e s ,  
N A F T A  e x p l i c i t l y  s t a te s  t h a t  t h e  t r a d e  o b l ig a t io n s  o f  s o m e  s p e c i f i e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a g r e e m e n t s  ( e n d a n g e r e d  s p e c ie s ,  o z o n e  d e p le t i o n ,  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e s )  w i l l  t a k e  p r e c e d e n c e  o v e r  N A F T A ’s 
p r o v i s i o n s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h i s  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  s o m e  q u a l i f y i n g  l a n g u a g e .  T h i s  p r o v i s i o n  is  i n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  o f  a  
c h a l l e n g e  in  G A T T  t o  u s i n g  t r a d e  m e a s u r e s  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p u r p o s e s .
F i n a l l y ,  i t  s h o u l d  b e  m e n t i o n e d  t h a t  i n  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 2  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s ,  
C a n a d a ,  a n d  M e x i c o  a g r e e d  to  e s t a b l i s h  a  N o r t h  A m e r i c a n  C o m m i s s io n  o n  th e  E n v i r o n m e n t ,  o n e  f u n c t i o n  
o f  w h i c h  w o u l d  b e  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  e f f e c t i v e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  N A F T A ’s  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o v i s i o n s .
62 . The review  concluded that N A F T A  w ill enhance environm ental protection by providing M exico  w ith  
additional resources, ease environm ental problem s at the border as activity in  M exico shifts southward, and 
w ould  not encourage U .S . firms to seek low er environm ental cost location in  M exico  as pollu tion  abatement is a 
sm all share o f  total production costs in m ost industries. U STR , "Environment: The North A m erican Free 
Trade Agreement" (W ashington, D .C .: U STR , A ugust 1992).
63 . See "Description o f  the Proposed North Am erican Free Trade Agreement" prepared by the Governm ents o f  
Canada, U .S . and M exico , A ugust 12, 1992; and testim ony o f  Stuart H udson on behalf o f  N ational W ild life  
Federation before the Subcom m ittee on International Trade o f  the Senate Finance C om m ittee, Septem ber 16, 
1992.
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IV. S u m m a r y ,  Conclusions, an d  Implications for Western Hemisphere Economic Integration
S u m m a r y  a n d  Conclusions
S e c t i o n  I  o f  t h i s  p a p e r  r e v i e w e d  r e l e v a n t  t h e o r y  a n d  c o n c l u d e d :  ( 1 )  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  
a n  a d d i t i o n a l  d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  a n d  a  s o u r c e  o f  g a in s  f r o m  t r a d e ;  (2 )  s u b j e c t  to  
c e r t a i n  c a v e a t s ,  a t t e m p t s  t o  e q u a l i z e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  c o s t s  w o u l d  m i s a l l o c a t e  r e s o u r c e s  a n d  b e  
i n e f f i c i e n t ;  ( 3 )  t r a d e  m e a s u r e s  a r e  n o t  t h e  f i r s t  b e s t  i n s t r u m e n t s  f o r  a c h i e v i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  o b j e c t iv e s  
a n d ,  i f  u s e d ,  m a y  o r  m a y  n o t  i m p r o v e  w e l f a r e ;  ( 4 )  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  o f  t r a n s b o u n d a r y  p o l l u t i o n  i s  l i k e l y  
t o  r e q u i r e  s i d e  p a y m e n t s  o r  s a n c t i o n s ,  a n d  a n  “ e a s y ” c h o ic e  m ig h t  b e  t r a d e  i n d u c e m e n t s  o r  t r a d e  
c o e r c io n ;  a n d  (5 )  p o l i t i c a l  e c o n o m y  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a n d  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  i n t e r e s t s  m a y  o v e r l a p .
S e c t i o n  I  a l s o  p r e s e n t e d  a  f o u r f o l d  t a x o n o m y  o f  t r a d e - e n v i r o n m e n t  i s s u e s :  
c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s ,
e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  r e l a t e d  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s ,
u s e  o f  t r a d e  m e a s u r e s  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p u r p o s e s ,  a n d  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  im p a c t s  o f  t r a d e  a n d  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n .
T h e  s e c t i o n  t h e n  a r g u e d  t h a t  r e g io n a l  e c o n o m ic  i n t e g r a t i o n  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  s a l i e n c y  o f  a l l  f o u r  s e t s  o f  i s s u e s .
S e c t i o n  I I  r e v i e w e d  G A T T  t r e a tm e n t  o f  t h r e e  o f  t h e s e  f o u r  i s s u e s  ( G A T T  d o e s  n o t  d i r e c t l y  
c o n c e r n  i t s e l f  w i t h  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p a c t  o f  t r a d e  o r  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ) .  I t  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  ( 1 )  t h e r e  
a r e  f o u r  u n r e s o l v e d  i s s u e s  i n  G A T T  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s ;  (2 )  G A T T  a d d r e s s e s  t h e  
c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  i s s u e  t h r o u g h  i ts  s u b s id y  a n d  c o u n te r v a i l i n g  d u t y  p r o v i s i o n s ,  b u t  w i t h  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
a m b i g u i ty ;  a n d  ( 3 )  t h e  t r a d e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  s o m e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a g r e e m e n t s  m a y  b e  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  G A T T ,  b u t  t h e y  h a v e  n o t  y e t  b e e n  c h a l l e n g e d .  S e c t i o n  I I  a l s o  r e v i e w s  e m p i r i c a l  s t u d i e s  
o f  t r a d e ,  i n v e s tm e n t ,  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  (1 )  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  t h r o u g h  1 9 9 0  f o u n d  m in im a l  
t r a d e / i n v e s t m e n t  im p a c t  o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c i e s ;  ( 2 )  i n  m o r e  r e c e n t  s t u d i e s  s o m e  e f f e c t  
o n  t r a d e  a n d  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l o c a t i o n  c a n n o t  b e  r u l e d  o u t ,  b u t  s u c h  e f f e c t s  m a y  b e  e i t h e r  a  d e s i r a b l e  
r e a l l o c a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  i n  c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e ,  a n  a r t i f a c t  o f  c h a n g i n g  i n d u s t r i a l  
c o m p o s i t i o n  in  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  o r  a  r e s u l t  o f  r e l a t i v e ly  c lo s e d  t r a d e  a n d  i n v e s tm e n t  p o l i c i e s  
i n  s o m e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ;  a n d  (3 )  s t u d i e s  o f  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t r a d e  o n  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  a r e  i n  t h e i r  
i n f a n c y ,  a n d  t h e  im p a c t  c a n  b e  p o s i t i v e  o r  n e g a t i v e ,  t h e  l a t t e r  b e in g  m o r e  m o s t  l ik e l y  i f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
p o l i c y  i s  d e f i c i e n t  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l .
S e c t i o n  I I I  r e v i e w e d  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  E C ,  t h e  U . S . -  C a n a d a  F T A ,  a n d  N A F T A .  I t  c o n c l u d e s  
t h a t  ( 1 )  t h e  E C  c o n t i n u e s  to  g r a p p le  w i th  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  h a r m o n i z i n g  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s  t h r o u g h  th e  
s u b s i d i a r y  p r i n c i p l e  a n d  th e  d o c t r i n e  o f  m u tu a l  r e c o g n i t i o n ;  (2 )  h a r m o n i z i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  
p r o d u c t i o n  to  e q u a l i z e  c o m p e t i t i v e  p o s i t i o n  h a s  n o t  y e t  d o m in a t e d  E C  p o l ic y ;  ( 3 )  t h e  C U S F T A  w a s  
r e a s o n a b l y  f r e e  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n c e r n s  ( p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s ,  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  i s s u e ) ,  a n d  t h e  C U S F T A  
m a d e  n o  s e r i o u s  e f f o r t  e i t h e r  t o  r e s o l v e  b i l a t e r a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l / r e s o u r c e  d i s p u t e s  o r  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e f f e c t s  o f  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ;  ( 4 )  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n c e r n s  h a v e  b e e n  p r o m i n e n t  i n  N A F T A  
f o r  q u i t e  o b v i o u s  r e a s o n s  i n c l u d i n g  b o r d e r  p r o b l e m s  a n d  a  c o n c e r n  f o r  t h e  e n c o u r a g e m e n t  o f  p o l l u t i o n  
h a v e n s ;  (5 )  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s ’ s t r a t e g y  in  N A F T A  w a s  to  e s t a b l i s h  a  p a r a l l e l  t r a c k  to  a d d r e s s  e n v i r o n m e n t  
t o  t h e  e x t e n t  p o s s ib l e ;  a n d  ( 6 )  N A F T A  h a s  i n d e e d  b e c o m e  a  “ g r e e n e r ” t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t  b e c a u s e  o f  
p r e s s u r e s  f r o m  e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s .
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Implications
W h a t  d o e s  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  s u g g e s t  f o r  f u t u r e  W e s t e r n  H e m is p h e r e  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n ?
( 1 )  U n l i k e  t h e  E C ,  w h i c h  a im e d  a t  a  v e r y  h i g h  l e v e l  o f  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  a n d  i n  w h i c h
s u p r a n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w e r e  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  r e g io n a l  f r e e  t r a d e  a r r a n g e m e n t s  i n  
t h e  W e s t e r n  H e m is p h e r e  w i l l  b e  l o o s e r  i n  n a tu r e .  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  c a s e  f o r  s t r i c t  
a  p r i o r i  h a r m o n i z a t io n  o f  m e m b e r s ’ e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u la t i o n s  a n d  p o l i c i e s  is  n o t  a s  
c o m p e l l i n g ,  n o r  w i l l  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n s  f o r  s u c h  h a r m o n i z a t i o n  b e  
p r e s e n t .
( 2 )  B e c a u s e  o f  t h e  d o m in a n c e  o f  t h e  U .S .  e c o n o m y  in  a  r e g io n a l  m a r k e t ,  t h e r e  w i l l  b e
f u r t h e r  c o n v e r g e n c e  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  r e l a t e d  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  t r a d e d  g o o d s  t o w a r d  
U . S .  l e v e l s .  T h i s  w i l l  b e  m a i n l y  m a r k e t  d r i v e n ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  w o u l d  b e  s e n s i b l e  to  
n e g o t i a t e  im p r o v e d  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  p r o d u c t  t e s t i n g  a n d  c e r t i f i c a t i o n .  T h e  E C  a p p r o a c h  
o f  mutual recognition o f  p r o d u c t  s t a n d a r d s  d o e s  n o t  s e e m  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  W e s t e r n  
H e m is p h e r e  i n t e g r a t i o n .  T h e  N A F T A  a p p r o a c h ,  r e s e r v i n g  u l t i m a t e  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  
a u t h o r i t y  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  p r o v i d e s  a  b e t t e r  m o d e l .
( 3 )  T h e  c a s e  f o r  h a r m o n i z i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u la t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  t o  e q u a l i z e
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  c o s t s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  i s  w e a k  o n  t h e o r e t i c a l  a n d  p r a c t i c a l  g r o u n d s .  
W h i l e  a  c o n c e r n  f o r  l o s s  o f  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  w a s  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  N A F T A  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  i t  
s h o u l d  b e  l e s s  i n t e n s e  i n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  c o u n t r i e s  w h o s e  a c tu a l  a n d  p o t e n t i a l  t r a d e  w i th  
t h e  U . S .  is  r e l a t i v e ly  s m a l l  a n d  w h o  a r e  l e s s  l ik e l y  t o  b e c o m e  m a j o r  h o s t  c o u n t r i e s  f o r  
U . S .  i n v e s tm e n t .  T h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  N A F T A  w o u l d  c r e a t e  a  “ p o l l u t i o n  h a v e n ” in  
M e x i c o  h a d  a  m o d ic u m  o f  c r e d i b i l i t y ;  a n  F T A - i n d u c e d  p o l l u t i o n  h a v e n  e l s e w h e r e  i n  th e  
W e s t e r n  H e m is p h e r e  d o e s  n o t .
( 4 )  T r a n s b o u n d a r y  p o l l u t i o n  p r o b l e m s  h a v e  b e e n  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  t h e  E C  a s  w e l l  a s  i n  U . S . -
C a n a d i a n  a n d  U . S . - M e x i c a n  r e l a t i o n s .  F o r  r e a s o n s  o f  g e o g r a p h y ,  s u c h  p r o b l e m s  a r e  
m u c h  l e s s  l ik e l y  t o  p l a y  a  p r o m i n e n t  r o l e  i n  n e g o t i a t i n g  f r e e  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t s  w i t h  o t h e r  
W e s t e r n  H e m is p h e r e  c o u n t r i e s .
( 5 )  P o i n t s  2 ,  3 ,  a n d  4  s u g g e s t  t h a t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n c e r n s  m a y  p l a y  a  l e s s e r  r o l e  i n  a n y  
e x p a n s i o n  o f  N A F T A .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  o c c a s i o n  o f  n e g o t i a t i n g  W e s t e r n  H e m i s p h e r e  
f r e e  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t s  w i l l  p r o v i d e  t h e  opportunity t o  p r e s s  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  t o  i m p r o v e  
t h e i r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p e r f o r m a n c e .  T h e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  U . S .  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  l o b b y  in  
i n c l u d i n g  t h e  i s s u e  i n  N A F T A  w i l l  i n t e n s i f y  t h i s  p r e s s u r e ,  a n d  i t  is  l i k e l y  t o  b e  
c o n t r o v e r s i a l .  W h i l e  s o m e  o u t s i d e  p r e s s u r e ,  u s i n g  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  a s  t h e  c a r r o t ,  m a y  
b e  p r o d u c t i v e ,  t h e r e  a r e  l im i t s  t o  h o w  f a r  a  l i b e r a l  t r a d e  s y s te m  s h o u l d  b e  u s e d  to  s e c u r e  
n o n c o m m e r c i a l  ( i . e . ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l )  o b j e c t iv e s .  T h e r e  is  a  g e n u i n e  c o n c e r n  f o r  n o t  
a l l o w i n g  “ e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p e r i a l i s m ” t o  c o r r o d e  t r a d e  n e g o t i a t i o n s .
( 6 )  N A F T A  d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  i t  is  p o s s ib l e  t o  w r i t e  a  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  s o m e  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s e n s i t i v i t y  w i t h o u t  s u b v e r t i n g  t h e  m a i n  t r a d e  a n d  i n v e s tm e n t  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n
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objectives. For this reason N A F T A  may provide a workable model for additional trade 
agreements in the Western Hemisphere.
(7) Regional liberalization of trade will affect the level and composition o f production and 
consumption, and hence demand on environmental resources. These effects may be 
positive or negative. It would be sensible to anticipate them for resource management 
purposes. This will require much improved modeling o f the interaction between trade 
liberalization and demand for and stress on environmental resources; a searching review 
of national environmental policies directed at correcting externalities and property rights 
failures; and a change in government policies that inadvertently increase environmental 
stress (e .g ., energy, agricultural chemical and water subsidies).
(8) Trade liberalization is likely to be accompanied by increased foreign direct investment. 
Potential W H F T A  members need to review or establish policies related to foreign direct 
investment to insure adequate environmental performance.
(9) The policy reforms recommended in points (7) and (8) are desirable whether or not there 
is further Western Hemisphere economic integration.
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W E S T E R N  H E M IS P H E R E  F R E E  T R A D E : G E T T IN G  F R O M  H E R E  T O  T H E R E
Sidney Weintraub
In tro d u c tio n
Progress toward free trade for the hemisphere is likely to be slow for reasons centered in the 
political and economic situations in both the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC ). 
When Chile proposed to start the time-consuming process on the “ fast track,” the suggestion was rejected 
on the grounds that the negotiations at a time was all the Congress wished to undertake. Other than 
Mexico and Chile, few L A C  countries are ready and economically able to open their markets to free trade 
with the United States.
Any achievement of a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Agreement (W H F T A ) would be the result 
of a process that has already begun. The United States’ part in this process includes entering into a free- 
trade agreement (FTA ) with Canada, negotiating the North America Free Trade Agreement (N A F T A ), 
and entering framework agreements with all L A C  countries other than Haiti, Suriname, and Cuba, either 
individually or by groups. The L A C  counties are playing their part by making drastic changes in 
development policy, in particular opening their markets to imports and seeking to revitalize subregional 
economic arrangements. Without these steps on both sides, the U .S . proposal for Western Hemisphere 
free trade has little hope o f achievement. The proposal was in fact greeted with great initial enthusiasm 
by most L A C  countries.1
The F T A ’s path and accomplishment are uncertain. There are many paths and many potential 
final outcomes. Getting from here to there— and there must be some kind o f “there,” a W H F T A  or 
something short o f that— is the theme o f this paper. It will summarize the Western Hemisphere’s state 
of economic integration to set the stage for discussion o f potential benefits for the various parties. These 
sections serve as background for recent developments in the hemisphere.
This paper is directed at process and institutions and does not undertake an elaborate analysis of 
the benefits and costs o f free trade. The following two sections contain the core o f the discussion. The 
first explores the sequencing o f movement toward free trade, whether by subregions or individual nations, 
with N A F T A  as the core of a W H F T A , and how to overcome problems o f costs to specific nations and 
subregions. The second discusses the institutional framework that is likely to be required as the process 
unfolds. The paper concludes with suggestions about options for sequencing and for institutions.
1. Peter Hakim, "President Bush’s Southern Strategy: The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative," W ashington  
Q uarterly , vol. 15, no. 2 (Spring 1992), notes (p. 93) that Enrique Iglesias, President o f the Inter-American 
Development Bank, referred to the E A I as perhaps the most ambitious proposal in the LA C  region’s relations with 
the United States.
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E c o n o m ic  In te g ra tio n  in  th e  A m e ric a s
Interest in economic integration arises from developments in the region and on other continents. 
Free trade between the United States and L A C  countries is an outgrowth o f a shift in U .S . policy toward 
bilateralism and regionalism. This shift can be explained by the growth of regionalism in Europe (“ If 
regionalism has a beneficial economic outcome there, then why not in the United States’ back yard?” ), 
persistent U .S . trade deficits that reflect the increasingly competitive nature o f the world economy, and 
frustration with the workings o f the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G A T T ).2 The change in 
policy is evident in the two free-trade agreements (FTAs) the United States has struck, with Israel, 
Canada and Mexico. It is now conventional (but not unanimous) wisdom that regionalism and globalism  
in trade can be pursued simultaneously.3 This paper proposes a somewhat different argument, that 
regionalism is here to stay, at least for the indefinite future, and so it is essential to make it compatible 
with globalism if globalism is to succeed.
For more than a century, United States economic regionalism found its main expression in the 
establishment o f a large national market. Regionalism among L A C  countries goes back to Bolivar and 
emerges again in its economic manifestation after World War II as a way to widen the scope for import 
substitution. What is new for the L A C  countries is the acceptance of regional trade and economic 
arrangements with the United States. This is not the first time the United States has made a proposal for 
Western Hemisphere free trade, but it is the first time such an initiative has been taken seriously.4 The 
main reason for the change is the transformation in development policy from looking inward to seeking 
extraregional markets for L A C  exports; and what better market than the United States, by far the region’ s 
largest export destination? Figure 1 illustrates the importance of the United States as a market for the 
major L A C  exporters. The country’s dominance in the exports o f Canada and Mexico helps explain why 
they were the first to seek FTAs with the United States.
2. Sidney Weintraub, "Regionalism and the GATT: The North American Initiative," SAIS R eview , vol. 11, 
no. 1 (Winter-Spring 1991), p. 46.
3. For example, see the explicit statement to this effect in Richard Feinberg, "Economic Themes for the 
1990s," in Henry Hamman, ed., Setting the N orth-South A genda: U nited S ta tes-L atin  A m erican R ela tion s in the  
1990s, proceedings of conference plenary sessions (University o f Miami: North-South Center, 1991, p. 34.
4. U .S . Secretary o f State James G. Blaine proposed the formation of a hemispheric free-trade area at the 
Washington Conference of American States in 1889-90. The suggestion was peremptorily dismissed by the Latin 
American representatives.
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Figure 1
Share o f Exports to the United States 
o f Selected Western Hemisphere Countries, 1988 
(Percent o f total exports)
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2 Data are from 1986.
Source: Erzan and Yeats, p. 7.
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To rest o f Western Hemisphere 
Outside Western Hemisphere
The 1980s were the stimulus for substantial changes in economic policy— from closed to more 
open economies, from state-dominated planning to greater scope for private enterprise, and from what 
one commentator called “ defensive nationalism” (a third approach to economic policy that was neither 
capitalism nor socialism) to greater reliance on markets.5 The primacy o f economics as the centerpiece 
o f international policy in the L A C  countries reflects events in the United States as its competitive position 
weakened.
5. Isaac Cohen, "Economic Questions," in G. Pope Atkins, ed., The United States and Latin Am erica: 
Redefining U.S. Purposes in the Post-C old W ar Era (Austin, Texas: Lyndon B. Johnson School o f Public Affairs, 
1992), p. 28.
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The dramatic shift from extreme protectionism to open markets has not been uniform among all 
L A C  countries, but greater import openness and export promotion are found everywhere. Nine L A C  
countries now have tariffs that average below 20 percent, compared with levels as much as five times 
greater a decade ago. In the case o f Mexico, the trade-weighted average tariff is about 10 percent. These 
tariff levels are still higher than those o f the industrial countries, but they are no longer generally intended 
to exclude imports. Their further reduction over an extended transition period would no longer be 
traumatic. Nontariff barriers such as prior import licensing have also been dramatically reduced.6 It 
was these changes, made unilaterally by L A C  countries, that made possible the free-trade initiative by 
Mexico, the request for free-trade negotiations with the United States by Chile, and the contemplation 
o f hemispheric free trade on the part o f L A C  countries.
This is a key point, one to which the argument o f this paper will refer throughout. Only after 
a country has accomplished internal restructuring to adapt to an open economy can it contemplate free 
trade with any hope o f accomplishing that transition in a reasonable number o f years after conclusion o f 
an agreement.
In addition, the shift in mentality from protectionism— safeguarding generally small markets and 
small production runs— to playing a larger role on the world economic scene has served to reinvigorate 
regional integration among L A C  countries (Table 1). However, the integration agreements in the 
Western Hemisphere are a crazy-quilt o f cross-memberships and nests o f small arrangements within larger 
agreements: membership in the Andean Common Market (A N D E A N ) overlaps that o f  the Latin
American Integration Association (L A IA ). So does the membership o f the Southern Cone Common 
Market (M ERCOSUR) and L A IA . Mexico is a member o f L A IA , has a free-trade agreement with Chile, 
has negotiated to become a member o f N A F T A , and is conducting integration talks with Venezuela and 
Colombia on the one hand and the Central American Economic Community (C A C M ) on the other. 
Venezuela and Colombia have approached the United States about possible free-trade talks even as they 
retain membership in L A IA  and A N D E A N , and they are negotiating separately with Mexico.
This proliferation o f economic integration schemes and multiple memberships will have to be 
sorted out. Each arrangement has its own rules, and the rules are not always consistent. This complex 
structure must give way to something more coherent if  the process o f  hemispheric trade integration is to 
advance further. This theme will reappear in the discussion o f sequencing o f trade and institutional 
arrangements.
Despite the invigoration and proliferation o f economic integration schemes, intraregional trade 
among L A C  countries is not extensive. Figure 1 shows how much more important the U .S . market is 
to L A C  countries than are their markets o f the rest o f the hemisphere. There are some exceptions: 
Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay send a larger share o f their exports to other South American countries 
than to the United States.7 Figure 2 shows the relatively small proportion o f intra-trade o f Western 
Hemisphere groupings.
6. These figures come from David R. Malpass, Deputy Assistant Secretary o f State for Inter-American 
Affairs, testimony on U .S .-Latin American relations before the Joint Economic Committee, U .S . Congress, April 
2, 1992.
7. Refik Erzan and Alexander Yeats, "Free Trade Agreements with the United States: W hat’s In  It  for Latin 
America?” W orld Bank policy research paper WPS 827, January 1992.p. 7.
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Table 1
Integration Movements in the Western Hemisphere
Movement Established Timetable
A L A D I 1980 Ultimate goal is Latin American common market
A N C O M 1969 Common external tariff 5 -2 0 %  in 1992
M ER COSUR 1991 CET by 1995
C A C M 1960 Free trade zone and common trade policy, 1992
CA R IC O M 1973 Tariffs range 5 -4 5 % , CET by 1994
CU SFTA 1989 Transition to free trade by 1992
Chile-Mexico 1991 Remove all tariffs and many NTBs by 1998
N A F T A 1993 10-15 year transition to free trade beginning 1994
Source: Council o f  the Americas, W ash in gton  R e p o r t, winter 1992; and de la Torre and Kelly
Figure 2
Intraregional Exports o f Western Hemisphere Groupings, 1990 
(Percent o f grouping’s total exports)
U.S.-Canada
Andean Pact
Central American Common Market
ALADI
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / ^
40 60 80 100
Intra-regional exports 
Exports outside region
Source: de la Torre and Kelly, pp. 20 and 30.
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The L A C  countries still account for a relatively modest share of U .S . exports. U .S . exports to 
Canada, with a population o f 27 million, are greater in value than exports to the rest o f the Western 
Hemisphere, o f which the population is 450 million. U .S . exports to Mexico (population about 83 
million), while only about 40 percent o f its exports to Canada, are more than to all other L A C  countries 
combined. The question asked by Erzan and Yeats is,' What’ s in free trade with the U .S . for the LAC  
countries?8 There is also the reverse o f the question: What’s in it for the United States other than the 
potential for significant exports to a few countries in the hemisphere? And there is a final question: 
W hat’s in it for Canada?
Table 2









Source: U .S . Department of Commerce, 
U .S. F oreign  T rade  H igh ligh ts, 1991 .
T h e  B e n e fits  o f H e m is p h e ric  F re e  T ra d e
U n ited  S ta tes  In teres t
U .S . merchandise exports are widely dispersed (Figure 3). Western Hemisphere countries in 
1991 received 35 percent o f U .S . merchandise exports, most in North America. Canada and Mexico 
together took 28 percent. Put differently, 80 percent of all U .S . merchandise exports to Western 
Hemisphere countries ($118 billion) went to Canada and Mexico; the rest o f the Western Hemisphere 
accounts for only $30 billion. The static picture, therefore, does not demonstrate that the United States 
should have great interest in expanding N A F T A  to the rest o f the Western Hemisphere. If anything, a 
snapshot o f U .S . exports in 1991 would imply that the U .S . free-trade interest after North America 
should focus on Asia and the Pacific, the destination o f 31 percent o f U .S . exports.9
8. Ibid.
9. This may have been the indirect message of Robert Zoellick, U .S. Under Secretary o f State for Economic
Affairs, in an address on July 24, 1992, during post-ministerial meetings in Manila o f the Association o f Southeast 
Asian Nations. Zoellick said that free trade in North America and in Asia should complement each other and help 
create stronger pan-Pacific ties.
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The dynamic picture is more instructive. U .S . exports worldwide grew (in current dollars) by 
7.1 percent in 1991 over 1990. Exports to developing countries in the Western Hemisphere grew by 
17.7 percent.10 This was greater than U .S . export growth either to Asia and the Pacific or to Western 
Europe, the two other important export destinations shown in Figure 3. This growth o f exports to L A C  
countries continued into 1992. Some o f the growth in U .S . exports may have been due to the unilateral 
liberalization o f import restrictions undertaken in recent years by L A C  countries. A  much more 
significant explanation, however, is the overall economic recovery o f L A C  countries.11
Figure 3
U .S . Exports by Geographic Region, 1991 
(Percent o f total U .S . exports)
Asia and the Pacific, 31%
Source: U .S . Department of Commerce, U .S. F oreign  T rade H igh ligh ts, 1991 .
U .S . merchandise exports to L A C  countries grew fivefold during the 1970s, and the region’s 
GDP grew at an annual rate o f about 4 .5  percent. By contrast, U .S . exports to the region grew by less 
than 50 percent during the 1980s, when GDP growth averaged only about 1.5 percent a year. Exports 
actually declined on a per capita basis. Discounting for inflation, U .S . exports to L A C  countries were 
stagnant during the 1980s and reflected the economic stagnation in the countries themselves. A  large 
portion o f L A C  hard-currency earnings and capital inflows had to be dedicated to debt servicing, and this 
requirement limited resources available for internal economic development and for imports.12 U .S .
10. U .S . Department o f Commerce, U.S. Foreign Trade Highlights 1991 (Washington, D .C .: International
Trade Administration, 1992), p. 11.
11. I  base this statement on econometric analysis.
12. Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe (CEPAL), "Preliminary Overview o f the Latin
American and Caribbean Economy, 1991", information note no. 519/520, December 1991, Santiago, Chile, 
estimates that LAC  debt service as a percentage of exports o f goods and services was 22 percent in 1991 compared
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producers paid a heavy price to sustain the viability o f U .S . financial institutions. The L A C  region’s 
economies are now recovering, and their imports from the United States are recovering as well.
A  greater share of the imports o f L A C  countries and Canada comes from the United States than 
from any other source. The proportion varies by country: 60-70 percent for Canada and M exico, 40-60  
percent for Venezuela and much o f Central America, 30-40 percent for Colombia and Ecuador, 20- 
30 percent for Brazil, Chile, and Peru, and less than 20 percent for Argentina alone among the larger 
economies. For L A C  as a whole, the share of imports coming from the United States, which was 
57 percent in 1989, is at least double the share of either Western Europe or Asia and the Pacific. Thus, 
as L A C  countries have become able to afford more imports, the main exporter to benefit is the United 
States. The same is not true o f other regions with which the United States has substantial trade. U .S . 
imports from Western Hemisphere countries are reflected in large U .S . exports to them in return. U .S . 
imports from Asia and the Pacific (including Japan) have a far lower reflection ratio in exports back to 
the countries in those regions. The United States has a major trade stake in the economic health o f the 
L A C  region. The economic dynamics o f U .S .-L A C  relations provide the main explanation for the U .S . 
interest in a W H F T A .
Moreover, the interest of the United States goes beyond trade. The U .S . is the leading foreign 
investor in the Western Hemisphere. This is particularly true in Canada and Mexico, but prevails as well 
in the rest o f the hemisphere. Trade has followed investment. Earlier, during the import-substitution 
period in hemispheric trade, U .S . investment in manufacturing was designed largely to serve the protected 
domestic market in the host country. This was attractive in the countries with the larger economies such 
as Canada, M exico, and Brazil, but less so in the smaller economies.
Trade barriers are coming down, and U .S . multinational corporations have a substantial interest 
in co-production arrangements in the Western Hemisphere. The very basis for the export processing 
zones that have proliferated in the L A C  countries, especially in Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central 
America, is to exploit factor advantages— primarily low labor costs— available in these countries. Their 
proximity also minimizes transportation costs. The shipment o f intermediate goods across national 
boundaries requires low trade barriers. U .S . law already partially provides this since tariffs are levied 
on such products, imported under subheadings 9802 .00 .60  and 9802 .00 .80  o f the harmonized tariff 
schedule, only on the value added outside the United States. Free trade would lead to the elimination of 
these and other tariffs and also to the easing o f nontariff barriers such as quotas.
The United States thus has both trade and production interests in a W H F T A . This interest cannot 
be based on giving up markets in other regions because, as Figure 3 shows, U .S . merchandise exports 
are, in broad terms, evenly divided among the Western Hemisphere, Asia and the Pacific, and Western 
Europe. This distribution o f U .S . exports provides an incentive to keep import barriers against third 
countries relatively low in any W H F T A .
with proportions in the mid-30 percent range during most o f the 1980s. This same source estimates that there were 
resource inflows into LA C  countries of $6.7 billion in 1991, the first time this figure was positive since 1981. 
L A C ’s debt problem is by no means resolved, but it does not now have the same devastating effect it did during 
the 1980s.
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C an ad ian  In te res t
Canada’s interest in Western Hemisphere free trade is less evident. Only about 5 percent of 
Canada’s trade is with L A C  countries (Figure 1), and one third o f that is with Mexico. The Canadian 
case has been referred to as “ reluctant regionalism.” 13 Canada joined the N A F T A  negotiations to 
protect its interests in the U .S . market, but did so with considerable misgiving.14 Canada is being drawn 
into the broader regional free-trade process for much the same reason, to protect its trade interests in the 
United States and its potential interests in L A C  countries, plus the desire to prevent a hub-and-spoke 
outcome. This issue, the way free-trade should be approached in the hemisphere, will be taken up later. 
It is quite revealing, however, that the phrase “hub-and-spoke” in reference to hemispheric free trade 
originated in Canada and is heard more from Canadian sources than from elsewhere in the hemisphere. 
Indeed, as Table 1 shows, L A C  countries are quite prepared to move ahead on a hub-and-spoke basis 
when they are the hubs— the Mexico-Chile free trade agreement is an example o f this. The Canadian 
position against a hub-and-spoke design for a W H F T A  is correct, but the issue is not pressing if 
hemispheric integration continues to follow the path it now seems to be taking. The United States, the 
country Canada had in mind, has not suggested a series of FT As in the hemisphere with it alone, but has 
left open accession to N A F T A .
However reluctant Canada’s regionalism may be, if the process prospers, it will have 
repercussions on its future trade and investment policy in the hemisphere. Western Europe was not seen 
as a natural trading area before the establishment of the European Community, but the EC is now 
perceived as a “ natural” trading bloc. This natural trading area is growing throughout Europe by grafting 
additional countries onto the EC. The preferential opportunities a W H F T A  can provide should stimulate 
Canadian businesses to invest in L A C  countries and exploit export opportunities. It would be a mistake 
to assume that past Canadian disinterest in the L A C  region would prevail under changed circumstances.
LA C  In te res t
Defining the interest o f L A C  is more complex than for either Canada or the United States because 
o f the differences among L A C  countries. M exico’s natural market in the United States has been nurtured 
over the years by U .S . investment, co-production, and regional marketing alliances. This interest is 
reflected in free trade with the United States— in the creation of N A F T A — but not in a W H F T A , at least 
not yet. The more countries in the hemisphere that have free access to the U .S . market, the more 
Mexican preferences will be diluted. Yet for political and cultural reasons, Mexico has muted any 
expression o f misgivings about other L A C  countries’ joining them in free trade. Indeed, Mexico has 
embraced the idea by its own free-trade negotiations with them.
The first approach to defining L A C ’s interest in a W H F T A  is to examine the current destinations 
o f exports: How much goes to the United States, and how much to other L A C  countries? Figure 1
13. A1 Berry, Leonard Waverman, and Ann Weston, "Canada and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative: 
A  Case of Reluctant Regionalism," B usiness E conom ics, vol. 27, no. 2 (April 1992), pp. 31-38.
14. Bob Rae, the premier o f Ontario, has noted his concern about Canadian vulnerability "on cars, on culture 
and on two or three other issues." See Karsten Prager and George Russell interview with Premier Rae in Tim e, 
November 11, 1991, p. 39.
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shows relative trade flows for L A C ’s largest exporters. The countries that should have the greatest 
interest in hemispheric free trade— that is, free entry into the U .S . market and not just into subregional 
L A C  markets— are Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and (to some extent) Brazil. The Central American 
and Caribbean countries should be added to this list, but the case of Venezuela is tenuous because most 
o f its exports to the United States are petroleum, for which an FTA is not particularly relevant. Less than 
20 percent o f Colombia’s exports to the United States are manufactured goods, and it is for these products 
that free trade is most important.
Yet both Colombia and Venezuela have indicated strong interest in free trade with the United 
States. The portion o f Chile’s exports going to the United States is still relatively small, but Chile was 
the first country after Mexico to propose an FTA with the United States. The response o f L A C  countries 
to free trade with the United States is based on much more than the current destinations of their exports. 
It is also based on how they want their economies to develop.
A  second approach is to examine the tariff and nontariff barriers their exports face in the United 
States. Erzan and Yeats make this examination and conclude that the countries that export a wide range 
o f manufactured goods (such as Mexico and Brazil) should have the greatest interest in removing U .S . 
tariffs, whereas the countries that export raw materials, which face relatively few tariff barriers, are likely 
to have only modest interest in free trade with the United States. They also conclude that the benefits 
of free trade with the United States would be constrained unless hard-core nontariff barriers (such as those 
for textiles, clothing, and sugar) are eased or removed as w ell.15
These approaches— looking at current trade patterns or levels o f U .S . protection against current 
L A C  exports— are valid, but they do not tell the full story. The levels of cross-national protection 
between Canada and the United States were quite low before they entered into free trade. The C U SFTA  
would not have been necessary if the purpose were simply to reduce trade barriers. The composition of 
M exico’s exports changed radically from the early 1980s, when petroleum dominated, to the dominance 
o f manufactures. The change in domestic development policy in Mexico made the past a poor predictor 
o f the future. In both cases, the initiatives for free trade with the United States were taken on much 
broader grounds than the current trade and protective situation: to assure continuity o f U .S . policy, to 
provide a psychological incentive for foreign investment, and to link production and marketing between 
Canada and Mexico (respectively) and the United States, and now among all three in N A F T A .
North American f r e e  tra d e  is a simplification that borders on being misleading; North American 
f r e e  in vestm en t a n d  tra d e  might better describe the intent of N A F T A ; and not just investment from within 
North America itself, but from all sources to combine production and marketing in the large North 
American market. One o f the weaknesses o f many partial and general equilibrium models projecting the 
outcomes o f free trade either in North America or the Western Hemisphere, particularly the static models, 
is that investment is either omitted or is not endogenous.
Answering the question, “What’s in it for the L A C  countries to have free trade with the United 
States (and with their neighbors in their own subregions as well)?” requires approaching the issue from 
the viewpoint o f the L A C  countries’ domestic development strategies. Country after country in the 
hemisphere has concluded that its development requires substantial structural adjustment. This obviously
15. Erzan and Yeats, "Free Trade Agreements with the United States," pp. 18-24.
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involves many aspects o f macro- and microeconomic policies. The details will differ from one country 
to another, but the general objectives are thoroughly discussed in the literature and require no elaboration 
here. One aspect of these new development policies is to induce greater competition through more open 
markets. It is these policies that are driving external trade and investment measures.
Mexico was able to seek free trade with the United States because it first decided to restructure 
its domestic economy and to open its market to imports. Chile has done the same. Both countries have 
made substantial progress in their internal restructuring. Because relative prices in these two countries 
have been and are being altered for internal development reasons, and because markets have been largely 
opened unilaterally in order to stimulate competition, seeking reciprocal opening in the U .S . market is 
almost certain to be a net plus for them.
Both Mexico and Chile first undertook internal restructuring and then sought free trade with the 
United States. Most other L A C  countries are not yet ready to seek free trade with the United States 
because their domestic adjustments, including the reduction o f barriers against imports, are not yet 
complete. They still have a number of years of restructuring to reach the stage o f either Mexico or 
Chile. These further changes must come before they seek free trade with the United States.
The analysis o f “ what’s in it for” the L A C  countries should not be approached the way 
governments traditionally look at trade negotiations, where every reduction o f one’s own import barriers 
is seen as a “ concession” to some foreign interest, but instead on broader development grounds. Is it in 
the national interest of a L A C  country to open its market, to restructure its economy? If so, then free 
trade is a further step that permits obtaining reciprocity.
The Central American and Caribbean countries represent a special case. They enjoy preferential 
treatment for their exports to the United States, their main market, under the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(CBI). Under a N A F T A , these preferences are being shared with Mexico, and under a W H F T A  they 
would have to be shared with other countries in South America. Many of the manufactured products they 
now export come from export-processing zones and pay duty only on the in-country value added when 
imported by the United States. This benefit would be diluted (a) as other countries obtain duty-free entry 
for their products entering the United States, and (b) as the United States gradually eliminates textile and 
clothing quotas for other free-trade partners, as contemplated in N A F T A . The N A F T A  agreement calls 
for a phased easing of the U .S . sugar quota as it applies to M exico, and this could work to the 
disadvantage o f Central American and Caribbean exporters unless and until they obtain comparable 
treatment.
One expert from the English-speaking Caribbean posed a number o f questions pertaining to that 
region. Because of their small size, how many Caribbean countries can meet the criteria (especially 
markets open to free imports from non-CARICOM  countries) that would make them ready to enter free- 
trade negotiations with the United States? Should they try to meet these criteria? And even if they can, 
what will happen during the transition when Mexico enjoys preferential treatment in the U .S . market? 
If they negotiate for free trade with the United States, should they do so individually or as a group? 
Would the necessary investment come to these countries under free trade? What will happen to the trade
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preferences these countries receive from the EC under the Lomé convention if they enter an F TA  with 
the United States? Or must preferences granted to the United States also be granted to EC countries?16
The Central American and Caribbean countries represent a special case because o f their 
dependence on the U .S . market. Yet the resolution of their problem should not be accession to N A F T A  
if they are not ready to undertake its obligations. An alternative solution is to augment the one-way 
preferences they now receive under the CBI to avoid placing them at a disadvantage with respect to 
Mexico.
C o n c lu d in g  C o m m e n t o n  th e  V a ry in g  In te re s ts
What emerges in this cursory discussion o f different national interests in a W H F T A  is the 
difficulty o f making general statements that are valid for all countries. For the United States, if one takes 
a static view, free trade is o f interest only with a few countries. The markets o f many L A C  countries 
and subregions are relatively small, and the pursuit o f free trade with them would require some U .S . 
political interest beyond expanded exports.
Looked at in reverse, some countries in the hemisphere rely primarily on the United States for 
their export earnings, but many do not. Based on static analysis, free trade with the United States does 
not appear to offer much to those countries whose main markets are elsewhere or whose raw-material 
exports do not face significant trade barriers in the United States. Indeed, some countries (such as those 
in Central America and the Caribbean) could be hurt if their present preferences in the U .S . market are 
diluted.
The longer-term view o f current trade patterns as well as desired ones may change this outlook. 
The L A C  market is o f minor current interest to Canada, but Canada may be forced to become regional 
in spite o f itself. Canada and Mexico now dominate U .S . exports to the hemisphere, but the United 
States sees a natural trade advantage for itself if hemispheric incomes and imports grow. Chile, 
Colombia, and Venezuela all contemplate changing the composition o f and augmenting their exports to 
the United States. Chile is ready to move now and Colombia and Venezuela expect to be ready soon. 
The MERCOSLTR countries are not now ready for free trade with the United States, but Brazil and 
Argentina could become major beneficiaries as the process unfolds.
What is now driving the process— what did not exist during the import-substitution period in the 
L A C  region— is the dramatic change in development thinking, from largely closed to open markets, from 
looking within to looking outward. The analysis o f country interests, therefore, must derive from this 
philosophic change. Countries or groups of countries will be ready to consider a W H F T A  for themselves 
only as their internal restructuring progresses far enough to make it possible. This has been accomplished 
only in Mexico and Chile. It will have to take place in other L A C  countries if the process o f hemispheric 
trade is to progress.
16. Richard L. Bernal, "A Caribbean Perspective o f the Enterprise for the Americas In itiative," paper presented 
at a seminar on the Caribbean and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, Kingston, Jamaica, September 26-27, 
1991
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M o v e m e n t T o w a rd  F re e  T ra d e
The C o m p a tib ility  o f  R eg io n a lism  a n d  G loba lism
The growth o f regionalism, in both formal and informal trade and investment arrangements, is 
disquieting to many trade economists because it must diminish the authority o f the more global structure 
represented in the G A T T  or in the proposed W T O .17 Even though regional trade arrangements are 
authorized in Article X X IV , the G A TT  and the economist’s ideal is still the unconditional most-favored- 
nation (M FN ) rule for the conduct o f international trade.
Bhagwati has noted that regional integration, even while it can be consistent with the letter o f the 
G A T T , threatens the basic concept o f the world trading system envisioned in the G A T T .18 The very 
purpose o f bilateralism and regionalism in the sense discussed here— an FT A — is to favor some countries 
over others. Whether the result o f any regional preferential arrangement achieves the test set forth by 
Viner, that trade creation should exceed trade diversion, and despite all our sophisticated modeling, it is 
not always possible to know exactly how much trade is created and how much diverted from third 
countries. It is no accident that the formation o f the European Economic Community spawned the 
creation o f the European Free Trade Association. Preference begets counter-preference. Nor is it an 
accident that the creation o f the EEC led to a clamor for the entry of new countries, or that the C U SFTA  
stimulated Mexico to act, and that the N A F T A  has aroused interest in other L A C  countries for free trade 
with the United States.
Preferential regional arrangements also arouse political hostility. The United States, from the 
time o f its creation as a country until 1923, practiced conditional M F N , that is, it discriminated against 
countries unless they gave trade concessions in return for nondiscriminatory treatment. The main reason 
for the shift was that as the United States became a major trading nation, the discrimination inherent in 
this policy generated substantial political conflict.19 Viner noted that this conditional application o f the 
M F N  clause has probably been the cause in the last century of more diplomatic controversy, more 
variations in construction, more international ill-feeling, more conflict between international obligations 
and municipal law and between judicial interpretation and executive practice, more confusion and 
uncertainty o f operation, than have developed under all the unconditional most-favored-nation pledges 
o f all other countries combined.20
17. What I  have in mind by a more comprehensive organization is the proposal made in the context o f the 
Uruguay Round negotiations to broaden the charter o f the G A TT  to make it reflect what is actually covered in trade 
negotiations, such as trade in services, trade-related investment matters, environmental issues related to trade, 
intellectual property, and many other matters. G A TT  has never been universal, particularly because of the absence 
of most countries with centrally-planned economies, but, as we know, this situation is changing.
18. Jagdish Bhagwati, The W orld  Trading System  (Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 58.
19. This is discussed in Sidney Weintraub, Trade P references f o r  L ess-D eveloped  C ountries: An A n alysis o f  
U nited S ta tes P o licy  (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), pp. 1-22.
20. Jacob Viner, "The Most-Favored-Nation Clause in American Commercial Treaties," Journal o f  P o litica l 
E conom y, vol. xxxii, no. 1 (February 1924), p. 111.
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The United States discriminated in its policy o f conditional M F N  in order to extract the most 
favorable trade openings by other countries. Regionalism is practiced in order to provide concessions 
to some countries but not to all. The contexts are different and the instruments are not the same, but the 
issue o f resentment aroused by discrimination is identical.21
If ever a task could be called Sisyphean, seeking to roll back the regionalism that already exists 
is one. The major regional groups in Western Europe and North America each account for abut 
30 percent o f world GDP, and together they generate some 65 percent of world trade and absorb nearly 
50 percent o f developing-country exports.22 And these are not the only regional arrangements in 
existence. Japan does not have preferential trade arrangements with other countries in Asia, but it is 
dominant in this trade, in large part because of investment and co-production arrangements.
Countries enter preferential regional arrangements precisely because they are preferential. That 
is, countries are willing to open their markets regionally more thoroughly than they are willing to open 
them universally. The conflict within the former EC about completing the common market there and 
expanding to economic and monetary union or widening the community to include other aspirants brings 
out this issue with great clarity. Michel Rocard, the former French prime minister, made this point quite 
explicitly: “ European integration is necessary, but it cannot be achieved in every field with the same 
partner or with the same intensity.”23
I raise this question because the same issue will arise in the Western Hemisphere. N A F T A , if 
it comes into existence, is apt to deepen over time, much more than can a free-trade arrangement between 
the N A F T A  countries and those in Central America, the Caribbean, or most other L A C  countries. This 
theme reappears because it is important for the path o f hemispheric free trade.
Regionalism is certain to be a fact of life for the indefinite future and may well increase in 
importance. It will be a complex regionalism, with subregions within regions, and the issue to be decided 
is the kind o f structure that can be created within this complexity. In addition to this awkwardness within 
regions, conflicts between regionalism and globalism center around the issue o f who gets hurt when the 
sway o f unconditional M F N  is weakened. The world trading order to be worked out will require 
minimizing this conflict since there is little prospect o f eliminating it. If either element o f this dyad is 
under threat today— and if optimum coexistence is not achieved— the more vulnerable structure is the 
global one, the G A T T , not the regional structures.
21. See C. Michael Aho, "A Recipe for RIBS — Resentment, Inefficiency, Bureaucracy, and Stupid Signals," 
in Richard S. Belous and Rebecca S. Hartley, eds., The G row th  o f  R egion al Trading B locs in the G loba l E conom y  
(Washington, D .C .: National Planning Association, 1990), pp. 22-29, for a presentation of this point o f view about 
the current trend toward regionalism.
22. Augusto de la Torre and Margaret R. Kelly, R egional T rade A rrangem ents, occasional paper 93 
(Washington, D .C .: International Monetary Fund, 1992), p. 1
23. Michel Rocard, E urope an d  the U nited S ta tes (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), 
p. 11.
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Bhagwati, despite his misgivings about the growth of regionalism, concedes that its current rise 
will endure.24 His recommendations to avoid undermining the G A T T  are to insist on strict interpretation 
o f Article X X IV , granting permission only for customs unions with a bound common external tariff 
(CET) on the ground that this would probably result in a downward tendency in tariffs, and assuring that 
any arrangement will be open to new members.25 Bhagwati suggests that to ensure that a CET leads 
to lower tariffs, G A T T  Article X X IV  should be changed to require all members o f a customs union to 
adopt the lowest tariff on any item rather than to construct an average o f the member countries’ tariffs, 
as is now the practice. The objective o f these suggestions is straightforward: regional integration 
arrangements should minimize margins of preference in order to impose the fewest possible distortions 
on the system. Few economists would quarrel with the intent o f these suggestions.
However, the double suggestion to tighten the provisions of Article X X IV  and then interpret them 
more strictly has elements of futility. Schott has pointed out that G A T T  examined 69 preferential 
agreements between 1948 and 1988 (this includes the C U SFTA), and only four minor agreements were 
deemed compatible with Article X X IV . No agreement was censured as being incompatible with G A TT  
provisions; the Contracting Parties merely submitted reports with no formal conclusions on the other 
6 5 .26 It is by no means assured that a CET will lower tariffs, as Bhagwati implicitly admits in his 
suggestion to eliminate averaging and to set the CET on particular items at the level of the lowest 
member. The requirement for a CET has served in some cases to keep tariffs high, for example in 
C A R IC O M  today and earlier in the C A C M . The Canadians preferred an FT A  over a customs union 
because o f the belief that the former carried less political baggage. The reality is that if an F TA  functions 
successfully, the pressure will be for tariffs on particular production inputs— that is, raw materials, 
intermediate products, and capital goods— to equalize at the lowest rate o f any of the members. The 
reason for this is that the member with the lowest tariff would otherwise have a cost advantage in 
production. The tendency for tariff rates to converge downward in an F TA  may not be as strong for 
finished consumer goods that are not used as inputs for further production.
One theoretical advantage o f a CET is that it would eliminate the technical basis for rules of 
origin in an integration agreement. There would be no need to define products originating in the member 
countries if the tariff on any given item were the same in all. As we have seen in the N A F T A  
negotiations, the technical basis for a rule o f origin has been transformed into a buy-North-American 
provision for many items, particularly automobiles and textiles and apparel. However, the EC has not 
found it difficult to devise other rationales for limiting foreign competition in these and other sectors.
Dornbusch does not agree that bilateralism is necessarily inferior to multilateralism. He has 
argued that bilateralism got a bad name when it was used to restrict trade, but it can also be used to 
liberalize trade, as N A F T A  and the proposed W H F T A  would probably accomplish.27 The conclusion
24. Bhagwati, The W orld  Trading System , p. 71.
25. Ibid, pp. 76-77.
26. Jeffrey J. Schott, M ore  F ree T rade A reas?  (Washington, D .C .: Institute for International Economics, 1989),
p. 27.
27. Rudiger Dornbusch, "U.S.-Latin American Trade Relations," testimony before the Joint Economic
Committee, U .S. Congress, April 2, 1992.
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coming from this line o f reasoning is that regional integration can serve a trade-creating purpose if it 
lowers barriers more than they would otherwise be reduced. Put differently, this is an argument that a 
low margin o f discrimination in favor o f member countries (inherent in bilateralism and regionalism) may 
be less onerous than high nondiscriminatory barriers.
The logical conclusion is that a theoretical argument about the compatibility o f regionalism and 
bilateralism is futile. The two will coexist, and if they do not, the multilateral structure is the one in 
greater danger o f disintegrating. What remains, therefore, are two requirements: (1) to strengthen the 
multilateral trading system by implementing the Final Act o f  the Uruguay Round; and (2) to minimize 
the effects o f  regionalism on third countries by reducing protection against them. This protection deals 
not just with tariffs, but with a whole range o f preferences relating to differences in nontariff protection, 
trade in services, limits on foreign direct investment, entitlements to bid on government procurement, and 
many other elements o f  modern integration arrangements.
M a n a g in g  th e P ro c e ss  in  th e W estern  H em isph ere
The discussion so far lays out many o f  the considerations that must be taken into account in 
structuring the process toward hemispheric free trade. Constraints on the process include:
■ Determining the desired structure o f free trade, whether hub-and-spoke, a single F T A , or 
a series o f FTAs among the various subregional groups;
■ Setting priorities between subregional integration and hemispheric free trade;
■ Different objective circumstances o f  countries or groups o f countries (but without slowing 
progress toward free trade to the speed o f the countries least able to act);
■ Sorting out the labyrinth o f integration arrangements that now exist in the hemisphere;
■ Minimizing barriers against nonmember countries; and
■ Maintaining the ability for new countries to join (but not thereby thwarting the ability of
particular groups o f countries to deepen their own integration).
These constraints raise related questions. One o f the more complex is whether the requirement 
that any hemispheric agreement be kept open to new members means that nonhemispheric countries 
should also be permitted to join. The proposed N A F T A  agreement contains no geographic limit on 
accession o f new members. The possibility exists that Australia and New Zealand in particular, and 
potentially other countries in Asia and the Pacific, might want to become members. The lower the 
barriers against third countries, the less pressing it is to answer this question, but the issue may arise. 
Nonregional countries should not be excluded in principle, but the decision whether or not to admit them 
can be deferred until the process o f hemispheric integration has progressed much further. Deferral o f  
the decision is possible because the transition to free trade in N A F T A  will require 10-15 years; the 
process o f integration in the Western Hemisphere will take even longer.
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A  second set o f questions relates to the undertakings o f member countries o f L A IA  to each other 
and o f the Caribbean countries that benefit from preferences in the EC under the Lomé convention. In 
the case o f L A IA , the letter o f the agreement requires that any concessions granted to nonmember 
countries be extended to other members o f L A IA . Can a country join N A F T A  and discriminate against 
other L A IA  countries? In theory, no, unless it withdraws from L A IA . In practice, the assumption is that 
some way will be found to accommodate countries that wish to remain in L A IA  and join in a W H F T A . 
In the case o f  Caribbean countries receiving preferences in the E C , the Lomé convention requires them 
to grant M F N  trade treatment to EC countries. Thus, in theory, C A R IC O M  could not join into free trade 
with the United States without giving free entry to EC countries as well. It is not clear what this will 
mean in practice. The EC might insist that beneficiaries o f  Lomé preferences give these up if they 
become part o f a W H F T A .
The most important constraints relate to how countries enter into free trade within their 
subregions and also with the United States. The initial Canadian concern was that the United States 
would sign a series o f F T A s, country by country, first with Canada, then M exico, then a third country, 
and thus only the United States would enjoy generally free trade. This concern over a hub-and-spoke 
outcome was one o f the reasons why Canada joined in the negotiations with Mexico, in order to have a 
single N A F T A  rather than two separate bilaterals. According to Ronald Wonnacott, the main 
disadvantages o f  a hub-and-spoke pattern are that it would add to discrimination against spoke countries 
in each other’s markets as compared with the hub country, which would be the only country to enjoy 
barrier-free entry into all markets; this, in turn, would erode the benefits derived from an F T A  with the 
United States; and, perhaps most crucial, the advantage in attracting investment would be with the hub 
country.28 Technically, devising rules o f origin in an elaborate array o f hub-and-spoke FTAs would be 
horribly complex. The end result o f  a hub-and-spoke pattern compared with a single, large W H F T A , 
Wonnacott argues, would be to lower collective incomes.
The United States is not now a hub country in the sense that Canada originally feared, but Mexico 
is. The trade consequences are not significant because M exico’s trade with Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, 
and several Central American counties is not substantial. N A F T A  as a unit may be a hub, however. The 
starting point o f the United States as a hub, the concern that led to Canadian analysis o f  hub-and-spoke 
arrangements, is not now the major problem. The issue, rather, is how the separate hubs, the subregional 
arrangements that exist plus M exico’ s multiple agreements, are best melded into hemispheric free trade.
The second constraint cited above, that o f  the relative priority o f subregional integration as 
compared with hemispheric integration, is now more relevant than a simple hub-and-spoke scenario. The 
most important o f the subregional agreements is N A F T A . It has the largest combined GDP and conducts 
more trade than all the other trading groups in the hemisphere combined. Most important, if the process 
is intended to lead to a single free-trade area in the hemisphere, N A F T A  is the only feasible nucleus 
around which such a group could come together. Nevertheless, for many L A C  countries the focus o f  
attention is on subregional arrangements. For the first time in their modern history, L A C  countries are 
approaching regional and subregional integration by confronting the constraint o f minimizing barriers 
against nonmember countries. There is an effort to use subregional integration as a device to expand 
trade rather than to augment the scope for import substitution.
28. Ronald J. Wonnacott, The E conom ics o f  O verlapping  F ree Trade A reas an d  th e  M exican C hallenge  
(Toronto: C. D . Howe Institute; Washington, D .C .: National Planning Association, 1991).
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Each subregion must decide its priorities: whether subregional integration should come first, or 
whether accession to N A F T A  is more important. Subregional integration is likely to be more important 
in the long term. If all L A C  countries were to join in a W H F T A , the trade preferences o f  all o f  them 
would be diluted. One big F T A  in the hemisphere could first deal primarily, perhaps exclusively, with 
trade. It will be more like the E F T A , a preferential trading arrangement, and less like N A F T A , which 
involves many other rights and obligations o f its members.
Over the long term, subregional agreements other than N A F T A  can also deepen beyond trade 
matters into other economic areas, transportation, and policy consultation. Effective subregionalism does 
not preclude preferential trade with the countries o f North America. I f anything, subregional integration 
will enhance the bargaining power o f the subregions.
A  good case can be made that N A F T A  should not accept individual country applications for free 
trade.29 The reasoning is that accepting country-by-country applications would only complicate the maze 
o f integration agreements that already exist, and it would thwart promising movement toward subregional 
integration in the hemisphere. Implicitly, this meant that Chile should be forced to join a subregional 
grouping, presumably M ER COSUR before N A F T A  would accept a Chilean petition to open FTA  
negotiations. But Chile is unique in that it is not now a member o f any subregional integration 
arrangement other than L A IA , and moreover it is the only L A C  country other than Mexico that is ready 
to begin negotiations to enter N A F T A .
Some other countries, in addition to Chile, are not now members o f subregional groups. These 
include Panama, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Suriname. If Chile were accepted into N A F T A  on 
an individual basis, then why not the others? On a practical level, the answer is that Chile is ready for 
free trade with N A F T A  because o f its internal restructuring; the others are not. On a more general level, 
N A F T A  loses its ra iso n  d ’ê tre  if every “ orphan” country is admitted regardless o f  its potential economic 
contribution. These countries should first seek subregional partners before seeking entry into N A F T A , 
but they should not be penalized as the process plays itself out. Some enjoy trade preferences in the U .S . 
market under the CBI.
It is clear that the L A C  countries have not yet established priorities between subregional 
integration and accession to N A F T A . Apart from Chile and Mexico, no other L A C  country is ready for 
accession to N A F T A . For countries to open reciprocal negotiations to obtain free access to the United 
States in the context o f an F T A  before they open their own markets will not work. One-way preferences 
into the U .S . market already exist for Andean and CBI countries. Countries should first demonstrate that 
they are able to open markets within their own subregions. This would strengthen subregional economic 
and political solidarity in the hemisphere, an advantage that would be lost if each country acts separately 
to negotiate for accession to N A F T A .
The negotiating group on the North American side presumably would not be the United States 
acting alone, but N A F T A . The individual countries o f N A F T A  would have to agree to such a 
negotiation, just as the individual countries o f other subregional groups would have to consent. This 
assumption raises a number o f issues. It is not difficult to state, in principle, that N A F T A  is open to 
accession by new countries; that is in the agreement. In practice, however, a number o f problems arise.
29. See Sidney Weintraub, "The New U .S . Initiative Toward Latin America."
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Each country o f N A F T A , the accession clause states, must go through its constitutional and legislative 
procedures for accepting a new member, whether a single country or group o f countries. Because the 
new members would be joining N A F T A , the provisions o f that agreement would set the parameters for 
membership.30 The negotiation, in other words, would not be to alter the basic agreement for the 
benefit o f the applicant country, but rather to discuss the transition to membership. Some applicants will 
need a long transition with many exceptions during the phase-in period, others will need less time and 
fewer exceptions.
However, the widening o f N A F T A  will limit its deepening among core countries ready and able 
to augment what now exists in the agreement. This is the last point mentioned under the constraints that 
must be dealt with in the hemispheric integration process. Deepening o f integration in North America 
would not have the same content as it does in the EC. The three countries in North America do not 
aspire to economic and monetary union, let alone political union. However, they may wish to limit the 
volatility in their exchange-rate relationships as trade increases. At some point, they may be prepared 
to consult more frequently on prospective changes in economic policy or in their regulatory framework. 
It is possible that they can make their dispute-settlement arrangements more comprehensive and more 
binding than is now the case. This is possible not just in the pure trade area, but in trade-related 
environmental issues and in complaints about labor standards. This type o f deepening among most L A C  
and North American countries is far more problematic.
Other subregional groupings o f L A C  countries may wish to pursue their own versions of 
deepening. The opportunity to accomplish this deepening would be lost if entry into N A F T A  proceeds 
by country by country. There would be no possibility for subregional deepening unless subregional 
integration were given top priority. Even if the N A F T A  countries showed little interest in widening their 
preferential area— something that is clearly possible with changes in the political situations in all three 
N A F T A  countries— subregional integration would have its own rewards.
There is another option to a single W H F T A  that could lead to hemispheric free trade without 
compromising the potential for deepening the relationships within subregions: a series o f free-trade 
agreements between N A F T A  and other subregional groups, or the concentric-circle approach to 
hemispheric free trade. Under this choice, the N A F T A  itself need not be the basis for the negotiation. 
Instead, two subregional groups with different obligations among their members would seek to reach free 
trade. This would not obligate either group to accept the other’s internal arrangements. It is, in rough 
form, the model that was followed in Europe between the EC and EFT A . The groupings might 
eventually come together if developments lead in that direction, but this would not be necessary.
If the FTAs between the subregional groups were only with N A F T A , this would create another 
form o f hub and spoke, with the three countries o f N A F T A  as the hub. To avoid this, it may be 
necessary for the various subregional groups to reach free-trade agreements among themselves. The 
disadvantage o f this approach is that it would create a new labyrinth o f FTA s, but the structure would 
be much more straightforward than what now exists. After all, the EC and EFT A  have separate 
provisions, but also free trade between them.
30. This was the preferred choice set forth in Peter Hakim and Nora Lustig, "Western Hemisphere Free Trade: 
Issues and Prospects: Notes of a Policy Discussion," issued by the Inter-American Dialogue and the Brookings 
Institution, September 16, 1991.
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These two approaches to hemispheric free trade would be likely to lead to different outcomes. 
The first approach, looking toward a single hemispheric F T A , would subordinate other subregional 
arrangements in the sense that they would have to abide by N A F T A  provisions. Under this scenario, 
they would become redundant and probably wither away. The second approach would allow each 
subregion to develop according to its own idiosyncrasies, but still lead to free trade between it and 
N A F T A , and between it and other subregions. Other subregional groups could seek accession to N A F T A  
as a group if they preferred this path rather than a separate F TA  with N A F T A , but the ultimate decision 
in this case would rest with N A F T A . A  series o f  concentric circles— a series o f  FTAs among regional 
groups— would simplify the labyrinth o f integration arrangements that now exists if  it were made clear 
that individual countries could join only one subregional arrangement. If individual countries continued 
to have multiple subregional memberships, this would complicate the current complexity o f trade 
relationships.
S u m m a ry  o f A p p ro a c h e s  to  H e m is p h e ric  F re e  T ra d e
The danger o f the hub-and-spoke option, with the United States as the hub country, has been 
diminished by the trilateral participation in N A F T A . This concern would be eliminated completely if 
N A F T A  were to negotiate as a group with applicant countries or groups o f countries.
Still, N A F T A  could be the hub, particularly over a transition period as new countries or groups 
of countries join. This is one option for reaching hemispheric free trade: using N A F T A  as the center 
which receives accession applications from other countries or subregional groups. This would cause 
increased discrimination against countries outside N A F T A  until there was one grand W H F T A .
The advantage o f this approach is that it may lead to the creation o f a single W H F T A  in which 
all countries are treated equally. Its main disadvantage (other than the inherent growing discrimination 
over the transition period) is that it would not permit deepening either o f N A F T A  or other subregional 
arrangements.
Another approach is to encourage the strengthening o f subregional groups o f L A C  countries. 
These subregional groups could then seek accession to N A F T A , in which case they would still have to 
use the provisions o f N A F T A  as the basis o f negotiation; or instead they could seek separate FTAs with 
N A F T A  and with each other.
The advantage o f the approach involving a series o f FTAs is that it permits deepening o f  
economic integration among like-minded countries without prejudice to the free-trade objective. Its 
disadvantage is that it maintains (perhaps indefinitely) a large number o f subregional groupings.
In s t itu tio n a l A rra n g e m e n ts
Two rules o f institution building should be kept in mind. First, do not create institutions in the 
simple hope that a new body will lead to creative thinking. Second (a corollary o f the first), do not 
create an institution until it is clear what it will administer. The hemisphere is already replete with 
institutions; adding yet another without a clear objective would most likely intensify turf battles.
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There are other viewpoints. One suggestion is that while existing institutions may be able to 
carry out many research and planning functions for now, consideration should be given to new 
architecture required to guide an economically integrated hemisphere.31 The underlying argument of 
this position is that a new mechanism will be needed to make prenegotiation studies, check new FT As 
for cross-consistency, help to settle disputes, and perhaps help in the negotiations a developing W H F T A  
will require.32
Following the second rule— do not create a new institution until it is clear what is being 
administered— calls for delay o f institutional decisions until the sequencing option toward hemispheric free 
trade is chosen. More precisely, it means using existing hemispheric and subregional institutions for the 
time being. These include the IDB, E C LA C , the Organization o f American States, and the various 
secretariats o f the subregional integration arrangements.
If the architecture chosen for hemispheric free trade is to seek a single W H F T A  by building on 
the core of N A F T A , it will require its own institutional structure. If, instead, the path chosen is that of 
reaching free trade by a series o f FT A s, then quite different institutions are needed. In the first case, the 
organization would have to be similar to those of other large integration arrangements, a secretariat for 
monitoring the daily operations o f the W H F T A  and for carrying out studies and making proposals, a 
policy- and rule-making body, and panels for dispute resolution and preparation o f positions for 
negotiating purposes within the W H F T A  and with other countries and groupings. This is the kind of 
mechanism suggested by Feinberg and Hakim. Implicitly, they assume option one. The arrangement 
would be something between that o f the EC Commission and the EFTA secretariat— its powers would 
be less than those o f the EC Commission because the W H F T A  would have a less ambitious mandate than 
the EC, but greater than those o f the EFTA secretariat because EFTA itself has a less comprehensive 
agenda than a W H F T A  built on the core o f N A F T A  would have.
If the choice is option two— based on FT As among subregional groupings— a large, unified 
secretariat would not be called for. Instead, each subregional group would function with its own 
secretariat but with coordinating functions among the various groups to ensure consistency among the 
FTAs. Existing institutions like the O A S, the IDB, and EC LA C  could provide comprehensive studies 
as required.
If priority is given to building subregional integration arrangements, then the choice o f the 
ultimate institution can clearly be delayed until the overall architecture is determined. Subregional 
integration arrangements can accommodate either option, even though each has different institutional 
requirements.
One other institutional feature should be mentioned. N A F T A , unlike the EC, does not call for 
financial transfers from the two wealthy countries to Mexico. The financial transfers that do take place 
come from outside the N A F T A  structure, such as from the IDB. A  North American regional
31. Richard E. Feinberg and Peter Hakim, "The Americas Commission: A  Proposal," in Feinberg and Hakim, 
N ew  D irec tio n s in U .S .-L a tin  A m erican R ela tions  (Washington, D .C .: Overseas Development Council and Inter- 
American Dialogue, 1991), pp. 23-28.
32. The series o f studies of which this paper is a part being carried out cooperatively by the ID B  and ECLAC  
is presumably an example o f what this suggestion has in mind.
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development bank was established to help N A F T A  members solve infrastructure and adjustment problems 
in the transition to free trade. Similar suggestions have been made about the need to help the least- 
developed countries o f the hemisphere prepare for free trade.33 Should there be a special bank for 
hemispheric economic integration, similar to that in the EC and in some subregions in L A C ? Or, can 
this function be assumed by the IDB augmented by,the subregional development banks already in 
existence? Since the resources o f the IDB have been augmented in recent years. It is most unlikely, 
therefore, that the United States would consent to still another development bank for the hemisphere. 
The strength o f the free-trade proposal is that it provides permanent opportunities, not foreign assistance 
dependent on the whim o f the United States president and Congress.
C o n c lu d in g  C o m m e n ts
The main purpose o f this paper has been to examine paths to hemispheric free trade and explore 
the institutional implications o f the paths. To do this requires analysis o f the objective situation in the 
hemisphere: W hy is hemispheric free trade now an option when just a few years ago the idea would have 
been dismissed out o f hand? The answer is in the nature o f the development philosophy that has emerged 
in the L A C  region. Countries are opening their markets and seeking to promote exports, with or without 
free trade. The process of getting to free trade also requires that the countries of the hemisphere decide 
what they want in the final arrangements. This writer’s judgments on these matters were cited as the 
constraints that must shape the process o f movement toward free trade. What follows are considered 
opinions about the institutional choices to be made and their sequencing.
1. The strengthening of subregional arrangements should receive priority.
These groupings can and should be the building blocks o f hemispheric free 
trade. This priority does not require that every L A C  country be part o f a 
subregional grouping, since several countries are now outside the main 
subregional economic integration arrangements and should not be forced 
against their perceived interests to enter one o f them. The main thrust 
should be toward inclusion, and with the likely exception o f Chile, countries 
that choose to remain outside o f groupings in their own subregions should 
not have the option o f joining N A F T A  individually. Because most L A C  
countries, to one degree or another, are now opening their markets, the 
prospects for trade-expanding subregional integration are more promising 
than at any time since World War II.
2. O f the two major paths to free trade— building on N A F T A  and enlarging it 
as other subregional groups (or in the case o f Chile, that country alone) are 
ready to seek accession, or concluding a series o f FTAs among subregional 
groupings, including N A F T A — the latter is to be preferred because it will 
not preclude the deepening o f each subregional group, whereas building on 
N A F T A  alone would slow the progress o f all groups to the ability o f the 
countries least able to take on greater obligations. Hybrids o f these two 
options are sure to emerge, such as a mixture of some subregional groups
33. See Bemal, "A  Caribbean Perspective...."
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seeking entry into N A F T A  and others more content to maintain their own 
structures but still wanting free trade with the N A F T A  countries.
3. Decisions on the structure are best delayed until the path to free trade is 
more clearly defined. The two sequencing options have quite different 
institutional implications.
It is unclear where the free trade proposal will take the countries of the hemisphere. Many 
intervening circumstances will influence the thinking of countries. Yet a process has started, and 
negotiations for reducing subregional trade and related barriers are taking place throughout the 
hemisphere. Unlike the past, these are intended to be trade-expanding. The very idea o f hemispheric 
free trade, unthinkable as recently as a decade ago, is being given serious attention. The process in place 
is one o f opening markets, not closing them. This is new and should be encouraged.
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E V A L U A T IO N  O F  A  C fflL E -U .S . F R E E  T R A D E  A G R E E M E N T
Andrea Butelmann 
Patricio Meller
In tro d u c tio n  a n d  O v e rv ie w
The degree o f change in the international arena in recent years would have been impossible to 
predict only a decade ago. W hile some o f these changes have been purely economic and others the result 
o f changes in political systems, all have helped create a new international economic scene. Chile, 
exposed to the ebb and flow o f the global economy, should use these changes to identify and evaluate new 
economic opportunities and make political decisions in order to reap potential benefits.
Conditions in the 1990s are substantially different from those that existed 15 years ago when 
Chile’ s unilateral trade liberalization began. Since then, most Latin American nations have adopted less 
protectionist measures and generated discussion about the best method o f opening to international markets. 
Among the various liberalization strategies that have been examined are unilateral liberalization, 
liberalization within a tariff union in which trade policies toward the rest o f the world are developed with 
member nations, and free trade agreements (FTAs), which allow each member to determine its own trade 
policy. In most cases, the reduction o f protectionist measures in Latin American nations has been done 
unilaterally, with a bilateral strategy to complement trade liberalization.
This new Latin American attitude toward trade policy emerged when Chile embarked on a 
political transition to democracy. This political change has made it possible for Chile to become part o f  
new integration strategies and attempt to become more closely tied to nearby markets. During the 1980s, 
the importance o f Latin American nations in Chile’ s trade had decreased as a result o f recessions, 
adjustment, and the debt crisis.
A t the same time that Latin American nations began adopting liberalization policies that 
industrialized nations had been promoting for years, the continued vitality o f the world trade system was 
called into question. The United States, which had previously championed trade liberalization by 
sponsoring multilateral negotiations, began to feel threatened by international competition. Concurrently, 
however, bilateral and interregional negotiations emerged as a more efficient alternative for solving trade 
disagreements by reducing the number o f sources o f disagreement. This development appears to be 
leading to the creation o f regional economic blocs. It is frequently suggested that the world is already 
divided into three economic blocs: the European Economic Community (EEC, now the E U ), the North 
American Free Trade Area (N A F T A ), and Japan and Southeast Asia.
The most obvious o f these three blocs is Europe. The E U , already a customs union, created an 
economic entity with unified, coordinated policies. The EU will function much like a single federal state. 
Several European countries that have already signed a free trade agreement with the 12 nations o f  the EU  
and those that form part o f the European Free Trade Area will join the customs union. Eastern European 
nations may also join this association.
The integration o f the Eastern European countries into the flow o f international trade opens new 
opportunities, but at the same time it closes others. This is especially true o f Chile, whose natural
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resource base is similar to that o f some o f the Eastern European nations that have the advantage o f being 
close to developed markets.
The context o f intense change gives rise to another variable relevant to the development o f Chile’s 
trade policies in the 1990s. With the hope o f strengthening the favorable attitude toward liberalization 
now prevalent in Latin America, the United States is proposing the possibility o f creating a free trade 
zone throughout the hemisphere. As time passes, it becomes clearer that this is a long-term goal whose 
success depends on political events in the U .S . as well as the progress of Latin American nations in 
political reform. Nevertheless, the possibility that Chile will sign a free trade agreement with the U .S . 
has become less remote. Former U .S .  President Bush was committed to making Chile the first country 
to sign an F TA  once the agreement with Mexico was approved.
As a result o f these changes in the international panorama, two options have emerged, and Chile 
should evaluate them with great care because o f their potential benefits. The first is the possibility of 
signing a free trade agreement with the United States, historically Chile’s main trading partner. The 
second is the possibility o f further integration with M ERCOSUR. Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and 
Paraguay have already reduced tariffs among members, but the structure o f common external tariffs with 
nonmember nations is not yet certain.
The possibility of signing an FTA with the United States is clearly perceived as a positive move 
for the Chilean economy. However, such an agreement will not improve access for Chile’s exports to 
the U .S . market since barriers are already quite low. In fact, the average weighted tariff applied to 
Chilean exports to the U .S . was only 1.8 percent in 1991. Exports were hardly affected by quantitative 
barriers, and the most serious problems in terms of access were a result o f technical barriers. It is worth 
noting that some o f these technical barriers were solved by the bilateral commission that was formed upon 
the signing o f this agreement. It is unlikely that other barriers such as marketing orders for fruit exports 
will be eliminated in the process o f negotiating an FTA.
It is, therefore, necessary to elaborate on the enthusiasm that an F TA  with the United States has 
caused in Chile. There are numerous reasons for this, some of which relate directly to trade and others 
that are less tangible but whose benefits could be greater than traditional results.
The average tariff imposed on Chilean exports is minimal and reflects o f the fact that Chile is an 
exporter o f natural resources that undergo very little processing. These goods are poorly protected by 
the American tariff. In certain sectors there is a strong tariff schedule designed to protect domestic 
industry in the United States, and Chilean products face tariffs o f 35 percent or higher (Butelmann and 
Campero 1992).
As long as Chile continues on the path of export diversification (which has been extremely 
successful in recent years [Campero and Escobar 1992]), tariff scheduling will remain a significant 
obstacle. Thus it is important to negotiate the reduction and eventual elimination o f the highest tariffs, 
not only to achieve greater access to that market, but also as a fundamentally defensive measure. In 
many products Mexico and Canada are Chile’s most important competitors in the U .S . market: it is 
preferable to compete under the same conditions. Since Mexico and Canada will both be able to export 
their products to that market without tariffs, Chile should seek to achieve the same status.
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To analyze the benefits of an FT A  with the United States or with N A F T A , it is not sufficient to 
consider only those obstacles facing Chile in the present. It is also important to consider the issue of 
stability with respect to rules of access. Once imports reach a high rate o f growth, pressures emerge in 
the importing country to increase access barriers. Recent U .S . trade deficits have increased the 
propensity o f U .S . authorities to accede to such pressures, and the perception of a loss o f hegemony in 
world economic leadership has also played an important role. There has been an increase in tariffs to 
compensate for subsidies and disloyal pricing policies on the part o f exporters, and other less transparent 
measures in the guise o f imposing “voluntary export restrictions” on countries that have followed a 
successful path in the promotion o f exports.
The apparent movement toward the creation of a series of economic blocs and the possibility that 
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (G ATT) will be weakened if the Uruguay Round does not 
fulfill initial expectations make it important to ensure that the rules o f the game are not changed for Chile, 
at least in the United States, which is one o f Chile’s main trading partners and the only developed nation 
that is offering us the possibility o f an FTA.
Beyond its direct or potential benefits in the flow in trade, an F TA  is important in and o f itself. 
Despite the fact that Chile has already negotiated and signed an F TA  with Mexico, an agreement with 
the United States brings something that no agreement with Latin American nations can: an F TA  with 
the U .S . will include a much wider range o f areas than would otherwise be included in a similar 
agreement with some other country, and the requirements for transparency and predictability with respect 
to the rules o f the game will be much more demanding. In fact, the terms required by the U .S . even to 
begin negotiations are a  p r io r i  stricter than those o f less-developed countries. All o f these 
demands— which in some cases will be costly to comply with, such as environmental measures— will 
provide Chile with a seal of approval that will enhance chances for capturing foreign investment. That 
is quite important at a time when there is tremendous competition between Latin American nations (and 
developing nations in general) for foreign investment.
The United States has emphasized the fact that Chile would be the only Latin American nation 
able to negotiate an FTA . This contributes positively to Chile’s image, but at the same time may mean 
a postponement of the most important global benefits of a W H F T A . This potential market would assure 
Chile free entry into the markets o f neighboring nations. There is tremendous potential for growth and 
a better opportunity for exporting industrial goods as well as further diversification o f export products 
(Saez 1992).
If a W H F T A  seems too remote a possibility, then Chile should examine alternative methods for 
expanding exports into those markets. One realistic possibility would be Chile’s incorporation into 
M ER COSUR . However, Chilean authorities have been hesitant about such a move for a variety of 
reasons, the most important o f which is the macroeconomic instability of the M ER COSUR nations. The 
current Chilean tariff of 11 percent, and the barriers to Argentine and Brazilian trade are not sufficient 
to protect Chile from the instability with regard to real change possible within these nations. Greater 
integration o f trade would increase M ER CO SU R ’S importance in the volume of Chile’ s trade and make 
Chile more vulnerable to instability. The macroeconomic instability o f Argentina and Brazil causes major 
fluctuations in the type of real exchange between Chile and those nations, alters the balance of trade, and 
diminishes the incentives of domestic producers.
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The issue o f macroeconomic instability is a negative element o f integration; however, it can also 
be a positive factor. If macroeconomic instability may eventually reverse the liberalization o f these 
nations, it is better to assure entry into those markets through some trade agreement.
Another factor that contributes to a rejection of the idea of becoming a part o f this future common 
market has to do with the determination o f the common external tariff. The countries o f M ER COSUR  
have not been able to agree on the structure of this tariff, but today it seems quite clear that it will be 
staggering and that the highest percentage will be more than the 11 percent maintained by Chile. In the 
1970s, Chile suffered the effects of a profound structural change when it opened itself up to international 
markets. Beyond the efficiency of a single tariff rate, there would exist no desire to face another radical 
change in relative prices and long-term incentives.
Despite the disadvantages o f membership in M ERCOSUR, the enormous potential o f these 
markets should not be underestimated. These countries represent the principal destinations o f Chilean 
exports to Latin America, and despite recent liberalization they still provide greater levels o f  protection 
than the United States. Gains made in access would be stronger, and possibilities for future recuperation 
are many.
Beyond gains in trade, the M ERCOSUR alternative could accelerate the flow o f foreign 
investment. It is not enough for Chile to be economically efficient with an infrastructure superior to that 
o f her neighbors. The existence o f a market for the products o f companies that establish themselves 
within Chile is absolutely essential. It is clear that, if in addition to being able to meet the needs o f a 
small internal market, Chile is also able to assure companies access to a market as important as 
Argentina’ s or Brazil’s, then interest in Chile will be even greater. The goal o f attracting foreign 
investment with the incentive o f covering larger markets is more difficult to achieve with an F T A  with 
the United States because investments will go to Mexico, which has geographic advantages, in addition 
to being the first Latin American country to be a member o f N A F T A .
Finally, given the close proximity to those markets, especially Argentina, integration would allow 
for a greater possibility to increase productivity and competition in foreign markets and an increase in 
intraindustry trade. Intraindustry trade makes structural adjustments caused by an F TA  less traumatic 
compared with cases in which the increase in intraindustry trade provokes the disappearance o f certain 
subsectors o f the economy, where capital and capabilities specific to it are lost.
It is important to design frameworks that allow Chile to take advantage o f the benefits o f the 
Argentine and Brazilian markets, but at the same time minimize the costs mentioned above. The central 
issue is obtaining preferential access to this market without having to adopt the common tariff agreed to 
by member nations. This is not a new problem. In other cases, it has been resolved through the signing 
o f an F T A  with the tariff union or common market. This occurs among nations that belong to the 
European Free Trade Area and the EU , and it is what will happen if M ER COSUR signs an F TA  with 
the United States. It is, however, uncertain if the countries o f M ER COSUR would be interested in this 
option. Argentina’ s interest in having Chile become a member o f MERCOSLTR is due in part to its 
interest in having more leverage in negotiating the external common tariff, given their differences with 
Brazil, which is pushing for a higher tariff. On the other hand, if M ER COSUR decided to set a uniform 
common tariff close to 11 percent, should Chile become an active member o f MERCOSLTR? This 
question merits careful examination.
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This study analyzes some o f those issues in the debate over the advantages and disadvantages of 
an F T A  with the United States, as well as alternative trade strategies available to Chile. The first section 
lists the direct and indirect costs and benefits o f an FTA with the U .S ., and how these are perceived from 
a Chilean perspective. The second section presents a detailed analysis o f the evolution of the various 
categories o f Chilean exports (natural resources, processed natural resources, and other industrial 
products) into different types of markets. The paper then identifies those industries that could benefit 
from an F T A  with the U .S . The third section analyzes the tariff scheduling which affects Chilean exports 
o f processed natural resources and identifies the areas in which the elimination o f tariff scheduling would 
create incentives to increase exports. The fourth section presents a quantitative analysis o f the direct 
effects o f an F TA  with the U .S . The environment and the various arguments that link it to international 
trade are the subject o f the fifth section. Finally, the sixth section analyzes Chile’s position vis-à-vis 
M ER COSUR .
T h e  In it ia t iv e  F ro m  a  C h ile a n  P e rsp e c tive
The least important benefit o f an F TA  with the United States would be increased access for 
Chilean exports to the U .S . In 1991, tariff barriers reached an average of 1.8 percent, and while a clear 
tariff scheduling exists, a large part o f this was eliminated by Chile’s reintegration into the Generalized 
System o f Preferences (GSP) (see the section on Chile’s export structure).
The great enthusiasm that the possibility o f an FTA with the U .S . has generated among Chilean 
authorities is not based on tangible benefits, even though these are thought to be more significant than 
mere reduction o f tariffs for current exports. It is important to remember that the Chilean export basket 
diversifies rapidly, and barriers that are not o f concern today could limit export growth in the near future 
(see the section on Chile’s export structure).
Stability in the rules of access is critical in the process o f export diversification because 
diversification requires high levels o f investment. Chilean producers must have safeguards against export 
barriers, and they need direct channels for resolving conflicts. This is important, given the fact that when 
an exporter achieves success in that market, protectionist pressures emerge as a result.
One way Chile can defend itself from the privileged access o f its main competitors is another 
benefit that will emerge as Chile begins to export goods that have higher levels o f protection. Chile’s 
most important competitors for the U .S . market for a large percentage o f such exports are Canada and 
Mexico. Given their unrestricted access to this vast market because o f geographic proximity, it is 
important for Chile to obtain similar conditions with respect to protectionist barriers.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the signing o f an agreement o f this nature would help 
Chile’ s image as an attractive country for investment. At a time when many countries in the region are 
implementing economic reforms, it is important for Chile to distinguish itself as a stable, modern nation 
where foreign investors will find guarantees for their investments.
Still, a price must also be paid for such benefits. One result is trade diversion, the traditional 
cost o f an F T A . U .S . participation in Chile’s foreign trade has been decreasing and was less than 
18 percent in 1991. Therefore the possibility of diversion is significant even if the level o f protection 
in Chile is low. Chile’s 11 percent tariff is uniform. However, the reductions in duty foreseen in an
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FT A  is gradual, and it is probable that Chile will continue to reduce its tariff to the rest o f the world in 
the future. As the preferential tariff for the United States— as well as the general one— is reduced, the 
costs o f trade diversion are also reduced. The cost would be further reduced once other countries in the 
region become part o f a regional FTA.
Chile has already implemented a series o f economic reforms that have liberalized internal markets 
and foreign trade. Significant progress has also been made with respect to international commitments. 
As a result of these reforms, there exists— in both Chile and the United States— the perception that the 
negotiation o f an F TA  would be relatively quick. There are issues that will not be that easy to negotiate, 
and changes must take place in Chile in the areas of foreign trade as well as with respect to domestic laws 
and institutions. The possible sources of conflict that as a minimum require changes in the way they 
currently operate are tarriffs, subsidies, government purchases, safeguards, compensatory tarriffs and 
antidumping, investment, intellectual property rights, and the environment.
Tariffs
Certain agricultural products enjoy levels of protection greater than 11 percent, as well as other 
variables in existence for agricultural products. Prices of wheat, oleaginous products, oil, and sugar are 
protected from the fluctuations of international prices. Other agricultural products, such as rice and flour, 
are protected by temporary surtaxes. It is obvious that upon negotiating an F T A , the United States will 
push for the elimination of these barriers. Plans are in place for agricultural reconversion to assist in the 
substitution o f more profitable crops, and it is possible that a gradual duty reduction will provide adequate 
time to soften the impact. There is tremendous opposition on the part o f powerful interests to the plans 
to reduce protection o f the agricultural sector. These interests will put forth strong opposition to any 
trade agreements with nations that export these same crops.
D u ty  D ra w b a c k s
Another controversial subject in the area of altering relative prices is that o f drawbacks. Chile 
has two drawback systems. The first, known as s im p lif ie d  d ra w b a c k , applied to low-cost, nontraditional 
exports is canceled out as a percentage of the export value, and not in relation to utilized import 
consumption. In several cases, this translates into a subsidy for exports and, as a result, is a potentially 
controversial topic in trade negotiations.
G o vern m en t P u rch a ses
Chile would not have to make great changes in this area because in practice its public acquisitions 
are guided by the principle of minimization o f costs rather than protecting domestic industry. 
Nevertheless, this principle should be explicitly incorporated into legislation, and precedent should be set 
for arguing discrimination cases in the adjudication of public contracts. The signing and implementation 
of G A T T ’ s Governmental Purchase Code would constitute an important step toward stability and 
transparency in the adjudication of this sector.
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S a fe g u a rd  M e c h a n ism s
If an F TA  between Chile and the United States is signed, it is more likely that Chile would use 
emergency protection measures in the case o f  abrupt increases in the imports o f  a product that could 
damage domestic industry. In order to do that, Chile would have to pass a safeguarding law. Currently, 
changes in tariff rates must be approved by Congress except those required to protect from distortions 
in international prices that harm national products.
C o m p e n sa to ry  T a riffs  a n d  A n tid u m p in g
One o f the main arguments in favor o f  negotiating an F T A  with the United States is to protect 
Chile from frequent compensatory and antidumping measures which the U .S . often applies. However, 
to date no country has gotten the U .S . to modify such legislation. The most important progress that has 
been made is that these decisions can now be appealed before a bilateral panel. In this way, the appeal 
process is impartially expedited.
Legislation in Chile does not differentiate between dumping and subsidies, and the processes for 
determining the imposition o f a tariff to protect disloyal competition are not transparent enough. Thus, 
if it is hoped that a binational panel will be established to ensure that compensatory measures adjust to 
the laws o f the nation imposing them, it will be necessary to make some changes in Chilean laws.
In v e s tm e n t
The system that regulates foreign investment in Chile is among the most liberal and least 
discriminatory. Nevertheless, terms that have to do with the procedural transparency o f investment 
approvals and time frames for the repatriation o f invested capital need modification. Currently the 
Committee on Foreign Investments has the power to reject foreign investment programs. This power has 
not yet been used, but it will still be necessary to regulate its use as well as the time limit within which 
it can be used. On the other hand, at the time o f writing, laws do not allow for the repatriation o f capital 
until three years following the actual investment. Both o f these issues are currently being modified in 
favor o f foreign investment.
In te lle c tu a l P ro p e r ty  R ig h ts
During an F T A  negotiation, Chile will clearly be pressured to modify its law regarding 
intellectual property rights, especially in relation to pharmaceutical patents. Chile recently adopted a new 
law on intellectual property rights, but this law was not satisfactory to the U .S . because it contains no 
pipeline mechanism and a shorter period o f protection for patents than the U .S . originally wanted.
E n v iro n m e n t
Chile will have to make changes in its environmental laws. Although there will be long-term 
benefits, initially such changes will require large public and private expenditures.
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The direct benefits o f an FTA will not be terribly important in the short term, but its adoption 
will protect Chile for the future and consolidate its image. The F T A  would require Chile to adopt costly 
reforms, but these reforms would have to be implemented sooner or later in order to maintain Chile’s 
presence on the international scene. Hence, these costs are not seen as directly attributable to the FTA  
with the United States.
Structure o f Chile’ s Exports
Export structure reveals the nature of a nation’s comparative advantages. In order to examine 
Chile’ s export structure, two different aspects will be considered: (1) Export classification into three 
categories, natural resources (NR), industrial goods derived from processed natural resources (PNR), 
and other industrial products (OIP); and (2) four destination markets— the U .S ., the EU (European Union, 
formerly the EEC), Japan, and L A  (Latin America).
Most o f Chile’s exports to developed nations are NR; in 1991, it is estimated that N R  represent 
over 61 percent o f total exports to the U .S . and Japan, and almost 70 percent o f those to the then EEC  
(see Table 1). PNR make up the second most important category in Chilean exports to developed 
countries, roughly 30 percent o f total exports to each market. Finally, OIP comprise slightly more than 
10 percent o f exports to the United States, less than 5 percent to the EU and less than 1 percent to Japan. 
On the other hand, in 1991, Chilean exports were equally divided among the three categories o f goods 
in the Latin American market: NR, 35 percent; NPR, 38 percent; and OIP, 27 percent (Table 2).
Table 1
Composition o f Chilean Exports by 
Market Destination, 1991 
(percent o f total)
Sector U .S. EEC Japan A L A D I
Natural resources (NR) 61.2 69.1 62.3 34 .7
Processed natural resources (PNR)a 28.7 26.3 36 .4 38 .0
Other industrial products (OIP) 10.1 4 .6 1.3 27 .3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Value of exports ($ million) 1,596 2,881 1,644 1,239
a. There is a correlation between categories NR and PNR, i.e ., industrial 
goods included in PNR require a higher degree of processing than goods 
in the NR category.
Source: Camperò and Escobar (1992)
368
Evaluation of a Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
Given the different volumes of exports to these four regions, it is useful to examine the relative 
significance of each region in the two categories of Chilean industrial exports in 1991 (Table 2). The 
EU and Japan received 26 .6  percent and 21 percent, respectively, o f total exports in the category
Table 2
Sectoral Distribution of Chilean Exports 
According to Market o f Destination, 1991 
(percent)
Sector U.S. EEC Japan ALADI Remainder Total Total 
($ mill)
Natural resources 
Mining3 9 .7 38.5 24 .5 8.5 18.8 100.0 4 ,037
Fruits &  veg. 48 .2 35.7 0 .7 7 .2 8.3 100.0 1,081
Game 8.5 49 .9 1.1 30 .0 10.5 100.0 22
Fishing 57.3 31.8 8.4 0 .8 1.7 100.0 111
Forestry 0 .7 6.3 30.1 1.3 61 .6 100.0 67




39.9 31.4 6 .2 13.2 10.0 100.0 451
Horticultural 25 .6 16.9 9.3 33.3 15.0 100.0 505
Game 0.1 17.1 19.7 51.8 11.3 100.0 43
Fishing 8.5 34.7 25 .4 2 .4 29 .0 100.0 977
Forestry 8.0 21 .0 30.5 22 .5 18.0 100.0 872
Subtotal 16.1 26 .6 21 .0 16.5 19.9 100.0 2 ,849
Other Industrial Products 
Chemical 
products 15.5 18.0 4 .2 29 .0 33 .2 100.0 507
Textiles 35.5 14.4 0.1 4 0 .9 9 .0 100.0 148
Metal-
mechanics 11.3 10.3 0.1 68 .7 9 .6 100.0 181
Others 20.2 5.3 0.1 12.5 61 .9 100.0 45
Subtotal 18.2 15.2 2 .5 38.3 25 .8 100.0 881
Totals 18.2 31.8 18.2 13.7 18.7 100.0 9 ,049
a. Includes refined copper.
Source: Campero and Escobar (1992).
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o f PNR; the United States and Latin America receive approximately 16 percent each. In the case o f OIP 
exports, Latin America stands out, receiving 38.3 percent of total exports; the EU and the U .S . received 
18.2 percent and 15.2 percent, respectively, o f OIP exports, and Japan received only 2 .5  percent.
There is a certain global similarity in the structure o f Chilean exports to developed nations: NR  
and PNR make up over 90 percent o f exports to those markets. But there are differences in the types 
of N R  and PNR exported to each of these markets (Table 2). With regard to mining NR, the EU and 
Japan are the largest markets, while the U .S . and the EU are the main destination markets for mining 
PNR. With regard to fish, fruits, and vegetables (NR), the U .S . and the EU are the main markets. 
Japan and the EU are the principal markets for forestry and fish PNR.
W hen comparing the evolution of Chilean exports to developed countries during the period 1986- 
91, Campero and Escobar (1992) observe a negative correlation between sectoral N R  exports and the 
equivalent industrial PNR goods according to specific destination markets. For example, in the case of 
the United States between 1986 and 1991, Chile’s forestry exports fell while there was a significant 
simultaneous increase in PNR forestry exports. A  similar pattern occurred in the areas o f fish and fishing 
NR. This suggests that there is substitution o f NR exports with the corresponding PNR in the same 
destination market. W e could be seeing the spontaneous induction of the process o f increasing the value 
added to exported NR.
Chilean OIP export statistics for 1991 show that Latin America is the most important market for 
metal-mechanic products and textiles. The United States has also acquired an increased importance in 
the area o f textile imports (Table 2 .2 ).
W e  can draw these conclusions from this analysis o f Chile’ s export structure: Chile’s
comparative advantages with respect to developed nations are in the category o f NR. The increase in 
industrial goods exports to these markets appears to be oriented toward the expansion of the respective 
PNRs that correspond to the NR currently exported to each market. In the Latin American market, Chile 
has comparative advantages (in addition to traditional NR) in PNR and certain OIP (metal-mechanics, 
textiles, chemicals). The case of textile exports illustrates the possibility o f Chilean exports to the U .S . 
(and Latin America) that are not based on the highest existing level o f processing o f NR in the country.
The C h ile -U .S . F T  A  a n d  P o te n tia l E xports  to  th e  U .S .
The following procedure has been used1 to evaluate the effect that an F TA  between Chile and the 
United States would have on potential Chilean exports to that market. At the product level, we have 
examined Chilean industrial exports whose market destinations are developed nations. Then we selected 
those goods in which the U .S . is overrepresented in or absent from Chile’ s exports in relation to the EU  
and Japan.2 For this category o f goods, we have analyzed whether a demand for imports exists in the 
U .S ., and the principal supplier countries where it does exist was identified. An implicit assumption is 
that Chilean industrial goods currently exported to other developed nations, the E U , and Japan will
1. This section is based on Campero and Escobar (1992).
2. Only goods in which Chilean exports to the EEC and Japan together surpassed $2 million in 1991 are included. 
This category o f goods surpassed 90% of the total in these markets.
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comply with quality standards required in the U .S ., but this might not be the case for industrial goods 
exported to Latin America. Another implicit assumption is that Chile has the productive capacity to 
supply a greater external demand.
According to this procedure, there are 23 Chilean export products with a potential for expansion 
in the event o f an FT A  with the United States. (Table 3). O f these 23 exports, 15 are in the category 
of PNR, six are NR, and two are OIP. Among the PNR, six are fishing products (fish flour, fish, and 
canned seafood), five are forestry products (wood, wood pulp, and paper), and three are fruit and 
vegetable products. In the NR category, we find manufactured copper products, iron pellets, apples, and 
kiwi fruit. The OIP category includes metal-mechanical products.
It is interesting to observe that Canada is one of the main suppliers to the U .S . market o f 15 of 
the 23 products mentioned, especially forestry and fishing PNR (Table 3). Among Latin American 
nations, Mexico and Peru stand out as the principal providers o f those Chilean products with growth 
potential in the U .S . market. Even if Chile eventually becomes a member of N A F T A , a significant 
portion o f Chilean exports with the greatest growth potential in the U .S . market will face difficult 
competition from Canadian and Mexican suppliers already well established in that market.
T a r if f  S c h e d u lin g  fo r  C h ile a n  E x p o rts  to  th e  U n ite d  S ta tes
Despite significant diversification o f its exports, Chile continues to export primarily natural 
resources or derivatives with a low level o f processing. This phenomenon is the result o f natural 
comparative advantages, previous import substitution policies, scarcity o f capital for industrial investment, 
and the distance to the principal export markets. Some o f these factors are difficult to change. Tariff 
policies in principal export markets discriminate against imported processed goods in order to protect 
local industry. That tariff structure makes the export of processed goods to developing nations difficult 
(Yeats 1987).
This subject is o f great importance in Chile, given its efforts to increase the level o f value added 
to natural resource exports. As developing countries abandon their internal growth strategies and apply 
liberal international trade policies, more diversified export baskets will emerge and the subject o f tariff 
scheduling and other nontraditional export barriers will take on added importance.
It is important to note which sectors are most harmed by the current tariff structure given the 
potential for an initiation of discussions o f an FT A  between Chile and the United States. This 
information will be useful during negotiations and will also allow for the possibility o f foreseeing which 
sectors will most benefit from tariff reduction. A  review o f the figures on Chilean exports to the United 
States during 1990, show that 80.5 percent o f exports are concentrated in tariff levels below 3 percent, 
and half are exempt from customs taxes. To calculate tariffs that fall under GSP status (which was not 
in place for Chile in 1990), it was assumed that exports for 1990 would have maintained the same 
structure under this new arrangement. In this way, the percentage o f exports which fall under the GSP 
status that face tariff rates below 3 percent increases to 86 .2  percent, and 51 .2  percent tax-exempt 
(Table 4).
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Table 3
Chilean Exports o f Selected Products and 
Principal Suppliers to the U .S








Mining NR Copper minerals and conc. 8.3 480,203.5 Mexico, Portugal
Mining NR Other refined coppers 18,518.1 197,534.0 Chile, Canada
Mining NR Iron mineral pellets 0.0 86,337.8 Canada, Brazil, Venezuela
Mining NR Copper bars for wire 0.0 53,723.4 Peru
Mining PNR Gold dust (non-monet. use) 0.0 37,351.0 Canada, Guyana, East Germany
Fruit & Veg. NR Fresh apples 20,899.9 108,234.4 Canada, Chile, New Zealand
Fruit & Veg. NR Fresh kiwi 3,366.4 40,676.5 New Zealand,
Fruit & Veg. PNR Sugar Beet 0.0 13,620.4 Canada, Mexico
Fruit & Veg.PNR Prunes 0.4 3,558.1 China, Turkey, Singapore
Fruit & Veg.PNR Canned cherries 84.8 2,865.9 Italy, France
Fishing PNR Fish meal 8,430.5 233,430.9 Peru, Canada, Chile
Fishing PNR Frozen hake fillets 44.9 69,658.4 Peru, Argentina, Uruguay
Fishing PNR Frozen Pacific salmon 3.5 65,552.5 Canada, Chile
Fishing PNR Frozen trout fillets 220.1 21,859.4 Chile, Canada, Denmark
Fishing PNR Canned clams 11.6 13,068.7 Thailand, Chile, Malaysia
Fishing PNR Canned razor clams 79.7 6,561.4 Mexico, Peru, Chile
Forestry PNR Non-pine wood sheets 0.0 134,841.0 Canada, Haiti, Jamaica
Forestry PNR Semi-blanched wood pulp 567.9 121,478.4 Canada, Brazil, Portugal
Forestry PNR Serrated pine 5,716.4 74,220.1 Canada, Chile, Mexico
Forestry PNR Pine Wood sheets 0.0 15,710.8 Canada, East Germany
Forestry PNR Reams printed paper 0.0 2,891.2 Canada, Switz., Finland
Metalmec. Ind. Gear shifts 0.0 6,213.3 Canada, Japan, France
Metalmec. Ind. Cargo ships 0.0 2,650.0 Holland, Canada
NR: Unprocessed Natural Resources 
NPR: Processed Natural Resources
Source: U .S . Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; Export Shipments, Central Bank. 
See Campero and Escobar (1992)
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Table 4
Distribution o f U .S . Tariffs on Chilean Exports






0 percent 471.0 40.2 percent 600.7 51.2 percent
0.01 percent - 3 percent 472.9 40.3 percent 410.2 35.0 percent
3.01 percent - 5 percent 54.6 4.7 percent 29.2 2.5 percent
5.01 percent - 8 percent 35.0 3.0 percent 38.4 3.3 percent
8.01 percent - 10 percent 31.6 2.7 percent 29.9 2.6 percent
10.01 percent - 15 percent1 45.2 3.9 percent 38.4 3.3 percent
15.01 percent - 20 percent 48.6 4.1 percent 43.1 3.7 percent
20.01 percent - 30 percent 9.0 0.4 percent 8.6 0.7 percent
30.01 - and over 4.5 0.4 percent 4.5 0.4 percent
Total 1,172,4 100.0 percent 1,172.4 100.0 percent
Source: Butelmann and Campero (1991).
Tariff barriers are few, and their elimination should not have a significant effect on export 
volume. However, the existence o f an important degree of dispersion suggests that potential benefits in 
terms o f access to specific markets can be expected. The following section will show that this dispersion 
is not accidental, and the highest tariffs are concentrated on the most elaborate manufactured products.
Since we seek to study the effects o f a tariff scheduling on the part of the United States toward 
Chilean exports, this report will concentrate on Chile’ s main exportable natural resources and will 
evaluate tariff barriers that make the export o f these products— in their various levels of 
processing— difficult. The sectors chosen for this evaluation are agriculture, fishing, forestry, and 
copper.
Table 5 shows the degree o f tariff scheduling that affects Chilean exports to the United States. 
Although tariff scheduling exists in all four sectors of importance to the Chilean economy, in most cases 
this effect disappears when the GSP tariff is considered. Unfortunately, tariff schedules continue in the 
sector that is our principal export source: fruits and vegetables.
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Table 5
Tariff Schedule for Chilean Exports 







Fresh 9.5 6.4 0.52
Dehydrated 5.5 0.8 0.76
Frozen 17.5 14.4 0.03
Canned 13.8 13.6 2.26
Fruits
Fresh 0.9 0.9 29.66
Dehydrated 2.0 1.9 0.53
Frozen 9.9 4.7 0.20
Canned 7.1 6.9 1.80
FISHING
Fish
Fresh 0.02 0.00 5.79
Frozen 0.01 0.00 2.62
Smoked 4.47 4.47 0.07
Canned 5.90 0.01 0.52
FORESTRY
Wood
Raw wood 0.00 0.00 1.56
Wood molding & briquette 1.48 0.00 0.48
Wood products 6.80 0.00 0.27
Wood furniture 3.20 0.00 0.68
Wood Pulp
Wood pulp 0.00 0.00 0.58
Paper 4.80 0.00 0.04
COPPER
Refined and unrefined 1.00 1.00 15.63
Copp. alloy,bars,wire & plates 1.20 0.00 1.57
Copper products 3.60 0.00 0.02
Source: Butelmann and Campero (1992)
The figures in Table 5 represent weighted averages and therefore do not reflect the level o f tariff 
scheduling for products with little or no representation. Tables 4  and 5 show the tariff for processed and 
unprocessed resources for a select number o f products from the agricultural and fishing sectors, 
respectively. The tariffs listed correspond to the GSP. For a select group of products, the adjustment 
to the value added is higher than the average for that particular sector. Indeed, it is essential to make a 
product-by-product analysis to foresee the effects of a trade liberalization.
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To summarize, this analysis o f U .S . tariffs and their effect on the principal sectors o f Chilean 
natural resources demonstrates that Chile’ s exports to the United States are burdened by tariffs that are, 
on average, low but greatly dispersed. It is important to study these tariff schedules individually to 
determine Chile’s priorities in negotiating lower tariffs.
In the main categories o f  Chilean natural resources— agriculture, fishing, forestry and copper— the 
tendency o f U .S . tariff schedules to affect higher value-added goods adversely is clear. Nevertheless, 
schedule levels differ according to each category. The greatest level o f scheduling is in agriculture, 
where tariffs range between 0 percent and 35 percent and are highly correlated to the value added o f each 
product. In addition, the tariff scheduling in this category was not reduced with the introduction o f the 
GSP, and became even worse in the case o f vegetables since the GSP primarily benefits fresh products. 
In the other three categories, the tariff is minor and was either reduced or completely eliminated by the 
introduction o f the GSP.
Quantitative Analysis o f the Effect o f  an F T A  Between Chile and the United States
This section first summarizes theoretical a analysis o f the effects o f  an F T A  and then presents 
empirical evaluation o f an F TA  between Chile and the United States.
T h eoretica l E lem en ts
The conventional literature on preferential trade agreements highlights two distinct phenomena:3 
the creation o f trade and the diversion o f trade. Trade-creation is associated with the growth o f imports 
caused by tariff reductions. An analysis o f this phenomenon is equivalent to that o f a unilateral tariff 
liberalization. Prior to signing a trade agreement, a country has a tariff “t ” assigned to a particular 
product. The establishment o f  an F TA  causes a tariff reduction, i.e ., tariff “t ” is eventually reduced to 
zero. This creates a new and higher level o f consumption, and local production o f that product is able 
to supply only a small part o f that demand. The new excess in demand is eliminated through a higher 
level o f  imports.
To analyze gains in welfare generated by the phenomenon o f trade creation, only net gains in 
welfare need be considered. In fact, within the local country, tariff reduction causes internal 
redistribution o f welfare. (Extra) utilities caused by tariff “t ” on domestic products are transferred to 
local consumers. Likewise, the collection o f taxes generated by tariffs paid for imports are not paid when 
t  =  0 ,  which is a redistribution from the government to consumers. Net earnings in welfare generated 
by the creation o f trade (which are in turn caused by a reduction in tariffs) are associated with the 
additional net welfare gain that consumers will receive as a result o f  the expansion in the consumption 
o f the good in question, as well as the net earnings in welfare generated by die alternative use given the 
production elements that are freed up or displaced as a result o f trade liberalization.
Trade diversion occurs when a product that was imported from country C , is imported from 
country B after the establishment o f an F TA  with country B. The tariff benefit given to country B allows
3. See  Ffrench-Davis (1985); Caves, Frenkel, and Jones (1990)
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imports from country B to substitute imports from country C. If D m is the demand for imports o f  product 
k  from a given country, which faces a tariff o f t„; at the price P*c ( l+ t „ ) , country C is the one with 
competitive advantage to supply the local country with the required level o f  imports. Once a preferential 
agreement is established with country B, whereby, country B can supply the local country without 
canceling the tariff previously paid by imports from country C , then there is a possible expansion in the 
level o f imports. These are now completely supplied by country B at the price o f P*b (this is higher than 
the price without a tariff P*c which country C could supply).
Trade-diversion causes a net increase in welfare for consumers through a reduction o f preferential 
tariffs given to country B; there is a transfer o f  earnings corresponding to the taxes previously captured 
by the government, which are now transferred to consumers. On the other hand, there is a net loss o f  
welfare in the local country as a result o f trade-diversion; this loss corresponds to a portion o f taxes 
collected prior to the establishment o f  an F T A .
Once an F T A  is established, local consumers pay the price differential (P*B - P*c) to producers 
from country B , which are relatively less inefficient than those o f country C . If the loss associated with 
the decreased tax collection is not transferred to local consumers, then it is greater than the increase in 
the welfare o f  consumers derived from the marginal expansion o f imports, and the phenomenon o f trade- 
diversion causes a net loss o f welfare in the local country.
Another important phenomenon to consider is related to the expansion o f exports caused by an 
F T A  in the local country. Here it is assumed that the local country is small (Chile) and the other country 
is large (the United States); the prices o f the large country will not be altered by the changes caused in 
the small country by the F T A . As a result, variations in exports will depend on the price elasticity o f  
the exports. In this case, since the small country will receive preferential tariff treatment, exporters from 
the small country will receive a higher price for their goods than they received prior to the signing o f the 
F T A . In summary: the price o f exports will increase with the establishment o f  an F T A , and this will 
lead exporters to increase their level o f exports.
As a result, from the perspective o f the increase in welfare generated by exports to the F T A , 
there are two different issues to consider: the price increase perceived by exporters with regard to 
exports conducted prior to the F T A , and the additional growth in exports.
E m p ir ic a l A p p lica tio n 4
To calculate the effects o f  an F TA  on Chilean imports and exports related to the United States, 
it is necessary to know the price elasticity o f  the demand for imports and the supply o f exports at a 
particular level (in this case, 3 digits from the Standard Industrial Trade Class, SITC). Because 
econometric estimates at that level o f separation are not available for Chile, the price elasticity o f  current 
imports for the Mexican economy are used (IN FORUM , 1991); the magnitude o f these elasticities 
fluctuates between -0 .5  to -2 .0 . In the case o f exports, De Gregorio’ s (1984) study has been used for 
the most aggregated sectors o f Chilean exports. The mode value for these elasticities is 2 .3  for most
4. For a more detailed discussion o f the empirical process and corresponding calculations, se e  Valdes (1992). For 
the assumptions used in the operationalization o f calculating the effect o f trade-diversion and the expansion o f 
exports, se e  the Technical Appendix.
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categories. For the elasticity o f substitution between goods imported from different countries the value 
o f 1.5 has been used.5
Im ports
Table 6 shows the value o f Chilean imports to a level o f three SITC digits with a breakdown of 
its origin according to destination to the U .S . and the rest o f the world. This permits a separate 
calculation o f the effects of creation and diversion of trade using a uniform tariff rate o f 11 percent as 
a base. In addition, the value o f Chilean exports to the United States are provided, as well as average 
tariffs these exports paid during 1990.
Table 7 shows the welfare effect associated with trade-diversion caused by the immediate duty 
reduction to a 0  percent level on imports from the United States. This nonaggregate calculation allows 
for identification of those national sectors that will face greater competition from the expansion o f North 
American imports. In addition, it shows the sectors where the effect of (negative) welfare due to the 
trade diversion will reach higher values at the sectoral level than those corresponding to the (positive) 
welfare effect caused of trade creation.
The total creation o f trade o f an F TA  reaches $223.2 million, equivalent to 16 percent of Chilean 
imports from the United States (1990). The creation o f trade would be concentrated in o f nonelectrical 
machinery ($84.3  million), chemical substances and products ($32.1 million), electrical machinery and 
parts ($31 .6  million), and transportation materials ($18.8 million). Trade-diversion, on the other hand, 
would reach $152.7  million. The sectors that would experience the greatest level o f diversion would be 
nonelectrical machinery ($45.3 million), chemical products and substances ($28 .0  million), electrical 
machinery and parts/equipment ($18 .6  million) and transportation materials ($14.8  million, Table 6).
The effects o f the increase in imports on welfare are upset by a profit resulting from the creation 
of trade valued ($12.3 million) and a loss caused by the diversion o f trade valued ($16 .8  million) means 
that if we were to assume a 10 percent rate o f discount per year, and if tariffs were lowered to 0  percent 
immediately, the F T A  would mean a loss o f welfare in the area of imports valued at $45 million. The 
sectors most affected by this loss o f welfare would be chemical products and substances, and 
transportation equipment.
To reduce the negative effect on welfare caused by the diversion o f trade that resulted from the 
abrupt reduction in duty on imports from the United States to zero, the authors have examined what 
would happen if tariffs were gradually lowered over the course of five years. In operative terms, they 
have assumed that the 1992 rate of 11 percent would be reduced to 8 percent during the first year, 
6 percent during the second year, 4  percent the third, 2 percent in the fourth, and zero in the fifth years.
5. For a breakdown by sector and a discussion o f value o f elasticities, see  Valdes (1992).
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Table 6
Chilean Imports and Exports and 
North American Tariffs, 1990
Sector Chilean imports Chilean exports Tariff on Chilean
according to origin to the U.S. exports to U.S.
($’000) ($’000) {%)
United States Rest of World
Agri. and Fish 23,079 55,469 378,078 1.07
Mining (Copper & Iron) 5 43 433,514 1.00
Gas & Petroleum 0 818,289 0 0.00
Coal 19,494 74.435 0 0.00
Other minerals/rocks 6,235 22,253 149,760 0.07
Food, Bev. & Tobacco 16.377 243.327 223.116 3.85
Textiles 38.807 222,401 11.702 20.15
Apparel 7.467 30,858 26,047 17.39
Leather and Shoes 2,081 18,254 17,803 8.97
Wood (not inc. fum) 6,988 10,267 30,971 0.95
Furniture (exc. metal.) 1,790 6,085 11,719 3.25
Paper 22,654 88,158 7,283 0.95
Printing Presses/
publishing houses 6,479 20,880 1,664 1.98
Chemical prod./sub. 270,094 622,596 40,487 3.59
Petroleum/ derivatives 22,319 167,710 5,127 0,09
Rubber products 22,236 78,253 6,037 4.00
Plastic products 30,956 66,061 718 3.91
Glass, china, clay 17,435 74,247 15,251 9.87
Steel and iron 20,333 228,886 2,575 0.96
Non-iron metals (copp) 8,368 42,763 14,205 0.00
Metal products 59,145 251,291 10,760 1.18
Non-elec. machinery 425,405 1,073,787 6,776 3.44
Elec. machinery/parts 159,576 584,432 2,225 4.74
Transp. material 118,815 601,941 27,573 1.40
Prof. equipment 8,682 58,781 3,836 3.06
Total 1,366,894 5,566,809 1,427,267
S ource: Central Bank and Bureau o f Census
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Table 7
Growth in Imports Resulting from a Chile-United States FTA  





Fishing and agriculture 1,144 2,423 63 266
Coal 1,932 2,296 106 253
Food, bev. & tobacco 2,286 2,294 126 252
Textiles 7,307 4,912 402 540
Paper 1,347 2,679 74 295
Chem. subs, or products 32,119 28,002 1,767 3,080
Rubber products 4,187 2,574 230 283
Plastic products 6,135 3,133 337 345
Glass, china, clay 3,456 2,099 190 231
Iron & steel basics 3,022 2,776 166 305
Non-iron metals (copp.) 1,576 1,040 87 114
Metal products 11,722 7,117 645 783
Non-elec. machinery 84,315 45,292 4,636 4,982
Elec. mach. & parts 31,628 18,633 1,740 2,050
Transportation material 18,839 14,750 1,036 1,623
Prof. and ophtalmolo-
gical equipment 6,181 5,173 340 569
Total 223,210 152,700 12,277 16,797
Source: Valdes (1992)
Table 8
Aggregate Effects o f  Uniform Tariff 







1 60.9 41.6 5.8 1.2 4.6
2 101.5 69.4 8.6 3.3 5.4
3 142.0 97.2 10.7 6.5 4.1
4 182.6 124.9 11.9 11.0 0.8
5 223.2 152.7 12.3 16.8 -4.6
Source: Valdes (1992)
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The potential year-to-year effects o f  an FTA with a uniform tariff reduction over the course o f  five 
years are shown in Table 8. During these five years, the behavior resulting from the creation and 
diversion o f trade would be linear. In terms o f effects on welfare, we observe that up until the fourth 
year, earnings resulting from the creation o f trade would be larger than losses caused by the diversion 
o f trade. This means that the loss previously calculated at $45 million under the hypothesis that an 
immediate tariff reduction and a discount rate o f 10 percent would be reduced to $15.8 million over the 
course o f  five years.
In a scenario in which tariffs are reduced at a slower rate for sectors that produce the 
greatest loss because o f trade diversion, the net loss in welfare is even smaller than what is shown in 
Table 4.3. A s a result, a slower duty reduction in those sectors that generate the greatest amount o f  
trade diversion implies a significant reduction o f the negative effect caused by the FTA. The net loss 
in welfare generated by an increase in imports is reduced to one fifth o f  what it would otherwise be {see  
Valdes, 1992).
E x p o rts
Table 9 shows the effects o f  an FTA between Chile and the U.S. on the expansion o f  
Chilean exports, using the extreme assumption that tariffs would be reduced to 0 percent immediately. 
Total exports to the United States would increase by $62.3 million, equivalent to 4.4  percent o f  total 
Chilean exports to that nation. This increase would be concentrated primarily in the areas o f  food, 
beverages, and tobacco ($19.3 million), agriculture and fish ($14.2 million), apparel ($9.0 million), and 
textiles ($4.6  million). The effects on welfare, on the other hand, add up to $32.7 million, which means 
that, assuming an annual discount rate o f  10 percent, the FTA would create a benefit (at present value) 
in the area o f exports equivalent to 330 million. The effects on welfare would be concentrated in the 
areas o f  food, beverages, and tobacco ($9.0 million, textiles ($5.3 million), mining-copper and iron, 
($4.3 million), and agriculture and fish ($4.1 million).
Table 9
Expansion o f Exports Resulting From A  Chile-United States FTA  
($ ’ 000, base year 1990)
Sector Growth in exports Welfare effect
Agriculture and fishing 14,204 4,108
Mining (copper and iron) 642 4,327
Food, beverages, and tobacco 19,338 8,954
Textiles 4,592 2,820
Clothing 9,029 5,314
Leather and shoes 3,428 1,750
Chemical substances and products 3,280 1,511
Glass, china and clay 3,205 1,663
Total 62,290 32,683
a. Includes other sectors 
Source: Valdes (1992)
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Estimates o f  export expansion in Valdes (1992) differ significantly from the estimates in Erzan 
and Yeats (1992); the latter estimate that Chile would experience an increase o f  $22.8 million in exports 
to the United States upon signing an FTA. The fundamental reasons for this discrepancy are found in 
the base year chosen and the methodology used for the study. Erzan and Yeats (1992) use 1986 as the 
baseline year. In fact, if  the effects o f  an FTA were calculated using 1986 as the base year, a 
recalculation o f  the figures in Table 9 would show that the increase in exports caused by an FTA to be 
$26.3 million. The small difference that exists between the Erzan and Yeats (1992) and Valdes (1992) 
studies results from the use o f different elasticities.
Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that the estimates in Table 9 (as well as Tables 7 and 8) 
depend on the year used as the base. The results should be interpreted with caution. A t the very least, 
this requires keeping in mind that an agreement would be implemented within two years at the earliest. 
Given that Chilean exports show a significant secular dynamism, the effects o f  an FTA on trade will 
have to be recalculated according to the most up-to-date information.
In summary: the effects o f  a Chile-U.S. FTA on trade (using 1990 as the base year) would be 
as follows:
(1) Chilean exports to the U.S. would increase 4.4 percent (with a value somewhat 
higher than $60 million);
(2) Chilean imports from the United States would increase by 27.5 percent (approximately 
$375 million), 16.3 percent from trade creation and 11.2 percent from trade diversion; 
and
(3) the effects o f  these changes on welfare would be equal to a net gain in welfare (using 
an intertemporal discount rate o f 10 percent) o f 1 percent o f the GNP (approximately 
$310 million).
A n  F T A  a n d  th e  E n v iro n m e n t
The issue o f  the environment was present throughout the N A F T A  negotiations; it is also 
expected to emerge in negotiations with Chile. It has been discussed both in Chile and the United 
States. Labor and environmental groups in the United States fear that the strengthening o f commercial 
ties with less-developed countries where environmental regulations are not as strict would result in 
“ecological dumping.” In Chile, environmentalists perceive a negative relationship between trade and 
the environment.
Opposition is based on two potential effects o f  free trade. Because less-developed nations often 
have more permissive regulations with regard to pollution, they would have an advantage with respect 
to the production and export o f  products with more contaminating production processes. In addition, 
there would be a shift in investment to those countries. Both effects would lead to a reduction in 
employment in developed countries that are linked to less-developed, less-regulated nations; 
contamination would also increase in less-developed nations.
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The theoretical and empirical evidence to support these arguments is weak, and is in many ways 
contradictory. From a theoretical perspective, it is obvious that each region has different capacities to 
absorb contaminating emissions, depending on the socioeconomic characteristics o f  each: acceptable 
contamination levels differ from one country to another. A  higher level o f  emissions does not always 
lead to a higher level o f  pollution, nor does a higher accepted level o f contamination necessarily mean 
that “ecological dumping” is taking place. Different values are placed on certain environmental 
conditions.
From an empirical perspective, we have seen that a proportional increase in costs that are part 
o f environmental regulations are not enough to justify the relocation o f factories. In fact, no such 
exodus o f factories has occurred upon the implementation o f these regulations. Factors such as 
transportation o f goods to principal markets, the quality and cost o f  labor, and the political risks o f  
operating in a given country tend to control these decisions.
Beyond the cost advantages resulting from different levels o f regulation, a greater degree o f  
liberalization also produces changes in the production structure. Those changes could lead to greater 
production in the most polluting industries. Along the same line, it is feared that in nations with a 
relative abundance o f natural resources, liberalization will cause overexploitation o f those resources and 
could even cause the collapse o f  this source o f wealth. The counter-argument is that the exploitation 
o f goods that are common property should be combatted through appropriate regulations and assignment 
o f rights o f  ownership, rather than rejecting the advantages o f international trade.
Finally, a fear exists that free trade agreements will inhibit the freedom o f nations to impose 
regulations to protect their environments. This fear also appears to be unfounded, given that FTAs tend 
to adopt the obligations o f  the Codes o f Standards o f GATT, which allow for regulations that protect 
the environment as long as they do not discriminate against external producers and measures adopted 
accomplish the desired objective with minimal impact on the flow o f trade.
There are estimates o f  the effect o f trade liberalization on Chile’ s environment. These studies 
indicate that the restructuring o f production following liberalization will decrease the pollution levels 
per unit o f  product once the least-polluting industries are expanded and those with the highest emissions 
are reduced. Nevertheless,, the exploitation o f comparative advantages will lead to higher natural- 
resource exports. In some cases— fishing— appropriate regulations are lacking, and the result is likely 
to be over-exploitation.
W e believe that an FTA with the United States would have similar effects. That is, the least- 
polluting industries would grow, the export o f natural resources would increase and perhaps incorporate 
higher levels o f  processing. Nevertheless, the effects would be relatively minor upon the initiation o f  
the new process o f tariff reduction from a low level o f protection. On the other hand, the damage 
caused by the overexploitation o f natural resources would be controlled by environmental regulations. 
The fishing law has already been approved, the native forest law is being negotiated, and a proposed 
environmental bill would penalize polluting activities and require an environmental impact study o f  
proposed projects.
An FTA with the United States is expected to increase the flow o f foreign investment to Chile. 
A s mentioned previously, this increase could occur not so much as a result o f  improved access to the 
U .S. market (given that this type o f incentive would lead to investment from Mexico), but as a result
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o f the positive effect such an FTA would have on the international image o f the country: the perceived 
risk o f investment in Chile would decrease. Certain sectors may see this increase in investment as a 
threat to Chile’ s environment and fear invasion by polluting industries. However, evidence suggests 
that foreign companies tend to use technical standards equivalent to those in their own countries because 
o f the pressure by environmental groups. This decision is also influenced by the anticipated cost o f 
modifying production technology after an investment has been made should the recipient nation adopt 
stricter regulations.
The theoretical and empirical arguments that detract from the environmentalists’ objections to 
free trade will be insufficient to eliminate the environmental issue from the agenda o f  trade negotiations. 
Theoretical arguments used to remove environmental issues from the agenda will be ineffective in 
changing public opinion and the posturing o f lobbying groups, at least in the short term. From that 
perspective, it is interesting to consider the implications o f  the negotiation o f a free trade agreement 
with the United States would be for Chile.
Unlike Mexico, Chile does not share a common border with the United States, and consequently 
there are fewer issues o f  conflict with regard to the environmental provisions o f an FTA. The issue o f  
having to come up with shared solutions is eliminated, and the potential for ecological dumping and the 
flight o f  industry is diminished by the high cost o f transportation. Nevertheless, Chile has some serious 
environmental problems that could be used by opponents to an agreement with the U.S. One is the 
weakness o f  existing laws and institutions to regulate environmental impact. Solutions are being 
developed to these legislative weaknesses, but Chile’ s lack o f resources and experience in this area pose 
significant obstacles.
The lack o f resources is apparent not only in environmental regulation but also in the actual 
process o f  cleaning the air and hydraulic resources as well as the implementation o f the cleanest 
production technologies. The trade-off between growth and solving the problem o f poverty, on the one 
hand, and improved environmental quality on the other, becomes especially pronounced with respect 
to issues o f  urban environmental quality and mining production processes.
Despite the cost o f  adopting stricter standards, there is an awareness in Chile that the developed 
world will be increasingly demanding with regard to methods used in the production o f  goods it 
imports, and that products made with technology that is harmful to the environment will be rejected, 
either through foreign trade legislation or by consumers. That is why changes adopted in environmental 
regulations will not be seen not as requirements to achieve an FTA with the U .S ., but instead as 
necessary changes to improve international standing and the quality o f  life in Chile.
The FTA will provide an appropriate opportunity to resolve controversies over environmental 
regulations. Chilean producers will also feel less threatened by protectionist measures that make use 
o f environmental arguments.
C h ile  a n d  M E R C O S U R
Geography appears to play a critical role in the creation o f common markets, and trade 
arrangements between neighboring countries tend to endure. On the other hand, once a trade agreement
383
Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere
is established between two countries, the smaller country obtains a greater relative gain in welfare. These 
factors suggest the benefits Chile could anticipate from affiliation with M ERCOSUR.
Moreover, Chile’ s most important Latin American trade partners are Argentina and Brazil. 
Table 10 shows the relative magnitude o f Chilean exports and imports with Argentina and Brazil. Brazil 
and Argentina make up about 40 percent and 18 percent, respectively, o f Chilean exports to Latin 
America; however, Chile’s exports to these two countries make up a little over 8 percent o f Chile’ s total 
exports.
The M ER COSUR created in 1991 has set December 1994 as the deadline for the final 
establishment o f  a common market.6 This will require a time frame for reducing and ultimately 
eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers between the four member nations (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
and Uruguay), the establishment o f a common external tariff (CET), harmonization o f laws and policies 
dealing with foreign trade, and coordination o f sectoral and macroeconomic policies.
Table 10








Chile Exp. to Arg. 









Chile exp. to Brazil 
Chile exp. - L.A. 
(percent)
1985 84 106 15.7 210 49 39.2
1986 161 123 23.5 293 248 42.8
1987 175 159 21.0 348 380 41.7
1988 168 279 19.3 342 555 39.2
1989 110 399 11.5 523 703 54.5
1990 114 503 11.2 487 564 48.0
1991 257 554 20.8 448 698 36.2
Source: Central Bank 
* See footnotes 7 and 8.
The M ER COSUR Treaty allows for the accession o f other A L A D I member countries, but 
requests will be considered only after the treaty has been in existence for five years, with the exception 
o f those presented by nations that “ do not form part o f subregional integration schemes or an
6. For a more detailed discussion o f this subject, see  M izala (1992) and Saez (1992).
7. Chilean exports are FOB.
8. Imports from Argentina and Brazil are C IF .
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extraregional association.” This has been interpreted as a method o f allowing Chile to join the 
M ER CO SU R  Treaty, given that at the time o f its signing, Chile was the only country that met the 
condition. Argentina and Uruguay have repeatedly favored Chile’ s admission. It is not clear where 
Chile stands, and its official position vis-à-vis M ERCOSUR has been extremely cautious. Interest exists 
in having this initiative succeed, but by observing from the outside looking in.
The effective implementation o f M ERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay) would 
create an economic bloc with a GNP close to $400 billion, a population o f almost 190 million 
inhabitants, a labor force o f  75 million, and exports valued at $44 billion (1990 data).
Alejandra Mizala (1992) puts forth various alternatives that should be analyzed regarding Chile’ s 
incorporation or nonincorporation into M ERCOSUR. Chile’ s marginalization from M ER CO SU R  could 
mean the displacement o f Chile’ s competitive exports by those from trade associates who will benefit 
from tariff preferences. According to Mizala (1992), if we were to consider the extreme case o f  
keeping only copper exports, Chilean exports to Argentina and Brazil would be reduced by $81.6  
million and $276 million, respectively. This would mean a total reduction o f Chilean exports o f  
4.3 percent (from the year 1990). A  less extreme scenario suggests that M ER COSUR should not affect 
all Chilean exports that are not competitive with reciprocal exports from the member nations o f  
M ER COSUR . In addition, other products would have to be added to copper. In that case, Chilean 
exports to Argentina and Brazil would decrease by $74.5 million and $165.7 million, respectively 
(Mizala, 1992). Here, the effect on total Chilean exports would be approximately 3 percent.
Chile’ s incorporation into M ERCOSUR creates problems related to the acceptance o f a higher 
external and differentiated common tariff, as opposed to the current uniform level o f  11 percent. In 
addition, there are difficulties associated with neutralizing the microeconomic and macroeconomic 
effects that could be caused by macroeconomic instability in Brazil and (potentially) in Argentina. 
However, there would be certain benefits from joining M ERCOSUR: the possibility o f  expanding 
Chilean exports, greater incentives for foreign investment given the attractiveness o f being able to 
operate in an expanded market, and the increase in the country’ s negotiating capability at a bloc level 
rather than as a single country. Finally, it is possible that an FTA could be established with 
M ER CO SU R  and/or sectoral (bilateral) agreements with the various member nations o f M ERCOSUR. 
An evaluation o f these alternatives requires a more detailed study.
Finally, another aspect o f  this issue merits attention. The creation o f M ER CO SU R is causing 
important economic liberalization and rationalization o f foreign trade regimes by member countries. 
Even when an AEC is put into place that distinguishes between member and nonmember nations, those 
countries that do not form part o f  M ER COSUR will be in a relatively better position than in the past. 
This will allow for an increase in bilateral trade exchange with each o f the M ER COSUR member 
nations. The increase in the level o f  bilateral exchange as well as the greater investment on the part 
o f Latin American entrepreneurs in neighboring nations (a phenomenon already being observed between 
Chile and Argentina) will create even greater incentives for institutional and commercial bonds between 
Chile and M ERCOSUR.
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S u m m a ry  a n d  C o n c lu s io n s
From Chile’ s point o f  view, the signing o f a free trade agreement with the United States would 
be a positive step. Moderate benefits would be experienced in the area o f trade, with the greatest 
benefit falling primarily among certain specific export sectors that currently face high tariffs in the U.S. 
Specifically, agroindustry would enjoy the greatest benefit, as it currently must face tariff schedules. 
Exports o f  apparel, textiles, and leather products would also grow.
The global effects o f  an FTA between Chile and the United States would be as follows (using 
1990 as the base year):
(1) Chile’ s exports to the U.S. would increase by 4.4 percent (at a value o f  
a little over $60 million);
(2) Chile’ s imports from the U.S. would increase by 27.5 percent 
(approximate value, $375 million) with 16.3 percent from the creation 
o f trade and 11.2 percent from trade diversion; and
(3) the effects on welfare o f these changes would be valued at a net gain in 
welfare (using the intertemporal discount rate o f  10 percent) o f 1 percent 
o f GNP (i.e., approximately $310 million).
Beyond tariff reductions, an FTA with the U.S. includes conditions with regard to, inter alia, 
governmental purchases, trade in services, the elimination o f restrictions on foreign investment, and 
protection o f intellectual property rights. Chile, however, is either in the process o f  adopting, or has 
already adopted, the majority o f these requirements. Despite this, significant institutional changes have 
yet to be made if greater levels o f  transparency, predictability, and regulation are to be achieved in this 
process.
Another clear condition o f the FTA has to do with the environment. Chile will face significant 
pressure from the U .S. to implement stricter regulations with regard to activities harmful to the 
environment and will have to proceed more quickly than most would like. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
in order to ensure that Chile’s products have access to developed markets, the environmental issue will 
be central to the debate.
While it is important to emphasize that entering into negotiations with the United States is 
beneficial from a trade perspective and gives Chile a seal o f approval as an attractive country for 
investment, one cannot disregard the importance o f inclusion in M ERCOSUR. The market that these 
four nations comprise is sizeable: secured access to that market could be a significant motivating force 
for foreign investment. Today, Chile offers very attractive stability and nondiscrimination, but it cannot 
offer access to a broader market.
An FTA with M ER COSUR , where Chile maintains its independence vis-à-vis trade policy, 
would allow us a greater degree o f diversification, both in terms o f m arkets  as well as p ro d u c ts .  In fact, 
over 60 percent o f  Chile’ s exports to the developed world consist o f  unprocessed natural resources. In 
contrast, only 35 percent o f  Chile’ s exports to Latin America consist o f  unprocessed natural resources.
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So while an FTA with the U.S. would be beneficial, the importance o f Chile’ s integration with 
other Latin American nations— especially M ERCOSUR, which would afford Chile’ s export sector other 
types o f  advantages— should not be discounted.
387
Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere
Technical Appendix
This technical appendix will examine the theoretical concept and simplifying assumptions 
associated with the empirical analysis o f trade creation and trade diversion, as well as the expansion o f  
imports that will result from implementation o f an F T A .9
Figure A . l  presents the problem o f trade creation. This analysis presents the equivalent o f a 
unilateral tariff liberalization. Prior to the trade agreement, the local country has tariff t  for a product 
whose international price is P* (Figure A . l ) .  The local production level is 0 S o (point a) and the level 
o f consumption is O D 0 (point b). The excess demand is met by a b  imports. The establishment o f an 
F TA  causes a duty reduction, i.e ., tariff t  is eventually reduced to zero. This leads to a new level o f  
consumption O D t (point d), in which production at the local level only supplies O St (point c). The new 
excess in demand is eliminated through a high level o f imports cd .
Figure A - l :  Welfare Effect from Creation o f Trade
S
To evaluate gains in welfare caused by trade creation, one must consider net gains in welfare. 
In fact, tariff reductions cause a domestic redistribution o f welfare in the local country. (Extra) utilities 
generated by tariff t  on producers (area 4 , Figure A . 1) are transferred to local consumers. Similarly, the 
collection o f taxes resulting from tariff paid by imports (area 2, Figure A . l )  are not paid when t  =  0 , 
which is a redistribution to consumers on the part o f the government. Net gains in welfare caused by 
the creation o f trade (induced by a reduction in tariffs) correspond only to triangles 1 and 3 (Figure A .l ) .  
Area 3 is associated with the additional net welfare received by consumers as a result o f  the expansion 
o f the level o f consumption o f the product in question, and area 1 represents a net gain in welfare that 
is caused by the alternative use to which freed (or displaced) production factors are assigned as a result 
of trade liberalization. In addition, in this case the gain in welfare caused by the creation o f trade would 
be 0 .5  x d M  x t ,  in which d M  corresponds to the expansion o f imports resulting from liberalization.
9. For a more detailed discussion, see  Caves, Frenkel, and Jones (1990) and Valdes (1992).
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In general terms, if M oj is the quantity o f  product i imported from country j ,  t0 the initial tariff 
level, d , the preferential exchange o f tariffs, and assuming that the level o f elasticity ¿r ice ) o f  the demand 
for imports is known, £;, then d M  =  d j (  1 +  t0) d, x x M oj. As a result, the increase in welfare B c 
caused by the creation o f trade will be: B c  =  0 .5  [ d tl( \  +  r0) ] d , x £; x M oj. This increase in Be is 
directly proportionate to the initial value o f imports (M nj) coming from the country which is given the 
tariff preference.
Figure A-2: Welfare Effect from Trade Diversion
Figure A .2 demonstrates trade diversion that results when a product imported from country C, 
following the establishment o f an F T A  with country B , is then imported from country B . The tariff 
preference given to country B allows imports from country B to substitute those from country C  (see 
Figure A .2). I f D u  represents the demand for imports o f product k  from one country, in which the 
product faces tariff t0, at the price o f P*c  (1 +  t0) , country C  is the one which has the greatest degree o f  
competitive advantage in order to supply the local country at a level o f imports O M c  (point a ). Once a 
preferential agreement with country B  is established, in which this country can supply the local country 
without having to cancel the tariff previously paid for imports from country C, the level o f  imports is 
expanded to O M B (point b ). These products are now totally supplied by country B  at the price o f P'B (this 
is higher than the price P'c  without a tariff that country C  could offer). The diversion o f trade causes a 
gain in net welfare for consumers associated with the reduction o f tariffs that corresponds to area 2 . Area 
1 corresponds to a transfer o f income from the taxes previously collected by the government, which is 
transferred to consumers. On the other hand, area 3 represents the net loss in welfare o f the local 
country due to trade diversion. Area 3 corresponds to a portion o f the tax collection that existed prior 
to the establishment o f  an F T A . Once the FTA is established, local consumers pay the difference in 
prices (P i - P i )  on products from country B  which are relatively less efficient than those from country 
C. If area 3 is greater than area 2 , then trade diversion causes a net loss in well-being for the country.
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To estimate the effect o f  the diversion o f trade, we use elasticity to substitute between imported 
products Oj which come from two different countries, B  (with a preferential tariff) and C .10 In order 
to work this calculation, empirically it is useful to carry out some simplifying assumptions.11 Let us 
suppose that the local availability o f  products remains virtually constant, i.e ., the expansion o f  imports 
from country B  corresponds to the reduction o f imports from country C. Then, the loss associated with 
trade diversion would correspond to the magnitude o f imports that have been diverted multiplied by the 
price differentials (P*B - P i ) .  This procedure is the equivalent to that originating in the change o f tax 
collection caused by the establishment o f  an F T A  (for the corresponding derivation, see Valdes 1992).
Figure A -3 : Effects o f a F T A  on Exports
Figure A .3 demonstrates the phenomenon related to trade expansion caused by an F T A  in the 
local country. In this case, we will assume that the local country is small (Chile) and die other country 
is large (the U .S .) . Prices in the large country will not be affected by changes that the F T A  causes in 
the small country. A s a result, the variations in exports will depend on the price elasticity o f  the exports. 
In this case, since the small country will receive a preferential tariff, exports from the small country will 
receive a higher price than that paid prior to the establishment o f  an F T A . Figure A .3 , using a model 
o f partial equilibrium, illustrates this. Prior to the establishment o f an F T A , the smaller country produced 
0 S o (point a), consumed locally 0 D o (point b) and exported DJSa to the larger country. With the 
establishment o f  an F T A , the price for exports increases to [(1 +  to)/(l +  ti)] x P*. This creates a new 
level o f production O Slt  a reduction in domestic consumption to O D 1  and an expansion o f exports in (D a 
-  D j)  +  (S I  -  S0). I f  n  is the (price) elasticity offered by exports, then the increase in exports o f product 
j  caused by the F T A  will be D X j =  Xjo x «  x [(ta -  t j ) l ( l  +  / ,) , in which ta and t ,  represent the tariff 
imposed on exports o f product j  prior to and after the signing o f an F T A , respectively. Note that the 
calculation o f expansion o f exports is directly proportional to the level o f exports Xjo which exists in the 
first moments following the establishment o f an F T A .
10. W e suggest using oj =  1.5; se e  U N C T A D  (1989).
11. For more detailed discussion, se e  Valdes (1992).
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Consider the perspective o f  the increase in welfare caused by exports under the F T A : first, the 
price increase to exporters for exports that were carried out prior to the F T A  (area 1) and second, the 
additional expansion o f exports (areas 2 &  3). The net effect on the welfare o f  exports caused by the 
F T A  will be Bx =  X„ (t0 - 1,) +  0 .5  (t, -  Q  dX .
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E C O N O M IC  R E L A T IO N S  O F  B R A Z IL  A N D  T H E  U N IT E D  S T A T E S  
A N D  T H E  E N T E R P R IS E  F O R  T H E  A M E R IC A S  IN IT IA T IV E
M arcelo  de Paiva A b reu 1
A ssessm ent o f  the relative v irtues and shortcom ings o f  regional in teg ration  as opposed to  allegedly  
m ore  e lusive  m ultila tera l libera liza tion  has been  a m ajor them e o f recen t w o rk  in  trad e  po licy . It is rare  
that such  assessm ents acknow ledge that specific national in terests, in  particu la r m ixes o f  reg ionalism  and 
m ultila tera lism , w ill vary  significantly  depending on trade  structures and trade po lic ies. T h is p ap e r is 
m ain ly  concerned  w ith  trade relations and seeks to  evaluate (i) the argum ents that favo r and oppose the 
econom ic in teg ra tion  o f  B raz il’s econom y w ith  o ther econom ies in  the hem isphere, and (ii) how  relations 
betw een  B razil and the U nited  States could be affected by  a lternative in teg ration  scenarios. E conom ic 
in tegra tion  could  resu lt from  e ither concrete  developm ents o r the creation  o f  effective docking  conditions 
fo r the ex tension  o f  the  N orth  A m erican  F ree T rade  A greem ent (N A FT A ).
T he w ide d ifferences in  the speed o f  econom ic refo rm  and the success o f  m acroeconom ic 
s tab iliza tion  betw een  the  L atin  A m erican  econom ies are obvious. B raz il’s slow ness in  in troducing  
structu ra l refo rm , o r  the ineffectiveness o f  efforts to  control in fla tion  invalidate any unqualified  assertion  
o f  the reversa l o f  the  econom ic clim ate in  L atin  A m erica o r stable im provem ent o f  re la tions w ith  the 
U nited  S tates. T hese contrasts are  rooted in  the past. It is thus d ifficult to  assess B raz il’s cu rren t po licies 
and th e ir  likely  im pact on  relations w ith  the U nited  States w ithout a re la tively  long perspective  that 
includes the abrasive 1980s. A s it becom es increasing ly  likely  that such b ila teral fric tions w ill re tu rn , 
that p erspective  becom es all the m ore  relevant.
T h is paper begins by considering  the im pact o f  the econom ic crisis o f  the 1980s on  B razil-U nited  
States re la tions, in  particu la r the significant de terio ra tion  in  b ila teral and m ultila teral econom ic re la tions 
affecting  trade . T hen  it exam ines how , from  1988 on , these  fric tions w ere  reduced  by  dom estic  econom ic 
refo rm  (especially  o f  trade  policies) and the adoption  o f  a m ore positive approach  to  m ultila tera l trade 
nego tia tions in  the  G A T T . T he paper then  assesses a lternative im plem entation  scenarios fo r reg ional 
in teg ra tion  in itiatives involv ing  L atin  A m erican  countries and the U nited  States and  C anada (such  as the 
N A F T A  and the EA I) and exam ines the likely im pact o f  each on  B razil. T he conclusion  considers how  
the increased  im portance o f  reg ional in teg ration  is likely to  affect re la tions betw een  B razil and the  U nited  
S tates.
E co n o m ic  R e la tio n s  B etw een  B raz il a n d  th e  U n ite d  S ta tes  in  th e  1980s
Several s ign ifican t irritan ts w ere inherited  from  the 1960s and 1970s.2 T he po licy  o f  close 
po litical alignm ent w ith  the U nited  States, w hich  p revailed  in  the period  im m ediately  after the  1964 coup,
1. The author thanks Rubens Ricupero, Ron Sprout, and José Tavares for their comments and Clarice Gonçalves 
Silva for research assistance.
2 . Lim a (1986) is a standard treatment o f  B razil-U .S . relations, especially  in  the context o f  nuclear energy and 
trade.
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led to  a reversal o f  stances in  in ternational forum s. E xam ples include the cases o f  reservations B razil 
p laced  on  som e o f  the  princip les included in  the  F inal A ct o f  the U N C T A D  G eneva C onference o f  1964, 
and partic ip a tio n  o f  B razilian  troops in  the in tervention  in  the  D om inican  R epublic in  1965.
A fter 1967, B raz il’s negotia ting  stance started  to  change. In  the talks lead ing  to  the  T rea ty  fo r 
the P roh ib itio n  o f  N uclear W eapons in  L atin  A m erica signed at T late lo lco , M exico , in  1967, B razil d id  
no t w aive the requ irem ent o f  full ra tification  as a p recond ition  fo r effectiveness. B razil also  d id  no t sign  
the N uclear N on-P ro life ra tion  T reaty  o f  1968 and cited  national security  in terests as the  ra tionale  fo r the 
m atu ring  o f  po licies w hich  tended  increasing ly  to  assert B raz il’s autonom y in  re la tion  to  the U nited  States.
B raz il’s positio n  also began  to  shift in  trade negotiations. In  the U N C T A D  m eeting at N ew  D elhi 
in  1968, B razil w ithdrew  its reservations o f  1964 and took  an  active part in  the nego tia tions tha t led to  
the in troduction  o f  the  G eneralized  System  o f  Preferences by all developed countries desp ite  the  m arked  
reluctance o f  the U nited  States.
T he sharp  rise  o f  oil p rices after 1973 tended to  re in fo rce, ra ther than  defuse, la ten t o r  overt 
b ila tera l fric tions, g iven  B raz il’s dependence on  im ported  oil. In  the nuclear field , in  1975 B razil signed 
w ith  the F edera l R epublic o f  G erm any an  A greem ent C oncern ing  C ooperation  in  the  F ie ld  o f  the  Peaceful 
U se o f  N uclear E nergy , w hich  involved the construction  o f  several nuclear p ow er sta tions, tran sfe r o f  
sensitive  techno logy  in  u ran ium  enrichm ent, and p roduction  and reprocessing  o f  nuclear fuels. T h is m ove 
m arked  a m erge  o f  econom ic—that is, p rospective energy-sav ing—argum ents w ith  those that underlined  
the usefu lness o f  the agreem ent from  a m ore political po in t o f  v iew , especially  regard ing  b ila tera l 
re la tions w ith  the U nited  States.
T he C arte r adm in istra tion  abandoned the F o rd  adm in istra tion ’s em phasis on  B razil-U nited  States 
re la tions because B razil w as an  em erging regional p ow er cen ter. T he U nited  States reacted  strong ly  
against the  B razil-G erm any N uclear A greem ent and also p ressed  the G eisel adm in istra tion  to  im prove its 
hum an righ ts record . R esulting  fric tions led to  the denunciation  o f  the long-standing  agreem ent on  
m ilita ry  cooperation .
B razil adopted  an  increasing ly  aggressive stance in  its b ila teral re la tions in  the  M iddle  E ast and 
A frica  fo r the pu rpose  o f  assuring  long-term  oil supply  and to  use oil purchases as a lever to  increase 
exports th ro u g h  coun tertrade  deals. S ince these deals entailed a m ushroom ing  o f  m ilita ry  equipm ent 
expo rts , it is no t su rp rising  that the dom estic coalition  backing these new  policies gained  considerab le  
streng th . P artly  because o f  o il, bu t also as a natural backlash  g iven  its fo rm er stand in  favor o f  Portugal 
in  P o rtu g a l’s co lonial conflicts in  A frica, B razil struck  a h igh  p ro file  especially  in  S ou thern  A frica  to  
reassert its fo reign-po licy  independence in  re la tion  to the U nited  States.
In  h igh-techno logy  goods and in tellectual p ro p erty  there  w as also  a bu ildup  o f  fric tion  as B razil 
ta rgeted  stra teg ic  sectors such as electronics and pharm aceuticals to  benefit from  governm ent support 
b ecause o f  th e ir key ro le  in  assuring  self-sustained, endogenous developm ent o f  requ ired  technologies. 
T he in troduction  o f  a reg im e o f  absolute p ro tec tion  to  dom estic p ro duc tion  o f  m icrocom puters is on ly  one 
exam ple o f  such po lic ies. D om estic support fo r such regim es w as assured  by  a b lend  o f  lobbies based  
on concerns fo r national secu rity , sovere ign ty , and app rop ria tion  o f  scarcity  rents.
B razil w as no t very  active in  the  G A T T  before the T okyo R ound. T ow ard  the  end o f  the  R ound, 
h ow ever, in  the  negotiations o f  bo th  the so-called F ram ew ork  G roup and the G A T T  codes, B razil took
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a m ore  active ro le .3 T he negotiations in  the F ram ew ork  G roup4 o rig inated  from  B raz il’s p roposa l to 
p rov ide  a legal basis fo r G SP. T his w ould  requ ire  the consolidation  o f  preferences and  estab lish  liab ility  
to  com pensation  in  the  event they w ere  w ithdraw n, as w ell as m ore  flex ib ility  in  the  u se  o f  artic le  X V III 
fo r balance-of-paym ents p u rp o ses .5 N egotiations resu lted  in  the consolidation  o f  the  derogation , w hich 
legalized  non recip rocity  based  o n  special and differential trea tm en t.6
T he U nited  S tates, d issatisfied  w ith  w hat w as seen as consisten t p u rsu it o f  inappropria te  advantage 
by  developing  coun tries, em phasized the im portance o f  negotiating  specific  codes that attem pted  to  lim it 
M F N  trea tm ent to  signatories. F ro m  B raz il’s p o in t o f  v iew  the code on  subsid ies w as the m ost im portan t 
to  be nego tia ted  in  the  T okyo R ound. F o r code signatories the application  o f  com pensatory  du ties should  
be based  on  p ro o f  o f  in ju ry  to  dom estic industries. B razil’s negotia tors y ielded  to  U nited  States p ressu res 
and agreed  to  the  g radual rem oval o f  tax credits tied  to  export perfo rm ance as w ell as to  the freezing  o f 
export sub sid ies .7 B razil was the  first developing coun try  to  sign  the code o n  subsid ies. O ther 
developing  coun tries that fo llow ed as signatories m ade less sign ifican t concessions, as is ev ident in  the 
vague undertak ings requ ired  fo r Ind ia  and P ak is tan .8
T he m arked  d e te rio ra tion  in  econom ic relations betw een  B razil and  the U nited  States in  the 1980s 
had  b o th  financial and com m ercial com ponents. In  the financial fie ld , fric tions w ere d iffuse and 
frequen tly  involved  the in term ediation  o f  the  In ternational M onetary  F und  and the W o rld  B ank and also 
affected  com m ercial banks o ther than  those in  the U nited  States. T he m ain  exception  w as an  incident 
caused b y  B raz il’s g reat financial vu lnerab ility  at the  end  o f  1982 that led to  a sudden  w eakening  o f  its 
barga in ing  position . W hen  B razil needed a U nited  States T reasury  b rid g e  loan, the  U .S . governm ent 
successfu lly  p ressed  B razil to  soften  its stance o f  resisting  the inclusion  o f  the so-called  new  them es in 
the G A T T  M in isteria l D eclaration . In  1987 financial relations betw een  the tw o coun tries reached  the ir 
nad ir (since the early  1960s), and B razil declared  a foreign-debt m orato rium . T he renew ed m ora to rium  
in  1989 w as less abrasive, som e trade  liberalization  w as already taking p lace , and it w as clear tha t som e 
o f  the po litica l constra in ts to  debt norm alization  could be rem oved after the firs t free presiden tia l election  
in  29 years.
D ifficu lties re la ted  to  b ila teral and m ultila teral com m ercial issues w ere m uch m ore  exp lic it and 
perm anen t. T he U nited  S ta tes’ active im position  o f  antidum ping and subsidy  coun tervailing  du ties in  the 
1980s had  a sign ifican t im pact on  B razilian  exports. In  several instances B razil faced U nited  States
3. See Abreu (1992) for Brazil’s role in the Tokyo Round.
4. From The Legal Framework for Differential and More Favourable Treatment for Developing Countries in
Relation to GATT Provisions.
5. See Maciel (1978) and Winham (1986), pp. 144-146. The original document, which incorporates Brazilian 
proposals is entitled Statement by the Representative of Brazil, Ambassador George A. Maciel, 21 February 1977, 
GATT M TN/FR/W /1, of the same date.
6. See Winham (1986), p.274.
7. See Lima (1986), pp. 330-336.
8. See Hufbauer (1983), pp. 341-2 and Winham (1986), pp. 222-3.
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actions, o r  w as considered  as a ta rget fo r US actions, under Section 301, “Super 3 0 1 ,” and “ Special 3 0 1 ” 
o f  the  T rade  A ct o f  1974.
A ntidum ping  and  subsidy  countervailing  duty actions are  d ifficu lt to  assess. C om pared  to  o ther 
developing  and  cen tra lly  p lanned  econom ies, B razil w as a significant target fo r A D  in itia tions in  the 
U nited  S tates from  1986 to  1988, and less so from  1988 to  1990. O ther countries sim ilarly  affected  w ere 
C hina , T aiw an , S outh  K orea, and  South  A frica. B razil has also  faced m any C V D  actions, m ainly  
betw een  1982 and  1986. In  th ree  o f  these years it led , o r shared  the lead on , the lis t o f  affected 
coun tries. (O ther countries sim ilarly  affected besides those m entioned in  re la tion  to  A D  actions w ere 
M exico  and  V enezuela.)
O f  the w ide range o f  B raz il’s exports affected by  A D  and C V D  actions, the  m ost im portan t w ere 
iron  and  steel p ro duc ts , chem ical and petrochem ical p roducts, o range ju ice , tex tiles, and fo o tw ear.9 
B raz il’s steel and  iro n  exports to  the U nited  States w ere affected by  V E R s from  1984 to  1992. S im ilarly , 
B razilian  exports o f  tex tiles and clo thing are  constrained  by  export lim itations nego tia ted  b ila te ra lly  under 
the  M u lti-F ib e r A rrangem ent.
B razil w as less affected  by  A D  and C V D  actions in  the second h a lf  o f  the 1980s, at least in  part 
because o f  the u se  o f  o ther p ro tec tion ist instrum ents. B razil has faced actions u n d er Sections 301 o f  the 
T rade  A ct o f  1974, as am ended, “Super 3 0 1 ,” and “Special 3 0 1 .” O f 87 o f  such in itia tions betw een  1975 
and  O ctober 1991, six  w ere against B razil (the R epublic o f  K orea faced eight in itia tions; T a iw an  and 
A rgen tina , five; and  Ind ia  and C hina, fo u r) .10
B razil w as the  only  developing  coun try  to  suffer re ta lia tion  u n d er Section 301. It w as designated  
as one o f  the  p rio rity  countries un d er Section  301 because o f  its im port licensing system . T he O ctober 
1988 action  by  the  U nited  States im posing tariffs o f  100 percen t on  B razilian  paper, pharm aceu tica ls , and 
e lectron ic  p roducts en tering  the U nited  States fo llow ed a com plain t by  the P harm aceutical M anufactu rers 
A ssocia tion  tha t B raz il’s intellectual p roperty  righ ts leg isla tion  d id  no t p rov ide  adequate p ro tec tio n  fo r 
U .S . paten ts.
T he o ther im portan t 301 case affecting B razil was related  to  its inform atics po licy , in  particu la r 
so ftw are leg isla tion . T he case w as in itiated  by  the U ST R  in  1985 and w as based  on  grievances 
concern ing  access to  the B razilian  softw are m arket, p ro tec tion  o f  in tellectual p ro p erty  in  re la tion  to  
softw are and  h ardw are , and adm inistra tive procedures adopted by  the B razilian  au thorities in  the 
in form atics sector. It w as term inated  in  O ctober 1989 after changes in  B razilian  po lic ies.
D ete rio ra tio n  in  B razil-U nited  States relations also resu lted  from  d ifferen t stances adop ted  in  
m ultila tera l fo rum s, especially  in  the G A T T . O n the one hand, there  w as a natural p rocess o f  
m u ltila tera lization  o f  som e o f  the b ila teral d isputes, and som e w ere raised  in  the G A T T . O n the  o ther
9. For a complete list of actions between 1979 and 1990 see the annexes of Destler (1992) as well as, for earlier 
actions, IPEA/CEPAL (1985).
10. See GATT (1992), p. 127 and GATT (1989), pp. 260-65. Initiations against Brazil affected footwear, 
informatics products, soybean oil and meals, import licensing, and patenting of pharmaceutical products and 
processes.
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h an d , th e re  w as m uch scope fo r  d ifferen t stands betw een  the  tw o  coun tries in  re la tion  to  the  la test round  
o f  m ultila teral trad e  negotia tions.
In  th e  1980s th e re  w ere  m any consulta tions and panels concern ing  B razil in  th e  G A T T , b o th  as 
a com plainant and as a d efen d an t.11 B ut b y  fa r the  m ost s ign ifican t issue o f  B razilian  b ila teral in terest 
to  be  d iscussed  in  G A T T  in the  1980s w as rela ted  to  re ta lia to ry  action  b y  th e  U nited  S tates in  1988 that 
im posed  ta riffs  o f  100 p ercen t on  selected  B razilian  p ap er, pharm aceu ticals, and e lectron ic  products 
en tering  th e  U nited  S tates. I t w as perhaps th e  m ost ex trem e dem onstra tion  o f  how  fa r  th e  U nited  States 
w as w illing  to  go to  keep p ressu re  on  B razil to  im prove access to  its m arket and also  to  assure  
en forcem ent o f  s tric te r in tellectual p ro p erty  leg isla tion .
B razil asked  fo r a panel to  consider questions o f  p rin c ip le  involved  in  th e  U nited  S ta tes’ action. 
T h e  U nited  S tates sta lled , bu t a panel w as eventually  estab lished  in  early  1990. T h e re  w as no agreem ent 
on  its te rm s o f  reference  because th e  U .S . insisted  tha t the  substan tive B razilian  leg isla tion  b e  exam ined, 
b u t B razil cen tered  its case on  th e  conflic t betw een  the  U .S . action  and G A T T  righ ts and obligations. 
T erm s o f  re ference  lim ited  the  panel to  exam ination  o f  com patib ility  o f  th e  action  w ith  G A T T . T h e  U .S . 
faced m uch critic ism  in th e  G A T T  because it m ade no effo rt to  settle  th e  d ispu te  u sing  G A T T  m achinery .
In  th e  stric tly  m ultila teral scene th e re  w as continuous fric tion  betw een  the  tw o coun tries during  
th e  perio d  p reced ing  th e  launching  o f  th e  U ruguay  R ound. A  sm all g roup  o f  develop ing  coun tries, o f  
w hich  B razil w as a key  p lay er, objected  to  th e  inclusion  o f  th e  “new  them es” (trade-related  investm ent 
m easures, intellectual p ro p erty , and services) in  its agenda. D evelop ing  coun tries feared  th is  w ould  
underm ine  th e ir  em phasis on  unfin ished  business from  p rev ious rounds. I t w as also  th o ugh t un like ly  tha t 
it w ould  b e  possib le  to  reach  agreem ents th a t w ould  yield  rough ly  equ ivalen t concessions inasm uch as 
trad itional G A T T  negotia tion  p rocedu res w ere  fo llo w ed .12
W ith  th e  de  facto  inclusion  o f  th e  “ new  them es” in  th e  U ruguay  R ound nego tia tions in  P un ta  del 
E s te  in  1986, and p a rtly  due  to  in ternal developm ents, B razil s tarted  to  m ove tow ard  a  m ore  active ro le  
as a demandeur a fter 1987. I t w as fo rtunate  tha t B razil had  a c red ib le  and natural fa ll-back  positio n  as 
an initial (bu t fa r from  enthusiastic) m em ber o f  the  C airns g roup  o f  fa ir (and no t so fa ir) trad e rs  in 
ag ricu ltu ra l p roducts o f  tem pera te  reg ions.
11. As a complainant: The Brazil-Spain 1980 panel on the tariff treatment o f  unroasted coffee, the consultations 
held in 1982 on the EC sugar export refund system in which Brazil was one o f the ten countries involved, the 1986 
Brazil-US consultations on US tariff on ethyl alcohol, the protracted Brazil-U.S. dispute on CVD duties charged 
on non rubber footwear and the 1988 Brazil-US consultations on the unfavorable impact o f  US subsidies under the 
Export Enhancement Program on Brazilian exports o f  soya bean oil. As a defendant: the U.S. 1983 complaint on 
Brazilian violation o f Code o f Subsidies in relation to poultry exports, the US-Brazil 1987 aborted consultations on 
restrictions on micro electronic products and the US 1989 complaint on the Brazilian quantitative import control 
regulations. For data see GATT, GATT Activities, several issues, as well as GATT (1989 and 1992).
12. For the evolution o f Brazilian stance in the GATT see Abreu (1992). For countries without much bargaining 
power it became increasingly clear that it would be impossible to try to apply the equivalence o f  concessions rule. 
It became increasingly common to justify the advantages o f liberalization based on standard efficiency grounds for 
"small countries." It is, however, less common to find acknowledgement that efficiency rules are not necessarily 
coherent with the commercial policy o f contracting parties with negotiating clout.
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B etw een  1987 and 1988, B razil started  to  p lay  an  increasing ly  im portan t ro le  in  ag ricu ltu ra l and 
o ther nego tia tions. A s agricu ltu re  becam e the m ain  stum bling b lock  to  p ro g ress , B razil p layed  an 
im portan t ro le  in  the G A T T  M id term  R eview  in D ecem ber 1988 by  assuring  support fo r the stand  o f  the 
L atin  A m erican  m em bers o f  C airns, and then  by  the C airns group  (endorsed  by  the  U nited  States) o f 
cond ition ing  resu lts in  all negotia ting  g roups to  p rog ress in  ag ricu ltural liberalization.
Im p a c t  o f  D o m estic  E co n o m ic  R e fo rm  on  R e la tio n s  B etw een  B ra z il a n d  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s
D om estic  re fo rm  since 1990 played  an  im portant ro le  in  d rastically  reducing  fric tion  betw een  
B razil and  the U nited  States. P rom pted  by a m ix ture  o f  d isappoin tm ent w ith  the perfo rm ance o f  the 
econom y, the  deepening  fiscal c risis , w ear and tea r o f  in tervention ist po lic ies, and in ternational p ressu re , 
the B razilian  po licy  o f  export p rom otion  and im port rep ression  had  already  started  to  change in  1987. 
B etw een 1987 and 1989 the list o f  p roducts affected by de facto im port p roh ib itions w as p rog ressive ly  
reduced , o ther n o n ta riff  ba rrie rs  w ere rem oved, and ta riff  rates w ere reduced , bu t the  level o f  p ro tec tion  
rem ained  substantial and  n o n ta riff  b arrie rs  form idable. T he average nom inal ta r if f  w as in  the reg io n  o f 
35 p ercen t at the  end  o f  1989 (the m axim um  w as 85 percent). M ost effective rates o f  p ro tec tion  w ere 
betw een  30 percen t and  60 percen t, bu t som e—transport equipm ent—reached m ore  than  150 percen t.
W hen  a new  adm in istra tion  took  office in  M arch  1990, there  w as a sign ifican t red irec tio n  o f  
econom ic po licy . N ew  policies covering  p rice  stabilization , foreign  debt renego tia tion , and  structu ra l 
re fo rm  w ere  im plem ented, bu t alm ost from  the start the  new  adm in istra tion ’s c red ib ility  w as m arred  by 
its am biguous re fo rm  o f  long-established corruption . It is d ifficu lt to  oppose legal ren t-seeking  behav io r 
and at the  sam e tim e engage in  o r  condone openly  co rrup t practices.
T he fa ilu re , after several a ttem pts, to  achieve p rice  stab ilization  obscured  concrete  p rog ress 
tow ard  o th e r econom ic objectives such as deb t renegotia tion  and structu ra l reform s.
S ince early  1991, m uch p rog ress has been m ade in  renegotia tion . A fter a January  1992 
agreem ent w ith  the IM F  on m acroeconom ic adjustm ent, agreem ents fo llow ed w ith  the C lub  o f  P aris  (on 
fo re ign  official cred its) in  M arch  1992 and w ith  the p rivate  banks in  Ju ly  1992. By the end o f  M arch  
1993, m ore  than  95 percen t o f  B raz il’s cred ito r banks had  accepted the agreem ent, even  though  it 
con tained  a m ix  o f  options that d iffered  from  initial governm ent expectations.
T he p ro g ram  o f  structu ral reform s in troduced  by  the C o llo r adm in istra tion  included elem ents o f  
p riva tiza tion , deregu la tion , and  trad e  liberalization . P rivatiza tion  has p roceeded  som ew hat slow ly  because 
o f  legal actions against p riva tiza tion , constitu tional restric tions o f  p riva tiza tion  in  sectors such  as oil 
exp lo ra tion , refin ing , and transporta tion , and em phasis on  a transparen t, m arket-o rien ted  p rocess.
It is indeed rem arkable  that during  the C ollo r adm in istra tion  the process w as, on  the w hole , free 
from  accusations o f  co rrup tion  desp ite  w ide differences o f  op in ion  on  its conception  and  im plem entation , 
in  pa rticu la r concern ing  the alm ost exclusive u se  o f  several types o f  heavily  d iscounted  governm ent 
securities. T he p riva tiza tion  p ro g ram  has been  quite successful if  account is taken  o f  constrain ts. 
U sim inas, the largest B razilian  steel m ill (output o f  4  m illion  tons p er year), and C opesu l, an  im portan t 
pe trochem ical up stream  p lan t (sold  fo r $1 .3  b illion) w ere the m ost im portan t p riva tiza tion  cases. F o re ig n  
cap ital, how ever, has no t show n in terest in  the  privatiza tion  effort, an  ind ication  o f  a lack  o f  confidence
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in  the  success o f  p rice  stab ilization  efforts. U nder P residen t F ran co , p riva tiza tion  polic ies have  becom e 
m ore  cen tralized  and m ore  vu lnerab le  to  d iscre tionary  decisions.
D eregu la tion  o f  dom estic activ ity  m ostly  affected the  p ric in g  o f  inputs such as steel and fuels, 
w hich  h ad  been  subjected  to  th e  d isto rtions o f  s tric tly  enforced national p r ic e s .13 M uch rem ains to  be 
done in  deregu la tion , bu t it is un like ly  tha t C ongress w ill approve su ffic ien tly  liberal leg isla tion  o n  m ost 
re levan t issues. A fter C o llo r’s im peachm ent new  leg isla tion  w as in troduced  o n  th e  deregu la tion  o f  labor 
supply  arrangem ents in  po rts  and on  increased com petition  in  th e  u se  o f  p o r t facilities.
T rad e  libera liza tion  included th e  elim ination  o f  p ro h ib ition  in  th e  im port licensing  p rocess and 
o f  m ost n o n ta riff  b a rrie rs , the  refo rm ula tion  o f  the  system  o f  export incentives, and th e  in troduction  o f  
a m ultiyear ta r if f  reduction  p rog ram  to  reduce average tariffs  from  32 p ercen t (w ith a m axim um  ra te  o f  
105 percen t) to  14.2 percen t (w ith a m axim um  ra te  o f  35 percen t) by  O ctober 1993. L ibera lization  also 
reduced  b u reau cra tic  requ irem ents affecting im ports and exports , d iscon tinued  sta te  m onopolies in  the  
trad e  o f  w heat, coffee, and sugar, and d ism antled  th e  m ain  sta te  trad in g  com pany. T h e  lis t o f  im ports 
and exports req u irin g  p rio r  governm ent approval w as drastica lly  reduced , and n o n ta riff  p ro tec tion  
affecting  electron ic  p roducts w as also abolished.
T h ere  is scope fo r fu rth er libera liza tion , m ain ly  o f  national con ten t requ irem ents fo r access to 
official cred its o r to  pub lic  p rocurem ent. T he re laxation  o f  restric tions on  the  rig h t o f  estab lishm ent o f  
fo re ig n  firm s in  certa in  sec to rs, especially  in  serv ices, p rov ides m uch scope fo r efficiency im provem ent. 
H ow ever, pow erfu l industria l and trade-un ion  lobbies have  opposed  th e  approved  ta r if f  reduction  
schedu le , and the  possib ility  o f  a reversa l o f  th e  libera liza tion  tren d  canno t b e  d ism issed .
T h e  sh ift tow ard  libera liza tion  rem oved  fric tions w ith  the  U nited  S tates generated  by  trade  
re la tions. T h e  rem oval o f  im port licensing  elim inated th e  basic  reason  fo r B raz il’s designation  as a 
p rio rity  ta rge t. S im ilarly , undertak ings by  the  B razilian  governm en t to  p ro p o se  in tellectual p roperty  
leg isla tion  th a t w ould  considerab ly  im prove p ro tec tion  and allow  p rocess paten ting  led to  rem oval o f  
“ re ta lia to ry ” ta r if f  ra tes by  the U nited  States and eventually  to  w ithdraw al o f  com plain ts in  th e  G A T T  
w hile  th ese  changes w ere  still be ing  considered  by  th e  B razilian  C ongress. C hanges in  the  leg isla tion  
concern ing  in form atics addressed  U .S . com plaints in  the  se c to r .14 T h e  sh ift in  U .S . trad e  po licy  tow ards 
a m ore  liberal B razil w as also expressed  by  th e  reversal o f  a long-standing  U .S . po licy  concern ing  
g raduation  o f  p roducts enjoying preferen tial trea tm en t under G SP as p references w ere  resto red  in  1990 
fo r p roducts w hose  trad e  covered about $0 .5  b illion . A D  and C V D  actions becam e less frequen t, bu t 
in  early  1992 the  end o f  th e  arrangem ents th a t lim ited  th e  supply  o f  B razilian  steel p roducts in  th e  U .S . 
m arket led , as w ould  be  expected , to  a num ber o f  antidum ping  in itiations.
In  th e  G A T T , no t only  w ere  m ultila teral fric tions o rig inating  from  b ila teral d ifficu lties rem oved, 
b u t B razil also tended  to  take  a m ore  active stance in  nego tia tions, includ ing  the  “ new  th em es .” In  the  
G eneva m eeting  B razil played an  im portan t ro le  in  the  coalition  th a t refused  to  p roceed  w ithou t a 
com m itm ent by  the  E C  and o ther countries th a t p ro tec t th e ir in terests in  tem pera te  ag ricu ltu re  to  liberalize
13. Foreign trade deregulation was significant but is treated below under trade liberalization.
14. The shift in US trade policy towards a more liberal Brazil was also expressed by the reversal o f a long standing 
US policy concerning graduation of products enjoying preferential treatment under GSP as preferences were restored 
in 1990 for products whose trade covered US$ 0.5 billion.
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th e ir  po lic ies in  m ore  sign ifican t w ays. A fter a y ea r’s stalem ate, th e  G A T T  S ecre taria t p resen ted  a d raft 
o f  th e  final act tha t em bodied th e  resu lts  o f  negotia tions since 1986, and B razil indicated  w illingness to 
accept it desp ite  reservations.
M o re  recen tly , m inor problem s em erged in  the  G A T T . T h e  old  B razil-U nited  States d ispu te  on 
C V D s o n  B raz il’s exports o f  non rubber foo tw ear flared  up  as B razil, w ith  su p p o rt o f  o ther contracting  
parties , has b locked  adoption  o f  th e  p an e l’s rep o rt in  favo r o f  the  U nited  S tates. S im ilarly , th e  U .S . 
b locked , a t least tem porarily , B raz il’s som ew hat odd  attem pt to  ob tain  G A T T  approval o f  its 
M E R C O SU R  arrangem ents u n d er th e  T okyo R ound F ram ew ork  agreem ent, w hich  assures developing  
countries special and d ifferen tia ted  trea tm en t, ra ther than  un d er th e  theore tica lly  m ore  exacting  (but 
no to riously  lax ly  applied) A rtic le  X X IV . In  m id-O ctober 1992, B razilian  com m ercial po licy  w as fo r the 
first tim e assessed un d er G A T T ’s T rad e  P o licy  R eview  M echanism  w ith  a quite  favo rab le  ou tcom e, w hich 
fu lly  recogn ized  the  libera liza tion  efforts undertaken  in  the  recen t past.
N ew  D ire c tio n s  in  L a tin  A m e ric a ’s E co n o m ic  In te g ra t io n
P roposals and a lternative im plem entation  scenarios fo r econom ic in teg ra tion  encom passing  L atin  
A m erican  econom ies and the  U nited  States have v a ry ing  im plications fo r B razil. R elevan t in tegration  
in itiatives include th e  N A F T A , and a W estern  H em isphere  F ree  T rad e  A greem ent (W H F T A ). T he 
M E R C O S U R  in itia tive  is re levan t only  w hen  it constrains o r  fosters econom ic in teg ra tion  o f  B razil and 
the U .S .
R egional econom ic in teg ra tion  has been hailed  by  m any as m ore  likely  to  p rom ote  trade  
libera liza tion  th an  m ultila teral negotia tions conducted  in  th e  G A T T . H ow ever, it is no t easy to  show  the 
unqualified  inheren t econom ic advantages o f  tak ing  reg ional econom ic in tegra tion  as a road  leading to  
a g lobal m arket unh indered  by  obstacles to  the  free  flow  o f  goods, serv ices, and fa c to rs .15 A dvantages 
are likely  to  v a ry  substan tia lly  w ith  the  individual characteristics o f  d ifferen t econom ies.
Som e argum ents are  based  on  po litical expediency to  show  the  advantages o f  reg ionaliza tion  over 
g lobalization . O ther frequen t argum ents tha t underline  th e  advantages o f  reg ional in tegra tion  stress tha t 
F T A s assure  access to  m arkets tha t w ould o therw ise  be fu rther re stric ted , and they  lock  in  libera liza tion  
com m itm ents. T h e  advantages p rov ided  by  G A T T ’s ta r if f  b ind ings fo r lock ing  in  liberalization , 
especially  in  th e  case o f  sm all econom ies, have  been  som ew hat d isregarded .
T h e  theo ry  o f  co llective action  has been  suggested  to  explain  w hy a sm all num ber o f  countries 
in terested  in  reg ional in teg ra tion , w ith m ore  apparen t sectoral in terests , are  m ore  likely  to  succeed than 
a la rg e  num ber o f  countries aim ing at the  successful conclusion  o f  m ultila teral trad e  nego tia tions, o f  
w hich th e  benefits a re  m ore  w idely  spread . T h is v iew  sure ly  underestim ates the  im portance  o f  d ifferences 
in  size , bargain ing  po w er, o r  bo th  am ong the  G A T T  contracting  parties . T h e  th eo ry  o f  co llective action
15. See, on this, Lawrence (1991) and, especially, Bhagwati (1992), who stresses the conflicts between regionalism 
and multilateralism. See also Lawrence (1991) and Fishlow and Haggard (1992) for views more inclined to see the 
advantages o f regionalism.
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is m ore  re levan t to  explain ing  th e  p ast troub les o f  th e  G A T T , w hich  w ere  essen tially  d u e  to  E C  objections 
to  th e  ex ten t and p ace  o f  ag ricu ltural lib era liza tio n .16
In  sharp  con trast w ith  the  1960s, recen t in teg ration  in itia tives involv ing  L atin  A m erican  
econom ies include as an  explicit end the  goal o f  increased access to  U nited  S tates m arkets. T h is has 
becom e possib le  as the  levels o f  ta r if f  and n o n ta riff p ro tec tion  in  L atin  A m erica  have  dram atically  
decreased  in  the  la s t decade. A s it is clear tha t N A F T A  takes precedence  o v er W H F T A  o n  th e  U .S . 
agenda, it m akes sense to  consider N A F T A  firs t, its im plications, dock ing  p ro v isions, and com patib ility  
w ith  W H F T A  o r o ther reg ional in teg ra tion  arrangem ents th a t do  n o t include th e  U .S ., such  as 
M E R C O SU R .
T h e  N A F T A  A greem ent is com plex, and it has m any d irec t and ind irec t im plications fo r  B raz il’s 
in terests. In  re la tion  to  trad e  in  goods, N A F T A  prov ides fo r the  p ro g ressiv e  e lim ination  o f  all ta riffs. 
In  m ost cases ta riffs  w ill b e  phased  ou t im m ediately  o r in  annual stages over fiv e  to  ten  years. F o r 
especially  sensitive p roducts , th e  tim e w ill b e  extended to  15 years. It is im portan t to  analyze d ifferen t 
scenarios concern ing  N A F T A , particu larly  in  re la tion  to  its trea tm en t o f  access o f  p roducts m ost affected 
b y  U nited  States p ro tec tion  and likely  to  be  o f  special in terest to  B razil, such as sugar, o range  ju ice , and 
certa in  m anufactured  goods.
O ne o f  th e  m ost res tric tiv e  features o f  the  agreem ent on  trad e  in  au tom otive goods is the  h igh 
level o f  N o rth  A m erican  conten t (62 .5  percent) requ ired  to  qualify  fo r p re fe ren tia l trea tm en t. S im ilarly , 
trad e  in  tex tiles and apparel requ ires N orth  A m erican  trip le  transfo rm ation , o r  “ yarn  fo rw ard ” ru les o f  
orig in .
L ibera lization  o f  trad e  in agricu ltu re  w ill take, in  certa in  cases, up  to  15 years. M exico and the 
U n ited  S tates agreed to  elim inate all n o n ta riff b a rrie rs  to  th e ir  agricu ltu ra l trad e  th ro u g h  conversion  to 
ta riff-ra te  quotas (T R Q s) o r  ta riffs. U p to  th e  quota  th resho ld , trad e  w ill be  du ty  free; du ties applied  to 
trad e  exceeding quota  lim its w ill b e  phased  ou t o v er ten  to  15 years.
S ugar and o range  ju ic e  are  th e  m ost im portan t p roducts in  the  U nited  S tates m arket to  qualify  for 
special trea tm en t. In  b o th  cases B raz il’s exports to  the  U nited  States a re  sign ifican t. S ugar T R Q s will 
b e  applied  in  th e  six th  year after N A F T A  takes e ffec t.17 A fter 15 years, all re stric tions on  sugar trade  
w ill have  been  abolished  except certa in  U .S . p rov isions o n  sugar re-exports . T o  increase  its quota, 
M exico w ill have  e ither to  increase p roductiv ity  o r  sh ift to  the  u se  o f  corn-based  sw eeteners in  its 
substantial so ft d rin k  industry  to  re lease  sugar fo r export. Special agricu ltu ra l safeguards can be  applied 
d u ring  th e  firs t ten  years.
W h ile  som e L a tin  A m erican  econom ies—M exico (m ore th an  7 0  p e rcen t) ,18 V enezuela  (around 
55 percen t), and C olom bia (around 45 percen t)—depend o n  N orth  A m erican  m arkets, they  are  less 
im portan t fo r  B razil (under 30 percen t) and A rgentina. T hese  o th e r la rg e  L atin  A m erican  econom ies 
depend  o n  E uropean  m arkets (25-30 percent) and m arkets in  E aste rn  E u ro p e  and o ther developing
16. See CEPR Bulletin, 50-51, April/June 1992, p. 18.
17. Brazil’s sugar quota in 1992 was 169,084 tons, equivalent to about $75 million.
18. Data from 1988 unless stated otherwise.
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econom ies, especially  A rgen tina. Im port com m odity  struc tu res, on  th e  o ther han d , to  a la rg e  extent 
define the  o rig in  o f  im ports. O il-dependent econom ies such as B razil pu rchase  a lo w er p ro p o rtio n  o f  
im ports in  developed  countries and a la rg e r share  in  W est A sia. In  1991 less th an  20  pe rcen t o f  total 
B razilian  exports w ere  purchased  by  the  U .S ., w hile  U .S . im ports m ade up  2 3 .6  percen t o f  to ta l B razilian  
im ports.
T ab le  1 show s th e  1989 shares o f  B razil, M exico , o ther developing  L atin  A m erican  countries, 
and o th e r supp liers in  to tal U nited  States im ports o f  p roducts re levan t to  B razil. P roducts  included in  the 
lis t co rrespond  to  m ore  than  79 p ercen t o f  to tal B razilian  exports to  th e  U .S . in  1991.
T h e re  is no com petition  in  th e  U .S  m arkets betw een  B razil and M exico fo r iron  and alum inum  
o res , p u lp  and w aste  p ap er, and gaso line, and only  m arg inal com petition  in  foo tw ear, o f  w hich  B razil’s 
exports to  th e  U nited  States am ounted to  $2 ,0 7 0  m illion  in  1989, 23 p ercen t o f  B razilian  exports to  the  
U .S . In  m ost o th e r p roducts th e re  is com petition  betw een  B razil and M exico fo r th e  U .S . m arket. O ther 
L atin  A m erica  and C aribbean  countries also com pete w ith  B razilian  p roducts fo r  th e  U .S . m arket, but 
th e ir  exports to  th e  U .S . o f  o range ju ice , pulp  and w aste  paper, and all m anufactured  goods w ith  the 
exception  o f  e lectrical m ach inery , c lo th ing , foo tw ear, and scien tific  equipm ent are  insignificant; 
44 p ercen t o f  B raz il’s exports to  th e  U .S . do no t com pete w ith  tho se  from  L A C  coun tries o ther than  
M exico.
A m ong th e  largest L atin  A m erican  coun tries, B razil w as, in  1986, the  m ost affected by  tariffs 
and by  bo th  ta r if f  and n o n ta riff  b a rrie rs  in  the  U nited  S tates. Incidence o f  all N T B s w as m arg inally  low er 
on  im ports from  B razil than  on  tho se  from  A rgen tina  and M exico , b u t B razilian  exports  w ere  re la tively  
m ore  affected b y  h ard -co re  N T B s (quantitative restric tions and flex ib le  im port fee s) .19 T ariffs  on  
B razilian  exports are  genera lly  low  (under 5 percen t) except in  th e  case o f  tobacco , copper, and tin  
m anufactured  goods, w hich varied  betw een  10 percen t and 17 percen t. Som e o f  B raz il’s m ost im portan t 
exports to  the  U .S .,  how ever, face sign ifican t n o n ta riff  barrie rs: o range  ju ice  (excise), su g ar (quota), 
steel p roducts (V ER s in  the  past, now  C V D  actions), and tex tiles and clo th ing  (under th e  M FA ).
E stim ates o f  sta tic  trad e  d iversion  caused by  N A F T A  suggest tha t the  to tal v a lu e  o f  trad e  diverted  
w ould  be  on ly  abou t $441 m illion , o f  w hich  no m ore  than  $35 m illion  w ould  b e  o f  L atin  A m erican  
o rig in . B razil w ould  b e  the  larg est lo ser, w ith  d iverted  exports o f  $18 .3  m illion , rough ly  h a lf  food  and 
agricu ltu ra l exports and h a lf  m anufactured  goods. T rad e  d iversion  w ould  be  dw arfed  by  th e  expected 
incom e effects o f  N A F T A  generated  by  a com prehensive libera liza tion  p ro g ram  th a t goes fa r beyond 
libera liza tion  o f  trad e  in  g o o d s .20 T rad e  d iversion  o f  B raz il’s exports is zero  fo r m any 
p ro d u c ts—crustaceans, nu ts, coffee, pu lp  and w aste p ap er, iron  and alum inum  o res , ru b b er p ro d u cts , and 
gaso line—eith er because ta r if f  rates in  the  U nited  States a re  zero  o r  because M exico’s exports to  the U .S . 
do no t ex ist. M ost trad e  d iversion  affects o range  ju ice , since B razil is the  dom inan t supp lier to  th e  U .S . 
and p ro tec tion  o f  o range  ju ic e  is h igh  in  th e  U .S .
19. See Erzan and Yeats (1992b), tables 5 and 7.
20. Erzan and Yeats (1992b), box 1. Assessment o f NAFTA trade diversion affecting Brazilian products is in line 
with findings on Kreinin-Finger "export similarity measures” o f  pairs o f  developing Latin American countries which 
placed the Brazil-Mexico pair in the top position, that is as the pair o f countries with the most similar export 
structure to the U .S ., see Erzan and Yeats (1992a), box 3.
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T able 1 
U nited  States
O rig in  o f  Im ports b y  S T IC  o r G roups o f  P ro d u cts , 1989
(percent)
B razil M exico
O ther dev. 
countries 







036 C rustaceans 3.61 13.13 29.01 54 .25 2 ,511 ,091
057 .7 N uts 26.51 5 .2 5 .3 6 62 .77 312,383
059.1 O range ju ice 86.41 10.23 2 .8 6 0 .5 0 569 ,529
061 Sugar 4 .3 6 5 .43 4 7 .7 9 42 .42 891 ,136
071 C offee 19.81 19.90 4 0 .8 4 19.45 2 ,5 7 7 ,4 0 8
12 T obacco 14.81 2 .7 4 12.06 7 0 .4 0 799 ,072
251 P u lp , w aste paper 7 .3 9 0 .2 6 0 .3 0 9 2 .0 4 3 ,1 6 4 ,3 6 7
281 Iro n  o re 19.21 0 21 .78 59.01 6 08 ,859
285 A lum inum  o re 4 .63 0 18.01 7 7 .3 6 1 ,708 ,535
334 M oto r gaso line 9 .61 0 .9 2 31 .87 57 .59 5 ,6 4 1 ,9 5 8
62 R ubber 2 .93 2 .61 0 .5 9 93 .87 3 ,8 1 5 ,5 7 6




Iro n  and steel
31 .44 9 .7 7 4 .5 8 5 4 .2 0 151,163
m anuf. goods 5 .8 5 2 .7 7 2 .93 8.45 11 ,376 ,408
682 C opper m anuf. goods 3 .46 9 .13 22.71 6 4 .7 0 2 ,2 3 8 ,6 6 9
687 T in  m anuf. goods 2 7 .3 0 5 .1 2 15.66 51 .92 343 ,785
71
72
P o w er genera ting  m ach. 
Special indus­
4 .1 6 8 .38 0 .13 87.33 14 ,488 ,108
tria l m achinery 1.73 1.13 0 .08 9 7 .0 6 13 ,390 ,418
73
74
M etalw ork ing  m achinery  
G eneral indus­
0 .5 0 0 .2 0 0 .05 9 9 .2 6 4 ,0 0 4 ,8 1 7
tria l m achinery 1.66 4 .8 6 0 .2 0 93 .28 14 ,973 ,973
75 O ffice m achines 0 .1 8 2 .9 6 0 .09 96 .78 2 6 ,2 5 1 ,7 1 6
76 T elecom m unications 0 .05 11.33 0 .08 8 8 .54 23 ,603 ,881
77 E lectrical m achinery 0 .5 4 12.75 0 .87 85.85 3 3 ,0 3 3 ,9 7 7
78 R oad vehicles 0 .9 2 3 .2 6 0 .08 9 5 .7 4 7 3 ,8 4 2 ,5 8 5
79 O ther transp . m achinery 2 .79 0 .63 0 .12 9 6 .4 6 7 ,2 1 7 ,3 7 7
84 C lo th ing  and accessories 0 .69 2 .29 8.79 88.23 2 6 ,0 2 5 ,9 8 2
85 F oo tw ear 12.46 1.95 2 .27 83.31 8 ,7 9 5 ,6 6 4
87 S cien tific  equipm ent 0 .22 7 .9 0 1.31 90 .57 5 ,9 6 4 ,0 3 7
88 P ho to  and optical equip. 1.80 1.60 0 .08 96 .52 5 ,9 9 7 ,1 2 2
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B ut even then , trad e  created  by  N A F T A  is sm all. M exico is no t an im portan t exporter to  the 
U nited  S tates. T rad e  d iversion  is therefo re  also quite sm all, and it is un like ly  th a t foo tw ear exports w ill 
be  substan tia lly  d iverted  as levels o f  p ro tec tion  are  low , w ith  tariffs  around  5 p ercen t and no recent 
N TB s.
F o r m ost p ro d u c ts , h ow ever, the  potential trad e  d iversion  o f  N A F T A  is likely  to  b e  fa r  m ore 
sign ifican t than  the  sta tic  one. P referen tia l ta r if f  trea tm en t o f  M exico in  the  U nited  States w ill stim ulate  
investm ent in  M exico b y  U nited  States and o ther coun try  p roducers o f  goods now  p ro tec ted  in  th e  U .S . 
Incen tives fo r new  investm ent are  likely  to  be  m ore  im portan t in sectors tha t a re  m ore  pro tec ted . T he 
m ain  p roduc ts  o f  in terest to  B razil tha t in  p rinc ip le  could be substan tia lly  d iverted  a fte r a tim e  lag  o f  five 
o r  m ore  years, a re  o range ju ic e , steel p ro ducts, sugar, and tex tiles. In  m ost cases M exico w ill have 
d ifficu lty  ra ising  p resen t p roduc tiv ity  to  levels requ ired  to  increase its m arket shares in  th e  U .S . 
substan tia lly .
T h e  E A I, announced in  Ju n e  1990, w as based  on  th ree  p illa rs: in teg ration  o f  trad e  in  a free-trade 
arrangem ent, p rom otion  o f  fo re ign  investm ent, and reduction  o f  fo re ign  debt. T h e  trad e  in tegration  
p roposals  are  likely  to  b e  m ore  sign ifican t than  those  on  investm ent and debt. L ibera lization  o f  fo re ign  
investm ent reg im es is to  be  fostered  th rough  tw o ID B -adm inistered  p rog ram s: a lim ited  technical 
assistance p ro g ram  and a m ultila teral investm ent fund. T h e  reduction  in  debt serv ice  is un like ly  to  
p rov ide  sign ifican t re lief, especially  fo r B razil: the  O verseas D evelopm ent C ouncil estim ated th e  likely  
deb t-serv ice  re lie f  o v er the  period  1991-94 to  be  $287 m illion . Japan  has con tribu ted  to  the  m ultila teral 
investm ent fund , b u t it is d ifficu lt to  p red ic t tha t the  E C  w ill cooperate  en thusiastically  in  th e  p rov ision  
o f  additional funds to  an in itia tive  tha t is clearly  a counterbalance to  its reg ional in teg ra tion  in itiatives. 
T h e  trad e  elem ent o f  th e  E A I has in  any case been c learly  dom inant as th e  N A F T A  nego tia tions have 
achieved success.
U nder th e  E A I fram ew ork , agreem ents have been  signed w ith  m any coun tries and g roups o f  
countries. T h e  R ose G arden  agreem ent o f  M ay 1991 w as signed w ith  th e  fou r m em bers o f  M E R C O SU R . 
T hese  agreem ents a re  qu ite  g enera l, firs t steps in the  negotia tion  o f  m atters o f  re levance.
A lthough  a “hub and spoke” m odel o f  in teg ration  involv ing  the  U nited  States and L a tin  A m erican  
econom ies w ould  be  possib le , th e  success o f  N A F T A  negotiations suggests as m ore  likely  tha t docking 
to  N A F T A  m ay in  due course  becom e the  standard  w ay fo r L atin  A m erican  countries to  achieve 
econom ic in tegra tion  w ith the U nited  S tates. A s the  en try  o f  new  m em bers erodes fo rm erly  established 
p re ferences, it is to  b e  expected  th a t negotia tions o f  new  accessions, especially  o f  la rg e r applicants w ith 
a p ro d u c tiv e  s tru c tu re  sim ilar to  M exico’s, w ill face M exican  resistance.
E stim ates o f  the  im pact o f  th e  preferen tial rem oval o f  trad e  b a rrie rs  in  th e  U nited  S tates m arket 
on  exports o f  L atin  A m erican  countries suggest tha t export gains a re  heavily  concentrated  in  M exico and 
B razil. O f a to ta l ex p o rt expansion  o f  $3 ,208  m illion , $1 ,6 4 0  m illion  w ould  benefit M exico and $947 
m illion  w ould  benefit B razil. In  fact, the  14.2 percen t expansion  o f  B razilian  exports is h ig h er than  the
9 .6  p e rcen t estim ated increase in  M exican exports because energy  p ro d u c ts—w hich  en ter th e  U .S . 
p ractica lly  du ty  free—are  an im portan t share  o f  total M exican exports to  th e  U .S . T otal L atin  A m erican  
exports w ould  increase 8 p ercen t w hile  exports from  countries such as C hile , P eru , B oliv ia  and E cuador 
w ould  g ro w  less th an  3 percen t. T hese estim ates re fe r to exclusive F T A s o f  each L a tin  A m erican  country
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w ith  the  U .S .,  bu t they  w ould no t be  significantly  d ifferen t in  a scenario  w here  all L atin  A m erican  
countries w ere  in tegrated  to  the  U .S . bu t no t linked to  each o th e r.21
Incentives to  in tegrate , how ever, m ay have little  connection  w ith  static  trad e  gains. In teg ra tion  
w ith  the  U nited  S tates m ay be  seen as the  best insurance against new  trad e  restric tions in  the  U .S ., as the 
m ost effective m eans o f  lock ing  in  elem ents o f  trad e  re fo rm , o r  as p a rt o f  a po licy  package to  attract 
fo re ign  investm ent.
C oncre te  in terest in p roposals  fo r econom ic in teg ration  w ith  th e  U nited  S tates varies considerab ly  
w ith  th e  structu ra l characteristics o f  specific  L atin  A m erican  econom ies. O ther factors m ay outw eigh  the 
advantages o f  im proved  access to  th e  U .S . m arket. T h is is the  case o f  B razil w hich , am ong the  larger 
L atin  A m erican  econom ies, is the  least likely  to  b e  enthusiastic  about in tegration  w ith  the  U .S . in  sp ite  
o f  th e  fact tha t it w ould  enjoy, after M exico, the  g rea test export expansion  in  a F T A  w ith  th e  U .S .
B raz il’s benefits in  en tering  a F T A  w ith  the  U nited  States w ould  be  re la tive ly  im portan t g iven 
the  h igh  value o f  its exports to  the  U .S . and the  h igh p rice  elasticities o f  dem and fo r its exports. T ariffs 
and N T B s sign ifican tly  affect its exports to  the  U .S . B raz il’s gains are  lim ited  by  th e  d iversifica tion  o f  
its export m arkets since its share  o f  exports to  the  U .S . is low er than  tha t o f  m ost o ther L atin  A m erican  
countries. E xports  to  th e  U .S . have been losing  im portance since th e  reco rd  year o f  1984, w hen  the  U .S . 
m arket regained  the  im portance o f  the  early  1970s (see T ab le  2). F ro m  1984 to  1990, B razil lo st m ore 
than  one  th ird  o f  its sh are  o f  the  U .S . m arket, and the  co llapse has continued: in  1991 U .S . exports w ere 
less than  20  p ercen t o f  B raz il’s to tal exports.
D isaggregated  figures show ing  shares o f  B razilian  im ports to  the  U nited  States (T able 3) 
indicate th a t the  decreasing  overall im portance o f  B razilian  exports to  the  U .S . can be  explained by 
the  re la tiv e  decline o f  food p roduct exports to  U .S . and, to  a lesser ex ten t (by a fac to r o f  about 10 
re la tive  to  food), o f  m anufactured  goods excluding  m achinery . Food im ports fell from  7.1  p e rcen t o f  
to ta l U .S . im ports in  1984 to  5 .7 5  percen t in  1989. B ut B razil also lo st m arket share  in  th e  U .S .,  
especially  in  food and live anim als (SITC 0 , w hich includes coffee and o range ju ice ), w hich fell from
12.6 percen t to  7 percen t because o f  gradual d islocation  o f  B razilian  coffee exports by  tho se  from  
o ther o rig in s and fluctuations in the  U .S . dom estic p roduction  o f  o range  ju ice .
A  F T A  w ith  the  U nited  States w ould have  consequences fo r B razilian  im ports and dom estic 
p roduction  o f  com petitive products sim ilar to  tho se  o f  m ultila teral libera liza tion . S ince B raz il’s ta r iff  
is h igh , and g iven  th e  d iversifica tion  in  th e  o rig in  o f  im ports, trad e  d iversion  o f  o ther suppliers w ould 
b e  considerab le . I t is to  be  expected that suppliers such as th e  E C  could , in  re ta lia tion , increase 
obstacles faced in  its m arkets by  B razilian  exports. I t is also likely  tha t re la tive ly  inefficiently  
p roduced  im ports from  the  U .S . w ould  d iv e rt efficient p roducers if  no o ther developed  coun try  had 
p referen tial access to  the  B razilian  m arket. T rad e  creation  in B razil w ould  also be  re la tive ly  m ore  
im portan t since th e  ta r if f  is h igher than  in the  U .S . and ad justm ent costs re la ted  to  th e  d isp lacem ent o f  
dom estic p roducers by  im ports are  likely  to  be  substan tia l.22
21. See Erzan and Yeats (1992b), table 8.
22. See Fritsch (1989).
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T ab le  2
B raz il’s E xports  to  th e  U nited  S tates, 1980-1990 
(percent)
Y ear
S hare  o f  exports 
to  th e  U .S . o f  
to ta l exports
B raz il’s share  
o f  U .S . 
im ports
B raz il’s 
sh are  o f  U .S . 
non-o il im ports
1980 17.4 1.61 2 .3 0
1984 2 8 .4 2 .38 2 .93
1989 24 .3 1.82 2 .0 6
1990 24 .5 1.66 1.88
S ources: C alculations based  on  IM F  and B razil C entral B ank data
T ab le  3
Shares o f  Im ports to  th e  U nited  States O rig inating  in  B razil 
in  U .S . T otal Im ports , 1980-89 
(percent)
S hare  o f S hare  o f
B raz il’s exports to —  U .S . im ports —
the U .S . (1984) 1980 1984 1989
A ll food  (STC  0 + 1  + 2 2 + 4 )  31 .2 10.73 10.9 6 .1 9
A gricu ltu ra l raw  m ateria ls (2 - (2 2 + 2 7 + 2 8 ))  1.9 2 .79 2.91 3 .8
F uels (3) 9 .7 0 .0 6 1.27 0 .3 6
O res and m etals ( 2 7 + 2 8 + 6 8 )  5 .3 1.51 3 .52 3 .2 7
M anufactured  goods ( 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 - 6 8 )  4 9 .5 1.04 1.36 1.24
C hem ical p roducts (5) 5 .5 1.49 3 .16 1.57
O ther m anuf. p roduc ts  (6 + 8 -6 8 )  30 .5 1.52 1.91 1.57
M ach inery  (7) 13.6 0 .6 7 0.91 1.05
M em o: Iro n  and steel p roducts — 2.80 5 .0 4 5 .8 5
T extiles 3 .45 3 .79 3.21
F ru it ju ice s  — 38 .78 7 5 .2 5 55 .87
Source: C alcu lations based  o n  U nited  N ations C om m odity  T rade  S ta tistics, 1989.
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T h e im portance o f  the  B razilian  m arket cannot be  underestim ated , even i f  B raz il’s m ediocre  
m acroeconom ic perfo rm ance since  th e  early  1980s—high in fla tion  and falling  p e r capita 
G D P —contrasts pa in fu lly  w ith  the  im provem ent o f  o ther L atin  A m erican  econom ies. B raz il’s is a 
re la tively  closed econom y, p a rtly  because it is o f  continental size. E ven  so , its m arket fo r im ports 
com pared to  those  o f  o ther L atin  A m erican  econom ies is second on ly  to  M ex ico ’s (T able 4 ), in  w hich 
the  U nited  States m arket share  is already very  h igh . E ven  if, fo r exam ple, C h ile ’s im p o rt/G N P  ratio  
is five  tim es B raz il’s im port/G N P  ra tio , the  sheer size o f  B raz il’s G N P , about 15 tim es tha t o f  C hile, 
m eans th a t B raz il’s im port m arket is rough ly  th ree  tim es th e  size o f  the  C hilean  m arket. M oreover, 
th e  size  o f  th e  dom estic m arket is increasing ly  re levan t, even w ith  re la tive ly  low  ra tio s o f  openness, 
fo r issues d irec tly  o r  ind irec tly  re la ted  to  fo re ign  investm ent, services and intellectual p ro p erty , tend 
to  gain  in  im portance com pared to  trad itional trad e  issues.
R em aining ou tside  e ither a “hub-and-spoke” trad e  in teg ration  o f  the  A m ericas, o r  a W H F T A  
w ith m any m em bers, o r  w ithou t a p referen tial arrangem ent w hen  m ost o th e r L atin  A m erican  countries 
have one , w ould  fo ster potential trad e  conflicts w ith the  U nited  S tates. B raz il’s exports are  likely  to 
be  d iverted  by  the  U nited  States in  L atin  A m erica, g iven  the  h igh  sh are  o f  m anufactured  goods in 
exports to  o ther L atin  A m erican  countries and the  share  o f  L atin  A m erican  exports in  B raz il’s to tal 
exports.
A lternative  scenarios fo r the  tim ing  and scope o f  econom ic in tegration  depend  crucially  on 
U nited  States po licy . O ne alternative  is th a t w hile  N A F T A  is be ing  d igested , th a t is, w h ile  the  
po litical consequences o f  the  initial d islocations p roduced  by  trad e  libera liza tion  are  being  settled , the 
U .S . w ould  no t b e  eager to  consider fu rth er concrete  initiatives seeking in teg ration  w ith  a re la tively  
large  L atin  A m erican  econom y such as B razil, e ither th rough  b ila teral F T A s o r N A F T A  docking  
p rov isions. T h is w ill b e  tru e  desp ite  the  sign ifican t advantages to  the  U .S . i f  its p roducts benefit from  
p referen tia l access to  th e  B razilian  m arket. A n additional independent de te rren t to  the  U .S . is a 
continuation  o f  th e  “ sick  m an o f L a tin  A m erica” syndrom e in B razil.
T ab le  4
O penness and S ize o f  the  L arg est L atin  A m erican  E conom ies, 1990
E x ports/G N P Im ports/G N P T otal trad e /G N P  
(Brazil =  100)
T otal G D P
A rgentina 0 .138 0 .046 0 .1 8 4 2 2 .2
B razil 0 .078 0 .0 5 6 0 .1 3 4 100.0
C hile 0 .335 0 .2 7 4 0 .609 6 .4
C olom bia 0 .1 6 6 0 .137 0 .303 10.1
M exico 0 .1 2 4 0.131 0 .255 53 .3
P eru 0 .1 3 0 0 .128 0 .2 5 9 6 .2
V enezuela 0 .341 0 .126 0 .468 12.5
Source: C alcu lations based  on  W orld  B ank data.
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M o reo v er, g iven  the  sim ilarities o f  econom ic s tructu res in  B razil and M exico , it is to  be  expected 
th a t M exico m ay resis t B razil-U nited  States p referen tial trad e  arrangem ents fo r fear o f  erod ing  prev ious 
benefits gained  in  the  U .S . In teg ra tion  sequencing is likely  to  b e  defined by  resistance  to  w idening  
in tegra tion  by  p rev iously  in tegrated  partners.
T h e  alternative  scenario  is determ ined  by  w illingness o f  th e  U nited  S tates to  go  ahead w ith 
W H F T A  because its po litical s ign ificance and perceived  econom ic gains ou tw eigh  d ifficu lties caused by  
perceived  costs re la ted  to  dom estic  d islocations. A tten tion  w ould  tend  natu ra lly  to  cen ter on  B razil, 
w hich w ill then  face a d ifficu lt situation . Its in terests a re  m ultila teral and system ic, and no t stric tly  
reg ional. T o  p roceed  w ith in teg ra tion  w ith  th e  U .S . w ould  fu rth er s tra in  th e  dom estic  secto rs th a t are 
a lready  ad justing  to  a sign ifican t trad e  libera liza tion  p rog ram . T a riff  ra tes, how ever, a re  above those  in 
o ther L atin  A m erican  coun tries, and they  w ill rem ain  so after the  last round  o f  reductions in  m id-1993. 
T rad e  d iversion  w ill s ign ifican tly  affect o ther suppliers w ith  a risk  o f  re ta lia tion  in  th e  case o f  som e o f  
them , in  particu la r the  E C .
T h e  fact tha t A rgen tina  and B razil are  p artners in  M E R C O S U R  in p rin c ip le  fosters econom ic 
in tegra tion  betw een  B razil and the  U nited  S tates, g iven  A rgen tina’s considerab le  en thusiasm  fo r 
in teg ra tion  w ith  the  U .S . even i f  the  econom ic foundations o f  th a t en thusiasm  are  som ew hat m ysterious. 
B ut th e re  are  pow erfu l counterbalancing  fac to rs. T h e  m ost im portan t are  linked to  th e  lack  o f  perceived  
net econom ic advantage fo r B razil. T he balance o f  costs and benefits is likely  to  b e  w orsened  by  the 
poten tia l d islocation  o f  B razilian  exports by  U .S . p roducts in  A rgentina. R ecognition  o f  such difficulties 
has p rom pted  B razil to  p roceed  on  a “ fou r p lus o n e” basis, that is, M E R C O SU R  and the  U .S ., ra ther 
than  b ila tera lly .
T h ere  are  also po litical lim its to  A rgen tine  initiatives th a t counter B raz il’s concrete  in terests. 
In te rest in  the  tw o b ig  p artners in  M E R C O SU R  w as from  the  s ta rt no t sym m etrical, g iven  the  size o f  
the ir m arkets. P o litical argum ents had  g rea t w eight in  explain ing B raz il’s stance. A rg en tin a ’s recent 
increase in  im port duties to  reduce trad e  im balances generated  by  overvaluation  o f  th e  exchange ra te  has 
been  accom panied by  critic ism  o f  B raz il’s m acroeconom ic policies as a cause o f  th e  im port su rge . W hile  
B raz il’s inab ility  to  contro l in fla tion  is a m ajor stum bling b lock  in the  path  o f  M E R C O S U R , th is  should  
no t h id e  the  substan tia l d isto rtions in A rg en tin a’s fo re ign  exchange po licy . O ne o f  th e  very  few  
acceptable featu res o f  econom ic po licy  in  B razil is tha t the  exchange ra te  is about righ t. In  A rgentina 
itself, lobbies favo ring  in tegration  w ith the  U nited  S tates, even at the  cost o f  je ttiso n in g  M E R C O SU R , 
seem  to  b e  gain ing  strength .
T h e  consequences o f  reg ional arrangem ents such as N A F T A  and W H F T A  on  investm ent flow s 
w ill v a ry  d ram atically  depending  on  specific  conditions. It is reasonab le  to  expect th a t investm ent from  
the  U nited  States w ould  benefit la rger countries such as M exico and B razil. I t is also likely  th a t, at least 
in itia lly , the  d riv e  fo r econom ies o f  scale and scope w ill benefit those  countries w here  th ere  a lready  exists 
a  sm all num ber o f  la rg e  p lan ts. T h is is especially  re levan t in the  case o f  m ultinational en terp rises. T he 
theore tica l increase o f  fo re ign  investm ent from  sources o ther than  the  U .S . could b e  reversed  by  clauses 
such as tho se  on  ru les o f  o rig in . T h e  s tiff  o rig in  requ irem ents defined fo r th e  au tom otive industry  under 
N A F T A , fo r exam ple, w ill fu rth er reduce M exico’s already lim ited  a ttraction  o f  investm ent by  Japanese 
firm s. B ut such general argum ents m ust be  qualified  by  consideration  o f  com parative m acroeconom ic
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environm ents. B raz il’s p resen t capacity  to  a ttrac t such investm ents is lim ited  desp ite  its structu ral 
advantages o f  s ize .23
In  p rincip le , the  enhancem ent o f  in tra industry  trad e  as a consequence o ff  reg ional in tegration  
depends to  a g rea t ex ten t on the  tim ing  o f  inclusion o f  th e  b igger p artn ers . So, the  la te r B razil and 
A rgen tina  are  in tegrated  w ith  the  U nited  States re la tive  to  th e  inclusion  o f  M exico in N A F T A , th e  m ore 
likely  it is th a t in ter- and in trafirm  arrangem ents w ill consolidate  in trasectoral trad e  w ith in  the  respective 
reg ional in teg ration  arrangem ents. T h is affects p resen t industria l capacity  and fu tu re  investm ent fostered  
by  ta r if f  reductions and im provem ent in  opera ting  conditions.
R e la tio n s  B etw een  B ra z il a n d  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  a n d  R eg io n a l In te g ra t io n  in  th e  A m erica s
It is no t easy to  determ ine how  relations betw een th e  U nited  States and B razil w ould  b e  affected 
by  the  m ost likely  outcom es fo r regional in tegration . T w o scenarios based  on  d ifferen t U .S . po lic ies on 
the  pace o f  reg ional in tegration  have been considered . T h e  firs t, w ith  th e  U .S . unw illing  to  p roceed  very  
rap id ly  w ith  trad e  in tegration  w ith  o ther L atin  A m erican  econom ies, w ould  genera te  less fric tion  than  the 
second, in  w hich the  U .S . pursues in tegration  m ore  actively: B raz il’s d iverse  econom ic in terests w ould 
m ake it unen thusiastic  to  pu rsue  rap id  in tegration .
B ut d ifferen t trends concern ing  econom ic po licy  and structu ra l re fo rm  in B razil are  h igh ly  
relevan t to  any analysis o f  the fu tu re  o f  econom ic re la tions betw een  B razil and th e  U nited  S tates. O n the 
o ther hand , it is no t un likely  tha t trad e  libera liza tion  w ill rem ain  frozen  o r  even be  reversed  in  special 
cases. O ther struc tu ra l reform s such as p riva tiza tion  have already been  adversely  affected . O ne 
extrem ely  serious (but frequen tly  m issed) consequence o f  the  institu tional crisis th a t led to  P residen t 
C o llo r’s im peachm ent fo r co rrup tion  is tha t struc tu ra l reform s in troduced  b y  the  p rev ious adm in istra tion  
are  being  singled  ou t, especially  b y  vested  in terests, as being  tain ted  because they  w ere  p roposed  by  a 
d iscred ited  p residen t.
In  a clim ate o f  low  expectations th ere  is no cred ib le  ro le  fo r stra teg ic  trad e  po lic ies. D ecision  
m aking w ould  face w ell-know n difficulties. T h e  effects o f  costly  past e rro rs  in ta rg e tin g  and pace, and 
sharp  d e te rio ra tion  o f  adm inistra tive capacity  in  the  federal governm ent. It is un like ly  th a t tim id  advances 
in  po litical transparency  w ill be  ab le to  com pensate fo r these  un favo rab le  trends. I f  th is scenario  p revails , 
B raz il’s cred ib ility  w ill continue to  reflect its econom ic frag ility , and re la tions w ith  the  U nited  S tates are 
likely  to  deterio ra te.
G iven  the  lim its o f  B raz il’s in terest in econom ic in teg ra tion , its stances and activ ities in 
m ultila teral trad e  fo rum s, p articu larly  in th e  G A T T , are  likely  to  be  rem ain  m ore  im portan t. T h ere  is 
som e scope fo r convergence o f  in terests w ith  th e  U nited  States in th is  context.
B raz il’s nego tia ting  agenda in the G A T T  em phasized issues re la ted  to  B razil as a demandeur: 
tem pera te  agricu ltu re ; trop ical p roducts; tex tiles and clo th ing; antidum ping  du ties, subsidy  countervailing  
du ties, and o ther im pedim ents to  exports o f  m anufactures; and im provem ent o f  th e  G A T T  system  
including  d ispu te  se ttlem ent and defin ition  o f  ru les and th e ir  im plem entation . T h e  re s t o f  the  agenda
23. See Vemon (1992), p. 25.
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consisted  o f  issues o f  a m ore  defensive nature: “new  issu es” th a t have  becom e trad itio n a l—serv ices, 
TR IPS and T R IM S —and em erging  them es th a t w ill becom e increasing ly  im portan t in  m ultila teral 
nego tia tions. T h ese  include th e  harm onization  o f  po licies re la ted  to  environm ental p ro tec tion  standards, 
com petition , and labo r rig h ts , and to  d iscrim ination  o f  th ird  coun tries created  b y  reg ional in tegration  
in itiatives such as stringen t ru les o f  o rig in . T here  is concern  tha t B razil m ay becom e a p re fe rred  target 
o f  d isc rim ina to ry  actions by developed countries including  th e  U nited  S tates, as p o licy  harm onization  is 
requ ired  to  ensure  a “ level p lay ing  f ie ld .”
T h ere  is a convergence o f  the  in terests o f  B razil and th e  U nited  States in  re la tion  to  agricu ltural 
libera liza tion  and m ost system ic issues.24 In  re la tion  to  m ost o ther G A T T  “b ack lo g ” issues, the  tw o 
coun tries are  like ly  to  have  m o re  d ifficu lty  find ing  com m on g round . B razil is in terested  in  im proving  
access to  the  m arkets o f  developed  countries including the  U .S . In  re la tion  to  th e  “ new  issu e s ,” and, still 
m ore, to  th e  em erg ing  issues re la ted  to  po licy  harm onization , the  poten tia l fo r fric tion  is considerab le  
since th e  U .S . leads th e  g roup  o f  demandeur countries.
D urab le  m in im ization  o f  fric tions betw een B razil and th e  U nited  States requ ires a com bination  
o f  re la tive ly  slow  hem ispheric  in teg ration , a continuous com m itm ent to  m ultila teral libera liza tion  by  both  
countries in  the  G A T T , and developm ents in  B razil tha t w ould  assu re  ach ievem ent o f  p rice  stab ilization  
and the  effective im plem entation  o f  struc tu ra l reform s p rog ressin g  tow ards the  conso lida tion  o f  a m arket 
econom y.
24. The asymmetric interests concerning the new issues, particularly TRIPS, combined with certain features o f the 
proposed WTO, such as the integrated dispute settlement system allowing cross retaliation, could be unfavorable 
to developing countries. Similarly, the existence o f  several specialized councils may weaken the position of 
contracting parties with limited bargaining power.
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FROM MERCOSUR TO AMERICAN INTEGRATION
L uiz C arlos B resser P ere ira  
V era T horstensen
In tro d u c tio n
B razil is go ing  th rough  an  im portan t m om ent in its in ternational re la tions and fo re ign  trade  
po lic ies. I t has to  choose betw een  tw o possib le  stra teg ies. T h e  firs t is the  m ain tenance o f  m ultila teralism , 
w hich  is the  stra tegy  B razil has been  fo llow ing  fo r a long tim e: no special re la tionsh ips w ith  those 
reg ional b locs th a t a re  being  created , except fo r the  Southern  C one. T h e  second one  is th e  s tra tegy  o f  
A m erican  in teg ra tion , i .e .,  the  insertion  o f  the  B razilian  econom y in a reg ional b loc led by the  U nited  
States.
It m ay be  necessary  to re th ink  the question  o f  inserting  B razil in the  in ternational econom y, since 
the  prev ious fram ew ork  tha t has served as reference  until now  has been im paired . T h is fram ew ork , in 
its s tra igh t fo rm , is no t useful to  the  U nited States nor to  B razil. T h e  alternative  is to  adopt new  
stra teg ies, consisten t w ith  the new  in ternational realities.
S ince 1991, B razil, A rgen tina , U ruguay  and Paraguay  have been engaged in a p rocess o f  
econom ic in tegration  th a t ough t to  be  accom plished by the  end o f  1994. In  spite  o f  th e  d ifficu lties o f  
such a p ro jec t, the  countries be longing  to  M E R C O SU R  are  aw are the  in teg ration  cannot exclude a 
stra tegy  o f  in ternational insertion , since M E R C O SU R  alone is no t sufficien tly  la rg e  to  b rin g  to  the 
m em ber countries econom ies’ the  necessary  dynam ism .
T h e  M E R C O S U R  option  has already been adopted and is no t under d iscussion  here . O ur p o in t 
is to  analyze the  fu tu re  options o f  alliances w ith in  a new  in ternational o rd er. T h e  fundam entally  
im portan t decision  to  be  m ade by  B razil and its partners o f  M E R C O SU R  refers  to  the  selection o f  a 
stra tegy  o f  insertion  in the  in ternational econom y.
O ne a lternative  is the  m aintenance o f  the  stra tegy  o f  m ultila teralism , w here  B razil d o esn ’t  stand 
fo r special alliances w ith any o th e r g rea t p a rtn e r o r  trad ing  bloc and m aintains its po licy  o f  export 
d iversifica tion  by  products and destinations. T h is op tion  has been defended and im plem ented th rough  the 
1970s and 1980s.
A nother a lternative is to  strengthen  the  alliance w ith the U nited  States bu t no t at the  expense o f  
o u r re la tionsh ips w ith  th e  rest o f  th e  w orld . D raw ing  on the  1990 proposal m ade by the  U nited  States the 
m ain  ob jec tive  is to  create  a free  trad e  area in the  reg ion . B razil w ould p ro fit from  th e  access to  a b ig  
m arket, new  investm ents and technology  but, on the o ther hand, w ould  run  the costs o f  open ing  its 
econom y, w hich is no t fu lly  p repared  to face the  com petition  o f  the  U nited  S tates, and th e  costs o f  
im ports d iversion  from  o ther trad e  reg ions. O n the  o ther hand , B razil w ould  b e  buy ing  an “ insurance 
p o licy ” against th e  uncertain ties o f  the  fu tu re , especially  against possib le  problem s b ro u g h t about by  the 
streng then ing  o f  reg ional b locs, including the  N orth-A m erican  one; such as: selective p ro tec tion  to  certain  
p roducts, defense o f  th e  in terests o f  th e  m em bers o f  the b loc, and one-sided decisions against the  alleged 
“unfa ir tra d e ” practiced  by  exporters ou tside the  b loc. T hese  a re  the  com m on practices o f  an in ternational
413
Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere
trad e  m ore  and m ore  m anaged and less and less liberalized  in  a w orld  w here  th e re  is no hegem onic pow er 
to  ensu re  tru e  m ultila tera lism  (K rasner 1976).
T h is p ap er w ill exam ine th e  B razilian  po licy  op tion  o f  adhesion  to  W H F T A . T h e  f irs t section 
w ill analyze th e  new  reference  fram ew ork  facing B razil after th e  co llapse o f  com m unism  and  th e  end o f  
th e  C old  W ar. T h en  it w ill analyze th e  possib le  in terests o f  th e  E uropean  U n ion , fo rm erly  th e  E C , and 
Japan  in  B razil. In  th e  th ird  and fourth  sections w e w ill d iscuss respective ly  th e  national in te rest o f  the 
U nited  States and o f  B razil in  the  crea tion  o f  an  A m erican  bloc. T h e  fifth  sec tion  d iscusses B raz il’s 
objections to  the  c rea tion  o f  a U .S .- led  econom ic b loc.
T h e  p ap er w ill adopt a h is to ric  o r  rea lis tic  approach . T heore tically , m ultila tera lism  is the  m ost 
ra tional long  te rm  op tio n  fo r B razil ju s t  as it is fo r any coun try  in  th e  w orld . In  th e  sh o rt and  m edium  
ru n , h o w ev er, B razil has to  analyze the  in ternational trad e  and investm ent tendencies, and consequently  
take  in itia tives, instead  o f  be ing  dragged  by  th e  c ircum stances o r  excluded from  th e  em erg ing  w orld  
econom ic system .
T h e  N ew  F ra m e w o rk
Several fac to rs define the  new  fram ew ork . T h e  slow ing  o f  econom ic g ro w th  o f  the  developed 
coun tries, and p articu la rly  o f  the  U nited  S tates, after th e  firs t o il shock  o f  1993, d ie  ex trao rd in ary  success 
o f  Jap an  and the  A sian  tig e rs , th e  consolidation  o f  the  fo rm er E C , the  dem ocratic  revo lu tion  in  E ast 
E u ro p e  s ignalling  th e  co llapse o f  com m unism , and th e  deb t and econom ic crisis o f  L atin  A m erica  since 
th e  1980s a re  som e o f  th e  new  h isto ric  facts tha t define an em erging  new  in ternational o rd e r and m ake 
it necessary  fo r B razil to  take  a stand.
F o u r aspects o f  tha t changing  p rocess are  p articu larly  re levan t to  th e  defin ition  o f  th e  new  
fram ew ork:
■ The change from a bipolar model to a multipolar one. T h e  N ew  In ternational O rd er defined 
in  1989 w ith  th e  fall o f  the  B erlin  W all, the  reunifica tion  o f  G erm any and th e  co llapse o f  th e  S ov ie t B loc, 
b ro k e  dow n the  o ld  m odel o f  p ow er b ipo larity  betw een  the  U nited  S tates and th e  U SSR . W ith  th e  end 
o f  th e  C old  W ar th e  w orld  faces th e  lack  o f  clear econom ic leadersh ip  and the  b irth  o f  a new  m ultipo lar 
m odel, w hich  w ill p robab ly  b e  centered on  a triad  com posed o f  th e  E U , the  U nited  S tates and Japan , 
confron ting  o ther po les o f  po litical ra th e r th an  econom ic pow er. A m ong them  p ro b ab ly  w ill b e  R ussia, 
allied  to  w hat w ill b e  left from  th e  C om m onw ealth  o f  Independent S tates, the  M uslim  G roup  and even 
C hina , w hich  is in  th e  p rocess o f  econom ic liberalization .
■ End o f the U.S. hegemony. T h e  U nited  States has a lready  lo st th e  lead ing  position  in  w orld  
trad e  to  th e  E U , bo th  in  exports and im ports. T hey  have  also  lost to  Jap an  th e ir  technological leadersh ip  
in  som e lead ing  sec to rs, includ ing  those  o f  m ass p roduction  such as au tom obiles, in form atics and 
te lecom m unications. T h e  U nited  States has changed from  the  position  o f  fo re ign  investm ent leadership  
to  b ig  in ternational d eb to r, w ith  a  fo re ign  deb t am ounting to  o v er $1 trillio n , an  in ternal deb t o f  about 
$4  trillio n , a  budget defic it around  $300 b illion  and a trad e  defic it o f  about $100 b illion . A t p resen t the  
leadersh ip  o f  th e  in ternational econom y is vacan t bu t tw o o ther candidates besides th e  U nited  S tates are 
in  th e  race: th e  E U  and Japan . A s Japan  is a g rea t econom ic p o w er b u t no t a po litical o n e  in  the
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in ternational arena, th e  fo rm er E C , now  th e  E uropean  U n ion , is doub tless th e  s trongest candidate fo r 
w orld  leadersh ip  (T hurow  1992).
■ Globalization o f the economies. T h e  g lobalization  o f  m arkets, p ro duction  and investm ent puts 
an  end to  th e  o ld  m odel o f  national econom ies centered  on  th e ir  dom estic m arkets and gives p rio rity  to 
export activ ities, w hich  have been  grow ing  faster th an  the  in ternal ones. Such a g lobalization  leads to  the  
in ternationalization  o f  trad e , investm ents, and o f  the  transference  o f  p ro d u c t and p rocess technology .
■ Weakening o f multilateralism and strengthening o f regionalism. T h e  ever g row ing  com plexity  
o f  the  in ternational trad e  re lations eventually  upsets th e  basic  p rinc ip les supported  b y  th e  G eneral 
A greem ent on  T ariffs and T rad e—G A T T : trad e  libera liza tion  and m ultila teral nego tia tions, involv ing  the 
condem nation  o f  all fo rm s o f  d iscrim ination  betw een  com m ercial pa rtn e rs . H ow ever, fo r the  last few  
years the  w orld  has w itnessed  th e  streng then ing  o f  “m anaged tra d e ,” i.e . th e  se lec tive  p ro tec tion ism  
related  to  special p roduc ts and partn ers , th e  adoption  o f  un ila teral m easures against u n fa ir trade , and the  
crea tion  o f  reg ional b locs. A ccord ing  to  P rim o  B raga  and Y eats, in  1988 the  percen tage  o f  in ternational 
trad e  based  on  reg ional agreem ents w as 5 3 .7 , w ith  30 .5%  o f  th is  tak ing  p lace  w ith in  th e  E U  o r betw een 
the  U nited  S tates and C anada. T h e  au thors, how ever, after po in ting  ou t tha t th e  system  o f  un ila tera l trade  
agreem ents has a lready  reached  irreversib le  p ro p o rtio n s, conclude tha t “ the  p ro life ra tio n  o f  m anaged trad e  
in itiatives seem s, to  u s , to  pose  a la rg e r th rea t to  the  m ultilateral trad e  system  in a post-U ruguay  R ound 
w orld  th an  new  p referen tia l trad ing  b lo cs” (1992:21).
Such trad in g  b locs have  th e ir  ow n typology: (a) econom ic b lo c  v ia  com m on m arket, such as the  
E C ; (b) trad in g  b loc  v ia  a free  trad e  agreem ent such as the  N A F T A ; and (c) b locs o f  concerted  
p roduction , o f  the  k ind being  developed  betw een  Japan  and th e  coun tries o f  the  P acific . T h e  last type 
targets  th e  b ig  fo re ign  m arkets, bu t doesn ’t in tend to  create  a  free  trad in g  area  am ong th e m .1 A s 
indicated  b y  th e  d ifficu lties being  faced in the U ruguay  R ound, th e  am bitious a ttem pt to  streng then  G A T T  
as th e  in ternational trad e  ru le r has been  fru stra ted  exactly  because  th e  in ternational trad in g  p a rtn e rs  have  
a lready  been  p rac tic ing  a p ragm atic  reg ionalism , opposed  to  th e  so rt o f  a trad e  libera lism  w hich now adays 
appears unatta inable .
W ith in  th is  fram ew ork , new  rela tionsh ips a re  beg inn ing  to  develop  in  the  continent. T hey  m ay 
becom e th e  em bryo o f  A m erican  in teg ra tion , w ith  the  crea tion  o f  the  B loc o f  th e  A m ericas o r  th e  
A m ericas’ F re e  T rad e  A ssociation . F ro m  W orld  W ar II to  the  end o f  th e  1970s the  re la tions betw een  the 
U n ited  S tates and th e  o ther coun tries o f  th e  A m ericas w ere  m arked  b y  a p rocess o f  conflic t and 
cooperation . C onflic t a rose  m ostly  due  to  the  national im port substitu tion  industria liza tion  stra tegy  
adopted by  th e  L atin -A m erican  coun tries, w h ile  the  cooperation  cam e from  th e  su p p o rt g iven  b y  the  
reg io n  to  th e  U nited  S tates in th e ir  confron tation  w ith  the  U SSR .
T h e  1980s w ere  m arked  b y  conflicts o f  in terest re la ted  to  trad e , to  intellectual p ro p erty  rig h ts , 
to  th e  fo re ign  deb t and by  the  L a tin -A m erica’s becom ing  aw are o f  the  necessity  to  face the  fiscal crisis, 
at a tim e  w hen  th e  popu list, inner-orien ted  g row th  stra tegy  p roved  exhausted . T h e re  w as no a lternative 
b u t to  im plem ent m arket-o rien ted  structu ral reform s and enforce fiscal d iscip line.
1. Sylvia Ostry proposes a typology o f modes o f integration based on its depth. W e would have "deep 
integration", involving economic, political and institutional dimensions, as EC, and "economic or natural 
integration", as NAFTA and the East Asian bloc (1992: 5).
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at a tim e  w hen the  populist, inner-oriented  grow th strategy proved exhausted. There w as no alternative 
bu t to  im plem ent m arket-orien ted  structural reform s and enforce fiscal discipline.
T he 1990s w ill p robably  be m arked by new  threats, now  related  to  econom ic and social them es 
such as: drugs, im m igration  control and environm ental protection. The key-poin t o f  the  new  relationship , 
how ever, is the reduction  and consolidation  o f  L atin-A m erica’s foreign debt, the  success o f  the  
stab ilization  program s and structural reform s and, above all, the efforts to  resum e grow th and incom e 
d istribu tion , w hich  are not ye t assured.
H aving  in m ind  this last objective, the U nited States, through the E nterprise  for the  A m ericas, 
pu t forw ard an initial p roposal for creating an A m erican Free T rading Z one granting  the  L atin-A m erican  
countries access to  th e ir m arket. R egardless o f  its in trinsic m erits, P resident B u sh ’s proposal differs 
from  the  o ther tw o em erging blocs (the EU  and the  Japanese) because they  do no t show  the  sam e 
in terest in  L atin  A m erica.
T h e  P r io r i t ie s  o f  th e  E U
In the late 1980s, B razil and Latin  A m erica expected tha t the then EC w ould  considerab ly  
change its a ttitude tow ard  the  region w ith the entry o f  Portugal and Spain into the C om m unity . But, in 
sp ite o f  new  cooperation agreem ents (already in the th ird  generation) w hich  include a vast reperto ire 
o f  in itia tives, the  essential elem ents such as access to  m arkets and investm ents o r financing have no t 
changed. B raz il’s only  priv ilege is the access to  the G eneralized System  o f  Preferences. B u t because 
it is one o f  the g reatest beneficiaries o f  tha t system , B razil runs the risk  o f  having m any  o f  its products 
excluded from  the nex t program  now  being negotiated. It is true that the vo lum e o f  resources for 
financing  and support has risen, bu t they  are m ain ly  addressed to  the least developed countries o f  the 
region, especially  C entral A m erica.
In  the  late 1980s the C om m ission  in B russels tried  to  turn  the foreign debt into a po litica l issue 
bu t w as to ld  by  its m em bers that this w as a prerogative o f  the individual governm ents, ra ther than a 
C o m m u n ity ’s concern. A dditionally , the m em bers o f  the EU  follow ed the leadership  o f  the  U .S. 
governm ent and o f  the U .S . com m ercial banks, w hich are the greatest holders o f  L atin-A m erican  debt.
F rom  1986 on, the EU  reappears in the in ternational scene as a great econom ic pow er by 
converting  the internal m arket into reality  w ith a free flow  o f  people, goods, services, and capital. It 
thus becam e an im portan t partner not only  because o f  the size o f  its m arket bu t also because o f  the 
possib ilities o f  accom plish ing  new  agreem ents on com m ercial cooperation, investm ent and technology. 
Y et, the  EU  now  faces great challenges: the deepening o f  the  C om m unity  w ith  the  estab lishm ent o f  the 
m onetary  and political unification  negotiated  in M aastricht in 1991; enlargem ent o f  the  C om m unity  w ith 
the adhesion  o f  new  m em bers such as A ustria, Sweden, F in land, Sw itzerland and N orw ay, the  nex t plus 
the adhesion  o f  C entral E uropean countries, such as H ungary, Poland and perhaps the  Czech and S lovak 
R epublics w ith in  the next five or seven years; adoption o f  a security  policy  to  pro tect its boundaries 
against m assive  im m igration, drug traffic, organized crim e, besides actual th reats such as terrorism , 
po litical fanaticism  arising  from  the grow ing  o f  the ultra-conservative righ t w ing  and the  relig ious 
p roblem s arising  from  the spread o f  M uslim  fundam entalism  inside and outside its boundaries; and, 
above all, the  revival o f  o ld  ethnic rivalries pu tting  in check the w hole  concept o f  the  nation-state  in 
w hich  the  construction  o f  E urope is based.
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O n the  o ther hand, the EU  established, during the last few  years, a system  o f  trad ing  preferences 
and econom ic concessions aim ed at the creation o f  an enlarged econom ic bloc under its influence.
W ith in  th is  fram ew ork it is hard to  believe that the EU  conceded to  L atin  A m erica  som ething 
m ore than  political agreem ents, full o f  good in tentions but lacking econom ic content.
The sam e is true o f  Japan. Its interest in Latin  A m erica and specifically  in B razil is only 
m arginal. Japan show ed som e in terest in B razil in the 1970s, as long as B razil seem ed to  com plem ent 
its shortage o f  natural resources. B u t since the crisis o f  the 1980s its lack o f  in terest has becom e alm ost 
aggressive. E ven w hen they  are v igorously  com peting am ong them , one o f  the characteristics o f  
Japanese business enterprises is the solidarity  they  exhib it in the ir in ternational perform ance. Through 
an inv isib le  coord ination , that m ay orig inate in the  governm ent or in the trade associations, the  decision 
w hether to  invest or no t in a given country o r region becom es com m on to alm ost all the  enterprises. 
A t the regional level, Jap an ’s investm ent decisions seem  to have concentrated  in the South-E ast and 
E ast A sia. Jap an ’s ’ in terest in L atin  A m erica is distant. Japanese governm ent officials and business m en 
usually  say that “Latin  A m erica is an area o f  influence o f  the U nited  S tates” .
T h e  N a tio n a l In te re s t  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta tes
The attitude o f  the U nited  States tow ards Latin A m erica  is d ifferent from  the  aforem entioned. 
B efore exam ining  th is  subject, le t’s scan the U nited  States trad ing  policy, w hich has developed  in three 
d ifferent levels (P reeg 1992).
A t the  internal level, the  U .S. trad ing  policy  m ay be characterized as one o f  selective 
pro tection ism  in response to  pressures from  non-com petitive industrial sectors. A m ong  the protected 
sectors are the autom otive, electronic, com puter, steel and tex tile  industries. A nother characteristic  is 
the un ila teralism  against any m easure considered unfair to  the U nited  States trade w hich  leads to 
im m ediate  retaliation even going against G A T T ’s principles (Section 301, Super 301 and 301 Special).
A t the m ultilateral level, the U nited  States w as m ost in terested  in launching the G A T T ’s 
U ruguay  R ound  in 1986. The U .S . w as also responsib le for the inclusion o f  new  sectors in the 
nego tia tions such as farm  goods, textiles, services, intellectual property  and investm ents.
A t the  regional level, the U nited  States led the process o f  creation o f  the  N A FT A , aim ed at the 
creation  o f  a  zone o f  free trade no t only  w ith  C anada (since 1989) bu t also w ith  M exico (1994). 
N A F T A  w as initiated  by  M exico, bu t it is clearly  a  new  political option  for the U nited  States in face 
o f  the  rea lity  o f  the  new  trad ing  blocs.
It is no t the  righ t tim e to  discuss w hether free trade areas are m ain ly  trade d iverting  o r trade 
creating. S ince these tw o possib ilities w ere defined in the 1950s by Jacob V iner, w ho opted fo r the  first 
one and, thus, opposed  regionalism , th is issue has been subject to  debate. R egional blocs, in the  form  
o f  free trade zones or custom  unions, are authorized by  article X X IV  o f  the G A TT. Thus, an exception 
w as estab lished  to  the  basic  princip le o f  non-discrim ination (the m ost favored nation  clause), as long 
as the  constitu tion  o f  the  new  b loc  doesn’t entail h igher barriers to  trade w ith  the rest o f  the w orld  and 
as long as the  tariffs, w ith in  the  bloc, tend  to  be around zero. T his article has been d iscussed  ever 
since, particu larly  in re la tion  to  the  EU , the m ost successful case o f  regionalism .
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T hough having  approved article X X IV , the U nited  States has alw ays been in favor o f  
m ultila teralism . T hey  supported  the constitu tion  o f  the European b loc for political reasons m ainly . B u t 
there  w as a clear change o f  attitude. A s K rasner notes, “the end o f  the C old  W ar does m ean  tha t the 
U nited  S tates w ill becom e increasingly  econom ically  self-interested in its in ternational econom ic 
policies. It w ill no  longer be as strongly  com m itted  to  m ultilateralism . This w ill m ake reg ional blocs 
m ore  attrac tive” (1991: 340).
In th is  context, despite  the resistance inside the U nited States and the  critic ism  o f  liberal 
econom ists such as B aghw ati, w ho considers the existence o f  bloc as a clear th reat to  free in ternational 
trade (1992), the  general tendency  in the U nited  States is to  support regional agreem ents. S ince the  first 
best scenario-m ultila teralism -is no t currently  a viable option, the tendency  today  in the  U nited  States 
is to  believe tha t F T A s do no t conflict w ith  the broader and longer term  perspective th a t favors 
m ultila teralism  (D om busch , 1991; H ufbauer and Schott, 1992).
B u t reg ionalism  is still m arginal to  the  U nited  States w hich, as a m atter o f  fact, m ain ta ins an 
aggressive po licy  for the  m aintenance o f  the ir m ost im portant m arkets (EU ) and for open ing  new  
m arkets (Japan). T hey  also  concentrate the ir foreign investm ents in those m arkets. E very  tim e  a national 
sector feels th a t it has been harm ed by the  so called unfair trade practices, the U nited  S tates react 
v io len tly  against the  “aggressor” , putting  aside political speeches and acting in a un ila teral w ay.
T he U nited  S ta tes’ p roposal for the in itiation o f  an A m erican bloc orig inated  from  tw o im portan t 
perceptions. The first one w as the necessity  o f  a policy  that ensured them  broader m arkets than  C anada 
and M exico  in case o f  failure o f  the U ruguay  R ound and w eakening o f  G A T T  as m odera to r and 
superv iso r o f  the  in ternational trade. The U nited  States aim s to  balance the specific  w eight o f  the  EU, 
shored up  by  the b loc o f  its satellite  countries, and that o f  Japan, strengthened by  its p roduction-b loc 
in E ast and  South-w est A sia, w ith  the bloc led by  the U nited  States: a b loc tha t could  be called the  B loc 
o f  the  A m ericas o r A m ericas’ Free Trade A ssociation.
T he U .S . seem s to  have already decided that the ir national in terest coincides w ith  the  creation 
o f  the  N A F T A . H ow ever, it is no t clear to  them  if  it is w orth  w idening  the  b loc to  include o ther 
countries o f  the  hem isphere. The in terest o f  the  U nited  States underly ing  a W H FT A  could  be classified  
in tw o types: rhetorical and real interests.
T he rhetorical in terests had  im m ediate political objectives, ju stify in g  regional in tegration  as an 
elem ent o f  pressure  from  the U nited  States against the strengthening o f  the E U  and Japan. O n the  o ther 
hand, the  possib ility  o f  creating  an A m erican free trade area w ould becom e a w eapon fo r the  U nited 
States against the  E uropean  countries tha t have been insisting  on the protection o f  the ir agriculture, 
causing  the  U ruguay  R ound to  stall. So, i f  trade liberalization  and m ultila teralism  fail to  progress, the 
U nited  S tates w ould  be assured by signing free trade areas w ith  strategic countries: Israel (1985), 
C anada (1989), M exico  (1993) and m aybe all the A m ericas in a near future. B u t the  argum ents o f  the 
B loc o f  th e  A m ericas against the  E urobloc in the  G A T T  negotiations w ere invalidated  by  the  alliances 
o f  the  U n ited  S tates w ith  the G roup o f  C airns o f  agricultural producers such as A ustralia , N ew  Zealand, 
A rgentina and B razil, tha t constitu ted  another pressure group against the  then EC.
H ow ever, besides the  rhetorical interests, used only  as elem ents o f  im pact in in ternational 
negotia tions, there  are real in terests tha t ju s tify  an alliance betw een the U nited  States and Latin 
A m erica, specially  w ith  Brazil.
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A m ong th e  real in terests o f  th e  U nited  S tates in an  in teg ration  w ith  L a tin  A m erica w e m ay p o in t
out:
■ Impossibility of dominating all o f the Third World markets. T h e  U nited  S tates is b eg inn ing  to  
rea lize  th a t it is no longer the  so le  w orld  pow er. F o r th e  g rea t po w er, tha t it w as in  th e  b ip o la r m odel, 
th e  defense  o f  m ultila tera lism  and o f  trad e  libera liza tion  w ere  th e  m ost rew ard ing  stra tegy . B u t reality  
has changed. A s hegem onic leader o f  th e  w estern  w orld , th e  U nited  States d icta ted  th e  ru les o f  the  
in ternational gam e and held  p riv ileged  positions in  m any m arkets. T oday  th is w orld  leadersh ip  is 
contested  b y  the  E U  and Japan , since they  have  established th e ir  in fluence areas. So, th e  E U  leads 
N o rth ern  E u ro p e , E aste rn  E u ro p e  (except: C IS , th e  C om m onw ealth  o f  Independen t S tates), N orthern  
A frica  and S ub-S aharan  A frica . Japan  has becom e stronger in  W estern  and South  W este rn  A sia  including 
C hina. T h e  U n ited  S tates still ho ld s a dom inan t position  in  N orth  A m erica , th e  M idd le  E ast and, 
h isto rica lly , in  L atin  A m erica.
T h e  Islam ic G roup concentrates g rea t influence in  th e  M uslim  countries o f  th e  sou thern  C IS , in 
th e  M idd le  E ast and in  N o rth ern  A frica . Its  cu rren t behav io r is hard ly  foreseeable. A s a m atter o f  fact, 
Islam ic fundam entalism  is m eant to  be  an alternative  to  the  cap italist and to  the  com m unist w o rld . In  this 
area th e  A m erican  influence w ill face sevefe restric tions in  the  fu ture .
W ith in  the  p resen t fram ew ork  the  U nited  S tates’ leadersh ip  in  L atin  A m erica w ill no t b e  contested  
b y  th e  o th e r w orld  leaders, the  E U  and Japan , w hich  a re  involved in  th e  conso lidation  o f  th e ir  ow n  areas 
o f  influence.
* Interest in managing the debt problem. T h e  g rea t debate  o f  th e  1980s w as th e  various attem pts 
to  so lve  the  T h ird  W o rld  debt p rob lem . Fori the  U nited  S tates, the  L atin  A m erica d eb t ($420 b illion ) was 
the  m ost im portan t. M ost o f  th e  deb t is ow ed to  p riv a te  A m erican  banks and th e  con tinu ity  o f  a flow  o f  
paym ents depends on  the  genera tion  o f  fo re ign  currency  th rough  exports. T h e  certa in ty  o f  accessing  the  
A m erican  m arket m ay be  an im portan t p o in t in  m anaging th is p ro b lem .2
■ Need for a new dialogue between the United States and Latin America. S ince th e  security  
p rob lem  o f  th e  A m ericas has been  lessened by  the  co llapse o f  the  Sov iet w o rld , th e  U nited  S tates needs 
ano ther argum ent to  base  its d ialogue w ith L a tin  A m erica. T hus, the  E n te rp rise  fo r the  A m ericas 
p roposed  u n d er th e  B ush adm in istra tion  relaunched  the  econom ic d ia logue w ith  L atin  A m erica in  the 
1990s. N ow  w e have th e  p rio rity  o f  the  econom ic over th e  po litical and an a ttem pt to  m anage th e  new  
th reats and conflicts betw een  the  tw o reg ions. T h e  U nited  S tates is like  an  actor w ithou t a sc rip t befo re  
a m arg inalized  L atin  A m erica. N ew  in terest m ust be  created  to  b rin g  them  near again.
■ Commercial interest. T h e  creation  o f  the  trad ing  b loc  led by  th e  U nited  S tates is a real ra ther 
than  a rheto rica l necessity  and w as bo rn  from  the  uncerta in ties su rround ing  the  w orld  o f  today . T he 
U nited  S tates has been  th e  m ost im portan t p a rtn e r o f  L atin  A m erica as a w hole  (as fo r  B razil it com es
2. As Bhagwati points out, "the offer in June 1990 by President Bush to get more nations from South America 
to jo in  the United States in a free trade area... is reflective o f the compulsions that the debt crisis there imposes on 
American policy to respond in a regional framework to ensure that this crisis remains manageable and does not 
engulf the United States, whose banks are principally endangered by it" (1992: 15).
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second, after the  EU ). Even so, its exports to  L atin  A m erica have been falling  every  year. I t is im portan t 
for the U nited  S tates to  regain a  com fortable position.
In  spite  o f  these argum ents, som e analysts, like A ndrew  H urrell, m ain tain  th a t “there  is no clear 
im petus nor incontrovertib le political o r econom ic logic behind the argum ents th a t the U nited  States 
should  seek to  create o r reestablish  a new  regional order in the A m ericas” . B esides th is, H urrell doubts 
th a t the  U n ited  S tates has the pow er to  do that, adding: “A nd there are also real questions as to  w hether 
the U .S . has the  econom ic resources to  do so” .(1991: 39). Y et, the facts are dem onstrating  th a t this 
analysis does no t correspond to  reality. N A F T A  is already a reality. The loss o f  hegem ony  o f  the  U nited 
States is basic  logic behind th is  new  position  o f  the U nited States.
A fter several in terview s w ith  businessm en and U .S . governm ent officials, R oberto  B ouzas and 
Juan C arlos B arbosa  concluded tha t the  negotiation  o f  a free trad ing  zone w ith  M E R C O S U R  is still 
considered  prem ature. The agreem ent w ith  M exico has to  be concluded first. B u t they  show ed great 
in terest in the  Southern  C one and particularly  in B razil, “characterized as an in teresting  partner o f  the 
U nited  S tates no t only  because its econom y has great potential, bu t also because it represen ts w ide 
perspectives o f  expanding U .S . exports since the B razilian econom y rem ains rela tively  closed” . O n the 
other hand, “the  poten tia l for expansion (o f  B razil) i f  the  A m erican business installed  in B razil reorien t 
the ir p roduction  from  the dom estic m arket to  export” (1992:44-45).
In  short, w ith  the end o f  the  C old  W ar and o f  the  hegem ony o f  the U nited  States, there  rem ains 
the p o ssib ility  o f  the  strengthening o f  regional blocs. The U nited  States, though  no t ye t resigned  to  the 
loss o f  hegem ony  and naturally  eager to  m ain tain  its trade open w ith  all the w orld, w ill have no choice 
bu t to  support the  B loc o f  the  A m ericas. This b loc w ill be very  useful to  the U nited  States no t on ly  to  
exert p ressures and bargain positions in the  international context bu t also to  assure for its exports and 
investm ents a preferential space.
B ra z i l ’s N a tio n a l In te re s t
G iven  th is new  political fact rooted  in the m ovem ent tow ard A m erican in tegration , one has to  
ask the  question: w hat is B raz il’s national in terest? Should  w e accept such a proposal o r no t?  A fte r all, 
unless the  econom ic agents in B razil are really  interested, no  agreem ent w ill w ork.
T he true interests o f  B razil in A m erican integration derive from  the country  becom ing  conscious 
tha t the  o ld  in ternational order, w hich supported its m ultilateral strategy, is over. In the new  
international o rder requires a new  strategy for B razil’s insertion in the  w orld  econom y. A ctually  the  new  
in terests are shared by  B razil, M E R C O S U R  and Latin  A m erica as a w hole.
Som e in ternational changes ju s tify  B raz il’s new  national interest. F irst o f  all, w e have the  failure 
o f  B razil as a m odel Third W orld pow er and leader o f  the  non-aligned countries, ou tside o f  the  dom ain 
o f  the  U n ited  States and o f  the form er U SSR . This m odel w as exhausted  by the  foreign deb t crisis and 
the end o f  the  strategy o f  im port substitu tion . Such strategy o f  na tionalist character, w hich  reached its 
peak in the  1970s, d id n ’t  prove itse lf  a realistic  alternative capable o f  p rom oting  the developm ent o f
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B razil in  the  1980s. Instead o f  p ressu rin g  th e  F irs t W orld  to  ob tain  p referen tia l trea tm en t,3 w e had  no 
choice b u t adopting  a defensive positio n  b efo re  the  p ressu re  o f  o u r cred ito rs. A t th e  sam e tim e , w e had 
to  adm it th e  m istakes o f  econom ic po licy  caused by  th e  fac t th a t th e  im p o rt substitu tion  s tra tegy  was 
artific ia lly  ex tended  in  the  1970s th rough  External financing . T h e  ideas o f  reducing  th e  sta te  th ro u g h  trade  
libera liza tion , deregu la tion  and p riva tiza tion  becam e dom inan t, pu ttin g  an  end to  B raz il’s T h ird  W orld  
o rien ted  stra tegy .
Second, w e have  the  crisis o f  the  state. S ince the  1930s, th e  sta te  has been  th e  m ajo r agen t o f  
B raz il’s econom ic developm ent, th rough  th ree  instrum ents: (1) the  im port substitu tion  stra tegy , w hich 
gave a b ig  im pulse to  the  industria l expansion o f  som e L atin -A m erican  coun tries; (2) subsid ies to  the 
industria l secto rs considered  as stra teg ic; and (3) d irec t investm en t in  sta te-ow ned en terp rises. T h is 
s tra tegy , h ow ever, w as a lready  exhausted in  th e  early  1960s. It w as artific ia lly  m ain tained  in  th e  1970s 
th rough  fo re ign  indebtedness to  finance p ro jec ts  o f  im port substitu tion , as w ell as by  a new  w ave o f  
subsid ies and the  crea tion  o f  state-ow ned en terp rises. B ut the  cost o f  such an op tion  tu rned  ou t to  b e  very  
h igh  after all. I t  resu lted  in  a deep crisis o f  the  sta te  th a t has tw o com ponents: (a) a fiscal c risis  d irectly  
re la ted  to  th e  fo re ign  deb t, w hich financed excessive sta te  expenditures and resu lted  in  a ex trem ely  h igh 
pub lic  deb t, th e  decrease  o f  pub lic  savings (w hich becam e negative after all), and to  a van ish ing  public 
credit: and (b) th e  exhaustion  o f  th e  m ode o f  sta te  in tervention  based  on  th e  im port substitu tion  strategy.
T h e  crisis o f  th e  state in  B razil is th e  fundam ental cause o f  th e  h igh  ra tes o f  in fla tion  that 
devastate  th e  coun try , the  decrease  o f  investm ents and econom ic stagnation . In  the  last 12 years B razil 
has been  facing th e  m ost serious econom ic crisis o f  its h is to ry . I t is c lear tha t th e  p resen t decade and the 
new  in ternational fram ew ork  call fo r radical changes. B razil has to  define a new  national p ro jec t o f  
developm ent and in ternationalize  its econom y a t the  sam e tim e.
T h e  p rocess o f  in ternalization  o f  an econom y does no t sign ify , as W ash ing ton  and the  “ F irs t 
W o rld ” usually  b e lieve , ju s t  to  stabilize p rices, reduce  the  state, and open  the  econom y. T hese  are  
necessary  b u t no t su ffic ien t conditions. T h e  neoliberal s tra tegy  assum es th a t the  rise  in  investm ent, w hich 
is abso lu te ly  essential to  the  resum ption  o f  developm ent, w ill com e from  abroad , from  th e  m ultinational 
en terp rises. T h is assum ption  is no t rea listic . It is possib le  and desirab le  to  expect an  increase in  foreign  
investm ent b u t w e know  tha t th e re  are  cleiar lim itations to  tha t k ind  o f  source. T h e  g rea t changes in  the  
in ternational fram ew ork  have  m oved the  poles o f  political and econom ic concern  to  o ther reg ions o f  the 
w orld . T h e  new  p rio rity  areas in  te rm s o f  com m ercial p rom otion  and new  investm ents becam e: th e  E U  
w ith  th e  conso lida tion  o f  its in ternal m arket in  1992, the  countries o f  C entral E u ro p e , w hich are  now  
u n d er th e  influence o f  the  E U  and m ay sprve as an ou tle t fo r E U  exports; the  countries o f  the  Pacific 
B asin A rea , due  to  th e ir  h igh rates o f  g row th ; and M exico, w hich has negotia ted  its partic ipa tion  in  the 
N A F T A . B esides the  change o f  poles o f  po litical and econom ic a ttrac tion , the  figures confirm  the 
m arg inaliza tion  o f  L a tin  A m erica  in  in ternational trade . In  1950 it rep resen ted  11% o f  the  w orld  exports, 
in  1958 abou t 5%  and in  1990 on ly  about 3% .
T h e  defin ition  o f  a new  national p ro jec t involves, f irs t o f  all, the  recovery  o f  th e  sav ing  capacity  
o f  th e  state. T h is  w ould  be  done th rough  an  increase in  revenues, decrease o f  cu rren t expend itu re  o r 
th rough  th e  cancellation  o r  consolidation  o f  its public  deb t (w hose respective  in terests red u ce  public
3. This was the leitm otif o f the "new international order" strategy that the non-aligned countries adopted in the 
1970s.
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sav ings). O n th e  o th e r hand , it has to  open  th e  econom y so as to  g uaran tee  g rea te r ex ternal com petition  
and m o re  efficient re so u rce  allocation . A dditionally , it has to  stim ulate  th e  en try  o f  techno logy  necessary  
to  m odern ize  th e  industry  and m ake it com patib le w ith  the  ph ilosophy  o f  m arke t and p roduction  
g lobaliza tion . T h ese  po lic ies, com plem ented b y  com petent industria l and technological po lic ies, both  
financed by  the  recovered  p ub lic  sav ings, w ill constitu te  th e ,b a s is  fo r  an aggressive  p o stu re  in  the 
exporting  b usiness, necessary  to  stim ulate in ternal investm ent and g enera te  po sitiv e  balances o f  fo reign  
currency .
B ased o n  th is  fram ew ork , le t us exam ine B razil’s fo re ign  trad e  po licy . In  th e  last years it has been 
develop ing  w ith in  th ree  d ifferen t d im ensions (A zam buja, 1991). A t th e  in ternal level, a po licy  o f  trade  
libera liza tion  em erges, w ith  a s ign ifican t decrease  in  B razilian  tariffs  up  to  th e  end o f  1993. A t the 
reg ional level, B razil is actively  com m itted  to  the  creation  o f  a com m on m arket encom passing  goods and 
serv ices w ith  A rgen tina , Paraguay  and U ruguay . T h is p ro jec t m ight be  accom plished  by  1995. A t the 
m ultila tera l level, B razil had  a re levan t ro le  in  th e  G A T T  negotia tions o f  the  U ruguay  R ound. B razil 
defends th e  theses o f  nondiscrim ination  and la te ly  o f  in ternational trad e  libera liza tion . Som e po in ts  o f  the  
nego tia tion  th a t d rags on  in  G eneva are  specially  sign ifican t to  the  country : ag ricu ltu re , tex tiles, 
intellectual p ro p erty  and serv ices. A  fourth  d im ension  w ill open  up  if  B razil decides to  con tribu te  m ore 
actively  to  th e  c rea tion  o f  the  B loc o f  the  A m ericas.
In  th e  la te  1980s B razil realized  tha t the  im port substitu tion  stra tegy  w as exhausted  and th a t the 
m ost effic ien t a llocation  o f  its resources w ould  depend  on  th e  opening  o f  its m arkets and also  th a t the  
resum ing  o f  developm ent should  be  based on  th e  aggressiveness o f  its exports. T h is percep tion  added to  
th e  b u rd en  o f  the  fo re ig n  deb t and th e  p ressu re  from  m ultila teral agencies fo r th e  adop tion  o f  structu ral 
refo rm s led B razil to  s ta rt open ing  its econom y.
In  th e  last y ears , the  flow  o f  trad e  in  g lobal values dem onstrated  tha t B raz il’s m ost im portan t 
partn ers  are  th e  E C , the  U nited  S tates/C anada and A L A D I. T h e  figures o f  th e  destina tion  o f  B razilian  
exports in  1991 are: E U  3 1 % , U nited  S tates/C anada 2 1 .5 % , and A L A D I 15% . E xp o rts  to  th e  U nited 
S tates/C anada led  th e  lis t up  to  1988 bu t in  1989 the  E U  cam e firs t. T h e  figures fo r  1990 w ere  32.3%  
to  th e  E C , 25 .8%  to  th e  U nited  S ta tes/C anada and 10.2%  to  A L A D I. W hat happened  in  1991 is th a t the 
exports m oved from  the  U nited  S tates/C anada to  A L A D I, as th e  fo llow ing  tab le  dem onstrates.
T ab le  1. B razil: E xports  by  E conom ic Z ones (% )
1988 1989 1990 1991
A L A D I 11.0 10.2 10.2 15.5
U S +  C anada 29 .3 2 6 .6 2 5 .8 21 .5
E C 2 8 .7 30 .6 31 .4 31 .0
Japan 6 .9 7.1 7 .5 8 .2
A sia 8 .2 9 .3 9 .5 9 .8
M iddle  E ast 4 .4 3 .5 3 .4 3 .5
O thers 11.4 12.8 12.2 10.1
Source: D ecex.
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T h e  flow  o f  exports to  th e  m ain  p a rtn e rs , how ever, m akes o n e  im portan t ch aracteristic  evident. 
T h e  con ten t o f  th e  exports to  th e  E U  in 1990 w as 43%  o f  m anufactures against 57%  o f  raw -m aterials and 
sem i-industria lized  goods. A s to  th e  exports to  th e  U nited  States and C anada, 76%  w ere  m anufactures 
against 24%  o f  raw -m aterials and sem i-industria lized  goods. T hus, th e  flow  to  th e  U nited  S tates show s 
m ore  varie ty  and has a h ig h er level o f  industria lization . (See T ab le  2).
T ab le  2 . B razil: E xports o f  M anufactures by  E conom ic Z ones
(percent)
1988 1989 1990
A L A D I 84.2 84 .0 86 .7
U S +  C anada 7 4 .4 7 6 .6 7 5 .8
E C 39.1 38 .9 42 .7
Japan 25 .3 19.6 16.6
A sia 6 1 .6 4 3 .6 4 1 .8
M idd le  E ast 60.1 6 2 .4 5 3 .6
O thers 4.1 4 4 .6 4 3 .3
Source: D ecex.
F u rth e rm o re , analysis o f  the  forijner E C  as an  econom ic b loc  reveals a system  o f  preferences 
w ith in  its trad e  po licy  th a t involves b ig  alliances and high-level p riv ileges w ith  th e  E F T A , C entral E u rope  
coun tries, and M editerranean  countries. A  m ore  detailed  analysis o f  such agreem ents and o f  B razilian  
exports dem onstrates th a t m any p roducts w ill b e  seriously  affected in  th e  near fu tu re . A m ong them : iron , 
ingots and steel, as w ell as p ro d u c t such as m eat and vegetab le  o il, tex tile  and shoes, au to -parts , paper 
and cardboard .
I t is also im portan t to  rem em ber tha t the  m ost im portan t p a rtn e r fo r the  rest o f  L a tin  A m erica is 
the  U nited  S tates, w hereas fo r B razil the  [main m arket is th e  E U .
A s to  the  G eneralized System  o f  I n f e r e n c e s ,  B razil has access to  the  E U  as w ell as to  th e  U nited  
States th ro u g h  it. T h is system  allow s B razil to  export a range o f  goods w ith  ta r if f  reduction  o r  exem ption 
w ith in  g iven  quotas. H ow ever, it is w idely  know n tha t bo th  the  U nited  States and the  E U  are  w illing  to  
lim it to  th e  less developed  coun tries access to  tha t system . T h is w ould  affect bad ly  B razilian  exports to  
those  m arkets.
T h u s , in  sp ite  o f  th e  E U ’s being 
U nited  S tates represen ts som e advantages 
aggregate  value , a re  m ore  d iversified  
agreem ents. A m ong the  products B razil ex 
equ ipm ent, au tom obile  p a rts , shoes and 
ju ice , soy bean  com plex , sugar, coffee, si
cu rren tly  th e  m ost im portan t com m ercial p a rtn e r o f  B raz il, the  
: B razilian  exports to  the  U nited  States and C anada have h igher 
and include p roducts less p ro n e  to  be  affected  by  special 
ports to  the  U nited  States are: a irc ra ft, m achines, transpo rta tion  
chem icals. T h e  m ain  products exported  to  the  E U  are: o range 
i eel and iron.
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O n the o ther hand, B razil and Latin  A m erica w ill have to  com pete w ith  the  M exican products 
fo r the  m arkets o f  the  U nited  States and C anada after N A FT A . W ith  the  ta r if f  d ism antling  betw een  the 
m em bers o f  N A F T A , B razil w ill have to  face a com petitor, w ith  strategic advantages o f  p rox im ity  and 
zero-tariffs, com peting  for the  sam e final m arkets. The presen t trend in the  form ation  o f  reg ional blocs 
o f  in ternational trade has created new  practices for in ternational relationships. O ne o f  them  is the  rule 
o f  increasing  preferences for the m em bers o f  the bloc even i f  th is contradict the  m ost im portan t 
p rincip le  o f  G A TT, nondiscrim ination . The o ther is the ru le o f  selective pro tection ism  o f  the  m em bers 
o f  the  b loc  against outsiders, th rough the practice o f  m anaged trade to  avoid  fu rther re ta lia tion  (for 
exam ple, au tom obiles, electronics, steel, and textiles). In th is fram ew ork, it is c lear tha t B razil has a 
lo t to  lose w ith  N A FT A . Trade betw een B razil and the U nited  States w ould  d ivert to  M exico  due to  
the fact th a t n o n ta riff  barriers w ill be elim inated  for M exico bu t no t for B razil.4
A s a m atter o f  fact, B razil and L atin  A m erica are m arginalized  in the in ternational scene. The 
creation  o f  M E R C O S U R  w as fundam ental and is doing v e iy  w ell. B u t it is no t enough to  generate  the 
econom ic dynam ism  to  take L atin  A m erica  ou t o f  the  presen t stagnation. In a  m arketp lace full o f  
an tagonism  and  rivalries betw een blocs, such m arginalization  m ay be fatal.
T h e  C o u n te r-A rg u m e n ts
T he analysis ju s t  presented drives to  the conclusion tha t B razil ought to  show  great in terest in 
the  fo rm ation  o f  the B loc o f  the  A m ericas. B u t th is is no t the  official position  o f  the  B razilian  M inistry  
o f  In ternational A ffairs (Itam araty) and o f  the  m ost im portant econom ists w ho analyze our in ternational 
relations.
F o r som e tim e B razilian  d ip lom acy avoided the question  o f  U .S. proposals fo r a hem ispheric 
b loc, arguing  tha t it lacked content. B razil should w ait for a clearer definition, nam ely, the U nited  States 
w as no t really  in terested  in a F T A  w ith  B razil and the o ther countries o f  South  A m erica. A lso, 
reg ionalism  w as no t a real trend  in the  w orld. W hen th is type o f  reasoning proved  unrealistic , m ore 
exp lic it argum ent against B razil participating o f  a FT A  w ith  the U nited  States w as developed.
T he first argum ent w as tha t the conditions tha t the  U nited States estab lished  for B razil and  the 
o ther M E R C O S U R  m em bers to  jo in  N A FT A  w ere too  dem anding  o r ju s t  undesirable (m acroeconom ic 
stability , adoption  o f  m arket oriented reform s, including an intellectual property  agreem ent and 
p ro tection  o f  foreign investm ent agreem ent). A s a m atter o f  fact, m acroeconom ic stability , m arket 
orien ted  reform s and the protection  o f  foreign investm ent are as m uch an in terest to  B razil as they  are 
o f  the U nited  States. O nly  the  protection  o f  intellectual property is no t in th is case. Is m uch  m ore on 
the in terest o f  the  U nited  States, but in a bargaining process B razil m ay gain accepting  an agreem ent 
on tha t subject.
A s a m atter o f  fact, the  B razilian  governm ent understands tha t B razil has an essen tially  
m ultila teral vocation  and no in terest in participating in regional agreem ents in the continent. O nly
4. Estimates given by the World Bank and referred to by Sergio Abreu and Lima Florencio (1992: 11) show 
that Brazil’s gain with the elimination o f tariffs and nontariff barriers could amount to some $0.9 million a year, 
which is only lower than Mexico’s gain in the same situation ($1.6 billion).
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M E R C O S U R  is v iew ed as acceptable. The argum ent that supports th e ir position  is ex trem ely  sim ple.
B razil is a  “global trader”, w hose exports
the  M exican  exports. Then, it w ould  m ak 
States.
are w idely  diversified  in term s o f  destinations. T he U nited
States accounts for only  one quarter o f  B razilian exports bu t is responsib le for a lm ost th ree quarters o f
e no sense fo r B razil to  concede preferences to  the  U nited
O ther argum ents are added. W inston Fritsch  enum erates tw o: first, w ith in  M E R C O S U R , B razil 
w ould  lose ou t on reducing  trade barriers relative to  the U nited  States; second, since the  U nited  States 
is no t the  m ost efficien t supplier o f  B raz il’s im ports, the  gains derived from  bilateral liberalization 
w ould  be sm aller than  those from  m ultilateral liberalization. F ritsch , how ever, adm its a ra tionale  for 
B razil: “the  on ly  econom ic rationale for a B razilian  in terest in hem ispheric integration  is to  gain 
d iscrim inato ry  access to  the larger US m arket.” B u t he added im m ediately  (adopting  the “w ait-and-see” 
attitude th a t dom inates the  presen t B razilian  policy), “the evaluation o f  such prospective gains cannot 
be m ad e ...” W e w ill on ly  know  after “the U ruguay R ound... the  cred ib ility  o f  the  US offer o f  free 
m arket access... and  the  negotiations involv ing  M exico and, perhaps, C hile, w hose ou tcom es are still 
to  be seen .” (1992: 4)
A n argum ent tha t reveals B raz il’s fear o f  opening its econom y to the U nited  States is elegantly  
presen ted  b y  H elio  Jaguaribe (1991). A ccording to  h im , w e have tw o m odels o f  integration: “ factors 
red istribu tion  m odel” and “system s restructjuring m odel.” The first one is claim ed to  be typ ical o f  sm all 
countries; the second one w ould  be applicable to  Brazil. A ccording to  th is v iew , trade liberalization  and 
the  A m erican  in tegration  should  be conditional to  technology  transfer and m anagerial tra in ing  in B razil. 
The assum ption  behind  is that the B razilian  industry has no capacity  to  com pete w ith  the A m erican 
industry, requ iring  new  form s o f  protection. I f  this is no t done, B razil w ill regress to  being  an 
agricultural country  w ith  a few  and lim ited industrial activities.
In fact, th is  pessim ism  about the  B razilian  industry  is no t realistic. N o  doubt, and in 
contrad iction  to  the  W ashington consensus, it is necessary  to  have an industrial, technological, and 
m anagerial developm ent policy. B ut one th ing  is to  favor industrial policy, another is to  have it as a 
necessary  cond ition  fo r a N A F T A  w ith  the| U nited  States. T his is the  best w ay  to , de facto, oppose  the  
A m erican  in tegration .5
B razilian  d ip lom acy is becom ing  a vare  tha t the U nited  States are inclined to  create a W H FT A
by Serg io  de A breu  and L im a F lorencio  w  
to a possib le  association  w ith an W H FT A ”
after the  creation o f  the N A FT A . T his aw areness is reflected in a recent and very  represen tative tex t
10 adm itted  that “ in the m edium  term  w e m ust be prepared 
but “th is  should no t be a priority  o f  ou r in ternational trade
po licy” (1991:10). A s a  m atter o f  fact, the B razilian  position ing  against the  W H FT A  is m arked  by
5. In a similar form, the strategy some Brazilian industrialists found to oppose trade liberalization is to make 
it conditional to the adoption of industrial bolicy. In a recent document IEDI, Instituto de Economía e 
Desenvolvimento Industrial (an institute formed by the most important national industries in Brazil) affirms the 
dilemma between protectionism and foreign Opening is false. The opening to international competition is a 
required tool o f modernization, since it prevent:) accommodation and immobilism. But its width and rhythm must 
be coordinated with the recovery of macroeconomic control, with a coordinated action on the systemic factors 
assuring competitiveness, and with industrial policies implying the reorganization o f the productive system and 
aiming the persistent advancement o f productivity" (1992: 2).
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caution. B razilian  com m ercial relationships w ith  the U nited  States w ere very  conflic tive  in the  1980s;6 
even m ore  than  w ith  the E U  and Japan, because both  protected them selves against the  increasing 
com petition  o f  B razilian  exports o f  m anufactures, w hile  the  U nited  States, attached to  the p rincip les o f  
free trade, w as constrained  to  m ake use o f  unilateral m easures. O n the  o ther hand, B razil has a  long 
trad ition  o f  fearing  the “ im perialism ” o f  the U nited States and try ing  to  p ro tect itself. The im port 
substitu tion  strategy and the T hird-W orld  oriented policy  that Itam araty  has been com peten tly  adopting  
fo r m any  years has been a form  o f  protection against im perialism . It is then very  d ifficu lt fo r B razil to  
accept qu ick ly  the  hypotheses o f  further in tegration  w ith  the U nited  States.
H ow ever, as the  im perialist thesis is out o f  date, the alternative o f  its opponents is to  d isqualify  
the  A m erican  proposal. T his is done either by denying tha t there is a  tendency  to  the  fo rm ation  o f  
com m ercial b locs, o r by  the adoption  o f  som e standard phrases as “the proposal is no t clear,” “the  B ush 
in itia tive lacks con ten t,” and “ le t’s w ait and see w hat happens.” 7
T he argum ent tha t there  is no tendency  tow ards the form ation  o f  trade blocs w as abso lu tely  
d om inan t in the Itam araty  until very  recen tly .8 W ith the  increasing consolidation o f  N A F T A  th is  thesis 
o bv iously  is losing  ground.
Thus, o ther form s o f  opposition  to  a W H FT A  are em erging. A n in teresting  one has been adopted 
by Santos N eves (1991), w ho argues th a t the  creation o f  the N A FT A , w hose ru les do n o t include any 
clause abou t the  access o f  the rest o f  L atin  A m erica, show s the U nited  S tates’ decision to  m arg inalize  
South  A m erica. W ith the  end o f  the C old  W ar, the Second and the  Third W orld disappear. There are 
now  four blocs: the European, the  Japanese, the N orth-A m erican and the  one to  be constitu ted  around 
R ussia. T hus “the South  is no t a fifth  bloc, no t even a lesser bloc. T he people and nations o f  th e  South 
are sim ply  those  w ho have no t found a  place in the em erging in ternational order, an  order th a t seem s 
to  be gu ided  by  a  harsh  ’princip le  o f  exclusion ’”(1992:5).
In  th is  fram ew ork, Santo N eves continues, the  N A F T A  represents a  h istorical w atershed; the 
end o f  th e  econom ic concept o f  L atin  A m erica leading back to  the geographical concept o f  South 
A m erica: “the  creation  o f  the  N orth  A m erican Free T rade A ssociation brings to  the  fore th e  fact that
6. See Primo Braga and Silber (1988).
7. This attitude, however, seems to be changing. According to daily Gazeta Mercantil (8/22/92) in a seminar 
carried out at Funda?ao Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, on August 21 (when this paper was almost finished), "for 
the first time since the announcement of the creation of the NAFTA, Itamaraty officially admits that the Brazilian 
competitiveness in the U.S. market is going to be harmed by the concession given to Mexico in the access to high 
tariff products and to protected fields like citrus, textiles and tile. This assertion was made by the Minister o f 
International Affairs, Celso Lafer, in his speech".
8. See, for instance, Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim, head o f the Economic Department o f  Itamaraty, argues that 
only the EC would effectively be a commercial bloc (1991).
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the  L atin  A m erican  idea, although plentifu l in  historical substance, has lost a large m easure  o f  its 
econom ic and political th rust.”9
B razil and South A m erica are, thbn, threatened w ith  exclusion. B u t th is  d o esn ’t drive Santos 
N eves to  the conclusion  tha t w e m ust strive for in tegration  into the B loc o f  the A m ericas, w hile 
rem ain ing  faithful to  m ultilateralism . W e are supposedly  excluded from  N A F T A  or from  a  F T A  w ith 
the U nited  States— an exclusion  tha t Santos N eves does no t regret, since he also opposes an in tegration  
w ith  the U nited  States. O ur only  choice w 
B razilian  policy , “B razil aggressively  opp 
be open  to  in ternational trade .” (1992:17)
ould be to  keep fighting  fo r m ultilateralism . In line w ith  the 
oses all form s o f  regionalized protectionism . A ll b locs m ust
Santos N eves m akes an in telligent and creative analysis tha t is representative o f  B razilian  
thought, in spite  o f  the  au th o r’s w arning in a footnote tha t h is ideas “ should  no t be construed  to 
represent, in w hole  or in part, the official pjosition o f  the governm ent o f  the  Federal R epublic  o f  B razil.”
N o  doubt, the  B razilian  official position  
decisive adhesion o f  B razil to  the B loc o f
is m ore m oderate and m ore dip lom atic. B u t it opposes a 
the A m ericas.
It is p robably  clear by  now  tha t tl)e B razilian  position  is fundam entally  contradictory . O n one 
hand, i t ’s adm itted  tha t there is a  strong tendency  tow ards regionalism . In addition, it is adm itted  that 
th is reg ionalism  m ay  represent the exclusion o f  B razil and Latin  A m erica  from  international trade and 
capital flow s. O n the  o ther hand, B razil insists in  figh ting  against all k inds o f  reg ionalism , in  favor o f  
m u ltila teralism  as i f  it w ere easier to  fight ^gainst regionalism  than  against the d ifficu lties in integrating  
the A m ericas.
T his position  is obviously  unrealist 
is also  part o f  South A m erica bu t it is al 
position  reflects an old  d istrust relative to 
national in terests coincide w ith  those o f  t 
tha t B razil is no longer such a w eak coun
ic. It show s an unacceptable geographical determ inism . C hile 
ready in line to  be included in N A FT A . Furtherm ore, such 
he U nited  States tha t m akes no sense today. It is no t th a t our 
le  U nited  States. W e still have m any conflicts. T he p o in t is 
:ry that can no t negotiate its ow n in terests.6.
C o n c lu s io n s : In s u ra n c e  A gains^ th e  U n c e rta in tie s  o f  th e  F u tu re
M ultila teralism  rem ains the ideal to  be sought. B u t in the short o r m edium  range there  is no
room  in the  w orld  for m ultilateralism . The b locs are fu lly  constitu ted , and they  w ill not be an obstacle
to  fu ture m ultila teralism . W e either seek
In th is  case, w e cannot assum e a 
for the  U nited  States to  take the  initiative 
is b ig  and m ature enough to  adopt an acti\ 
A m ericas. N o  doub t the U nited  States is ai
to be included, o r w e w ill be really excluded.
cautious w aiting  position . I t m akes no sense to  keep w aiting  
<br to  further explain  w hat they  intend w ith  a W H FTA . B razil 
e position  on th is issue and help to  construct the B loc o f  the 
rid w ill be the leader, and w ill hesitate about adm itting  B razil.
9. The Latin America concept is historically new for Brazil. Up to the first part of this century Brazilians used 
to define themselves as South-Americans. The idea that we are Latin Americans was introduced by the United 
States, and some old nationalists never accepted it. The participation o f Mexico in NAFTA is being viewed by 
these nationalists as a confirmation that Brazil is indeed part o f South America, not o f Latin America.
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A s it is hesita ting  in relation to  M exico. The differences in degree o f  developm ent betw een  the  U nited  
States and  C anada on one side and L atin  A m erica on the  other, represent the  m ain  obstacle  to  
in tegration. B u t since the integration responds to the  national interests o f  the  U nited  States as w ell as 
to  th o se  o f  B razil, there  is no reason for its no t being accom plished.
T he foreign  trade o f  the  then  EC, the  U nited  States and Japan in 1991, (tak ing  into account 
in tra-C om m unity  trade), represented 58%  o f  w orld  trade. E xclud ing  the  intra-EC  trade, th a t figure falls 
to  35% . T hese data  m akes clear the w eight o f  these pow ers in the  in ternational scene. E ven though  each 
one o f  them  is try ing  to  create and strengthen its ow n zones o f  influence and o f  preferential trade, none 
o f  them  can afford  to  lose the m ajor m arkets. Thus, L atin  A m erica’s becom ing  a  preferential partner 
does no t m ean  any  change in the A m erican position  in in ternational trade.
To the U nited  States the  m ost im portant outcom e o f  the  creation o f  an A m erican  b loc is that 
it w ou ld  prov ide an institu tional fram ew ork to  give support to  several econom ic in terests such as access 
to  the  L atin  A m erican  m arket, regulation  o f  investm ents and protection to  intellectual property . B esides, 
it w ould  provide institu tional support to  the solu tion o f  serious econom ic problem s such as c landestine 
m igration , d rug  traffic, and environm ent protection.
The m ajo r advantage for B razil and for the w hole  o f  L atin  A m erica w ould  be the end  o f  the 
m arg inaliza tion  and  iso lation  they  have been suffering, especially  in face o f  the  con tex t o f  uncertain ties 
o f  the new  in ternational order. In term s o f  exports, B razil d o esn ’t  need to  nego tia te  priv ileged  access 
to  prim ary  or sem i-industria lized  goods, since it is com petitive enough to  gain  m arket share. So, w ith  
the E U  the  determ inan t strategy is efficiency. A s to  m anufactures, the experience has dem onstrated  that 
in ternational trade is becom ing  increasingly  m anaged. F o r th is  reason, the  negotia tion  o f  a  zone o f  free 
trade, in the  short term , m ay be a decisive strategy for the  U nited  States. To B razil, a  reg ional trading 
bloc proposed  by the  U .S. represents an insurance po licy  against the perplexities and uncerta in ties o f  
a  w orld  o f  rivalries betw een blocs and lack o f  hegem onic econom ic leadership. The U nited  States 
launched th e  proposal. I t is up to  B razil either to  let it d ie or to  g ive it real content. The bet w ith  the 
fu ture m ay  be on an occasional iso lation  o f  Brazil; m aybe B razil is com pelled  to  jo in  a  b loc already 
com posed  by  the  m ain  countries o f  L atin  A m erica; or m aybe B razil could  be leading the  in terests o f  
South A m erica  in the  B loc o f  the  A m ericas centered on the U nited  States.
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ST A T IS T IC A L  A P P E N D IX
T ab le  3: B razil: E xports  p e r E conom ic Z ones ($ b illion)
1988 1989 1990 1991
A L A D I 3 .7 3 .5 3 .2 4 .9
U S +  C anada 9 .9 9 .2 8.1 6 .8
E C 9 .7 10.5 9 .9 9 .8
Japan 2 .3 2 .4 2 .3 2 .6
A sia 2 .8 3 .2 3 .0 3.1
M iddle  E ast 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1
O thers 3 .8 4 .4 3 .8 3 .2
T otal 33 .8 3 4 .4 3 1 .4 3 1 .6
Source: D ecex.
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T ab le  4: U .S . Im ports ($ b illion)
1985 1990
W o rld  358 .9  5 1 5 .6
C anada 6 7 .9  93 .2
Japan  7 2 .4  93 .1
E C  7 1 .4  9 5 .4
L atin  A m erica  4 8 .3  66 .7
M exico 19.3 30 .8
B razil 8.1 8 .6
A rgen tina  1.2 1.7
C hile  0 .8  1.5
V enezuela  6 .8  9 .9
C olom bia 1.5 3 .4
E cuador 2 .0  1.5
P eru  1.1 0 .8
% Im p .L A /to ta l im ports 13.5 12.9
% Im p .L A /M ex ico /to ta l im p. 8.1 7 .0
% Im p .B raz il/T o ta l im p. 2 .3  1.7
S ource: O E C D  - O rgan ization  fo r E conom ic C o-opera tion  and D evelopm ent.
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T ab le  5: E xports  to  th e  U nited  States ($ b illion)
1985 1990
W orld  2 0 5 .2  371 .5
C anada 6 7 .9  93 .2
Japan  7 3 .4  93.1
E C  7 1 .4  9 5 .4
L atin  A m erica  2 9 .5  52 .2
M exico 12.8 2 7 .4
B razil 3.1 4 .9
A rgen tina  0 .7  1.1
C hile  0 .7  1.6
V enezuela 3.1 3 .0
C olom bia 1.5 2 .0
E cuador 0 .6  0 .7
P eru  0 .5  0 .8
% L A  im p ./to ta ls  im p. 14.4 14.1
% L A  im p .- M exico /to ta l im p. 8.1 6 .7
% B razil im p ./to ta l im p. 1.5 1.3
Source: O E C D .
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T able 6: E conom ic C om m unity ’s Im ports ($ b illion)
1985 1990
W orld  3 0 8 .9  5 8 7 .6
E F T A  62 .3  137.9
U S /C anada  58 .1  120.1
Japan  2 1 .7  58 .7
A C P  (69) 23 .2  2 5 .5
M ed iterranean  countries 33 .7  53 .7
L atin  A m erica 2 2 .7  32 .3
B razil 8 .0  11.7
M exico 3 .9  3 .7
C olom bia  1.3 1.9
V enezuela  3 .0  2 .3
C hile  1.4  3 .3
A rgen tina  2 .5  4 .4
U ruguay  0 .2  0 .8
P eru  0 .8  1.0
E cuador 0 .2  0 .5
B oliv ia  0 .2  0.1
P araguay  0 .2  0 .5
% L A  im p ./to ta l im p. 7 .4  5 .5
% B razil im p ./to ta l im p. 2 .6  2 .0
Source: E u rosta t.
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T able 7: E conom ic C om m unity ’s E xp o rts  ($ b illion)
1985 1990 1991
W orld 287 .8 533.1 5 2 0 .9
E F T A 6 4 .4 141.5 133.9
U S /C anada 7 2 .5 109.1 9 9 .0
Japan 8 .0 2 8 .8 27 .3
A C P  (69)
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% L A  im p ./to ta l im p. 3 .9  3 .6  4 .1
% B razil im p ./to ta l im p. 0 .7  0 .9  0 .9
Source: E urosta t.
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P R E F E R E N T IA L  T R A D E  A G R E E M E N T S  IN  T H E  C A R IB B E A N : 
IS S U E S  A N D  A P P R O A C H E S
W inston  D ookeran1
In tro d u c tio n
T he structu res that defined  the C aribbean  econom ic p ic tu re  over the past 4 0  years w ere  the 
“trian g u la r tra d e ” (export o f  p rim ary  products and im port o f  fin ished  goods) o f  the preindependence  
p erio d , fo llow ed  by  m ultinational co rporations b ring ing  U nited  States hegem ony, and, m ost recently , 
s truc tu ra l ad justm ent p rogram s superv ised  by  the W orld  B ank and the IM F. T his analytical fram ew ork  
genera ted  theories o f  exp lo ita tion , neocolonialism , and  m arg inalization  coupled  w ith  the pers is ten t call 
(w ith  heavy  m oral and  po litical overtones) fo r p ro tec tion , p references, special considera tion , aid , and 
trade  and  investm ent support.
O ne o f  the d istu rb ing  aspects p f  the C arib b ean ’s econom ic h isto ry  is that these  sho rt-term  
m easures have d iscouraged  the developm ent o f  long-term  strateg ic  p lans. P rim ary  export com m odities 
such as bananas, sugar, and rum , w hich have trad itionally  sustained m any C aribbean  econom ies, have 
su rv ived  w ell beyond  the ir natu ral lifetim es th rough  preferen tial treatm ent. N ew  m anufactures have also 
b een  p ro tec ted  by  p referen tia l treatm ent ¡from the  m ajor trad ing  p artn ers . T h is has allow ed C aribbean  
coun tries to  enjoy a level o f  access to  the in ternational trad ing  system  that is not com patib le w ith  its levels 
o f  p ro d u c tio n , p rodu c tiv ity , and  in ternational com petitiveness.
G lobal trends are  characterized  by  m oves tow ard  libera liza tion  o f  trade  th ro u g h  the redu c tio n  o f  
ta r iff  and n o n ta riff  barrie rs . C o m p e titio n  efficiency, and productiv ity  have becom e the new  w atchw ords. 
T he C arib b ean ’s underdeveloped  p roductiv ity  severely  constrains partic ipa tion  in  increasing ly  liberalized  
trade  reg im es. W hile  C aribbean  countries have realized  that p referen tial treatm en t has no t engendered  
a com petitive  p ro d u c tio n  base, p referen tial agreem ents can play  an  im portan t ro le  in the short term in  the 
attainm ent o f  desired  levels o f  p roduction .
G lobal trends th rea ten  the existence and nature  o f  such agreem ents be tw een  the C aribbean  
coun tries and  the ir trad itional trad ing  partn ers , the U nited  States and E urope. T hese changes w ill 
s ign ifican tly  affect the  trade  sectors o f the reg io n ’s econom y, w hich  w ill req u ire  a stra teg ic  policy  
response  in  b o th  the sho rt and long term s, in  o rd er to  allow  the C aribbean  countries to  find a new  niche 
in  the  w o rld  econom y.
T his paper d iscusses key policy  issues that face C aribbean  countries as they  respond  to  rap id  
changes in  in ternational trade . T hese issues are p resen ted  w ith  regard  to  the  m ajo r preferen tial 
agreem ents that define C aribbean  trade: tjie C aribbean  B asin  In itiative (C BI), the C A R IB C A N , the Lom é 
C onven tion , and the C A R IC O M  E xternal T a riff  (C E T ). T he paper also  assesses the im pact o f  such 
arrangem en ts , exp lo res the ir fu tu re  in  ligh t o f  cu rren t trends and issues, and suggests po licy  d irections 
fo r C aribbean  coun tries to  deal w ith  then).
1 The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable research o f Hitomi Rankine.
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C a r ib b e a n  P re fe re n tia l  T ra d e  A rra n g e m e n ts
T h e  C aribbean  C om m unity  (C A R IC O M ) includes B arbados, G uyana, Jam aica, T rin idad  and 
T obago , A n tigua  and B arbuda, B elize, D om inica, G renada, M on tserra t, St. K itts and  N ev is, St. L ucia, 
and St. V incen t and the G renadines. Its popu la tion  o f  5-.5 m illion  com pares to that o f  D enm ark , and its 
G N P  is approx im ately  $10 b illion . T he countries have very  open  econom ies w ith  an  average trade-to- 
G D P  ra tio  o f  6 0  percent.
T h e  largest p o rtio n  o f  C aribbean  exports goes to  the U nited  States and E urope, and p referen tia l 
access w ith  these  trad ing  partn ers  is established under the C BI and the Lom é C onven tion . A  long­
stand ing  re la tionsh ip  w ith  C anada is covered by  the C A R IB C A N  trade  agreem ent. P referen tia l access 
ex isted  p r io r  to  these  schem es u n d er arrangem ents such as the G eneralized  System  o f  P references (G SP).
T h e  C a r ib b e a n  B a s in  In itia tiv e
T h e  C aribbean  B asin In itiative (CBI) w as enacted by  the C aribbean  B asin  E conom ic R ecovery  
A ct (C B E R A ) in  January  1984. T he CBI w as seen as a change in  U nited  States fo re ig n  econom ic policy  
from  m ultila tera lism  in  trade  relations to  em phasis on  dom estic in terests. T he “m agic  o f  the  m arket 
p lace” w as to  pu ll the  C aribbean  B asin countries out o f  the social and  econom ic slum p. It w as the first 
tim e tha t the  U nited  States g ran ted  p referen tial econom ic treatm ent to  an  en tire  geograph ic  reg ion .
T he CBI g ran ted  du ty -free  treatm en t to  a range o f  goods from  the C aribbean , subject to  ru les o f 
o rig in , and  it excluded  specific item s. T he arrangem ents under the  CBI w ere o f  indefin ite  du ra tio n , but 
they  m ay b e  term inated  at any tim e by  the U nited  States. T he C B I’s features include:
■ T h e  807  P ro g ra m , w hich  p rovides that articles assem bled in  CBI coun tries u sin g , in  
w hole  o r in  p a rt, US com ponents, are subject to  reduced  duty ; and
■ T h e  C B I S p ec ia l A ccess P ro g ra m , w hich  uses guaran teed  access levels (G A L s) tha t are 
applied  (after negotiation) fo r specific item s assem bled in  the C aribbean  B asin  fro m  fabric  
m anufactured  and  cu t in  the  U nited  States.
S upporting  m echanism s fo r the achievem ent o f  the b roader objectives o f  the p ro g ram  include:
■ a tax  exem ption  allow ing  tax deductions fo r com panies ho ld ing  m eetings in  C B I-approved
countries;
■ p rom otional p rog ram s b y  U nited  States federal and state agencies and p riva te -sec to r
o rganizations to  facilitate  investm ent and increase p roduction  capacities;
■ increased  assistance fo r p riva te-sec to r developm ent; and
■ access to  investm ent funds under the 936 p rogram .
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Im p a c ts  o f  th e  C B I
F ro m  the beg inn ing , the CBI was expected  to  have little , if  any, positive effect on  the  econom ies 
o r  the  social p rob lem s o f  the partic ipa ting  countries, desp ite  the stated  goals o f  the  U nited  S tates. The 
C B I’s du ty -free  benefits w ere extended to  only  7 percent o f  the re g io n ’s exports.
Economic growth. T he  provisionjs o f  the CBI w ere  unable  to  halt the decline o f  the G D P  grow th  
ra te , w h ich  started  in  the p re-C B I period . D uring  the period  1984-87, m ost coun tries experienced  
p o sitive  g ro w th  bu t only  six achieved real G D P  g row th  o f  6 percen t o r  m ore. T he fact tha t the  largest 
coun tries tended  to  have the low est g row th  dam pened average grow th .
Trade. C aribbean  exports to  the U nited States are  gain ing m om entum . U .S . trade  figures w ith  
the C aribbean  B asin  fo r the first h a lf  o f  1991 and 1992 show  that U .S . im ports from  nine coun tries had 
sign ifican t p rop o rtio n a l increases, and oijly th ree  had significant decreases in  to tal exports to  the  U .S . 
T he C B I w as characterized  by  p o o r perforjm ance in  the early  years. In  1987, im ports w ere  on ly  5 percent 
above the level o f  1983, due in  part to  ft series o f  crises in  C A R IC O M : in trareg ional trad e  p lunged  
because o f  deb t, b reakdow n o f  the m ultila teral clearance facility , and  tem porary  c losure  to  C A R IC O M  
o f  one o f  the  m ajo r m arkets, T rin idad  and T obago.
Diversification. T here  has been  s 
and  tran sp o rta tio n  serv ices, bu t all o f  the 
T he d iversifica tion  effort that began  w ith
om e d iversification  into m anufacturing , tou rism , and  financial 
countries can  still be described  as p roducers o f  com m odities, 
the CBI holds potential fo r fu rth er increases.
Agribusiness. CBI had  the greatest im pact on  agribusiness. P referen tia l trea tm ent ranged  from  
25 p ercen t to  75 percen t, and agribusiness recorded  the fastest and  m ost stable g row th  from  1983 to 
1986. F o u r coun tries achieved g row th  rfttes betw een 3 percen t and 7 percen t betw een  1984 and  1987.
Investment. D irec t, long-term  fo re ign  investm ent d ropped  betw een  1984 and 1987, m ain ly  as a 
resu lt o f  the  severe  d rop  in T rin idad  and T obago. But during  th is sam e perio d  the D om in ican  R epublic, 
C osta  R ica, and H onduras show ed increases in  fo re ign  investm ent. L arge  am ounts w ere  also  invested  
in  the  B aham as and  Panam a.
T he 936 p ro g ram , w hich  w as linked w ith  the CBI under the  C B E R A , has been  responsib le  for 
increasing  levels o f  investm ent in  the C aribbean. A  study  by  C aribbean /L atin  A m erican  A ction  (C /L A A ), 
a  W ash ing ton , D .C .-b ased  g roup  that p ro inotes business developm ent, has concluded that P uerto  R ico ’s 
low -in terest funds p rov ided  to  the reg ion  under the 936 p ro g ram  represen ted  the single la rgest source  o f  
p ro jec t loans to  qualified  C aribbean  B asin  bo rro w er countries in  1991, an  average o f  22  p ercen t o f  total 
loans d isb u rsed  in  the reg ion  from  1988 tfo 1991. Its g row th  as a source o f  funding has also  exceeded 
all o th e r lo an  sources. T en  C aribbean  countries signed  the  T ax  In fo rm ation  E xchange A greem ents w ith  
W ash ing ton  and  there fo re  cu rren tly  qualify  fo r loans th ro u g h  the 936 p rogram . T rin idad  and T obago  has 
received  the m ost from  C BI loans: $275 m illion . Jam aica and the D om inican  R epublic a re  c lose  beh ind .
Financial and technical assistance 
assistance to  the  CBI reg ion  in  1987 was 
T h e  C B I rep laced  the  trad itiona l m ixed  ecft 
sector. T h is em phasis is alleged to  have 
is even  charged  w ith  having increased m igration
Som e increase has been  recorded . U nited  States econom ic 
48 percen t h igher than  in  1983, bu t the  level declined  in  1988. 
onom ics o f th e  C aribbean  w ith  a  new  em phasis on  th e  p rivate  
aggravated  social tensions and increase po litical instab ility , and 
from  the C aribbean . It has also  been  said  tha t the  CBI
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lim ited  the  econom ic sovereign ty  o f  the C aribbean  countries, and that the  b ila tera l charac ter o f  the 
agreem ents signed  th rea tened  reg ional in tegration  and heightened econom ic d ifferences.
T he m ost im portan t con tribu tion  o f  the CBI has been  its ro le  in  help ing  the reg ion  to  offset, if  
only  m in im ally , the b ro ad er decline in  trade. T he trade  benefits o f  the CBI have been  concen tra ted  in 
the C en tra l A m erican  coun tries.2 T he im pacts o f  the CBI have not yet m et its sta ted  goals in  m ost o f  the 
22 coun tries that have acceded to  its term s. It has, how ever, begun  a p rocess o f  econom ic restru c tu rin g , 
w ith  econom ic and social im plications.
C A R IB C A N
Jam aica ’s P rim e M in iste r, E dw ard  Seaga, p resen ted  a detailed  proposal fo r aid  to  the  C aribbean  
reg ion  at a 1985 m eeting  o f  C A R IC O M  heads o f  governm ent. C anada responded  w ith  the C A R IB C A N , 
w hich  w as announced  in  F eb ruary  1986 and took  effect o n  June 15, 1986. C anada had  p rev iously  
ex tended  p referen tia l en try  treatm en t to  C om m onw ealth  C aribbean  goods th rough  the C anad ian  G eneral 
P referen tia l T a riff  (G P T ), the general p referen tia l p ro g ram  for developing countries (G SP), and the 
B ritish  P referen tia l T ariff.
C A R IB C A N ’s basic  objectives d iffered  from  those o f  the  CBI. C A R IB C A N ’s objectives w ere
to:
■ enhance bila teral com m ercial relations betw een C anada and C A R IC O M  states,
■ enhance C A R IC O M  trade  and export-earn ing  poten tia l,
■ im prove trade and  econom ic developm ent,
■ p rom ote  new  investm ent, and
■ encourage econom ic in tegration  and cooperation .
C A R IB C A N ’s m ain  features are  the unilateral ex tension  o f  p referen tia l, du ty -free  access to 
C anad ian  m arkets fo r m ost im ports from  the C aribbean , subject to  ru les o f  o rig in  and shipping 
requ irem en ts, and m easures to  encourage C anadian  investm ent and o ther form s o f  industria l coopera tion  
w ith  the  reg ion . P roducts excluded from  preferen tial treatm en t under the p ro g ram  continue to  be elig ib le 
fo r p re fe ren tia l treatm en t under the G PT  and B PT, if  such elig ib ility  exists u n d er those p rogram s. 
C A R IB C A N  included  a num ber o f  p rov isions that p rov ided  tra in ing , s trengthening  o f  m arketing  sk ills, 
p rom otional activ ity , and a num ber o f  business-related  activities spring ing  from  the  p riva te  sector.
Substan tia l im provem ent in  the  o rig inal concessions g ran ted  by  C A R IB C A N  w ere  m ade in  1990 
in  the  areas o f  ru m  bo ttling  and inclusion  o f  leather luggage and certa in  vegetab le-fiber p roducts . T hese 
changes opened  du ty -free  access to  C anada to  98 percen t o f  all C A R IC O M  goods.
C om plem entary  p rov isions fo r investm ent and facilita tion  o f  trade and industria l coopera tion  have 
concen tra ted  on  the  crea tion  o f  linkages betw een  the p rivate  sectors o f  C anada and the C aribbean . A gain , 
the p riv a te  sec to r continues as a key p ro v id er o f  developm ent in itiative in  the reg ion .
2. Clarke, D. P ., "Measurement of trade concentration under the United States’ Caribbean Basin Initiative." 
World Development Vol. 17 no. 6.
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N o tim e lim it has been attached to  C A R IB C A N , bu t an  ex tension  o f  the w aiver g ran ted  by  the 
G A T T  in  1986 fo r 12 years m ust be  sought in  1988. T he w aiver exem pted C anada from  the requ irem ent 
contained  u n d er parag raph  1 o f  the G eneral A greem ent that the sam e du ty -free treatm en t m ust be 
ex tended  to  like p roducts o f  any C ontracting  P arty . U nder the prov isions o f  C A R IB C A N , C anada m ay 
suspend  o r w ithdraw  duty-free  treatm ent in  w hole o r  in  p art from  any benefic iary  coun try . The 
benefic iaries o f  the p ro g ram  are the E nglish-speaking C aribbean  countries that m ain tain  links w ith  the
C om m onw ealth : C A R IC O M  countries plu 
Islands, and  the T urks and C aicos Islands.
5 A nguilla , B erm uda, the B ritish  V irg in  Islands, the C aym an
T h e  Im p a c t  o f  C A R IC O M
F ro m  the beg inn ing , expectations q f  the p rog ram  w ere not h igh , p rim arily  because the  value o f  
the du tiab le  p roducts constitu ted  a sm all share o f C anada’s im ports com pared  w ith  the range o f  im ports 
a lready  accorded  zero  ta r if f  access by  such p rogram s as M F N , the B P T , and the G PT .
H enry  S. G ill (1992), consultant to 
that any evaluation  o f  C A R IB C A N ’s im pact 
effects o f  th is arrangem ent from  o thers deri 
notes that th is is especially  the  case w ith 
exam ine the  re la tionsh ip  in  th ree  m ain  areas 
pub lished  in  June 1992, are sum m arized be
the L atin  A m erican  E conom ic System  (S E L A ), has observed  
w ith  respect to  its goals is d ifficu lt because o f  “ iso lating  the 
ving essentially  from  the pre-C A R IB C A N  re la tio n sh ip .” H e 
industria l cooperation  activ ities. H ow ever, he attem pts to 
: trad e , industria l cooperation , and investm ent. H is resu lts, 
low .
Trade. In  genera l, C A R IB C A N  has had little  positive im pact on  C aribbean  exports to  C anada, 
and the  im pact that has occurred  w as concentrated  in  a few  o f  the la rger countries. C aribbean  countries 
have expressed  concern  about various aspects o f  the  ag reem en t’s trade  p rov isions related  to  the  o rig in  
c rite ria , requ irem ent fo r d irect sh ipping , arid p roduct exclusions.
T he C A R IC O M  S ecre ta ria t’s statistics show  that:
C an ad a’s share  o f  C A R IC O M  exports has varied  considerab ly , ranging  betw een  3 .7  
p ercen t and 6 percen t during  the period  1984 to  1990;
C A R IC O M  exports to C anada have risen  in  value since the start o f  the C A R IB C A N  
p ro g ram , from  E C $455 .3  m illion  in  1986 to  E C $498 .3  m illion  in  1990, an  increase  o f 
only 9 .4  percen t, low er than changes in  g lobal exports, w hich  rose  46 .5  percen t over the 
sam e period ; and
m ajor exporters have been 
T obago , and G renada. By 
exports from  1986 to 1988,
Jam aica (66 percen t o f  to tal exports in  1990), T rin idad  and 
Contrast, the  O EC S countries experienced  a sligh t increase in 
and decreases in  1989 and 1990.
G ill’s exam ination  o f  the figures rev 
trade  and 2 .7  tim es the to tal C A R IB C A N  t 
factors as requ irem ents o f  o rig in , and direi 
trea tm ent figures fo r 1987 show s that dut> 
1.6 p e rcen t o f  du ty -free  im ports and 1.5 pe
eals that im ports valued at $11 .2  m illion , 4 .2  percen t o f  total 
rade, d id  not qualify  under the arrangem ent because o f  such 
ct sh ipm ent, am ong o thers. A n exam ination  o f  the ta riff  
-free im ports under C A R IB C A N  w ere  valued  at less than 
Ircent o f  all im ports.
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Industrial cooperation and investment. Som e success has been  repo rted , no tab ly  in  the 
estab lishm ent o f  N ational D evelopm ent Foundations and Institu tes in  nearly  all C A R IC O M  coun tries, and 
the funding  o f  m ore  th an  376 business p roposals  from  the reg ion , m ost under the Industria l C oopera tion  
P ro g ram  in  the fo rm  o f  en trepreneuria l and m anagem ent tra in ing , standards developm ent, investm ent 
p rom otion , and  institu tional strengthening . Investm ent, is said to  have been h indered  by  d istance and 
sh ipping  costs. C anadian  investm ent in  the C aribbean  area  has been  m ainly  in  the financial sector, 
com m unications and o ther u tilities, and tourism . C A R IB C A N  has becom e a focal p o in t o f  ac tiv ity  and 
has streng thened  com m ercial relations betw een C anada and the C aribbean  countries over the years.
T h e  L o m é  C o n v en tio n
L om é I w as negotiated  in  1975 to  legalize and  facilitate  coopera tion  betw een  the E uropean  
C om m unity  and the A frican , C aribbean , and Pacific  (A C P) g roup  o f  developing  coun tries that had 
h is to ric  links w ith  E uropean  states. Subsequent conventions w ere signed in  1979 and  1984. T he latest, 
L om é IV , w as finalized  in  1990 and rem ains in  force un til 2000. T he A C P states cu rren tly  num ber 69, 
13 o f  w h ich  are  C aribbean , the 12 m em bers o f  C A R IC O M  plus Surinam e. C oopera tion  u n d er the 
conventions is d irec ted  tow ards developm ent centered on  hum an righ ts as a basic  requ irem ent o f  real 
p rog ress.
L om é IV  offers opportun ities fo r A C P -E E C  cooperation  in  aid  and trade , and  it m akes available 
a to ta l o f  E C U  12.8 b illion , an  increase o f  40  percen t in  nom inal te rm s, and 20  percen t in  real term s and 
ad justed  fo r in fla tion , over levels p rov ided  in  Lom é III. A  notable change is the increased  em phasis on  
the ro le  o f  the p riva te  secto r in  stim ulating  g row th  and d iversifica tion  o f  A C P coun tries, and the  special 
inc lusion  o f  p rov isions fo r the developm ent o f  tourism . P rov isions o f  the latest conven tion  rep resen t a 
considerab le  im provem ent fo r the effectiveness o f  the  convention. T rade  p rov isions are also  considerab ly  
im proved  in  the  areas o f  com m odities, ru les o f  o rig in , and access.
T h e  m ain  p rov isions o f  the Lom é IV  C onvention  are:
■ Trade. P rov isions fo r trade  include nonreciprocal duty- and quota-free access fo r m ost 
A C P  exports, clarified  and relaxed rules o f  o rig in  w ith  p ro v ision  fo r exem ption  based  on  
value added, safeguard ing  o f  the in terest o f  its trad itional suppliers o f  bananas a fte r the 
com pletion  o f  the in ternal m arket, guaran teed  purchase o f  a s tipu lated  quo ta  o f  sugar and 
a llocation  o f  funds fo r p rom otion  o f  trade and tourism . T here  is also  p ro tec tio n  for 
com m odities that are  o f  crucial im portance fo r m ost A C P coun tries, and specifically  fo r 
the  C aribbean  states, as a resu lt o f  the  dow nw ard  trend  o f  agricu ltu ra l com m odity  prices 
(th rough  STA B EX  and SY SM IN ). R eduction  o f  dependence o n  these com m odities is 
sough t th ro u g h  support fo r d iversifica tion  efforts in  p rocessing , m arketing , d istribu tion , 
and  transpo rt.
■ Development cooperation. T he  p rom otion  and expedition  o f  the  econom ic, cu ltu ra l, and 
social developm ent o f  the A C P  countries is the objective o f  the  A id  fo r D evelopm ent 
F inancing  p rog ram . T w o m ajor innovations have been  support fo r struc tu ra l adjustm ent 
(w ith  the  aim  o f  adjustm ent w ith  social equity) and p rov isions fo r re liev ing  the cripp ling  
b u rden  o f  debt ow ed by  A C P  states. O ther areas fo r cooperation  include su p p o rt o f  the 
p riv a te  sec to r, p rom otion  o f  environm ental issues, popu la tion  g row th , and ag ricu ltu ra l,
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cultu ra l, social, and industria l cooperation . A n im portan t aspect o f  the conven tion  is its 
support to  regional cooperation , w hich is intended to  aid  the efforts o f  A C P  states to 
p rom ote  developm ent th rough  reg ional coopera tion  and  in tegration .
T h e  Im p a c t  o f  th e  L o m é  C o n v en tio n
T he E uropean  C om m unity  is a m ajo r m arket fo r the  developing  countries. In  1990, it absorbed  
one q u arte r o f  all developing  country  expdrts. It is especially  im portan t to  the  sm aller island p roducers 
o f  trad itiona l com m odities such as sugar, bananas, and rum .
T he reg ional cooperation  p ro g ram  has led to  establishm ent o f  the C aribbean  F o ru m , w hich 
includes th e  C A R IC O M  states, H aiti, and the D om inican  R epublic. T h is fo rum  has agreed  tha t th e  areas 
o f  reg ional coopera tion  it covers w ill be agricu ltu re , transpo rt, tou rism  env ironm ent, and  hum an 
resources.
T h e  C A R IC O M -V en ezu e la  A g reem en t
O n January  1, 1993, C A R IC O M  ajnd V enezuela agreed  to  a b ila teral trea ty  in tended to  increase 
levels o f  trade . T he trea ty  w ill allow  one-)way p referen tial access fo r C A R IC O M  goods to  V en ezu e la ’s 
m arket and the gradual reduction  o f  tariffs over five years. D uty-free en try  o f  agreed  im ports is 
an tic ipated  at the end o f  that period .
C A R IC O M  m em bers w ill then  start a phased  reduction  o f  tariffs fo r V enezuelan  goods for 
ano ther five-year p erio d . A t the  end  o f  te|n y ears , to tally  free  trade  (except in  m utually  ag reed  goods) 
w ill be  in  p lace betw een  C A R IC O M  and V enezuela. C A R IC O M  m em bers w ill also  gran t V enezuela 
M F N  status in  the app lication  o f  custom s tariffs over the  first phase. N o new  quantita tive  restric tions 
w ill be  app lied  to  im ports from  V enezuela. V enezuela has officially  im plem ented the agreem ent, bu t not 
all the  C A R IC O M  m em ber countries have ratified  it.
C A R IC O M  im ports from  V enezuela are  curren tly  about $360 m illion  p e r year, and V enezuela 
cu rren tly  im ports goods w orth  about $90 h iillion  p er year from  C A R IC O M  countries. In  recen t years, 
C A R IC O M  exports to  the L atin  A m erican  m arket, and particu larly  to  V enezuela, have increased . The 
agreem ent is expected  to  yield  g reat result® fo r the C A R IC O M  countries and is a fo re ru n n er to  w hat is 
hoped  w ill b e  a series o f  trade  agreem ents w ith  L atin  A m erican  countries and econom ic groups. 
C o lom bia  m ay be  the next coun try  to  link  Up w ith  the C aribbean  reg io n  in  this w ay.
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In tra -C A R IC O M  A rra n g e m e n ts :  T h e  C o m m o n  E x te rn a l T a r i f f
T h e  C om m on E xternal T a riff  (C E T ) rep laced  quantita tive restric tions as th e  p rinc ipa l instrum ent 
o f  p ro tec tio n  in  th e  C A R IC O M  o n  January  1, 1991. T h e  C om m on P ro tec tive  P o licy , w hich  engendered 
the  C E T , w as in tended  to  serve  as an  in teg ra tive  fo rce  fo r the  econom ies o f  C A R IC O M  m em bers by  
creating  an  en larged  and m ore  secure m arket. T h e  ob jectives o f  th e  C E T , as ag reed  in  1986, are:
■ p ro tec tio n  fo r reg ional agricu ltu ra l and industria l p rodu c tio n  o f  fin ished  goods, raw  and 
in term ediate  m ateria ls, and capital goods; and
■ su p p o rt fo r developm ent o f  in ternationally  com petitive p roducts  in  th e  C om m on M arket.
T h e  rev ised  C E T  was approved  at the Special M eeting  o f  the  C onference  o f  H eads o f  G overnm ent 
o f  th e  C aribbean  C om m unity  in  O ctober 1992. I t  estab lished  a ra te  stru c tu re  in  th e  C E T  o f  5 percen t 
(0-5 L D C s) to 20  p ercen t by  Jan u ary  1998 th rough  “phased  reduction  o f  the  cu rren t ra te  s tru c tu re  o f  the 
C E T .”
T h e  phased  reduction  is p lanned  to  b e  carried  ou t as illustra ted  in  T ab le  1. T h e  p roposa l fo r the  
rev ised  C E T  w as presen ted  to  th e  special m eeting o f  the  C om m on M arke t C ouncil in  O ctober 1992, a 
year earlie r th an  th e  scheduled com prehensive rev iew  o f  the  1991 C E T . It w as form ula ted  as a d irec t 
re sponse  to  the  trends o f  trad e  re fo rm  and libera liza tion  in  th e  in ternational econom y, and th e  perceived  
need to  encourage  C aribbean  econom ies to  com pete in th e  new  environm ent.
T h e  m ove to  low er b a rrie rs  to  in tra-C aribbean  trad e  took  p lace  fo llow ing  th e  rea liza tion  th a t the  
ex istence o f  p referen tia l agreem ents w as th reatened  and th e ir benefits stood  to  b e  eroded  by  the  successful 
com pletion  o f  nego tia tions w ith in  th e  U ruguay  R ound o f  G A T T  trad e  negotia tions.
T ab le  1
Im plem entation  Schedule o f  the  C E T
P eriod  o f Im plem entation R ate
application period stru c tu re
Jan  1, 1993-D ec 31 , 1994 Jan  1, 1993-Jul 1, 1993 5 (0-5 L D C s) to  30/35
Jan  1, 1995-D ec 31 , 1996 Jan  1, 1995-Jul 1, 1995 5 (0-5 L D C s) to  25 /3 0
Jan  1, 1997-D ec 31 , 1997 Jan  1, 1997-Jul 1, 1997 5 (0-5 L D C s) to  20 /25
Jan  1, 1998 onw ard Jan  1, 1998-Jul 1, 1998 5 (0-5 L D C s) to  20
T h e  rates o f  th e  new  C E T  w ere  based  on  eight p rinc ip les, the  tw o m ost im portan t o f  w hich  w ere 
the  ach ievem ent o f  in ternational com petitiveness and efficient p ro duc tion  fo r b o th  th e  reg ional and
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in ternational m arkets. A  com parison  o f  pre-ex isting  rate treatm ent w ith  the new  C E T  is show n in 
T ab le  2 . T he eight p rincip les w ere:
■ International competitiveness: T he  ta riff  s truc tu re  shou ld  support the  developm ent of 
in ternationally  com petitive p roduction  in  the C om m on M arket.
■ Efficient production: O verpro tective rates should  be avoided and rates that keep 
p ro duc tion  costs low  should  be im plem ented. U nrestric ted  in trareg ional com petition  
should  be encouraged , and subsid ies should  applied in  ex trareg ional m arkets shou ld  be 
taken  into account.
■ Cost of living: N o undue increase in  the cost o f  liv ing should  resu lt.
■ Government revenue: N eeds o f  m em ber states should  be taken  into account.
■ Removal of exemptions: U n ifo rm  treatm ent o f  inputs across C A R IC O M  w ould  requ ire
rem oval o r reduction  o f  the exem ptions regim e.
■ Commodity-based tariff: S im plification  o f  the struc tu re  by  applying one rate  to  a good
regard less o f  econom ic use.
■ Special measures for the less-developed countries: Special needs o f  L D C s shou ld  be 
taken  into account.
■ Simplification and transparency: S im plification  o f  the struc tu re , m in im ization  o f  the 
num ber o f  rate bands, and reduction  o f  the need fo r d iscre tionary  app lication  in  the 
rou tine  adm in istra tion  o f  thq  ta riff  should  b e  a basic  consideration .
C o n sidera tion  o f  the factors above led to  the classification  o f  goods schem atically  described  in  
F igu re  1. W ith  reference to  that figure, note:
1. T he te rm  com peting was taken  to  refer to  those goods w here “ reg ional p roduc tion , o r im m ediate 
p ro d u c tio n  po ten tia l from  existing  capacity , am ounted to  over 75 p ercen t o f  reg ional 
dem and /co n su m p tio n . ”3
2. T h e  categories o f  final goods m ay be  identified  as:
■ Selected exports: goods traded  in trareg ionally  and ex trareg ionally  insign ifican t q u an titie s .
■ Agriculture: vegetab le oils and p rim ary  agricu ltural p roducts traded  in  e ither fresh , 
frozen , o r chilled  form .
3. Report of the Working Group of Experts on the Common External Tariff.
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F ig u re  1 : T h e  S tru c tu re  o f  th e  C E T




Primary \ \  Primary
In term ed ia te ^  Intermediate
Capital Capital
Final goods Special goods




General m anufactures 
Agriculture Inputs 
Safety
Cost o f living
S ocioeco n o m ic
Revenue






■ General manufactures: goods produced  in  C A R IC O M  at a level w hich  w ould  satisfy  75 
percen t o f  reg ional dem and, and are not specifically  identified  in  the  o ther final goods 
categories.
■ Agriculture inputs: goods considered  agricu ltu re  inputs include insectic ides and
herb ic ides, p lan ting  m ateria ls, and fertilizers that have been  accorded  du ty -free  treatm ent.
■ Safety: goods used  fo r the p ro tec tion  o f  life and lim b.
■ Cost of living: goods considered  to  have an  im pact on  the cost o f  liv ing.
■ Socioeconomic: goods tha t are  considered  to  be im portan t fo r, inter alia, educational, 
cu ltu ra l, tra in ing , m edical, and sporting  purposes.
3. Special goods belong  to  one o f  four categories:
■ List A consists o f  goods o f  w hich m em ber states w ish  to  encourage  p ro d u c tio n  bu t w ould  
no t o therw ise qualify  fo r com peting rates.
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\ T ab le  2 
C om parison  o f  R ate T reatm ents under the  C E T
C ategories
"I,----------------------------------------------------------
—  P revious rates —
M D C s L D C s
R ates from  
Jan  1993 to  
Jan  1998
N oncom peting prim ary inputs 
N oncom peting interm ediate
0-10 0-5 5 (0-5 LDCs)
inputs 0-10 0-5 5 (0-5 LDCs)
N oncom peting capital inputs 0-10 0 5 (0-5 LDCs)
Com peting prim ary inputs 30 30 20 to 10
Com peting interm ediate inputs 30 30 25 to 15
Com peting capital goods 20 20 25 to 15
Selected exports 20-30 20-30 20 to  10
Agriculture 45 45 40
A griculture inputs
Cost o f living, socioeconomic
0 0
and sociocultural 0-30 0-30 0-20 until 
Dec 31, 1996a
Safety 0 0 0 to unspecified
A groindustry 45 20-45 30-35 to 20
Garments 45 20-45 30-35 to 20
General m anufactures 
Revenue and noncompeting
45 20-45 30-35 to 20
final goods 30 30 25 to 25-30 to 
20-25 to 20
List A susp. rates susp. rates susp. rates until 
Dec 31, 1996
List B susp. rates susp. rates 
(LDCs) until 
Dec 31, 1996b
List C min. rates min. rates min. rates
L ist D (parts 1 and 2) susp. rates susp. rates 
(LDCs) until 
Dec 31, 1996b
a. Item s to  be included in  other categories witjh the reduction in  the levels o f rates in  the latter.
b. It is anticipated that on January 1, 1998, there will be no items in  these categories.
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■ List B includes item s for w hich  im plem entation o f  the C E T  is to  b e  delayed  due to  the 
considerab le  gap betw een  p revailing  rates and the p roposed  tariffs.
■ List C  refers to  those item s that are trad itionally  significant revenue earners, and  also 
item s on  w hich  agreem ent on  ta riff  levels has not been achieved.
■ ListD  consists o f  those item s fo r w hich the C E T  is to  be suspended. T hese include item s 
o f  specific  in terest to  B elize (part 1), rice in  the  cases o f  A ntigua and  B arbuda, D om inica 
and  Jam aica (part 2), and pharm aceuticals in  the case o f  L D C s (part 3).
4 . In teg ra l to  the  s truc tu re  is the  list o f  C onditional D uty  E xem ptions, w hich  includes goods that 
m em ber states m ay exem pt from  duty u n d er the C E T . W here inputs w ere categorized  as com peting 
and w ere  easily  available, it w as p roposed  that these be included in  the  L ist o f  G oods Inelig ib le  fo r 
E xem ptions.
5. T h e  suspension  o f  rates m ay be done only by the C ouncil. In  the in tercessional p e riods o f  the 
C ouncil, the  Secretary  G eneral has been  given the pow er to suspend  the tariff.
6. T h e  L D C s have been  g ra ted  the facility  to  apply a rate betw een zero  and 5 p ercen t on  noncom peting 
in term edia te  inputs and capital goods.
7 . A g ricu ltu re  has been  accorded  special status.
E x trareg ional C aribbean  trade is vastly  g rea ter than in trareg ional trade. T he conclusion  tha t som e 
have m ade is that the concern  o f  fostering  in tra-C A R IC O M  trade is overem phasized . H ow ever, it is 
instructive  to  no te  that in tra-C A R IC O M  trade  constitutes alm ost 10 percen t o f  all C A R IC O M  trad e  (and 
it is g row ing) and in  certa in  cases em ploys a substantial p o rtio n  o f  a co u n try ’s population .
T re n d s  in  In te rn a tio n a l  T ra d e
Multilateralism versus Regionalism. T he trend  tow ards m ultila tera lism  o r g lobaliza tion  o f  trade 
is em bodied  by  the conclusion  o f  the U ruguay  R ound and seem s to  act against the “ reg io n a liz in g ” o f  
trad e  em bodied  by  the crea tion  o f  the  E uropean  S ingle M arket, the  N orth  A m erican  F ree  T rade 
A greem ent (N A F T A ), and free trade  agreem ents in  L atin  A m erica and the P acific  R im . T he im pact o f  
tw o seem ingly  opposed  trends is unclear. A ccord ing  to T rev o r H ark er, E C L A C  R egional E conom ic 
A dv iso r to  the  C aribbean:
T here  is som e debate  about the rationale  and final outcom e o f regional b locs. W ill they  
b e  bu ild ing  b locks to  m ultila teralism , o r stum bling b locks? W ill the b locs reduce h igh  
tariffs  betw een  countries at the  regional level, and lead la ter to  ta r iff  reductions o r ta r if f  
e lim ination  betw een  the b locs, thus la ter leading to  true  m ultila teral trade?
T rade  libera liza tion  is a feature o f  b o th  trends, and has been  recognized  as an  inev itab le  rou te , 
w hether in  b locs o r g lobally . It im plies the m inim izing o f  nonreciprocal p rov isions in  trad e  agreem ents 
o n  w hich  C aribbean  countries have relied  to  date. T rade  liberalization  acts against p referen tia l term s and 
p ro tec tion ism . O n the  one hand , there  is the  need to  p ro tec t industry  in  the sho rt te rm , and  o n  the  o ther
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hand th ere  is the need to  challenge it to  achieve excellence in  the  long term . T he streng th  o f  p ro tec tion ist 
influences has led  one observer to  conclude that there  is no such th ing  as free (liberalized) trad e , only 
freer tra d e .4
T he considera tion  o f  trends and characteristics o f  in ternational trade  lead to  an  exam ination  o f  
the  w ays these  trends m ay affect the  C aribbean ’s position  in  ex isting  trad ing  re lationsh ips and  decisions 
to  be  m ade by  C aribbean  countries in  dealing w ith  these effects. T he conflic ting  natu re  o f  severa l o f  the 
trends and  the decreasing  popu larity  o f  the fo rm er modus operandi o f  the C aribbean  w ill fo rce the  reg ion  
to  decisions about po lic ies fo r approaching  new  regim es, and these po licies w ill determ ine approaches 
to ex isting  p referen tia l arrangem ents.
D o m estic  P o lic ies a n d  In te rn a tio n a l  T re n d s
T he fo re ign  trade  po licy  d irections taken  by  C A R IC O M  countries w ill be influenced by , and w ill 
influence, the natu re  o f  in ternal arrangem ents and policies.
The Regional Integration Movemetit
D iscussion  o f  C aribbean  regional in teg ration  has concentrated  on  econom ic ra th e r th an  political 
issues since the d isso lu tion  o f the  W est Ind ian  Federa tion  in  1962. T he underly ing  u rg e  fo r a W est Ind ian  
identity  and  the search  fo r m ore  economic) space have kept alive the ideals o f  reg ional in tegra tion , an 
ideal that has becom e even m ore  tim ely and relevant in  to d ay ’s new  trad ing  arrangem ents. P ractical 
aspects re la ting  to  the  possib ility  o f  reg ion-w ide m arketing , increased  econom ies o f  scale , and 
developm ent o f  the  services secto r have also been p art o f  the long-range vision.
T h e  W est Ind ian  C om m ission  has 
sovere ign  states w ho by  treaty  agree to  the 
co llectively  in  very  specific  respects. ” The 
o f  sovere ign ty , no t a transfer o f  it, tha t is i
sta ted  that concepts o f  C A R IC O M  focus o n  a “com m unity  o f 
poo ling  o f  certa in  o f  th e ir sovereignties and to  exerc ising  them  
C om m ission  em phasizes that “ it is the sharing  o f  the  exercise 
nvolved  in  the  in tegration  p ro c e ss .”5
P rim e M in iste r E rsk ine Sandiford  b f  B arbados said  at the opening  o f  the  eleventh  Sum m it o f 
C A R IC O M  H eads in  1990:
F o r m e the C aribbean  C om m unity  is nothing m ore and nothing less than  the efforts o f  
the  C aribbean  peop le  to  create  a new  and un ique po litical entity  tha t respects the  national 
sovere ign ty  o f  each individual te rrito ry , w hile at the sam e tim e pooling  aspects o f  that 
sovere ign ty  and  poo ling  aspects o f  the ir resources in  o rd er to  prom ote  and p reserve  
peace , p rom ote  and p reserv e  dem ocracy , p rom ote  and p reserv e  fundam ental hum an  righ ts 
and  the ru le  o f  law , and prom ote  artd p reserve  econom ic and social developm ent am ong 
C aribbean  people.
4. Hosten-Craig (1992).
5. Report of the West Indian Commission.
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T h e R eport o f  the  W est Ind ian  C om m ission  fu rther states:
S overeignty  is one th ing ; contractual ob ligation  is another. W e cannot ag ree  to  act 
toge ther in  particu la r w ays and rem ain  free to  act as w e please, o r as every  passing  
advantage induces us. I f  in tegration  is to  w ork  to  the long-term  advantage o f  the reg ion  
and  all its m em ber states, C A R IC O M  com m itm ents m ust be  b inding  com m itm ents, 
m ora lly , functionally , legally.
In ternational developm ents in  trade  regim es m ay hold  particu la r dangers fo r the  reg ional 
in teg ra tion  m ovem ent. A pproaches to  new  “libera lized” regim es on  a C A R IC O M -w ide basis w ill p resen t 
dangers fo r the  m ore  vu lnerab le  L D C s o f  the reg ion  and g rea ter benefits fo r the  M D C s. C arefu l 
exam ination  o f  the m odalities o f  such  an approach  w ill be requ ired . Individual approaches, w hile  not 
ho ld ing  m uch  scope fo r success (except in  the cases o f  the m ost developed C aribbean  countries) in  term s 
o f  the  lack  o f  negotia ting  w eight and pow er, m ay well h inder m oves to  the  ideally  in tegrated  C aribbean . 
P o licy  instrum ents fo r liberalized  econom ies (for exam ple, “ floa ting” currencies) m ay also conflic t w ith  
po licy  instrum ents such as a com m on currency.
A t the sam e tim e, it is evident that approaches to  the E u ropean  C om m unity  v ia  the Lom é 
C onven tion  w ill requ ire  increasing cohesion in  the face o f  p ressu re  from  countries tha t are  no t p a rt o f 
the  A C P  g roup  and  increased  a tten tion  to  E astern  E urope and E uropean  recession . C om m itm ent to  the 
in teg ra tion  p rocess w ould  serve the C arib b ean ’s in terests best.
R egional analysts have generally  agreed that the  C aribbean  countries rem ain  vu lnerab le  to  the 
chang ing  in ternational econom ic o rd er, not only  because they have rela tively  w eak econom ies bu t also 
because they  rem ain  po litically  div ided.
The Common External Tariff
It has b een  recognized  that p ro tecting  C aribbean  industry  from  ex trareg ional com petition  is 
inconsisten t w ith  trends tow ard  trade  liberalization , and the special m eeting o f  the C onference  o f  H eads 
o f  G overnm ent o f  the  C aribbean  C om m unity  in  O ctober 1992 decided to reduce the C E T  stepw ise until 
a range o f  5 percen t to 20  percen t is achieved by  1998. This tim e fram e m ay a llow  C aribbean  countries 
to  partic ip a te  fu lly  in  the N A F T A , given com pliance w ith  o ther requirem ents and  the likelihood  that the 
C aribbean  coun tries w ill no t be  considered  fo r accession at least on  a recip rocal basis fo r a few  years.
T he C E T  in  its p resen t fo rm  does not conflict w ith  the G A T T . B arbados, Jam aica, and  T rin idad  
and T obago  are  contracting  parties to  the G A T T  and have received  requests from  C anada and the  U nited  
States fo r the  reduction  o f  ta r iff  and non tariff barrie rs  and fo r the b ind ing  o f  ta riffs  on  a num ber o f  
p roducts. W ith  the  finalization  o f  the rev ised  C E T , it has been decided  tha t coun tero ffers (on  the basis 
o f  the C E T ) to  those requests w ill be m ade, and requests m ade to C anada and the U .S . to  e lim inate  and 
bind  tariffs  o n  the  item s cu rren tly  subject to duties o r  o ther charges under C A R IB C A N  and  CBI.
T he rev ised  C E T  does no t conflict w ith  arrangem ents under the Lom é C onvention . T h e  tim e 
fram e fo r reduc tion  o f  the C E T  allow s fo r new  Lom é negotiations (if  the op tion  is then  still open) on  a 
m ore  rec ip rocal footing.
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A num ber o f  po licy  dilem m as arise  w hen  considering  the ro le to  be p layed  by  the C E T . T here 
is a danger that w hile  prov isions are  m ade fo r the encouragem ent o f  in tra-C A R IC O M  trad e , a  b ias m ay 
be developed  against exporting  outside C A R IC O M , against the long-range objective o f  g lobal 
com petitiveness.
T he M axw ell Stam p P L C  study on  trade  policy  refo rm  in T rin idad  and T obago raises related  
issues. It states:
. . . i t  is necessary  to consider w hether C A R IC O M  m em bersh ip  o r  cu rren t C A R IC O M  
arrangem ents are a constrain t to  th e rem oval o f  an tiexport bias and therefo re  constrain t 
to  the  p rom otion  o f  ex tra-C A R IC O M  exports. I f  the com m on ex ternal tariffs (C E T ) o f  
C A R IC O M  w ere  the only  source o f 
necessita te  im m ediate attention, 
cu rren tly  in  T rin idad  and T obago,
an tiexport b ias, then  C A R IC O M  arrangem ents w ould  
But there are  parallel trade  policies in  opera tion  
tha t induce a g rea ter an tiexport b ias w hen  incentives 
to  export ou tside C A R IC O M  are cdm pared  w ith  the incentives to  sell to  the local m arket 
ra th e r than  w ith  those to  sell in  C A R IC O M . T here  is likely to  be considerab le  scope fo r 
low ering  an tiexport b ias by trade po licy  refo rm  outside o f  the C A R IC O M  fram ew ork .
O th er reg ional goals such as the  free convertib ility  o f  cu rrency  w ill requ ire  c lo ser exam ination  
to  determ ine  the im plications o f  m oves tow ards trade liberalization .
Recommendations of the West Indian Commission
T he rep o rt o f  the W est Ind ian  cjom m ission indicates a general reg ional consensus o n  the 
im portance  o f  p rom oting  export-led  grow th . Po licy  issues and p rescrip tions are:
R egional d irec tions fo r p rom oting  export-led  grow th:
■ E stab lish ing  m obility  o f  capital w ith in  C A R IC O M
■ E nsu ring  that respective currencies are  freely  convertib le  w ith  each  o ther
■ E stab lishm ent o f  regional titading houses
■ M obility  o f  labor
■ R educing  an tiexport bias
■ E xpanding  C A R IC O M  trade
E xtra reg iona l trade:
■ E nsu ring  that the  em ergence o f  the N A F T A  does not destroy  the benefits o f  the  C B I and 
C A R IB C A N
■ N egotiation  w ith  the U nited  S tates, C anada, and M exico and convincing  N A F T A  
nego tia to rs that the CBI and C A R IB C A N  m ust be  m aintained
■ Securing  p arity  w ith  M exico regard ing  access w ith in  N A F T A  and  a  con tinuation  o f  the 
nonrecip rocal arrangem ents estab lished  under the  C B I and  C A R IB C A N
■ Sustain ing  m ovem ent tow ard  d iversifica tion  o f  trade w ith  a focus on  agribusiness,
m anufacturing , and service sectors.
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P o licy  A p p ro a c h e s  to  P re fe re n tia l  A rra n g e m e n ts
C aribbean  countries m ust keep in  m ind  the need to  w iden  and deepen  the C aribbean  com m unity , 
decide o n  th e ir  levels o f  com m itm ent to  the p rocess, and determ ine the effect o f  th e ir  po licy  choices in 
the in ternational scene on  th e ir reg ional goals. In ternational developm ents also ho ld  im plications fo r the 
p re feren tia l agreem ents under w hich C aribbean  countries have operated  fo r the la rg e r p a rt o f  the  critical 
developm ental stage. T hese agreem ents, w hile  show ing vary ing  levels o f  perfo rm ance to  date , hold 
po ten tia lly  im portan t ro les as facilita tor o f  trade developm ent. Identification  o f the issues and exp lo ra tion  
o f  po licy  choices rem ain  im peratives.
NAFTA
T he effects o f  the N A F T A  on  C aribbean  econom ies have been w idely  debated  w ithout p roducing  
a  so lid  consensus beyond  the identification  o f the tex tile  and apparel sectors as p a rticu la rly  vu lnerab le . 
T he tex tile  industry  has becom e one o f Jam aica’s new er engines o f  g row th  under a b ila tera l pact w ith  the 
U .S . w h ich  w as extended in  January  1993. It is also w idely  held  that the C aribbean  w ill su ffer from  a 
d ep le tion  o f  investm ent. Talks have also been taking place about the fu ture o f  C aribbean  su g ar exports 
to  the U .S .
N A F T A ’s N o rth  A m erican  coverage w ill hold sim ilar im plications fo r trade  w ith  C anada. The 
N A F T A  has no t only  d raw n a tten tion  aw ay from  the in terests o f  the  C aribbean, bu t also  th rea tens to 
in troduce  M exico as a com petito r fo r C aribbean  goods and services in  the C anad ian  m arket. This 
scenario  applies p a rticu la rly  to  products excluded from  preferen tial access under C A R IB C A N . T hese 
p roducts rep resen t a sm all frac tion  o f  total exports to C anada from  the C aribbean , and  the negative effect 
on  C aribbean  econom ies m ay not be great in  the short term . L im iting  the m arket fo r these goods m ay, 
h ow ever, stun t fu tu re  g row th  o f  its m arket share.
Susan  H ow ell, C anada’s T rade  C om m issioner to T rin idad  and T obago, has attem pted  to  pu t things 
in to  p erspec tive  w ith  regard  to  the  extent to  w hich  C A R IC O M  countries w ill be  affected  by  com petition  
from  M exico  un d er N A F T A . In  an  address to  the  U niversity  o f  the  W est Indies Sem inar o n  Strategies 
for Survival: CARICOM Manufacturing and Export in a World of Change, O ctober 23 , 1992, in  P ort 
o f  Spain , she stated:
A nd le t’s pu t th ings in  perspective. E ighty  percen t o f  M ex ico ’s exports to  C anada 
already  com e in du ty -free , com pared w ith  98 percen t o f  C A R IC O M ’s. So C A R IC O M  
has in  fact been  com peting w ith  M exico , on close to  equal term s, fo r years. A nd 
com peting  successfully . In  fact m ost M exicans w ould  probab ly  say that C A R IC O M  has 
had  the advantage, w ith  its E nglish-speaking labor force, on  average b etter educated than  
M ex ico ’s, its generally  better in frastructu re , its fam iliarity  w ith  the N o rth  A m erican  
m arkets and business prac tices, and significant C anadian and U .S . investm ent p resence 
already . T h is is a lead over M exico w hich C A R IC O M  still m aintains and w hich  w o n ’t 
go aw ay quickly .
Impacts of NAFTA on the CBI and Policy Directions
T h e cu rren t advantages o f  the C B I are  likely to  be dram atically  eroded  by  M exico (and in  the 
fu tu re  b y  the  L atin  A m erican  countries) w ith in  the N A FT A . T he lack o f  com petitiveness in  te rm s o f
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m arketing , physical in frastructu re , and labor costs that h indered  C aribbean  countries from  tak ing  lu ll 
advantage o f  the  p referen tia l regim e w ill accelerate that ero sion  unless seriously  dealt w ith . The 
agricu ltu ra l secto r stands to lose its cu rren t positive g row th  in  exports to  the  U nited  States in  the face o f 
L atin  A m erican  com petition . T he close geographical p rox im ity  o f  M exico to  the  A m erican  m arketp lace 
m akes it com petitive in  term s o f  transporta tion  costs. M exico also th reatens to  draw  large vo lum es o f  
investm ent aw ay from  the C A R IC O M  region: an  estim ated $24 b illion  in  overseas investm ent has been  
received  by  M exico during  the th ree  years o f  negotiating N A FT A .
C aribbean  countries have little  choice bu t to  open  th e ir m arkets, at least in  the long term . This 
m eans partic ip a tio n  in  the N A F T A  som etim e in  the fu ture. T he tim ing and natu re  o f  th is partic ipa tion  
m ust be  determ ined  w hile  keeping in  m ind  the im plications o f  th is partic ipa tion  fo r the  CBI.
Docking. T he agreem ent, as it stands, includes an  accession  clause tha t w ill allow  o ther countries 
to  jo in  the accord  “ if  the N A F T A  countries agree, and subject to  the  term s and conditions tha t they 
req u ire  and to  the com pletion  o f  dom estic approval p rocedures in  each c o u n try .”
C aribbean  countries have the op tion  o f  docking into the N A F T A  one by  one as they  gradually  
m eet requ irem ents fo r access. H ow ever, this im plies a delay , and any delay w ill be costly  w ith  the 
an tic ipated  d ivergence  o f  in terest from  the area. This type o f  approach  w ill not com prom ise the benefits 
o f  the  C B I fo r the o ther C aribbean  countries, since agreem ents under the  CBI are  m ade coun try  by 
coun try . It is envisaged  that there  w ill be lim ited scope fo r ta ilo r-m ade agreem ents fo r individual 
countries.
Forging a new relationship (or modifying an old one). T he approach  that is perce ived  to  hold  
g rea te r po ten tia l benefit fo r the C A R IC O M  unit is the forg ing  o f  a new  re la tionsh ip  along the lines o f 
a nonrecip rocal (in itia lly , but w ith  increasing reciprocity) arrangem ent w ith  the en tire  N A F T A  group . 
T h is w ill req u ire  m odification  o f  the  C B I’s prov isions to  m ain tain  coherence betw een  the new  re la tionsh ip  
and the rela tionsh ip  w ith  the U nited  States. W hile  curren t C A R IC O M  efforts seem  to be concentrating  
on  the U .S . m arket, it m ust be noted that the trad itional ties w ith  C anada, and M ex ico ’s m ore  recent 
in terest in  the  C aribbean  hold  po ten tia l fo r the developm ent o f  an  arrangem ent com patib le  w ith  the  needs 
and goals o f  the C aribbean  region. M exico as a m arket has not yet been  explo ited  fu lly  by  C aribbean  
businesses and industry , and the dem and created  by the anticipated  g row th  o f  that co u n try ’s econom y 
should  no t be  overlooked .
O ther d irections seem  to have been identified. R ichard  L. B ernal, am bassador o f  Jam aica to  the 
U nited  S tates, iden tified  som e m ajor proposals to  the W ays and M eans C om m ittee o f  the  U .S . C ongress 
in  S ep tem ber 1992. T hey  w ere:
■ P re se rv e  th e  v ia b ility  o f  th e  C B I. N A F T A  should  not erode the p rov isions o f  the CBI. 
T his m ay requ ire  specific clauses to  guaran tee the nonerosion  o f  CBI
■ P a r i ty  a s  a  tra n s i t io n a l  a r ra n g e m e n t. T he CBI m odified  to  offer the sam e conditions 
o f  m arket access to  the U nited  States as those prov ided  to  M exico under the N A F T A , to  
cover products exem pted from  duty-free treatm ent u n d er CBI and those p laced  at a 
d isadvantage by  M exican  com petition .
■ P h a se d  re c ip ro c ity  o v e r a  su ita b le  a d ju s tm e n t p e r io d .
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■ F u n d in g  tr a n s fo rm a tio n . P rov ision  o f  resources to  install new  p ro d u ctiv e  capacity  and 
im prove p roduc tiv ity  and com petitiveness.
■ T r a n s p a re n t  p ro cess  o f  e x p a n s io n . P rocedures should  b e  m ade know n and c rite ria  fo r 
e lig ib ility  fo r accession  and specific  docking  p rov isions c learly  defined .
A  com m entary  by  Peter B . Johnson  in  US/Latin Trade (F ebruary  1993) states:
O ne cond ition  is qu ite  clear. T h e  sm aller countries w ill have  to  understand  th a t the  
benefits o f  nonrecip rocal trade , o ffered  under the term s o f  the  CBI o f  1984, w ill no t keep 
them  ahead o f  com petition  fo r investm ent o r  fo r  jo in t p roduction  arrangem ents . W ith  
ta r if f  b a rrie rs  under N A F T A  gradually  fa lling  to  ze ro , C BI countries could  end up  at a 
d isadvan tage in  m any p ro d u c t categories even if  they  jo in ed  th e  pact. T h is  perhaps is no t 
c learly  understood  by C aribbean  leaders, although it is w ell know n to U .S . firm s 
sourc ing  p roduc ts  from  these  coun tries, and by  th e  trad e  and com m ercial in terests in  the  
Sou thern  U .S . states.
Im p a c t  o f  N A F T A  o n  C A R IB C A N
A C anadian  study  evaluating  the  im pact o f  the  C anada-U .S . F ree  T rad e  A greem ent on  C aribbean  
econom ies has concluded  tha t the  agreem ent w ould  enhance levels o f  both  trad e  and  investm ent in  the 
C aribbean , and th a t any disp lacem ent o f  these  caused by  th e  agreem ent w ould  b e  ou tw eighed  by  its 
expansionary  econom ic effects fo r th e  reg ion .
A  sim ilar study  has been  conducted  on  the  im pact o f  N A F T A  on  th e  C om m onw ealth  C aribbean , 
w ith  th e  sam e conclusion . It has also observed , how ever, tha t sales o f  som e C aribbean  p roducts to 
C anada, no tab ly  in  the  areas o f  garm ents, fresh  p roduce , and low -cost assem bly could  b e  negatively  
affected in  th e  long  run .
T h e  W est Ind ian  C om m ission  has recom m ended th a t C A R IC O M  ensure th a t th e  em ergence o f  
th e  N orth  A m erican  F ree  T rad e  A greem ent does no t destroy  the  po ten tia l benefits o f  the  C A R IB C A N , 
and th a t p a rity  o f  trea tm en t be  extended to  C A R IC O M  by  the  U .S . and C anada w hen N A F T A  is 
im plem ented.
M o re  concre te  C aribbean  d irec tion  can be  detected  in  th e  com m unique from  th e  F ou rth  
In tersessional M eeting  o f  the  C onference o f  H eads o f  G overnm ent o f  the  C aribbean  C om m unity  in  M arch 
o f  1993. T h is com m unique called upon  th e  signatory  countries to  th e  N A F T A  to “ extend to  C A R IC O M  
products no t included in th e  C aribbean  B asin  In itia tive  (CBI) and C A R IB C A N  th e  sam e treatm en t 
accorded  to  these  p roducts  o rig ina ting  from  M ex ico .” T h e  Special M eeting  o f  the  H eads o f  G overnm ent, 
held  in  O ctober 1992, agreed to  pu rsu e  the possib ility  o f  negotia ting , as a g roup , a com m on position  fo r 
en try  in to  N A F T A  u n d er arrangem ents w hereby  the  benefits un d er th e  C BI are  m ain tained . A 
nonrecip rocal arrangem ent is stressed  here:
Ind ications from  the U .S . are  tha t arrangem ents such as the  CBI a re  un like ly  to  be
m ain tained  in  th e ir p resen t fo rm  as th e  N A F T A  proceeds. I t w as repo rted  in  D ecem ber
1992 tha t th e  U .S . C ongress w ill push  fo r  inclusion  o f  the  C B I countries in  the  N A F T A
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o n  at lea s t a  lim ite d  b a s is , e v e n  i f  that p a r tic ip a tio n  is  n o t in it ia lly  rec ip r o ca l. R ep . F ran k  
G u a r in i, D -N J , sta ted , “ L e g is la t io n  is  b e in g  d ra w n  up n o w  . . . (w ith ) th e  g o a l and  
o b je c t iv e  o f  ex ten d in g  th e  sa m e co n s id era tio n s  in  trade to  th e  C arib b ean  B a s in  In itia t iv e  
co u n tr ie s  that are b e in g  d is c u sse d  n o w  w ith  C an ad a  and M e x ic o .” T h e  C a r ib b e a n  F r e e  
T ra d e  A g re e m e n t  A c t  o f  1 9 9 3  is  b e in g  p ro p o sed  b y  certa in  sec to r s  o f  th e  A m er ica n  
C o n g r e s s , and  is  a im ed  at th e  p r o te c t io n  o f  C arib b ean  B a s in  co u n tr ie s  fr o m  th e  e ffe c ts  
o f  N A F T A .
Impact of NAFTA on Lomé IV
A c c e s s io n  to  N A F T A  m a y  req u ire  that th e  C arib b ean  ex ten d  th e  sa m e  a c c e ss  to  r e g io n a l m ark ets  
to  th e  L o m é  c o u n tr ie s  as to  th e  N A F T A  co u n tr ie s . U n d er  A r tic le  2 5  o f  th e  L o m é  IV  C o n v e n tio n , sh o u ld  
C A R IC O M  sta tes  b e c o m e  m em b ers  o f  N A F T A  (w h ic h  e x c lu d e s  d e v e lo p e d  co u n tr ie s  lik e  C an ad a  and  th e  
U n ite d  S ta te s ) , th e y  w il l  b e  o b lig a ted  to  ex ten d  s im ila r  c o n d it io n s  to  th e  E E C  m em b er  sta tes .
T h e  E x e c u t iv e  D ir e c to r  o f  th e  C arib b ean  C o u n c il fo r  E u ro p e , a  p r iv a te -sec to r  C a rib b ea n  gro u p  
that m o n ito r s  d e v e lo p m e n ts  in  E u ro p e  that a ffec t p r iv a te -sec to r  in terests  in  th e  C a r ib b ea n , sta tes:
. . . p ro b a b ly  th e  m o st d if f ic u lt  is su e  that th e  C arib b ean  is  l ik e ly  to  fa c e  in  its r e la tio n sh ip  
w ith  E u ro p e , is  th e  q u e st io n  o f  r ec ip r o c ity . I f  th e  C arib b ean  w ish e s  to  a c h ie v e  so m e  
fo r m  o f  d o c k in g  arran gem en ts w ith  th e  N A F T A , it w il l  b e  req u ired  to  d e v e lo p  an  
ap p ro a ch  that lea d s  to  tw o -w a y  trade lib era liza tio n . L o m é , o n  th e  o th er  h a n d , p r o v id e s  
fo r  fr e e  trad e in  o n ly  o n e  d ir e c t io n , and  so o n e r  o r  la ter  th e  C arib b ean  m a y  c o m e  u n d er  
p ressu re  to  fo r e g o  its n o n rec ip ro ca l L o m é  arran gem en t i f  it w ish e s  to  a c c e d e  to  th e  
N A F T A . T h e  d ilem m a  w il l  b e  o n e  o f  b e in g  fo r c e d  to  c h o o s e  b e tw e e n  fr ien d s.
N e v i l le  N ic h o ls ,  P resid en t o f  th e  C arib b ean  D e v e lo p m e n t B an k , sta tes that th e  req u irem en t o f  
e x te n s io n  n eed  n o t b e  d e tr im en ta l, p a rticu lar ly  i f  ad eq u ate  sa feg u a rd s and  ap p rop ria te  tra n s itio n  p er io d s  
are n e g o tia te d .
T h e  d isp a r ity  in  th e  d ev e lo p m en ta l s ta g es  o f  th e  C arib b ean  c o u n tr ie s , c o u p le d  w ith  v a r y in g  le v e ls  
o f  d em o n stra ted  co m m itm en t to  trade lib era liza tio n , c lo u d  th e  c lea r  d e term in a tio n  o f  m o d a lit ie s  fo r  
a c c e s s io n  to  th e  N A F T A  b y  th e  C a rib b ea n  c o u n tr ie s  as a  r eg io n a l g r o u p in g . A lrea d y  th ere  is  an  apparent 
d e fe r e n c e  to  Jam aica  in  th e  lea d  p o s it io n  in  N A F T A  n e g o tia tio n s , and  o n e  o b se r v e r  n oted :
In te r e s t in g ly , th e  c o n f lic t in g  s ig n a ls  c o m in g  ou t o f  th e  recen t m e e t in g  o f  th e  H ea d s  
se e m e d  to  su g g e s t  a  tw o -tie r  ap p roach . Jam aica  m ig h t b e  a llo w e d  to  p u rsu e  th e  N A F T A  
o p tio n  o n  b e h a lf  o f  th e  rest o f  C A R IC O M , w h o  m ig h t reta in  th e ir  fr e e d o m  to  d e c id e  o n  
th e  o u tc o m e . A t th e  sa m e tim e , in itia tiv e s  b e tw e e n  B a rb a d o s, G u y a n a  and  T r in id a d , and  
th o s e  w ith in  th e  O E C S  w il l  b e  p u rsu ed  in  p a ra lle l to  p r o v id e  an  o p tio n  i f  th e  ta sk  o f  
c o m p le te  lib e r a liz a tio n  b e c o m e s  to o  o n ero u s  to  b ear.
T h e  o n ly  C A R IC O M  co u n try  id en tified  as b e in g  rated  “ B ” in  q u a lify in g  fo r  a c c e s s io n  is  Jam aica , 
w h ic h  h a s  s h o w n  a rem ark ab le  co m m itm en t to  lib era liza tio n . T r in id ad  and  T o b a g o  a ls o  r e c e n tly  b eg a n  
e ffo r ts  to  lib e r a liz e  trad e. T o  m in im iz e  th e  lo s s  o f  trade and  in v es tm en t to  M e x ic o , a c c e s s io n  to  the  
N A F T A  as a g ro u p  in  so m e  fo rm  or fa sh io n  w ill  h a v e  to  o c c u r  in  th e  v e r y  near fu tu re . S u ch  a
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re la t io n sh ip  w il l  n e c e ss a r ily  in c lu d e  in crea s in g  le v e ls  o f  r e c ip r o c ity , and  th is  w il l  a g a in  le a v e  th e  le s s -  
d e v e lo p e d  C a rib b ea n  co u n tr ie s  at a  d isa d v a n ta g e .
The Single European Market
T h e  S in g le  E u ro p ea n  M a rk et ca m e in to  e ffe c t  o n  January 1, 1 9 9 3 . It crea ted  a m ark et w ith  the  
fr eed o m s o f  c a p ita l, la b o r , s e r v ic e s ,  and  g o o d s . O n  M arch  8 , 1 9 9 3 , th e  E C  fo r e ig n  and  trade m in ister s  
s ig n e d  an  a g reem en t th at crea ted  a g ia n t, 1 8 -n a tio n  free-trad e  z o n e . T h is  is  e x p e c te d  to  b e c o m e  la w  in  
1 9 9 3  and  w o u ld  e x te n d  th e  E C ’s s in g le -m a rk e t fr eed o m s to  th e  E F T A  co u n tr ie s  (S w itz e r la n d , A u str ia , 
F in la n d , L ie c h te n s te in , N o r w a y , and  S w ed en ).
T h e  tra d ition a l C arib b ean  c o m m o d itie s , su gar and  b an an as, b en e fitted  fr o m  th e  p r e -e x is t in g  
c o lle c t io n  o f  in d iv id u a l co u n tr ie s  that co n stitu ted  th e  E u ro p ea n  m ark et. E a ch  E u ro p ea n  co u n try  w a s  free  
to  g iv e  sp e c ia l trea tm en t to  th o se  C arib b ean  co u n tr ies  w ith  w h ic h  it had  trad ition a l t ie s . U n d er  a s in g le  
m ark et, h o w e v e r , p ro d u cts  im p o rted  b y  o n e  cou n try  ca n  c ircu la te  fr e e ly  in  o th er  co u n tr ie s  o f  th at s in g le  
m ark et. C ar ib b ea n  p ro d u cts  th ere fo re  fa c e  in crea sed  co m p etitio n .
T h e r e  are a n u m b er o f  u n cer ta in tie s . It is  p o s s ib le  that fo r  p ro d u cers  o f  raw  m a ter ia ls , th e  s in g le  
m ark et w i l l  ca u se  lit t le  ch a n g e  and  m a y  in crea se  d em an d . B u t th o se  co u n tr ie s  that d ep en d  o n  
m a n u fa ctu res m a y  fa c e  b e in g  d ro w n ed  out b y  in tern al c o m p etitio n . P ro p o n en ts  sa y  that th e  g ro w th  
g en era ted  b y  th e  e c o n o m ic  s t im u la tio n  p r o v id e d  b y  in teg ra tio n  w il l  en h a n ce  th e  g r o w th  o f  d e v e lo p in g  
e c o n o m ie s . H o w e v e r , it is  e n v isa g e d  that th e  im p act o f  th is  e ffe c t  w il l  b e  m u ch  le s s  th an  that e x p e r ie n c e d  
in  th e  1 9 7 0 s  and  1 9 8 0 s .
It is  a lrea d y  apparent that fears o f  th e  m a g n ifie d  attractive  fo r c e  o f  E u ro p e  as a  p r o d u c tio n  cen ter  
m a y  b e  ju s t if ie d , as la rg e  am ou n ts o f  fu n d s h a v e  b e e n  in jected  in to  E u ro p e  in  a n tic ip a tio n  o f  th e  in crea sed  
m ark et sp a c e  and  th e  in crea sed  o p p o rtu n itie s  fo r  p ro fits  and  sa le s . T h e  o p e n in g  u p  o f  E a stern  E u ro p e  
p r o v id e s  an  ab u n d an ce  o f  ch ea p , sk ille d , and  re la t iv e ly  w e ll-e d u c a te d  la b o r . E a stern  b lo c  c o u n tr ie s  m ay  
attract E u ro p ea n  cap ita l a w a y  fro m  th e  C arib b ean .
It h as b e e n  p o in te d  o u t, h o w e v e r , that th e  A C P ’s lo s t  grou n d  o n  th e  E C  m ark et o v e r  th e  la s t fe w  
y ea rs  h as n o t b e e n  d u e  to  th e  “th rea t” o f  th e  s in g le  m ark et but is  d u e  to  th e  la ck  o f  ad a p ta b ility  and  
ex p o r t o r ien ta tio n .
O n e  d e v e lo p m e n t that req u ires th e  C a r ib b ea n ’s a tten tion  is  th e  fu ll a c c e s s io n  o f  S p a in , P o r tu g a l, 
and  G r e e c e  to  th e  E E C  and  th e  d o u b lin g  o f  structural fu n d s to  th ese  co u n tr ie s  fo r  th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f  ou t-  
o f- s e a s o n  tro p ica l fru its . T h is  w il l  d im in ish  th e  C a rib b ea n ’s m arket sh ares o f  th e s e  p ro d u cts .
Impacts of the Lomé Convention
M o v e  to  T ra d e  L ib e r a l iz a t io n
W h ile  th e  p re feren tia l treatm ent u n d er L o m é  IV  is  u n lik e ly  to  b e  co n tin u ed  b e y o n d  th e  l i f e  o f  th e  
p resen t a g reem en t, C arib b ean  co u n tr ies  fa c e  th e  c h a lle n g e  o f  e n g in e e r in g  n e w  b a se s  o f  trad e re la tio n s  
w ith  fr e e  trad e as a m ajor  o b je c t iv e .
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It h as b e e n  sa id  that th e  in crea sed  a llo c a tio n  o f  a id  and  trade fo r  th e  A C P  g ro u p in g  b y  th e  E E C  
u n d er  th e  la test c o n v e n tio n  is  an  in d ica tio n  o f  im p o rta n ce  w h ic h  th e  C o m m u n ity  p la c e s  o n  th e  
stren g th en ed  r e la tio n sh ip s  d e v e lo p e d  w ith  th e  A C P  co u n tr ie s , e sp e c ia lly  in  lig h t o f  th e  e m e r g e n c e  o f  n ew  
d o m e s tic  and  in tern a tion a l p r io r itie s .
T h e  C o m m u n ity  has p ro v id ed  so m e  a ssu ran ce  to  A C P  co u n tr ies  that th e ir  n e e d s  w il l  b e  k ep t in  
m in d , w ith  th e  a g reem en t that n o  A C P  sta te  w il l  b e  p la ced  in  a le s s  fa v o ra b le  p o s it io n  than  in  th e  p ast  
after th e  fo r m a tio n  o f  th e  s in g le  m ark et. A n n e x  X X IX  fro m  th e  Jo in t D e c la r a tio n  o n  T rad e  L ib e r a liz a tio n  
reads:
T h e  co n tra c tin g  p a rtie s  n o te  that th e  C o m m u n ity  is  c o n sc io u s  o f  th e  n e e d  to  e n su re , in  
th e  o v e r a ll a p p lica tio n  o f  th e  C o n v e n tio n , th e  m a in ten a n ce  o f  th e  c o m p e tit iv e  p o s it io n  o f  
th e  A C P  sta tes  w h ere  th eir  ad va n ta g es o n  th e  C o m m u n ity  m ark et are a ffe c te d  b y  
m e a su r e s  re la tin g  to  g en era l trade lib era liza tio n .
T h e  C o m m u n ity  d ec la res  its w ill in g n e s s ,  w h e n e v e r  A C P  sta tes b r in g  to  its a tten tio n  an y  
s p e c if ic  c a s e , jo in t ly  to  stu d y  s p e c if ic  ap p rop ria te a c tio n  w ith  a v ie w  to  sa feg u a rd in g  th e  
in terest o f  th e  latter.
It h a s  b e e n  e m p h a s ized  that th e  d e v e lo p in g  co u n tr ie s  w ith  f le x ib le  p ro d u c tio n  ca p a c ity  w il l  b e  ab le  
to  tak e a d v a n ta g e  o f  th e  en la rg ed  m arket o ffe r e d  b y  th e  S in g le  E u ro p ea n  M a rk et, and  th e  n ew  
o p p o r tu n itie s  fo r  in crea sed  ea rn in g s . M r. E . P erez  P orras, h ead  o f  th e  E C  d e le g a t io n  to  T r in id a d  and  
T o b a g o , furth er  sta tes:6
In crea sed  d em an d  in  th e  co m m u n ity  fo r  raw  m ater ia ls  c h ie f ly  b en e fits  th e se  d e v e lo p in g  
co u n tr ie s  that ca n  o ffer  c o m p e tit iv e  and  f le x ib le  su p p lie s . T h e  in crea sed  d em an d  fo r  
c o n su m e r  g o o d s  w il l  b e  o f  g rea tes t a d van tage  to  th o se  co u n tr ie s  w h ere  th e  p r o c e ss  o f  
in d u str ia liza tio n  is  w e ll ad van ced . T h e  sa m e w il l  o ccu r  in  th e  o p e n in g  u p  o f  m ark ets fo r  
se r v ic e s  that w il l  p r im a r ily  b e n e fit  th e  d e v e lo p in g  co u n tr ies  that are a lread y  in  a p o s it io n  
to  m e e t C o m m u n ity  d em an d .
M a rk et p en etra tio n  o f  th e  s in g le  m arket w ill  req u ire  f in e ly  tu n ed  m arket in v e s tig a t io n . A lth o u g h  
trade b arriers w il l  c o m e  d o w n , th e  p re feren ces  o f  in d iv id u a l co u n tr ie s  w il l  la r g e ly  rem ain  th e  sa m e.
T h e  B a n a n a  Is s u e
T h e  is su e  o f  a c c e ss  o f  C arib b ean  ban an as to  E u ro p ea n  m ark ets , w h ere  a u n ifo r m  C o m m u n ity -  
w id e  arran gem en t w o u ld  p la ce  C arib b ean  b an an a p ro d u cers at a  se r io u s  d isa d v a n ta g e  v is  a  v is  th e  C entra l 
A m e r ic a n  o r  “d o lla r  z o n e ” p ro d u cers  has p r o v e n  to  b e  a so u r c e  o f  c o n fl ic t  b e tw e e n  E u ro p ea n  p r iv a te -  
se c to r  in tere sts  and  th e  E u ro p ea n  C o u n c il. A  E u ro p ea n  C o u n c il o f  M in is te r s ’ d e c is io n  to  a p p o rtio n  a 2 -  
m ill io n  m etr ic  to n  q u ota  o f  L a tin  A m er ica n  b an an as, w h ic h  w il l  b e  su b jec t to  a  h ig h  d u ty , w a s  m et w ith  
h o s t ili ty  fr o m  B e lg ia n , D u tch , and  G erm an  fru it im p orters and has b e e n  f ie r c e ly  c r it ic iz e d  in  G A T T  
c ir c le s  b y  rep resen ta tiv e s  o f  L a tin  A m er ica n  p ro d u cers . T h e  q u ota  is  est im a ted  to  lim it  G e r m a n y ’s
6 . Perez Porras, address to seminar on Strategies for Survival: "CARICOM M anufacturing and E xp on s in 
a W orld o f  Change." U niversity o f  the W est Indies Institute o f  B usiness, October 1992.
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im p o rts  to  o n ly  5 0  p ercen t o f  its cu rren t L a tin  A m er ica n  banan a im p o rts , w h ile  co u n tr ie s  that h a v e  
fa v o r e d  th e ir  fo rm er  c o lo n ie s ’ ban an as w il l  r e c e iv e  q u otas sev era l t im es  th eir  cu rren t le v e ls .  T h e  fru it 
im p o rters fear  m ark et d is to r tio n s , re im p o rta tio n  fro m  o th er  E C  m em b ers , p r ic e  in c r e a se s , and  su b seq u e n t  
jo b  lo s s e s .  T h e y  a ls o  c la im  th is  w o u ld  resu lt in  fe w e r  sa le s  o f  e x -c o lo n ia l b an an as, and  n o n a c h ie v e m e n t  
o f  th e  a im  o f  p r o te c t in g  th e  A C P  co u n try  banana p ro d u cers , and  h a v e  th reaten ed  to  tak e th e  E C  to  th e  
E u ro p ea n  C o u rt o f  J u stice  o v e r  th e  ra tifica tio n  o f  th e  p la n , w h ic h  is d u e  to  take e ffe c t  o n  J u ly  1, 1 9 9 3 . 
T h e  a p p ro v a l o f  th e  p la n  d e sp ite  in tern al p ressu re  m a y  b e  an  in d ica tio n  o f  th e  E C ’s c o m m itm en t to  th e  
p r o te c t io n  o f  th e  A C P  in terests  in  th e  era o f  th e  s in g le  m ark et. A  G A T T  arb itra tion  p a n el h a s  ru led  th e  
E C ’s r e s tr ic tio n s  o n  L a tin  A m er ica n  b an an a im p orts  u n fa ir  and  in  v io la t io n  o f  w o r ld  trade r u le s .
In crea sed  c o m p e tit io n  fro m  trad in g  partners w ith in  th e  s in g le  m ark et a lso  e x is t s ,  and  w h ile  q u otas  
w il l  c o n tin u e , C A R IC O M  c o u ld  fin d  i t s e l f  p ro d u c in g  at a  lo s s .  T h ere  is  a lso  resea rch  u n d er  w a y  b y  
B e lg ia n  s c ie n t is ts  to  p r o d u ce  a b an an a that is  sw e e te r  and  sm a ller  th an  C arib b ean  b an an as.
The Future of the Lomé Convention
W h ile  L o m é  IV  o ffe r s  n ea r ly  o p e n  a c c e ss  to  C arib b ean  g o o d s , at lea s t fo r  ag r icu ltu ra l p ro d u ce  
and  m a n u fa ctu red  g o o d s , u n til 2 0 0 0  and near au tom atic  d ero g a tio n s  fo r  m an y  m an u factu red  and  o th er  
p ro d u cts  that d o  n o t m e e t v a lu e -a d d ed  cr iter ia , its  e x is te n c e  in  its  p resen t fo rm  b e y o n d  2 0 0 0  is  e x tr e m e ly  
d o u b tfu l.
T h e  A C P  g r o u p in g  h as lit t le  to  h o p e  fo r  in  th e  w a y  o f  a d d itio n a l fu n d in g  in  th e  se c o n d  h a lf  o f  
L o m é  IV . G iv e n  cu rrent tren d s , it is  a lso  l ik e ly  that n ew  co n d it io n s  w il l  b e  in tro d u ced  b y  th e  E C , 
c o n d it io n s  that re la te  to  is su e s  su ch  as g o o d  g o v e r n a n c e , p r iv a t iz a tio n , trad e lib e r a liz a tio n , th e  
e n co u ra g em en t o f  th e  p r iv a te  se c to r , and th e  stren g th en in g  o f  r eg io n a l in teg ra tio n . C a rib b ea n  argu m en ts  
fo r  sp e c ia l trea tm en t stan d  to  lo s e  c r e d ib ility  in  th e  fa c e  o f  th e  threat o f  w a r  in  th e  B a lk a n s , s ta rv a tio n  
in  A fr ic a , and  o th er  m o re  u rg en t s itu a tio n s .
T h ere  is  n e e d  to  d e v e lo p  lo n g -term  ap p roach es to  E u ro p e  as part o f  a “b ro a d er  lo n g -te r m  r eg io n a l 
ap p ro a ch  to  ex tern a l trad e r e la t io n s” that r e c o g n iz e  th e  v a lu e  o f  th e  r e la tio n sh ip . T h is  h as b e e n  
e m p h a s iz e d  b y  th e  E x e c u tiv e  D ir e c to r  o f  th e  C arib b ean  C o u n c il fo r  E u ro p e , D a v id  J e s s o p . T h e se  
a p p ro a ch es , h e  sa id , m u st in c lu d e:
■ R e lo c a t io n  o f  en h a n ced  C arib b ean  d ip lo m a tic  rep resen ta tio n  fro m  L o n d o n  to  B r u sse ls ,  
and  s tren g th en in g  o f  lin k s  and  d ia lo g  w ith  E u ro p ea n  co u n tr ies  w ith  w h ic h  th ere  is  n o  
tra d itio n a l re la t io n sh ip .
■ E sta b lish m en t b y  th e  p r iv a te  se c to r  o f  a  C arib b ean  trad in g  h o u se  b a se d  in  co n tin en ta l  
E u ro p e  and  a b le  to  so u rce  and  m arket p ro d u cts  fr o m  th e  r e g io n .
■ R e c o g n it io n  o f  th e  E u ro p ea n  p re se n c e  in  th e  C arib b ean  in  th e  fo rm s o f  C u ra ça o  and  th e  
F ren ch  d ep artm en ts, w h ic h  o ffe r  a c c e ss  to  E u ro p e  th ro u g h  a d o o r w a y  r e c o g n iz e d  in  th e  
P o s e id o n  arran gem en t o f  th e  M aastr ic t T reaty .
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Latin American Free Trade
L a tin  A m e r ic a ’s r eg io n a l trad e b o o m  is  a  resu lt o f  th e  fo rm u la tio n  o f  sev era l m ajor  trad in g  b lo c s  
that in c lu d e:
■ T h e  M E R C O S U R  T rea ty  (B r a z il, U ru g u a y , A rg en tin a , and  P aragu ay)
■ C h ile -A r g e n tin a
■ C o lo m b ia -V e n e z u e la
■ T h e  A n d ea n  P act (C o lo m b ia , P eru , B o liv ia , E cu a d o r , and  V e n e z u e la )
T h e  r ed u c tio n  or  a b o lit io n  o f  tar iffs in  th ese  g r o u p in g s  h a v e  gen era ted  rap id  e x p a n s io n  in  trade. 
T h e  la rg es t b lo c , V e n e z u e la , C o lo m b ia , M e x ic o  (th e  G -3 ) and  f iv e  C en tra l A m er ica n  n a tio n s red u ced  
ta r iff  b arr iers in  th e  a g reem en t o n  F eb ru ary  12 , 1 9 9 3 . T rad e b e tw e e n  M E R C O S U R  c o u n tr ie s  in crea sed  
5 0  p e rcen t in  o n e  y ea r . It is  p red ic ted  that th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  fr ee  trade p acts in  S o u th  an d  C entra l 
A m e r ic a  w il l  a cce lera te .
T h e  C a rib b ea n  is  in  a stra teg ic  p o s it io n  to  b e  part o f  th is  m o v e m e n t. S e v e r a l trad e-re la ted  
a g reem en ts  h a v e  b e e n  m a d e w ith  L atin  A m er ica n  co u n tr ies  in  th e  p a st, th e  m o s t  recen t b e in g  trade  
a g reem en ts  b e tw e e n  V e n e z u e la  and  C A R IC O M . C A R IC O M  g o o d s  stan d  to  fa ce  c o m p e tit io n  fr o m  larger  
c o u n tr ie s  p r o d u c in g  s im ila r  g o o d s  in  th e  L atin  A m er ica n  m ark et. T h e  trade b o o m  is  a ls o  l ik e ly  to  ca u se  
a s iz e a b le  in crea se  in  in v es tm en t in  th e  ex p a n d ed  L a tin  A m er ica n  m ark et, in  c o m p e tit io n  w ith  th e  
C arib b ean .
T h e  C a rib b ea n  se e m s to  h a v e  d ec id ed  that stren g th en ed  trade w ith  L a tin  A m e r ic a  is  a  p r io r ity . 
W id e n in g  o f  C a rib b ea n  in teg ra tio n  ca n  p ro d u ce  s ig n if ic a n t b e n e fits . It is  sa id  that th e  C A R IC O M  m arket 
o f  5 .5  m ill io n  p e r so n s  is  b u t a m ic r o c o sm  o f  a  m ark et o f  1 1 2  m ill io n  that stre tch es fr o m  C en tra l A m e r ic a  
to  S u r in a m e. S u c h  a m e g a b lo c  ca n  w ie ld  en h a n ced  b a rg a in in g  p o w e r  in  in tern a tion a l n e g o t ia t io n s . In  
a d d it io n , it m a y  attract grea ter  trade and  in v es tm en t o p p o r tu n itie s . C o n s id era t io n  m u st b e  g iv e n ,  
h o w e v e r , to  th e  d a n g er  o f  C A R IC O M  co u n tr ie s  b e in g  sw a llo w e d  u p  in  a L atin  A m e r ic a n  m e g a b lo c .
C a refu l e x a m in a tio n  o f  th e  im p lica tio n s  is  req u ired , and  a lso  o f  th e  C a r ib b ea n ’s p o s i t io n  w ith in  
N A F T A  and  its a b ility  to  w ith sta n d  su ch  co m p e titio n . T h is  e x a m in a tio n  m u st tak e s to c k  o f  th e  tim e  
fra m es an d  m ark et s iz e s  in v o lv e d .
Cuba’s Strengthened Caribbean Relations
It is  c la im e d  that h e  e m e r g e n c e  o f  a  m a rk et-o r ien ted  C u b a  w il l ,  in  th e  w o r d s  o f  D a v id  J e sso p , 
“ le a d  to  th e  a sse r tio n  o f  an  h isp a n ic  id en tity  fo r  th e  C arib b ean . T h e  cen ter  o f  p o lit ic a l and  e c o n o m ic  
g r a v ity  o f  th e  r e g io n  w il l  sh ift  c a u s in g  [ s ic . ]  th e  D o m in ic a n  R e p u b lic , P u erto  R ic o  and  th e  E n g lish -  
sp ea k in g  C a rib b ea n  to  h a v e  to  r e a sse ss  th e ir  r eg io n a l and in tern ation a l e c o n o m ic  str a te g ie s . ” J e sso p  a lso  
sp e c u la te s  th at th e  ch a n g e  w il l  ca u se  s ig n if ic a n t c ro ss -b o rd er  trade and  stra teg ic  in v e s tm e n t in  C u b a , and  
s u g g e s ts  o th er  p o s s ib il it ie s :
■ D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  a  n e w  r eg io n a l in teg ra tio n  p r o c e s s  that b r in g s  to g e th er  th e  larger  
e c o n o m ie s  o f  th e  W estern  C arib b ean  (Jam aica , P u erto  R ic o , th e  D o m in ic a n  R e p u b lic , and  
e v e n tu a lly  H a iti) .
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■ E r o s io n  o f  p re feren tia l a d van tage  as C u b a  b e c o m e s  a m a g n et fo r  in v es tm en t and  to u r ism .
■ N e e d  fo r  r ea sse ssm en t o f  th e  r e g io n ’s tran sport in frastru ctu re , as an  o p e n  C u b an  m arket 
w il l  f ir s t  d is lo c a te  th en  d iv er t r eg io n a l and  in tern ation a l s e r v ic e s  to  n e w  C u b an  h u b s.
M r. J e sso p  g o e s  o n  to  su g g e s t  that th e  r e g io n  m u st id e n t ify  w h ere  its  s e l f  in tere st lie s  and  d e v e lo p  
a s tra teg y  that p o s it io n s  n e ig h b o r in g  e c o n o m ie s  so  that th ey  ca n  tak e ad v a n ta g e  o f  n e w  e c o n o m ic  lin k s  
as th e y  b e c o m e  a v a ila b le .
Other Issues
O th er  is su e s  to  b e  d ea lt w ith  a r ise  as a  c o n se q u e n c e  o f  d e v e lo p m e n ts  that are n o t n e c e s s a r ily  trade  
re la ted  b u t h o ld  im p ortan t im p lica tio n s  fo r  th e  r e g io n ’s trad in g  arran gem en ts.
D o m e s tic  A r ra n g e m e n ts
T h e  U n ited  S ta tes h as m a d e  it c lea r  that th o se  w ish in g  to  a c c e d e  to  th e  N A F T A  w il l  n e e d  to  
q u a lify  to  d o  s o . Q u a lif ic a tio n  w il l  en ta il a  su b stan tia l m o v e  to  e c o n o m ic  lib e r a liz a tio n . T r e v o r  H ark er  
su g g e s ts  that q u a lif ic a tio n  m ig h t rest o n  fo u r  issu es: d em o cra tiza tio n ; m a c r o e c o n o m ic  sta b ility ; m ark et-  
o r ien ted  p o lic ie s ,  g o o d  sta n d in g  w ith  th e  G A T T  and  w ill in g n e s s  to  p h a se  o u t tar iffs; and  stron g  
in te lle c tu a l p ro p erty  and  en v iro n m en ta l p ro tec tio n . D o m e s t ic  arran gem en ts in  m o s t  C a rib b ea n  co u n tr ies  
w il l  th ere fo re  h a v e  to  b e  su b sta n tia lly  reo rg a n ized .
9 3 6  F u n d s
E c o n o m ic  d if f ic u lt ie s  in  th e  U .S .  th rea ten  to  ero d e  th e  b e n e fits  o f  th e  C B I. O n e  o f  th e  C B I’s 
m o re  s u c c e s s fu l c o m p o n e n ts , th e  9 3 6  lo w -in te r e s t  lo a n  fa c ility  o ffered  th rou gh  P u er to  R ic o , w a s  recen tly  
th rea ten ed  b y  th e  p r o p o sa ls  to  cu t s e c t io n  9 3 6  en tir e ly , b u t recen t rep orts su g g e s t  that th e  U .S .  T rea su ry  
is  le a n in g  to w a rd s lim it in g , rather th an  cu tt in g , th e  p rogram . T h e  C lin to n  a d m in istra tio n  p e r c e iv e s  th e  
p ro g ra m  as a w a y  o f  p r o v id in g  a id  to  th e  r e g io n , but it l ik e ly  to  b e  red u ced  fro m  its  cu rrent $ 3  b il l io n  
and  n e w  c o n d it io n s  m a y  b e  ad d ed .
P r o p o sa ls  fo r  ch a n g e  to  th e  p ro g ra m  in c lu d e  a “ tw in -b e d ” p o lic y  that w o u ld  t ie  9 3 6  lo a n s  for  
to u r ism  p ro jec ts  o ffsh o r e  to  h o te l b u ild in g  in  P u erto  R ic o . C arib b ean  g o v ern m en t o ff ic ia ls  h a v e  reacted  
to  m o v e s  to  d im in ish  th e  a v a ila b ility  o f  th e  lo a n  fa c ility  to  th e  C B I. A  m e e t in g  w a s  h e ld  in  F eb ru ary  
1 9 9 3  w ith  P u erto  R ica n  9 3 6  co m p a n ie s  and  o ff ic ia ls  fro m  C /L A A  to  d is c u ss  stra teg y  fo r  th e  d e fe n s e  o f  
th e  p ro g ra m . A  ca ll h as b e e n  m a d e  fo r  C arib b ean  co u n tr ie s  to  lo b b y  fo r  su p p ort to  th e  co n tin u ed  
e x is te n c e  o f  th e  p ro g ra m , a v ita l so u rce  o f  f in a n c in g  fo r  th e  r e g io n . C arib b ean  b e n e fic ia r ie s  o f  th e  9 3 6  
p ro g ra m  h a v e  b e e n  ch a rg ed  w ith  b e in g  su rp r is in g ly  s ile n t to  d e v e lo p m e n ts  in  th e  9 3 6  d eb ate .
A  co n c e r te d  e ffo r t is n eed ed  to  reta in  th e  b e n e fits  o f  th e  9 3 6  p rogram . T h e  to u r ism  se c to r  sh o u ld  
tak e n o te  o f  r ea c tio n s  to  th e  p r o p o se d  “tw in -b e d ” p o lic y  b e c a u se  it h as im p lica tio n s  fo r  in v e s tm e n t in  th e  
area.
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C a n a d a -C a r ib b e a n  R e la tio n s
T h e  s c o p e  and  lik e lih o o d  fo r  m o d if ic a t io n  o f  th e  p r o v is io n s  o f  th e  C A R IB C A N  to  c o n fe r  g rea ter  
b e n e fits  o n  C ar ib b ea n  co u n tr ie s  w il l  b e  h am p ered  b y  d im in ish in g  C an ad ian  in terest in  th e  r e g io n . C a u ses  
fo r  th is  in c lu d e  C a n a d a ’s e c o n o m ic  d o w n tu rn , w h ic h  h as ca u sed  red u ced  p u b lic  su p p ort fo r  e c o n o m ic  
a ss is ta n c e  to  o th er  c o u n tr ie s , in  con trast to  th e  su p p ort e n jo y e d  b y  th e  C arib b ean  in  th e  in itia l s ta g e s  o f  
C A R IB C A N . T h e  C an ad ian  P arliam en t h as a ls o  a ssu m ed  a g rea ter  r o le  in  d e term in in g  fo r e ig n  p o lic y  
and  lim ite d  th e  p o w e r s  o f  g o v ern m en t. R e la tio n s  w ith  th e  E u rop ean  C o m m u n ity  and  E a stern  E u ro p e , 
L a tin  A m e r ic a , and  th e  A s ia -P a c if ic  r e g io n  are a lso  r e c e iv in g  in crea s in g  a tten tion . T h e  a b ility  o f  the  
C a rib b ea n  to  in f lu e n c e  C an ad ian  a c tio n  is d im in ish in g .
E u r o p e -C a r ib b e a n  R e la tio n s
D e v e lo p m e n ts  o n  th e  d o m e s tic  fron t d em an d  in crea s in g  am ou n ts o f  E u ro p ea n  fu n d s and  a tten tion . 
E u r o p e ’s r e c e s s io n  a ls o  th rea ten s to  m in im iz e  a tten tio n  to  C arib b ean  n e e d s  and  is su e s .
Trade Reform in Trinidad and Tobago
T h e  1 9 8 0 s  sa w  T rin id ad  and  T o b a g o  se ttin g  u p  a h ig h ly  p ro tec ted  trade r e g im e  that h am p ered  
d iv e r s if ic a t io n  and  m a d e  th e  m an u factu r in g  se c to r  u n c o m p e tit iv e  and  h ig h ly  d ep en d en t o n  p ro tec t io n . 
D o m e s t ic  s tra teg ie s  that co m b in ed  trade p ro tec t io n , restr ic tio n s  o n  cap ita l f lo w s ,  p r ic e  c o n tr o ls , and  h e a v y  
su b s id ie s  h a m p ered  th e  g r o w th  o f  c o m p e tit iv e  ag r icu ltu re , n o n -o il m a n u fa c tu r in g , and  to u r ism . T h e se  
fa c to rs a cco u n t fo r  th e  in a b ility  o f  T rin id ad  and  T o b a g o  to  take fu ll ad v a n ta g e  o f  th e  p re feren tia l trad e  
it e n jo y e d  w ith  C an ad a , th e  U n ited  S ta tes , and  E u rop e .
T h e  g o v e r n m e n ts  o f  T r in id ad  and T o b a g o  e le c te d  in  1 9 8 6  and  1991  b e g a n  to  resp o n d  to  th e  
in c r e a s in g ly  c o m p e t it iv e  n ature o f  th e  in tern a tion a l trad e re g im e . T h e y  em b ark ed  o n  a g g r e s s iv e  trade  
lib e r a liz a tio n , w ith  th e  n u d g in g  and  su p p ort o f  th e  W o r ld  B an k  and  th e  IM F .
In crea s in g  em p h a sis  o n  th e  p r iv a te  se c to r  in  e x is t in g  p re feren tia l arran gem en ts h as b e e n  
r e c o g n iz e d  in  th e  c o n te x t  o f  th o se  a g reem en ts . T h e  p r iv a te  se c to r  h as g a in ed  a d d itio n a l im p o rta n ce  in  
th e  c o n te x t  o f  a  p u sh  to  free  trade.
Background
T rin id a d  and  T o b a g o  “ e n jo y e d ” a d om in an t o il  se c to r  that en a b led  th e  co u n try  to  a tta in  r e la t iv e ly  
h ig h  le v e ls  o f  d e v e lo p m e n t, but it ca u sed  se v e r e  d is to r tio n s  in  th e  e c o n o m y  and p ro d u ced  su b stan tia l 
a p p rec ia tio n  o f  th e  rea l e x c h a n g e  rate. T w o  su rg es  in  o il  p r ic e s  d u rin g  th e  m id -1 9 7 0 s  to  e a r ly  1 9 8 0 s  
a d d ed  to  th e  b u o y a n c y  o f  th e  e c o n o m y . R ea l G D P  in crea sed  at an  an n u al a v era g e  rate o f  o v e r  6  p ercen t, 
w ith  in c r e a se s  in  fo r e ig n  e x c h a n g e  r e serv es  and  in crea s in g  le v e ls  o f  im p o rts . P er  cap ita  G D P  p ea k ed  in  
1 9 8 2  at n ea r ly  $ 7 ,0 0 0  b u t d ro p p ed  in  1 9 8 8  to  $ 3 ,3 5 0 ,  d u e  in  la rg e  part to  a  sharp  d rop  in  o i l  p r ic e s . 
D u r in g  that p e r io d , th e  co u n try  su ffered  a se v e r e  d e c lin e  in  its term s o f  trade.
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In  1 9 8 3 , in  r e sp o n se  to  th e  su d d en  d e c lin e  in  th e  term s o f  trad e and  o il  r e v e n u e s , th e  g o v e r n m e n t  
in tro d u ced  r e s tr ic t iv e  im p ort l ic e n s in g  and  e x c h a n g e  c o n tro ls  that sh arp ly  cu rta iled  im p o r ts , b u t it w a s  
u n a b le  to  h a lt th e  b a la n c e -o f-p a y m e n ts  sh ift to  a  d e fic it  and fo r e ig n  e x c h a n g e  r e se r v e s  w e r e  d ep le ted . 
In  D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 5 , th e  g o v ern m en t d ev a lu ed  th e  T rin id ad  and T o b a g o  d o lla r  b y  5 0  p ercen t, fro m  
T T $ 2 .4 9 /U S $ 1  to  T T $ 3 .6 0 / U S $ l .  In  A u g u st 1 9 8 8  a n ew  e x c h a n g e  rate p ar ity  T T $ 4 .2 5 /U S $ 1  w a s  se t , 
and  in  A p r il 1 9 9 3  th e  g o v ern m en t m o v e d  to  “ f lo a t” th e  T rin id ad  and  T o b a g o  d o lla r  and  r e m o v e  fo r e ig n  
e x c h a n g e  c o n tr o ls .
The Trinidad and Tobago Trade Policy Study: The Final Report
A  n u m b er  o f  c r it ica l is su e s  w e r e  e x p lo r e d  in  th e  1 9 9 2  stu d y  o n  T rin id ad  an d  T o b a g o  trad e p o lic y  
b y  M a x w e ll  S tam p  P L C . T h e  m ajor  c o n c lu s io n s  w ere:
■ E x t r a - a n d  in t r a r e g io n a l  e x p o rts :  W h ere  T rin id ad  and  T o b a g o  is  in tern a tio n a lly
c o m p e tit iv e  in  a p articu lar  g o o d , it is  lik e ly  that it w o u ld  b e  ex p o r ted  to  n o n -C A R lC O M  
m ark ets  su b jec t to  transp ort c o s ts . P referen tia l a c c e ss  to  th e  C A R IC O M  m ark et p r o v id e s  
an  o p p o rtu n ity  to  ex p o r t at h ig h er  le v e ls  o f  p ro fita b ility  than  a p p lie s  to  e x tra reg io n a l 
ex p o r ts  b e c a u se  o f  th e  p r o te c t io n  g iv e n  in  th e  C A R IC O M  m ark et. T h is  m a y  p r o v id e  
s c o p e  fo r  in c r e a s in g  th e  s c a le  o f  p ro d u c tio n  and  th e  in c e n t iv e  o f  in w a rd  in v e s tm e n t o v er  
e x p o r tin g  to  o u ts id e  th e  r e g io n  o n ly .
■ A n t ie x p o r t  b ia s  a n d  C A R IC O M :  I f  it is  leg itim a te  to  v ie w  C A R IC O M  as an  e x ten d ed
d o m e s t ic  m ark et fo r  T rin id ad  and  T o b a g o , th en  it is  le g it im a te  to  v ie w  th e  h ig h  re la t iv e  
in c e n t iv e  to  p r o d u ce  for  th is  ex ten d ed  m ark et rather than  th e  e x tra reg io n a l m ark et as  
b e in g  cen tra l to  th e  is su e  o f  trade reg im e  or  an tiexp ort b ia s . T h is  in terp reta tio n  o f  th e  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  th e  co m b in ed  lo c a l and  r e g io n a l m ark et and  th e  ex tra reg io n a l m arket 
a p p ears to  h a v e  b e e n  co n firm ed  b y  th e  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  C A R IC O M . T h e  sm a lln e s s  o f  th e  
c o m b in e d  C A R IC O M  m ark et and th e  c o m p e tit iv e  nature o f  im p o r t-su b stitu tio n  p o lic ie s  
a cro ss  th e  r e g io n  h a v e  m ean t that in trareg ion a l trade h as g e n e r a lly  g r o w n  s lo w ly  in  b o th  
a b so lu te  and  re la tiv e  term s o v e r  th e  la st tw o  d eca d es . A t  th e  sa m e  t im e , e x p e r ie n c e  d o es  
g iv e s  scan t su p p o rt to  th e  v ie w  that p en etra tio n  o f  r eg io n a l m ark ets  is  a  p recu rso r  to  
p en etra tio n  o f  g lo b a l m a rk ets . T h e  lim ite d  ex tra reg io n a l e x p o r t p er fo rm a n ce  in  
n o n tra d itio n a l a c t iv it ie s  p r io r  to  trade re fo rm  o f  T rin id a d  and  T o b a g o  and  m o s t  o th er  
C A R IC O M  co u n tr ie s  is  m o re  c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  v ie w  that r e g io n a l im p ort su b stitu tio n  
p o lic ie s  co n stra in ed  ex tra req io n a l ex p o rts .
■ T ra d e  re g im e  b ia s  a n d  e x p o rt  p e r fo rm a n c e :  H ig h  le v e ls  o f  n o m in a l and  e ffe c t iv e
p r o te c t io n  o f  im p o rt-su b stitu te  a c tiv itie s  c o n stitu te  a su b s id y  fo r  im p o r t-su b stitu tio n
a c tiv it ie s  and  are a s ig n if ic a n t so u r c e  o f  an tiexp ort b ia s . T h e  c o s ts  o f  th is  im p ort
p r o te c t io n  o n  ex p o r t a c t iv it ie s  in  T rin id ad  are id en tifia b le  fro m  th e  tru e p r o te c t io n
estim a te s  p r o v id e d . N e g a t iv e  true su b s id y  rates fo r  ex p o rt a c tiv it ie s  are e v id e n c e  o f  
im p lic it  tak es o n  ex p o rts  r e su ltin g  fro m  im p o rt-su b stitu tio n  p o lic ie s .  P o lic y  c o n f l ic ts  are  
a sso c ia te d  w ith  m ix e d  trade stra teg ies  o f  th e  im p ort su b stitu tio n  and  ex p o r t p r o m o tio n . 
T h e  “tr u e ” p attern  o f  p r o te c t io n  w ith in  th e  agricu ltu ra l and  m a n u fa ctu r in g  se c to r s  is  v ery  
d ifferen t to  th e  in ten d ed  pattern .
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T ra d e  a n d  in d u s tr ia l  p o l ic y  re fo rm s :  T h e  report id e n t if ie s  th e  sh o rt-term  c o s t  o f
u n restr ic ted  in tern a tion a l trade in  a sm a ll e c o n o m y  su ch  as T rin id ad  and  T o b a g o , and  
su g g e s ts  that “ lo n g -te r m  trade stra teg y  sh o u ld  n o t b e  d o m in a ted , h o w e v e r , b y  c o n cern s  
o v e r  th e  tra n sitio n a l c o s ts  o f  and  co n stra in ts  o n  re fo rm . R ather, trade stra teg y  sh o u ld  
fo c u s  o n  th e  g a in s  fro m  greater  e x p o su r e  to  in tern a tion a l c o m p e tit io n  and  fr o m  g rea ter  
o p p o rtu n itie s  to  ex p o r t that w o u ld  resu lt fro m  an  o u tw a rd - o r  ex p o r t-o r ien ted  trade  
stra teg y .
Trade Liberalization
W ith  th e  e le c t io n  o f  th e  g o v ern m en t in  1 9 8 6  ca m e a n u m b er  o f  im p ortan t sh o rt- and  m ed iu m -term  
r e fo rm s. T h e s e  in c lu d ed  u n if ic a tio n  o f  th e  tw o -tie r e d  e x c h a n g e  rate. T h e  1 9 8 8  d e v a lu a t io n  o f  th e  T T $  
to  T T $ 4 .2 5 /U S $ 1  co n tr ib u ted  to  a 6 -p ercen t im p ro v em en t in  th e  rea l e x c h a n g e  rate co m p a red  to  its  1 9 8 7  
le v e l .
T h e  e le c t io n  o f  a  n e w  g o v ern m en t in  19 9 1  b ro u g h t c o n tin u in g  trade re fo rm  c o n s is te n t w ith  
a g reem en ts  n e g o tia te d  w ith  th e  IM F  and  th e  W o r ld  B an k .
T rad e  re fo rm s u n d er  a  W o r ld  B a n k  structural ad ju stm en t lo a n  fo c u s  o n  ad ap tin g  in c e n t iv e s  in  
fa v o r  o f  e x p o r t p r o d u c tio n , w ith  sp e c ia l em p h a s is  o n  th e  rem o v a l o f  im p ort l ic e n s in g , rep la ce m en t o f  
q u a n tita tiv e  im p ort r e s tr ic tio n s  w ith  ta r iffs , ra tio n a liza tio n  o f  th e  ta r iff  stru ctu re , an d  fa c ilita t io n  o f  ex p o rt  
a c t iv it ie s . T rad e  lib e r a liz a tio n  h as b e e n  m ark ed  b y  rem o v a l o f  item s fro m  th e  n e g a tiv e  lis t .
IM F  a g reem en ts  c a lle d  fo r  lib e r a liz a tio n  o f  e x c h a n g e  r e s tr ic tio n s  and  e lim in a tio n  o f  im p ort  
l ic e n s in g  o n  4 0  p ercen t o f  restr ic ted  item s. In  1991  th e  co u n try  e x p e r ie n c e d  a 7 -p ercen t a p p rec ia tio n  in  
th e  rea l e x c h a n g e  rate w ith  r e sp ec t to  its  1 9 7 6  le v e l ,  and th is  d e v e lo p m e n t m a y  b e  p o s i t iv e ly  lin k e d  w ith  
r e la t iv e ly  s tr o n g  recen t ex tern a l term s o f  trade.
T h e  g o v e r n m e n t’s a ccep ta n ce  o f  IM F  and  W o r ld  B a n k  term s an d  reco m m en d a tio n s  w ith  re sp ec t  
to  trade lib e r a liz a tio n  w e r e  su p p o rted  b y  a g e n u in e  r e c o g n it io n  o f  p ast lim ita tio n s  and  a stron g  
d e term in a tio n  to  m o v e  to w a rd  fr e e  trad e. A fter  a se r ie s  o f  s te p w ise  co n stra in t r ed u ctio n s  startin g  in  1 9 8 8 , 
fo r e ig n  e x c h a n g e  c o n tr o l w a s  re lin q u ish ed  to  th e  co m m erc ia l b a n k  and  fo r e ig n  e x c h a n g e  w a s  lib e r a liz e d  
in  A p r il 1 9 9 3 .
M o s t  im p ort p a y m en t re str ic tio n s  h a v e  b e e n  lif te d , and  in  1 9 8 9  e x p o r t lic e n s in g  req u irem en ts and  
im p o rt r e s tr ic t io n s  w e r e  re m o v e d  fr o m  $ 1 5 0  m ill io n  w o r th  o f  ag r icu ltu re  p ro d u c ts , p e tr o le u m  and  
p e tr o le u m  p r o d u c ts , and  so m e  m an u factu res. T h e  n e g a tiv e  lis t  w a s  su b sta n tia lly  red u ced  in  term s o f  
n o n -o il m a n u fa ctu res fr o m  January 1 9 9 1  to  th e  p resen t. Q u an tita tive  re str ic tio n s  w e r e  rep la ce d  b y  im p ort  
ch a rg es  o f  u p  to  1 0 0  p ercen t in  1 9 9 1 . T a r if f  r e fo rm  h as b e e n  carried  o u t, and  a u n ifo rm  v a lu e -a d d e d  tax  
(V A T ) rep la ce d  th e  sa le s  tax
In crea s in g  su p p ort to  th e  p r iv a te  sec to r  in  term s o f  m ark etin g  and  ex p o r t fa c ilita t io n  h as a ls o  b e e n  
n o te d . B u t d e sp ite  th e s e  r e fo rm s, to ta l im p ort ta x  rates co n tin u e  to  c a u se  p r ic e  d is to r tio n  and  red u ce  
e c o n o m ic  e f f ic ie n c y . In cen tiv e s  to  im p ort su b stitu tio n  rem ain , and  d u ty  e x e m p tio n s  to  in p u ts and  cap ita l 
eq u ip m en t e n c o u r a g e  th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f  lo w -v a lu e -a d d e d  g o o d s . W h ile  in c e n tiv e s  fo r  p r o d u c tio n  fo r  th e  
lo c a l an d  r e g io n a l m ark et e x is t ,  p ro d u c tio n  fo r  ex p o r t to  th ird  co u n tr ie s  s t i l l  fa c e s  n e g a tiv e  p ro tec t io n .
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A s  a r e su lt  o f  its  a cce lera ted  in tern al r e fo rm , T rin id a d  and T o b a g o ’s  tra d e  re la t io n s  w ith  th e  
U n ite d  S ta tes  and E u r o p e  h a v e  co n tin u ed  to  b e  an  im p ortan t p art o f  th e  co u n try ’s e c o n o m y , and  im p ortan t  
in it ia t iv e s  w ith  r e sp e c t  to  f in a n c in g  o f  trad e  w ith  L a tin  A m er ica n  c o u n tr ie s  h a v e  r e c e n tly  b e e n  m a d e  b y  
m o re  th an  o n e  b a n k in g  in s titu tio n  in  T rin id a d  and  T o b a g o . T r in id a d  and  T o b a g o ’s  e x p o r ts  to  L a tin  
A m e r ic a  h a v e  g r o w n  in  r e cen t y ea rs  (T a b le  3 ) .
T h e  im p o r ta n ce  o f  e x p o r ts  to  th e  E E C  and th e  U n ite d  S ta tes  h a s  flu c tu a ted  in  r ecen t y e a r s  (T a b le  
4 ) .  E x p o r ts  to  C an ad a  in  1 9 8 7  w e r e  a p p ro x im a te ly  1 .7 5  p ercen t o f  th e  to ta l w o r ld  trad e . It h a s b e e n  
est im a ted  th at a p p ro x im a te ly  9 6  p ercen t o f  e x p o r ts  fro m  T rin id a d  and  T o b a g o  en ter  th e  C a n ad ian  m ark et  
d u ty -fr e e  u n d er  d ie  C A R IB C A N , M F N , B r it ish  P re feren tia l T a r iff , and  th e  G P T . In  1 9 8 7 , o n ly  7 .2 9  
p e r c e n t o f  th o s e  g o o d s  w e r e  ex p o r ted  u n d er  th e  C A R IB C A N , a c h a ra c ter is tica lly  lo w  sh a re  w h ic h  is  
r e fle c te d  b y  m a n y  o f  th e  C a rib b ea n  c o u n tr ie s ’ e x p o r ts  to  C an ada.
T h e  p r e se n t T r in id a d  and  T o b a g o  g o v e r n m e n t h a s co n tin u ed  to  ta k e  c o n c r e te  s te p s  tow ard  
l ib e r a liz in g  its  trad e  r e g im e . O n e  im p ortan t step  w a s  lib e r a liz a tio n  o f  fo r e ig n  cu rren cy  r e str ic tio n s .  
P r im e  M in is te r  P a tr ick  M a n n in g , C h airm an  o f  C A R IC O M , h a s  a ls o  e x p r e sse d  c o m m itm en t to  th e  
in teg ra tio n  p r o c e s s  and  p r o p o se d  an  e c o n o m ic  u n io n  b e tw e e n  G u y a n a , B a rb a d o s, and  T rin id a d  and  
T o b a g o  as a  p recu rso r  to  w id e r  C arib b ean  in teg ra tio n . S tren g th en ed  t ie s  w ith  L a tin  A m e r ic a  co n tin u e  
to  b e  a  p r io r ity , w h ile  t ie s  w ith  E u ro p e  h a v e  a ls o  r e c e iv e d  c o n s id e r a b le  a tten tio n .
Concluding Remarks
T h e  C arib b ean  c o u n tr ie s  fa c e  a m u ltitu d e  o f  u n cer ta in tie s  in  th e  ra p id ly  c h a n g in g  in tern a tion a l 
trad e  r e g im e . O n e  th in g  th at is  certa in  is  th at a c tio n  w il l  b e  req u ired  o n  th e ir  p art to  e n su r e  that th eir  
p a r tic ip a tio n , a lth o u g h  a lrea d y  lim ite d , is  n o t  furth er  je o p a r d iz e d  b y  su ch  d e v e lo p m e n ts . T h is  w il l  req u ire  
in c r e a s in g  le v e ls  o f  c o m p e tit io n  th at ca n n o t b e  a c h ie v e d  in  th e  sh o rt term , and c er ta in ly  n o t w ith o u t so m e  
fo r m  o f  p r o te c t io n . P r o te c tio n  fo r  C arib b ean  in d u stry  to  d a te  h a s  n o t l iv e d  u p  to  e x p e c ta t io n s , in  la r g e  
p art d u e  to  th e  fa ilu r e  o f  C arib b ean  co u n tr ie s  fu l ly  to  u t i l iz e  th e ir  p o ten tia l b e n e f its  w ith  th e  a im  o f  
a c h ie v in g  h ig h e r  m ark et sh a res  and le v e ls  o f  e f f ic ie n c y . W h a t is  req u ired  is  a  c h a n g e  in  a ttitu d e , a lread y  
in  e v id e n c e  a lb e it  in  r e sp o n s e  to  e x trem e  ex tern a l p ressu res  and th e  th reat o f  e c o n o m ic  p it fa lls . T h e  
p referen tia l r e g im e  w il l  c o n tin u e  to  p la y  a v ita l, co m p lem en ta ry  r o le  in  th e  tra n s itio n  p e r io d  in  o rd er  to  
a c h ie v e , in  th e  lo n g e r  term , h ig h e r  le v e ls  o f  h u m an  d e v e lo p m e n t fo r  th e  C a rib b ea n  s o c ie ty .
In tern a tion a l trad e  is  ch a ra cter ized  b y  ch a n g e . I s su e s  th at w il l  h o ld  im p lic a tio n s  fo r  C arib b ean  
d e v e lo p m e n t a r is e  d a ily . T h is  d o cu m en t h a s  a ttem p ted  to  p resen t th e  m ajor is s u e s  th at req u ire  d eep  
r e f le c t io n  and  r e so lu t io n  in  th e  im m ed ia te  fu tu re . A c t io n  to  b e  ta k en  w il l  r eq u ire  m u ch  furth er  
in v e s t ig a t io n , p a rticu la r ly  w ith  regard  to  th e  r e g io n ’s co m m itm en t to  r e g io n a l in teg ra tio n  and  
a cc o m p a n y in g  d o m e s t ic  arran gem en ts.
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T a b le  3
T r in id a d  and T o b a g o  E x p o r ts  to  S e le c te d  L a tin  A m e r ic a n  C o u n tr ies  
(m ill io n s  o f  U S  d o lla r s)
1 9 8 8  1 9 8 9  1 9 9 0  1991
A rg en tin a 1 4 .1 0 .9 0 .3 n .a .
B ra z il 1 .0 3 .2 4 .1 4 3 .8
C h ile 3 .5 4 .3 3 .7 7 .8 a
C o lo m b ia 1 0 .2 3 .5 4 .7 2 8 .4
C o sta  R ica 5 .4 3 .2 1 .4 2 .6
E cu a d o r 0 .6 0 .7 3 .5 9 .4
M e x ic o 1 .9 1 .9 4 .7 3 .5
V e n e z u e la 1 0 .5 2 3 .1 4 2 .7 5 4 .2
T o ta l im p orts 4 7 .2 4 0 .8 6 5 .1 1 4 9 .7
W o r ld  to ta l 1 ,3 9 1 .0 1 ,5 5 7 .9 1 ,7 1 7 .8 1 ,9 8 2 .6
P e r c e n t o f  w o r ld  to ta l 3 .4 2 .6 3 .8 7 .6
n .a . =  N o t  a v a ila b le
a . S ix  to  11 m o n th s o f  rep orted  d ata , 1 -6  m o n th s o f  est im a tes
S o u rce : In tern a tion a l M o n eta ry  F u n d , D ir e c t io n  o f  T ra d e  S ta tis t ic s  Y e a rb o o k  1 9 9 1 ,  
W a sh in g to n , D .C .
T a b le  4 .
E x p o r ts  to  th e  E E C  and th e  U n ite d  S ta tes  
( $ ’0 0 0 )
1 9 8 9  1 9 9 0  1991
E u ro p ea n  E c o n o m ic  
C o m m u n ity  
P ercen t o f  w o r ld  total 
U n ite d  S ta tes  
P ercen t o f  w o r ld  to ta l 
W o r ld  to ta l
1 3 5 .5 0 0 .8
8 .7
8 5 4 .2 4 7 .8
5 4 .6
1 ,5 6 3 ,3 9 7 .2
1 7 1 ,1 6 8 .2
8 .3
1 ,1 4 5 ,1 2 4 .7
5 5 .6
2 ,0 5 9 ,6 1 3 .2
1 8 0 ,4 3 9 .3
9 .8
9 6 6 ,1 6 8 .5
4 8 .6
1 ,9 8 6 ,8 9 8 .5
S o u rce : C en tra l S ta tis t ica l O f f ic e , R e p u b lic  o f  T r in id a d  and T o b a g o , O v e rs e a s  
T ra d e  R e p o r t
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T h e  L D C s  o f  th e  r e g io n  fa c e  cr it ica l is su e s  that w il l  h a v e  an  im p act o n  th e ir  d e v e lo p m e n t and  w ill  
req u ire  th e  su p p ort o f  th e  o th er  C arib b ean  co u n tr ie s  in  th e ir  r e so lu tio n , and  carefu l co n s id e r a tio n  w h e n  
m a k in g  r e g io n a l a p p ro a ch es to  n e w  reg im e s .
In  e c o n o m ic  term s, o u r  a g en d a  fo r  an  in tegra ted  e c o n o m y  m a y  fo c u s  o n 'fo u r  p illars:
* T h e  sea rch  fo r  ex tern a l (as o p p o se d  to  in tern a l) e c o n o m ie s  o f  s c a le ,
■ sh a p in g  o f  g e o g r a p h ic a lly  co m p a ct e c o n o m ie s ,
■ a d o p tio n  o f  fo rw a rd  lo o k in g  ad justm en t s tra teg ie s , and
■ m ea su rem en t o f  th e  ’’r a n g e ” o f  th e  C arib b ean  e c o n o m y .
External Economies of Scale
T h e  r e g io n ’s e c o n o m ic  v u ln era b ility  is  o n c e  a g a in  e x p o se d  in  th e  E C /A C P  b an an a d is p u te , the  
C B I arg u m en t o v e r  p a r ity  w ith  N A F T A , th e  W e st In d ian  C o m m iss io n ’s  ca ll fo r  a d eep er  and  w id e r  
C a rib b ea n , and  in  th e  recen t C A R IC O M -G 3  (C o lo m b ia , M e x ic o , and  V e n e z u e la )  su m m it m e e t in g s . A t  
stak e  h ere  is  th e  sea rch  fo r  ex tern a l e c o n o m ie s  o f  sc a le  fo r  th e  r e g io n ’s p ro d u c tiv e  c a p a c ity . T h e  is su e , 
h o w e v e r , is  in  w h a t areas c o u ld  ex tern a l e c o n o m ie s  o f  s c a le  b e  rea liz ed  in  a w o r ld  that is  le s s  d ep en d en t  
o n  p h y s ic a l r e so u r c e s  and  n o t d ep en d en t o n  c o m m o d itie s . S o m e  argu e  fo r  th e  s e r v ic e  se c to r , and  o th ers  
fo r  th e  k n o w le d g e  in d u str ie s , w h ile  y e t  o th ers em p h a s iz e  th e  n e w  te c h n o lo g ie s  in  in fo rm a tio n , 
e n g in e e r in g , and  b io p r o c e s se s . In  a ll c a se s , th e  c o n d it io n s  fo r  ex tern a l e c o n o m ie s  o f  s c a le  m u st e x is t  i f  
th is  stra teg y  is  to  b e  v ia b le .
Compact Economies
In teg ra tio n  w il l  b e  en h a n ced  b y  a red u ctio n  in  th e  c o s t  o f  d o in g  b u s in e s s . T h is  e c o n o m ic  
b e h a v io r  le a d s  to  g e o g r a p h ic a lly  co m p a ct e c o n o m ie s . In  a w o r ld  w ith o u t trade b a rr ier s , th e se  e c o n o m ic  
d is tr ic ts  g o  b e y o n d  n a tion a l b o u n d a r ie s .7 R ich ard  B ern a l h as p o in ted  ou t that th e  ap p arel in d u stry  in  
Jam aica  is  v e r t ic a lly  in teg ra ted  w ith  th e  U n ited  S ta tes te x t ile  in d u stry , a  lin k  that w il l  b e  b r o k e n  at grea t  
c o s t  to  U n ite d  S ta tes  jo b s  and  J a m a ica ’s fo r e ig n  e x c h a n g e  e a rn in g s , i f  p ar ity  b e tw e e n  C B I and  N A F T A  
is  n o t a c h ie v e d .
C o m p a ct e c o n o m ie s  are th e  resu lt o f  ch a n g es  in  e c o n o m ic  g e o g r a p h y , and  su ch  c h a n g e s  are  
cu rren tly  ta k in g  p la c e  in  b o th  N o r th  and  S o u th  A m er ica . W h at w il l  b e  th e  n ature o f  th e  in d u str ia l 
d is tr ic ts  o f  th e  tw e n ty -f ir s t  cen tu ry ?  C o u ld  th e  C arib b ean  b e  an  a ttractive  lo c a t io n  fo r  s tra teg ic  n ich es  
in  th e  W e ste r n  H e m isp h e r e  o r  in  th e  w o r ld  trad in g  sy s te m s?  In  o th er  w o r d s , c o u ld  th e  r e g io n  b e  a “h u b ” 
fo r  s p e c if ic  in d u str ia l d is tr ic ts?  T h e se  are q u estio n s  that m a y  in fo rm  th e  n e w  a g en d a  an d  o u g h t to  e n g a g e  
th e  co rp o ra te  le a d e r sh ip ’s a tten tio n  in  th e  C arib b ean  B a sin .
7. M ajor decisions on  G A T T, N A F T A , A PE C , and SEM  are still to be made and cou ld  raise the prospects 
o f  protectionism . A lso  nontariff, lingu istic, and cultural barriers to free trade may introduce further protection.
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Forward-looking Adjustment Policies
T h e  stru ctu ra l ad ju stm en t p o lic y  d eb ate  h as fo c u se d  su b sta n tia lly  o n  th e  se q u e n c in g  o f  m ea su res  
and  a tim e  p er io d  fo r  ad ju stm en t p o lic ie s  to  w o r k , h en c e  th e  c a ll fo r  t im e  to  ad ju st in  o rd er  to  p rep are  
fo r  th e  le v e l p la y in g  f ie ld , th e  m itig a t io n  o f  so c ia l c o s t s ,  th e  restru ctu r in g  o f  p ro d u c tio n  c o s t s ,  and  the  
sw itc h in g  o f  n a tio n a l e x p en d itu re . T h e se  a sse r tio n s  are a ll v a lid  in  th e ir  o w n  r ig h t b u t, c o l le c t iv e ly ,  w h at  
is  th e  n e w  eq u ilib r iu m  after ad ju stm en t?
T h e  e v id e n c e  is  c lear: th e  C arib b ean  h as had  d eca d es  to  adjust in  th e  su g a r  and  b an an a  in d u str ie s  
b u t h a s  a d ju sted  o n ly  to  a p e r s is te n t lo w  eq u ilib r iu m . T h e  argu m en t that m o r e  ad ju stm en t t im e  w il l  a llo w  
th e  C ar ib b ea n  to  p rep are  fo r  th e  fu tu re  is  m o re  lik e ly  to  lead  to  th e  p o stp o n e m e n t o f  a  n e w  stra teg y  and  
th e  recu rren ce  o f  o ld  s itu a tio n s . F o r w a r d -lo o k in g  ad ju stm en t p o lic ie s  m u st fo c u s  o n  th e  targets  o f  a  n ew  
h ig h  e q u ilib r iu m , and  se q u e n c in g  and  tim in g  sh o u ld  b e  d e term in ed  o n  that b a s is . O th e r w ise , the  
C arib b ea n  w o u ld  b e  e n g a g e d  in d e f in ite ly  in  th e  crea tio n  o f  “ rea lity  g a p s ” and  th e  c o n se q u e n t p o lit ic s  o f  
i l lu s io n .
M a n y  o f  th e  co u n tr ie s  in  th is  r e g io n  h a v e  ad op ted  stro n g  re fo rm  p o lic y  p ro g ra m s for  
m a c r o e c o n o m ic  sta b ility  and  g r o w th . In  s o  d o in g , le s s  a tten tion  h as b e e n  p la c e d  o n  th e  m ic r o e c o n o m ic  
c o n d it io n s  e s se n tia l fo r  m a cro  p er fo rm a n ce . F o r  in sta n ce , in stru m en ts fo r  ex p o r t p r o m o t io n  su c h  a s d u ty ­
free  a c c e s s  to  im p o rted  in p u ts are  so m e tim e s  v ie w e d  as a su rro g a te  to  e x c h a n g e  rate p o lic y —w ith o u t  
a p p rec ia tin g  that e x ch a n g e -ra te  p o lic ie s  ch a n g e  re la tiv e  p r ic e s  b e tw e e n  th e  trad eab le  and  n o n tra d ea b le  
se c to r  th ro u g h o u t th e  e c o n o m y , and  in stru m en ts fo r  ex p o r t p r o m o tio n  a ffe c t  o n ly  th e  c o s ts  o f  s p e c if ic  
in d u str ie s . Q u a lita tiv e ly , a cco rd in g  to  R ajapatirana, e x c h a n g e  rate p o lic y  and  ex p o r t p r o m o t io n  m ea su res  
are d if fe r e n t and  m u st b e  v ie w e d  as su ch . T h is  illu s tra tes  th e  d ic h o to m y  b e tw e e n  m a cro  and  m icro  
c o n d it io n s  and  d ra w s a tten tio n  to  th e  n eed  to  id e n t ify  and  a lter th e  m ic r o e c o n o m ic  c o n d it io n s  fo r  
e c o n o m ic  and  so c ia l ad ju stm en t.
The Range of the Caribbean Economy
W e  are fa m ilia r  w ith  th e  “ h u b -a n d -sp o k e ” argu m en t that h as b e e n  h ig h lig h te d  in  th e  c o n te x t  o f  
N A F T A  an d  L a tin  A m e r ic a . C arib b ean  e c o n o m ie s  are s e e n  as “ s p o k e ” in  a U n ite d  S ta te s -cen tered  c ir c le .  
A lth o u g h  n o t a rticu la ted  in  th e s e  w o r d s , th e  C a r ib b ea n -E u ro p e  lin k s  are s im ila r , a lth o u g h  th ere  w o u ld  
b e  su b sta n tia l d if fe r e n c e s  in  th e  n ature o f  that lin k . N o w  that th e  r e g io n  is  in  a d is e n g a g e m e n t p e r io d  in  
b o th  E u ro p e  and  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s , a d d itio n a l h u rd les  m a y  a r ise . H o w  m ig h t th e  C a r ib b ea n  o v e r c o m e  
th e se  h u rd les?  G iv e n  its  en d o w m en t, le v e l o f  d e v e lo p m e n t, and  th e  cu rren t e n v iro n m en t, w h a t is  the  
r e a lis t ic  ca p a c ity  fo r  th e  r e g io n  to  en ter  in to  th e  m a in strea m  o f  in c o m e -g e n e r a tin g  a c tiv it ie s  in  th e  w o r ld  
e c o n o m y ?  I ca ll th is  th e  ran ge  o f  th e  e c o n o m y .
M a n y  sm a ll e c o n o m ie s  o f  E ast A s ia  h a v e  e x ten d ed  th e ir  ra n g e  in  p r o d u c tio n  and  trade  
d ra m a tica lly , and  th e y  h a v e  secu red  an  in crea s in g  sh are  o f  w o r ld  c o m m e r c e . W h a t are th e  co n d it io n s  
that a llo w  su c h  ta rg e ts  to  b e  rea lized ?  Is it a  q u e st io n  o f  C arib b ean  tra n sn a tio n a ls , or  s tra teg ic  p u b lic  
p o lic y  in te r v e n tio n s , o r  a m atter o f  C arib b ean  in tern ation a l re la tio n s?  T h e s e  and  o th er  is su e s  c o u ld  add  
to  th e  c o m p o s ite  m ea su re , w h ic h  w e  c a ll th e  ran ge  o f  th e  e c o n o m y , and  s o  p r o v id e  an  in s ig h t that m ay  
lea d  to  a  n e w  d y n a m ic  in  th e  w id e r  C arib b ean  e c o n o m y  that in c lu d es  C u b a , th e  D o m in ic a n  R e p u b lic , and  
H a iti.
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T h is  a g en d a  p o in ts  to  c lea r  o b je c t iv e s  fo r  an  in teg ra tio n  p r o c e ss  in  th e  r e g io n . It m a y  at lea st  
p ersu a d e  s o m e  to  re th in k  th e  p resen t ap p roach . W h at is  c lea r , h o w e v e r , is  that th e  o ften -rep ea ted  c lic h é  
a b ou t th e  g o a ls  o f  in teg ra tio n  are  n o  lo n g e r  illu m in a tin g . E x tern a l e c o n o m ie s  o f  s c a le , co m p a ct  
e c o n o m ie s , fo r w a r d -lo o k in g  ad ju stm en t p o lic ie s ,  and th e  ran ge  o f  th e  C arib b ean  e c o n o m y  are areas that 
m a y  a d v a n ce  th e  sea rch  fo r  a tw e n ty -f ir s t  cen tu ry  in teg ra tio n  p a rad igm . T hat n e v e r -e n d in g  sea rch  is  o n  
th e  r is e  a g a in , and  a sy n th e s is  o f  th e  id ea s and  current th in k in g  w o u ld  b e  t im e ly , and  c o u ld  o ffe r  a 
v a lu a b le  p la tfo rm  fo r  a n e w  r e sp ec ta b ility .
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Introduction
T h is  e x a m in a tio n  o f  th e  so c ia l r o o ts  o f  A m er ica n  p r o te c t io n ism  r e v ie w s  th e  so u r c e s  o f  so c ia l 
p r e ssu r e s  th at h a v e  p ro d u ced — and c o n tin u e  to  crea te— b arriers to  fr e e  tra d e . M o s t  stu d en ts o f  trad e  
p o lic y  h a v e  so u g h t  to  is o la te  th e  v a r ia b le s  th at co n tr ib u te  to  p r o te c t io n ism . G e n e r a lly , th e s e  ex p la n a tio n s  
e m p h a s iz e  e ith er  d o m e s t ic  o r  in tern a tion a l fa c to r s . C r itic s  h a v e  n o ted  th at th e  p r e d ic t iv e  a ccu ra cy  o f  b o th  
ty p e s  o f  m o d e l h a s  b e e n  u n im p r e ss iv e . T h is  e s s a y , h o w e v e r , d o e s  n o t  s e e k  to  p r o g n o s t ic a te , b u t to  
d e sc r ib e  and  e x p la in  th e  im p ortan t a ctors and id ea s th at h a v e  p ro m o ted  d if fe r e n t trad e  o r ien ta tio n s  in  
A m e r ic a n  h is to r y .
A  b r ie f  s u r v e y  o f  A m er ica n  e c o n o m ic  h is to r y  w il l  c la r ify  th at p r o te c t io n ism  h a s  n o t m e r e ly  b e e n  
a  m atter  o f  e c o n o m ic s  o r  p o lit ic a l lo b b y in g  and  p a n d er in g . T h e  r e la t iv e  o p e n n e ss  o f  th e  e c o n o m y  h as  
b e e n  re la ted  in  im p ortan t w a y s  to  th e  in tera ctio n  o f  th e  s o c ie ty ’s  p o lit ic a l cu ltu re  and  th e  p o lit ic a l sy s te m  
it s e lf .  P a r a d o x ic a lly , w ith in  th at cu ltu re , w h ic h  can  b e  c a lle d  d ie  A m e r ic a n  C r e e d , l i e  th e  id e o lo g ic a l  
so u r c e s  o f  d iv e r g e n t  trad e  o r ie n ta tio n s— o n  th e  o n e  h a n d , th e  la r g e ly  u n in terru p ted  p r o te c t io n ism  o f  th e  
f ir s t  1 5 0  y ea rs  o f  th e  r ep u b lic  an d , o n  th e  o th e r , th e  U n ite d  S ta te s ’ p o s t-W o r ld  W ar II in tern a tio n a l r o le  
as a lea d er  o f  th e  lib era l tra d in g  r e g im e . T h is  p ap er  se e k s  to  e x p la in  th e s e  ap p aren t co n tra d ic tio n s  u s in g  
th e  th eo re tica l t o o ls  o f  cu rren t trad e  p o lic y  a n a ly s is  as w e ll  a s th e  a u th o rs’ o w n  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  im p o rta n ce  
o f  n a tio n a l id e o lo g y  in  sh a p in g  fo r e ig n  e c o n o m ic  p o lic y .
American Political Culture1
B o r n  o f  r e v o lu t io n , th e  U n ite d  S ta tes  is  a  co u n try  o r g a n iz e d  arou n d  an  id e o lo g y  th at in c lu d e s  a  
se t  o f  d o g m a s  a b o u t th e  n atu re  o f  a  g o o d  s o c ie ty . A m e r ic a n ism , a s  d if fe r e n t p e o p le  h a v e  p o in te d  o u t, 
is  an  “ is m ” o r  id e o lo g y  in  th e  sa m e  w a y  that co m m u n ism , o r  fa s c is m , A N D  lib e r a lism  are  “ is m s .” 
R ich ard  H o fsta d ter  n o te d , “ it  h a s  b een  o u r  fa te  a s a  n a tio n  n o t to  h a v e  id e o lo g ie s  b u t to  b e  o n e .”2 O r  
as G . K . C h ester to n  p u t it , “ A m e r ic a  is  th e  o n ly  n a tio n  in  th e  w o r ld  th at is  fo u n d e d  o n  a  cre e d . T h at  
creed  is  s e t  forth  w ith  d o g m a tic  and  e v e n  th e o lo g ic a l lu c id ity  in  th e  D e c la r a tio n  o f  I n d e p e n d e n c e . . . .”3 
T h e  n a tio n ’s  id e o lo g y  can  b e  su b su m ed  in  fo u r  w o rd s: a n tista tism , in d iv id u a lism , p o p u lism , and
1. T his section  has been  adapted from  the forthcom ing book by  Seym our M artin L ipset, A m erican  E xceptionalism  
R eaffirm ed.
2 . Quoted in  M ichael Kazin, "The R ight’s U nsung Prophet", The N a tio n , February 2 0 , 1989 , p . 242 .
3 . G . K . C hesterton, Wh at I  S aw  in  A m erica  (N ew  York: D od d , M ead and C om pany, 1922), p . 7 .
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eg a lita r ia n ism . T h e  r ev o lu tio n a ry  id e o lo g y  w h ich  b eca m e  th e  A m er ica n  C reed  is  lib e r a lism  in  its 
e ig h teen th - and n in eteen th -cen tu ry  m e a n in g s .4
O th er co u n tr ie s  d e r iv e  th e ir  s e n s e  o f  th e m se lv e s  fro m  a co m m o n  h is to r y , n o t  an id e o lo g y , and  
i f  th e y  h a v e  a h is to r ic  se t o f  c o n se r v a t iv e  p o lit ica l v a lu e s , it is T o r y ism , s ta tis t co m m u n ita r ia n ism , 
n ob le s s e  o b lig e .  W in s to n  C h u rch ill o n c e  g a v e  v iv id  e v id e n c e  to  th e  d if fe r e n c e  b e tw e e n  a n a tio n  roo ted  
in  h is to r y  and o n e  d e fin ed  b y  id e o lo g y  in  o b je c t in g  to  a p ro p o sa l in  1 9 4 0  to  o u tla w  th e  an tiw ar  
C o m m u n ist P arty . In  a sp e e c h  in  th e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s , C h u rch ill sa id  that as far as h e  k n ew  th e  
C o m m u n ist P arty  w a s  co m p o se d  o f  E n g lish m e n  and h e  d id  n o t fea r  an E n g lish m a n . In  E u ro p e , 
n a tio n a lity  is  re la ted  to  c o m m u n ity , and thu s o n e  can n ot b e c o m e  u n -E n g lish  o r  u n -S w e d is h . B e in g  an  
A m e r ic a n , h o w e v e r , is  an id e o lo g ic a l co m m itm en t. It is  n o t a  m atter o f  b irth . T h o s e  w h o  reject  
A m er ica n  v a lu e s  are  u n -A m er ica n .
T h e  A m er ica n  R e v o lu tio n  sh a rp ly  w ea k en ed  th e  n o b lesse  o b lig e ,  h ie r a r c h ic a lly  ro o te d , o rg a n ic  
c o m m u n ity  v a lu e s  th at had  b een  lin k ed  to  T o r y  se n t im e n ts , and it e n o r m o u s ly  stren g th en ed  th e  
in d iv id u a lis t ic , eg a lita r ia n  and a n tista tist o n e s . T h is  is e v id en t in  th e  fa c t that th e  U n ited  S ta te s , as
H . G . W e lls  p o in ted  o u t o v e r  8 0  y ea rs  a g o , n o t o n ly  h as la ck ed  a v ia b le  s o c ia lis t  p a r ty , it a ls o  n ev er  
d e v e lo p e d  a B r itish - or  E u ro p ea n -ty p e  c o n se r v a t iv e  or  T o r y  p arty . R ath er , A m e r ic a  h as b een  d o m in ated  
b y  p u re  b o u r g e o is , m id d le -c la ss  in d iv id u a lis t ic  v a lu e s . A s  W e lls  pu t it: “ E sse n t ia lly  A m e r ic a  is  a 
m id d le -c la ss  [w h ich  has] b e c o m e  a co m m u n ity  and so  its e ssen tia l p ro b lem s are th e  p r o b le m s  o f  a m od ern  
in d iv id u a lis t ic  s o c ie ty , stark  and c le a r .” H e  en u n cia ted  a th eo ry  o f  A m e r ic a  as a  lib era l s o c ie ty — in  th e  
c la s s ic  a n tista tist m ea n in g  o f  th e  term — that w a s  to  w in  w id e  a ccep ta n ce  a h a lf-cen tu ry  la ter w h en  
d e sc r ib e d  in  m o re  d eta il b y  L o u is  H artz:
It is  n o t d if f ic u lt  to  sh o w  fo r  e x a m p le , that th e  tw o  grea t p o lit ic a l p arties  in  A m er ica  
r ep resen t o n ly  o n e  E n g lish  p a rty , th e  m id d le -c la ss  L ib era l p a r ty .. . .  T h e r e  are no  
T o r ie s . . .a n d  no  L a b o r  P a r ty . . . .  [T ]h e  n ew  w o r ld  [w a s left] to  th e  W h ig s  and  
N o n c o n fo r m is ts  and to  th o s e  le s s  co n str u c tiv e , le s s  lo g ic a l,  m o re  p o p u la r  and lib era tin g  
th in k ers w h o  b e c a m e  R a d ica ls  in  E n g la n d , and J e ffer so n ia n s  and th en  D e m o c r a ts  in  
A m e r ic a . A ll A m er ica n s  are, fro m  th e  E n g lish  p o in t o f  v ie w , L ib era ls  o f  o n e  so r t or  
a n o th e r ... .
T h e  lib e r a lism  o f  th e  e ig h teen th  cen tu ry  w a s  e s s e n t ia lly  th e  r e b e ll io n .. .a g a in s t  th e  m on arch ica l 
and ar is to cra tic  sta te— a g a in st h ered itary  p r iv i le g e , a g a in st r e s tr ic tio n s  o n  b a rg a in s . Its sp ir it  w a s  
e s s e n t ia lly  a n a rch is tic , th e  a n tith esis  o f  S o c ia lis m . It w a s a n ti-S ta te .5
T h e  U n ite d  S ta te s , a lm o st fro m  its start, h as had an ex p a n d in g  e c o n o m ic  sy s te m . T h e  n in e teen th -  
cen tu ry  A m er ica n  e c o n o m y , as com p ared  to  th e  E u rop ean  o n e s , w a s  ch aracter ized  b y  m o re  m arket
4. L ouis Hartz, The L ib e ra l T rad itio n  in  A m erica , (N ew  York: Harcourt, Brace and W orld , 1955), pp. 6 , 234. 
The w ord liberal, it should be noted, did not com e into existence until the early 19th century and probably did not 
take on this m eaning until the m iddle. See Giovanni Sartori, The Theory o f  D em o cracy  R evisited, P a r t  Tw o: The 
C lass ica l Issue  (Chatham, NJ: Chatham H ouse Publishers, 1987), pp. 370-1 .
5. H . G. W ells , The F u tu re  in  A m erica  (N ew  York: Harper and Brothers, 1906), pp. 7 2 -7 6 . For an excellent 
analysis o f  liberal party politics in Britain, Canada, and the U nited States, see Robert K elley , The T ransatlan tic  
Persuasion: The L ib e ra l-D e m o c ra tic  M in d  in  The A ge o f  G ladstone  (N ew  York: A lfred A . K nopf, 1969).
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fr e e d o m , m o re  in d iv id u a l lan d  o w n e r sh ip , and a h ig h er  w a g e  in c o m e  stru ctu re— all su sta in ed  b y  th e  
n a tio n a l c la s s ic a l lib era l id e o lo g y . F ro m  th e  R e v o lu t io n  o n , it w a s  th e  la is s e z - fa ir e  co u n try  p a r  
e x c e lle n c e . U n lik e  th e  s itu a tio n  in  m an y  E u ro p ea n  co u n tr ies  in  w h ic h  e c o n o m ic  m a ter ia lism  w a s  v ie w e d  
b y  th e  tra d itio n a l a r is to cra cy  and th e  ch u rch  as c o n d u c iv e  to  v u lg a r  b eh a v io r  and im m o r a lity , in  th e  
U n ite d  S ta tes  hard  w o r k  and e c o n o m ic  a m b itio n  w e r e  p e r c e iv e d  as th e  p ro p er  a c tiv ity  o f  a  m ora l p e r so n .
W r it in g  in  th e  1 8 5 0 s , a v is it in g  S w is s  th e o lo g ia n , P h ilip  S c h a ff , co m m en ted  that th e  “ a c q u is it io n  
o f  r ic h e s  is  to  th em  [th e  A m er ica n s] o n ly  a h e lp  tow ard  h ig h e r  sp ir itu a l and m ora l e n d s .” 6 F r ied r ich  
E n g e ls  and M a x  W e b e r , a m o n g  m a n y , em p h a s ized  that th e  U n ited  S ta tes  w a s  th e  o n ly  p u re  b o u r g e o is  
c o u n try , th e  o n ly  o n e  w h ic h  w a s  n o t p o s t fe u d a l.7 A s  W eb er  n o ted , “ no  m e d ie v a l a n teced en ts  or  
c o m p lic a tin g  in stitu tio n a l h er ita g e  [serv ed ] to  m itig a te  th e  im p act o f  th e  P ro testan t e th ic  o n  A m er ica n  
e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n t .” 8 S im ila r  argu m en ts w e r e  m a d e  in  th e  1 9 2 0 s  b y  th e  g if te d  Ita lian  co m m u n ist  
th eo re tic ia n  A n to n io  G r a m sc i.9 A m e r ic a  w a s  ab le  to  a v o id  th e  rem n an ts o f  m erc a n tilism , s ta tis t  
r e g u la t io n s , ch u rch  e s ta b lish m en t, a r is to cra cy , and th e  em p h a sis  on  so c ia l c la s s  that th e  p o stfeu d a l 
co u n tr ie s  in h er ited . A ll o f  th e se  w r iters  em p h a sized  A m e r ic a ’s u n iq u e  o r ig in s  and resu ltan t v a lu e  sy s te m  
as a so u r c e  o f  its e c o n o m ic  and p o lit ica l d e v e lo p m e n t. Its sec u la r , la is s e z  f a i r e ,  lib era l o r ien ta tio n  w as  
in te g r a lly  re la ted  to  v a r io u s  a sp ec ts  d e r iv a t iv e  fro m  its sp ec ia l r e lig io u s  tra d itio n , th e  d o m in a n c e  o f  th e  
P ro testa n t se c ts  th at W eb er  em p h a s ized  fa c ilita ted  th e  r is e  o f  c a p ita lism .10
In  1 9 9 2 , w e  lo g ic a lly  a ss o c ia te  th e  fr e e  m ark et w ith  fr e e  trad e. Y e t  A m e r ic a ’s s tr o n g ly  lib era l 
tra d itio n  so m e h o w  p ro d u ced  a fo r e ig n  e c o n o m ic  p o lic y  w h ic h  re lied  u p o n  re str ic t iv e  p ro tec tio n is t  
m ea su res  u n til th e  m id tw en tie th  cen tu ry . B rita in  had a lread y  b u ilt  a p r o sp e r o u s , d o m in a n t trad in g  em p ire  
b y  th e  tim e  th at A m er ica n s  e v e n  b eg a n  to  co n tem p la te  th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  e c o n o m ic  g r o w th , e x p o r t  
m a rk ets , and lo w  trad e  b arr iers. W h a t ex p la in s  th is  apparent co n tra d ic tio n  b e tw e e n  cu ltu re  and p o lic y ?  
T h e  a n sw er  to  th is  q u est io n  b e g in s  w ith  a su r v e y  o f  A m e r ic a ’s p r o te c t io n is t  trad e p o lic ie s .
6 . Philip  Schaff, A m erica : A  Sketch o f  the P o lit ic a l, S ocia l, an d  R elig ious C h ara c te r o f  the U n ited  States o f  
N o rth  A m erica  (N ew  York: C. Scribner, 1855), p. 259 .
7 . E ngels to Sorge (February 8, 1890) in  M a r x  an d  Engels, Selected Correspondence, 1 8 4 6 -1 8 9 5  (N ew  York: 
International Publishers, 1942), p. 467.
8. M ax W eber, The Protestant E th ic  an d  the S p ir it  o f  C ap ita lism  (N ew  York: Scribner, 1935), pp. 55 -56 .
9. A ntonio Gram sci, Selections fro m  the P rison  Notebooks  (N ew  York: International Publishers, 1971), pp. 
21 -22 , 2 7 2 , 318.
10. W eber, The Protestant E th ic , pp. 155-183; and M ax W eber, "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit o f  
C apitalism ,1' in Essays in  Sociology, trans, by Hans Gerth and C .W . M ills (N ew  York: O xford U niversity Press, 
1946), pp. 309 , 313’.
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Protectionism in America
T h e  F o u n d in g  a n d  A n te b e llu m  T a r i f f  P o lio ?
T h o u g h  th e  U n ited  S ta tes  w a s  born  a lib era l so c ie ty  w ith  a stro n g  an tista tist o r ien ta tio n , 
g o v e r n m e n t in terv en tio n  in  th e  fo r m  o f  ta r iffs  w a s  th e  n orm  fro m  th e  b e g in n in g . O n e  o f  th e  f ir s t  o ff ic ia l  
acts o f  th e  C o n tin en ta l C o n g r e ss  in  1 7 8 9  w a s  th e  im p o s it io n  o f  a  ta r iff , a  5 -p e r c e n t d u ty  o n  a ll im p orts  
e x c e p t  s o m e  m an u factu red  g o o d s , w h ic h  had rates o f  up to  15 p ercen t. S in c e  th e  C o n stitu tio n  fo rb a d e  
ex p o r t ta x a tio n , th is  m o d e s t  im p ort tax w a s th e  p rin cip a l so u r c e  o f  r e v e n u e  fo r  th e  fed era l g o v ern m en t. 
D e b a te  o v e r  ea r ly  U .S .  trad e p o lic y  w a s  heated : J e ffer so n  and o th er  S ou th ern  agrarian s u rged  lo w  tar iffs  
to  k eep  im p ort p r ic e s  d o w n  (so  that th e y  co u ld  ex p o r t th e ir  farm  p ro d u cts  and b u y  m an u factu red  g o o d s  
c h e a p ly  fr o m  ab road ) w h ile  H a m ilto n  and a fa c t io n  rep resen tin g  N o rth ern  m a n u fa ctu r in g  in terests  argu ed  
fo r  h ig h e r  ta r iffs  to  p ro tec t w h a t h e  c a lle d , “ in fan t in d u s tr ie s .” T h o u g h  H a m ilto n ’s 1791  “R ep o rt o n  
M a n u fa c tu res” w a s  b ran d ish ed  b y  la ter a d v o ca te s  o f  p r o te c t io n ism , it had  lit t le  actual e f fe c t  o n  th e s e  early  
p o lic y  d e b a te s .11
T h e  le g a l b a se s  o f  A m er ica n  trad e p o lic y  can b e  fou n d  in  A r t ic le  I , S e c tio n  8 and A r tic le  II, 
S e c t io n  2  o f  th e  C o n stitu tio n . A d m in is te r in g  trade la w s  b eca m e  th e  trad ition a l d o m a in  o f  C o n g r e ss ,  
w h ich  w a s  c o n st itu t io n a lly  m andated  to  “ reg u la te  co m m e r c e  w ith  fo r e ig n  n a t io n s . . .” and “ la y  and  
c o l l e c t . . .d u t ie s .” B u t trea ty  n e g o tia t io n — w h ic h  w o u ld  later b e  an im p ortan t m ea n s fo r  th e  rec ip ro ca l 
red u ctio n  o f  trad e b a rr ier s— w a s le f t  to  th e  e x e c u t iv e  branch: “ [T h e  P resid en t] sh a ll h a v e  p o w e r , b y  and  
w ith  th e  a d v ic e  and c o n se n t o f  th e  S en a te , to  m ak e  tr e a t ie s , p ro v id ed  tw o -th ird s  o f  th e  S en a to rs  p resen t  
c o n c u r . . .” B o th  b ra n ch es o f  g o v e r n m e n t had  so m e  d e  ju r e  p o w e r  o v e r  trad e p o lic y .  D if fe r e n t  p o in ts  
in  h is to r y  p ro d u ced  v e r y  d if fe r e n t k in d s o f  p o lic ie s ,  and th e  d if fe r e n c e  d ep en d s o n  w h ic h  b ranch  w a s  
e x e r c is in g  p o w e r  at th e  tim e .
T h e  ea r lie s t  U .S .  ta r if f  w a s  n o t a p r o h ib it iv e  trad e restra in t re la t iv e  to  o th er  c o u n tr ie s  at th e  tim e .  
In fa c t , it co u ld  h a rd ly  b e  ca lled  a “trad e p o l i c y ” s in c e  th ere  w a s  lim ited  p o lit ic a l and e c o n o m ic  ra tio n a le  
b eh in d  th e  d u tie s . T h e  fed era l g o v e r n m e n t n eed ed  a stea d y  so u r c e  o f  r e v e n u e , and im p ort d u tie s  w e r e  
o n e  o f  th e  fe w  o p tio n s  at th e  tim e .
It to o k  a se r ie s  o f  e v e n ts  th at cu lm in a ted  in  th e  T a r if f  o f  1 8 1 6  to  b r in g  to  lig h t  th e  im p o rta n ce  
o f  th e  o p e n n e ss  o f  th e  A m er ica n  e c o n o m y . T h e  W ar o f  1 8 1 2  and th e  p r e c e d in g  B r itish  em b a rg o  o f  
D e c e m b e r  1 8 0 7  had  stim u la ted  th e  iron  fo u n d r ie s  o f  P e n n sy lv a n ia  and th e  te x t ile  m ills  o f  N e w  E n g la n d , 
and w ith  p e a c e  ca m e  ca lls  fo r  co n tin u ed  p ro tec tio n  fo r  th e s e  y o u n g  in d u str ie s . E v e n  J e ffe r so n  ca m e to  
fa v o r  p r o te c t io n ism  after w itn e s s in g  th e  d isru p tio n  w ro u g h t b y  15 years o f  B r itish  p red a to ry  tra d in g  and  
em b a rg o . H e  v ie w e d  A m e r ic a ’s f le d g lin g  m an u factu r in g  b a se  as v ita l to  th e  co u n tr y ’s con tin u ed  
in d e p e n d e n c e .12 T h e  1 8 1 6  ta r if f  pu t a v ir tu a l ch o k e -h o ld  o n  im p orted  w o o le n ,  c o tto n , and iron  
m a n u fa ctu res.
11. S idney Ratner, The T a r if f  in  A m erican  H is to ry  (N ew  York: D . Van Nostrand, 1972), p. 12.
12. Thom as Jefferson’s letter to Benjamin A ustin, 9 January 1816 in M errill D . Peterson, ed ., The P o rta b le  
Thomas Jefferson  (N ew  York: V ik ing Press, 1975), pp. 547 -550 .
474
The Social Roots o f  United States Protectionism
T a r if f  le v e ls  o sc illa te d  up  and d o w n  u n til th e  C iv il W a r, th o u g h  d u tie s , o n  a v e r a g e , rem a in ed  at 
r e la t iv e ly  m o d e s t  le v e ls  d u rin g  th is  p er io d . T a r iffs  w e r e  in crea sed  in  1 8 2 4 13 and a g a in  in  1 8 2 8 , b u t th is  
la tter ta r iff , th e  “ T a r if f  o f  A b o m in a t io n s ,” p ro d u ced  w id esp rea d  p u b lic  d is a ffe c t io n  w ith  th e  a r tif ic ia lly  
h ig h  p r ic e s  o f  s o m e  g o o d s . A v e r a g e  ad v a lo r e m  ta r if f  rates s to o d  b e tw e e n  4 5  p ercen t and 5 0  p ercen t on  
m o st im p o rted  g o o d s . T a r if f  red u ctio n s  so o n  fo l lo w e d  and retu rn ed  th e  a v e r a g e  ra te  to  arou nd  3 0  p ercen t  
u n til th e  d e p r e ss io n  o f  1 8 3 7 -1 8 4 2 , w h ich  co n v in c e d  m an y  W h ig s  (m an y  o f  w h o m  w o u ld  la ter c o m p r ise  
th e  R ep u b lica n  p arty ) th at trad e b arriers w e r e  e ssen tia l to  th e  co u n tr y ’s e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n t and se lf -  
s u f f ic ie n c y .
It is  n o t su rp r is in g  th at th ere  w e r e  n o  c a lls  fo r  “ fr e e  tra d e” in  th e  ea r ly  y ea rs  o f  th e  rep u b lic . 
O n e o f  th e  m o re  p o w e r fu l C o n g r e ss io n a l o p p o n e n ts  o f  ea r ly  p r o te c t io n is t  le g is la t io n  w a s  D a n ie l W eb ster  
o f  M a ss a c h u se tts .14 B u t w h ile  h e  argued  th e  c a se  a g a in st “ p r o h ib it iv e ” ta r iffs , h e , l ik e  m o s t  nation a l 
le a d e r s , su p p o rted  “ m o d era te” ta r iffs . T h e  ta r if f  q u estio n  w a s  o n e  o f  h o w  h ig h , n o t w h e th er  or  n o t to  
en a ct th em .
P o s tb e llu m  A m e r ic a  a n d  R e p u b lic a n  L e a d e rs h ip
B e fo r e  th e  C iv il W ar, ta r iffs  m a in ly  serv ed  (and w e r e  p o lit ic a lly  ju s t if ie d )  as a so u r c e  o f  r ev en u e  
fo r  th e  fed era l g o v e r n m e n t. T h e y  w e r e  n o t p r o h ib it iv e  r e la t iv e  to  o th er  trad in g  n a tio n s  o f  th at era . T h e  
f le d g lin g  e c o n o m y  co n tin u ed  to  g r o w  d u rin g  th is  p er io d  w ith  an em p h a sis  to w a rd  th e  d o m e s t ic  h o m e  
m ark et, w h ic h  w a s  v ie w e d  as a d ep en d a b le  and su f f ic ie n t  so u r c e  o f  d em an d  fo r  U .S .  p ro d u c ts . In cen tiv e s  
fo r  th e  e x p o r t o f  A m er ica n  g o o d s , h o w e v e r , in crea sed  su b sta n tia lly  a fter th e  w a r . A n n u a l a n teb e llu m  
trad e a v era g ed  $ 1 1 6  m ill io n  in  th e  years fro m  18 3 8  to  1 8 4 9  w h ile  b e tw e e n  1 8 5 0  and 1 8 7 3  ex p o rts  
a v era g ed  $ 2 7 4  m ill io n . A n d  b y  1 8 9 3 , A m e r ic a  w a s  se c o n d  o n ly  to  B rita in  in  to ta l e x p o r ts .15 In th e  
1 8 8 0 s , A m er ica n  fa rm ers h e lp e d  to  ch a n g e  th e  e c o n o m ic  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  th e  U n ited  S ta tes  and  
E u ro p e  as g ra in  e x p o r ts  sk y r o c k e te d , ch a llen g ed  E u rop ean  p ro d u cers , and m a d e th e  U n ited  S ta tes  a 
s ig n if ic a n t n e w  p r e se n c e  in  in tern ation a l m ark ets.
Y e t , e v e n  as G reat B rita in  m o v e d  to  crea te  a lib era l in tern ation a l trad in g  sy s te m  fro m  th e  1 8 4 0 s  
o n w a rd , th e  U n ited  S ta tes  d id  n o t fo l lo w  th e  lib era liza tio n  tren d . U .S .  ta r iffs  w e r e  e ith er  le f t  in tact or  
ra ised , and  th e  U n ite d  S ta tes b a s ic a lly  ig n o red  th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  o p e n  m ark ets abroad  and s im ila r  
trea tm en t fo r  E u ro p ea n  g o o d s  in  A m er ica n  m ark ets. T h ree  fa c to rs  w e r e  e ss e n t ia l. F ir s t  and m o st  
im p ortan t, th e  A m er ica n  ta r if f  w a s  co n sid ered  a d o m e s tic  p o lic y  is su e  b y  p o lit ic ia n s  and th e  p u b lic  a lik e . 
T h e  tw in  im p era tiv e s  o f  r e v e n u e  and n ation a l e c o n o m ic  in d e p en d en ce  m ad e U .S .  trad e  p o lic y  an in ternal 
m atter . R ec ip ro ca l ta r if f  r ed u ctio n s  w ith  trad in g  partners w e r e  n o t e v e n  a p o lic y  o p tio n . S e c o n d , th e  
C iv il W ar had  g en era ted  in te n se  f isc a l p ressu res  fo r  in crea sed  g o v e r n m e n t r e v e n u e . T h e  c o s ts  o f  th e  w ar, 
to  a  la r g e  ex ten t , w e r e  ab sorb ed  b y  n ew  and h ig h er  ta r if f  b arriers. T h ird , th e  C iv il W ar had th e  
ad d ition a l im p act o f  tem p o ra r ily  tra n sfo rm in g  A m e r ic a ’s fed era l g o v e r n m e n t in to  a o n e-p a rty  sy s te m .
13. T he general average tariff at this tim e w as about 30 percent.
14. W ebster ultim ately reversed h is position , how ever, and jo in ed  the pro-tariff forces beginning w ith  the 1828  
tariff.
15. C .J. B ullock , J .H . W illiam s, and R .S . Tuckner, "The Balance o f  Trade o f  the U nited States," R eview  o f  
Econom ics an d  Statistics, 1 (July 1919), pp. 215 -266 .
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A fter  th e  w a r , th e  R e p u b lic a n s , a sso c ia ted  w ith  N o rth ern , p r o te c t io n is t  b u s in e ss  fa c t io n s , a ssu m ed  con tro l 
o v e r  C o n g r e ss  and th e  p r e s id e n c y  fo r  m o s t  o f  th e  p er io d  fro m  1 8 6 0 -1 8 7 4 . T h is  p a r ty ’s g e n e r a lly  p ro ­
ta r if f  s ta n c e  d am p en ed  an y  p ro sp ec ts  fo r  red u ced  trad e b arriers. T h e  D e m o c r a ts  w e r e  fin a lly  resu sc ita ted  
w h e n  th e y  g a in e d  co n tro l o f  th e  H o u s e  fo l lo w in g  th e  d e p r e ss io n  o f  1 8 7 3 . It w a s  n o t u n til G ro v er  
C le v e la n d  and th e  e le c t io n  o f  1 8 8 4  that a D e m o c r a t m ad e  it to  th e  W h ite  H o u s e .
In  th e  a n teb e llu m  p e r io d , p o lit ic ia n s  w e r e  h esita n t to  u se  th e  ta r if f  is su e  as a p o in t  o f  co n tra st w ith  
th e ir  p o lit ic a l o p p o n e n ts . F e w  w an ted  to  b e  p e g g e d  as ex trem ists  on  e ith er  end  o f  th e  trad e  sp ec tru m , 
w h eth er  “ p r o te c t io n is t” or  “ fr e e  tr a d e r .” A n d rew  J a ck so n , a D e m o c r a t and a p ro p o n en t o f  lo w  ta r iffs ,  
ran fro m  th e  is s u e  d u r in g  h is  ten u re  as p resid en t: h e  so u g h t to  a v o id  th e  u n cer ta in  c o n se q u e n c e s  o f  
sta k in g  o u t a  c lea r  p o s it io n  o n  th e  trad e q u estio n . In a d d it io n , th e s e  years w e r e  m arked  b y  greater  
f lu id ity  in  C o n g r e ss io n a l v o t in g  p attern s o n  ta r iffs . R eg io n a l and party  c o a lit io n s  o n  b o th  s id e s  o f  th e  
p r o te c t io n is t  d eb a te  had  n o t th en  s o l id if ie d .
F o llo w in g  th e  w a r , th e  ta r if f  g ra d u a lly  a ssu m ed  g rea ter  p r o m in e n c e  in  th e  p o lit ica l arena  and  
b e c a m e  a to o l fo r  th e  u n if ic a tio n  o f  d iv e r s e  c o n st itu e n c ie s  and p o lit ica l a cto rs . “ T h e  ta r if f  is su e  w a s  o f  
su ch  im p o rta n ce  in  th is  p er io d  that th ere  w e r e  tim es w h en  it w a s  th e  o n ly  m ajor ca m p a ig n  i s s u e . . . ” 16 
A s  T o m  T err ill n o te s , party  p o s it io n s  o n  th e  ta r iff  b eca m e  stark ly  d efin ed :
P r o te c tio n ism , w h ic h  had b een  p o lit ic a lly  e x p ed ien t in  th e  1 8 6 0 s , n o w  b e c a m e  party  
d o g m a .. . .  B y  th e  e le c t io n  o f  1 8 8 0  p ro te c t io n ism  v ir tu a lly  eq u a lled  R e p u b lic a n ism . T h e  
D e m o c r a ts  la ter a ssu m ed  an o p p o s ite  p o s it io n . T h e  R ep u b lica n  c h o ic e  w a s  b o th  natural 
and fo r c e d  u p o n  th em . T h e  G O P , w h ic h  in c lu d ed  ch a m p io n s o f  in d u str ia liza tio n  and th e  
sp ir itu a l h e ir s  o f  H a m ilto n  and C la y  a m o n g  its s tr o n g e st fa c t io n s , n a tu ra lly  to o k  up  
p r o te c t io n is m .17
T a r if f  rh eto r ic  w a s a ch eap  co m m o d ity  fo r  la te  n in e teen th -cen tu ry  p o lit ic ia n s , fo r  w h o m  it w as  
le s s  d iv is iv e  than  o th er  n ation a l co n cern s  o f  th e  tim e . It cou n tered  “ th e  cen tr ifu g a l fo r c e s  o f  s e c t io n a lism ,  
eth n ic  and r e lig io u s  d if fe r e n c e s , d y n a m ic  but u n ev en  e c o n o m ic  c h a n g e , or  p e r sp e c t iv e s  lim ite d  b y  th e  
b o u n d a r ies  o f  a n e ig h b o rh o o d  or  sm a ll c o m m u n ity .” 18 T rad e barriers w e r e  th e  fo ca l p o in t  o f  n ation a l 
p o lit ic s  w h e n  P res id en t G ro v er  C le v e la n d , a D e m o c r a t, d ev o ted  an 1 8 8 7  m e s sa g e  to  C o n g r e ss  to  cr it ic ism  
o f  that h o ld o v e r  fro m  th e  C iv il W ar, th e  h ig h  p r o te c t iv e  ta r iff. T h e  e le c t io n  o f  th e  fo l lo w in g  y ea r  p itted  
B en ja m in  H a rr iso n  a g a in st C le v e la n d  and co n tin u ed  th e  b a ttle  o v e r  D e m o c r a tic  and R ep u b lica n  ta r iff  
p o s it io n s . W ith  H a r r iso n ’s  v ic to r y , C o n g r e ss  w a s  a b le  to  en act th e  q u ite  r e s tr ic t iv e  M c K in le y  A c t in  
1 8 9 0 . C le v e la n d  w a s  e lec ted  a g a in  in  1 8 9 2  and th e  W ilso n -G o rm a n  A ct o f  1 8 9 4  in stitu ted  m o d e s t  ta r iff  
red u c tio n s .
It is im p ortan t aga in  to  n o te  that th e  ta r if f  d eb a tes  o f  th e  n in eteen th  and th e  ea r ly  tw en tie th  
cen tu r ies  w e r e  argu m en ts o f  p r o tec tio n  v e r su s  t a r i f f  re d u c t io n .  F r e e  trad e , e v e n  as an id ea l, w a s  h ard ly
16. Robert A . Pastor, Congress and  the P o litics  o f  U .S . F oreign  E conom ic  P o licy , 1 9 2 9 -1 9 7 6  (Berkeley: 
U niversity  o f  C alifornia Press, 1980), p. 75 .
17. Tom  E. Terrill, The T a riff , P o litics  an d  A m erican  F o re ig n  P o licy  (W estport, CT: G reenw ood Press, 1973), 
p. 25.
18. Ib id ., p. 9 .
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c o n s id e r e d . T h e  D e m o c r a ts , k n o w n  la r g e ly  a s th e  a n tita r iff  p a r ty , a d v o ca ted  “ a  ta r if f  fo r  r e v e n u e  o n ly ,” 
n o t lib era l fr e e  tra d e , in  th e ir  p arty  p la tfo rm s o f  th e  1 8 7 6  and  1 8 8 0 .19 In  a d e b a te  o v e r  th e  p r o p o se d  
M o n g r e l T a r if f  o f  1 8 8 2 , C o n g r e ssm a n  W illia m  M . S p r in g er  sta ted  th at “th e  rea l is s u e  p resen ted  to  th e  
co u n try  in  th is  d eb a te  h a s  b e e n  g r e a tly  m isu n d ersto o d  o r  w i l l fu l ly  m ista ted . It is  n o t  b e tw e e n  fr e e  trad e  
and  p r o te c t io n . I  k n o w  o f  n o  p arty  in  th is  co u n try  o r  in  th is  H o u s e  w h o  p r o p o se s  fr e e  trad e  a s a  rem ed y  
fo r  e x is t in g  ta r if f  a b u s e s .” 20 A n d  e v e n  C le v e la n d ’s  v ic io u s  a ttack s o n  th e  ta r if f  d u r in g  th e  1 8 8 8  e le c t io n  
fe l l  fa r  sh o r t o f  a d v o c a tin g  fr e e  trad e.
T h e  r e a so n  fo r  th e  lu k ew a rm  c a lls  fo r  u n restr ic ted  trad e l ie s  p a r tly  in  th e  fa c t th at th e  in te llec tu a l 
arg u m en t fo r  fr e e  tra d e  w a s  u n so p h is tic a te d  at th is  t im e . B y  th e  1 8 7 0 s , th e  D e m o c r a ts  h ad  “ red u ced  th e ir  
trad e  th e o r ie s  to  o n e  m is le a d in g  q u a n tita tiv e  th eo ry : s in c e  fo r e ig n  trad e  is  e s s e n t ia l ly  b arter , co u n tr ie s  
ten d  to  trad e  in  s im ila r  a m o u n ts .” 21 R ic a r d o ’s th eo ry  o f  co m p a ra tiv e  a d v a n ta g e  h ad  n o t th en  a c h ie v e d  
a d o m in a n t p o s it io n  in  A m er ica n  e c o n o m ic s . E a ch  s id e — p r o te c t io n  and  ta r if f  r e d u c tio n — h ad  its 
a d v o ca te s  in  a ca d em ia . A n d  e v e n  w h e n  th e  la is s e z - fa ir e  trad e  th e o r y  b e c a m e  p red o m in a n t, it w a s  st ill 
m isu se d  and  m isu n d ersto o d  b y  p o lic y  m ak ers .
R e g a r d le ss  o f  th e ir  gra sp  o f  e c o n o m ic s , m o s t  p o lic y  m ak ers r e a liz e d  th e  p o ten tia l b e n e fits  o f  o p en  
fo r e ig n  m ark ets  fo r  A m e r ic a n  e x p o r ts . O d d ly  e n o u g h , m a n y  b e lie v e d  that th ere  w a s  n o  c o n tra d ic tio n  in  
in s titu tin g  h ig h  b a rr ier s fo r  en try  in to  th e  U .S .  m ark et and  d em a n d in g  lo w  b arr iers ab road . A s  o n e  
m a g a z in e  o f  th e  t im e  p u t it , “ P r o te c tio n is ts  and  fr e e  trad ers s e e m  to  h a v e  at la s t  a rr iv ed  at a  c o m m o n  
p o in t  as b o th  c la s se s  n o w  p r o fe s s  to  b e  d e s ir o u s  o f  en la rg in g  o u r  fo r e ig n  tra d e . T h e y  a re , o f  c o u r se , n o t  
in  h a rm o n y  w ith  ea ch  o th er  a s  to  th e  m ea n s to  b e  ad op ted  in  s e c u r in g  th is  p u r p o s e .” 22 S im ila r ly ,  
“ . . .E x p o r t  a n d  F in a n c e  n o ted  in  1 8 8 9  th at, a lth o u g h  th e  co u n try  w a s  f i l le d  w ith  s e lf - s ty le d  ‘is o la t io n is t s ,’ 
it  w a s  im p o s s ib le  to  f in d  a s in g le  p e r so n  w h o  d id  n o t fa v o r  in crea sed  co m m erc ia l e n ta n g le m e n ts .”23
W illia m  M c K in le y , w h o  b e c a m e  p r e s id e n t in  1 8 9 7 , c le a r ly  s y m b o liz e d  th e  s tra n g e  p a ra d o x  o f  
A m e r ic a n  th in k in g  o n  trad e  p o lic y :  a  n a rro w , d o m e s tic  o r ien ta tio n  c o u p le d  w ith  an  em p h a s is  o n  n ew  
o u tle ts  fo r  A m e r ic a n  p r o d u c tio n . H e  w a s  a s ta u n ch  R ep u b lic a n  p r o te c t io n is t  w h ile  a t th e  sa m e  t im e , lik e  
a tru e  fr e e  trad er , a w a re  o f  th e  im p o rta n ce  o f  o p e n  fo r e ig n  m ark ets b y  w h ic h  to  ta k e  a d v a n ta g e  o f  th e  
co u n tr y ’s  g r o w in g  e x p o r t  p o te n t ia l. T h o u g h  th e  co m b in a tio n  m a y  ap p ear c o n tra d ic to ry , it  w a s  c o n s is te n t  
and  lo g ic a l in  la te  n in e teen th -cen tu ry  A m e r ic a . T a r iffs  w e r e  c o n s id e r e d  d o m e s tic  p o lic y  a c tio n s; th eir  
im p a ct o n  A m e r ic a ’s tra d in g  partn ers w e r e  th o u g h t to  b e  in c id en ta l. T h e  y ea r  that M c K in le y  to o k  o f f ic e ,  
a R e p u b lic a n -c o n tr o lle d  C o n g r e ss  p a sse d  th e  r e s tr ic t iv e  D in g le y  T a r if f  A c t  th at re tu rn ed  ta r iffs  to  th e  
le v e ls  o f  th e  1 8 9 0  A c t . M c K in le y  la ter  tu rn ed  h is  a tten tio n  to  rec ip r o ca l tra d e  a g r e e m e n ts , an  a u th or ity  
d e le g a te d  b y  C o n g r e ss  in  th e  D in g le y  A c t , b y  w h ic h  h e  h o p ed  to  ex p a n d  A m e r ic a ’s o v e r se a s  trad e . In
19. Kirk H . Porter and D onald  B ruce Johnson, N a tio n a l P a rty  P la tfo rm s , 1 8 4 0 -1 9 6 4  (Urbana: U n iversity  o f  
Illin o is P ress, 1966), pp . 5 0 , 56 .
20 . Quoted in  T errill, The T a r iff , p . 66 .
21 . Ib id ., p . 34.
22 . Iro n  A g e, "Reciprocity Treaties," October 9 , 1890 , p . 599 .
23 . Ib id ., pp. 60 -61 .
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th e  c o m in g  y e a r s , e le v e n  trade trea ties  w e r e  n eg o tia ted , bu t all fa iled  to  b e  ra tified  b y  th e  S e n a te .24 
M c K in le y ’s a ttem p ts to  m a k e  th e  U n ited  S ta tes  e c o n o m ic a lly  in d ep en d en t and at th e  sa m e  tim e  a 
p ro sp ero u s  tra d in g  n a tion  d em o n stra te  th e  stra n g e  m ix  o f  th eo re tica l ju s t if ic a t io n s  fo r  p r o te c t io n ism  in  
A m e r ic a .
T o  m a n y  o b se r v e r s  th e  1 8 9 0 s  w e r e  a b r ie f  e x c e p tio n  to  th e  h ig h  ta r iff  n orm  o f  th e  U n ite d  S ta tes  
in  th e  n in e teen th  cen tu ry . H o w e v e r , th o u g h  th e  W ilso n -G o rm a n  A c t o f  1 8 9 4  in stitu ted  m o d e s t  ta r if f  
r e d u c tio n s , th e  D in g le y  T a r if f  o f  1 8 9 7  returned  ta r iffs  to  th e  le v e ls  o f  th e  r e s tr ic t iv e  1 8 9 0  M c K in le y  A c t. 
T h e  turn  o f  th e  cen tu ry  b ro u g h t a co n tin u a tio n  o f  p r o te c t io n ism . T h e  P a y n e -A ld r ic h  T a r if f  o f  1 9 0 9  ra ised  
im p ort d u tie s  to  th e ir  h ig h e s t  le v e l in  A m er ica n  h is to r y  p r io r  to  th e  F ir s t W o r ld  W a r. B u t p u b lic  c lam or  
o v e r  th e  h ig h  p r ic e s  o f  certa in  g o o d s  m ad e ta r if f  re fo rm  lik e ly . T h e  R ep u b lica n s  fared  b a d ly  in  th e  
C o n g r e ss io n a l e le c t io n s  o f  1 9 1 0  and 1 9 1 2 , and th e  lo w -ta r if f  fo r c e s  w o n  su f f ic ie n t  v o te s  to  p a ss  sw e e p in g  
red u c tio n s  in  th e  1 9 1 3  U n d e r w o o d -S im m o n s  T a r if f  A c t.
T h e  U n d e r w o o d -S im m o n s  A c t , s ig n e d  b y  W o o d r o w  W ils o n , w a s  n ot m e r e ly  o n e  m o re  sh ift  in  
th e  s e e m in g ly  e n d le s s  p o lit ic a l tu g -o f-w a r  o v e r  th e  ta r iff. It laid  th e  fo u n d a tio n  fo r  th e  grad u al w e a n in g  
o f  th e  U n ited  S ta tes  fro m  th e  ta r if f  as its m ajor so u r c e  o f  r ev en u e . T h e  U n d e r w o o d  A c t  in c lu d ed  
p r o v is io n  fo r  an in c o m e  ta x , a p o w e r  gran ted  th e  F ed era l G o v ern m en t b y  th e  S ix teen th  A m en d m en t to  
th e  C o n stitu tio n , ra tified  in  1 9 1 3 . T h is  m o v e m e n t tow ard  a p r o g r e s s iv e  sy s te m  o f  ta x a tio n  ev en tu a lly  
h e lp e d  sh ift  th e  d eb a te  o v e r  ta r if f  le v e ls .  P r e v io u s ly , bad e c o n o m ic  tim e s  b ro u g h t c a lls  fo r  h ig h e r  ta r iffs  
to  p ro tec t s lu m p in g  A m er ica n  p ro d u cers and in crea se  g o v e r n m e n t r e v e n u e s . A fte r  th e  in stitu tio n  o f  th e  
in c o m e  ta x , p r o te c t io n is ts  h ad  o n ly  th e  fir s t  ra tio n a le  o n  w h ic h  to  r e ly . A n d  c o n s id e r in g  th e  D e m o c r a ts ’ 
tra d itio n a l s lo g a n , “ a ta r iff  fo r  r e v e n u e  o n ly ,” p ro -ta r iff  fo r c e s  fo u n d  e v e n  fe w e r  a ll ie s  in  th e  D e m o c r a tic  
party . T h is  in stitu tio n a l ch a n g e  in  th e  c o m p o s it io n  o f  g o v e r n m e n t r e v e n u e  had a su b tle  and grad u al e ffe c t  
on  th e  p e r s is te n t and im p ortan t ta r if f  q u est io n . It w a s  n o t a c o in c id e n c e  that m ajor  red u c tio n s  in  U .S .  
ta r iffs  o ccu rred  in  th e  p o st-W o r ld  W ar II era  w h e n , b y  th e  la te  1 9 6 0 s , ta r iffs  a cco u n ted  fo r  le s s  th an  o n e  
p ercen t o f  F ed era l G o v ern m en t r ev en u e .
T h e  In t e r w a r  Y e a rs
T h o u g h  W ils o n ’s F o u r teen  P o in ts  ca lled  fo r  th e  “ re m o v a l, so  far as p o s s ib le ,  o f  a ll e c o n o m ic  
b a r r ie r s . . .” , h is  in c lin a tio n  to w a rd  in tern a tio n a lism  and fr e e  trad e had  lim ited  im p act o n  a C o n g r e ss  and  
a s o c ie ty  a ccu sto m ed  to  ta r if f  p ro tec tio n  as th e  n orm . T h e  end  o f  th e  F ir s t W o rld  W ar b ro u g h t c a lls  for  
d ise n ta n g lin g  th e  U n ited  S ta tes fro m  E u ro p ea n  a ffa irs . T h e  n ation a l m o o d  w a s  c le a r ly  in w a r d -lo o k in g  
rather th an  o u tw a r d -lo o k in g . H o p e s  fo r  ta r if f  red u ction  r o se  and fe ll w ith  th e  c y c le  o f  D e m o c r a tic  and  
R ep u b lica n  a d m in istra tio n s , b u t p ro te c t io n ism  rem ain ed  en tren ch ed . W illia m  K e lly  has n oted :
B e fo r e  1 8 6 0  th e  U n ited  S ta tes ta r if f  w a s  r e la t iv e ly  m o d era te . R ates w e r e  in crea sed  
d u rin g  th e  C iv il W a r , and th ey  co n tin u ed  to  r is e  d u r in g  th e  latter part o f  th e  n in eteen th  
and ea r ly  part o f  th e  tw en tie th  cen tu r ie s . T h e  o n ly  s ig n if ic a n t d e v ia t io n  fro m  th is  lo n g ­
24 . T his authority w as revoked in 1909 in favor o f  a "flexible tariff" w hich  sought to equalize production costs 
betw een U .S . firms and foreign ones, thereby effectively  mandating the cancellation o f  com parative advantage. The  
flex ib le  tariff w as a Republican favorite up to H oover but it failed in practical as w ell as theoretical term s. The 
T ariff C om m ission  succeeded in drawing up reports on only 38 item s betw een 1922 and 1930; in all but five  cases, 
the President raised the tariff levels.
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term  u p w ard  m o v e m e n t w a s  th e  U n d e r w o o d -S im m o n s  A c t o f  1 9 1 3 , in  w h ic h  th e  W ilso n  
A d m in istra tio n  a ttem p ted  to  re v e r se  th e  d irec tio n  o f  U n ited  S ta tes  p o lic y  and return to  
a ta r if f  fo r  r e v e n u e  o n ly , th e  trad ition a l p o s it io n  o f  th e  D e m o c r a tic  p a r ty .25
T h e  F o r d n ey -M cC u m b er  T a r if f  o f  1 9 2 2  w a s s ig n e d  in to  la w  u n d er a R ep u b lica n -co n tro lled  
C o n g r e ss  an d  p r e s id e n c y . T h e  ra tio n a le  fo r  th e s e  ta r iff  in crea se s  r e sem b led  that u se d  after th e  W ar o f  
1 8 1 2 : in fan t in d u str ie s  stim u la ted  b y  th e  w a r  n eed ed  p r o te c t io n  to  su r v iv e . T h is  act en d ed  n in e  years  
o f  r e la t iv e ly  lo w  ta r iffs  and s ig n a le d  A m e r ic a ’s u n w ill in g n e s s  (in a b ility ? ) to  a ssu m e  th e  m a n tle  o f  fr ee  
trad e lea d ersh ip  th at G reat B rita in  w a s  rap id ly  f in d in g  o n e r o u s  as its e c o n o m ic  m ig h t d e c lin e d .
A n  e x a m in a tio n  o f  th e  g ro u p s  w ith in  A m er ica n  s o c ie ty  rep resen ted  b y  th e  R ep u b lica n s h e lp s  
il lu m in a te  th e  c o n tin u in g  v ita lity  o f  th e  p r o -ta r iff  fo r c e s  in to  th e  tw en tie th  cen tu ry . T h r o u g h o u t m uch  
o f  th e  1 8 0 0 s , R ep u b lica n s  a lig n ed  th e m se lv e s  w ith  th e  g r o w in g  m an u factu r in g  se c to r , b u t to w a rd  th e  turn  
o f  th e  cen tu ry  th e s e  sa m e  b u s in e sse s  w e r e  th e  ta rg et o f  w id esp rea d  p u b lic  ire , p o rtra y ed  as m o n o p o lis t ic  
tru sts p r e y in g  u p o n  sm a ll b u s in e ss  and th e  co n su m er . T h e  1 8 9 0 s  w e r e  an era  o f  “ tr u s tb u stin g ,” and h ig h  
ta r iffs  w e r e  se e n  as th e  crea tu res o f  m o n o p o ly  in terests . T h is  sen tim en t co n tin u ed  to  in f lu e n c e  nation a l 
p o lit ic s  in to  th e  tw en tie th  cen tu ry  and w a s  a fa c to r  in  th e  s ig n if ic a n t r ed u ctio n s  o f  th e  1 9 1 3  U n d e r w o o d  
T a r iff . “ T r u stb u s tin g ” b e c a m e  a n ation a l ca m p a ig n  a g a in st un fa ir  b u s in e s s  p ra c tice s  that w e r e  se e n  as 
th rea ten in g . D u r in g  th is  p er io d  m an y  R ep u b lica n s a ttem pted  p u b lic ly  to  cem en t s tro n g  t ie s  to  sm a ll and  
m e d iu m -s iz e d  m a n u fa ctu rers, p o p u la r ized  as th e  d r iv in g  fo r c e  b eh in d  th e  A m er ica n  e c o n o m y . It w a s  n ot 
a c o in c id e n c e  that th is  g ro u p  o f  in terests  fa v o red  th e  R e p u b lic a n s ’ trad ition a l p r o -ta r iff  p la tfo rm . W h ile  
s o m e  la rg er  firm s had  a lrea d y  b eg u n  to  r e c o g n iz e  th e  b en efits  o f  fo r e ig n  sa le s , sm a ll b u s in e sse s  w ere  
m o st l ik e ly  to  e m p h a s iz e  th e  im p o rta n ce  o f  th e  d o m e s tic  A m er ica n  m arket. T h e  R e p u b lic a n s ’ a llia n c e  
w ith  th e  in w a r d -lo o k in g  sm a ll-b u s in e s s  se c to r  p ro v id ed  that p a rty ’s p r o te c t io n is t  p la tfo rm  w ith  (p erh ap s  
u n d e se r v e d ) lo n g e v ity  th ro u g h  th e  1 9 5 0 s .
B e fo r e  W o r ld  W ar II, ta r if f  ch a n g es  w e r e  p o s s ib le  m o s tly  th rou gh  reg io n a l c o a lit io n s  o f  
la w m a k ers  in  C o n g r e ss . T h e  ea r lie s t  p r o h ib it iv e  ta r iff , p a ssed  in  1 8 1 6 , w a s  p a ssed  b y  a c o a lit io n  o f  
agrarian  in terests  o f  th e  N o rth  and W e st and N o rth ern  in d u str ia lis ts , and th ey  d e fea ted  an a llia n c e  o f  
S o u th ern  p lan ters and N o rth ea stern  m erch a n ts. T h e  s itu a tio n  ch a n g ed  lit t le  o v e r  th e  fo l lo w in g  h un dred  
y ears: N o rth ern  and M id w e ste r n  m an u factu rers su p p orted  h ig h  ta r iffs , S o u th ern  farm ers o p p o sed
p r o te c t io n , and  M id w e ste r n  agr icu ltu re  w a s  sp lit  by  th e  p r o sp e c t  o f  lu cra t iv e  g ra in  e x p o r ts  and th e  fear  
o f  ch eap  farm  im p o rts . B u t in  th e  1 9 2 0 s  and 1 9 3 0 s  W estern  m an u factu rers b eg a n  to  fin d  e x p o r t  m ark ets  
fo r  th e ir  p ro d u c ts , and th e  S ou th  sa w  th e  g ro w th  o f  an in d ig en o u s  te x t ile  in d u stry  that req u ired  p ro tec tio n .  
T h e  c o m p o s it io n  o f  th e  n ation a l e c o n o m y  fu n d a m en ta lly  c h a n g ed , and th e  n eed s  o f  d if fe r e n t c o n st itu e n c ie s  
a lso  ch a n g e d , th o u g h  p o lit ic ia n s  in  W a sh in g to n  w e r e  o ften  s lo w  to  r e a liz e  th e  ra m ific a tio n s  in  p o lic y  
term s.
H erb er t H o o v e r , argu ab ly  o n e  o f  th e s e  p o lit ic ia n s , ca m p a ig n ed  fo r  th e  p r e s id e n c y  in  1 9 2 8  o n  a 
h ig h  ta r if f  p la tfo rm , a r e sp o n se  to  agricu ltu ra l in terests  p la g u ed  b y  lo w  p r ic e s  th ro u g h o u t th e  1 9 2 0 s . H e  
p ro m p tly  g o t  h is  w a y  as a ta r if f  b ill ro lled  th rou gh  C o n g r e ss  in  1 9 2 9 . T h e  S m o o t -H a w le y  T a r iff , as E . 
E . S c h a ttsc h n e id e r ’s b r illia n t s tu d y  s h o w e d ,26 w a s a c la s s ic  in sta n ce  o f  C o n g r e ss io n a l lo g -r o ll in g  that
2 5 . W illiam  B. K elly , Jr., "Antecedents o f  Present Commercial Policy,"  in W illiam  B. K elly , Jr., ed ., Studies  
in  U n ited  States C o m m erc ia l P o licy  (Chapel H ill: U niversity o f  N orth Carolina Press, 1963), p. 3 .
26 . S ee Elm er Eric Schattschneider, P o litics , Pressures and  the T a r i f f  (N ew  York: A m o Press, 1974 reprint).
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p ro d u ced  ta r if f  sc h e d u le s  fo r  o v e r  2 0 ,0 0 0  item s and an a v era g e  ad v a lo r e m  ta r iff  ra te  o n  d u tia b le  im p orts  
o f  5 2 .8  p e r c e n t— a le v e l h ig h er  th an  at an y  o th er  tim e  in  th e  tw en tie th  cen tu ry . T h e  fin a l b il l  to o k  14  
m o n th s to  p a ss  th ro u g h  C o n g r e s s , in  n o  sm a ll part d u e  to  th e  1 ,2 5 3  a m en d m en ts ad d ed  to  it in  th e  S en ate .
L ik e  m a n y  n a tion a l lea d ers  b e fo r e  h im , H o o v e r  v ie w e d  th e  n ew  ta r iff  p u re ly  as a d o m e s tic  is su e  
and se e m e d  o b liv io u s  to  th e  e n su in g  re ta lia t io n  b y  v ir tu a lly  e v e r y  U .S .  trad in g  p artn er . N a tio n s  around  
th e  w o r ld , e s p e c ia lly  in  W estern  E u r o p e , r e lie d  u p o n  th e  U n ited  S ta tes  as th e  w o r ld ’s la r g e s t cred itor  
n a tio n  and a cru c ia l e x p o r t m ark et. W ith o u t th is  m arket and fa v o ra b le  b a la n ces  o f  tra d e , th e y  w e r e  hard  
p r e sse d  to  m ee t th e ir  W o r ld  W ar I d eb t p a y m en ts . “D e fe n s iv e ” ta r iffs  w e r e  th u s fo r c e d  u p o n  m an y  o f  
th e s e  tra d in g  n a tio n s  to  stem  d e fla tio n  and e c o n o m ic  in s ta b ility . W o r ld  trad e , and w ith  it th e  A m er ica n  
e c o n o m y , sp ira led  d o w n w a rd .
E v e n  at th is  p o in t  in  h is to r y , fr e e  trad e as an id e o lo g y  fo u n d  fe w  p ro p o n en ts  e x c e p t  z e a lo ts  lik e  
C o rd e ll H u ll , S ecre ta ry  o f  S ta te  in  F ra n k lin  R o o s e v e lt ’s ad m in istra tio n . T a r iffs  w e r e  c o n s id ered  
le g it im a te  p r iz e s  th at le g is la to r s  d o led  o u t to  th eir  c o n s t itu e n c ie s , h e e d le s s  o f  th e ir  im p act o n  th e  
in tern a tion a l m a rk etp la ce . S ch a ttsch n e id er  q u oted  o n e  sen a tor  w h o  ju s t if ie d  ta r iffs  as a C o n stitu tio n a l  
righ t: “T h e  g o v e r n m e n t can n ot d en y  th e  equal p ro tec tio n  o f  th e  la w  to  an y  o f  its c i t iz e n s .”27 O n th e  
o th er  s id e  o f  th e  is su e , th o s e  w h o  o p p o se d  S m o o t-H a w le y  co u ld  h ard ly  b e  ca lled  ardent fr e e  traders: 
“T h e  o p p o s it io n  w a s  p u t in to  th e  p o s it io n  o f  a rgu in g  ag a in st in d iv id u a l d u t ie s . . .o n  th e  g ro u n d s that 
e x c e p tio n s  to  th e  g en era l p o lic y  sh o u ld  so m e tim e s  b e  m a d e .”28 T h o u g h  m o re  than  a th ou san d  
e c o n o m is ts  s ig n e d  a le tter  u rg in g  H o o v e r  n ot to  s ig n  th e  ta r iff  into la w , th e ir  r e a so n in g  had  y e t  to  
p erm ea te  n a tion a l e c o n o m ic  s tra teg y .
H o o v e r  rem a in ed  adam ant in  h is  is o la tio n is t  d e fe n s e  o f  h ig h  ta r iffs  th rou gh  1 9 3 2  w h en  h e  v e to ed  
a lo w e r  ta r iff , a rg u in g  that “ [t]h e  fir st le g is la t iv e  act o f  W a sh in g to n ’s ad m in istra tio n  w a s a ta r if f  b il l. 
F ro m  th at d a y  to  th is , o n e  o f  o u r  firm  nation a l p o lic ie s  has b een  that ta r iffs  are  s o le ly  a d o m e s tic  
q u e s t io n . . . .”29 R em a rk a b ly , th e  R ep u b lica n  party  co n tin u ed  to  a d v o ca te  th e  p r o te c t iv e  tar iff.
T h o u g h  R o o s e v e lt  and n o t a  fe w  C o n g ress io n a l D e m o c r a ts  w e r e  in it ia lly  a m b iv a len t in  th eir  
su p p o rt o f  fr e e  trad e , C o rd e ll H u ll w a s n o t. H is  fa n a tic ism  on  th e  is su e  o f  fr e e  and  o p en  trad e h e lp ed  
g a in  p a ssa g e  o f  th e  R ec ip ro ca l T rad e  A g r e e m e n ts  A c t in 1 9 3 4 , a la w  that m o st stu d en ts  o f  A m er ica n  trade  
p o lic y  v ie w  as a w a tersh ed  in  th e  c o u n tr y ’s e c o n o m ic  h is to r y . P a sse d  u n d er a D e m o c r a t ic  p re s id en t b y  
a D e m o c r a tic  C o n g r e s s , th e  act sh ifted  r e sp o n s ib il ity  fo r  trad e p o lic y  fro m  th e  le g is la t iv e  to  th e  e x e c u t iv e  
b ranch  and a llo w e d  th e  p res id en t to  n e g o tia te  fo r e ig n  trad e a g reem en ts to  red u ce  U .S .  ta r iffs  b y  as m uch  
as 5 0  p ercen t; C o n g r e ss  req u ired  ren ew a l o f  th is  au th ority  e v ery  th ree  y ea rs . B e tw e e n  1 9 3 4  and 1947  
2 9  a g reem en ts  w e r e  co n c lu d ed  an d , b e c a u se  o f  th e  a d o p tio n  o f  th e  u n co n d it io n a l m o st-fa v o red -n a tio n  
(M F N ) p o lic y  in  1 9 2 3 , ta r iffs  w e r e  b ro a d ly  red u ced  to  an a v era g e  o f  2 5  p ercen t d u r in g  th e s e  y ea rs .
T h e  u n co n d it io n a l M F N  ru le  w a s  e ssen tia l fo r  th e  su c c e s s  o f  th e se  in it ia t iv e s . T h e  em b ra ce  o f  
u n co n d it io n a l M F N  e ss e n t ia lly  m ean t that trade c o n c e s s io n s  gran ted  to  o n e  co u n try  w o u ld  b e
27 . Schattschneider, P o litics , Pressures an d  the T ariff, p. 92.
28 . Ib id ., p . 142.
29 . W illiam  S. M yers and W alter H . N ew ton , The H o o ver A d m in is tra tion : A  D ocum ented  N a rra tiv e  (N ew  York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936), p. 494 .
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a u to m a tica lly  g ran ted  to  a ll o th er  tra d in g  p artn ers , th ereb y  a ssu r in g  e q u ity , u n ifo r m ity , and  
n o n d isc r im in a tio n . T h o u g h  u n c o n d it io n a l M F N  h ad  a lw a y s  b e e n  th e  in tern a tio n a l n o r m , A m e r ic a  re s is ted  
th e  m u ltila tera l d im e n s io n  im p lic it  in  th e  p o lic y  and  o p ted  fo r  c o n d it io n a l M F N , w h ic h  e n ta ile d  rec ip r o ca l 
b ila tera l a g reem en ts  an d , n e c e s s a r ily , d iscr im in a tio n . T h e  1 9 2 3  d e c is io n  to  em b ra ce  u n co n d it io n a l M F N  
rep resen ted  a d e  ju r e  re v e r sa l o f  a  lo n g -s ta n d in g  U .S .  p o s it io n . In  fa c t , h o w e v e r , th e  U n ite d  S ta te s ’ 
in terp reta tio n  o f  co n d it io n a l M F N  ra re ly  re su lted  in  d isc r im in a tio n  a g a in st tra d in g  partn ers b e c a u se  so  
f e w  trad e  a g reem en ts  w e r e  e v e r  n eg o tia ted  and  s u c c e s s fu lly  im p lem en ted . It w a s  o n ly  a fter  th e  1 9 3 4  A c t  
th at th is  p o lic y  b e c a m e  in teg ra l to  lib e r a liz a tio n  e ffo r ts .
It is  im p o rta n t, h o w e v e r , n o t  to  o v e r s ta te  th e  certa in ty  and  sp e e d  o f  tra d e  p o lic y  c h a n g e . W e  
c a n n o t m ark  a s p e c if ic  y ea r  w h e n  A m e r ic a  em b ra ced  fr e e  trad e . F o r  in s ta n c e , in c lu d ed  in  th e  R ec ip ro ca l 
T ra d e  A g r e e m e n ts  A c t  w a s  w h a t ca m e  to  b e  ca lled  th e  “ e sc a p e  c la u s e ” th at a llo w e d  th e  p r e s id e n t to  
re in s ta te  th e  p r e v io u s ly  d ism a n tled  trad e b arriers i f  an in d u stry  c o u ld  p r o v e  “ se r io u s  in ju ry ” as a re su lt  
o f  th e  a b se n c e  o f  th o s e  b a rr ier s .30 T h e  p a ss a g e  o f  th e  A c t  d id  n o t im m e d ia te ly  s ig n a l an o p e n in g  o f  
A m e r ic a ’s  m ark ets; it  w a s  o n ly  a  f ir s t , and  so m e w h a t u n cer ta in , s tep  to w a rd  th e  in s t itu tio n a liz a t io n  and  
r e a liz a tio n  o f  a  lib era l trad e r e g im e .
Hegemony
A  lib era l tra d in g  sy s te m  w a s  n o t  a ssu red  after th e  S e c o n d  W o r ld  W a r. In d eed , th e  le s s o n  o f  
W o r ld  W ar I w a s  th a t is o la t io n is m  fo l lo w e d  o n  th e  h e e ls  o f  p ro tracted  in tern a tion a l e n g a g e m e n ts .  
P r e s id e n t R o o s e v e lt  w a s  d eterm in ed  n o t  to  a llo w  th at c o u r se  o f  e v e n ts  to  rep ea t it s e lf .  A s  ea r ly  a s 1 9 4 1 ,  
h e  and  W in s to n  C h u rch ill “ d rafted  an A tla n t ic  C harter that la id  d o w n  b road  p r in c ip le s  fo r  th e  
e sta b lish m e n t o f  a  lib era l e c o n o m ic  sy s te m  after th e  w a r .” 31 T h e  k e y  in s t itu tio n  in  th e  c rea tio n  o f  su ch  
an o rd er  w a s  to  b e  th e  In tern ation a l T ra d e  O rg a n iza tio n  (IT O ). T h e  IT O , h o w e v e r , n e v e r  e v e n  rea ch ed  
th e  S e n a te  fo r  r a tif ic a tio n . In s tea d , th e  S ta te  D ep a r tm en t c o n c lu d e d  th e  G en era l A g r e e m e n t o n  T a r iffs  
and T ra d e  (G A T T ). N e g o tia te d  in  1 9 4 7  to  b e  a part o f  th e  p erm a n en t IT O , G A T T  b e c a m e  th e  fo ru m  
fo r  fu tu re  m u ltila tera l trad e  ta lk s .
H o w e v e r , fr e e  trad e w a s  n o t th e  a ssu red  in tern a tion a l e c o n o m ic  sy s te m  e v e n  a fter th e  U n ited  
S ta tes  a ssu m e d  th e  m a n tle  o f  h e g e m o n y . W ith  th e  fa ll o f  co m m u n ism  and th e  g r o w in g  in tern a tion a l 
p o p u la r ity  o f  la is se z - fa ir e  e c o n o m ic  p r in c ip le s  in  th e  1 9 9 0 s , it is  e a sy  to  fo r g e t  that c la s s ic a l lib era l 
e c o n o m ic  th e o r y  w a s  n o t  a lw a y s  in  v o g u e . A fte r  W o r ld  W a r  II , cen tra l p la n n in g  w a s  c o n s id e r e d  in  m an y  
e c o n o m ic  and  p o lit ic a l c ir c le s  to  b e  th e  n e x t step  in  th e  e v o lu t io n  o f  m o d ern  in d u str ia l s o c ie ty . In  1 9 4 6 , 
Jacob  V in e r  g lo o m ily  d escr ib ed  “ T h e  P ro sp ec ts  fo r  F o r e ig n  T ra d e  in  th e  P o st-W a r  W o r ld ” :
T h e  g r o w th  o f  th e  d o c tr in e  and p ra c tice  o f  n a tion a l e c o n o m ic  p la n n in g  and th e  
e x p e r ie n c e s  and e x p er im en ts  o f  th e  G reat D e p r e s s io n  h a v e  le d  m a n y  p e r so n s  to  lo o k  w ith  
an  u n fr ie n d ly  e y e  o n  fo r e ig n  trad e , w ith  its in tractab ility  to  th e  d is c ip l in e s  o f  n a tion a l
30 . H ow ever, this safety-valve has not been an important protectionist lever in  the post-W orld W ar II era because 
the pow er to exercise  the escape clause continues to rest w ith  the executive w hich  has been traditionally m ore free 
trade oriented.
31 . Charles K indleberger, "U .S. foreign econom ic p o licy , 1776-1976,"  F o re ig n  A ffa irs , 5 5  (January 1977), p. 
4 06 .
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F iv e -Y e a r  P la n s . E v e n  B r itish  e c o n o m is ts  reared  in  th e  free -tra d e  trad ition  h a v e  c o m e  
to  w r ite  d o w n  th e  b en e fits  that f lo w  fro m  fo r e ig n  trade and to  attach  so  m u ch  w e ig h t  to  
its r isk s  and in c o n v e n ie n c e s  and d is o r d e r lin e ss  as se e n  from  th e  p o in t o f  v ie w  o f  th e  
n ation a l p la n n er  th at th e y  w e lc o m e  an y  natural te n d e n c ie s  tow ard  au tarky  and e ith er  
d e f in ite ly  a d v o ca te  p o s i t iv e  r e in fo rcem en t b y  g o v e r n m e n t fo r  su ch  te n d e n c ie s  o r  co n d em n  
it in  su ch  m ild  and h esita n t term s as fo r  p ractica l p u rp o ses  to  am ou n t to  th e  sa m e  
th in g .32
B y  so m e  m e a su r e s , U .S .  p o lic y  m ak ers w e r e  h es ita n tly  p u rsu in g  freer  trad e e v e n  in  th e  m id -  
1 9 5 0 s , w h e n  U .S .  e c o n o m ic  p o w e r  w a s  p erh ap s at its zen ith . T h e  T ra d e  A g r e e m e n ts  E x te n s io n  A c t o f  
1 9 5 5  “ w a s  e q u iv o c a l tow ard  th e  p o lic y  [ o f  fr e e  trad e], fu ll o f  c o m p r o m ise s , and m ea g er  in  its gran t o f  
a u th o r ity .”33 O n  th e  o th er  h an d , e v e n  th ou gh  th e  act in c lu d ed  r e str ic t iv e  a m en d m en ts , th is  w a s  th e  fir st  
t im e  th at a R ep u b lica n  ad m in istra tio n  str o n g ly  en d o rsed  freer  tra d e .34 E ise n h o w e r ’s tw o -te r m  p res id en cy  
w a s m ark ed  b y  a co m m itm en t to  in tern a tio n a lism  in fo r e ig n  p o lic y  and trad e p o lic y . B ip a rtisa n  su p p ort  
fo r  fe w e r  restra in ts o n  trad e h e lp ed  fo r g e  a co n se n su s  o n  th e  v ir tu e  o f  fr e e  trad e.
T h e  U n ite d  S ta tes  is  h ard ly  u n iq u e  in  ig n o r in g  e c o n o m ic  w isd o m  fo r  th e  sa k e  o f  p o lit ica l 
e x p e d ie n c y . T h o u g h  R ica rd o  d e v e lo p e d  h is  th eo ry  o f  co m p a ra tiv e  ad v a n ta g e  in  1 8 1 7 , h is  in s ig h tfu ln e ss  
o b v io u s ly  d id  n o t g u aran tee  fr e e  trade a p la c e  in  A m er ica n  trad e p o lic y . T h o u g h  it is  tem p tin g  to  
c o n s id e r  th e  h is to r ic a l e v id e n c e  that “p o lic y  m ak ers are  d e n s e ,” S tep h en  K rasn er r ig h t ly  p o in ts  o u t that 
“ stu p id ity  is  n o t  a  v e r y  in tere stin g  a n a ly tic  c a te g o r y .”35 W e  m u st turn to  o th er , m o re  r ig o ro u s  
e x p la n a tio n s  fo r  th e  p r o te c t io n is t  streak  in  A m er ica n  h is to r y  and fo r  th e  e m e r g e n c e  o f  a fr e e  trade  
c o n se n su s  after W o r ld  W ar II.
F red  B e r g ste n  h as n o ted , “ [t]h e  e c o n o m ic  argu m en t w a s n ev er  su f f ic ie n t  b y  i t s e l f . . . t o  su p p o rt a 
lib era l trad e  p o lic y  fo r  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s .” 36 In d eed , th e  e c o n o m ic  argu m en t w a s  n ot c o m p e llin g  u ntil 
W o rld  W ar II b e c a u se  o f  th e  r e la t iv e  u n im p o rta n ce  o f  trad e to  th e  co u n tr y ’s e c o n o m ic  g r o w th . F o r e ig n  
g ra in  sa le s  b e c a m e  im p ortan t in  th e  1 8 8 0 s , but b e fo r e  a n d  after th a t, th e  d eb a te  cen tered  arou n d  h o w  to  
p r o te c t th e  U n ited  S ta te s ’ “ h o m e  m a r k e t .” E v e n  in  1 9 8 5 , ex p o rts  a cco u n ted  fo r  o n ly  7  p ercen t o f  
A m e r ic a ’s G N P , com p ared  to  2 5  p ercen t fo r  E E C  co u n tr ie s .
B e r g ste n  a rg u es that p o stw a r  an tico m m u n ism  w a s  a m ajor m o tiv a tin g  fa c to r  in  th e  U n ited  S ta te s ’ 
a c tiv e  p r o m o tio n  o f  a  lib era l in tern ation a l e c o n o m y . A s  P res id en t E ise n h o w e r  sa id  in  h is  m e s sa g e  to  
C o n g r e ss  o f  M arch  2 0 ,  1 9 5 4 , “ [f)o r  ou r o w n  e c o n o m ic  g ro w th  w e  m u st h a v e  c o n tin u o u s ly  ex p a n d in g  
w o r ld  m ark ets; fo r  o u r  se c u r ity  w e  req u ire  that our a ll ie s  b e c o m e  e c o n o m ic a lly  s tr o n g . E x p a n d in g  trade
32 . Jacob V iner, In te rn a tio n a l Econom ics  (G lencoe, IL: T he Free Press), p. 310.
33 . Harry C. H aw kins and Janet L. N orw ood , "The L egislative Basis o f  U nited States Commercial P olicy ,"  in 
K elly , e d ., Studies in  U n ited  States C o m m erc ia l P o licy , p. 110.
34 . Ib id ., pp. 111-112.
35. Stephen Krasner, "State Pow er and the Structure o f  International Trade," W o rld  P o litics , 28  (A pril 1976), 
p. 319.
36 . C. Fred B ergsten, "Crisis in U .S . Trade P olicy,"  F ore ig n  A ffa irs , (July 1971), p. 620 .
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is  th e  o n ly  a d eq u ate  so lu tio n  fo r  th e s e  tw o  p r e ss in g  p ro b lem s co n fr o n t in g  o u r  c o u n tr y .” 37 B e r g s te n  a lso  
n o te s  th at “ o n e  o f  K e n n e d y ’s m a in  argu m en ts fo r  th e  T rad e  E x p a n sio n  A c t w a s  th e  n eed  to  co u n ter  th e  
‘c o m m u n ist  a id  and trad e  o f f e n s iv e ,’ and th e  th e m e  o f  a n tico m m u n ism  ran th ro u g h o u t th e  m e s sa g e  in  
w h ic h  h e  p r o p o se d  i t . ”38
A n tic o m m u n ism  c lea r ly  in flu en ced  A m er ica n  e ffo r ts  tow ard  trad e  lib e r a liz a tio n , b u t, m o re  
im p ortan t, it w a s  r e f le c t iv e  o f  a larger  sh ift  in  U .S .  p o lit ic s  fro m  in w a r d -lo o k in g  u n ila tera lism  to  ou tw ard -  
lo o k in g  in tern a tio n a lism . T ru m an , E ise n h o w e r , and K en n ed y  w e r e  in tern a tio n a lis ts , lea d ers  w h o  h e lp ed  
d e fin e  A m e r ic a ’s su p erp o w er  r o le . T h e y  sh ap ed  a fo r e ig n  p o lic y  that a c tiv e ly  so u g h t o u t en ta n g lem en ts  
in  th e  in d u str ia l and d e v e lo p in g  w o r ld s  to  en su re  fr ien d s in  w h at th e y  sa w  to  b e  a w o r ld  in c r e a s in g ly  
su b jec t to  co m m u n ist d o m in a tio n  and th e  “ d o m in o  e f f e c t .”
A m er ica n  fo r e ig n  p o lic y  h as tra d itio n a lly  em p h a s ized  in d irec t in f lu e n c e  or  p r e se n c e  g u aran tee  
a c c e ss  rather th an  d irec t in ter feren ce  in  o th er  c o u n tr ie s ’ a ffa ir s .39 O p en  c o m m e r c e  w a s  o n e  o f  th e  
U n ited  S ta te s ’ m o s t  e f fe c t iv e  to o ls  in  co n stru c tin g  th is  n e tw o rk . T hat is n o t to  sa y  th at th e  U n ited  S ta tes  
w o u ld  n o t b r in g  to  b ear  trem en d o u s p ressu res  o n  fo r e ig n  co u n tr ie s  to  se c u r e  its in tere sts , bu t A m er ica  
d id  n o t se e k  o u t th e  r e sp o n s ib ility  o f  p erm an en t territoria l g a in s  and th u s w a s  n ev er  an “ e m p ir e ” in  th e  
v e in  o f  B r ita in , F ra n ce , S p a in , P o r tu g a l, o r  th e  N eth er la n d s . C o n s id e r in g  th is  tra d itio n , it is  n ot 
su rp r is in g  th at trad e  b e c a m e  a ce n te r p ie c e  o f  A m er ica n  in tern a tio n a lis t fo r e ig n  p o lic y . U .S .  p o lic y  
m ak ers d id  n o t w ish  to  crea te  an a llia n c e  sy s te m  so  m uch  as an id e o lo g ic a l w eb  o f  co u n tr ie s  co n cern ed  
a b ou t th e  sa m e  th in g : co m m u n ist a g g r e ss io n . F r e e  trad e w a s  n ot o n ly  a stra teg y  fo r  d o m e s tic  e c o n o m ic  
stren g th  b u t a lso  a  p o lit ic a l in itia tiv e  r e fle c t in g  a n ew  co m m itm en t to  th e  in tern a tion a l sy s te m .
T h e  T ra d e  E x p a n s io n  A c t o f  1 9 6 2 , s ig n ed  by  John  F . K e n n e d y , w a s  a rg u a b ly  th e  a p ex  o f  
o p e n n e ss  and rep resen ted  th e  fu l le s t  em b ra ce  o f  fr ee  trade p r in c ip le s  in  A m er ica n  h is to r y . T h e  act 
ex p a n d ed  th e  p r e s id e n t’s au th ority  to  red u ce  and e v e n  e lim in a te  A m er ica n  ta r iffs . F u rth er , th e  K en n ed y  
R o u n d  o f  tra d e  n e g o tia tio n s  p ro d u ced  su b stan tia l ta r if f  red u ctio n s: “ T a r if f  c o n c e s s io n s  o f  ab ou t $ 4 0  
b il l io n  in  trad e  w e r e  e x ch a n g ed  a m o n g  p artic ip a tin g  co u n tr ies; ta r iff  red u ctio n s  o f  5 0  p ercen t w e r e  m ad e  
o n  m a n y  n o n a g ricu ltu ra l p r o d u c t s . . . .”40 U .S .  ta r iffs  w e r e  u lt im a te ly  red u ced  to  b e tw e e n  8 p ercen t and  
9  p e rcen t th ro u g h  th is  rou n d .
It w a s  a lso  in  th e  p o st-W o r ld  W ar II p er io d  that p ro - and a n ti-ta r iff  se c t io n a l a ll ia n c e s  con tin u ed  
to  lo s e  im p o rta n ce . T h o u g h  s o m e  m em b ers o f  C o n g r e ss  (su ch  as S en a to r  R o b ert T a ft o f  O h io )  
d isreg a rd ed  fu n d am en ta l ch a n g es  in  th e  e c o n o m ic  c o m p o s it io n  o f  th e ir  d is tr ic ts , th e  tra d ition a l c o a lit io n s  
n o  lo n g e r  fo rm ed  c o h e s iv e  v o t in g  b lo c s .  N o rth ern  m an u factu r in g  in terests  sa w  th e  b e n e fits  o f  o p en  
ex p o r t m ark ets w ith  fe w  stro n g  co m p e tito r s , and S ou th ern  ag r icu ltu re  had a lread y  m o v e d  fro m  se l l in g
37 . "Recom m endations concerning foreign econom ic policy,"  The D epartm ent o f  State B u lle tin , X X X  (A pril 19, 
1954), p. 607 .
38 . B ergsten, "Crisis in U .S . Trade P olicy ,"  p. 626 .
39 . Samuel P . H untington, "Transnational Organizations in W orld Politics,"  W o rld  P o litics , 2 5 /3  (A pril 1973), 
pp. 343-345 .
40 . M atthew  J. M arks and Harald B. M alm gren, "Negotiating nontariff distortions to trade," L a w  an d  P o licy  
in  In te rn a tio n a l Business, 7 (1975), p. 328 , ftn. 5.
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raw  m a ter ia ls  to  p r o d u c in g  f in ish e d  p ro d u cts . T h e  se c to r  w o u ld  e v e n tu a lly  b e  th reaten ed  b y  lo w -w a g e  
fo r e ig n  firm s.
P r o te c tio n ism , h o w e v e r , had  su ch  a lo n g  trad ition  in  A m er ica n  p o lit ic s  that it co u ld  n o t b e  fu lly  
p u rg ed . In  1 9 6 1 , ju s t  o n e  year  b e fo r e  th e  v e r y  p ro d u c tiv e  ta r iff-cu ttin g  K en n ed y  R ou n d  and p a ssa g e  o f  
th e  T ra d e  E x p a n s io n  A c t  w h ich  (it sh o u ld  b e  n o ted ) w a s p a ssed  o n ly  a fter  a f ie r c e  f ig h t  b y  th e  p res id en t, 
n o ted  e c o n o m is t  Jacob  V in er  is su ed  th is  w a rn in g : “ It is o b v io u s , h o w e v e r , that th ere  is  k een  a w a ren ess  
o n  th e  part o f  th e  p res id en t o f  th e  fa c t that in  C o n g r e ss , at le a s t , and p erh ap s a lso  in  th e  co u n try  at la rg e , 
th e  t id e  is  ru n n in g  in  a p r o te c t io n is t  d ir e c t io n ... , ” 41 In  n ew  trade le g is la t io n , m an y  o f  th e  o ld  sa feg u a rd s  
rem a in ed  in  th e  fo r m  o f  “p er il p o in t s ” and “ e sc a p e  c la u s e s .” T h e  fo rm er  serv ed  to  p ro tec t d o m e s tic  
in d u str ie s  fro m  harm  cau sed  b y  p r e -e x is t in g  trad e a g reem en ts , and th e  la tter lim ite d  c o n c e s s io n s  that 
m ig h t c a u se  in ju ry  in  fu tu re  a g reem en ts .
A f te r  H e g e m o n y :  T h e  1 9 7 0 s  a n d  1 9 8 0 s
S ig n s  o f  w a n in g  A m er ica n  e c o n o m ic  d o m in a n ce  in th e  in tern ation a l m a rk etp la ce  b eg a n  to  appear  
in  th e  1 9 6 0 s , w ith  s ig n if ic a n t p ressu res  fo r  p o lic y  ch a n g e  a rr iv in g  in th e  1 9 7 0 s . T h e  U n ited  S ta te s ’ f ir s t  
trad e d e f ic it  in  th e  tw en tie th  cen tu ry  ca m e in  1 9 7 1 . In a d d it io n , th e  p ercen ta g e  o f  p erso n a l co n su m p tio n  
ex p en d itu res  fo r  im p orts  in  th e  3 0  years a fter W orld  W ar II in crea sed  from  5  p ercen t to  14  p e rcen t b y  
1 9 8 4 . C h a r les  K in d leb erg er  o b se r v e d  in  1 9 7 6 , “ A n  a sy m m etr ic  or  h iera rch ica l sy s te m  in  w h ic h  th e  
U n ite d  S ta tes  acted  as b an k er fo r  th e  w o r ld ; th e  u ltim a te  p r o v id e r , a lo n g  w ith  m ilita ry  s e c u r ity , o f  a 
m ark et fo r  d is tr e ss  g o o d s ;  a so u r c e  o f  g o o d s  in  sh ort su p p ly , and o f  cap ita l req u irem en ts; a  m o n ito r  o f  
th e  sy s te m  o f  in tern ation a l m o n e y  in c lu d in g  th e  pattern  o f  e x c h a n g e  rates; and a len d er  o f  la s t resort in  
c r is is — su ch  a sy s te m  m a y  b e  p o s s ib le  to  co n tem p la te  in  e c o n o m ic  term s. B y  th e  1 9 7 0 s  it w a s  no  lo n g er  
in  th e  card s p o l i t ic a l ly .” 42
A m er ica n  c o m m erc ia l p o lic y  d u r in g  th e  1 9 7 0 s  and 1 9 8 0 s  w a s  J a n u s-fa ced , d iv e r g in g  and n o t  
d iv e r g in g  fro m  free  trad e. T h e  in stitu tio n s  and p o lic ie s  erected  after W orld  W ar II to  p r o m o te  lib era l 
trad e  h a v e  n o t b e e n  s ig n if ic a n t ly  a ltered . U .S .  ta r iffs  w e r e  at an a ll-t im e  lo w  o f  2  p ercen t-3  p ercen t in  
1 9 8 7 . B u t as E . E . S ch a ttsch n e id er  w r o te  in  1 9 3 5 , “ N e w  p o lic ie s  crea te  a n ew  p o l i t i c s .”43 T h is  d ic tu m  
p r o v id e s  s o m e  in s ig h t in to  th e  partia l d is in teg ra tio n  o f  th e  fr e e  trad e c o a lit io n  in  th e  1 9 7 0 s  and 1 9 8 0 s . 
A s la is s e z  fa ire  trad e  id e o lo g y  tran sform ed  fro m  a h e a v ily  d isp u ted  in te llec tu a l id ea l to  an en sh r in ed  
in s titu tio n , n e w  u n d ercu rren ts o f  p o lit ica l a c tiv ity  a m o n g  R ep u b lica n s  and , m o st n o t ic e a b ly , D em o cra ts  
ero d ed  th e  fo u n d a tio n  o f  th e  lib era l e c o n o m ic  trade reg im e . T h e  m o n o lith ic  su c c e s s  o f  free -tra d e  id eas  
p ro v id ed  m an y  o p e n in g s  fo r  p o lic y  d e fe c t io n s  in th e  en su in g  y e a r s .44 S p e c if ic a l ly ,  th e  u se  o f  
co m p a ra tiv e ly  o p a q u e  trad e m ea su res , su ch  as n o n ta r iff  barriers (N T B s ) , a llo w e d  p o lic y  m ak ers to  restr ic t  
trad e w h ile  p le d g in g  a lle g ia n c e  to  th e  id ea  o f  u n im p ed ed  co m m erce .
41 . Jacob V iner, "Econom ic Foreign  Policy,"  F ore ig n  A ffa irs , 39 (July 1961), p. 565 .
42 . Kindleberger, "U.S. Foreign  E conom ic P olicy,"  p. 413.
43 . Schattschneider, P o litics , Pressures and  the T a r iff , p. 288.
44 . See John B . Judis, "The tariff party," The N ew  R epublic , March 30 , 1992, pp. 23 -25 .
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R ich ard  N ix o n ’s p r e s id e n c y  w itn e s se d  th e  f ir s t  d ram atic  turn  a w a y  fro m  lib era l trad e  p r in c ip le s . 
O r d id  it? In  th e  N e w  E c o n o m ic  P la n  o f  1971  N ix o n  tried  to  in v ig o r a te  th e  s lu m p in g  A m er ica n  e c o n o m y  
b y  su sp e n d in g  th e  c o n v e r tib il ity  o f  th e  d o lla r  in to  g o ld  and im p o s in g  a tem p o ra ry  10 p ercen t su rch a rg e  
o n  im p o r ts . U .S .  trad e  partn ers w e r e  stu n n ed  at A m e r ic a ’s la ck  o f  lea d ersh ip  d u r in g  a tim e  o f  gen era l 
in s ta b ility  in  th e  w o r ld  e c o n o m y . O n th e  o th er  h an d , in  19 7 3  N ix o n  h e lp ed  in itia te  th e  T o k y o  R ou n d  
n e g o tia tio n s  w h ic h  red u ced  w o r ld  ta r if f  b arriers to  a ll-t im e  lo w s .
T h o u g h  N ix o n  se n t m ix e d  m e s sa g e s  to  C o n g r e ss  reg a rd in g  h is  su p p o rt o f  fr e e  tra d e , th e  
lib e r a liz in g  T ra d e  A c t  o f  1 9 7 4  w a s  p a ssed  d u r in g  h is  a d m in istra tio n . T h at act g a v e  th e  p res id en t  
u n p reced en ted  au th ority  to  r ed u ce , h a rm o n ize , o r  e lim in a te  trad e b arr iers. P a sto r  o b serv ed :
“ [ 0 ] n e  can  fo l lo w  a d is tin c t , co n s is te n t , and c lear  l in e  fro m  th e  1 9 3 4  T ra d e  A c t  to  its 
1 9 7 4  s u c c e s so r  in  th e  d e s ir e  b y  th e  C o n g r e ss  fo r  red u c in g  barriers to  trad e , fo r  
e m p o w e r in g  th e  P res id en t to  n e g o tia te  fir st b ila tera l and th en  m u ltila tera l a g r e e m e n ts , fo r  
p erm ittin g  e x e m p tio n s  fo r  th o se  in d u str ie s , f ir m s , or  w o rk ers  w h ic h  are s e v e r e ly  in jured  
b y  th e  im p act o f  im p o rts , and for  g ra d u a lly  but d e term in ed ly  in crea s in g  th e  p o w e r s  o f  
th e  C o n g r e ss  to  o v e r s e e  th e  a d m in istra tiv e  p r o c e ss  to  en su re  that th e  la w  is  ex ecu ted  
e q u it a b ly . . . .  T h e  n o n ta r iff, n o n le g is la t iv e  c o n c e s s io n s  to  sp e c if ic  g r o u p s .. .a r e  m in or  
d e v e lo p m e n ts  com p ared  to  th e  s c o p e  o f  m u ltila tera l trad e n e g o t ia t io n s .” 45
T h e  U n ite d  S ta tes-led  p o stw a r  lib era l trad e  re g im e  h as b een  su r p r is in g ly  str o n g . T h e  1 9 7 4  T ra d e  
A c t co n tin u ed  A m e r ic a ’s a ffirm a tio n  o f  fr e e  trad e , and th e  T o k y o  R ou n d  attem p ted  (w ith  lim ite d  su c c e s s )  
to  ad d ress fo r  th e  fir s t  t im e  th e  is su e  o f  n o n ta r iff  b arriers. F u rth er , th e  v o lu m e  o f  w o r ld  trad e con tin u ed  
to  in c r e a se  at a re sp e c ta b le  rate th ro u g h o u t th e  1 9 7 0 s  and ea r ly  1 9 8 0 s , e v e n  d u r in g  r e c e ss io n a r y  p er io d s  
fo r  th e  m o s t  p a r t.46 In  a d d it io n , th o u g h  p ressu res  fo r  p ro tec tio n  in crea sed  in  th e  1 9 7 0 s  and 1 9 8 0 s , th ere  
w e r e  s t ill m a n y  in d u str ie s  fo r  w h o m  a c c e ss  to  n ew  ex p o rt m ark ets w a s  co n s id ered  e s s e n t ia l , in c lu d in g  
th e  in su ra n ce , b a n k in g , fin a n c ia l s e r v ic e s ,  e le c tr o n ic s , c h e m ic a ls , p h a rm a ceu tica l, a g r icu ltu ra l, a ero sp a ce , 
b io te c h n o lo g y , and a u to m o b ile  s e c to r s . O th er m u ltin a tion a l c o m p a n ie s  a lso  r e c o g n iz e d  th e  im p ortan ce  
o f  a lib era l tra d in g  sy s te m .
E v e n  C o n g r e s s ’s p o st-W o r ld  W ar II f lir ta tio n s  w ith  p ro te c t io n ism  se e m  to  h a v e  had lit t le  e ffe c t. 
T h o u g h  C o n g r e ss  is  m o s t  su sc e p tib le  to  p r o te c t io n is t u p w e llin g s  fro m  a ffec ted  c o n s t itu e n c ie s , it  has  
re s is te d  le g is la t in g  p r o te c t iv e  d u tie s , a  p o w e r  it s t ill reta in s e v e n  a fter th e  1 9 3 4  T ra d e  A c t . C o n g r e ss  d id  
n o t g iv e  up  p o w e r  in  that le g is la t io n , it m ere ly  gran ted  n ew  p o w e r s  to  th e  e x e c u t iv e  and re m o v e d  it s e lf  
as a fo c a l p o in t  o f  so c ia l p ressu res  and b ro a d en ed  r e sp o n s ib il ity  for  trad e  a c tio n . Judith  G o ld s te in  has  
argu ed  that “ [a]s m o r e  p ressu re  is  p la ced  o n  C o n g r e ss , it resp o n d s b y  ex p a n d in g  th e  p o w e r s  o f  th e  
b u rea u cra cy , n o t b y  in te r v e n tio n .” 47 F or  in sta n ce , C o n g r e ss  am en d ed  th e  e sc a p e  c la u s e  cr iter ia  after  
1 9 7 4  to  m a k e  it  ea sier  to  g a in  r e lie f . T h e  re su lt  h as in  fact b e e n  h ig h er  a ccep ta n ce  ra tes fo r  e sc a p e -c la u se  
c a se s . H o w e v e r , e v e n  th o u g h  p e tit io n  rates h a v e  in creased  fo r  a n tid u m p in g  a c tio n , co u n te r v a ilin g  d u tie s ,
45 . Pastor, Congress an d  the P o litics  o f  U .S . Fore ig n  Econom ic P o licy , p. 191.
46 . M ichael M ichaely , "Trade in a Changed W orld Econom y," W o rld  D evelopm ent, 11/5  (1983 ), pp. 397 -403 .
47 . Judith G oldstein , "Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade P olicy,"  In te rn a tio n a l O rg a n iza tio n , 42  (W inter 
1988), p. 192.
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and r e l ie f  u n d er  S e c t io n  3 3 7  (c o m p le x  c a se s  in v o lv in g  p a ten t la w  o r  an titru st v io la t io n ) ,  a c c e p ta n c e  rates  
h a v e  rem a in ed  co n sta n t, an in d ic a tio n  that th e  fr e e  trad e c o n se n su s  h a s h e ld .4®
In  th e  y ea rs  fo l lo w in g  W o r ld  W ar II , C o n g r e ss  h a s o fte n  fo l lo w e d  a lo o s e  p r a c tice  o f  “ cry  and  
s ig h ” o v e r  p r o te c t io n is t  le g is la t io n . P o lic y  m ak ers cry  th at th e y  w il l  en a c t r e s tr ic t iv e  trad e  p o lic y  and  
th en  th e y  and  th e  w o r ld  s ig h  w h e n  lit t le  o r  n o th in g  c o m e s  o f  i t .49 A s  P a sto r  n o te d , h u n d red s o f  q u ota  
b il ls  w e r e  in tro d u ced  in  C o n g r e ss  in  th e  1 9 6 0 s , and  in  1 9 7 0 , W ilb u r  M ills  and  1 8 4  c o -s p o n so r s  
in tro d u ced  a b il l  o n to  th e  H o u s e  f lo o r  th at c a lle d  fo r  v o lu n ta ry  e x p o r t restra in ts  o n  a n u m b er  o f  co n su m er  
g o o d s .50 T h e  p r o te c t io n is t  b il l  fa i le d , b u t th e  m e s sa g e  to  th e  p r e s id e n t w a s  c lea r . M em b e r s  o f  C o n g r e ss  
fr e q u e n tly  se n t s tro n g  m e s sa g e s  to  th e  p res id en t that th e ir  c o n s t itu e n c ie s  w o u ld  n o t  stand  fo r  e x c e s s iv e  
h ard sh ip  b ro u g h t o n  b y  in crea sed  im p o rt co m p e titio n .
L ik e  N ix o n ’s ten u re , th e  R ea g a n  y ea rs  a lso  d em o n stra te  a m ix e d  reco rd  o n  trad e  p o lic y .  
C o n s id e r in g  R e a g a n ’s  s tro n g  em b ra ce  o f  la is se z - fa ir e  id e a ls , o n e  w o u ld  h a v e  e x p e c te d  im p ortan t m o v e s  
to w a rd  th e  fu rth er  d ism a n tlin g  o f  trad e  b a rr ier s , at h o m e  and ab road . In d eed , th e  U r u g u a y  R o u n d  o f  
1 9 8 6  w a s  in itia ted  s p e c if ic a l ly  a t th e  req u est and u r g in g  o f  th e  U .S .  a d m in istra tio n . T h e s e  n e g o tia t io n s  
w e r e  o r g a n iz e d  in  1 9 8 2  w h e n  m a n y  U .S .  d o m e s t ic  c o n s t itu e n c ie s , su f fe r in g  fr o m  a w e a k  e c o n o m y , w e r e  
o p p o se d  to  lo w e r in g  trad e  b a rr ier s , a  d em o n stra tio n  o f  R e a g a n ’s c o m m itm en t to  fr e e  tra d e . B u t it  is  a lso  
c lea r  th at th e  z e a l th a t th e  p r e s id e n t a p p lied  to  h is  d o m e s tic  p o lic ie s  w a s  a b sen t fr o m  fo r e ig n  tra d e  a ffa irs . 
M o st n o ta b le , R ea g a n  en g in e e r e d  v o lu n ta r y  e x p o r t  restra in ts o n  J a p a n ese  a u tos in  that sa m e  yea r .
In  a d d it io n , C h a r les  P ea rso n  h as w a rn ed  o f  th e  en tren ch m en t o f  th e  id ea  o f  “ fa ir  tra d e” a s a  b a s is  
fo r  fo r e ig n  e c o n o m ic  p o lic y  d u r in g  th e  R ea g a n  years: “ U n til 1 9 8 0  th e  p r o p o s it io n  th a t th e  w o r ld  w a s  
u n fa ir  and  th e  U n ite d  S ta tes  fa ir  rem a in ed  an a sser tio n ; b y  1 9 8 8  it  had  b e e n  a ccep ted  as a  fa c t b e y o n d  
q u e st io n  a m o n g  m o s t  p o lic y  m a k ers and w ith  th e  g en era l p u b lic . M o r e  im p o rta n tly  it  h ad  b e c o m e  th e  
co r n e r sto n e  o f  U .S .  trad e p o l i c y . . . . ” 51 T h is  w a s  d u rin g  a p er io d  w h e n  fo r e ig n  tra d e  b arr iers  w e r e  n o t  
n o tic e a b ly  in cr e a se d . D o m e s t ic  p r e ssu r e s , n o t  in tern a tion a l e c o n o m ic s , w e r e  c le a r ly  d r iv in g  th is  
p ra g m a tic  p o lic y  ra tio n a liza tio n .
U n fa ir  trad e  la w s  p o s e  a p o ten tia l d a n g er  to  o p e n  U .S .  m ark ets  b e c a u se  th e s e  la w s  ap p ea l to  
A m e r ic a n s ’ s e n s e  o f  fa ir  p la y . A n tid u m p in g  and c o u n te r v a ilin g  d u tie s  w e r e  l i t t le  u se d  in  th e  1 9 6 0 s , b u t  
in  su b se q u e n t y ea rs  b o th  th e  le g is la tu r e  and  th e  e x e c u t iv e  su c c u m b e d , to  an  e x te n t , to  g r o w in g  c r ie s  fo r  
p r o te c t io n . G o ld s te in  s u g g e s ts  th at th e s e  la w s  can  b e  o v e r ly  r e s tr ic t iv e  b e c a u se  o f  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s ’ 
lib era l la is s e z - fa ir e  trad ition : “ T h e  p r o b le m  fa c in g  cen tra l d e c is io n  m a k ers , h o w e v e r , is  th at A m e r ic a ’s  
u n fa ir  trad e  la w s  h o ld  an o v e r ly  n a rro w  in terp reta tion  o f  th e  le g it im a te  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  p ro d u cers
4 8 . Ib id ., p. 2 05 . See a lso  Judith G oldstein , "The Impact o f  Ideas on Trade P olicy: T he O rigins o f  U .S .  
Agricultural and M anufacturing P olic ies,"  In te rn a tio n a l O rg an iza tio n , 43 (W inter 1989), pp. 31 -71 .
4 9 . Pastor, Congress a n d  the P o litics  o f  U .S . F o re ig n  E conom ic  P o lic y , p . 191-198.
50 . Ib id ., p. 134.
5 1 . Charles S. Pearson, F re e  T rade, F a i r  T rade?  The R eagan  R ecord  (W ashington, D .C .:  T he Johns H opkins 
Foreign  P o licy  Institute, 1989), p . 73 .
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and th e  s ta te .” 52 S h e  g o e s  o n  to  argu e  that th e  U n ited  S ta te s ’ standard s fo r  fa ir  trad e h a v e  b een  “ o v e r ly  
e th n o c e n tr ic ” : “ S ta tes v a ry  g rea tly  in  th e ir  p h ilo so p h ica l and h is to r ica l r e la tio n sh ip  to  p r o d u c e r s . . . .  T o  
u s e  th e  U .S .  c a se  as a  b en ch m ark  e s ta b lish e s  cr iter ia  o n  th e  ex trem e  end  o f  a c o n tin u u m .” 53 M o st  
E u ro p ea n  trad in g  sta tes  h is to r ic a lly  fo s tered  c lo s e  g o v ern m en t-p ro d u cer  r e la t io n sh ip s . M o d ern  A m er ica n  
p o lic y  m ak ers and b u s in e s se s , ju d g in g  th e  w o r ld  b y  th e  A m er ica n  stan d ard , v ie w  th is  arran gem en t as an  
u n fa ir  a d v a n ta g e , a restra in t o n  th e  fr e e  w o r k in g s  o f  th e  m arket.
In  th e  en d , th e s e  argu m en ts o n ly  d istract fro m  th e  ta sk  at h an d , that is , im p r o v in g  A m er ica n  
c o m p e t it iv e n e ss . T h e  fa ir  trad e argu m en t h as a n o ta b le  h is to r ica l p reced en t, th o u g h  n o t in  th is  co u n try . 
In th e  la te  n in eteen th  cen tu ry , B r ita in ’s fr e e  trad e p o lic y  “ ca m e u n d er attack  fo r  fa ilin g  to  d em an d  
re c ip r o c ity  fr o m  trad e  p a r tn e r s .” 54 A m e r ic a ’s task  is n ot to  fo l lo w  th e  B r itish  e x a m p le .
N o n t a r i f f  B a r r ie r s
In  1 9 7 1 , B e r g ste n  w arn ed  about th e  g r o w in g  p r e v a le n c e  o f  N T B s: “ N o n ta r if f  d is to r tio n s  n o w  
p ro b a b ly  r iva l ta r iffs  as b arriers to  t r a d e . . .” 55 N T B s  a ro se  to  su p e r se d e  ta r iffs  a s th e  d o m in a n t fo rm  
o f  A m er ica n  p r o te c t io n ism  in  th e  1 9 7 0 s  and 1 9 8 0 s .56 N o n ta r if f  b arriers in c lu d e  “ su ch  trad ition a l 
o b sta c le s  to  trad e as im p ort q u otas and u n d u ly  co m p lica ted  c u sto m s p ro ced u res  that ten d  to  h in d er  
in tern a tion a l m o b ility  o f  m erch a n d ise . T h e y  a lso  in c lu d e  ex p o rt su b s id ie s , g o v e r n m e n t p ro cu rem en t  
p o l ic ie s ,  and  stan d ard s se t  fo r  co n su m er  o r  u ser  p r o te c t io n .”57 N T B s  fir s t  ca m e  to  th e  a tten tion  o f  
p o lic y  m ak ers in  th e  1 9 3 0 s  and 1 9 4 0 s , w h e n  s o m e  co u n tr ie s  b eg a n  re p la c in g  ta r iffs  w ith  im p ort q u otas  
and fo r e ig n  e x c h a n g e  c o n tr o ls . T h o u g h  th e  K en n ed y  R ou n d  b rou gh t ab ou t in crea s in g  r e c o g n it io n  o f  th e  
im p o rta n ce  o f  r ed u c in g  n o n ta r iff  d is to r tio n s , th e  fo c u s  o f  th e se  n e g o tia tio n s  w a s  trad ition a l ta r iff  b arriers. 
T h e  T o k y o  R o u n d  w a s  th e  f ir s t  o rg a n ized  attem pt to  red u ce  n o t o n ly  ta r if f  but a lso  n o n ta r iff  b arriers to  
trad e.
T h e se  restra in ts o f  trad e are m o re  su b t le  than  th e  o ld  fo rm  (that is ,  ta r iffs )  and m ay  d em o n stra te , 
ir o n ic a lly , th at th e  id e o lo g y  o f  fr e e  trad e h as y e t  to  b e  d isp la ced  fro m  th e  p o lit ica l arena e v e n  th o u g h  
p ressu res  fo r  p r o te c t io n  h a v e  in crea sed . T h e  lack  o f  a  co h eren t id e o lo g ic a l a ltern a tiv e  to  la is se z - fa ir e  
trad e th e o r y  is  an im p ortan t rea so n  fo r  th e  c o n tin u in g  o p e n n e ss  o f  w o r ld  m a rk e ts .58 T h e  p ro tec tio n ism
52 . G oldstein , "Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade P olicy,"  p. 205 .
53 . Ib id ., p . 199.
5 4 . Pearson, F re e  T rade, F a i r  T rade?  p. 15.
55 . B ergsten, "The C risis in U .S . Trade P olicy ,"  p. 626.
56 . For an exam ination o f  specific American N T B ’s from 1974 to 1985, see Peter M oric i, "Trends in  U .S . 
Trade P o licy  and N on -T ariff B arriers," in John W halley and Roderick H ill, e d s . , C a n a d a -U n ite d  States F ree  Trade  
(Toronto: U niversity  o f  Toronto Press, 1985), pp. 225-237 .
57 . M arks and M alm gren, "Negotiating N on -T ariff D istortions to Trade," p. 328.
58 . Harry Shutt, The M y th  o f  F ree  T rade: Patterns o f  Protectionism  since 1 9 4 5  (Oxford: B asil B lackw ell, 1985),
p. 2 .
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o f  th e  1 9 7 0 s  and 1 9 8 0 s  w a s  ad h o c . T h e s e  n ew  b arriers w e r e  m o re  co m p lica te d  and a lso  le s s  e f fe c t iv e  
th an  th e  c o m p r e h e n s iv e  ta r iffs  o f  o ld  b e c a u se  o f  c o u n tle ss  lo o p h o le s  and n o n u n ifo rm  a p p lica tio n .
N T B s , h o w e v e r , p re sen t n e w  c h a lle n g e s  to  th e  id ea l o f  fr e e  trad e and n ew  p ro b lem s fo r  A m er ica n  
p o lic y  m a k ers . O le c h o w s k i and S a m p so n  e st im a te  that at lea s t 21 p ercen t o f  m a n u fa c tu r in g  im p orts  b y  
th e  U n ite d  S ta tes  w e r e  a ffec ted  b y  N T B s  in  1 9 7 6 .59 T h o u g h  U .S .  ta r iffs  w e r e  red u ced  fro m  2 9  p ercen t  
in  1 9 4 6  to  o n ly  4  p ercen t b y  1 9 8 5 , th e  co m b in a tio n  o f  im p ort ta r iff  p ro tec tio n  a b o v e  G A T T -n e g o tia te d  
le v e ls ,  o r d e r ly  m a rk etin g  and v o lu n ta ry  e x p o r t restra in ts , and q u otas a ffe c tin g  m erch a n d ise  im p o rts  r o se  
fro m  8 p ercen t to  2 2  p ercen t in  th e  p er iod  1 9 7 5 -1 9 8 5 .60
N T B s  h a v e  b een  u sed  p r im a r ily  as su b stitu tes  fo r  ta r iffs , n o t as a n ew  le v e r  fo r  p r e v io u s ly  
u n p ro tected  in d u str ie s . B u t th e y  are p erh ap s m o re  e a s ily  in stitu ted  b e c a u se  th e y  d o  n o t r eq u ire  broad  
c o a lit io n s  o f  su p p o r t in  C o n g r e ss . In d u str ie s  n eed  n o t ap p ly  th e  threat o f  c o n s t itu e n c y  b a ck la sh  in  ord er  
to  g a in  p r o te c t io n  fro m  g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c ie s  w h e r e  p o lit ica l m a n eu v er in g  n eed  n o t b e  co n d u c ted  in  a 
p u b lic  aren a . R e f le c t in g  th e  “ n ew  p o li t ic s ” o f  th e  era , m ajor e c o n o m ic  and p o lit ic a l a ctors e v en tu a lly  
fo u n d  a c c e ss  p o in ts  as th ey  ad ju sted  to  th e  n ew  ru les  o f  th e  g a m e . Jan T u m lir  h as n o ted  that th e  
co n stra in ts  o f  d e c is io n  m a k in g  in  a p u b lic  arena are a lso  ab sen t fro m  th e  e x e c u t iv e  b ra n ch , w h o s e  
in f lu e n c e  o v e r  trad e p o lic y  h as in crea sed  su b sta n tia lly  s in c e  1 9 3 4 .61 T h e  p res id en t w a s , in  so m e  w a y s ,  
no m o re  in su la ted  fro m  sp ec ia l in terests  than m em b ers o f  C o n g r e ss . F or  in s ta n ce , in r e sp o n se  to  
in c r e a s in g ly  lo u d  cr ie s  fro m  th e  A m er ica n  stee l in d u stry , th e  N ix o n  a d m in is tra tio n ’s p ro m p tin g  resu lted  
in  a 1 9 6 9  v o lu n ta ry  ex p o r t a g reem en t b y  Japan and E u ro p e  to  lim it s tee l im p o rts . A n d , as n o ted  a b o v e , 
th e  g r u m b lin g s  o f  th e  U .S .  au to  in d u stry  resu lted  in a 19 8 2  v o lu n ta ry  ex p o r t a g reem en t w ith  th e  J a p a n ese  
o n  au to s .
A lt e r n a t iv e  T h e o r ie s  o f  T a r i f f  C h a n g e
C o n s id e r in g  th e  in tr ig u in g  h is to r y  o f  p ro tec tio n ism  in th e  U n ited  S ta tes  and e ls e w h e r e , it is  n ot 
su rp r is in g  that th ere  is  n o  sh o r ta g e  o f  gen era l e x p la n a tio n s  for  ch a n g in g  trade p o lic ie s .  T h e  ra n g e  o f  
th e o r ie s  in c lu d e s  th o se  that em p h a s iz e  (1 ) th e  p r e se n c e  o f  a h e g e m o n  w h o  en su res  th e  o p e n n e ss  o f  th e  
trad in g  sy s te m , (2 ) th e  im p o rta n ce  o f  fr e e  trad e id e o lo g y  as a ra tio n a le  fo r  lo w e r in g  trad e  b a rr ier s , (3 ) th e  
e ffe c ts  o f  s w in g s  in  th e  b u s in e ss  c y c le ,  (4 ) th e  fu n c tio n  o f  p u b lic -se c to r  in stitu tio n s  in  sh a p in g  trade  
p o lic y ,  and (5 ) th e  r o le  o f  in terest g ro u p s in  g a rn er in g  p ro tec tio n  fo r  sec to rs  th rea ten ed  b y  im p ort 
c o m p e tit io n .
59 . Andrzej O lechow ski and Gary Sam pson, "Current Trade R estrictions in the E EC , the U nited States and 
Japan," J o u rn a l o f  W o rld  T rade L a w ,  14/3 (M ay-June 1980), Table 4.
60 . C lyde H . F am w orth, "Trying to Shield Injured American Industries," N ew  York Tim es, January 18, 1987, 
p. E 5.
61 . Jan Tum lir, Protectionism . T rade P o licy  in  D em o c ra tic  Societies  (W ashington, DC: Am erican Enterprise 
Institute, 1985), pp. 15-16 . For further critique o f  the institutional shift from  legislative to executive authority over  
trade p o licy , see Charles Pearson and James R iedel, "United States Trade P olicy: From  M ultilateralism  to 
B ilateralism ,11 in E nzo G rilli and Enrico Sassoon, ed s., The N e w  P rotection is t W ave  (N ew  York: N ew  York  
U niversity  Press, 1990), pp. 113-114 .
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E a ch  o f  th e s e  th eo r ie s  h as its v ir tu es  and fa i lin g s , b u t to g e th er  th e y  p a in t a c o m p le x  p ortra it o f  
p r o te c t io n is t  te n d e n c ie s . F ro m  th e  b ro a d est p e r sp e c t iv e , h e g e m o n y  th eo ry  p r o v id e s  a d e sc r ip tio n  o f  th e  
p o lit ic a l and e c o n o m ic  in tera ctio n  a m o n g  n a tio n -sta te s . S im ila r ly , th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  fr e e  trad e p r in c ip le s  
can  a lso  e x p la in  in tern ation a l e c o n o m ic  p h en o m en a . O n th e  nation a l le v e l ,  w e  g e t  a v ie w  o f  th e  r o le  o f  
d o m e s t ic  b u s in e s s  c y c le s .  A d ju stin g  th e  v ie w  y e t  a g a in , p u b lic  in stitu tio n s  and in terest g ro u p s  b e c o m e  
th e  fo c u s . F in a lly , th o u g h  th ere  h as b e e n  lit t le  sy s te m a tic  litera tu re  in  th is  v e in , o n e  co u ld  c o n c e iv a b ly  
e m p h a s iz e  th e  r o le  o f  in d iv id u a ls— a “grea t m a n ” th eo ry  o f  trad e p o lic y . C o n s id e r , fo r  e x a m p le , th e  
im p o rta n ce  o f  C o rd e ll H u ll in  p r o m o tin g  A m er ica n  lea d ersh ip  in  th e  p o stw a r  lib era l e c o n o m ic  r e g im e .
Hegemony
H e g e m o n ic  in terp reta tion s o f  trad e  p o lic y  h o ld  that a  s in g le ,  o v e r w h e lm in g ly  d o m in a n t e c o n o m ic  
p o w e r  is  n e c e ssa r y  fo r  th e  e sta b lish m en t and m a in ten a n ce  o f  a lib era l trad in g  r e g im e .62 A c c o r d in g  to  
th is  th e o r y , o n ly  a s in g le  actor  can  crea te  an o p e n  sy s te m , s im ila r  to  th e  w a y  that a nation a l g o v e r n m e n t  
p r o v id e s  a “ p u b lic  g o o d ” n o  p r iv a te  en tity  w o u ld  b e  w ill in g  to  su p p ly , e v e n  th o u g h  su ch  a g o o d  m ig h t  
b e n e fit  n o t o n ly  th at en tity  but a lso  p o ten tia lly  th e  en tire  s o c ie ty .63 O n ly  th is  o n e  h e g e m o n ic  sta te  can  
c o n v in c e  a n d /o r  c a jo le  sm a ll and m ed iu m -s ized  sta tes  to  m ain ta in  o p en  m ark ets. T h e  h e g e m o n  acts to  
p rev en t “ fr e e  r id in g ” o n  th e  o p en  trad in g  sy s te m . In r e a lity , so m e  sta tes  w ill  fr e e  r id e , ra is in g  trade  
barriers to  ta k e  a d v a n ta g e  o f  o th er  c o u n tr ie s ’ (in c lu d in g  th e  h e g e m o n ’s)  o p en  m ark ets. O n ly  th e  h e g e m o n  
w ill  b e  su f f ic ie n t ly  e c o n o m ic a lly  p o w er fu l to  r e s is t  th e  tem p ta tio n  to  react w ith  s im ila r  b a rr ier s , a m o v e  
that w o u ld  d a m a g e  th e  en tire  sy s te m .
T h e  h e g e m o n ic  m o d e l g a in ed  le g it im a c y  b e c a u se  it seem ed  to  f it  th e  h is to r ic a l pattern  o f  th e  
n in eteen th  and tw en tie th  cen tu r ie s . G reat B rita in  w a s  th e  w o r ld ’s in d u str ia l p o w e r h o u se  in  th e  1 8 0 0 s ,  
and its c lea r  m o v e s  to w a rd  trad e lib era liza tio n  p ried  o p en  F ren ch  and G erm an  m a rk ets , as w e ll as th o se  
in  th e  C o m m o n w e a lth . A s  it u n ila tera lly  m o v e d  to w a rd  freer  tra d e , m o s t  o f  th e  w o r ld  fo l lo w e d .  
S im ila r ly , in  th e  n e x t  cen tu ry , B r ita in  w a s  e c lip se d  b y  th e  U n ited  S ta tes  in term s o f  e c o n o m ic  ou tp u t. 
F o llo w in g  W o r ld  W ar II , U .S .  d o m in a n ce  w a s cr itica l in  fo r g in g  a lib era l trad e sy s te m  after th e  
d isa stro u s  ta r if f  p o lic ie s  o f  th e  1 9 3 0 s .
U n d er  scru t in y , h o w e v e r , h e g e m o n y  th eo ry  fa ils  to  e x p la in  a n u m b er o f  h is to r ica l e v e n ts  and  
p r o v e s  u n a b le  to  p r o v id e  a c o n v in c in g  ra tio n a le  fo r  sta te  a c tio n s . Joh n  A . G . C o n y b ea re  p resen ts  a 
w id e ly  v o ic e d  c r it ic ism  o f  th e  th eo ry : “ . . . [ I ] t  sh o u ld  b e  n o ted  that th e  a s so c ia tio n  b e tw e e n  o p e n n e ss  and  
h e g e m o n y  is  w e a k  o n  e ith er  tim e  se r ie s  or  c r o ss  sec tio n a l e v id e n c e . In d ic e s  o f  h e g e m o n y  and in d u str ia l 
co u n try  ta r if f  a v era g es  o v e r  tim e  co rre la te  p o o r ly , at lea st d u rin g  th e  tw en tie th  cen tu ry , u n le s s  o n e
62 . See Krasner, "State Pow er and the Structure o f  International Trade;” Charles P. K indleberger, The W o rld  
in  D epression, 1 9 2 9 -1 9 3 9  (Berkeley: U niversity o f  California Press, 1973); and Robert K eohane, A fte r Hegem ony. 
C ooperation  an d  D is c o rd  in  the W o rld  P o lit ic a l Econom y  (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1984).
63 . Robert K eohane has argued that a group o f  actors organized through an international regim e can play a role 
sim ilar to a sin g le  hegem on, a point w hich  w e  w ill return to later in this paper.
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p o stu la te s  la g s  in  th e  e ffe c t  o f  h e g e m o n y  o n  t a r i f f s . . . .”64 C o n y b ea re  a lso  argu es that th e  e x a m p le s  o f  
G reat B rita in  in  th e  n in eteen th  cen tu ry  and A m er ica  in th e  tw en tie th  as h e g e m o n ic  lea d ers  o f  lib era l trade  
sy s te m s  d o  n o t n e c e ss a r ily  p r o v e  that fr e e  trad e is th e  p referred  e c o n o m ic  c h o ic e  o f  p o w e r fu l states: 
“ [T ]h ere  [is  n o ] p e r su a s iv e  cr o ss  se c t io n a l e v id e n c e  that s tro n g  p o w e r s  p re fer  lo w  ta r if f  l e v e l s .” 65 A  
str o n g  argu m en t can  b e  m a d e  th at th e  C o b d en  C h ev a lie r  T rea ty  b e tw e e n  B rita in  and F ra n ce  in  1 8 6 0  and  
th e  n u m ero u s trad e in itia tiv e s  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta tes  in  th e  p o st-W o r ld  W ar II era w e r e  p o lit ic a lly  m o tiv a ted  
n a tion a l se c u r ity  m o v e s .
T h e  h e g e m o n y  m o d e l is  b y  n o  m ea n s p er fec t , bu t it p r o v id e s  im p ortan t in s ig h ts . F ir s t , th o u g h  
th e  t im e  co rre la tio n  is  im p erfec t, o n e  ca n n o t ig n o re  th e  fact that th e  tw o  m o st e c o n o m ic a lly  p o w er fu l 
sta tes  o f  th e  n in e teen th  and tw en tie th  cen tu r ies  w e r e  in stru m en ta l in  p r o m o tin g  w o r ld w id e  fr e e  trade. 
S im ila r it ie s  su ch  as th is  are to o  fu n d am en ta l to  d ism is s  as c o in c id e n c e . It is  p o s s ib le  that a fu tu re  
h e g e m o n  m ig h t n o t b e  co m m itted  to  lib era l trad e , bu t it w o u ld  a lso  b e  ex tr e m e ly  d if f ic u lt  fo r  a n ation  
that la ck s  d o m in a n c e  in  e c o n o m ic  m ig h t to  crea te  and su sta in  a lib era l trad in g  r e g im e , i f  that nation  
w ish e d  to  d o  s o . S e c o n d , C o n y b ea re  argu es that h e g e m o n s  d o  n ot n e c e ssa r ily  h a v e  an e c o n o m ic  in terest  
in  o p e n  m a rk ets . T h is  m a y  in  fact b e  th e  c a se , y e t it m e r e ly  rev ea ls  an oth er  c o m p e llin g  d im e n s io n  o f  
th e  h e g e m o n ic  th e s is .  T h ro u g h o u t h is to r y , p o w er fu l e c o n o m ic  sta tes  h a v e  o ften  d em o n stra ted  a stron g  
in terest in  in tern a tion a l p o lit ic a l a ffa irs; it is  n o t su rp r is in g  that th e se  sta tes  h a v e  o fte n  b een  p o lit ic a l and  
m ilita ry  p o w e r s  as w e ll .  T h e  h e g e m o n s  that a ro se  after th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  free  trade th eo ry  (B rita in  and  
th e  U n ited  S ta te s) h a v e  th us ten d ed  to  p rom oted  free  trade as th e  m o s t  lo g ic a l p e a c e fu l m ean s to  cem en t  
e c o n o m ic  and p o lit ic a l t ie s  w ith  o th er  sta tes . F orm al d ip lo m a c y  is an oth er  w a y  to  a c h ie v e  a s im ila r  en d , 
bu t d ip lo m a c y  a lo n e  o ffe r s  fe w e r  rew ard s than a m u tu a lly  b en e fic ia l trad in g  r e la tio n sh ip .
Ideology
It h as lo n g  b e e n  argu ed  that fr ee  trade id e o lo g y  w a s th e  m o tiv a tin g  fa cto r  b eh in d  w o r ld w id e  trade  
lib e r a liz a tio n . I d e o lo g y , h o w e v e r , is  o n e  o f  th e  b lu n test th eo re tica l to o ls  fo r  a n a ly z in g  ch a n g es  in  n ational 
trad e p o lic y . B e g in n in g  in  th e  la te  e ig h teen th  cen tu ry , R icard o  and a h o s t  o f  o th er  e c o n o m is ts  d e v e lo p e d  
a m a s s iv e  b o d y  o f  litera tu re  o n  th e  b en e fits  o f  fr ee  and o p en  trad e and e v e n tu a lly  gen era ted  a n early  
in v in c ib le  se t  o f  th eo re tica l p r o p o s it io n s . H o w e v e r , p o lit ica l actors h a v e  h is to r ic a lly  n o t h eed ed  e c o n o m ic  
w isd o m  u n le s s  it w a s  co n g ru en t w ith  p o lit ic a l e x p e d ie n c y . T h e  q u estio n  is , h o w  can  o n e  d e term in e  
w h eth er  e c o n o m ic  th eo ry  w a s  th e  m o tiv e  b eh in d  lib era liza tio n  or m ere ly  an in c id en ta l fa c to r  com p ared  
to  o th er  p o lit ic a l o r  so c ia l d eterm in an ts?  I d e o lo g y  is c lea r ly  an im p ortan t v a r ia b le , but it d o e s  n o t f it  
n ea tly  in to  an y  te s ta b le  m o d e l.
T h e  B r itish  e x p e r ie n c e  m o s t  s tr o n g ly  su p p orts an id e o lo g ic a l e x p la n a tio n  o f  trad e p o lic y  ch a n g e . 
G u ilio  G a lla ro tti h as n o ted , “ F ro m  th e  1 8 2 0 s  o n , after free-trad e  id e o lo g y  b eca m e  an in flu en tia l fo r c e  in  
p o lit ic a l c ir c le s , ta r if f  ch a n g es  e x h ib it  an u n b rok en  lib era l tren d . A ll tw e lv e  c h a n g e s  [in  ta r if f  le v e ls ]
64 . John A .G . Conybeare, "Public G oods, Prisoner’s D ilem m as and the International P olitical Econom y,"  
In te rn a tio n a l Studies Q u arte rly , 28 (1984 ), p. 12.
65 . Ibid.
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b e tw e e n  1 8 2 0  and 1 8 7 9  are r e d u c t io n s .” 66 T h e  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s , h o w e v e r , d o e s  n o t bear  
o u t an id e o lo g ic a l in terp reta tion  o f  trade p o lic y . O b v io u s ly , d ifferen t co u n tr ie s  r eq u ire  d ifferen t  
e x p la n a tio n s  fo r  th e ir  em b ra ce  o r  re jec tio n  o f  lib era l trad e. T h e  U .S .  d o e s  n o t f it  th e  id e o lo g ic a l m o d e l 
b e c a u se  e c o n o m ic  th eo ry  p la y ed  a r e la t iv e ly  sm a ll part in  ea r ly  A m er ica n  trade p o lic y ,  and o th er  factors  
w e r e  m o r e  im p ortan t in  th e  tra n s itio n  to  a lib era l o r ien ta tio n . H o w e v e r , th e  th eo re tica l c o n se n su s  o n  th e  
a d v a n ta g es o f  fr e e  trad e  has b een  im p ortan t in  th e  m a in ten a n ce  o f  an o p en  d o m e s tic  m arket.
S tu d en ts o f  trad e p o lic y  o fte n  c o n c e iv e  o f  “ id e o lo g y ” s im p ly  as th e  m ass o f  e c o n o m ic  th eo r ie s  
th at su p p o rt th e  id ea  o f  fr e e  trad e . H o w e v e r , id e o lo g y  can  a lso  b e  a d im e n s io n  o f  a p articu lar  n a tio n ’s 
p o lit ic a l cu ltu re . U n d e r sto o d  in  th is  w a y , id e o lo g y  p r o v id e s  n ew  in s ig h ts  in to  d o m e s t ic  p r o te c t io n is t  
se n t im e n ts . In  w h a t w a y s  h as A m er ica n  trad e p o lic y  b e e n  re la ted  to  A m er ica n  cu ltu re?  H o w  d o  d ifferen t  
e le m e n ts  o f  th e  A m er ica n  id e o lo g y  in teract to  su p p ort or  re jec t p ro tec tio n ism ?  T h e s e  and o th er  q u estio n s  
in d ica te  th e  u se fu ln e s s  o f  id e o lo g y  th e o r y , b ro a d ly  d e fin ed .
B u s in e s s  C y c le
T h e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  n ation a l e c o n o m ic  h ea lth  and ta r iff  le v e ls  w a s  e x p lo r e d  as ea r ly  as 18 7 9  
b y  G u sta v  S c h m o lle r , an e c o n o m is t  o f  th e  G erm an  h is to r ica l sc h o o l:  “ T h e  t im e s  o f  b o o m , o f  in crea s in g  
ex p o r ts , o f  n ew  o p e n in g s  o f  o v e r se a s  m a rk ets , are th e  natural fr e e  trad e e p o c h s , w h ile  th e  r e v e r se  is true  
in  t im e s  o f  fo r e ig n  s lu m p s , o f  d e p r e ss io n s , o f  c r i s i s .”67 T h e  p r e d ic t iv e  accu ra cy  o f  th e  b u s in e ss  c y c le  
m o d e l is  su p er io r  to  th e  h e g e m o n y  and co n v en tio n a l id e o lo g y  th e o r ie s , th o u g h  it is  m o s t  u se fu l in  
p r ed ic tin g  ta r if f  ch a n g es  in  p e r io d s  o f  ex trem e  ex p a n s io n  or  c o n tr a c t io n .68 G a lla ro tti, a m o n g  o th ers , 
h as c o n v in c in g ly  d em on stra ted  th e  v a lu e  o f  th e  b u s in e ss  c y c le  th eo ry  as a “ s c ie n t if ic ” to o l.
H o w e v e r , th is  t o o l ’s fa ilin g s  are n u m ero u s . F ir s t , p red ic t io n s  that w e  w o u ld  e x p e c t  fro m  th e  
b u s in e ss  c y c le  th eo ry  h a v e  n o t r e fle c te d  th e  rea lity  o f  ch a n g es  in  th e  tra d in g  sy s te m  o v e r  th e  p a s t  tw o  
d e c a d e s . In 1 9 8 3 , M ich a e l M ic h a e ly  argued  that th e  d o w n w a rd  ad ju stm en t o f  th e  lo n g -te r m  b u s in e ss  
c y c le  b e g in n in g  in  1 9 7 3  b ro u g h t n o  stru ctural ch a n g es  in  th e  in tern ation a l e c o n o m ic  r e g im e  and w itn e s se d  
th e  c o n tin u in g  g ro w th  o f  trad e a m o n g  n a t io n s .69 In d eed , G a llaro tti gran ts th at A m er ica n  b u s in e ss  c y c le  
th e o r y  d o e s  b e s t  in  th e  p er io d  b e fo r e  th e  C iv il W a r .70 O n th is  b a s is , w e  q u estio n  its r e le v a n c e  for  
m o d ern  stu d en ts  o f  U .S .  trad e p o lic y .
M o re  im p ortan t, th e  b u s in e ss  c y c le  m o d e l fa ils  to  p r o v id e  a rea so n a b le  ex p la n a tio n  o f  th e  actual 
fo r c e s  and a ctors that g en era te  ta r iff  ch a n g e s . T h e  th eo ry  d e sc r ib e s  p o lic y  o u tc o m e s  in stead  o f  p o lic y
66 . G uilio  Gallarotti, "Toward a B usiness-C ycle M odel o f  T a riffs ,” In te rn a tio n a l O rg a n iza tio n , 39 (W inter 
1985), p. 179.
67 . Quoted in T im othy J. M cK eow n, "Firms and T ariff R egim e Change. E xplaining the D em and for 
Protection," W o rld  P o litics , 36 (January 1984), p. 215 .
68 . Gallarotti, "Toward a B usiness-C ycle M odel o f  T ar iffs,” p. 171.
69 . M ichaely , "Trade in a Changed W orld Econom y," pp. 397-403 .
70 . G allarotti, "Toward a B usiness-C ycle M odel o f  Tariffs," pp. 183-184.
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so u r c e s  and d e v e lo p m e n t. In p articu lar , th e  p ro b lem  w ith  u s in g  th e  b u s in e ss  c y c le  to  e x p la in  A m er ica n  
ta r if f  p o lic y  is  th at th e  p u r p o se s  o f  th e  ta r if f  h a v e  ch an ged  in  s ig n if ic a n t w a y s  th ro u g h o u t th e  co u n tr y ’s 
h is to r y . F o r  in s ta n ce , it is u n c lea r  w h e th er  n in e teen th -cen tu ry  r e c e s s io n s  g en era ted  c a lls  fo r  h ig h e r  ta r iffs  
b e c a u se  o f  in crea sed  p ressu re  fro m  th reaten ed  se c to r s  o f  th e  e c o n o m y , or  b e c a u se  o f  th e  f isc a l n eed s o f  
th e  fed era l g o v e r n m e n t. T h e  n eed  fo r  r ev en u e  w a s a p o lit ic a l argu m en t freq u en tly  u sed  in  su p p o rt o f  
u p w ard  ta r if f  ad ju stm en ts , su ch  as d u r in g  th e  C iv il W ar in  1 8 6 1 . T a r iffs  a cco u n ted  fo r  m o re  than  
9 0  p e rcen t o f  fed era l g o v e r n m e n t rev en u es  in  th e  ea r ly  d eca d es  o f  th e  rep u b lic  and w e r e  st ill 
a p p ro x im a te ly  4 0  p e rcen t to  5 0  p ercen t b e fo r e  W ilso n  s ig n e d  in to  la w  th e  red u ctio n s  o f  th e  U n d e r w o o d -  
S im m o n s  A c t  o f  1 9 1 3 .71 C o n v e r se ly , b u d g et su rp lu se s  b rou gh t ca lls  to  lo w e r  th e  ta r iff , su ch  as d u rin g  
th e  1 8 5 7 , 1 8 6 1 , 1 8 7 5 , 1 8 8 3 , and 1 8 9 0  d eb a tes  o f  ta r if f  acts . T h o u g h  th e  b u s in e ss  c y c le  th e o r y  m ig h t  
b e  v a lid a ted  in  e ith er  c a s e , it p r o v id e s  a fa ls e  se n s e  o f  co n tin u ity  and b e lie s  th e  v a r y in g  c o m p le x ity  o f  
th e  e le m e n ts  that in flu e n c e d  ta r if f  ch a n g es .
I n t e r e s t  G r o u p s
E . E . S ch a ttsc h n e id e r ’s  P o lit ic s ,  P re s s u re s  a n d  th e  T a r i f f  w as  th e  fir s t  sy s te m a tic  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  
e ffe c t  o f  sp e c ia l- in te r e s t  p re ssu re  o n  U n ited  S ta tes  trad e p o lic y . S ch a ttsch n e id er  ex p la in ed  h o w  th e  1 9 3 0  
S m o o t  H a w le y  T a r if f  w a s  p ro d u ced  b y  th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  sm a ll, w e ll-o r g a n iz e d , im p o r t-co m p etin g  p rod u cer  
g r o u p s— in d u str ia l and a g r icu ltu ra l— w h ic h  o v e r w h e lm e d  th e  larger  p u b lic  in terest (that is ,  freer  trade).
In terest g ro u p s  are  m o tiv a ted  to  restr ic t fo r e ig n  trad e b y  th e  e c o n o m ic  and so c ia l in s ta b ility  that 
freer  trad e  m ay  c a u se . A lth o u g h  o p en  m arkets m ay b e  th e  o p tim u m  e c o n o m ic  a ltern a tiv e  in  th e  
a g g r e g a te , sp e c if ic  se c to r s  o f  an e c o n o m y  m a y  su ffer  u n d er freer  trade as co m p a ra tiv e  a d v a n ta g e  b e g in s  
to  p u t p r e ssu r e  o n  le s s -e f f ic ie n t  in d u str ie s . “ S o c ia l in s ta b ility  is th ereb y  in crea sed  s in c e  th ere  is  fr ic tio n  
in  m o v in g  fa c to r s , p ar ticu la r ly  la b o r , fro m  o n e  sec to r  to  a n o th e r .” 72 T h e  h ig h  c o s ts  o f  ad ju stm en t  
g en era te  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n  o f  th rea ten ed  fa c to rs  in to  in terest g ro u p s.
A  s im p le  in tere st g ro u p  m o d e l p ortrays th e  g o v e r n m e n t as neutral arb iter b e tw e e n  co m p e tin g  
g r o u p s . “ [T ]h e  m o re  c o m p e t it iv e  th e  p o lit ic a l sy s te m , th e  m o re  l ik e ly  d is tr ib u tio n  q u e st io n s  w ill  
d o m in a te  e f f ic ie n c y  co n s id e r a tio n s  o n  sp e c ia l- in te r e s t  i s s u e s . . . .  [P ]o lit ic ia n s  are  s im ila r  to  a u ctio n eers  
c a ll in g  o u t p r ic e s  in  an o rg a n ized  c o m m o d ity  m arket: th ey  try  d ifferen t p r ices  u n til th e  p u rch a se  ord ers  
equal th e  s e ll  o r d e r s .” 73 T a r if f  p o lic y  can  thus b e  se e n  as “ r e n t-se e k in g ” b eh a v io r  b y  w e ll-o r g a n iz e d  
p ro d u cer  g ro u p s  and lo o s e ly  o rg a n ized  co n su m er  g ro u p s . T h is  latter c a teg o ry  can  b e  w id e n e d  to  in c lu d e  
ex p o r t-o r ien ted  in d u s tr ie s .74
7 1 . W illiam  J. G ill, Trade W ars A gainst A m erica : A  H is to ry  o f  U n ited  States T rade an d  M o n e ta ry  P o lic y  (N ew  
York: Praeger, 1990), p. 6.
72 . Krasner, "State Pow er and the Structure o f  International Trade," p. 319.
73 . W illiam  A  Brock and Stephen P. M agee, "Tariff Formation in a D em ocracy," in John Black and Brian 
H indley, ed s ., C u rren t Issues in  C om m ercia l P o licy  and  D ip lo m acy  (N ew  York: St. M artin’s Press, 1980), p. 1-2.
74 . T he fam ous Stolper-Sam uelson (1941) m odel suggests this categorization by arguing that in a tw o-factor  
econom y the abundant factor w ill favor free trade and the scarce factor, protection.
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T h e r e  is  a la r g e  b o d y  o f  litera ture  that a ttem p ts to  e x p la in  w h ic h  g ro u p s  r e c e iv e  p ro tec tio n . 
T h ro u g h  g ro u p  th eo ry  m o d e lin g  m atch ed  to  h is to r ica l e v id e n c e  fro m  th e  T a r if f  A c t  o f  1 8 2 4 , P in cu s  
asser ted  that “th e  id ea l in d u stry  p ressu re  g ro u p s  in  1 8 2 4  had lo w  p rop rie ta l in c o m e  sh a res  and  
g e o g r a p h ic a lly  co n cen tra ted  p ro d u c tio n  u n its , b u t th at p o lit ic a l e f fe c t iv e n e s s  req u ired  th e  g ro u p  to  sp eak  
fo r  m a n y  e s ta b lish m en ts  w ith  o u tp u t sp read  fa ir ly  e v e n ly  a cro ss  s t a te s .”75 R dal P . L a v e r g n e ’s stu d y  o f  
p r e ssu r e  g ro u p  in f lu e n c e  in d ica ted  that in d u str ie s  that e m p lo y  la r g e  w o rk  fo r c e s  and are g e o g r a p h ic a lly  
co n cen tra ted  in  la r g e  sta tes  w e r e  m o re  l ik e ly  to  r e c e iv e  h ig h er  le v e ls  o f  ta r if f  p r o te c t io n .76 W h ile  
G o ld ste in  fo u n d  th at in d u str ie s  th at are  ex p o r t o r ie n te d , sp en t r e la t iv e ly  le s s  o n  cap ita l in v e s tm e n t , and  
p e titio n e d  fo r  r e l ie f  le s s  o ften  w e r e  m o re  lik e ly  to  g a in  a id .77 T h o u g h  th ere  is s o m e  o v er la p  am o n g  
th e s e  g r o u p in g s , th e  s u c c e s s  o f  d ifferen t in terest g ro u p s in  lo b b y in g  fo r  p ro tec tio n  o b v io u s ly  v a r ie s  from  
ca se  to  ca se .
T h e  su c c e s s  o r  fa ilu re  o f  a  grou p  in  p e tit io n in g  fo r  p ro tec tio n  fr o m  im p o rts  is  a lso  in f lu en ced  b y  
th e  e x ten t to  w h ic h  p articu lar  se c to r s  are id en tified  w ith  A m e r ic a n ism , th e  nation a l cu ltu re . F o r  in s ta n ce , 
a g r icu ltu re , as in  m a n y  E u ro p ea n  c o u n tr ie s , is  c lo s e ly  a sso c ia ted  in  th e  n ational m ind  w ith  th e  A m er ica n  
w a y  o f  l i f e — p ro p erty  o w n e r sh ip , s e l f - s u f f ic ie n c y , and a rural l i f e s ty le  ch aracter ized  b y  m o ra lity  and  
v ir tu e . S im ila r ly , th e  au to  in d u stry  is  se e n  as a d is t in c t ly  A m er ica n  sy m b o l o f  in d e p e n d e n c e  and th e  
p io n e e r in g  s p ir it .78
T o d a y , o rg a n ized  lab or  is  th o u g h t to  b e  a m o n g  th e  m o st p o w e r fu l and v o c a l o p p o n en ts  o f  fr ee  
trad e. B u t fro m  th e  p a ssa g e  o f  th e  1 9 3 4  R ec ip ro ca l T rad e  A g r e e m e n ts  A c t  to  th e  T ra d e  E x p a n s io n  A c t  
o f  1 9 6 2 , o rg a n ized  lab or  w a s  str o n g ly  co m m itted  to  free  tr a d e .79 L a b o r  rea liz ed  that in crea sed  ex p o rts  
co u ld  p r o d u c e  s ig n if ic a n t g a in s  fo r  its m em b ers . H o w e v e r , w ith  in crea sed  c o m p e tit io n  in  th e  d o m e s tic  
m ark et fr o m  im p o rts  and th e  p r o sp e c t  o f  p lan t r e lo c a tio n s  to  co u n tr ie s  w ith  ch ea p er  la b o r , u n io n s  b eg a n  
to  sh ift  to w a rd  p ro te c t io n ism  in  th e  la te  1 9 6 0 s . T h e  h ig h ly  r e s tr ic t iv e  B u rk e-H a rtk e  b ill o f  1971  r e c e iv e d  
stro n g  su p p o rt fr o m  la b o r .
In terest g ro u p  th eo ry  is  su b jec t to  a n u m b er o f  c r it ic ism s . M o st im p ortan t, it is  an e x a g g e r a tio n  
to  sa y  th at sp ec ia l in terests  se t  n ation a l trad e p o lic ie s .  T h e r e  are s im p ly  to o  m an y  e x a m p le s  o f  th reaten ed  
in d u str ie s  th at p e tit io n  fo r  p ro tec tio n  but d o  n o t r e c e iv e  r e lie f . In d eed , L a v e r g n e ’s o v e r a ll s tu d y  o f  s ix  
v a r ia b le s  u lt im a te ly  sh o w e d  th e  p ressu re -g ro u p  v a r ia b le  to  b e  o n e  o f  th e  w e a k e s t  co rre la tes  to  th e
75 . J.J. P incus, "Pressure Groups and the Pattern o f  Tariffs," J o u rn a l o f  P o lit ic a l Econom y, 83 (A ugust 1975), 
p. 757 .
76 . Real P . L avergne, The P o lit ic a l Econom y o f  U .S . T ariffs  (N ew  York: A cadem ic Press, 1983), p. 92 -106 .
77 . G oldstein , "Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade P olicy ,"  p. 208 .
78 . E nrico Sassoon, "Protectionism and International Trade N egotiations,"  in Enzo G rilli and Enrico Sassoon, 
ed s., The N e w  P rotection ist W ave  (N ew  York: N ew  York U niversity Press, 1990), p. 10.
79 . For a history o f  organized labor’s lim ited pre-1930 impact on U .S . trade p o licy , see M argaret H ardy, The 
In fluence o f  O rg an ized  L a b o r  on the F o re ig n  P o licy  o f  the U n ited  States  (P h .D . D issertation, T he U niversity  o f  
G eneva, 1936), pp. 195-205.
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a p p lica tio n  o f  p r o te c t io n is t  m e a s u r e s .80 S e c o n d , th e  m o d e l h as d if f ic u lty  a cco u n tin g  fo r  p o lic y  ch a n g es  
o v e r  t im e . S in c e  th e  le v e l o f  p ro tec tio n  o f  an e c o n o m y  c h a n g e s , th e  im p act o f  in terest g ro u p s  m u st n ot 
b e  co n sta n t o v e r  t im e . O n ly  i f  w e  w ed  th e  in terest grou p  th eo ry  to  th e  b u s in e ss  c y c le  (th u s a rg u in g  that 
in  r e c e ss io n a r y  p e r io d s , grou p  a c tiv ity  in crea se s  and c a u se s  th e  e s ta b lish m en t o f  h ig h e r  trad e barriers)  
can  p o lic y  b e  ex p la in ed  b y  th e  r o le  o f  in terest g ro u p s . F in a lly , th e  m o d e l is , in s o m e  s e n s e s ,  ta u to lo g ic a l. 
It e x p la in s  p ro te c t io n ism  b y  a n a ly z in g  th e  sp ec ia l in terests  that r e c e iv e  r e l ie f  and th en  in terp rets th e  
lo b b y in g  o f  th e s e  g r o u p s  as e v id e n c e  th at th e  g ro u p s th e m se lv e s  w e r e  in stru m en ta l in  th e  in crea sed  
p r o te c t io n ism .
I n s t itu t io n s
Ju d ith  G o ld s te in , a m o n g  m an y  o th ers , ca sts  d o u b t o n  o v e r s im p lis t ic  in terest g ro u p  th e o r ie s  o f  
p r o te c t io n ism  b y  em p h a s iz in g  th e  im p o rta n ce  o f  th e  stru ctu re  and n orm s o f  p u b lic  in s titu tio n s . “ A lth o u g h  
in  th e  lo n g  term  g ro u p s  m ay  b e  a b le  to  o r g a n iz e  and ch a n g e  th e  gen era l ch aracter  o f  A m er ica n  
in s t itu tio n s , in  th e  sh o rt term  la w s  and n o rm s h a v e  s ig n if ic a n t im p act o n  th eir  a b ility  to  tra n s la te  so c ia l 
a ctio n  in to  p u b lic  g o o d s .” 81
M o d e ls  o f  ta r if f  ch a n g e  in  d em o cra tic  s o c ie t ie s  o ften  h o ld  to  th e  in tu itiv e  p r e m ise  that g o v e r n m e n t  
in s titu tio n s  w ill  r e f le c t  th e  w ill  o f  th e  p e o p le . “ T h e  p re feren ces  o f  g o v e r n m e n t o f f ic ia ls  are u su a lly  lin k ed  
to  th e  p attern  o f  p r e fe r e n c e s  in  th e ir  s o c ie t ie s ,  s im p ly  b e c a u se  in  sy s te m s  w ith  s o m e  fo rm  o f  
rep resen ta tio n a l m e c h a n ism s , th e  o ccu p a n ts  o f  g o v ern m en ta l p o sts  w ill  ch a n g e  a lo n g  w ith  c h a n g e s  in  th e  
p attern  o f  o p in io n s  and d e m a n d s .” 82 H o w e v e r , th is  a ssu m es  that d e c is io n -m a k in g  p o w e r  l ie s  w ith  
e le c te d  o f f ic ia ls ,  a n o t en tire ly  a ccu ra te  p ic tu re  o f  th e  w a y  trad e p o lic y  is created  and im p lem en ted . 
E x e c u t iv e  and le g is la t iv e  a g e n c ie s  h a v e  a s ig n if ic a n t r o le  in  ad ju d ica tin g  trad e g r ie v a n c e s  and  
im p le m e n tin g  trad e  la w s , o ften  w ith  w id e  d iscre tio n  to  in terp ret th e  la w s . A nd  th e s e  in stitu tio n s  o ften  
h a v e  a lo n g  l i fe .  “ In th e  U .S . ,  a so c ie ty  em b a lm ed  in  th e  ‘ru le  o f  la w ,’ leg a l co n stra in ts  e n c o u r a g e  th e  
la y e r in g , rather than th e  rep la c in g  o f  g o v e r n m e n t in s t itu t io n s .” 83 Id eas that are em b ed d ed  in in stitu tio n s  
can  a ffe c t  p o lic y  th ro u g h  t im e , r eg a rd le ss  o f  th e  current b e lie fs  and co n stra in ts  o f  p o lic y  m ak ers.
T h e  in stitu tio n a l m o d e l o f  ta r iff  ch a n g e  p resen ts  o n e  o f  th e  m o st se r io u s  c r it ic ism s  o f  in terest  
g ro u p  th e o r y . In terest g ro u p  m o d e ls , in  th eir  m o st b a s ic  fo rm , a ssu m e  that th e  a ctors and th e  
o r g a n iza tio n a l stru ctu res o f  th e  p o lit ic a l arena are th e  sa m e a s , or  at lea st a n a lo g o u s  to , th e  m ark etp lace . 
In  s o m e  c a se s  th e  a n a lo g y  h o ld s , b u t in  p o lit ic s  it is n ot o n ly  c irc u m sta n ces  that c h a n g e  bu t a lso  th e  ru les  
o f  in tera ctio n  th e m s e lv e s , so m e tim e s  in crem en ta lly , so m e tim e s  d ra m a tica lly . A s  L a v e r g n e  n o te s , “ . . . th e  
s u c c e s s  that sp ec ia l in terests  can  b e  ex p ec ted  to  h a v e  in secu r in g  p r iv i le g e s  is n o t co n sta n t in  an y  se n s e ,
80. Lavergne, The P o lit ic a l Econom y o f  U. S. Tariffs , pp. 183-187. T he other variables, in addition to pressure- 
group in fluence, w ere the m inim ization o f  displacem ent costs, the com parative disadvantage o f  the industry, 
international bargaining, m aintenance o f  historical continuity, and m iscellaneous aspects o f  the public interest.
81. G oldstein , "Ideas, Institutions, and Am erican Trade P olicy ,"  p. 186.
82. M cK eow n, "Firms and T ariff R egim e Change," p. 216 .
83. G oldstein , "Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade P olicy ,"  p. 181.
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but rather d ep en d s o n  th e  ru les  o f  th e  g a m e  as d eterm in ed  and co n sta n tly  r e v is e d  b y  th e  p o lit ic ia n s  
th e m s e lv e s .” 84
In stitu tio n a l re fo rm s h a v e  b e e n  cru cia l in th e  tran sform ation  o f  U n ited  S ta tes  trad e p o lic y  in  th e  
tw en tie th  cen tu ry . W h en  C o n g r e ss  d e leg a ted  rec ip ro ca l ta r if f  ad ju stm en t a u th or ity  to  th e  e x e c u t iv e  in  
1 9 3 4 , it d ra m a tica lly  a ltered  th e  w a y  th e  trad e g a m e  w a s  p la y ed  nd e f f e c t iv e ly  red u ced  th e  im p o rta n ce  
o f  in tere st g ro u p s  in  se ttin g  n a tion a l trade p o l ic y .85 T h is  n ew  e x e c u t iv e  p o w e r  o v e r  in tern a tion a l trade  
w a s a m ajor  fa c to r  in  th e  grad u al sh ift  to  lib era liza tio n . M ich a e l B o rru s and G o ld s te in  n o te  that “ e v e n  
w h e r e  w e ll-o r g a n iz e d  o p p o s it io n  to  o p en  trad e e x is ts ,  th e  n o rm s that h a v e  d e v e lo p e d  and th e  in stitu tio n s  
w h ic h  h a v e  b e e n  created  to  im p lem en t th e  U n ited  S ta tes  trad e p o lic y  d o  n o t n e c e s s a r ily  r e sp o n d  to  th e  
o p p o s i t io n . . . .  [Ijn terest gro u p  p ressu res  to  ch a n g e  esta b lish ed  p o lic y  m ay  b e  ig n o r e d .” 86
A m e r ic a ’s w a n in g  h e g e m o n y  in th e  1 9 6 0 s  and 1 9 7 0 s  b rou gh t w ith  it , fo r  rea so n s  u n re la ted  to  th e  
c o u n tr y ’s g r o w in g  c o m p e tit iv e n e ss  p r o b le m s, C o n g ress io n a l re fo rm s that m ad e  th e  le g is la tu r e  m o re  
su s c e p tib le  to  p r o te c t io n is t  p re ssu r e s . “ S in c e  th e  m id -1 9 7 0 s , p roced u ra l re fo rm  in  b oth  th e  H o u s e  and  
S en a te  h as ero d ed  th e  p o w e r  o f  c o m m ittee  ch a irm en  to  co n tro l th e  p a c e  and co n ten t o f  le g is la t io n . In  
th e  H o u s e , p o w e r  h as d e v o lv e d  o n  a h o s t  o f  sp e c ia liz e d  su b co m m ittee s  and o n  th e  party  le a d ersh ip . T h e  
S en a te  h a s a lso  im p o se d  a d e g r e e  o f  a cco u n ta b ility  o n  its ch a irm en  and p erm itted  a g rea ter  d e g r e e  o f  
in d e p e n d e n c e  fo r  its ju n io r  m e m b e r s .” 87 T h e s e  d em o cra tiz in g  re fo rm s in crea sed  d ecen tra liza tio n  in  th e  
C o n g r e ss  and lo o s e n e d  a lread y  u n d isc ip lin e d  p arty  o rg a n iz a t io n s . In th e  p ast, th e  lea d ersh ip  o f  k e y  party  
m em b ers  had  b e e n  v ita l in  fo r g in g  a fr e e  trad e co n se n su s  o v e r  th e  p a ro ch ia l in terests  o f  in d iv id u a l p o lic y  
m a k ers . T h e  c o n se n su s  h as d eter iora ted  in  part b e c a u se  o f  th e s e  in stitu tion a l ch a n g es .
H o w e v e r , b y  so m e  m ea su res  C o n g r e ss  d id  n ot en cro a ch  u p o n  th e  e x e c u t iv e ’s p o w e r  in  th e  1 9 7 0 s  
and 1 9 8 0 s , as in  th e  ca se  o f  th e  a p p lica tio n  o f  th e  e sc a p e  c la u se  ru le: “ In s titu tio n a liza tio n  o f  th e
p r e s id e n t . . .a s  th e  fin a l en fo rcer  o f  th e  e sc a p e  c la u se  trad e rem ed y  assu red  that fr e e  trad e p o lic y  co u ld  
tr iu m p h  e v e n  w h e r e  o b je c t iv e  sta tu tory  cr iter ia  fo r  p ro tec tio n  w e r e  m e t .” 88 S in c e  o u tr ig h t ta r iffs  w e r e  
n o t o n  th e  p o lit ic a l ta b le , C o n g r e ss  o ften  p ro v id ed  r e l ie f  to  th reaten ed  in d u str ie s  th ro u g h  th e  a p p lica tio n  
o f  N T B s . C o n g r e ss  resp o n d ed  to  p r o te c t io n is t p ressu res  n o t b y  ra is in g  ta r iffs  b u t b y  lo o s e n in g  th e  cr iter ia  
b y  w h ic h  an in d u stry  can  se e k  r e l ie f  and b y  in crea s in g  th e  p o w e r s  o f  in d ep en d en t le g is la t iv e  a g e n c ie s  that 
o v e r s e e  trad e  is s u e s .89
84. L avergne, The P o lit ic a l Econom y o f  U .S . Tariffs , p. 31.
85. Lavergne argues that tw o other factors w ere also important: (1) adaptations o f  the rules o f  process in the
C ongress itse lf and (2) the sw itch from a unilateral approach to trade policy  changes to a negotiated approach.
86. M ichael Borrus and Judith G oldstein , "United States Trade Protectionism : Institutions, N orm s, and 
Practices," N orthw estern  J o u rn a l o f  In te rn a tio n a l L a w  &  Business, 8 (Fall 1987), pp. 333-334 .
87. R aym ond J. A heam , "Political Determ inants o f  U .S . Trade P olicy,"  O rb is , 26  (Sum m er 1982), p. 421. 
T hese reform s w ere largely the result o f  W atergate; they sought to reduce the im portance o f  seniority and patronage 
in  C ongress.
88. Borrus and G oldstein , "United States Trade Protectionism ," p. 341.
89. For a specific exam ple o f  institutional change affecting trade policy  in the post-W orld W ar II era, see
Lavergne, The P o lit ic a l Econom y o f  U .S . T ariffs , p. 29.
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T h e  A m er ica n  p o lit ica l sy s te m  m a k es it d if f ic u lt  to  a c h ie v e  s w if t  in stitu tio n a l tra n sfo rm a tio n  
w ith o u t a rad ica l m an d ate  fo r  c h a n g e . T h e  sep ara tion  o f  p o w e r s  lim its  th e  a b ility  o f  an y  o n e  b o d y  or  
b ranch  to  a ffe c t  re fo rm s o f  th e  so r t that w o u ld  im m ed ia te ly  sh ift  in stitu tio n a l p e r sp e c t iv e s . In th e  ca se  
o f  trad e p o lic y  in  th e  1 9 3 0 s , “ C o n g r e ss  d e leg a ted  p o w e r  to  th e  e x e c u t iv e  branch  to  s e t  ta r iffs , p artly  to  
p ro tec t th e  e c o n o m y  fro m  th e  ill e f fe c t  lo g -r o lle d  ta r if f s .” 90 W ith  th is  o r ig in a l m an d ate  in  m in d , m an y  
trad e in s titu tio n s  v ie w e d  th e ir  m is s io n  as restra in in g  th e  le g is la tu r e ’s te n d e n c y  to  m a k e  trad e p o lic y  that 
d o e s  n o t m a k e  g o o d  e c o n o m ic  s e n s e . T h is  m is s io n  reta in s its v ita lity  b e c a u se  o f  th e  v ir tu a lly  u n iv ersa l 
a ccep ta n ce  th at, in  a p er fec t w o r ld , trad e w o u ld  b e  fr e e  and o p e n . T h e  d o m in a n ce  o f  fr e e  trad e id e o lo g y  
p r o v id e s  th e s e  in s titu tio n s  w ith  a s tro n g  m an d ate  to  r e s is t  p ro te c t io n ism .
It is  c lea r  th at th e  n ature o f  th e  A m er ica n  p o lit ic a l sy s te m  m a k es th e  in stitu tio n a l th e o r y  o f  
p r o te c t io n ism  an im p ortan t to o l in  a n a ly z in g  trad e p o lic y . In fa c t , L a v e r g n e ’s ta r if f  stu d y  n o te s  that 
h is to r ic a l c o n tin u ity  is  o n e  o f  th e  m o st im p ortan t d eterm in an ts o f  ta r if f  le v e ls ,  in d ica tin g  th e  p ers is ten t  
in f lu e n c e  o f  o ld  in s titu tio n s  and th e  p o lit ica l cu ltu re  w h ic h  u n d er lie s  th o s e  in s t itu t io n s .91
T h e  A m e r ic a n  C r e e d  a n d  P r o te c t io n is m
T h e  h is to r y  and im p o rta n ce  o f  th e  A m er ica n  C reed  has b een  w e ll d o cu m en ted  b y  L o u is  H artz , 
S a m u el H u n tin g to n , L ip se t , and m an y  o th e r s .92 Its ten ets  in c lu d e  a n ti-s ta tism , in d iv id u a lism , p o p u lism ,  
and eg a lita r ia n ism . T h e s e  e le m e n ts  portray  a r ich  n ation a l character  but o n e  that la ck s a d r iv in g  co n cern  
a b ou t re la t io n s  w ith  th e  rest o f  th e  w o r ld . F o r  th eir  f ir st  cen tu ry  as a n a tio n , th e  o n ly  b ord er  that 
A m e r ic a n s  c o n cern ed  th e m se lv e s  w ith  w a s th e ir  o w n  w estern  fro n tier . M e x ic o  and C an ad a h a v e  b een  
a m y s te r y  to  m o s t  U .S .  c it iz e n s , w h o  rarely  p ay  a tten tion  to  th e  a ffa irs  o f  th eir  n e ig h b o r s  to  th e  north  
and so u th . T h u s , fro m  o n e  p e r sp e c t iv e  th e  A m er ica n  C reed  is an in w a r d -lo o k in g  id e o lo g y . P o sse s se d  
o f  abu n d an t natural w ea lth  and a ta len ted  p o p u la tio n , g e o g r a p h ic a lly  iso la ted  fro m  th e  p o w e r fu l n a tion s  
o f  th e  w o r ld , and m ilita r ily  s e c u r e  in  its h em isp h ere , A m er ica  g r e w  up as an o n ly  ch ild .
A n d  th e  b e h a v io r  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta tes in  th e  in ternational arena has so m e tim e s  re flec ted  p o o r  
so c ia l s k i l ls .  N in e te e n th -  an d , to  s o m e  ex ten t, tw en tie th -cen tu ry  A m er ica n  fo r e ig n  p o lic y  in itia tiv e s  h a v e  
o fte n  b e e n  ch aracter ized  as am ateu rish . T h is  is u n d erstan d ab le  fo r  a s o c ie ty  w ith  th e  U n ited  S ta te s ’ 
id e o lo g ic a l h is to r y . T h e  fo u n d in g  fa th ers and su b seq u e n t g en era tio n s  w e r e  im m ersed  in  a d eb a te  o v e r  
w h a t k in d  o f  a r ep u b lic  A m e r ic a  sh o u ld  be: th e  agricu ltural s o c ie ty  a lo n g  J e f fe r s o n ’s lin e s  o r  th e  
m a n u fa ctu r in g  p o w e r  e n v is io n e d  b y  H a m ilto n . B o th  o f  th e s e  fa c t io n s  s tr o v e  fo r  th e  en d  g o a l o f  n ation al 
e c o n o m ic  s e lf - s u f f ic ie n c y , and th ey  w e r e  b o th  in w a r d -lo o k in g . A s  T h e o d o r e  L o w i and B en jam in  
G in sb e r g  p u t it , “ .. .d u r in g  m o st o f  th e  n in eteen th  cen tu ry , A m er ica n  fo r e ig n  p o lic y  w a s  to  a la r g e  ex ten t  
n o  fo r e ig n  p o l i c y .” 93
90 . Borrus and G oldstein , "United States Trade Protectionism ," p. 334.
91 . L avergne, The P o lit ic a l Econom y o f  U .S . T ariffs , pp. 164-166.
92 . See Hartz, The L ib e ra l T rad itio n  in  A m erica , Seym our Martin L ipset, The F irs t  N e w  N a tio n . The U n ited
States in  H is to r ic a l an d  C om p ara tive  Perspective  (N ew  York: N orton, 1979 reprint), and Samuel H untington,
A m erican  P o litics . The Prom ise o f  D isharm o ny  (Cam bridge, M .A .: Harvard U niversity P ress, 1981).
93 . T heodore L ow i and Benjamin G insberg, A m erican  G overnm ent (N ew  York: N orton, 1992), p. 756 .
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E a r ly  p o lit ic a l a n a ly se s  b y  W a sh in g to n  and o th ers  d em o n stra ted  an a lle r g ic  r e sp o n s e  to  E u rop ean  
p o lit ic s  and  “ e n ta n g lin g  a l l ia n c e s .” T h ro u g h o u t th is  p er iod  and in to  th e  tw e n tie th  c e n tu ry , artful 
d ip lo m a c y  w a s  co n s id ered  a su s p ic io u s ly  “ E u ro p ea n ” p u rsu it. It sm a ck ed  o f  s e c r e t  tr e a t ie s , sh if t in g  and  
o p p o r tu n is tic  a ll ia n c e s , and u n e le c te d  bu reau crats m a k in g  p o lic y  w ith o u t th e  m an d ate o f  th e  p e o p le . T h e  
im a g e  o f  d ip lo m a c y  as an ar is to cra tic  g a m e  o ffen d ed  th e  str o n g ly  p o p u lis t  and eg a lita r ia n  cu ltu ral ro o ts  
o f  A m e r ic a n s . In  fa c t , it w a s  n o t u n til th e  F o r e ig n  S e r v ic e  A c t o f  1 9 4 6  that a p r o fe s s io n a l d ip lo m a tic  
co rp s  w a s  fin a lly  e s ta b lish ed  in  th e  U n ited  S ta tes .
T h e  re su lt  o f  th is  h is to r y  w a s  a fo r e ig n  p o lic y — e c o n o m ic  and p o lit ic a l— that co u ld  b e  d escr ib ed  
as u n ila tera l, is o la t io n is t , or  so m e tim e s  b o th . In th e  c a se  o f  U .S .  ta r iffs , barriers w e r e  k ep t h ig h  p artly  
to  en su re  e c o n o m ic  in d e p en d en ce  and p artly  as a  so u r c e  o f  r e v e n u e . W h ile  th is  p o lic y  d en o te s  
is o la t io n is m  in  its  c lo s u r e  o f  th e  d o m e s tic  m ark et, it w a s  im p lem en ted  w ith o u t c o n cern  fo r  h o w  o th er  
n a tio n s w o u ld  re sp o n d , an in d ica tio n  that u n ila tera lism  w a s  a g u id in g  p r in c ip le  as w e ll .  U .S .  a c tio n s  in  
th e  in tern a tion a l arena  h a v e  b e e n  p r o fo u n d ly  in flu en ced  b y  th e  v a lu e s  o f  th e  A m er ica n  C reed .
T h e  C reed , h o w e v e r , ra tio n a lized  tw o  s e e m in g ly  p o lar  o p p o s ite  p e r sp e c t iv e s  o n  A m e r ic a ’s ro le  
in  th e  w o r ld . W e  h a v e  sa id  that th e  fir st p e r sp e c t iv e  d o m in ated  th rou gh  th e  1 9 0 0 s , bu t a se c o n d  a ro se  
to  c o e x is t  w ith  th e  f ir s t . T h is  id e o lo g ic a l sh ift  in  th e  p o lit ica l cu ltu re  w a s  that o f  an in w a r d -lo o k in g  
p e r sp e c t iv e  so m e h o w  tra n sfo rm ed  in to  id e a lis t ic  in tern a tio n a lism .
In  th e  la te  n in e teen th  cen tu ry  e c o n o m ic  co n s id e r a tio n s  led  A rrierican p ro d u cers  and p o lic y  m ak ers  
to  r e c o g n iz e  th e  v a lu e  o f  fo r e ig n  r e la t io n s , o r  m o re  s p e c if ic a l ly ,  fo r e ig n  m ark ets . B u t e c o n o m ic  
co n s id e r a tio n s  w e r e  c lea r ly  n o t a su f f ic ie n t  im p etu s fo r  lib era liza tio n ; i f  th ey  had  b e e n , th en  th e  
d ism a n tlin g  o f  tra d e  b arriers w o u ld  h a v e  b e g u n  at le a s t  b y  th e  turn  o f  th e  cen tu ry . T h e r e  is  l i t t le  d ou b t 
that a m o r e  o p en  trad e  p o lic y  w o u ld  h a v e  b een  in  th e  nation a l in terest in th e  1 9 2 0 s , b u t th e  so c ia l 
stru ctu res and in stitu tio n a l arran gem en ts that p rotected  im p o r t-co m p etin g  in d u str ie s  in  th e  la s t cen tu ry  
w e r e  e f f e c t iv e ly  stro n g er  than  th e  sta te . E q u a lly  or  m o re  cru cia l w e r e  so c ie ta l r e sp o n se s  to  e v e n ts  su ch  
as th e  w o r ld w id e  s tra n g u la tio n  o f  trad e a fter S m o o t -H a w le y , th e  v u ln era b ility  in d u ced  b y  th e  attack  on  
P earl H a rb o r , and  th e  d a w n in g  o f  th e  n u clear  a g e . In tech n ica l te rm s, “ th e  co n d it io n  o f  th e  en v iro n m en t  
req u ired  to  d r iv e  th e  sy s te m  to  th e  c o llu s iv e  so lu tio n  is m uch  h ig h er  than th e  le v e l req u ired  to  m ain ta in  
it o n c e  it h as a c h ie v e d  th is  p o s i t i o n . . . .” 94 K rasn er n o tes  that th e  p o ta to  fa m in e  o f  th e  1 8 4 0 s  w a s  a 
cr it ica l im p etu s  fo r  th e  rep ea l o f  th e  C o rn  L a w s  and B r ita in ’s  grad u al m o v e  to w a rd  fr e e  tra d e . S im ila r ly ,  
“ th e  U n ited  S ta tes  d id  n o t a ssu m e  th e  m a n tle  o f  w o r ld  lea d ersh ip  u ntil th e  w o r ld  had b e e n  la id  b are  b y  
s ix  y ea rs  o f  to ta l w a r . S o m e  c a ta ly tic  ex tern a l e v e n t se e m s  n e c e ssa r y  to  m o v e  sta tes  to  d ram atic  p o lic y  
in it ia t iv e s  in  lin e  w ith  sta te  in te r e s ts .” 95 C o n sid er  that th e  R ec ip ro ca l T ra d e  A g r e e m e n t A c t o f  1 9 3 4  w a s  
p a sse d  o n ly  after th e  w o rld  w a s  d eep  in  d e p r e ss io n  a n d  th ere  w a s  a fa ir ly  w id e  c o n se n su s  that th e  
r a d ica lly  h ig h er  b arriers o f  th e  S m o o t-H a w le y  T a r if f  p la y ed  a r o le  in  w o r se n in g  th e  n a tio n ’s e c o n o m ic  
p lig h t.
L ik e  th e  tu rn in g  o f  a k a le id o sc o p e  w h ic h  p ro d u ces  m an y  im a g es  w ith  a f in ite  n u m b er  o f  
c r y s ta llin e  fo r m s , e v e n ts  su ch  as th e  G reat D e p r e s s io n  and W o rld  W ar II h e lp ed  to  “ ro ta te” th e  “ fo r m ” 
o f  th e  A m er ica n  C reed , p r o d u c in g  in tern a tio n a lism  as an id e o lo g ic a l cou n terp art to  th e  tra d itio n  o f
94 . W illiam  W illiam son , "A D ynam ic M odel o f  Inter-Firm B eh av ior ,” Q u arte rly  J o u rn a l o f  Econom ics, 79  
(N ovem ber 1965), p. 583 .
95 . Krasner, "State Pow er and the Structure o f  International Trade," p. 341.
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is o la t io n is m  and u n ila tera lism . Ir o n ic a lly , in  sp ite  o f  its d ic h o to m o u s  r e la tio n  to  th at tra d itio n , 
in tern a tio n a lism  w a s  ju s t  as m u ch  a p ro d u ct o f  th e  n ation a l id e o lo g y  and m esh ed  e a s i ly  w ith  th e  ten ets  
o f  th e  creed . In d eed , th is  n e w  o u tw a r d -lo o k in g  p e r sp e c t iv e  a ch iev ed  le g it im a c y  b y  a lly in g  i t s e l f  w ith , 
and in  e f fe c t  s e w in g  i t s e l f  in to  th e  fa b r ic  o f ,  A m er ica n  p o lit ic a l cu ltu re .
In tern a tio n a lism  b ro u g h t A m er ica n  id ea ls  o u t o f  th e  e x c e p tio n a l co n te x t  o f  th e  U n ite d  S ta tes  and  
o n to  th e  w o r ld  s ta g e . In  th is  n e w  aren a , id ea ls  su ch  as lib er ty  w e r e  b ro a d en ed  to  in c lu d e  u n restr ic ted  
c o m m e r c e  n o t o n ly  w ith in  but a lso  b e tw e e n  co u n tr ie s . B e n  W a tten b erg  h as ca lled  th e  U n ite d  S ta tes  th e  
f ir s t  “ u n iv e r sa l n a t io n ,” and in d eed  th is  is  h o w  A m er ica n s h a v e  c o n c e iv e d  o f  th e ir  c r e e d — a se t  o f  v a lu e s  
im b u ed  w ith  u n iv e r sa l truth  and read y  fo r  ex p o rt.
A g a in , th is  sh ift  w a s  p o s s ib le  o n ly  b e c a u se  e lem en ts  o f  th e  creed  le g it im iz e d  th e  n ew  
in tern a tio n a lis t  p e r sp e c t iv e . O n e  o f  th e  m o s t  im p ortan t o f  th e se  e le m e n ts  w a s  A m e r ic a ’s  h is to r y  o f  
r e lig io u s  sec ta r ia n ism . T h e  em p h a sis  o n  A m e r ic a n ism  as a p o lit ica l id e o lo g y  h as led  to  a u top ian  
o r ien ta tio n  a m o n g  A m er ica n  lib era ls  and c o n se r v a t iv e s . B o th  se e k  to  ex ten d  th e  “ g o o d  s o c i e t y .” B u t  
th e  r e lig io u s  tra d itio n s  o f  P ro testa n t “ d is s e n t” h a v e  ca lled  o n  A m er ica n s to  b e  m o r a lis t ic , to  fo l lo w  their  
c o n s c ie n c e  w ith  an u n e q u iv o c a l em p h a s is  n o t to  b e  fo u n d  in  co u n tr ie s  w h o s e  p red o m in a n t d en o m in a tio n s  
h a v e  e v o lv e d  fr o m  sta te  ch u rch es . T h e  d is sen ter s  are “ th e  o r ig in a l so u r c e  b oth  o f  th e  c lo s e  in term in g lin g  
o f  r e lig io n  and  p o lit ic s  th at [has] ch aracter ized  su b seq u e n t A m er ica n  h is to r y  and o f  th e  m ora l p a ss io n  that 
h a s p o w e r e d  th e  e n g in e s  o f  p o lit ic a l ch a n g e  in  A m e r ic a .” 96 A s  R o b ert B e lla h  h as e m p h a s iz e d , “ [t]h e  
m ille n n ia lism  o f  th e  A m er ica n  P ro testan t trad ition  aga in  and aga in  sp a w n ed  m o v e m e n ts  fo r  so c ia l ch a n g e  
and so c ia l r e fo r m .” 97 T h e  A m er ica n  P ro testa n t r e lig io u s  e th o s  has a ssu m ed , in  p r a c tice  i f  n o t in  
th e o lo g y , th e  p e r fe c t ib ility  o f  h u m a n ity  and an o b lig a tio n  to  a v o id  s in , w h ile  th e  ch u rch es  w h o se  
fo l lo w e r s  h a v e  p red o m in a ted  in  E u r o p e , C an ad a , and A u stra lia  h a v e  a ccep ted  th e  in h eren t w e a k n e ss  o f  
p e o p le , th e ir  in a b ility  to  e sc a p e  s in n in g  and error , and th e  n eed  fo r  th e  ch u rch  to  b e  fo r g iv in g  and  
p r o te c t in g .98
A m e r ic a n s  are u to p ia n  m o ra lis ts  w h o  p ress  hard to  in s t itu tio n a liz e  v ir tu e , to  d e str o y  e v il p e o p le  
and e lim in a te  w ic k e d  in stitu tio n s  and p r a c tice s . T h e y  tend  to  v ie w  so c ia l and p o lit ic a l d ram as as m o ra lity  
p la y s , as b a ttles  b e tw e e n  G od  and th e  D e v i l ,  so  that c o m p r o m ise  is  v ir tu a lly  u n th in k a b le . T h is  is ,  o f  
c o u r se , p art o f  w h a t s o m e  p e o p le  s e e  as p ro b lem a tic  a b ou t A m er ica n  fo r e ig n  p o l ic y .99 A s  S am u el 
H u n tin g to n  h as n o te d , A m er ica n s  g iv e  to  th e ir  nation  and its creed  “ m an y  o f  th e  attr ib u tes and fu n c tio n s  
o f  a  c h u r c h . . . .” 100 T h e se  are r e fle c te d , as B e lla h  has s tr e sse d , in th e  A m er ica n  “ c iv ic  r e l ig io n ,” w h ich
96. H untington, A m erican  P o litics :  77ie  P rom ise o f  D isharm o ny, p. 154. For docum entation, see pp. 8, 31-2 , 
84-104 .
97 . Robert B ellah, The Broken C ovenant: A m erican  C iv il R e lig io n  in  T im e o f  T r ia l  (N ew  York: Seabury Press, 
1975), p. 48 . See also Sacvan B ercovitch , Ttie A m erican  Jerem iad  (M adison: U niversity o f  W isconsin  P ress, 1978), 
pp. 2 0 , 94 .
98 . L ipset, The F irs t  N e w  N a tio n , pp. 166-169.
99 . G eorge Kennan, R ealities  o f  A m erican  F o re ig n  P o licy  (N ew  York: N orton, 1966), pp. 3-50; Robert Bellah, 
B eyond B e lie f  {N ew  York: Harper and R ow , 1970), pp. 182-183.
100. H untington, A m erican  P o litics , pp. 158-159.
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h as p r o v id e d  “ a r e lig io u s  d im e n s io n  fo r  th e  w h o le  fab r ic  o f  A m er ica n  l i f e ,  in c lu d in g  th e  p o lit ic a l s p h e r e .” 
T h e  U n ite d  S ta tes  is  s e e n  as th e  n e w  Isra e l. “ E u ro p e  is  E g y p t; A m e r ic a  th e  p r o m ise d  la n d . G o d  h a s  led  
h is  p e o p le  to  e s ta b lish  a n ew  so r t o f  so c ia l o rd er  th a t  s h a ll  b e  a  l ig h t  u n to  a l l  n a tio n s .  ”101 E v e r e tt  C arll 
L ad d  a d d s, “ [t]o  u n d erstan d  th e  A m er ica n  id e o lo g y , w e  n eed  to  s e e  in d iv id u a lism  n o t as a d im e n s io n  o f  
in d iv id u a l character  b u t rather as a m o r a l  standard b y  w h ic h  so c ia l in s titu tio n s  and p ra c tice s  are  
ju d g e d .” 102
T h is  m ora l standard  p r e sse s  p o lic y  m ak ers to  p ro m o te  A m er ica n ism  th ro u g h o u t th e  w o r ld . T h e  
id ea ls  o f  fr e e d o m , lib e r ty , and eq u a lity  are se e n  as g o s p e l ,  truths ap p rop ria te  fo r  all n a tio n s . S im ila r ly , 
th e  A m e r ic a n  sy s te m  o f  c o m m e r c e  a lso  m u st b e  spread  to  s o c ie t ie s  s e e k in g  e c o n o m ic  g r o w th . E x p o r tin g  
th e  id ea  o f  fr e e  m a rk ets , o f  c o u r se , req u ires that th e  U .S .  lead  th e  w a y  in  u n restr ic ted  tra d e , a  d em an d  
w h ic h  w a s  m a d e  o f  A m e r ic a  o n ly  after W o r ld  W ar II. Id e o lo g ic a l c o n s is te n c y  co u ld  n o  lo n g e r  b e  
sa c r ific e d  to  th e  p r o te c t io n is t  c o n s t itu e n c ie s  o f  m em b ers o f  C o n g r e ss  e a g er  to  p le a s e . T h e  A m er ica n  
C reed  h ad  ta k en  cen ter  s ta g e  in  th e  in tern ation a l arena.
T h is  is  n o t to  sa y  that th ere  w a s  an im m ed ia te  sh ift  to  in tern a tio n a lism . It is  im p ortan t to  
rem em b er  th at b o th  fo r e ig n  p o lic y  p e r sp e c t iv e s— iso la tio n ism -u n ila te r a lism  and in tern a tio n a lism — are  
ju s t if ie d  b y  th e  sa m e  creed . T h e se  tw o  p e r sp e c t iv e s  c o e x is te d  up until th e  S e c o n d  W o r ld  W ar. H o w e v e r ,  
th e  te r r ib le  im p act o f  S m o o t-H a w le y  and th en  P earl H arb or erased  an y  n o tio n s  o f  A m er ica n  sep a ra ten ess  
fro m  w o r ld  a ffa ir s . T h e  o n ly  ch ild  w a s g e tt in g  a crash  c o u r se  in  so c ia liz a t io n . C o rr e sp o n d in g  to  th is  
sh ift , th e  ta r if f  d eb a te  b e c a m e  fram ed  in  th e  c o n tex t o f  in tern ation a l co m m itm en ts  rather th an  n ation a l 
c o n c e r n s . T h e  r u le s  o f  th e  trad e g a m e  ch a n g ed  ir re v o ca b ly  w h e n  th e  U .S .  w a s  th ru st in to  th e  
in tern a tion a l arena as th e  le a d in g  e c o n o m ic  and m ilita ry  p o w e r . “W ith  its a scen d a n cy  to  a p o s it io n  o f  
lea d ersh ip  in  in tern a tion a l a ffa ir s , th e  A m er ica n  e x e c u tiv e  e v e n tu a lly  su c c e e d e d  in  r e d e fin in g  th e  q u estio n  
p o lit ic a lly  in  v ie w in g  th e  ta r if f  as an in stru m en t o f  m a n a g em en t o f  th e  in tern ation a l s y s t e m .” 103
T h e  in tern a tio n a lis t v ie w  p red o m in a ted  up u n til th e  1 9 7 0 s  and th e  V ie tn a m  W a r, anoth er  
cu ltu ra lly  w r e n c h in g  ev e n t in  A m er ica n  h is to r y , b u t iso la tio n is t-u n ila tera l te n d e n c ie s  w e r e  n e v e r  v e r y  far  
b en ea th  th e  su r fa ce  b e c a u se  th e  A m er ica n  id e o lo g y  co n tin u es  to  le g it im iz e  th em . T o  a la r g e  ex te n t , th e  
ta sk  is  to  k eep  th e  s o c ie ty — its p u b lic  and its p o lic y  m a k ers— lo o k in g  o u tw a rd , ta p p in g  th e  e le m e n ts  o f  
th e  creed  that g en era te  p o lit ic a l and e c o n o m ic  o p e n n e ss  rather than p r o te c t io n ism . P aul G o ttfr ied  has  
n o ted  th at th is  ta sk  is m ad e  ea s ier  b y  th e  fa c ts  o f  th e  m od ern  era: “ In an a g e  o f  in tern ation a l
e c o n o m ie s ,g lo b a l co m m u n ic a tio n s , and co n ta m in a tin g  a to m ic  p o w e r  and g a la c t ic  w e a p o n  s y s te m s , it is  
n o  lo n g e r  p o s s ib le  n o t  to  ex er t p o lit ic a l in f lu e n c e  o n  o th er  parts o f  th e  w o r ld .” 104 B u t th e  tem p ta tio n  
to  tu rn  in w ard  s t ill  e x is ts  fo r  A m e r ic a n s , ir o n ic a lly  b e c a u se  o f  th e  c o n tin u in g  v ita lity  o f  th e  creed .
101. B ellah , Beyond B e lie f, p. 175 (em phasis SM L); Kenneth D . W ald, R elig io n  an d  P o litics  in  the U n ited  States 
(N ew  York: St. M artin’s Press, 1987), pp. 48 -55 .
102. Everett Carll Ladd, "The Am erican Ideology. A n Explanation o f  the O rigins, M eaning, and R ole  o f  
‘Am erican V a lu es,’" (Storrs, CT: unpublished paper, February 1992), p. 7 (em phasis SM L).
103. Ib id ., p . 28 .
104. Paul G ottfried, "Sovereign State at Bay," Society, 2 9 /6  (Septem ber/O ctober 1992), p. 22.
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O n e  o f  th e  m o s t  in tere stin g  q u estio n s  is w h y  U .S .  lea d ersh ip  o f  th e  p o st-W o r ld  W ar II lib era l 
trad e r e g im e  w e a k en ed  after su ch  a sh o rt t im e . T h e  B r itish  carried  th e  fr e e  trad e m a n tle  fo r  m o re  than  
8 0  y e a r s , w h ile  th e  U .S .  co m m itm en t b eg a n  to  la g  after o n ly  ab ou t 3 0  y ea rs . A m e r ic a  th e  c la s s ic a lly  
l ib e r a l, la is s e z  fa ir e , b o u r g e o is  sta te  h as p r o v e d — c o u n te r in tu it iv e ly — to  b e  a le s s  th an  id ea l h e g e m o n ic  
lea d er  o f  a  lib era l in tern ation a l e c o n o m ic  sy s te m .
A m e r ic a n  lea d ersh ip  w a s  ten u o u s p a r tia lly  b e c a u se  th e  A m er ica n  sy s te m  o f  g o v e r n m e n t re flec ts  
th e  n a tio n a l p o lit ic a l cu ltu re . It is  a tru ism  th at, g iv e n  id en tica l c ir c u m sta n c e s , n a tio n s  w il l  r ea c t in  v ery  
d iffe r e n t w a y s :  “ in tern a tion a l stru ctu re  can  rem ain  th e  b a s ic  d eterm in an t o f  th e  n a tion a l in terest. S ta tes  
d o , h o w e v e r , v a r y  in  th e ir  a b ility  to  act o n  th e s e  in te r e s ts .” 105 S im ila r ly , sta tes  d if fe r  in  th e ir  a b ility  
to  rea c t to  d o m e s tic  fa c to r s . A  m o re  p o w e r fu l cen tra l g o v e r n m e n t is ,  th e o r e t ic a lly , b etter  a b le  to  r e s is t  
th e  tem p ta tio n s  o f  sh o rt-term , d irec t in terv en tio n  th rou gh  trad e p o lic y . A  stro n g  s o c ie ty  and a w e a k  sta te  
m a k e  A m e r ic a  a d u b io u s  trad e lea d er . P e ter  K a tzen ste in  is c er ta in ly  n o t th e  fir s t  to  a rg u e , “ [i]n  A m er ica  
th e  p u b lic  in tere st w a s  serv ed  n o t b e  a co n cen tra tio n  o f  p o w e r  in  stro n g  sta te  in stitu tio n s  b u t b y  a 
d is p e r s io n  o f  p o w e r  a m o n g  m a n y  w ea k  o n e s . . . . ” 106 T h u s , “ so c ie ty -c e n te r e d  n e tw o rk s  in  th e  U n ited  
S ta tes g iv e  fr e e  p la y  to  th e  q u est fo r  e c o n o m ic  a im s ,” i .e .  p r o te c t io n is m .107 In  th is  c a se , th e  a n tista tist  
creed  p la y e d  a r o le  in  in crea s in g  g o v e r n m e n t in ter feren ce  in  trade.
T h e  p o p u lis t  e le m e n t o f  th e  A m er ica n  C reed  a lso  con tr ib u ted  to  th e  c o n tin u in g  v ita lity  o f  in w ard -  
lo o k in g  trad e p o li t ic s .  T h e  p o p u la r ity  o f  p r o te c t io n is t  m ea su res a m o n g  th e  g en era l p u b lic  can  b e  v ie w e d  
as a c o r o lla r y  to  th e  p o w e r fu l d em o cra tic  o r ien ta tio n  o f  th e  s o c ie ty . T h e  p o lit ic a l sy s te m  h as b een  
h is to r ic a lly  r e sp o n s iv e  to  th e  v o ic e  o f  th e  p e o p le , w h ich  in  th is  c a se  h as su p p o rted  th e  p r o te c t io n  o f  U .S .  
w o rk ers  and in d u str ie s . P u b lic  o p in io n  data  bears o u t th e  lo n g -term  ro m a n ce  o f  th e  A m er ica n  p u b lic  and  
re s tr ic t iv e  trad e b a rr iers. E c o n o m is t  Jam es T o b in  p o se d  th e  q u estio n  o n ly  im p lic it ly  articu la ted  b y  
A m e r ic a n s , “ w h y  th e  p r e feren ces  o f  in d iv id u a ls  ‘sh o u ld  b e  w o r th y  o f  re sp ec t o n ly  w h e n  th e y  qre  
ex p r e sse d  in  th e  m ark et, w h y  th e  p re feren ces  o f  th e  v e r y  sa m e  in d iv id u a ls  e x p r e sse d  p o lit ic a lly  sh o u ld  
b e  regard ed  as d is to r t io n s .’” 108
T h e  k a le id o sc o p ic  A m er ica n  C reed  co n tin u es  to  sh ift  and th u s le g it im a te , o n  th e  o n e  h an d , a 
z e a lo u s  and o fte n  id e a lis t ic  in tern a tio n a lism , and o n  th e  o th er  an in w a r d -lo o k in g  co n c e r n . T h e  q u estio n  
is ,  w h a t im a g e  w ill  th e  C lin to n  ad m in istra tion  d e r iv e  from  th is so c ie ta l k a le id o sc o p e , and w h a t w ill  th e  
fu tu re  h o ld  fo r  fr e e  and o p en  trade? A ll th e  a v a ila b le  in d ica to rs su g g e s t  that it w il l  c o n tin u e  to  b e  u sed  
to  e n d o r se  p red em o cra tic  a c tiv is t  p o lic ie s  and fr e e  trade.
105. G oldstein , "Ideas, Institutions, and A m erican Trade P olicy,"  p. 185.
106. Peter J. Katzenstein, "International relations and dom estic structures: foreign econom ic p o lic ies o f  advanced  
industrial states," In te rn a tio n a l O rg an iza tio n , 30  (W inter 1976), p. 15. See also Samuel H untington, "Paradigms 
o f  A m erican politics: beyond the one, the tw o and the many," P o lit ic a l Science Q u arte rly , 89 (M arch 1974), pp. 
1-26.
107. Ib id ., p. 21 .
108. Quoted in  Goran O hlin, "Trade in a N on-L aissez-Faire W orld," in Paul A . Sam uelson, ed ., In te rn a tio n a l  
E conom ic  R elations  (N ew  York: St. M artin’s Press, 1969), p. 174.
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C o n c lu s io n
T h e  w o r ld  d o e s  n o t p o s s e s s  th e  ch a ra cter istic s  that w o u ld  m a k e  o p e n  w o r ld  trad e th e  l ik e ly  resu lt  
o f  m u ltila tera l n e g o tia tio n s . A m e r ic a , s t ill th e  w e a lth ie s t  and m o s t  p r o d u c tiv e  n a tion  in  th e  w o r ld , is  n o
lo n g e r  th e  e c o n o m ic  g ia n t , to w e r in g  o v e r  its n ea rest co m p e tito r s . N o r  d o e s  it s e e m  l ik e ly , b arrin g
ca ta stro p h e  o r  w a r , th at th e  e c o n o m ic  b a la n ce  o f  p o w e r  w il l  sh if t  so  d ra m a tica lly  a s to  crea te  an oth er  su ch  
h e g e m o n  in  th e  near fu tu re . B e c a u se  o f  th e  m a n y  p o w e r fu l e c o n o m ic  and w e lfa r e  p o lic y  to o ls  o f  th e  
m o d ern  lib era l s ta te , th e  n ation a l r is e  o r  d e c lin e  o f  a n y  o f  th e s e  c o u n tr ie s  is  l ik e ly  to  b e  gra d u a l. T h e  
b a la n c e  o f  e c o n o m ic  p o w e r  w il l  th u s n o t sh ift  d ra m a tica lly  in  th e  m ed iu m  term . T h e  U .S . ,  Japan , and  
G erm a n y  (th e  E u ro p ea n  C o m m u n ity ) n o w  rep resen t a p o w e r fu l tr iu m v ira te , w ith o u t a c lea r  lea d er . T h e  
em e r g in g  N IC s  a n d /o r  C h in a  m ig h t jo in  th e  ranks o f  th is  g ro u p  in  th e  c o m in g  y e a r s , b u t n o  s in g le  
co u n try  p o s s e s s e s  th e  e c o n o m ic  a n d  p o lit ic a l p o w e r  to  act as a lea d er  and p o lic e m a n  o f  a lib era l trad in g  
r e g im e . In  d e sc r ib in g  th e  p r o sp e c ts  fo r  th e  in tern ation a l s y s te m , A rth ur C yr n o tes:
G erm a n y  and Japan rep resen t r is in g  p o w e r s  o n  th e  in tern a tion a l s ta g e , w ith  c o n se q u e n t
p o lit ic a l im p a ct and in f lu e n c e , y e t  b o th  o p era te  a lm o st p u re ly  in  th e  rea lm  o f  e c o n o m ic s .
E v e n  w h ile  c o m p e tin g  e f fe c t iv e ly  w ith  th e  U n ited  S ta te s , th ey  are c lo s e ly  lin k ed  w ith  and  
la r g e ly  d e fer  to  u s in  m ilita ry  s e c u r ity  term s. T h e  U n ite d  S ta tes  c o n tro ls  a d e c lin in g  
sh a re  o f  th e  g r o s s  p ro d u ct o f  th e  w o r ld , y e t  rem ain s an e n o r m o u s ly  im p ortan t and d iv e r s e  
e c o n o m y  an d , as th e  P ers ia n  G u lf  W ar h as d em o n stra ted , re ta in s a fo r m id a b le  ca p a c ity  
to  d e liv e r  m ilita ry  d estru c tio n  o v e r  lo n g  d is ta n c e s .109
B r ita in  w a s  u n iq u e  in  th e  n in eteen th  cen tu ry  as th e  sh in in g  e x a m p le  o f  in d u str ia l and im p eria l 
s u c c e s s ,  and A m e r ic a  w a s  e x c e p tio n a l a fter W o r ld  W ar II as su p p lier  to  th e  w o r ld  o f  b o th  m ateria l g o o d s  
and an  in sp ir in g  id e o lo g y  o f  fr e e d o m  and e q u a lity . R e a lis t ic a l ly , n o  c o u n try , e x c e p t  p erh ap s th e  U .S . ,  
w ill  b e  a b le  to  a ssu m e  su ch  a p la c e  in  th e  in tern ation a l arena in  th e  n ex t fe w  d e c a d e s , and su ch  an  
o u tc o m e  is  e x tr e m e ly  d o u b tfu l.
H is to r ic a l w is d o m  is  th at a m u ltip o la r  b a la n ce  o f  p o w e r  m a k es  th e  id ea l o f  w o r ld  fr e e  trad e  ju s t  
that: an id ea l. In  th e  p a st th is  s itu a tio n  w o u ld  b e  a ca u se  to  fea r  that p ro te c t io n ism  w a s  aroun d  th e  
co rn er . Y e t , as w e  h a v e  s e e n , w o r ld  trad e v o lu m e  co n tin u es  to  g r o w , and g o v e r n m e n ts  h a v e  n ot  
ab an d on ed  fr e e  trad e  to  p ro tec t d o m e s tic  m ark ets. T h e  A m er ica n  C reed  c o n tin u e s  to  le g it im iz e  th e  
id e o lo g ic a l c o n se n su s  in  th is  co u n try . H o w e v e r , th is  is n o t a r ea so n  to  c o n tin u e  d o w n  th e  path o f  
in e f fe c t iv e  m u ltila tera l n eg o tia tio n  and re jec t b ila tera l fr e e  trad e in itia tiv e s .
B ila te r a lism  rep resen ts  th e  b e st  h o p e  fo r  ev en tu a l fr e e  and o p en  trad e th ro u g h o u t th e  w o r ld . F irst  
and m o s t  im p ortan t, su c c e s s fu l b ila tera l a g reem en ts  s o l id ify  th e  fr e e  trad e  id e o lo g ic a l c o n se n s u s . A s  
G o ld ste in  n o te s , “ n o th in g  e s ta b lish e s  th e  le g it im a c y  o f  a p o lic y  l ik e  s u c c e s s .  P o lic ie s  b e c o m e  
in s titu tio n a liz e d  b e c a u se  th e y  w o r k .” 110 S e c o n d , b ila tera l tra d in g  b lo c s  p resen t th e  fir st  o p p o rtu n ity  in  
m o d ern  h is to r y  to  d e v e lo p  and su sta in  a lib era l in tern ation a l e c o n o m ic  r e g im e  w ith o u t th e  p r e se n c e  o f  
a h e g e m o n . R o b ert K eo h a n e  a rg u es that g ro u p s o f  n a tio n s m ig h t b e  a b le  to  act as a c o l le c t iv e  h e g e m o n , 
y e t  th ere  are se r io u s  c o lle c t iv e  a c tio n  p r o b le m s in h eren t in  su ch  an arran gem en t. O n  th e  o th er  h an d , 
b ila te r a lly  p ro d u ced  fr e e  trad e b lo c s  su ch  as N A F T A  co u ld  p o te n t ia lly  act as a s in g le  u n it w ith  a g e n e r a lly
109. Arthur C yr, "Neo versus N ew  Isolationism ," Society, 2 9 /6  (Septem ber/O ctober 1992), p. 21 .
110. G oldstein , "The Impact o f  Ideas on Trade P olicy ,"  p . 71 .
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u n if ie d  se t  o f  in terests  in  n e g o tia tin g  w ith  o th er  n a tio n s  o r  o th er  fr e e  trad e  b lo c s . T h e  c o l le c t iv e  a c tio n  
p r o b le m s in h eren t in  th is  ty p e  o f  arran gem en t are  c o n s id e r a b ly  le s s  p ro b le m a tic  th an  in  a m u ltila tera l 
n e g o tia tin g  sy s te m . O f  c o u r se , th is  sc e n a r io  a ssu m es  c o n tin u ed  in tere st in  m u ltila tera l fr e e  tra d e  b y  th e  
b lo c s ,  b u t so  d o e s  a n y  sc e n a r io  o f  in d iv id u a l n a tio n s a c tin g  to  l ib e r a liz e  trad e . T h u s , w e  ca n  c o n c e iv e  
o f  th e  p r o sp e c t  fo r  a s ta b le  lib era l sy s te m  w ith o u t a h e g e m o n , so m e th in g  n o t e x p e r ie n c e d  in  e ith er  th e  
n in eteen th  o r  th e  tw e n tie th  c en tu r ie s .
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